Re: NASA Identifies Foam Flaw That Killed Astronauts
Nicholas Fitzpatrick
Bill Cantrell <nos...@nospam.com> wrote:
>
>NASA also hopes to recertify the 11 fuel tanks that were ready for
>flight prior to Columbia once modifications are made. Each tank
>represents about a $40 million investment.
Am I the only one who winces when I read that? Toss them all and
start from scratch. Asking for trouble ....
Nick
David A. Scott
news:b1aqh09r6bg5dk85o...@4ax.com:
>
> The damage went undetected during the shuttle's 16-day mission, but
> caused the nation's oldest spacecraft to break apart under the stress
> of re-entering the Earth's atmosphere on Feb. 1, killing the
> astronauts.
>
No the damage was detected or at least feared by the compedent
engineers. But management went out ot there why to make sure that
it was not obvious. The engineers even tried to by pass management
so that photos could be taken of wing like they did when a sentor
a on board. But it was stopped by management. I belive to this day
if a senator was on board they would have moved heaven and earth to
make sure things were ok. I think the NASA top management and a few
senator who voted no on NASA finding should take the next ride.
Other wise we may blow it again.
David A. Scott
--
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http://bijective.dogma.net/crypto/scott19u.zip
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Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"
bob haller
> No the damage was detected or at least feared by the compedent
>engineers. But management went out ot there why to make sure that
>it was not obvious. The engineers even tried to by pass management
>so that photos could be taken of wing like they did when a sentor
>a on board. But it was stopped by management. I belive to this day
>if a senator was on board they would have moved heaven and earth to
>make sure things were ok. I think the NASA top management and a few
>senator who voted no on NASA finding should take the next ride.
>Other wise we may blow it again.
>
>
>
>David A. Scott
>--
I agree with you,
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
Damon Hill
> Gaps, or voids, were often left, and tests done since the Columbia
> accident have shown liquid hydrogen could seep into those voids. After
> launch, the gas inside the voids starts to heat up and expand, causing
> large pieces of insulation to pop off.
Liquid hydrogen? Not hardly. I could believe liquified air, which
wouldn't be possible at the bipod area because that's at the LOX tank
level.
--Damon
bob haller
>> Gaps, or voids, were often left, and tests done since the Columbia
>> accident have shown liquid hydrogen could seep into those voids. After
>> launch, the gas inside the voids starts to heat up and expand, causing
>> large pieces of insulation to po
I wonder if this rather late revelation had something to do with that lawsuit
about the bolts?
Public perception wise it would be bad to say we tried to save some money on
the bolts, and the new manufacturer screwed up, costing a irreplaceable orbiter
and 7 lives....
I only wonder this now because the news came so late......
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
Mike Scott
but it would have been a moot point. The Columbia was in no position to
"hold"
in orbit while we attempted some makeshift rescue, and alternative re-entry
profiles would not significantly help.
Mike Scott
USA Space Shuttle Flight Design and Dynamics
bob haller
>We might have done everything we could to take photos and the other things,
>but it would have been a moot point. The Columbia was in no position to
>"hold"
>in orbit while we attempted some makeshift rescue, and alternative re-entry
>profiles would not significantly help.
>
>
>Mike Scott
The safety board found there may well have been enough time to launch a rescue
shuttle if the trouble had been identified early and the ship largely opowered
down to savwe consumables
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
David A. Scott
news:nOBTc.414$3O3...@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
> We might have done everything we could to take photos and the other
> things, but it would have been a moot point. The Columbia was in no
> position to "hold"
> in orbit while we attempted some makeshift rescue, and alternative
> re-entry profiles would not significantly help.
>
>
Not true it was brought up here that there was time for another
mission. Also Nasa use to brag about how they could alter the return
path so as to minimize the stress on the wing. They might had ligthed
the craft. Your answser seems to me to imply there lives not worth
saving. I still feel if a senator on board or one the managers kids
they may have actually saved ther lives. At least it would make many
americans fell like they gave a damn instead of what happened.
You really think it was not worth trying. Don't you realize
Americans would be more able to except there deaths if at least
we tried, But instead managers did everythink to hinder trying to
help. I sure as hell never want to follow a leader like you I want
leaders that at least try.
Even if your a cold hearted person who cares nothing for saving
there lives. We could have a better idea of the damage before it
burned up maybe some future astronaunts lives would be safer if only
we had management that cared enough to try.
Craig Fink
Hi Mike,
You've just stated the reason why there are no pictures taken, as
explained by Ron Dittimore right after the disaster.
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=QmI3b.185%24Lk5.34%40newsread3.news.pas.earthlink.net
I call it, "Dead Men Orbiting and Plausible Deniability", a self
fulfilling prophecy. Not a pretty picture. Why bother working to save
"Dead Men Orbiting" while there is still 16 days to work on "Plausible
Deniability?"
Rescue was plausible, as well as onorbit repair. The Orbiter contains all
kinds of high temperature materials that could have been used to make a
jury rig patch that would have minimized damage during entry.
BTW, there was an alternative re-entry profile. The first one that comes
to my mind is landing at Edwards, to minimize the exposure of people who
are not in the space program (Hence the CAIB recommendation).
Probably a good enough reason all by itself to take a few pictures.
Looks like NASA needs to spend a little more time and money working on
cultural changes (a good thing).
Craig Fink
Craig Fink
They also found that the repair option probably had a much better chance
of success than the little bit of half-hearted post-disaster analysis that
NASA did.
Craig Fink
Paul F. Dietz
> Looks like NASA needs to spend a little more time and money working on
> cultural changes (a good thing).
And the first step in this direction is termination of the shuttle program.
NASA has for two decades been assigned the task of squaring the shuttle circle,
and all the organizational pathologies trace back to this.
