>Re: Intelligence Analysis
>Author:   John M. Hansen <jmhansen@erols.com>
>Date:     1999/02/04
>Forum:    alt.politics.org.cia
>----------------------------

>    It would be nice if you shared your techniques for operational analysis
>of intelligence material on the web site or in this news group. It would 
>seem like a worthwhile means of organizing all of the random bits of 
>intelligence material that are gathered so they form a coherent whole -
>which is what you stated you did with the Thai material.

>    Do you have a general method?

>    In my humble opinion the only way that terrorist groups can be
>successfully monitored is through infiltration by long term resident human
>intelligence resources.  This is not always as difficult as it sounds,
>although it often brings forth interesting results. After all, this is how
>Hitler got into the NSWP (Later the NSDAP)  It is also how Stalin joined
>the CP Russia. It worked for their secret services, why not for ours?
>Regards,
>John M Hansen
>jmhansen@erols.com
----------------------
2/4/99

John M. Hansen:

   Thanks for your comments and interest. Today I posted an essay -- 
Ops Analysis -- A Chinese James Bond. In addition, I recommend strongly 
the referenced essay: Introduction: Intelligence and Operational Analysis. 
It is posted on my web site. To access use the -- "Click on the Arrow to 
View Menu," option.

   In my own experiences and analysis I found that one must adopt one's
approach to the problems and assets at hand. A method that works in 
one area, will not work in another. (Thailand required a unique combined 
operational/analytical approach). 

   Analysts must be able to scan large amounts of information and eliminate 
the non-relevant and peripheral, while identifying and focusing on the 
important. Above all, analysts must have flexible mentalities -- and be 
able to examine facts and data without fixed preconceptions -- as much as 
possible. I note that my study of Asian Revolutions relied heavily on the 
writings of the various Communist leaders -- Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, 
Vo Nguyen Giap, etc. (For those interested in this study, I suggest a 
Freedom of Information request to the CIA.) (Also, of extreme importance, 
analysts must be free of political pressures; and, promotion methods 
rewarding politicized results.) 

   Each situation demands flexibility in searching for and adopting 
analytical and operational procedures. From a distance it appears that 
terrorism and terrorists have definite vulnerabilities and invulnerability's. 
Each group or groups-of-groups present different analytical challenges.

   As one example of analysis I offer my data base, CIABASE. Trying to
put an analytical collar on all of the Agency's activities is a challenge 
of unending proportions. I do this since I know in my own mind that
the CIA will lead the United States into one disaster after another
as it uses operators and operations not analysts and analysis to deal 
with situations -- the Vietnam War being one of its greatest negative 
accomplishments. 

   The advocates of the Agency will note the large number of analysts 
in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). But the CIA "is" the Directorate 
of Operations (DO) --  where it leads, the rest of the Agency follows. 
So you can have any number of analysts and sophisticated computerized 
analytical systems but they all come to naught when they are bent to 
the operational, intellectual, and ideological will of the DO.  

   This is one reason why I advocate the assignment of analysts or 
analytical case officers to field operations -- this is the beginning 
and much of the end of the Agency's problems -- including the lack of 
accuracy in its predictions and intelligence. If you get all sorts of 
nonsense reported from the field, it destroys most opportunities for 
later adjustments or analysis, especially when this nonsense comes from 
the all-powerful, know-nothings of the DO.

Ralph McGehee
http://come.to/CIABASE