MEDS Glass Cockpit Led to Death of Columbia Crew (One Gaping Hole in the CAIB Report)
Stuf4
modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg
...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
Gehman's group worked diligently over seven months to deliver a
statement that NASA lacked adequate funding for safe shuttle
operations. This is a seriously flawed conclusion. NASA was given 10
figures worth of money to improve the shuttle - well over a billion
dollars. The problem that proved fatal was that NASA prioritized
glitz over safety.
Here is a .pdf of a 1997 GAO report on shuttle upgrades:
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98021t.pdf
Page 6 highlights the four most costly upgrades, including over $200
million to fund a snazzy glass cockpit. What was NASA doing pumping
so much money into an upgrade that had questionable value with regards
to safety? What was Congress doing in approving NASA's wish list?
How is it that priorities got so backwards that safety took a back
seat to "flash"?
Consider this feeble justification for the MEDS upgrade:
_____
...Gregory, who piloted space shuttle mission STS-67 in 1995 and also
helped evaluate MEDS from a pilot's perspective.
Most astronauts entering the space shuttle for the first time, find
the experience to be a step backwards. "The flight instruments are
very reminiscent of the 60s and 70s technology," Gregory says. "When
MEDS was first being developed...the shuttle pilots were older
pilots...used to the steam gauges.
"Today, new shuttle commanders and pilots are used to the glass
cockpits of the F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s, which they have flown either
as operational or test pilots. This [upgrade] is bringing them back to
what is familiar to them."
_____
(From http://www.defensedaily.com/reports/avionics/previous/nov99/11spaceshutle.htm)
So with MEDS making the top four with regards to cost, consider the
upgrades that didn't make the cut. Years before STS-107, NASA had
designed a more robust replacement for WLE RCC to counter:
"...the risk of a catastrophic puncture of an Orbiter wing leading
edge..."
A simple Googling of [WLE MMOD] will take you straight to the webpage
that NASA keeps available (MMOD stands for Micro-Meteoroid Orbital
Debris). The quote above is taken from this page:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/upgrades/wle.html
This site (last updated on "04/07/02") offers lots more info on this
upgrade that got cancelled:
_____
Solution: Design being implemented provides additional insulation
(Nextel 440 fabric) behind the Inconel foil for WLE panels 5-13.
Initial Operation Date: Phase II Upgrade
OV-102 STS-103 (12/2/99)
OV-103 STS- 97(4/8/99)
OV-104 STS-92 (1/14/99)
OV-105 STS-96 (12/9/98)
_____
So why did Hal Gehman and his group not bother to highlight this fact?
A thorough investigation would have criticized this misappropriation
of MEDS at the expense of safety. A tragic irony is that Willy McCool
had a leading role in the MEDS upgrade. Here is a photo of him
working at SAIL, the Shuttle Avionics Integration Lab (designated as
OV-095):
http://www.unitedspacealliance.com/press/meds/meds12b.jpg
Here's a page listing shuttle program goals:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/upgrades/goals.html
Nowhere do I see a goal of "keeping up with the Jones's" triple-7
style, as Bill Gregory seems to justify the cost. But it is brutally
evident that what was sacrificed at the expense of the decision to
implement MEDS was:
"Goal 1: Fly Safely".
NASA had gotten plenty of money to fly the shuttle safely. That money
was not spent wisely.
~ CT
Jan C. Vorbrüggen
than the one you cite, which indeed is feeble. Two points I remember: it
became increasingly difficult and costly to maintain the original display
equipment; and the new devices allow more information to be presented
in more easily perceptible form, required for the additional tasks in
building ISS.
> Solution: Design being implemented provides additional insulation
> (Nextel 440 fabric) behind the Inconel foil for WLE panels 5-13.
I doubt that this modification would have made much of a difference in
the STS-107 scenario - it is directed at the much smaller damage caused
by orbital debris.
Jan
Brian Gaff
not available to us!
The leading edge scheme, for instance, was named after what it was supposed
to prevent, namely micro meteorite damage, which I gather has not been a
significant problem, so little wonder it was not given a high priority.
Now if it had been called foam impact strangthening of leading edge, then
two things should have happened,
1 why the hell do we need to do this, fix the bloody foam!
and
if we fix the foam, do we really need this?
The glass cockpit sounds valid to me, as it must save a lot of retraining of
how to use equipment, and presumably be easier to actually fly it.
So, I say, lets spend the money of hindsight research! :-)
Brian
--
Brian Gaff....
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email: bri...@blueyonder.co.uk
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Julian Bordas
> A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
>
> http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg
>
> ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
>
the foam strike. You idiot
Julian
Herb Schaltegger
Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
Not only that but do you really think Nextel 440 fabric behind the
leading edge would have provided sufficient thermal protection for a TEN
INCH hole in the RCC panel 8? Furthermore, have you even seen the foam
test strike videos? It's is VERY possible that the foam would (and did)
knock large pieces of fractured RCC straight back into the cavity; it is
very unlikely that any sort of high-tech fabric insulation would survive
such a shattering impact to the RCC; it would tear or rupture as the RCC
fragment(s) were smashed back through it.
The upgrade you refer to was supposed to help in a micrometeoroid impact
scenario. I suggest you consider the sizes, masses, velocities and
impact angles such an uprgrade is supposed to help with, and consider as
well the estimated sizes of any supposed RCC penetrations caused by such
an impact.
On second thought, why don't you spend less time digging through obscure
reports for bits of data which are meaningless without full context and
MORE time understanding fundamental principles of engineering?
--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
"Heisenberg might have been here."
~ Anonymous
stmx3
> A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
>
> http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg
>
> ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
>
Sounds to me like you're trying to create a cause celebre. With the
benefit of hindsight, it's easy to say we should have upgraded RCC or
updated CRATER or performed more foam strike testing. Instead, NASA
updated the cockpit as part of shuttle upgrades to keep the shuttle
flying for another 20 or 30 years.
Saying things like "...this glass cockpit led to the death of the seven
Columbia astronauts" is a sensational claim devoid of merit.
Roger Balettie
> ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
This is asinine... even for you.
Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/
Mark
> NASA had gotten plenty of money to fly the shuttle safely. That money
> was not spent wisely.
Right. And had we lost a shuttle due to instrumentation failure of
some kind, say a crash-landing or erroneous abort due to incorrect
readouts, you'd be complaining that they'd spent money on leading edge
upgrades (which probably wouldn't have saved Columbia anyway) rather
than replacing the antique instruments.
This is the problem with the shuttle: it's not that there are glaring
faults that are being deliberately ignored, it's that there are so
many potentially fatal flaws that if you fix one it just means that
another one will kill you instead.
Mark
John Doe
> Consider this feeble justification for the MEDS upgrade:
You forgot the fact that the new cockpit weighs a lot less, consumes less
power (considere that fuel cells share oxygen with humans, loweing power
consumption helps when the time comes to add a few days to a mission), and are
far less complex to maintain.
And while MEDS currently only replicates old steam gauges, they were
developped to allow future plans to make more dramatic changes to the cockpit
flight computers, allowing further automation. So I am not sure of that $200
million you quoted was simply for MEDS or if it included a substantial portion
for the baseline design of a new cockpit to come in the future.
OM
wrote:
>Sounds to me like you're trying to create a cause celebre.
...Kids, don't fall for this troll. ~CT or Stuff4 is a rather infamous
troll around these groups. If you google on his account, you'll find
all he does is post banal and impossible conspiracy theories designed
to piss people off with their sheer audacity and ignorance. Note that
you'll need to search before 2/1/03, as he thankfully vanished after
Columbia(*) and only recently resurfaced a couple of weeks ago.
Don't let his bullshit start screwing up the group again. PLEASE just
killfile the troll and be done with him.
(*) The hope at the time was that he was in the debris path and got
painfully killed by an impact or ten.
OM
--
"No bastard ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m
his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms
poor dumb bastard die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society
- General George S. Patton, Jr
OM
<julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
>What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
>the foam strike. You idiot
...Again, the work of the Conspiracy Troll. KILLFILE HIM, DAMMIT!
OM
<herbsch...@spamtrap.invalid> wrote:
>On second thought, why don't you spend less time digging through obscure
>reports for bits of data which are meaningless without full context and
>MORE time understanding fundamental principles of engineering?
...Why should he bother? We just need to killfile him and BE DONE WITH
HIM!!
LooseChanj
> On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 21:34:17 +1000, Julian Bordas
><julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
>
>>What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
>>the foam strike. You idiot
>
> ...Again, the work of the Conspiracy Troll. KILLFILE HIM, DAMMIT!
And people wonder why these groups are going to shit. I think it's pretty
fucking sad when people in a sci group can't muster a little maturity and
ignore dipshits like this.
BTW, anyone seen Craig Fink since CT returned?
--
This is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | This space is for rent
It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | Inquire within if you
No person, none, care | and it will reach me | Would like your ad here
OM
wrote:
>On or about Wed, 17 Sep 2003 11:54:54 -0600, OM <om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_research_facility.org> made the sensational claim that:
>> On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 21:34:17 +1000, Julian Bordas
>><julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
>>>the foam strike. You idiot
>>
>> ...Again, the work of the Conspiracy Troll. KILLFILE HIM, DAMMIT!
>
>And people wonder why these groups are going to shit. I think it's pretty
>fucking sad when people in a sci group can't muster a little maturity and
>ignore dipshits like this.
...Agreed. While I can accept the newbies to not recognize the
Conspiracy Troll, Julian's been around here for about as long as the
rest of us elders. He should *know* better than to fall for CT's
bullshit.
>BTW, anyone seen Craig Fink since CT returned?
...Nope. But then again, I've not seen any postings by that particular
dogsucking dipshit for months. Most of those who responded to him were
also in Killfile Hell along with him. Luckily, most of those
responding were idiots anyway and not normal contributors.
Bottom Line: Kids, don't respond to any single post CT makes, no
matter what the topic is. He's an idiot, a moron, a dipshit and a
troll who's just trying his best to piss everyone off by posting
bullshit conspiracy theories. Google his tdadamend bogus address and
you'll see a history of nothing but utter garbage.
LooseChanj
> Bottom Line: Kids, don't respond to any single post CT makes, no
> matter what the topic is. He's an idiot, a moron, a dipshit and a
> troll who's just trying his best to piss everyone off by posting
> bullshit conspiracy theories. Google his tdadamend bogus address and
> you'll see a history of nothing but utter garbage.
CT is one smart cookie. Smart enough to construct sentences which *DEMAND*
some sort of response. Which is all he wants, as it floods the group with
noise and runs off people who really do want to hold discussions related to
space.
Jochem Huhmann
While "MEDS Glass Cockpit Led to Death of Columbia Crew" is a bold
statement, it points at a truth: NASA was fixing things not broken,
anticipating tens of years of Shuttle operations as if it weren't an
experimental vehicle, was treating foam coming loose from the ET as if
it couldn't do any serious damage at all, had a way of judging damage
done by foam that did not work and did not see a reason to request
orbital images from a foam impact. So that statement is absurd but
NASA's way of doing things and not doing others is absurd, too.
BTW: I *have* seen idiots in this group lately, many of them, yes. But
Stuf4 still belongs to that dozen of regulars in here I actually read
and calling him names is nothing than shooting the messanger. While
spending the money not on the MEDS surely wouldn't have stopped the foam
strike, spending it on procedures to check for damage done by foam
strikes (which *had* happened in the past, just in less sensitive
places) would have given NASA and the crew facts *before* what happened
on reentry. MEDS was necessary to be able to operate the Shuttle longer
and with less hassle, but other things would've been necessary to be
able to make it or at least the crew *survive*. These things did *not*
happen. MEDS *did*. There was something going wrong with priorities,
obviously.
Jochem
--
"A designer knows he has arrived at perfection not when there is no
longer anything to add, but when there is no longer anything to take
away." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery
Stuf4
> I'd tend to think that there is more justification to be found for MEDS
> than the one you cite, which indeed is feeble. Two points I remember: it
> became increasingly difficult and costly to maintain the original display
> equipment; and the new devices allow more information to be presented
> in more easily perceptible form, required for the additional tasks in
> building ISS.
MEDS was pitched as an upgrade that enhanced safety. But I'm not
aware of evidence that the old cockpit was a significant threat to
safety. I certainly don't see justification as the fourth most costly
upgrade.
The bottom line is clear to me that MEDS was funded because it was
glamorous.
> > Solution: Design being implemented provides additional insulation
> > (Nextel 440 fabric) behind the Inconel foil for WLE panels 5-13.
>
> I doubt that this modification would have made much of a difference in
> the STS-107 scenario - it is directed at the much smaller damage caused
> by orbital debris.
I would like to think that those involved in designing the upgraded
wing leading edges were aware of the foam impact problem. The CAIB
report has a clear graph showing the history of impacts throughout the
program. The data did not emphasize orbital debris impacts. The
graph, as I remember it, focused on the problem of foam impacts.
~ CT
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
"Stuf4" <tdadamemd-...@excite.com> wrote in message
news:d3af8584.03091...@posting.google.com...
> A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
>
>
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg
>
> ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
You know Stuf4, I've put up with a lot of your BS, but this is way to much
you hypocritical POS.
Had they stiffed the RCC and not done MEDS and an accident was caused by
failures in the cockpit, you'd be howling about how NASA had spent money on
something that had never broken before instead of replacing an aging set of
cockpit equipment that was prone to failure and that it was becoming
increasingly difficult to find replacement parts for.
You're a hypocritical ass that should sit back and take stock in what you've
said. You're twisting the unfortunate deaths of 7 astronauts to your own
personal ends.
Oh, and don't bother trying to contact me to discuss this.
>
> ~ CT
Stuf4
> I'm sorry, but you are talking with the benefit of hindsight, a technology
> not available to us!
This is not hindsight, Brian. I was clear in pointing out the dates
listed on that website. WLE MMOD was a specific design to solve a
specific *known* problem.