Paul
bob haller
>NASA has for two decades been assigned the task of squaring the shuttle
>circle,
>and all the organizational pathologies trace back to this.
>
> Paul
I AGREE! Launch just ISS modules, service hubble and ground the fleet ASAP.
how many more module flights are needed?
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
Mike Scott
> of success than the little bit of half-hearted post-disaster analysis that
> NASA did.
>
What repair option?
Mike Scott
> path so as to minimize the stress on the wing. They might had ligthed
> the craft.
My group is the one who did the study on entry heating and it was determined
that
any alternate entry profile would reduce the heat load by less than 10%.
That's
not enough to help the situation that happened with Columbia. As for
lightening
the load, that is a risky procedure by itself. All of the speculation about
what
NASA did or did not do is meaningless to Columbia because NASA did not
know there was a problem. Several people THOUGHT there MIGHT be
a problem, but there was no engineering evidence to support the claims.
That's
the paradox that lead to the unfortunate outcome. That's why the dissenting
opinions did not get as far as they should. Unfortunately it costs lots of
money
to go follow every concern, and that's something that NASA is short on. The
NASA managers understand that. We wish we had unliminted funds to go
do all sorts of tests like shooting foam at wing leading edges, but we
don't.
We have to work within a limited framework of knowledge and funding. That
makes it more dangerous. It would be extremely dangerous even if we could
do all that testing.
Jorge R. Frank
>> They also found that the repair option probably had a much better
>> chance of success than the little bit of half-hearted post-disaster
>> analysis that NASA did.
>
> What repair option?
http://www.caib.us/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf
See pp. 173-174 of the PDF for discussion of the rescue/repair options.
However, Craig has it backward here. Both NASA and the CAIB concluded that
"the rescue option had a considerably higher chance of bringing Columbia's
crew back alive."
Furthermore, the work that NASA has done on RCC repair since the
publication of the CAIB report reinforces the position that the repair
option had no possibility of saving the crew. See p. 82 of the report and
note the cracks and delaminations surrounding the impact hole. Tests in
JSC's arcjet facility show that RCC panels will fail rapidly along these
crack/delamination lines, negating the effects of any repair.
--
JRF
Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.
Mike Scott
> kinds of high temperature materials that could have been used to make a
> jury rig patch that would have minimized damage during entry.
On-orbit repair was not possible for several reasons, one being the lack of
materials, procedures, and tools needed for such a repair.
Can you fill me in on your idea of what they could have used to jury rig an
RCC panel?
> BTW, there was an alternative re-entry profile. The first one that comes
> to my mind is landing at Edwards, to minimize the exposure of people who
> are not in the space program (Hence the CAIB recommendation).
Landing at Edwards would not have helped the Columbia not break up.
Besides, changing landing sites to protect people on the ground would not
have been done unless NASA knew a threat existed. They didn't know
in this case.
Derek Lyons
>However, Craig has it backward here. Both NASA and the CAIB concluded that
>"the rescue option had a considerably higher chance of bringing Columbia's
>crew back alive."
If you accepted several optimistic assumptions and if nothing else
went wrong.
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
Derek Lyons
They trace back even further... Well into the Apollo years.
David A. Scott
>> Also Nasa use to brag about how they could alter the return
>> path so as to minimize the stress on the wing. They might had ligthed
>> the craft.
>
> My group is the one who did the study on entry heating and it was
> determined that
> any alternate entry profile would reduce the heat load by less than
> 10%. That's
> not enough to help the situation that happened with Columbia. As for
No one has any true idea of the extent of the damange. Management
made sure of that. If its true that there could have been even a 9.9%
change that may have been enough to prevent the destruction. Thanks to the
head in the ground approach of nasa management we will never know. I use
to work on simulations too so big deal there are a lot of unknowns and one
of the biggest unknowns in this case was what was the true extent of
damage after launch. It was obvious there was some but managent did its
best to not find out.
One of the old lines I use to hear at work is that simulations are
like masturbation if one does it often enough one confuses it for the
real thing which it isn't.
> lightening
> the load, that is a risky procedure by itself. All of the speculation
> about what
More risky than what happened? I don't think so.
> NASA did or did not do is meaningless to Columbia because NASA did not
> know there was a problem. Several people THOUGHT there MIGHT be
> a problem, but there was no engineering evidence to support the
> claims. That's
You mean managenment did there best to keep ensingeers from getting
the evidence. Obviously they knew something wrong from examing the take
off data. Thats why the engineers begged for more data.
> the paradox that lead to the unfortunate outcome. That's why the
> dissenting opinions did not get as far as they should. Unfortunately
> it costs lots of money
> to go follow every concern, and that's something that NASA is short
> on. The NASA managers understand that. We wish we had unliminted
Bull. NASA management went of there way to stop the miltary from
taking data the engineers wanted. The only money it cose was the phone
call telling the military to stop since from all indications they were
about to do it. You can't blame all of NASA management faults on lack
of money. But even you have to admit when engineers who at risk to
there jobs went aroung management to try to get data. It cost NASA
nothing. I use to work on remote sites. When they get bored they take
pictures of anything. I am sure many would have jumped at the chance
money to NASA was not the issue.
> funds to go do all sorts of tests like shooting foam at wing leading
> edges, but we don't.
That money could have been saved if they examimed the craft in space.
Second it my understanding the NASA trying there best to be PC changed
the way foam appllies to prevent green house gases being used. When
they has a wavier. Apparently NASA had enough money to try to please
the environmentilists at the expense of doing it right.
> We have to work within a limited framework of knowledge and funding.
> That makes it more dangerous. It would be extremely dangerous even if
> we could do all that testing.
>
When I worked at NASA I meet some old timers who told me I would
have liked the good ole days when job one was the goal. They claimed
NASA was a poor shadow of itself. I think the problem from there
prospective was that big money corporations where calling the shots
instead of these truely concerned who use to work there its poilitics.