(Note similarity to how o-ring burn through was a known problem
*prior* to -51L and in that case as well, a new design had already
been worked.)
> The leading edge scheme, for instance, was named after what it was supposed
> to prevent, namely micro meteorite damage, which I gather has not been a
> significant problem, so little wonder it was not given a high priority.
I submit to you that the threat was known. If you go back and look at
Figure 6.1-6 on p127 of CAIBv1, it is clear to me that the emphasis
from the history of the program has been on foam shedding.
> Now if it had been called foam impact strangthening of leading edge, then
> two things should have happened,
> 1 why the hell do we need to do this, fix the bloody foam!
>
> and
>
> if we fix the foam, do we really need this?
A smart decision would be to fix both.
> The glass cockpit sounds valid to me, as it must save a lot of retraining of
> how to use equipment, and presumably be easier to actually fly it.
The transition to MEDS has produced a training *nightmare*. Crews
have to learn both systems with positive training on one system
translating to negative training on the other. This aspect actually
creates a safety *hazard*.
I will grant that MEDS brings a huge improvement for the longer term,
but the key question is whether this mod will bring about an
improvement in shuttle safety that is worth the megabucks investment.
The answer I see is a clear resounding "NO".
> So, I say, lets spend the money of hindsight research! :-)
~ CT
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> > A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> >
> > http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg
> >
> > ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
> >
> [snip]
>
> Sounds to me like you're trying to create a cause celebre.
What I am doing here is highlighting just how far down NASA's priority
list where Safety can be found.
> With the
> benefit of hindsight, it's easy to say we should have upgraded RCC or
> updated CRATER or performed more foam strike testing. Instead, NASA
> updated the cockpit as part of shuttle upgrades to keep the shuttle
> flying for another 20 or 30 years.
As with my response to Brian above, the decision required no
hindsight. The simple analysis looking forward is:
Does MEDS enhance safety?
Does it enhance safety in a cost effective manner?
Can that money be more smartly invested in other upgrades?
The reason that it's easy to say that RCC needed to be upgraded is
because the threat was so evident. And once again, the old cockpit
hardly posed a threat to safety. It flew just fine for over 100
missions.
This isn't to say that I don't want the cockpit modernized. I would
be tickled if Congress would have funded *all* the upgrades. The
point is that the money was not spent with safety as the primary
consideration.
> Saying things like "...this glass cockpit led to the death of the seven
> Columbia astronauts" is a sensational claim devoid of merit.
Let's say that I am buying a car and I choose to not opt for antilock
brakes, while I instead shell out cash for a snazzy leather upholstry.
I might justify the purchase because leather seats make my car
marginally safer somehow. Then say that a few years later I am
cruising through an intersection and am shocked to see a semi run a
red light. I lock up the brakes and I get crushed to death under all
18 wheels...
I don't see how it would be sensational for someone to criticize my
decision for having gotten leather upholstry at the opportunity cost
of anti-lock brakes.
For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
proven fatal.
~ CT
Stuf4
~ CT
Stephen Stocker
> On or about Wed, 17 Sep 2003 11:54:54 -0600, OM <om@our_blessed_lady_mary_of_the_holy_NASA_research_facility.org> made the sensational claim that:
>> On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 21:34:17 +1000, Julian Bordas
>><julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
>>>the foam strike. You idiot
>>
>> ...Again, the work of the Conspiracy Troll. KILLFILE HIM, DAMMIT!
Uh-oh, another threat to Mosley's imaginary usenet dictatorship. LOL!
> And people wonder why these groups are going to shit. I think it's pretty
> fucking sad when people in a sci group can't muster a little maturity and
> ignore dipshits like this.
Which one? I was enjoying learning something new, and seeing the
various views on it.
Steve
Stuf4
> > NASA had gotten plenty of money to fly the shuttle safely. That money
> > was not spent wisely.
>
> Right. And had we lost a shuttle due to instrumentation failure of
> some kind, say a crash-landing or erroneous abort due to incorrect
> readouts, you'd be complaining that they'd spent money on leading edge
> upgrades (which probably wouldn't have saved Columbia anyway) rather
> than replacing the antique instruments.
I agree that MEDS has the potential to save lives.
What I see as faulty in your point is that the probability of life
threatening instrumentation failure is far lower than the probability
of lethality cured by upgrades that got cut.
It is a cost/benefit analysis that is the crux of the issue here. And
MEDS just doesn't provide that much benefit.
(But it sure does look cool.)
> This is the problem with the shuttle: it's not that there are glaring
> faults that are being deliberately ignored, it's that there are so
> many potentially fatal flaws that if you fix one it just means that
> another one will kill you instead.
I'd like to see the case to justify MEDS as curing a potentially fatal
flaw. You have to get many failures deep before limitations of the
old cockpit become fatal.
WLE? Impacts were a problem on *every* mission. And impacts to the
thermal protection system are potentially fatal.
Doing the math:
Zero missions with potential fatalities due to cockpit design,
-versus-
Every mission with potential fatalities due to debris impacts.
OK, lets spend all that money on the bright new cockpit.
(Hal sidestepped a big one here.)
~ CT
Stephen Stocker
>> Bottom Line: Kids, don't respond to any single post CT makes, no
>> matter what the topic is. He's an idiot, a moron, a dipshit and a
>> troll who's just trying his best to piss everyone off by posting
>> bullshit conspiracy theories. Google his tdadamend bogus address and
>> you'll see a history of nothing but utter garbage.
>
> CT is one smart cookie. Smart enough to construct sentences which *DEMAND*
> some sort of response. Which is all he wants, as it floods the group with
> noise and runs off people who really do want to hold discussions related to
> space.
I'm not sure I follow this. He (CT) posted an opinion regarding the
way NASA spent money for safety upgrades. That did concern space, and
shuttles in particular.
He received quite a few decent replies which were informative, until
this pointless crap sprang up. I'm aware that Mosley's "Kids"
directives are intended to imply that he's been around longer than
anyone, knows more than anyone and is in some sort of unique position
to judge people. Such is not the case. He's simply another one who was
attracted to usenet because no other forum would tolerate his brand of
"wisdom". And that's sad, because it gives newcomers the impression
that the entire group approves of such behavior.
I've long known better, having been around usenet since '95, and
learned that we're all free to disregard what we don't like or find
offensive, but there are many who wander into it wondering if they've
stumbled across a bad sitcom plot.
Steve
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> > Consider this feeble justification for the MEDS upgrade:
>
> You forgot the fact that the new cockpit weighs a lot less, consumes less
> power (considere that fuel cells share oxygen with humans, loweing power
> consumption helps when the time comes to add a few days to a mission), and are
> far less complex to maintain.
Try writing that on seven tombstones.
> And while MEDS currently only replicates old steam gauges, they were
> developped to allow future plans to make more dramatic changes to the cockpit
> flight computers, allowing further automation. So I am not sure of that $200
> million you quoted was simply for MEDS or if it included a substantial portion
> for the baseline design of a new cockpit to come in the future.
My guess is that the quoted figure was just for hardware/software in
the first iteration. Whatever the case, the criticism regarding MEDS
having minimal improvement for safety includes consideration for
future use under the SAFM program, etc.
~ CT
Stephen Stocker
> Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> writes:
>
>> Stuf4 wrote:
>>> A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
>>> modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
>>> http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg
>>> ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
>>> death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
>>>
>> What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
>> the foam strike. You idiot
>
> While "MEDS Glass Cockpit Led to Death of Columbia Crew" is a bold
> statement, it points at a truth: NASA was fixing things not broken,
> anticipating tens of years of Shuttle operations as if it weren't an
> experimental vehicle, was treating foam coming loose from the ET as if
> it couldn't do any serious damage at all, had a way of judging damage
> done by foam that did not work and did not see a reason to request
> orbital images from a foam impact. So that statement is absurd but
> NASA's way of doing things and not doing others is absurd, too.
From what relatively little I've read in the way of 20/20 hindsight, I
agree. But I still admire NASA. Somewhere, they seem to have gotten
off the track. I also think that some of it *has* been a lack of
funding.
> BTW: I *have* seen idiots in this group lately, many of them, yes. But
> Stuf4 still belongs to that dozen of regulars in here I actually read
> and calling him names is nothing than shooting the messanger. While
Thank you. Agreed.
> spending the money not on the MEDS surely wouldn't have stopped the foam
> strike, spending it on procedures to check for damage done by foam
> strikes (which *had* happened in the past, just in less sensitive
> places) would have given NASA and the crew facts *before* what happened
> on reentry. MEDS was necessary to be able to operate the Shuttle longer
> and with less hassle, but other things would've been necessary to be
> able to make it or at least the crew *survive*. These things did *not*
> happen. MEDS *did*. There was something going wrong with priorities,
> obviously.
This is what still baffles me. A lack of morale (as well as funding)
perhaps? Or just a generally-held belief that since it (foam impact)
had happened before with no dire consequence, it was "safe"?
I think I'm rambling somewhat without getting my thoughts across, but
I've been kicking this around for awhile, and really can't find the
answers... The CAIB report is long on factual information (as it
should be), but doesn't really satisfy me on the issue of "why".
Steve
Stuf4
> Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
>
> > Stuf4 wrote:
> > > A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> > > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> > >
> > > http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e105
> > > 22.jpg
> > >
> > > ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> > > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
> > >
> > What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
> > the foam strike. You idiot
Argument by insult. Not uncommon on this forum, I'm sad to say. But
I don't find it very persuasive either.
Obviously there is no direct link between MEDS and the -107 tragedy.
It is a higher order causality that requires higher order reasoning.
I've presented the argument and I've responded to the waves of
criticism. If you don't agree, I'd be interested to hear *why*.
But if you do think that it is a bogus position, please consider your
option of not responding at all versus creating a permanent record of
profanity and hatred.
> Not only that but do you really think Nextel 440 fabric behind the
> leading edge would have provided sufficient thermal protection for a TEN
> INCH hole in the RCC panel 8? Furthermore, have you even seen the foam
> test strike videos? It's is VERY possible that the foam would (and did)
> knock large pieces of fractured RCC straight back into the cavity; it is
> very unlikely that any sort of high-tech fabric insulation would survive
> such a shattering impact to the RCC; it would tear or rupture as the RCC
> fragment(s) were smashed back through it.
>
> The upgrade you refer to was supposed to help in a micrometeoroid impact
> scenario. I suggest you consider the sizes, masses, velocities and
> impact angles such an uprgrade is supposed to help with, and consider as
> well the estimated sizes of any supposed RCC penetrations caused by such
> an impact.
You are trying to excuse the faulty decision based upon a
technicality. Let's say that somehow we have the knowledge that
Columbia with the WLE MMOD mod would have had a catastrophic
penetration just the same. Please reconsider this position for merit.
On the original thread, I offered the analogy of buying a car and
opting not to get anti-lock brakes while instead buying leather
upholstery. For a scenario where an intersection collision results in
fatality after the brakes got locked up, I consider it an extremely
weak point to say that anti-lock brakes wouldn't have prevented the
death.
Even if proven to be accurate, the point remains that the purchase
decision stands as proof for a lack of regard for safety.
> On second thought, why don't you spend less time digging through obscure
> reports for bits of data which are meaningless without full context and
> MORE time understanding fundamental principles of engineering?
(Along with our discussions elsewhere, I've been doing a lot of both
lately. I'm going to need to catch up on my sleep soon!)
~ CT
Larry
> impacts to the thermal protection system are potentially
> fatal.
What your simple mind is overlooking, and was so clearly stated
in the CAIB report, is that the WLE is not the problem, the
debris is the problem. FIX THE FOAM PROBLEM!!
--
Why, if aliens are smart enough
to travel light years through
space, do they keep abducting
the dumbest people on earth?
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
> > Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > > Stuf4 wrote:
> > > > A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the
shuttle's
> > > > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> > > >
> > > >
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e105
> > > > 22.jpg
> > > >
> > > > ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> > > > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
> > > >
> > > What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not
stop
> > > the foam strike. You idiot
>
> Argument by insult. Not uncommon on this forum, I'm sad to say. But
> I don't find it very persuasive either.
>
As opposed to argument by lies and deception.
> Obviously there is no direct link between MEDS and the -107 tragedy.
> It is a higher order causality that requires higher order reasoning.
> I've presented the argument and I've responded to the waves of
> criticism. If you don't agree, I'd be interested to hear *why*.
For several reasons:
1) You claim the glass cockpit led to the deaths... now you're claiming "oh
it's not a direct link..."
Excuse us for requiring a bit more formal reasoning in a SCI newsgroup.
Not just "oh it requires higher order reasoning".
What exactly is that? Can you put it in a calculus? I'm sure many of us
are versed in various forms of logic, try us.
So, either your first statement is a lie and deception or your second one
needs a hell of a lot of backing.
2) You leave out the real reasons MEDS was adopted.
Again likes and deception.
The problem Stuf4, is we all know you're not stupid. You're smart enough to
know the real reasons MEDS was adopted. So your crocodile tears don't serve
you well here.
> ~ CT
Derek Lyons
> I'm not sure I follow this. He (CT) posted an opinion regarding the
> way NASA spent money for safety upgrades. That did concern space, and
> shuttles in particular.
>
> He received quite a few decent replies which were informative,
In some ways the trolls are valuable in that more informed folks post
the good gouge to correct the trolls.
But that's the limit's of their usefulness.
D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:
Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html
Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html
Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to o...@io.com, as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.
John Doe
> What I am doing here is highlighting just how far down NASA's priority
> list where Safety can be found.
Shuttle upgrades are not only for "safety" but also for the continued
maintainability and improvements to the shuttle. Indirectly, those two also
improve safety.
When you have a vehicle that is maintained so well that it lasts a very very
very long time, you end up with the problem of no longer being able to buy
spare parts. The solution is to continually and progressively upgrade the
vehicle. Spending money to dump the steam gauges which were no longer
manufactured brings the shuttle closer to having new flight computers with
upgraded automation. Spending money to have old style steam gauges custom
manufacturerd doesn't bring you any closer to a more modern cockpit.
MEDS may not be the highest priority, but when you consider that MEDS was
installed during an orbiter's heavy maintenance period where many things were
changed, it makes sense to initiate all those "small" projects that can easily
be implemented.
And had NASA not messed with the major maintenance facilities, the length of
time where two different cockpits co-existed would have been reduced, greatly
reducing the training issues you outlined. Besides, any major upgrade to any
system on the shuttle will require a period of co-existence of the old and new
systems.
Considering that astronauts train for years and generally have functioning
brains, I would venture that it is not such a big issue to train a shuttle
pilot for 2 cockpits. In the end, the basics are the same. And a pilot knows
months in advance on which shuttle he will next fly and can then train during
those months on the right simulator.
> Does MEDS enhance safety?
> Does it enhance safety in a cost effective manner?
> Can that money be more smartly invested in other upgrades?
If you don't have enough money to upgrade something more important, but have
enough money to upgrade lots of smaller items, what is wrong with using that
money to do all those smaller items and then work harder to convince the govt
to fund your bigger upgrades ?
> because the threat was so evident. And once again, the old cockpit
> hardly posed a threat to safety. It flew just fine for over 100
> missions.
What if it had become a maintenance nighmare, costing NASA money and time,
making the shuttle more expensive to maintain, thus consuming money that coudl
have gone towards upgrading more stuff ?
> be tickled if Congress would have funded *all* the upgrades. The
> point is that the money was not spent with safety as the primary
> consideration.
Safety isn't the only copnsideration. Keeping the orbiters in flying
considtion and maintainable is perhaps even molre important than safety. You
don't have any safety concerns if the orbiters are relegated to useums.
> Let's say that I am buying a car and I choose to not opt for antilock
> brakes, while I instead shell out cash for a snazzy leather upholstry.
Lets say you buy a 1957 chevy that has a broken speedometer. Because those
needle ones are no longer available, do you just keep your car in the garage,
or do you instal a current speedometer and then worry about other stuff that
needs to be replaced ?
If your goal is to have a good performing vehicle (instead of a polished
museum piece), do you strive to find original parts at exhorbitant cost, or do
you think about slowly upgrading that car with more modern components ? Do you
strive to keep the same gas guzzling engine, or would you accept engine
upgrades that would result is much lower fuel consumption ?
NASA's role is not to flaunt its 1970s era shuttles nor to keep its shuttles
in the very same state that they were first built in. NASA's role is to have a
working vehicle with lower operating costs, better safety, better performance
and easier maintenance/quicker turn around.
And there are many things that must be done to the shuttle to achieve those
goals, not all of which are solely for safety.
OM
wrote:
>Stephen Stocker <lp...@par1.net> wrote:
>> I'm not sure I follow this.
...Of course not. You're a willing Maxson Sock Puppet. It's only
logical that you'd support a fuckwit troll like CT as well.
>In some ways the trolls are valuable in that more informed folks post
>the good gouge to correct the trolls.
...Of which Stephen's obviously not one of the more informed folks.
Herb Schaltegger
tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) wrote:
> From Herb Schaltegger:
> > Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > > Stuf4 wrote:
> > > > A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> > > > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> > > >
> > > > http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000
> > > > e105
> > > > 22.jpg
> > > >
> > > > ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> > > > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
> > > >
> > > What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
> > > the foam strike. You idiot
>
> Argument by insult. Not uncommon on this forum, I'm sad to say. But
> I don't find it very persuasive either.
>
> Obviously there is no direct link between MEDS and the -107 tragedy.
> It is a higher order causality that requires higher order reasoning.
> I've presented the argument and I've responded to the waves of
> criticism. If you don't agree, I'd be interested to hear *why*.
>
> But if you do think that it is a bogus position, please consider your
> option of not responding at all versus creating a permanent record of
> profanity and hatred.
Watch your attributions. Your creative responding to both me and Julian
leaves a STRONG implication that I wrote the paragraph to which you are
responding.
> > Not only that but do you really think Nextel 440 fabric behind the
> > leading edge would have provided sufficient thermal protection for a TEN
> > INCH hole in the RCC panel 8? Furthermore, have you even seen the foam
> > test strike videos? It's is VERY possible that the foam would (and did)
> > knock large pieces of fractured RCC straight back into the cavity; it is
> > very unlikely that any sort of high-tech fabric insulation would survive
> > such a shattering impact to the RCC; it would tear or rupture as the RCC
> > fragment(s) were smashed back through it.
> >
> > The upgrade you refer to was supposed to help in a micrometeoroid impact
> > scenario. I suggest you consider the sizes, masses, velocities and
> > impact angles such an uprgrade is supposed to help with, and consider as
> > well the estimated sizes of any supposed RCC penetrations caused by such
> > an impact.
>
> You are trying to excuse the faulty decision based upon a
> technicality.
Your response makes two assumptions: that the decision to forego
installation of the Nextel 440 fabric in favor of other upgrades such as
MEDS was faulty and that the rationale was a "technicality."
Addressing your comments in order, the rationale was clearly NOT faulty.
There had been no clear micrometeoroid/OD threat to the RCC; what there
was was supposition and fear of a POSSIBLE threat, whcih threat had
never been fully understood. The MEDS upgrades, however, WERE the
result of clearly understood problems with the then-current flight deck
displays: pilots and CDRs were coming into the program with a very
limited set of experiences using "steam gauges" and were having a touch
time transitioning. Further, there have been tremendous strides in
congnitive psychology and human factors over the last 30 years; these
advances in understanding how best to present critical data in clearly
understandable and usable ways in a time-pressured environment most
definitely merited incorporation into the fleet of orbiters.
Regarding your assertion that the prioritization of upgrades was based
on a "technicality" I would ask this: aren't engineering dollars best
allocated by technical analysis? If a proposed upgrade cannot be
technically justified by the "threat" to be ameliorated by the upgrade
(because the threat is not clear, has not been demonstrated to be
serious and there are extant other threats which ARE clear and HAVE been
demonstrated to be serious - e.g., crew information/workflow overload),
then the decision to forego the first upgrade in favor of the second is
correct.
ESPECIALLY when the difference between what destroyed the TPS integrity
of the Columbia was completely different in nature, scope and character
from that which your Nextel fabric installation upgrade was designed to
and could be reasonably be expected to protect against.
> Let's say that somehow we have the knowledge that
> Columbia with the WLE MMOD mod would have had a catastrophic
> penetration just the same. Please reconsider this position for merit.
This statement is not clear. What reconsideration is required? Do YOU
propose that a swatch of Nextel fabric insulation would have made a
difference in the survivability of Columbia under the circumstances?
Have you read both the CAIB Final Report and the CAIB Working Scenario?
> On the original thread, I offered the analogy of buying a car and
> opting not to get anti-lock brakes while instead buying leather
> upholstery. For a scenario where an intersection collision results in
> fatality after the brakes got locked up, I consider it an extremely
> weak point to say that anti-lock brakes wouldn't have prevented the
> death.
This statement, standing alone, is clear. However, how many automobile
accident reconstructions have you participated in or studied? Very few
accidents of ANY sort can be blamed on one factor. Yes, perhaps the
collision COULD have been avoided by a vehicle with anti-lock brakes.
But perhaps it could ALSO have been avoided if the driver bought a
better watch which kept more accurate time and he had left 2 minutes
earlier (his cheap watch was slow) and avoided the circumstances of the
collision altogether. Perhaps the crash wouldn't have been fatal is his
seatbelt was cinched tighter. Et cetera.
In any case, your analogy doesn't hold because I could easily say
instead: what if his antilock brakes could only stop his car in 170
feet (the Nextel fabric only would protect against penetrations of say
one inch diameter or smaller by particles weighing less than 100 grams)
when the acciden occured becuase he had to stop in 120 feet (a ten inch
hole caused by a 1.7 pound piece of foam).
> Even if proven to be accurate, the point remains that the purchase
> decision stands as proof for a lack of regard for safety.
Absolutely not. Flight crew situational awareness is a PARAMOUNT safety
consideration. Read some NTSB aircraft accident reports sometime. Look
for the phrase "Controlled flight into terrain."
> > On second thought, why don't you spend less time digging through obscure
> > reports for bits of data which are meaningless without full context and
> > MORE time understanding fundamental principles of engineering?
>
> (Along with our discussions elsewhere, I've been doing a lot of both
> lately. I'm going to need to catch up on my sleep soon!)
Good luck and rest your eyes. The stuff is heavy going.
> ~ CT
--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
"Heisenberg might have been here."
~ Anonymous
stmx3
> In article <d3af8584.03091...@posting.google.com>,
> tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) wrote:
>
Excellent post. A great example of point-counterpoint. My guess is
that CT has deeper reservations about the MEDS cockpit, whether due to
its sizable cost or it's modernity (stemming from the "I remember when I
had to walk 5 miles to school, barefoot in the snow, uphill, both ways!"
ilk) or simply for an inherent dislike of the thing altogether. This
feeling percolates through in his attributing it, directly or
indirectly, to the accident. I suppose, with sufficient energy, he
(she?) could have taken the alternate opinion that the accident was, in
someway, attributable to NASA not using the super lightweight external
tank for the mission.
CT, I grant that you have thrown this topic up in the air for debate,
but I see no one supporting your conclusions and I wonder if you might
reconsider *your* point of view, especially when there are more direct
links to the accident which may have not been covered.
Just a thought.
stmx3
> CT is one smart cookie. Smart enough to construct sentences which *DEMAND*
> some sort of response. Which is all he wants, as it floods the group with
> noise and runs off people who really do want to hold discussions related to
> space.
This makes no sense. If you engage in the thread, it is because you are
in someway motivated to respond. You are in no way forced to respond
and, in CT's case, the majority of responses are attacks on his
character and not relevant to the thread at all. Perhaps CT's problem
is that he responds to you at all, knowing that, despite his best
intentions, he is inviting more witless & vulgar criticism.
stmx3
[snip]
>
> I'm not sure I follow this. He (CT) posted an opinion regarding the
> way NASA spent money for safety upgrades. That did concern space, and
> shuttles in particular.
>
> He received quite a few decent replies which were informative, until
> this pointless crap sprang up. I'm aware that Mosley's "Kids"
> directives are intended to imply that he's been around longer than
> anyone, knows more than anyone and is in some sort of unique position
> to judge people. Such is not the case. He's simply another one who was
> attracted to usenet because no other forum would tolerate his brand of
> "wisdom". And that's sad, because it gives newcomers the impression
> that the entire group approves of such behavior.
>
> I've long known better, having been around usenet since '95, and
> learned that we're all free to disregard what we don't like or find
> offensive, but there are many who wander into it wondering if they've
> stumbled across a bad sitcom plot.
>
> Steve
Roger that. Excellent post.
stmx3
[snip]
> This is what still baffles me. A lack of morale (as well as funding)
> perhaps? Or just a generally-held belief that since it (foam impact)
> had happened before with no dire consequence, it was "safe"?
>
> I think I'm rambling somewhat without getting my thoughts across, but
> I've been kicking this around for awhile, and really can't find the
> answers... The CAIB report is long on factual information (as it
> should be), but doesn't really satisfy me on the issue of "why".
>
> Steve
Well, the indicators of the problem were there, just as with Challenger.
To get to the "why" of it all, I think you have to come to the
realization that there was a slow erosion of standards over time due to
1) an attitude of being able to accomplish anything ("can do!")
2) management styles that refused to acknowledge problems within their
own organization
3) a weakly administered ISO, VPP & Safety program (these were given
little more than lip service) which created the *impression* that there
were no problems
4) a heirarchical structure that relegated engineering analysis below
management's desires (? poorly worded...can't think of the right phrase
here...hope you get my meaning)
And all of these (if not more) fall under the umbrella of "culture". My
concern is how NASA can possibly fix their problems. Certainly, they
can address the physical problems (e.g. on-orbit tile repairs, on-orbit
inspections, developing new analysis software for debris impacts, etc.),
but how will they fix the cultural problems that will keep them from
being blinded in the future? (And sending mgmt off to some training
camp is not the answer...unless they come back wearing Marine drill sgt.
uniforms!)
stmx3
>
> What I am doing here is highlighting just how far down NASA's priority
> list where Safety can be found.
[snip]
Well, in most respects, safety was at the *top* of NASA's list. The
problems was/is that their safety program was basically ineffectual and
they didn't know enough to realize that.
>
>
>>With the
>>benefit of hindsight, it's easy to say we should have upgraded RCC or
>>updated CRATER or performed more foam strike testing. Instead, NASA
>>updated the cockpit as part of shuttle upgrades to keep the shuttle
>>flying for another 20 or 30 years.
>
>
> As with my response to Brian above, the decision required no
> hindsight. The simple analysis looking forward is:
>
> Does MEDS enhance safety?
I don't know enough about MEDS to answer this. I thought MEDS was part
of the shuttle upgrades program and I generally believe upgrades are
designed to enhance safety (over the long term, in this case).
> Does it enhance safety in a cost effective manner?
There's the rub. Granted, MEDS was expensive. But if you live by the
above statement, you might conclude (pre-Columbia) that doing RCC impact
analysis was not cost effective given your experience base of over 100
shuttle flights.
> Can that money be more smartly invested in other upgrades?
Probably. Assume that the cockpit hasn't been upgraded. You've got a
billion dollars to spend on shuttle upgrades. After touring the
shuttle, what upgrades would you make? My reaction, upon looking at the
70's style cockpit would be (and has been) "What a piece of crap!"
Didn't NASA have to resort to e-bay recently to gather enough 8080 (?)
chips to flesh out their spares? Doesn't that indicate something to you?
>
> The reason that it's easy to say that RCC needed to be upgraded is
> because the threat was so evident. And once again, the old cockpit
> hardly posed a threat to safety. It flew just fine for over 100
> missions.
>
> This isn't to say that I don't want the cockpit modernized. I would
> be tickled if Congress would have funded *all* the upgrades. The
> point is that the money was not spent with safety as the primary
> consideration.