And yes I did work at NASA as a contractor when I retired from China
Lake.
> Mike Scott
> USA Space Shuttle Flight Design and Dynamics
>
>
>
David A. Scott
MasterShrink
>I AGREE! Launch just ISS modules, service hubble and ground the fleet ASAP.
But, that's what they are doing....(well, except for the HST part).
-A.L.
Paul F. Dietz
>>My group is the one who did the study on entry heating and it was
>>determined that
>>any alternate entry profile would reduce the heat load by less than
>>10%. That's
>>not enough to help the situation that happened with Columbia. As for
>
>
> No one has any true idea of the extent of the damange. Management
> made sure of that. If its true that there could have been even a 9.9%
> change that may have been enough to prevent the destruction.
This is just wrong. There is conclusive evidence that there was a large,
preexisting hole in the RCC. Anything less would not have caused
the forward spar to burn through so quickly (and that burnthrough
is well-documented in the data recovered from that tape recorder.)
Given that, a 10% change in heat rate would have only moved the time
of breakup a little bit, if at all. By the time the shuttle broke up,
the wing had already been catastrophically damaged, well beyond the point
that it could have survived the maximum load that would have been put on it
later in the reentry.
Paul
Herb Schaltegger
"David A. Scott" <daVvid_...@email.com> wrote:
(snipped delusional ranting)
> Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
> made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
That would explain a lot.
> As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
> system is only as strong as its weakest link"
Now I remember why I had you killfiled and just another reason why I
should never set my killfiles to expire after 30 days of nonuse. Won't
make that mistake again.
<PLONK>
--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
"Never underestimate the power of human stupidity."
~ Robert A. Heinlein
<http://www.angryherb.net>
Jorge R. Frank
news:Xns9546B14AB576FH1...@130.133.1.4:
> "Mike Scott" <mike_...@earthlink.net> wrote in
> news:V_MTc.22897$9Y6....@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
>>> Also Nasa use to brag about how they could alter the return
>>> path so as to minimize the stress on the wing. They might had
>>> ligthed the craft.
>>
>> My group is the one who did the study on entry heating and it was
>> determined that
>> any alternate entry profile would reduce the heat load by less than
>> 10%. That's
>> not enough to help the situation that happened with Columbia. As for
>
> No one has any true idea of the extent of the damange.
The exact extent, no, but the weight of the evidence (aerothermal,
telemetry, recovered debris, analysis of the "flight day 2 object" radar
data) all points to a 6-10 inch hole on the underside of RCC panel 8L. No
modifications to the entry profile would have made any real difference with
that amount of damage.
> Second it my understanding the NASA trying there best to be PC changed
> the way foam appllies to prevent green house gases being used.
That did not contribute to the accident, however. The change in blowing
agent (from CFC-11 to HCFC-141b) affected only mechanically applied foam.
The foam that struck Columbia's wing came from the bipod ramp, which was
hand-sprayed. Those were still applied using CFC-11. (See CAIB vol. 1, p.
129 for discussion). This has not, of course, stopped certain publications
from claiming it as a cause of the accident. I suspect that has more to do
with those publications' political agendas than any other reason.
Mike Scott
"David A. Scott" <daVvid_...@email.com> wrote in message
news:Xns9546B14AB576FH1...@130.133.1.4...
>
> No one has any true idea of the extent of the damange. Management
> made sure of that. If its true that there could have been even a 9.9%
> change that may have been enough to prevent the destruction.
I agree that nobody knows exactly what condition the wing leading edge
was in upon re-entry, but most of the evidence points to some serious
problems
that would have surfaced a little later (at best) in an alternate entry
profile.
Regarding the managers: I don't believe there is one person working for
NASA that would intentionally suppress information that they knew was
imperative for safety. The problem, as I have stated before, was that there
was no engineering evidence to support the damage claim.
As for management not acting upon advice of engineers who were more in-tune
with what might actually be happening with the vehicle - that's a problem
that I
blame more on human character than on wrong NASA thinking. It is human
nature
to assume that since something has happened safely over 100 times it is
probably
safe this time. For example, after getting on a motorcycle over 100 times
in my life,
I have a reasonable expectation that the 101st time will not result in an
accident. On
the other hand, if I crashed every other time I rode the bike, I might be
more
cautious. Also remember that almost all the discussion about what SHOULD
have
been done is carried out with the treasure of hindsight. Also remember that
on
each and every flight there are people who think they have identified a
safety concern.
The items of concern almost never lead to the destruction of the vehicle,
but sometimes they
do. Judgement on which concerns should be followed is extremely difficult
without
engineering data.
> You mean managenment did there best to keep ensingeers from getting
> the evidence. Obviously they knew something wrong from examing the take
> off data. Thats why the engineers begged for more data.
There was no "takeoff" data to analyze except some grainy film. Notheing
unusual registered on any accelerometers or in flight control downlinked
telemetry.
By the way, there were fewer and fewer camers as the years went by because
of budgetary cuts (see previous post).
> NASA management went of there way to stop the miltary from
> taking data the engineers wanted.
I'm not 100% positive on what happened with this, but I believe
the managers did not approve the request for photos. I do not
think they asked the militry to not take photos.
> That money could have been saved if they examimed the craft in space.
... again, IF they knew they had a problem
> Second it my understanding the NASA trying there best to be PC changed
> the way foam appllies to prevent green house gases being used. When
> they has a wavier. Apparently NASA had enough money to try to please
> the environmentilists at the expense of doing it right.
The change was to the chemical makeup of the foam. I agree with you 100%
on the point of being PC. However, NASA is at the mercy of
politics - and environmental groups are wielding stronger and stronger
political power these days - power to affect budgets.