>
>
Good point, if true. I assume you know what the primary consideration
was for MEDS?
>>Saying things like "...this glass cockpit led to the death of the seven
>>Columbia astronauts" is a sensational claim devoid of merit.
>
>
> Let's say that I am buying a car and I choose to not opt for antilock
> brakes, while I instead shell out cash for a snazzy leather upholstry.
> I might justify the purchase because leather seats make my car
> marginally safer somehow. Then say that a few years later I am
> cruising through an intersection and am shocked to see a semi run a
> red light. I lock up the brakes and I get crushed to death under all
> 18 wheels...
>
I think this is a poor analogy.
> I don't see how it would be sensational for someone to criticize my
> decision for having gotten leather upholstry at the opportunity cost
> of anti-lock brakes.
>
> For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
> proven fatal.
>
>
> ~ CT
Wait...let me quote that again:
> For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
> proven fatal.
And again...
>the opportunity cost of MEDS has proven fatal.
You invite severe criticism with statements like this. Again, you are
coming off as a Fox news sensationalistic journalist, lacking a logical
chain of credibility. I really don't believe you are being objective in
light of all the arguments, pro and con. Be wary of taking those first
steps to CRANK posts.
OM
wrote:
>This makes no sense. If you engage in the thread, it is because you are
>in someway motivated to respond. You are in no way forced to respond
>and, in CT's case, the majority of responses are attacks on his
>character and not relevant to the thread at all. Perhaps CT's problem
>is that he responds to you at all, knowing that, despite his best
>intentions, he is inviting more witless & vulgar criticism.
...Bullshit. Quit being lazy and do a google on the past two years of
his bogus conspiracy theories. He has no intention of contributing
anything to this group other than insane and inflamatory theories
designed to piss people off with their outlandish and slanderous
accusations.
Again, go do a google on "stuff4" or "~CT" if you refuse to believe
us. See the facts for yourself.
stmx3
[snip]
>
> I agree that MEDS has the potential to save lives.
>
of Columbia Crew" or the bit about the 'MEDS upgrades proven fatal' in
an earlier post.
> What I see as faulty in your point is that the probability of life
> threatening instrumentation failure is far lower than the probability
> of lethality cured by upgrades that got cut.
>
What were the upgrades that got cut? Maybe a compare/contrast of these
upgrades should have been your *initial* post.
> It is a cost/benefit analysis that is the crux of the issue here. And
> MEDS just doesn't provide that much benefit.
>
> (But it sure does look cool.)
>
You could also attribute cost/benefit analysis for lack of detailed
testing on impact strikes to RCC.
>
>>This is the problem with the shuttle: it's not that there are glaring
>>faults that are being deliberately ignored, it's that there are so
>>many potentially fatal flaws that if you fix one it just means that
>>another one will kill you instead.
>
>
> I'd like to see the case to justify MEDS as curing a potentially fatal
> flaw. You have to get many failures deep before limitations of the
> old cockpit become fatal.
>
> WLE? Impacts were a problem on *every* mission. And impacts to the
> thermal protection system are potentially fatal.
>
> Doing the math:
>
> Zero missions with potential fatalities due to cockpit design,
How can you know this? Have you seen the risk analysis performed for
the earlier cockpit?
stmx3
[snip]
>
> Try writing that on seven tombstones.
>
>
can use their deaths for your gain, then you should tell us how,
with your obvious foreknowledge and higher order reasoning, you
made your concerns known to head of NASA safety, to the
astronauts themselves or to anyone in general. I don't recall, having
googled a bit, seeing you raise the alarm of foam debris strikes.
What a cheap tactic.
Stuf4
> > > Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au wrote:
> > >
> > > > Stuf4 wrote:
> > > > > A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the
> shuttle's
> > > > > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> <http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e105>
> > > > > 22.jpg
> > > > >
> > > > > ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> > > > > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
> > > > >
> > > > What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not
> stop
> > > > the foam strike. You idiot
> >
> > Argument by insult. Not uncommon on this forum, I'm sad to say. But
> > I don't find it very persuasive either.
> >
>
> As opposed to argument by lies and deception.
A -lie- requires inacurate information coupled with an intent to
deceive. Inferring intent is always guesswork. What can definitively
be determined is inaccurate facts. If any facts here are mistaken, I
would like to know about it.
> > Obviously there is no direct link between MEDS and the -107 tragedy.
> > It is a higher order causality that requires higher order reasoning.
> > I've presented the argument and I've responded to the waves of
> > criticism. If you don't agree, I'd be interested to hear *why*.
>
> For several reasons:
>
> 1) You claim the glass cockpit led to the deaths... now you're claiming "oh
> it's not a direct link..."
>
> Excuse us for requiring a bit more formal reasoning in a SCI newsgroup.
> Not just "oh it requires higher order reasoning".
> What exactly is that? Can you put it in a calculus? I'm sure many of us
> are versed in various forms of logic, try us.
I've explained this explicitly in my posts. Money went into funding
MEDS at the expense of upgrades that would have been a much more
efficient enhancement to safety. Buy MEDS and die from WLE. That is
indirect causality. No calculus required.
> So, either your first statement is a lie and deception or your second one
> needs a hell of a lot of backing.
(Lots of backing has been offered. For one, the ABSvsLeatherUpholstry
car analogy.)
> 2) You leave out the real reasons MEDS was adopted.
>
> Again likes and deception.
>
> The problem Stuf4, is we all know you're not stupid. You're smart enough to
> know the real reasons MEDS was adopted. So your crocodile tears don't serve
> you well here.
By "real reasons MEDS was adopted", perhaps you mean such enhancement
nicities as SAFM (Shuttle Abort Flight Management) and such. Please
remember that no astronaut has ever touched the stick or throttle
during ascent for any mission in the entire history of the program.
While MEDS does have potential to go a long way toward increasing crew
situational awareness, such awareness has never been needed. For the
one abort that was flown (ATO), the old cockpit served just fine. For
MEDS to be justified as a safety enhancement, the crew would need to
lose comm with MCC and then get into a world of hurt requiring a
complex abort. Odds for this are just too slim to rationalize the
money that was shoveled into the cockpit at the expense of other
safety upgrades.
(And please note that these aborts had been flown No Comm just fine on
the old cockpit. MEDS was making this crew task easier.)
~ CT
Stuf4
> "Stuf4" wrote in message
> > A popular poster available from NASA is the one showing the shuttle's
> > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> >
> >
> <http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000e10522.jpg>
> >
> > ...I feel a sickening reminder of how this glass cockpit led to the
> > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
>
> You know Stuf4, I've put up with a lot of your BS, but this is way to much
> you hypocritical POS.
(Et tu, Greg?)
> Had they stiffed the RCC and not done MEDS and an accident was caused by
> failures in the cockpit, you'd be howling about how NASA had spent money on
> something that had never broken before instead of replacing an aging set of
> cockpit equipment that was prone to failure and that it was becoming
> increasingly difficult to find replacement parts for.
I'd be glad to consider any evidence that the old cockpit posed a
serious threat to safety.
> You're a hypocritical ass that should sit back and take stock in what you've
> said. You're twisting the unfortunate deaths of 7 astronauts to your own
> personal ends.
Insults and profanity aside, my goal is an accurate finding of fault
in the causes that led to Columbia's tragedy. Part of this process is
an independent finding of fault with Gehman's investigation. I do not
see this as my "personal ends". Whether or not anyone here may be in
agreement with any specific posts, I like to think that there are many
others on this forum who share the goal of accurate fault finding.
This is the best way I know to get the problem fixed so that things
like this don't happen again.
> Oh, and don't bother trying to contact me to discuss this.
If you don't want to discuss this further, I am totally fine with
that. But for anyone who does decide to respond, I suggest that
upholding a standard of basic courtesy will go a long way toward
enabling productive discussion.
~ CT
Stuf4
> > WLE? Impacts were a problem on *every* mission. And
> > impacts to the thermal protection system are potentially
> > fatal.
>
> What your simple mind is overlooking, and was so clearly stated
> in the CAIB report, is that the WLE is not the problem, the
> debris is the problem. FIX THE FOAM PROBLEM!!
This is exactly my criticism of the CAIB report. There is no
recognition that WLEs *had been identified* as a problem and that a
fix had been designed, but that funding was diverted.
As to the foam problem, yesterday in another post I stated that the
smart approach would have been to fix the problem at both ends. Fix
the foam AND fix the wings.
(Yes, even those of us with simple minds could have come up with that
answer.)
~ CT
jeff findley
>
> While "MEDS Glass Cockpit Led to Death of Columbia Crew" is a bold
> statement, it points at a truth: NASA was fixing things not broken,
> anticipating tens of years of Shuttle operations as if it weren't an
> experimental vehicle, was treating foam coming loose from the ET as if
> it couldn't do any serious damage at all, had a way of judging damage
> done by foam that did not work and did not see a reason to request
> orbital images from a foam impact. So that statement is absurd but
> NASA's way of doing things and not doing others is absurd, too.
You're wrong. There were plenty of reasons to do the MEDS upgrade.
The problems with the old systems were well known and replacing them
was a good thing. You're bashing NASA with hindsight. They didn't
know the shedding foam could cause a loss of an orbiter and crew. The
failure was in not recognizing that fact early enough. If it had been
recognized early enough, certainly something could have been done.
But since it wasn't, canceling MEDS would *not* have resulted in any
changes to the foam on the ET.
Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.
jeff findley
>
> The glass cockpit sounds valid to me, as it must save a lot of retraining of
> how to use equipment, and presumably be easier to actually fly it.
Consider the availability of parts for displays designed and initially
built in the 70's. The glass cockpit increased the reliability of the
system with modern, more reliable equipment, it made maintenance
easier and cheaper (due to parts availability).
The biggest failing was congress and the administration choosing not to
fund safety upgrades over the years, despite the lack of a credible
plan to retire the shuttle.
Dan Foster
<jeff.f...@no.sdrc.spam.com> wrote:
> They didn't > know the shedding foam could cause a loss of an orbiter and
> crew. The failure was in not recognizing that fact early enough.
That's not quite an accurate summary, IMO.
NASA personnel _did_ know that a foam hit of sufficient size, magnitude,
and speed -- especially if directed toward the Achilles heel of the Orbiter
-- had great potential for a LOCV situation, even if not an ascent-phase
LOCV situation.
_That_ was one of the premises behind the heated what-if debates occurring
by the engineers with sufficient concern for internal and informal
escalation. They clearly had reason to be concerned... they knew what
they'd be worried about if they had anything to worry about, and why.
Granted, it may have been normal what-if'ing, but the fact remains, they
had a pretty good idea of what to be worried about and why, *if* something
did transpire to be pretty bad.
This concern just didn't get communicated very effectively to NASA
management, according to the CAIB report.
The entry flight director himself (according to a direct question and
answer at a post-107 press conference) was mentally prepared for foam
strike in that area as a possible LOCV situation, having been briefed by
MMACS the day before about the possibility. Hence, him repeating
'no...commonality' ominously as 107 entry unfolded.
107 was a large series of errors, so it would be simplistic to try and pin
it down on any particular decision made (or not made), but NASA not
understanding foam risk wasn't one of the things that did transpire.
They -- NASA management -- consequentally thought it was manageable. ('in
family...' and by implication, manageable, having been seen so many times
before and all survivable even for the large gash in Atlantis a while
before.)
The lower-level engineers thought otherwise as far as potential went.
In the end, nobody knew for sure as to the actual extent of damage for a
variety of reasons (abusing CRATER by feeding it data outside of its
operating parameters, blurry tracking camera, denied internal requests for
photography attempts, etc), so it was a relatively moot point after
committing to re-entry.
-Dan
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> > What I am doing here is highlighting just how far down NASA's priority
> > list where Safety can be found.
>
> Shuttle upgrades are not only for "safety" but also for the continued
> maintainability and improvements to the shuttle. Indirectly, those two also
> improve safety.
Upgrades fall into two general categories: safety and performance.
But I disagree with a view that performance upgrades enhance safety
because this is not always the case. Increasing performance can mean
having to shave into safety margins (SLWT?).
> When you have a vehicle that is maintained so well that it lasts a very very
> very long time, you end up with the problem of no longer being able to buy
> spare parts. The solution is to continually and progressively upgrade the
> vehicle. Spending money to dump the steam gauges which were no longer
> manufactured brings the shuttle closer to having new flight computers with
> upgraded automation. Spending money to have old style steam gauges custom
> manufacturerd doesn't bring you any closer to a more modern cockpit.
I agree with your line of reasoning, but please keep in mind the price
tag on the MEDS upgrade. You can buy *lots* of steam gauges for a
quarter of a billion dollars!
<snip>
> Considering that astronauts train for years and generally have functioning
> brains, I would venture that it is not such a big issue to train a shuttle
> pilot for 2 cockpits. In the end, the basics are the same. And a pilot knows
> months in advance on which shuttle he will next fly and can then train during
> those months on the right simulator.
I agree in general. But the transition makes availability of the
"right simulator" problematic. Consider STA training alone.
> > Does MEDS enhance safety?
> > Does it enhance safety in a cost effective manner?
> > Can that money be more smartly invested in other upgrades?
>
> If you don't have enough money to upgrade something more important, but have
> enough money to upgrade lots of smaller items, what is wrong with using that
> money to do all those smaller items and then work harder to convince the govt
> to fund your bigger upgrades ?
That strategy might work. Sadly, the point remains that the strategy
that NASA did go with failed horribly.
> > because the threat was so evident. And once again, the old cockpit
> > hardly posed a threat to safety. It flew just fine for over 100
> > missions.
>
> What if it had become a maintenance nighmare, costing NASA money and time,
> making the shuttle more expensive to maintain, thus consuming money that coudl
> have gone towards upgrading more stuff ?
If that were the case then I might agree that MEDS could possibly have
been money well spent.
But to date I have not seen anything that comes close to a valid
justification for spending those hundreds of millions of dollars on
MEDS while safety upgrades got cut.
> > be tickled if Congress would have funded *all* the upgrades. The
> > point is that the money was not spent with safety as the primary
> > consideration.
>
> Safety isn't the only copnsideration. Keeping the orbiters in flying
> considtion and maintainable is perhaps even molre important than safety. You
> don't have any safety concerns if the orbiters are relegated to useums.
I expect that you wouldn't have to look too far into NASA accounting
to see that maintaining the old cockpit was not that big a deal. This
is just my guess. If anyone presents a case that MEDS was money well
spent, I'd be glad to consider their facts.
> > Let's say that I am buying a car and I choose to not opt for antilock
> > brakes, while I instead shell out cash for a snazzy leather upholstry.
>
> Lets say you buy a 1957 chevy that has a broken speedometer. Because those
> needle ones are no longer available, do you just keep your car in the garage,
> or do you instal a current speedometer and then worry about other stuff that
> needs to be replaced ?
I say scrap the Chevy! Buying a 2004 Toyota will work out great in
the long run.
(Plug for OSP)
> If your goal is to have a good performing vehicle (instead of a polished
> museum piece), do you strive to find original parts at exhorbitant cost, or do
> you think about slowly upgrading that car with more modern components ? Do you
> strive to keep the same gas guzzling engine, or would you accept engine
> upgrades that would result is much lower fuel consumption ?
Again, I agree with the logic behind your argument. What is needed is
more facts regarding maintenance costs on the old cockpit.
(But my guess here is that you could maintain the old shuttle cockpit
through this entire century and then some, given $200 million bucks.)
> NASA's role is not to flaunt its 1970s era shuttles nor to keep its shuttles
> in the very same state that they were first built in. NASA's role is to have a
> working vehicle with lower operating costs, better safety, better performance
> and easier maintenance/quicker turn around.
>
> And there are many things that must be done to the shuttle to achieve those
> goals, not all of which are solely for safety.
Again it is a question of priorities. Looking at two of the four most
costly upgrades, it is clear that NASA had a serious concern for
safety with regards to main engine reliability. I do agree that there
are many other factors involved that complex equation. But if after
all that you go out and crash your shuttle, then not much else
matters.
Big picture: NASA dropped the safety ball.
I hope we can agree on that.
~ CT
Jochem Huhmann
> You're wrong. There were plenty of reasons to do the MEDS upgrade.
> The problems with the old systems were well known and replacing them
> was a good thing.
Surely it was a good thing if you expect the orbiters to fly for tens of
years ahead.
> You're bashing NASA with hindsight. They didn't know the shedding foam
> could cause a loss of an orbiter and crew. The failure was in not
> recognizing that fact early enough.
The failure was that, although the foam wasn't meant to come loose by
design, it *did* come loose repeatedly without causing a loss of orbiter
and crew and NASA just accepted the fact the ET shed foam and did *not*
seriously look into what this might result in. After all the RCC (and
the tiles) are not designed for foam impacts.
> If it had been recognized early enough, certainly something could have
> been done.
But they didn't.
> But since it wasn't, canceling MEDS would *not* have resulted in any
> changes to the foam on the ET.
Canceling MEDS had not changed anything, yes. Nevertheless spending
money on MEDS and not spending money on an ET shedding foam or on
researching possible consequences of this was a strange arrangement of
priorities. Pointing at this does not mean bashing NASA with hindsight,
it means looking at where NASA failed. NASA failed in taking the ET
shedding foam as seriously as it deserved. If they had worked hard to
make the ET *not* shed foam at all Columbia would have flown a perfect
mission.
Jochem
--
"A designer knows he has arrived at perfection not when there is no
longer anything to add, but when there is no longer anything to take
away." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery
John Doe
> Upgrades fall into two general categories: safety and performance.
Your forgot maintainability. Sometimes you need to upgrade because it comes
out cheaper than to pay exhorbitant costs of maintaining older hardware.
You also forgot flexibility. Consider launch scrubs, as well as landings at
Edwards. (and the costs associated with each). Would you consider upgrades
that would allow the shuttle to operate with less strict weather criteria to
be money well spent ?
While MEDS is just a change in displays, have you considered that part of the
alledged $200 million were spent on planning subsequent steps in cockpit
upgrades (steps which may add sufficient automation to make shuttle more flexible).
Furthermore, and more importantly, improvements to the shuttle will also
benefit its successor because NASA will have developped hard data on just how
well each improvement works/costs and how much maintenance is required.
> I agree with your line of reasoning, but please keep in mind the price
> tag on the MEDS upgrade. You can buy *lots* of steam gauges for a
> quarter of a billion dollars!
But those steam gauges bring no improvement to the shuttle and cannot form the
basis for a truly improved cockpit. MEDS by themselves don't add functionality
to shuttle, but they allow the unlderlying computers to eventually be upgraded
and provide more/better information to pilots as well as increased cockpit automation.
> I agree in general. But the transition makes availability of the
> "right simulator" problematic. Consider STA training alone.
Had NASA not messed with the orbiter major maintenance, that period would have
been much shorter.
> That strategy might work. Sadly, the point remains that the strategy
> that NASA did go with failed horribly.
OK, lets talk turkey here. MEDS and other improvements have nothing to do with
Columbia. The real problem is that NASA failed to see the ET foam as a serious
threath. If the budget makers and management aren't told of a problem (foam),
then you cannot fault them for budgeting other types of upgrades.
> I expect that you wouldn't have to look too far into NASA accounting
> to see that maintaining the old cockpit was not that big a deal.
In the short term, correct. But if you have set out a roadmap for the shuttle,
and that roadmap includes a major cockpit rebuilding over time, then going
step by step (MEDS being one step) is the right thing to do.
If you have decided that the shuttle will last another 15 years, then you need
to consider availability of spares not now, but over a period of 15 years.
> I say scrap the Chevy! Buying a 2004 Toyota will work out great in
> the long run.
>
> (Plug for OSP)
The problem is that all you have is the 1957 chevy and that 2004 Toyota
doesn't exist. So your only option is to keep on maintaining the 1957 Chevy
intil that modern Toyota becomes available.
> Big picture: NASA dropped the safety ball.
>
> I hope we can agree on that.
Yes an no. Yes, NBASA failed safety in many aspects. It failed in considering
the foam a serious problem. And it failed by quickly coming to conclusion that
nothing could be done to fix tiles in space so a tile damage at launch was not
an issue because NASA decided there was nothing they could do.
But this has nothing to do with shuttle upgrades. It has to do with mentality
inside NASA. Were shit disturbers at NASA given awards or were they fired ?
Julian Bordas
> From Jan Vorbrüggen:
>
>>I'd tend to think that there is more justification to be found for MEDS
>>than the one you cite, which indeed is feeble. Two points I remember: it
>>became increasingly difficult and costly to maintain the original display
>>equipment; and the new devices allow more information to be presented
>>in more easily perceptible form, required for the additional tasks in
>>building ISS.
>
>
> MEDS was pitched as an upgrade that enhanced safety. But I'm not
> aware of evidence that the old cockpit was a significant threat to
> safety. I certainly don't see justification as the fourth most costly
> upgrade.
>
> The bottom line is clear to me that MEDS was funded because it was
> glamorous.
Troll, go run away and hide, back to your cave. The sun is rising
Julian Bordas
> Obviously there is no direct link between MEDS and the -107 tragedy.
So why link the two?
Quick troll, hide under the bridge, the Billy Goats Gruff are coming.
Julian
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> > MEDS was pitched as an upgrade that enhanced safety. But I'm not
> > aware of evidence that the old cockpit was a significant threat to
> > safety. I certainly don't see justification as the fourth most costly
> > upgrade.
> >
> > The bottom line is clear to me that MEDS was funded because it was
> > glamorous.
>
> Troll, go run away and hide, back to your cave. The sun is rising
(I am sure that we are all capable of mature interaction here.)
~ CT
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> [snip]
> >
> > I agree that MEDS has the potential to save lives.
> >
> This is a far different statement than "MEDS Glass Cockpit Led to Death
> of Columbia Crew" or the bit about the 'MEDS upgrades proven fatal' in
> an earlier post.
The statements are not mutually exclusive. To be explicit:
- Money spent on MEDS could have been used for upgrades that had
potential to maintain WLE integrity for STS-107, therefore the
decision to fund MEDS in lieu of WLE MMOD led to the death of the
Columbia crew.
- There is some conceivable possibility that a Columbia that remained
with the old cockpit configuration may have suffered some
instrumentation failure on that same entry which might have led to
LOCV. There was/is potential to save lives with MEDS.
My criticism is based on the assessment that MEDS has an extremely
slim potential to save lives and that the dollar value for other
upgrades was orders of magnitude higher in terms of safety.
> > What I see as faulty in your point is that the probability of life
> > threatening instrumentation failure is far lower than the probability
> > of lethality cured by upgrades that got cut.
> >
>
> What were the upgrades that got cut? Maybe a compare/contrast of these
> upgrades should have been your *initial* post.
For anyone who would like to do this analysis, I would be glad to look
at it.
(My initial post was structured to focus on points that I see as most
important.)
> > It is a cost/benefit analysis that is the crux of the issue here. And
> > MEDS just doesn't provide that much benefit.
> >
> > (But it sure does look cool.)
> >
>
> You could also attribute cost/benefit analysis for lack of detailed
> testing on impact strikes to RCC.
Agreed! Following STS-102 impacts, if NASA wanted to continue flying
such tests are the *least* they could have done.
> >>This is the problem with the shuttle: it's not that there are glaring
> >>faults that are being deliberately ignored, it's that there are so
> >>many potentially fatal flaws that if you fix one it just means that
> >>another one will kill you instead.
> >
> >
> > I'd like to see the case to justify MEDS as curing a potentially fatal
> > flaw. You have to get many failures deep before limitations of the
> > old cockpit become fatal.
> >
> > WLE? Impacts were a problem on *every* mission. And impacts to the
> > thermal protection system are potentially fatal.
> >
> > Doing the math:
> >
> > Zero missions with potential fatalities due to cockpit design,
>
> How can you know this? Have you seen the risk analysis performed for
> the earlier cockpit?
I offered my best understanding of shuttle program history. If anyone
has facts to the contrary that they would like to inject here, please
do so.
> > -versus-
> > Every mission with potential fatalities due to debris impacts.
~ CT
Stuf4
(I don't know what is meant by deaths being used for my "gain".)
Regarding "cheap tactic", I apologize for my sassy comment. I was
trying to emphasize the importance of safety in the midst of all the
issues you've pointed out.
Regarding foreknowledge, I never did raise any alarm about the SOFI
risk (neither pre-102, post-102, pre-107 launch nor pre-107 entry). I
never did voice an objection to MEDS being funded over safety
upgrades. In this respect, my criticism is being offered with
hindsight.
But the criticism is being offered to those who had the obligation to
ensure safe operations. Those entrusted with the authority to make
these key decisions are the ones who had information available to them
to make smarter choices than what they did. That's the whole point of
investigation. Learn from these mistakes so that we can avoid them in
the future.
The cliche is "live and learn". Sadly, it is often that people die
before we learn. Perhaps the ultimate tragedy is when people die and
we *don't* learn. Over the years I have voiced lots of criticism for
the Rogers Commission because I wanted to avoid another Challenger. I
will continue looking carefully for rocks left unturned so that we can
avoid a future Columbia.
I don't see the position I've offered to be "morally lofty". I'm not
looking down on anyone as a "bad person". I am pointing out what I
see to be mistakes. And all of these mistakes are understandable.
~ CT
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> > Upgrades fall into two general categories: safety and performance.
>
> Your forgot maintainability. Sometimes you need to upgrade because it comes
> out cheaper than to pay exhorbitant costs of maintaining older hardware.
>
> You also forgot flexibility. Consider launch scrubs, as well as landings at
> Edwards. (and the costs associated with each). Would you consider upgrades
> that would allow the shuttle to operate with less strict weather criteria to
> be money well spent ?
I agree that these other two factors are important concerns for
upgrades.
In response to your question, lots more info is needed to give a
meaningful answer. Cost? Benefit? Risk? And so on.
> While MEDS is just a change in displays, have you considered that part of the
> alledged $200 million were spent on planning subsequent steps in cockpit
> upgrades (steps which may add sufficient automation to make shuttle more flexible).
>
> Furthermore, and more importantly, improvements to the shuttle will also
> benefit its successor because NASA will have developped hard data on just how
> well each improvement works/costs and how much maintenance is required.
I agree that points get chalked up in the "plus column".
<snip>
> > That strategy might work. Sadly, the point remains that the strategy
> > that NASA did go with failed horribly.
>
>
> OK, lets talk turkey here. MEDS and other improvements have nothing to do with
> Columbia. The real problem is that NASA failed to see the ET foam as a serious
> threath. If the budget makers and management aren't told of a problem (foam),
> then you cannot fault them for budgeting other types of upgrades.
I disagree completely. NASA was well aware of the foam problem (maybe
even some of the smart budget makers too - think of all their
staffers). They rolled the dice and they lost.
Where MEDS comes into play is that NASA had the chance to buy "loaded
dice", if you will, to improve the odds.
> > I expect that you wouldn't have to look too far into NASA accounting
> > to see that maintaining the old cockpit was not that big a deal.
>
> In the short term, correct. But if you have set out a roadmap for the shuttle,
> and that roadmap includes a major cockpit rebuilding over time, then going
> step by step (MEDS being one step) is the right thing to do.
>
> If you have decided that the shuttle will last another 15 years, then you need
> to consider availability of spares not now, but over a period of 15 years.
(Again, none of this matters if your vehicles don't survive that
duration of years.)
> > I say scrap the Chevy! Buying a 2004 Toyota will work out great in
> > the long run.
> >
> > (Plug for OSP)
>
> The problem is that all you have is the 1957 chevy and that 2004 Toyota
> doesn't exist. So your only option is to keep on maintaining the 1957 Chevy
> intil that modern Toyota becomes available.