> When I worked at NASA I meet some old timers who told me I would
> have liked the good ole days when job one was the goal. They claimed
> NASA was a poor shadow of itself. >
> David A. Scott
I grieve the loss of the good old days with you - when things got done
without mountains of red tape. However, NASA operates fearing its
own end at any time, and must adhere to a different style of business
these days due to external political forces.
David A. Scott
news:Xns9546EAC5...@216.196.97.130:
>
> The exact extent, no, but the weight of the evidence (aerothermal,
> telemetry, recovered debris, analysis of the "flight day 2 object"
> radar data) all points to a 6-10 inch hole on the underside of RCC
> panel 8L. No modifications to the entry profile would have made any
> real difference with that amount of damage.
>
>
You don't know it might have been a 4 inch hole that ripped a little
more. The fact is nothing was tried becauce the actions of an uncaring
egotisic management prevented engineers from getting an accurate assement
of the true extent of the damages. A previous poster claining to say he
worked for NASA said that the effects could have been reduced by about
10% plus there was tine for a resuce of NASA had been on the ball.
David A. Scott
>
> As for management not acting upon advice of engineers who were more
> in-tune with what might actually be happening with the vehicle -
> that's a problem that I
> blame more on human character than on wrong NASA thinking. It is
> human nature
> to assume that since something has happened safely over 100 times it
> is probably
> safe this time.
I disagree. I saw the difference in the Navy how it did things from
earilier years and I suspect political corectness in management has
dome the same for NASA. It takes many hard years as an engineer
working with real problems to understand this. A young manager with an
ego and no real world hard engineering experience should not be in
charge of any real life and death desicions.
Fire the management that screwed up or they will do it again like
the last two times. To be honest I don't think NASA has learned its
lesson. If all they can do on this group is to say they did the
correct thing by sitting on there asses since they would have died
anyway. This is not the kind of people NASA needs. You must be a
Scott from distant branch of the scott tree than me.
Andrew Gray
>
> You don't know it might have been a 4 inch hole that ripped a little
> more. The fact is nothing was tried becauce the actions of an uncaring
> egotisic management prevented engineers from getting an accurate assement
> of the true extent of the damages. A previous poster claining to say he
> worked for NASA said that the effects could have been reduced by about
> 10% plus there was tine for a resuce of NASA had been on the ball.
You might find it educational to read the CAIB report in detail; "time
for a rescue" would more accurately be termed "time for an attempt at a
rescue" and "on the ball" might more producitvely be thought of as
"near-psychic". The scenario relies on a lot of things going right; it's
an interesting case study, but...
Also: she started breaking up over the West, debris impacting in Texas.
"Effects reduced by 10%" is a lovely phrase, but functionally
meaningless - what, so the major debris field hits Mississippi instead?
--
-Andrew Gray
andre...@dunelm.org.uk
bob haller
>bob haller wrote:
>
>> I AGREE! Launch just ISS modules, service hubble and ground the fleet ASAP.
>
>
> Date: 13 Aug 2004 11:24:21 GMT
> Subject: Re: Hubble man vs robot repair
> Message-ID: <20040813072421...@mb-m17.aol.com>
>
> Remaining shuttles at most should be completely automated, and send
> the crews up on soyuz, or a new us launcher.
>
> President whoever to nasa.
>
> You will fly no more people onboard the shuttle, automate it and build
> a new manned capsule. You get to fly people once the new manned
> launcher is complete.
>
>As you see, my dog didn't eat the message-id.
>
>So, on one hand you say to fly, both to ISS and HST, which makes you more
>risk
>taking than NASA. On the other hand you are issuing a Presidential Decree
>that says no more manned flight, making you less risk taking than NASA.
>
>You are self-contradictory.
>
> [ insert Flipper theme song here ]
>
>--
>rk, Just an OldEngineer
Well I think either will e better than the existing situation. I prefer
converting shuttle to unmanned only, and honestly think nasa prefers it too,
over just grounding the vehicle permanetely.
although it would be expensive, a unmanned shuttle might remain past 2010 for
special jobs.
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
bob haller
How many think the 2010 deadline will be honored?
next spring we return to flying. a few months later some new safety concerns
surface. The fleet gets grounded for 4 months. this reoccurs regurally. the
station build flights fall seriously behind. 2010 is a pipe dream.....
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
Craig Fink
> "Mike Scott" <mike_...@earthlink.net> wrote in
> news:FSMTc.637$3O...@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
>>> They also found that the repair option probably had a much better
>>> chance of success than the little bit of half-hearted post-disaster
>>> analysis that NASA did.
>>
>> What repair option?
>
> http://www.caib.us/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf
>
> See pp. 173-174 of the PDF for discussion of the rescue/repair options.
>
> However, Craig has it backward here. Both NASA and the CAIB concluded
that
Let's keep it in context.
Beginning of paragraph:
"The repair option (see Figure 6.4-1). while logistically viable using
existing materials onboard Columbia, relied on so many uncertainties that
NASA rated this option "high risk."
...lot of word describing what NASA looked at...
"Because the NASA team could not verify that the repairs would survive
even a modified re-entry,
> the rescue option had a considerably higher chance of bringing
> Columbia's crew back alive."
End of paragraph
In my view, the CAIB was being nice to NASA and it's repair option study,
but they viewed it's chances of working "considerably higher" than what
NASA came up with. NASA said "high risk" (don't do that), CAIB said
"considerably higher chance of success" (do that). Medium, possibly low
risk.
This is understandable when the actual on-orbit repair option study is
looked at.
In the study, NASA did not consider even using some of the best material
that was on-board, graphite composite. The graphite having a sublimation
temperature of 6000 degrees, if the oxygen can be kept off it. While the
epoxy resin is of little value, the carbon was some of the best stuff they
had. With a layer of quartz fiber cloth in front of it to keep the oxygen
off, it would have protected everything behind it.