OK, but if the owner chooses to fix their dashboard before fixing the
breaks, I'd say they need to check their priorities.
> > Big picture: NASA dropped the safety ball.
> >
> > I hope we can agree on that.
>
> Yes an no. Yes, NBASA failed safety in many aspects. It failed in considering
> the foam a serious problem. And it failed by quickly coming to conclusion that
> nothing could be done to fix tiles in space so a tile damage at launch was not
> an issue because NASA decided there was nothing they could do.
My read is that all the key decision makers were well aware of the
foam threat. So I would prefer to word this as a failure to _honor_
the problem (rather than a failure to consider the problem).
> But this has nothing to do with shuttle upgrades. It has to do with mentality
> inside NASA. Were shit disturbers at NASA given awards or were they fired ?
Upgrades had the potential to prevent the problem.
While I agree that "culture" contributed to the problem, I am
disappointed to see CAIB highlight this along the lines of being a
_cause_. That's way too vague for me. Every organization is going to
have problems of that type.
A chronology of specifics could have been nailed down:
______
~ 1972: Failure to design for crew escape.
(Culpability: Shuttle Program, Rockwell, NASA chain, Congressional
oversight)
~ 1998: Failure to prioritize safety in funding of upgrades.
(Culpability: Shuttle Program, NASA chain, Congress)
Oct2002: Failure to find adequate resolution to foam impact hazard.
(Possible solutions: ground the fleet, perform testing, cancel
missions,)
(Culpability: Shuttle Program, NASA chain)
Jan2003: Failure to assess damage and study rescue options.
(Culpability: Shuttle Ops, Shuttle Program, NASA chain)
______
(The above list represents 5 minutes worth of effort, just to provide
an example of concise specifics that CAIBv1 could have offered.)
~ CT
Julian Bordas
>
> For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
> proven fatal.
>
Still trolling? Quick hide, the sun's rising
Julian Bordas
>>Troll, go run away and hide, back to your cave. The sun is rising
>
>
> (I am sure that we are all capable of mature interaction here.)
>
So when will start?
Julian Bordas
> From Mark (mma...@my-deja.com):
>
>>>NASA had gotten plenty of money to fly the shuttle safely. That money
>>>was not spent wisely.
>>
>>Right. And had we lost a shuttle due to instrumentation failure of
>>some kind, say a crash-landing or erroneous abort due to incorrect
>>readouts, you'd be complaining that they'd spent money on leading edge
>>upgrades (which probably wouldn't have saved Columbia anyway) rather
>>than replacing the antique instruments.
>
>
> I agree that MEDS has the potential to save lives.
>
> What I see as faulty in your point is that the probability of life
> threatening instrumentation failure is far lower than the probability
> of lethality cured by upgrades that got cut.
>
And the upgrade that would prevent the Columbia tradegy that was cut is
called?
It's not there is it.
Julian Bordas
>
> This is exactly my criticism of the CAIB report. There is no
> recognition that WLEs *had been identified* as a problem and that a
> fix had been designed, but that funding was diverted.
>
The funding was of course diverted to the MEDS. right?
Julian Bordas
>
> This is the best way I know to get the problem fixed so that things
> like this don't happen again.
>
And NASA is going to take notice of you? Yeah right!
Julian Bordas
>
> - Money spent on MEDS could have been used for upgrades that had
> potential to maintain WLE integrity for STS-107, therefore the
> decision to fund MEDS in lieu of WLE MMOD led to the death of the
> Columbia crew.
Was this an option that was discussed?
> My criticism is based on the assessment that MEDS has an extremely
> slim potential to save lives and that the dollar value for other
> upgrades was orders of magnitude higher in terms of safety.
>
Your criticism is unfounded has no basis in fact and is just trolling
>>What were the upgrades that got cut? Maybe a compare/contrast of these
>>upgrades should have been your *initial* post.
>
>
> For anyone who would like to do this analysis, I would be glad to look
> at it.
>
You claim that these upgrades were cut, provide the evidence, do your
one analysis, or are you just a recalitrant troll?
Stuf4
> tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) wrote:
>
> > From Herb Schaltegger:
> > > Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Stuf4 wrote:
> > > > > modern glass cockpit. Whenever I look at this image:
> > > > >
> > > > > http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/sts-101/lores/jsc2000
> > > > > e105
> > > > > 22.jpg
> > > > >
> > > > > death of the seven Columbia astronauts.
> > > > >
> > > > What a crock of shit. Not spending the money on the Meds would not stop
> > > > the foam strike. You idiot
> >
> > Argument by insult. Not uncommon on this forum, I'm sad to say. But
> > I don't find it very persuasive either.
> >
> > I've presented the argument and I've responded to the waves of
> > criticism. If you don't agree, I'd be interested to hear *why*.
> >
> > option of not responding at all versus creating a permanent record of
> > profanity and hatred.
>
> Watch your attributions. Your creative responding to both me and Julian
> leaves a STRONG implication that I wrote the paragraph to which you are
> responding.
My bad. Sorry. What I usually do when responding like this is to
address people by name. I will be more careful for the future.
> > > Not only that but do you really think Nextel 440 fabric behind the
> > > leading edge would have provided sufficient thermal protection for a TEN
> > > INCH hole in the RCC panel 8? Furthermore, have you even seen the foam
> > > test strike videos? It's is VERY possible that the foam would (and did)
> > > knock large pieces of fractured RCC straight back into the cavity; it is
> > > very unlikely that any sort of high-tech fabric insulation would survive
> > > such a shattering impact to the RCC; it would tear or rupture as the RCC
> > > fragment(s) were smashed back through it.
> > >
> > > The upgrade you refer to was supposed to help in a micrometeoroid impact
> > > scenario. I suggest you consider the sizes, masses, velocities and
> > > impact angles such an uprgrade is supposed to help with, and consider as
> > > well the estimated sizes of any supposed RCC penetrations caused by such
> > > an impact.
> >
> > You are trying to excuse the faulty decision based upon a
> > technicality.
>
> Your response makes two assumptions: that the decision to forego
> installation of the Nextel 440 fabric in favor of other upgrades such as
> MEDS was faulty and that the rationale was a "technicality."
>
> Addressing your comments in order, the rationale was clearly NOT faulty.
> There had been no clear micrometeoroid/OD threat to the RCC; what there
> was was supposition and fear of a POSSIBLE threat, whcih threat had
> never been fully understood. The MEDS upgrades, however, WERE the
> result of clearly understood problems with the then-current flight deck
> displays: pilots and CDRs were coming into the program with a very
> limited set of experiences using "steam gauges" and were having a touch
> time transitioning. Further, there have been tremendous strides in
> congnitive psychology and human factors over the last 30 years; these
> advances in understanding how best to present critical data in clearly
> understandable and usable ways in a time-pressured environment most
> definitely merited incorporation into the fleet of orbiters.
I disagree point by point here. Regarding the RCC upgrade, just
because it was titled "MMOD" (Micro-Meteoroid / Orbital Debris) does
not mean that the strenghthened design didn't have SOFI primarily in
mind. Consider the possibility that the title was chosen because
"MMOD" sounds more hip than "Foam-Resistant WLEs".
I also don't see a problem with pilots flying with steam gauges. Test
pilots (and they're all test pilots) are trained to fly with many
different kinds of "non-glass" cockpit layouts.
Lastly, I don't see that great an advance with glass cockpit
symbology. An F-15E crash from the mid-90s occurred when the pilot
attempted to fly a "post hole" maneuver at night. In the
investigation he was quoted as stating that he was looking for the
nadir symbol on the ADI. There was no nadir symbol. Cognitive
psychology has a long way to go.
> Regarding your assertion that the prioritization of upgrades was based
> on a "technicality" I would ask this: aren't engineering dollars best
> allocated by technical analysis? If a proposed upgrade cannot be
> technically justified by the "threat" to be ameliorated by the upgrade
> (because the threat is not clear, has not been demonstrated to be
> serious and there are extant other threats which ARE clear and HAVE been
> demonstrated to be serious - e.g., crew information/workflow overload),
> then the decision to forego the first upgrade in favor of the second is
> correct.
>
> ESPECIALLY when the difference between what destroyed the TPS integrity
> of the Columbia was completely different in nature, scope and character
> from that which your Nextel fabric installation upgrade was designed to
> and could be reasonably be expected to protect against.
Given your propositions, I would agree with your conclusion. The
point of disagreement is that I don't see the crew workload issue to
have been a significant threat that MEDS would cure. Also, I see the
TPS FOD issue to have been very clear. I'd say that the seriousness
was known. Even a ballpark estimation of the odds was known. I see
it to be a decision to gamble. A decision that didn't pay off.
> > Let's say that somehow we have the knowledge that
> > Columbia with the WLE MMOD mod would have had a catastrophic
> > penetration just the same. Please reconsider this position for merit.
>
> This statement is not clear. What reconsideration is required? Do YOU
> propose that a swatch of Nextel fabric insulation would have made a
> difference in the survivability of Columbia under the circumstances?
> Have you read both the CAIB Final Report and the CAIB Working Scenario?
On the contrary, my point was that even if the WLE MMOD upgrade would
have failed to save Columbia, it would still show proper
prioritization of funding.
NASA can't protect for *everything*. But I will fault them for not
trying.
> > On the original thread, I offered the analogy of buying a car and
> > opting not to get anti-lock brakes while instead buying leather
> > upholstery. For a scenario where an intersection collision results in
> > fatality after the brakes got locked up, I consider it an extremely
> > weak point to say that anti-lock brakes wouldn't have prevented the
> > death.
>
> This statement, standing alone, is clear. However, how many automobile
> accident reconstructions have you participated in or studied? Very few
> accidents of ANY sort can be blamed on one factor. Yes, perhaps the
> collision COULD have been avoided by a vehicle with anti-lock brakes.
> But perhaps it could ALSO have been avoided if the driver bought a
> better watch which kept more accurate time and he had left 2 minutes
> earlier (his cheap watch was slow) and avoided the circumstances of the
> collision altogether. Perhaps the crash wouldn't have been fatal is his
> seatbelt was cinched tighter. Et cetera.
Please know that I am not singling out MEDS as -the one factor- that
killed Columbia. It is one of many factors in a causal chain that
spans decades.
My reason for putting so much emphasis on it here is because this
aspect was overlooked. In 248 pages, they could have at least given
it one sentence.
> In any case, your analogy doesn't hold because I could easily say
> instead: what if his antilock brakes could only stop his car in 170
> feet (the Nextel fabric only would protect against penetrations of say
> one inch diameter or smaller by particles weighing less than 100 grams)
> when the acciden occured becuase he had to stop in 120 feet (a ten inch
> hole caused by a 1.7 pound piece of foam).
Again it appears that my point was missed. Hopefully my comments
above have cleared up that point.
> > Even if proven to be accurate, the point remains that the purchase
> > decision stands as proof for a lack of regard for safety.
>
> Absolutely not. Flight crew situational awareness is a PARAMOUNT safety
> consideration. Read some NTSB aircraft accident reports sometime. Look
> for the phrase "Controlled flight into terrain."
CFIT happens with glass cockpits too. But we are in agreement that
MEDS can enhance safety. Our difference stems from the matter of
degree - the cost/benefit evaluation.
~ CT
Stuf4
> Herb Schaltegger wrote:
> > In article <d3af8584.03091...@posting.google.com>,
> > tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) wrote:
> >
> [snip]
> Excellent post. A great example of point-counterpoint. My guess is
> that CT has deeper reservations about the MEDS cockpit, whether due to
> its sizable cost or it's modernity (stemming from the "I remember when I
> had to walk 5 miles to school, barefoot in the snow, uphill, both ways!"
> ilk) or simply for an inherent dislike of the thing altogether. This
> feeling percolates through in his attributing it, directly or
> indirectly, to the accident. I suppose, with sufficient energy, he
> (she?) could have taken the alternate opinion that the accident was, in
> someway, attributable to NASA not using the super lightweight external
> tank for the mission.
Ha! No, I don't have that much energy. But if some stray neurons
fuse together some other pattern of causality, I will let you know.
As to glass cockpits, I actually love them. It is their very
seduction that makes this such a difficult issue! But yes, I did
learn on the old stuff. Many miles in "deep snow". (If you want
specifics, pop me an email.)
> CT, I grant that you have thrown this topic up in the air for debate,
> but I see no one supporting your conclusions and I wonder if you might
> reconsider *your* point of view, especially when there are more direct
> links to the accident which may have not been covered.
>
> Just a thought.
I distinctly remember this angle getting strong support from at least
one other person here. Nevertheless, while absence of support may
serve as a healthy indicator of possible error, lack of support never
constitutes *proof*.
(As you may have guessed, I have stood alone on many issues here at
sci.space.)
~ CT
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
>
> >
> > What I am doing here is highlighting just how far down NASA's priority
> > list where Safety can be found.
>
> Well, in most respects, safety was at the *top* of NASA's list. The
> problems was/is that their safety program was basically ineffectual and
> they didn't know enough to realize that.
Here's another chunk that is missing in the CAIBv1 report! It's nice
to have emails and such from managers, but I saw no evidence that
anyone within SR&QA was doing their job. I would really like to think
that *someone* squawked about the -102 foam incident.
> >>With the
> >>benefit of hindsight, it's easy to say we should have upgraded RCC or
> >>updated CRATER or performed more foam strike testing. Instead, NASA
> >>updated the cockpit as part of shuttle upgrades to keep the shuttle
> >>flying for another 20 or 30 years.
> >
> >
> > As with my response to Brian above, the decision required no
> > hindsight. The simple analysis looking forward is:
> >
> > Does MEDS enhance safety?
>
> I don't know enough about MEDS to answer this. I thought MEDS was part
> of the shuttle upgrades program and I generally believe upgrades are
> designed to enhance safety (over the long term, in this case).
The short answer is 'yes'. A longer answer is '...but not by much'
(long term considered).
> > Does it enhance safety in a cost effective manner?
>
> There's the rub. Granted, MEDS was expensive. But if you live by the
> above statement, you might conclude (pre-Columbia) that doing RCC impact
> analysis was not cost effective given your experience base of over 100
> shuttle flights.
I might agree with that... right up to STS-102. That was a huge
scare. Terrible irony that the Russian Roulette game only lasted two
clicks of the trigger after this.
> > Can that money be more smartly invested in other upgrades?
>
> Probably. Assume that the cockpit hasn't been upgraded. You've got a
> billion dollars to spend on shuttle upgrades. After touring the
> shuttle, what upgrades would you make? My reaction, upon looking at the
> 70's style cockpit would be (and has been) "What a piece of crap!"
> Didn't NASA have to resort to e-bay recently to gather enough 8080 (?)
> chips to flesh out their spares? Doesn't that indicate something to you?
Ha! You could also look inside an SR-71 and say "What a piece of
junk!" But a more important realization is that the junk works.
There's a reason that NASA's space program is run using FORTRAN 77,
Variacs, even Punchcards. Those systems are effective. They may not
be efficient and they may not be -cost- effective, but they do work.
It's funny how the public thinks of "NASA" as synonymous with "leading
edge technology". One peek inside and you see that NASA got left
behind in the 70s, with some places in the 60s!
> > The reason that it's easy to say that RCC needed to be upgraded is
> > because the threat was so evident. And once again, the old cockpit
> > hardly posed a threat to safety. It flew just fine for over 100
> > missions.
> >
> > This isn't to say that I don't want the cockpit modernized. I would
> > be tickled if Congress would have funded *all* the upgrades. The
> > point is that the money was not spent with safety as the primary
> > consideration.
> >
> >
>
> Good point, if true. I assume you know what the primary consideration
> was for MEDS?
Sex appeal.
There, I said it.
You don't have to go to a New York fashion show to find overpriced
goods that serve the primary purpose of being in vogue. Those runways
share a common thread (if you will) with the aerospace industry.
Why do modern commercial jets have winglets? Because they are in
vogue. They serve as a symbol that cries out, "I'm hip with the
latest fashion trend!" Some might justify equations about fuel costs
or whatever, but if you do the analysis, these new threads don't
necessarily wash.
Same with the glass cockpit. Very sexy. Pilots want them. Bill
Gregory spelled this out. Our astronauts come out of their F-16 and
F-18. They *want* their sexy cockpits. Well they got it. Willy
McCool worked really hard to make MEDS a reality. I wonder if, during
all those years of cockpit upgrade efforts, if in the back of his mind
that he was aware that there were better ways to spend this money.
Maybe when he and Rick were emailed that mpeg of the foam strike and
they watched it over and over they said to each other, "We should have
bought the WLE upgrade." This sad irony comes full circle when during
those last few minutes they are monitoring their entry coming apart on
their bright colorful expensive MEDS displays.
<snip>
> > For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
> > proven fatal.
> >
> >
> > ~ CT
>
> Wait...let me quote that again:
>
> > For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
> > proven fatal.
>
> And again...
> >the opportunity cost of MEDS has proven fatal.
>
> You invite severe criticism with statements like this. Again, you are
> coming off as a Fox news sensationalistic journalist, lacking a logical
> chain of credibility. I really don't believe you are being objective in
> light of all the arguments, pro and con. Be wary of taking those first
> steps to CRANK posts.
I have spent the last day wondering why there was so much hostile
reaction to this original post. The best conclusion I could come up
with is that people read the title and immediately reject the
connection as ludicrous. If they bothered reading the logic that was
subsequently presented, those arguments got pre-filtered out by their
prejudicial conclusion.
I appreciate the warning against crankdom, but I put a lot of thought
before posting a conclusion like this. I spent weeks finding articles
that support the chain of connection. I see the causal path from MEDS
to death to be clear. No, this is not the thickest path by any means.
Yet it is there and it got ignored.
Where I see that I can improve is to spell out up front that this
causal chain is only one of *many*. That way everyone can be clear
that I do not hold MEDS to be the only cause.
Now for everyone who doesn't by the evidence presented... for everyone
who rejects any possible connection between MEDS and Safety being
sacrificed, there is always the option to just drop this topic and
focus on whatever *you* see to be important.
However much I may disagree with any such connections that may get
presented, I can guarantee you that I will not insult and degrade
anyone for the ideas they present. No matter how silly, or even how
CRANKED, I may evaluate that post.
If for no other reason, it is a lesson I take from history. Consider
all the theories that got laughed away by those who "know better"...
The Earth orbits the Sun?! What a CRANK.
Continents float on plates?! What a CRANK.
Columbia was killed by MEDS?! What a CRANK.
Yes, I agree that Fox News goes too far. But that does not mean that
I close my mind to what Fox News says. I will look for truth, and
seeds of truth, in any information that I see.
~ CT
Stuf4
Well, one might also conclude that funding was diverted to that
hyper-costly upgrade, the AHPTP (Alternate High Pressure TurboPump).
This cost the US taxpayers over $1 billion dollars! But this
connection has not been highlighted because what is being criticized
is NASA's attitude toward safety. The AHPTP stands as strong evidence
that NASA *cared* about safety. They "put their money where their
mouth is". Lots of money.
The point being made in this thread is that NASA did not put *enough*
money toward the goal of safety. This thread is a criticism of Hal's
conclusion that NASA was not appropriated enough money for safety. I
say that Congress gave them plenty.
That's why were talking about MEDS, and not something else like the
AHPTP, the LTMCC or whatnot.
~ CT
Herb Schaltegger
(Snipped lots of stuff)
> Please know that I am not singling out MEDS as -the one factor- that
> killed Columbia. It is one of many factors in a causal chain that
> spans decades.
I suppose I (and nearly everyone else who responded) must have just
misunderstood the original Subject (a subject YOU chose for your
original post). Yeah, right.
Such an inflammatory subject line, from which you now are apparently
backing away, is clearly flame-baiting. And you play the martyr and
wonder why you are being cast in the roll of resident troll. It's a
role for which you are self-selecting. If you don't like the
appellation, stop trolling.
--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
"Heisenberg might have been here."
~ Anonymous
jeff findley
>
> In article <yz9he3a...@sgipd572.net.plm.eds.com>, jeff findley
> <jeff.f...@no.sdrc.spam.com> wrote:
> > They didn't > know the shedding foam could cause a loss of an orbiter and
> > crew. The failure was in not recognizing that fact early enough.
>
> That's not quite an accurate summary, IMO.
While I agree with your detailed description, it doesn't change my
point. Cancelling MEDS upgrades would not have directly resulted in
NASA addressing the foam shedding problem. It simply was not a
priority, at least for upper management.
Stuf4
tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) wrote in message news:<d3af8584.03091...@posting.google.com>...
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
>
>
> >
> > - Money spent on MEDS could have been used for upgrades that had
> > potential to maintain WLE integrity for STS-107, therefore the
> > decision to fund MEDS in lieu of WLE MMOD led to the death of the
> > Columbia crew.
>
> Was this an option that was discussed?
I don't see how this could -not- have been discussed. All budget
decisions, whether you are working out the budget of an entire nation
or just your home grocery bill, are a matter of priorities. Any
comprehensive evaluation of which shuttle upgrades would be funded
would discuss all upgrades that were already in the works (WLE MMOD
being one) as well as other upgrades that were being proposed.
The line gets drawn. Items above the line get bought. Items below
the line get shelved.
> > My criticism is based on the assessment that MEDS has an extremely
> > slim potential to save lives and that the dollar value for other
> > upgrades was orders of magnitude higher in terms of safety.
> >
> Your criticism is unfounded has no basis in fact and is just trolling
(I have yet to see evidence that the old cockpit was dangerous.)
> >>What were the upgrades that got cut? Maybe a compare/contrast of these
> >>upgrades should have been your *initial* post.
> >
> >
> > For anyone who would like to do this analysis, I would be glad to look
> > at it.
> >
> You claim that these upgrades were cut, provide the evidence, do your
> one analysis, or are you just a recalitrant troll?
The word 'recalcitrant' means...
Marked by stubborn resistance, opposition or defiance of authority.
That is an adjective that I gladly accept in regards to authority that
is making fatal, extremely costly mistakes.
Now I'm not sure what you are questioning here. My points rest on the
fact that WLE MMOD got cut. That is offered as a solid fact that NASA
can tell you about themselves. I provided a link to a NASA website
that showed the WLE MMOD schedule:
Initial Operation Date: Phase II Upgrade
OV-102 STS-103 (12/2/99)
OV-103 STS- 97(4/8/99)
OV-104 STS-92 (1/14/99)
OV-105 STS-96 (12/9/98)
If you are of the opinion that this upgrade was actually funded and
performed, the CAIB final report clearly states that Columbia's WLEs
were the original design.
(If I missed your point here, please restate for clarity.)
~ CT
Roger Balettie
> If for no other reason, it is a lesson I take from history. Consider
> all the theories that got laughed away by those who "know better"...
>
> The Earth orbits the Sun?! What a CRANK.
>
> Continents float on plates?! What a CRANK.
>
> Columbia was killed by MEDS?! What a CRANK.
For every one example in history that was correct, there were many thousands
more that were wrong and refused to listen to those who were correct... and
they truely were "cranks".
Count yourself among the thousands... :/
Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/
Stuf4
> Stuf4 wrote:
> > I agree that MEDS has the potential to save lives.
> >
> > What I see as faulty in your point is that the probability of life
> > threatening instrumentation failure is far lower than the probability
> > of lethality cured by upgrades that got cut.
> >
>
> And the upgrade that would prevent the Columbia tradegy that was cut is
> called?
>
> It's not there is it.
Testing of the modified WLE will provide an indication as to how much
more robust the new design is. It will then be interesting to note
how close the implemented design will be in comparison to the proposed
WLE MMOD upgrade from the 90s.
This is another sad parallel to Challenger. O-ring burn through was a
known problem. I have read that the seals had already been redesigned
*prior* to 1986. (Also a radical redesign of composite material for
SRB casings had been worked up as a weight saving performance upgrade
- another example of an upgrade that infringes into safety margin, and
so were scrapped post-51L.)
~ CT
Stuf4
It's quite possible that the only attention this gets from NASA is
insults, harassment and degradation. But I am hoping that they will
act more maturely than that. My expectations? I expect the upgrades
funding decision to stay swept under the rug. This is what Gehman
seems to want to do with it.
(The -no crew escape module- decision from the early 70s has gotten
swept under the rug by two investigation boards now. No one has been
held accountable for that fatal mistake.)
~ CT
Stuf4
I set this goal from the first day I joined this forum years ago. I
have never insulted any member here, no matter how irate they may get
over opinions that I have shared.
I make a solid commitment to uphold respect for all. If this is
adopted as a forum standard then this can serve as fertile ground for
excellent discussion.
...and that's one lesson that can be taken from fertilizer. Even if
it looks like a pile of crap, you can plant a seed that can grow in a
healthy manneur (manner/manure).
So I personally have no problem if someone here is spouting manure. I
know how to avoid stepping in the cowpies. It's the crows that I'm
concerned about.
~ CT
stmx3
> "Stuf4" <tdadamemd-...@excite.com> wrote:
>
>>If for no other reason, it is a lesson I take from history. Consider
>>all the theories that got laughed away by those who "know better"...
>>
>>The Earth orbits the Sun?! What a CRANK.
>>
>>Continents float on plates?! What a CRANK.
>>
>>Columbia was killed by MEDS?! What a CRANK.
>
>
> For every one example in history that was correct, there were many thousands
> more that were wrong and refused to listen to those who were correct... and
> they truely were "cranks".
>
> Count yourself among the thousands... :/
>
> Roger
Another CRANK trait is the CRANK grouping himself among the scientific
(or whatever) elite. No doubt, their radical ideas advanced science in
quantum leaps. But having a radical idea does not make one a member of
the elite.
To be objective, I considered MEDS to perhaps be a symptom of a larger
problem concerning NASA's attitude toward safety. Even still, I cannot
arrive at a workable logic to support this because *it is the larger
problem that blinded NASA to its priorities.*
To revive the 57 Chevy analogy...ABS Brakes or Leather Upholstery?
Well, it doesn't really matter if the driver is drunk at the wheel when
the crash occurs. The overriding problem here is sobriety. Now I don't
mean to infer that "NASA was drunk at the wheel", but I'm certain they
believed they were #1 when it came to safety. It was a
self-perpetuating delusion. MEDS was the attempt to drive in a straight
line, while in hindsight, we can see they were weaving down the road.
OM
<herbsch...@spamtrap.invalid> wrote:
>Such an inflammatory subject line, from which you now are apparently
>backing away, is clearly flame-baiting. And you play the martyr and
>wonder why you are being cast in the roll of resident troll. It's a
>role for which you are self-selecting. If you don't like the
>appellation, stop trolling.
...If everyone would put the dogsucking little troll in killfile hell
where he fucking BELONGS, then we'd never *see* his lame-assed
attempts to piss off everyone here. Until as such a time as we can
find a way to get him kicked off of usenet eternally, for godsakes
everyone just killfile the little bastard.
Please.
OM
--
"No bastard ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m
his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms
poor dumb bastard die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society
- General George S. Patton, Jr
OM
wrote:
>To revive the 57 Chevy analogy...ABS Brakes or Leather Upholstery?
...Neither. Full Moon hubcaps & a pair of fuzzy dice to hang from the
rear view mirror.
Now, please - killfile CT and be done with him. Enough's enough.
jeff findley
>
> (The -no crew escape module- decision from the early 70s has gotten
> swept under the rug by two investigation boards now. No one has been
> held accountable for that fatal mistake.)
That's because it would have eaten up so much payload, it couldn't
have met the Air Force requirements. Without meeting those, the
entire program was dead. One reason that the shuttle is such a
disaster was the "all things to all people" approach to requirements.