> Furthermore, the work that NASA has done on RCC repair since the
> publication of the CAIB report reinforces the position that the repair
> option had no possibility of saving the crew. See p. 82 of the report
> and note the cracks and delaminations surrounding the impact hole. Tests
> in JSC's arcjet facility show that RCC panels will fail rapidly along
> these crack/delamination lines, negating the effects of any repair.
Sounds to me like a "control" test to me. Do nothing and the RCC panel
rapidly fails, exactly as it did. It would be interesting to read the
report, do you have a URL to this report? Was this test with or without a
blanket covering the damage? Does the arc jet accurately simulate simulate
the entry environment? Are the dynamic pressure, density, temperature
profiles and rates the same?
The CAIB had a lot of interesting presentations. In particular, the launch
pad paint chips eating holes in the RCC panels. The RCC panels didn't fail
as expected. Even though the holes were small, if the carbon-carbon in the
leading edge is exposed to the hot oxygen, it will burn. Making the holes
larger. But when the panels were analyzed, it was found that the SiC had
flowed into the small holes, and coated the carbon. Preventing the carbon
from burning.
A Jury Rigged repair, might have included wrapping the broken panel with
some of the quartz (Si) blankets. Essentially, the same stuff the tiles
are made of. Now during entry, the cracks which are exposed carbon (C),
are protected by quartz blankets (Si). The same two elements in SiC, which
are used to currently to protect the RCC panels. Si and SiC have similar
melting points and I suspect that hot Si + hot C might react to even equal
SiC, but don't really know.
How would Si blankets be held on?
Another interesting presentation at the CAIB talks about a gap between the
RCC panel and the upper panel of the wing. Keep it simple. Stuff the
blanket in the gap? Or, maybe stitch it to the upper wing blankets?
What about the bottom?
There are plenty of tiles to fasten the blanket too. Use screws, bolts, a
pencil. I'm sure they could have found something to stick into the soft
tiles to hold the blanket in place.
Won't the aerodynamic forces just rip the blanket off?
In the first part of entry, aerodynamic forces are near zero, and
temperatures of the plasma are at there highest. The blankets would tend
to melt and begin flowing, eventually coating the leading edge with a
thick layer of melted glass flowing an filling the cracks and sticking to
everything as the aerodynamic forces spreads it around.
Si, is a good insulator, after the surface melts, it'll take more and more
time for the heat to flow in and melt the next layer, and the next. Also,
it would be self leveling to some extent, anything sticking out in the
flow would melt much faster.
Later aerodynamic forces would tend to hold the blanket down, if it hasn't
all melted.
What about holes in the blanket after it melts?
Then all the stuffing in the wing comes into play, more blankets, graphite
epoxy stuff, titanium stuff, ice, water. Boiling water adds mass to the
flow and cools it. It adds a small amount of pressure reducing plasma flow
into the wing. Eventually, it will all boil off, but how much further in
entry are they? How much did it delay the first piece from coming off and
the vehicle unzipping from the inside? Probably quite a bit.
The vehicle began shedding pieces quite early while the dynamic pressure
was really low, making the hole much large even before the high heating
region when the dynamic pressure was much greater.
I think we still have a difference of opinion wrt the question, "Would
they have made it?"
Craig Fink
Vote Libertarian - Badnarik for President - The only third party candidate
that you can vote for in all fifty states!
http://www.opednews.com/sherry_081404_libertarian.htm
Jorge R. Frank
> "Jorge R. Frank" <jrf...@ibm-pc.borg> wrote in
> news:Xns9546EAC5...@216.196.97.130:
>
>> The exact extent, no, but the weight of the evidence (aerothermal,
>> telemetry, recovered debris, analysis of the "flight day 2 object"
>> radar data) all points to a 6-10 inch hole on the underside of RCC
>> panel 8L. No modifications to the entry profile would have made any
>> real difference with that amount of damage.
>
> You don't know it might have been a 4 inch hole that ripped a little
> more.
That is inconsistent with the radar analysis of the flight day 2 object.
The trouble with theories is that they must be consistent with *all* the
evidence in order to be true. Find one piece of contradictory evidence, and
the theory is falsified.
For all your bluster, you seem not to have read the CAIB report at all, or
at least to have absorbed what you have read.
Jeff Findley
"Nicholas Fitzpatrick" <nf...@sentex.ca> wrote in message
news:411d5a96$1...@news.sentex.net...
> In article <b1aqh09r6bg5dk85o...@4ax.com>,
> Bill Cantrell <nos...@nospam.com> wrote:
> >
> >NASA also hopes to recertify the 11 fuel tanks that were ready for
> >flight prior to Columbia once modifications are made. Each tank
> >represents about a $40 million investment.
>
> Am I the only one who winces when I read that? Toss them all and
> start from scratch. Asking for trouble ....
Dude, the AlLi tank isn't the problem, it's the foam insulation, especially
in certain areas. Scrape off the foam, clean the metal, and apply the foam
again with the newer, safer, techniques and bi-pod ramp design, and the
actual metal tank should be fine to fly.
Jeff
--
Remove icky phrase from email address to get a valid address.
Jeff Findley
> Gaps, or voids, were often left, and tests done since the Columbia
> accident have shown liquid hydrogen could seep into those voids. After
> launch, the gas inside the voids starts to heat up and expand, causing
> large pieces of insulation to pop off.
I thought that it was liquefied air (from outside the tank) that would find
its way into the voids since the liquid hydrogen is inside the metal tank?
Jeff Findley
"Mike Scott" <mike_...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:V_MTc.22897$9Y6....@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net...
> All of the speculation about
> what
> NASA did or did not do is meaningless to Columbia because NASA did not
> know there was a problem. Several people THOUGHT there MIGHT be
> a problem, but there was no engineering evidence to support the claims.