Part of the reason we don't have an acceptable follow-on is the
refusal to let go of that mentality. The next generation of shuttle
ought to do everything the shuttle does, right? Wrong. It's time to
get back to basics and focus on more simple, reliable, cheaper
spacecraft.
jeff findley
> Also a radical redesign of composite material for
> SRB casings had been worked up as a weight saving performance upgrade
> - another example of an upgrade that infringes into safety margin, and
> so were scrapped post-51L.
They were scrapped for reasons other than safety, much like the
Vandenberg launch pad. Safety was a convenient excuse.
Andrew Gray
> "Stuf4" <tdadamemd-...@excite.com> wrote:
>> If for no other reason, it is a lesson I take from history. Consider
>> all the theories that got laughed away by those who "know better"...
>>
>> The Earth orbits the Sun?! What a CRANK.
>>
>> Continents float on plates?! What a CRANK.
>>
>> Columbia was killed by MEDS?! What a CRANK.
>
> For every one example in history that was correct, there were many thousands
> more that were wrong and refused to listen to those who were correct... and
> they truely were "cranks".
To paraphrase Sagan:
They laughed at Galileo. They laughed at Einstein. But they also laughed
at Bozo the Clown.
--
-Andrew Gray
shim...@bigfoot.com
Stephen Stocker
> Stephen Stocker wrote:
> [snip]
>> This is what still baffles me. A lack of morale (as well as funding)
>> perhaps? Or just a generally-held belief that since it (foam impact)
>> had happened before with no dire consequence, it was "safe"?
>>
>> I think I'm rambling somewhat without getting my thoughts across, but
>> I've been kicking this around for awhile, and really can't find the
>> answers... The CAIB report is long on factual information (as it
>> should be), but doesn't really satisfy me on the issue of "why".
>>
>> Steve
>
> Well, the indicators of the problem were there, just as with Challenger.
> To get to the "why" of it all, I think you have to come to the
> realization that there was a slow erosion of standards over time due to
>
> 1) an attitude of being able to accomplish anything ("can do!")
> 2) management styles that refused to acknowledge problems within their
> own organization
> 3) a weakly administered ISO, VPP & Safety program (these were given
> little more than lip service) which created the *impression* that there
> were no problems
> 4) a heirarchical structure that relegated engineering analysis below
> management's desires (? poorly worded...can't think of the right phrase
> here...hope you get my meaning)
It makes sense, I think. I'm just not sure how (or if) it can be
fixed. I don't mean that as anything against NASA, it's just that it
could best be described as human nature.
> And all of these (if not more) fall under the umbrella of "culture". My
> concern is how NASA can possibly fix their problems. Certainly, they
> can address the physical problems (e.g. on-orbit tile repairs, on-orbit
> inspections, developing new analysis software for debris impacts, etc.),
> but how will they fix the cultural problems that will keep them from
> being blinded in the future? (And sending mgmt off to some training
> camp is not the answer...unless they come back wearing Marine drill sgt.
> uniforms!)
Oops, I didn't read far enough! And I agree. I think I have the habit
of putting myself in the shoes of the managers, asking what *I'd* do.
And realistically, I think I'd have done precisely what they did.
*sigh*
Steve
Derek Lyons
>I set this goal from the first day I joined this forum years ago. I
>have never insulted any member here, no matter how irate they may get
>over opinions that I have shared.
You insult our intelligence on a daily basis.
>I make a solid commitment to uphold respect for all.
You fail utterly with respect to this commitment.
>If this is adopted as a forum standard then this can serve as fertile
>ground for excellent discussion.
This was a forum standard long before you arrived, and continues to
this day. But it only applies to those willing to engage in open and
substantive debate.
But is does not apply to individuals like yourself who believe
prevarications, evasions, and semantic games equate to open and
substantive debate.
D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:
Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html
Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html
Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to o...@io.com, as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.
Stephen Stocker
> From Julian Bordas <julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au>:
>> Stuf4 wrote:
>
>> > MEDS was pitched as an upgrade that enhanced safety. But I'm not
>> > aware of evidence that the old cockpit was a significant threat to
>> > safety. I certainly don't see justification as the fourth most costly
>> > upgrade.
>> >
>> > The bottom line is clear to me that MEDS was funded because it was
>> > glamorous.
>>
>> Troll, go run away and hide, back to your cave. The sun is rising
>
> (I am sure that we are all capable of mature interaction here.)
I'd like to think so. At any rate, it's an interesting thread.
Steve
Stephen Stocker
<julian...@nospamyoubastards.iprimus.com.au> wrote:
> Stuf4 wrote:
>
>>
>> For NASA's space shuttle program, the opportunity cost of MEDS has
>> proven fatal.
>>
What are you talking about? He's discussing safety upgrades vs
other things which may or may not have a bearing on safety, as I
understand it.
Steve
jeff findley
>
> So I personally have no problem if someone here is spouting manure. I
> know how to avoid stepping in the cowpies. It's the crows that I'm
> concerned about.
You mean like the post that started this whole thread? Wait, that was
you. Remember, you can't polish a turd.
OM
wrote:
>They laughed at Galileo. They laughed at Einstein. But they also laughed
>at Bozo the Clown.
"Billions and billions laughed because of Bozo the Clown. The
difference between Bozo the Clown and CT is that in the case of CT,
we're laughing *at* him, and not *with* him."
Carl SagOM
OM
>
> So I personally have no problem if someone here is spouting manure.
...Because you're used to not only spouting it yourself, you're
sleeping in it as well.
Killfile this little bastard, kids. Please.
Stuf4
> Roger Balettie wrote:
> > "Stuf4" <tdadamemd-...@excite.com> wrote:
> >
> >>If for no other reason, it is a lesson I take from history. Consider
> >>all the theories that got laughed away by those who "know better"...
> >>
> >>The Earth orbits the Sun?! What a CRANK.
> >>
> >>Continents float on plates?! What a CRANK.
> >>
> >>Columbia was killed by MEDS?! What a CRANK.
> >
> >
> > For every one example in history that was correct, there were many thousands
> > more that were wrong and refused to listen to those who were correct... and
> > they truely were "cranks".
> >
> > Count yourself among the thousands... :/
> >
> > Roger
I agree about the statistics, Roger. You are free to place my ideas
in whatever category you feel like.
> Another CRANK trait is the CRANK grouping himself among the scientific
> (or whatever) elite. No doubt, their radical ideas advanced science in
> quantum leaps. But having a radical idea does not make one a member of
> the elite.
I agree, stmx3. And please do not misinterpret the examples given as
a claim to any elite status. The point intended was simply a caution
as to which theories you choose to discard. And when someone presents
a theory that fails my evaluation for validity, I still am careful as
to how I discard it. I avoid running it through the shredder (flame
on) when gently placing it in the recycle bin will suffice. For all I
know, there may come a time when I decide to dig it out of the bin for
a re-examination.
I have not presented the MEDS connection to be "right" or "correct".
I presented a case supported by evidence. I am glad to have any
mistakes pointed out so that I have an opportunity to improve. All
constructive criticism is welcome.
> To be objective, I considered MEDS to perhaps be a symptom of a larger
> problem concerning NASA's attitude toward safety. Even still, I cannot
> arrive at a workable logic to support this because *it is the larger
> problem that blinded NASA to its priorities.*
>
> To revive the 57 Chevy analogy...ABS Brakes or Leather Upholstery?
> Well, it doesn't really matter if the driver is drunk at the wheel when
> the crash occurs. The overriding problem here is sobriety. Now I don't
> mean to infer that "NASA was drunk at the wheel", but I'm certain they
> believed they were #1 when it came to safety. It was a
> self-perpetuating delusion. MEDS was the attempt to drive in a straight
> line, while in hindsight, we can see they were weaving down the road.
Well there are those who have been appointed to diligently guard
against such situations. Again I would like to see evidence that
someone in SR&QA raised a flag.
~ CT
Stuf4
> tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) writes:
> > Also a radical redesign of composite material for
> > SRB casings had been worked up as a weight saving performance upgrade
> > - another example of an upgrade that infringes into safety margin, and
> > so were scrapped post-51L.
>
> They were scrapped for reasons other than safety, much like the
> Vandenberg launch pad. Safety was a convenient excuse.
If anyone would like to offer other reasons as to why composite SRBs
never flew, I'd be glad to hear about it.
~ CT
Stuf4
> tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) writes:
> >
> > (The -no crew escape module- decision from the early 70s has gotten
> > swept under the rug by two investigation boards now. No one has been
> > held accountable for that fatal mistake.)
>
> That's because it would have eaten up so much payload, it couldn't
> have met the Air Force requirements. Without meeting those, the
> entire program was dead. One reason that the shuttle is such a
> disaster was the "all things to all people" approach to requirements.
(Please reconsider the "lightweight crew escape module" concept that
was discussed here in the last several days. Survivable crew escape
could have been designed at a minimal impact to payload.)
~ CT
Stuf4
> tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) wrote:
>
> (Snipped lots of stuff)
>
> > Please know that I am not singling out MEDS as -the one factor- that
> > killed Columbia. It is one of many factors in a causal chain that
> > spans decades.
>
> I suppose I (and nearly everyone else who responded) must have just
> misunderstood the original Subject (a subject YOU chose for your
> original post). Yeah, right.
>
> Such an inflammatory subject line, from which you now are apparently
> backing away, is clearly flame-baiting. And you play the martyr and
> wonder why you are being cast in the roll of resident troll. It's a
> role for which you are self-selecting. If you don't like the
> appellation, stop trolling.
The link between the MEDS upgrade being funded and the consequence of
catastrophic failure of Columbia's wing was, and still is, offered as
a simple fact.
I can understand how people can close off their minds to a case that
is presented based only on the title, but I don't necessarily see that
as being a problem with the choice of words in the title.
~ CT
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
"Stuf4" <tdadamemd-...@excite.com> wrote in message
news:d3af8584.03091...@posting.google.com...
Cost.
>
>
> ~ CT
Julian Bordas
> Maybe when he and Rick were emailed that mpeg of the foam strike and
> they watched it over and over they said to each other, "We should have
> bought the WLE upgrade."
What upgrade is this? I've not found any mention of it. Canyou direct
me to any supporting documents?
Julian Bordas
> From Julian Bordas:
>
>>Stuf4 wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>>This is exactly my criticism of the CAIB report. There is no
>>>recognition that WLEs *had been identified* as a problem and that a
>>>fix had been designed, but that funding was diverted.
>>>
>>
>>The funding was of course diverted to the MEDS. right?
>
>
> Well, one might also conclude that funding was diverted to that
> hyper-costly upgrade, the AHPTP (Alternate High Pressure TurboPump).
One may conclude that you are just a troll
>
> The point being made in this thread is that NASA did not put *enough*
> money toward the goal of safety. This thread is a criticism of Hal's
> conclusion that NASA was not appropriated enough money for safety. I
> say that Congress gave them plenty.
Your point is that installing the MEds caused the catastophic failure of
STS 107
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
> > Stuf4 wrote:
> >
> > >>Troll, go run away and hide, back to your cave. The sun is rising
> > >
> > >
> > > (I am sure that we are all capable of mature interaction here.)
> > >
> >
> > So when will start?
>
> I set this goal from the first day I joined this forum years ago. I
> have never insulted any member here, no matter how irate they may get
> over opinions that I have shared.
>
No, you just insult folks who aren't here, like veterans, etc.
Stephen Stocker
It's becoming more and more clear that there's a clique here that's
not interested in science, the shuttle, space or much of anything else
except maintaining what's apparently been an unchallenged domination
of this group.
However, I hope you keep posting, CT. As you may have noticed, among
the garbage there's also been some top-notch discussion in this
thread.
My personal take on the subject is that NASA hasn't been exactly a
priority when it comes to funding. That's far from the entire problem,
of course, but it seems to me it might help if they had even a
fraction of what's being spent on killing people. Oh well.
Steve
Herb Schaltegger
Stephen Stocker <lp...@par1.net> wrote:
> It's becoming more and more clear that there's a clique here that's
> not interested in science, the shuttle, space or much of anything else
> except maintaining what's apparently been an unchallenged domination
> of this group.
And it's also becoming clear that when any poster asks questions
requiring an earlier poster for technical details or serious rationale
for an otherwise-inflammatory, trolling or outlandish premise, you will
speak up and claim injustice.
<PLONK!>
--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
"Heisenberg might have been here."
~ Anonymous
Stuf4
> tdadamemd-...@excite.com (Stuf4) writes:
> >
> > So I personally have no problem if someone here is spouting manure. I
> > know how to avoid stepping in the cowpies. It's the crows that I'm
> > concerned about.
>
> You mean like the post that started this whole thread? Wait, that was
> you. Remember, you can't polish a turd.
I don't see how it falls into a "crow" category. I can understand if
you think that the connection is a "turd", but then all everyone need
do is sidestep it.
How many people went up in arms when Homer Hickam compared the shuttle
program to Vietnam? Was he rebuked for making a "trolling"
commentary? Inviting a "flamewar"? He voiced an opinion. There were
key points that I didn't agree with, but I didn't get *angry* at him.
So Homer compares the shuttle to Vietnam. I have a problem with
seeing the connection.
I've offered a connection from MEDS. I'd say that this is much more
direct than Vietnam. I'd also say that there is much less emotional
tie to MEDS than there is to Vietnam bloodshed. Yet look at how this
forum reacts.
If we can handle Homer's opinion, I'd say that we are capable of
handling an opinion on MEDS.
~ CT
Derek Lyons
>Upgrades fall into two general categories: safety and performance.
Um, no. There's a continuum where the endpoints are 'purely safety
enhancing upgrade' and 'purely performance enhancing upgrade'.
Very few changes will be be purely one or the other, most will have
some component of each.
D.
Derek Lyons
>The link between the MEDS upgrade being funded and the consequence of
>catastrophic failure of Columbia's wing was, and still is, offered as
>a simple fact.
It's an unproven theory, not a fact. That you cannot tell the
difference says much.
>I can understand how people can close off their minds to a case that
>is presented based only on the title, but I don't necessarily see that
>as being a problem with the choice of words in the title.
Except, that you haven't present a case.