To be fair, film did show the impact of foam on the shuttle and there was no
solid "engineering evidence" suggesting that foam impacting the RCC was
safe.
I still remember STS-1 (as a child) and one of the biggest worries, at the
time, was the "tiles" protecting the shuttle on re-entry. Even then,
everyone convinced themselves that the "tiles" where the weakest link and
that the far harder RCC was nothing to worry about. It was a false
assumption that led to the loss of Columbia.
MasterShrink
>How many think the 2010 deadline will be honored?
I think it will go a year or two over that deadline because I am sure that
between RTF and the completion of ISS the Shuttle will have some kind of
problem that requires the fleet being grounded or what not.
>next spring we return to flying. a few months later some new safety concerns
>surface. The fleet gets grounded for 4 months. this reoccurs regurally. the
>station build flights fall seriously behind. 2010 is a pipe dream.....
You suggested that Shuttle just be used to build ISS and service HST and then
retired. NASA is only using shuttle for the former after which the orbiters
will be retired. How is the vehicle being grounded due to a safety matter an
example of NASA using the Shuttle for something beyond finishing ISS?
And also, would you rather NASA IGNORE a safety concern just for the sake of
finishing ISS by 2010?
-A.L.
Craig Fink
>
> "David A. Scott" <daVvid_...@email.com> wrote in message
> news:Xns9546B14AB576FH1...@130.133.1.4...
>>
>> No one has any true idea of the extent of the damange. Management
>> made sure of that. If its true that there could have been even a 9.9%
>> change that may have been enough to prevent the destruction.
>
> I agree that nobody knows exactly what condition the wing leading edge
> was in upon re-entry, but most of the evidence points to some serious
> problems
> that would have surfaced a little later (at best) in an alternate entry
> profile.
>
> Regarding the managers: I don't believe there is one person working for
> NASA that would intentionally suppress information that they knew was
> imperative for safety. The problem, as I have stated before, was that there
> was no engineering evidence to support the damage claim.
>
You should read the "Boeing" Report.
Penitration depth of the RCC is greater than the thickness of the RCC
panel.
Craig Fink
dave schneider
[...]
> How many think the 2010 deadline will be honored?
>
> next spring we return to flying. a few months later some new safety concerns
> surface. The fleet gets grounded for 4 months. this reoccurs regurally. the
> station build flights fall seriously behind. 2010 is a pipe dream.....
While it is true that the shuttle ages even when it doesn't fly, the
key part of the 2010 *target* is the number of flights, since most of
the shuttle's aging comes from the wear and stress of flight.
Stand-downs and groundings don't increase the number of flights.
So I'm not particularly concerned about 2010. Is there some evidence
that President Bush considers 2010 to be a hard limit, rather than a
target based on the expected assembly schedule?
/dps
Jorge R. Frank
news:28326d49.04081...@posting.google.com:
President Bush didn't set the 2010 deadline. The CAIB did, by recommending
a complete recertification (R9.2-1) if the fleet is to be flown past that
date. It was NASA's desire to avoid such an expensive recertification that
drove the 2010 retirement date.
Brian Thorn
<jrf...@ibm-pc.borg> wrote:
>President Bush didn't set the 2010 deadline. The CAIB did, by recommending
>a complete recertification (R9.2-1) if the fleet is to be flown past that
>date. It was NASA's desire to avoid such an expensive recertification that
>drove the 2010 retirement date.
Does the CAIB explain where the 2010 date comes from? Seems fairly
abirtrary to me.
Brian
Jorge R. Frank
Craig Fink
That's how long it takes to put up the rest of the space station.
Craig Fink
bob haller
>That's how long it takes to put up the rest of the space station.
>
>Craig Fink
>
not necessarily, since columbia we should of launched what 8 or 10 flights
construction zip.
2010 is a pipe dream.
be cautious and the date will slip dramatically
be not so cautious and another accident can ground the program again, causing
another date slip.
basically theres no way to know when ISS will be finished.
BTW orbiters troubles arent just all from flying, corrosion a major concern
occurs while sitting in a hangar. heck rubber products go bad sitting on a
shelf:(
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
bob haller
>You suggested that Shuttle just be used to build ISS and service HST and then
>retired. NASA is only using shuttle for the former after which the orbiters
>will be retired. How is the vehicle being grounded due to a safety matter an
>example of NASA using the Shuttle for something beyond finishing ISS?
>
>And also, would you rather NASA IGNORE a safety concern just for the sake of
>finishing ISS by 2010?
>
>-A.L.
>
My point is 2010 date will come and go while the shuttle continues flying!
The end of shuttle is a MAJOR workforce reduction! shuttle will still be flying
when new manned launcher begins operating.
management will be very cautious for good reasons.
they dont want to loose another vehicle
they really dont want the big layoff.
bottom line they dont want shuttle to quit flying
so there will be lots of stand downs, and the station completion date will slip
endlessely.
remember this in 2015 when retirement hasnt occured yet....
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
Mark
> My point is 2010 date will come and go while the shuttle continues flying!
Which politician do you think is going to take responsibility for
flying thirty-year-old shuttles past 2010, now that that is the
announced retirement date? Who'd have the balls to allow them to
continue flying and risk losing another orbiter and crew?
Mark
Dan Foster
One of the major limiting factors for vehicle lifetime appears to be the
simple fact that the corrosive salty air of coastal Florida has been
doing a nasty job on the interior orbiter frame.
IIRC, some time before STS-107, we had a regular s.s.s poster whom
worked on the vehicles at the time, and had mentioned this as being a
known issue.
This person also thought that (as of year 2000 or so) they could perhaps
last another 10-15 years more before the corrosion got too severe.
Is that 2010 date arbitrary? Sure. But would appear to represent a
balance between economics, goals, and safety in which all can be
satisfied. Besides, it gives NASA time to gear up for Odyssey Two. :-)
-Dan
MasterShrink
>My point is 2010 date will come and go while the shuttle continues flying!
Likely because ISS won't be finished.
>The end of shuttle is a MAJOR workforce reduction! shuttle will still be
>flying
>when new manned launcher begins operating.
>
>management will be very cautious for good reasons.
>
>they dont want to loose another vehicle
>they really dont want the big layoff.
>bottom line they dont want shuttle to quit flying
>
>so there will be lots of stand downs, and the station completion date will
>slip
>endlessely.
>
>remember this in 2015 when retirement hasnt occured yet....
Are you suggesting NASA management will withhold ISS components from being
launched just to keep shuttle flying? Do you realize how stupid that is?
Because that is the only way, barring safety concerns (which would be a damn
legitimate reason for not flying) for ISS not being completed ever.
-A.L.
Vello
the ET, not on inner surface of just directly on LOX and hydrogen tanks? Was
there something different with first shuttle starts - if I remember
correctly, ET was not of orange color?
Best,
Vello
"Mike Scott" <mike_...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:93NTc.22909$9Y6....@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net...
> > Rescue was plausible, as well as onorbit repair. The Orbiter contains
all
> > kinds of high temperature materials that could have been used to make a
> > jury rig patch that would have minimized damage during entry.
>
> On-orbit repair was not possible for several reasons, one being the lack
of
> materials, procedures, and tools needed for such a repair.
> Can you fill me in on your idea of what they could have used to jury rig
an
> RCC panel?
>
> > BTW, there was an alternative re-entry profile. The first one that comes
> > to my mind is landing at Edwards, to minimize the exposure of people who
> > are not in the space program (Hence the CAIB recommendation).
>
> Landing at Edwards would not have helped the Columbia not break up.
> Besides, changing landing sites to protect people on the ground would not
> have been done unless NASA knew a threat existed. They didn't know
> in this case.
>
> Mike Scott
> USA Space Shuttle Flight Design and Dynamics
>
>
Jeff Findley
"Vello" <vell...@hot.ee> wrote in message
news:41223...@news.estpak.ee...
> One simple, probably stupid question: why the hell if foam isolation
outside
> the ET, not on inner surface of just directly on LOX and hydrogen tanks?
Was
> there something different with first shuttle starts - if I remember
> correctly, ET was not of orange color?
The tank is all there is. It's on the outside for a few reasons. One is
that it keeps the aluminum (now AlLi) tank cold. This increases the
strength of the aluminum so you can make the tanks thinner and lighter than
if they were at room temperature.
Another reason to put it on the outside is that it protects the tank against
aerodynamic heating during ascent. Again, this keeps the metal colder and
stronger.
Derek Lyons
>One simple, probably stupid question: why the hell if foam isolation outside
>the ET, not on inner surface of just directly on LOX and hydrogen tanks? Was
>there something different with first shuttle starts - if I remember
>correctly, ET was not of orange color?
Jeff covered the other points; however on the issue of color, the
first few tanks were painted. They stopped painting them when it
became clear the paint provided no benifit, and a drawback in the form
of weight.
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
bob haller
>Are you suggesting NASA management will withhold ISS components from being
>launched just to keep shuttle flying? Do you realize how stupid that is?
>Because that is the only way, barring safety concerns (which would be a damn
>legitimate reason for not flying) for ISS not being completed ever.
>
>-A.L.
No I am stating the 2010 date is totally smoke and mirrors. Management will be
careful, with lots of stand downs for safety, and the station completion date
will stretch on and on and on...
for valid legit reasons that also happen to keep people working. if you think
about it iots obvious....
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
hop
>
> The tank is all there is. It's on the outside for a few reasons. One is
> that it keeps the aluminum (now AlLi) tank cold. This increases the
> strength of the aluminum so you can make the tanks thinner and lighter than
> if they were at room temperature.
>
However, it is worth noting that shedding on the *inside* is quite
likely to be just as much of a problem as shedding on the outside.
Chunks of foam clogging your inlet, or being injested by a turbopump
would most likely be a Very Bad Day. A number of rocket failures have
been blamed on internal FOD. Designing an insulation to survive and
adhere while immersed in LH2 is likely non-trivial.
Brian Thorn
wrote:
>Finally, recertification is but one aspect of a Service Life Ex-tension
>Program that is essential if the Shuttle is to continue operating for another
>10 to 20 years.
Okay, then shouldn't the "recert required" date have been 2013?
>R9.2-1 Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010,
That's only seven years after their report. Seems internally
inconsistent to me.
Brian
Brian Thorn
wrote:
>> Does the CAIB explain where the 2010 date comes from? Seems fairly
>> abirtrary to me.
>
>
>That's how long it takes to put up the rest of the space station.
Care to wager on that? My bet is on 2012 for completion.
Brian
hop
>
> that it keeps the aluminum (now AlLi) tank cold. This increases the
> strength of the aluminum so you can make the tanks thinner and lighter than
> if they were at room temperature.
>
hop
>
> that it keeps the aluminum (now AlLi) tank cold. This increases the
> strength of the aluminum so you can make the tanks thinner and lighter than
> if they were at room temperature.
>
JazzMan
And a couple of years after that ISS will be at the end
of it's life according to NASA and will be deorbited. No
ISS, no shuttle, no meaningful exploratory and scienctific
American presence in space.
So much for that.
JazzMan
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Jorge R. Frank
> Craig Fink wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, 16 Aug 2004 22:12:32 -0500, Brian Thorn wrote:
>>
>> > On Mon, 16 Aug 2004 19:30:22 -0500, "Jorge R. Frank"
>> > <jrf...@ibm-pc.borg> wrote:
>> >
>> >>President Bush didn't set the 2010 deadline. The CAIB did, by
>> >>recommending a complete recertification (R9.2-1) if the fleet is to
>> >>be flown past that date. It was NASA's desire to avoid such an
>> >>expensive recertification that drove the 2010 retirement date.
>> >
>> > Does the CAIB explain where the 2010 date comes from? Seems fairly
>> > abirtrary to me.
>>
>> That's how long it takes to put up the rest of the space station.
>>
>
>
> And a couple of years after that ISS will be at the end
> of it's life according to NASA and will be deorbited.
Where'd you get that? According to NASA, the US will remain an ISS partner
until 2016.
Vello
"Derek Lyons" <fair...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:41225d3a...@supernews.seanet.com...
One more simple silly idea: nobody in aviation and space exploration had put
foam islation outside as it is fragile per se. Probably calculations about
what we save in structural weight are pointless now when life is made clear
such a fragile material just not work out on surface (I read losing pieces
of foam is common case with Shuttle, just lethal result was first time.
Jorge R. Frank
> "Derek Lyons" <fair...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:41225d3a...@supernews.seanet.com...
>> "Vello" <vell...@hot.ee> wrote:
>>
>> >One simple, probably stupid question: why the hell if foam isolation
> outside
>> >the ET, not on inner surface of just directly on LOX and hydrogen
>> >tanks?
> Was
>> >there something different with first shuttle starts - if I remember
>> >correctly, ET was not of orange color?
>>
>> Jeff covered the other points; however on the issue of color, the
>> first few tanks were painted. They stopped painting them when it
>> became clear the paint provided no benifit, and a drawback in the
>> form of weight.
>
> One more simple silly idea: nobody in aviation and space exploration
> had put foam islation outside as it is fragile per se.
Nope, incorrect. The Saturn V's S-II stage had foam on the exterior. So
does the Delta 4, I think.
Mike Scott
"David A. Scott" <daVvid_...@email.com> wrote in message
news:Xns9546EA2A88101H1...@130.133.1.4...
> To be honest I don't think NASA has learned its
> lesson. If all they can do on this group is to say they did the
> correct thing by sitting on there asses since they would have died
> anyway. This is not the kind of people NASA needs. You must be a
> Scott from distant branch of the scott tree than me.
I'm not saying that inaction was appropriate given the advantage of
hindsight that we now have. I'm simply saying that the inaction
should be understandable given human nature and the fact
that there was no engineering evidence to support a damage claim.
As for the family tree - if you are into genealogy I'll be happy to
compare notes with you.
JazzMan
> > One more simple silly idea: nobody in aviation and space exploration
> > had put foam islation outside as it is fragile per se.
>
> Nope, incorrect. The Saturn V's S-II stage had foam on the exterior. So
> does the Delta 4, I think.
>
Yes, and on those two craft it makes not one whit of difference
if the foam comes off during launch.
Craig Fink
True, but there are other ways to keep the skin cold. Just because NASA
choose one many years ago, doesn't mean that's the only way to do it.
I like the following analogy.
Numbed by flying in a blinded by a blizzard of snow, NASA just couldn't
see how a snowball could break the vehicle.
Well, NASA's solution, remove all the snowballs from the ET, but leave the
blizzard of snow. No snowballs, no problem. True, as long as there are no
rock in that blinding blizzard of snow. The rocks might be ice. Their
saving grace, they are going to do a preflight check (walk around)
on-orbit before entry.
The space station allows the shuttle mission to be view differently.
Instead of a single flight that includes three phases (ascent, on-orbit,
entry), it can be viewed as two flights with a stop at a remote outpost.
Like an airliner flight to a third world country with very limited
maintenance facilities. A thorough preflight check can be performed at
both airports, but only rudimentary maintenance can be performed at one of
them. If the aircraft is too damaged, they can always choose not to fly
the second leg, or delay the flight and fly in spare parts.
A paradigm shift.
This paradigm shift really gives the space station purpose if we go back
to the Moon or Mars.
If there is another disaster, it's cause will most likely be something
totally different. But, there just aren't that many flights left, so
hopefully everything will go well.
Craig Fink
Badnarik for President. A vote for the RepublicRat or the DemoCans is a
wasted vote. A vote for the status quo.
http://www.augustafreepress.com/stories/storyReader$25066
Craig Fink
> On Tue, 17 Aug 2004 13:20:15 -0400, Jeff Findley wrote:
>
>
>> "Vello" <vell...@hot.ee> wrote in message
>> news:41223...@news.estpak.ee...
>>> One simple, probably stupid question: why the hell if foam isolation
>> outside
>>> the ET, not on inner surface of just directly on LOX and hydrogen
>>> tanks?
>> Was
>>> there something different with first shuttle starts - if I remember
>>> correctly, ET was not of orange color?
>>
>> The tank is all there is. It's on the outside for a few reasons. One
>> is that it keeps the aluminum (now AlLi) tank cold. This increases the
>> strength of the aluminum so you can make the tanks thinner and lighter
>> than if they were at room temperature.
>>
>> Another reason to put it on the outside is that it protects the tank
>> against aerodynamic heating during ascent. Again, this keeps the metal
>> colder and stronger.
>>
>>
> True, but there are other ways to keep the skin cold. Just because NASA
> choose one many years ago, doesn't mean that's the only way to do it.
>
> I like the following analogy.
>
Oops, it reads much better this way.
Numbed by flying in a blinding blizzard of snow, NASA just couldn't
David A. Scott
>
> One more simple silly idea: nobody in aviation and space exploration
> had put foam islation outside as it is fragile per se. Probably
> calculations about what we save in structural weight are pointless now
> when life is made clear such a fragile material just not work out on
> surface (I read losing pieces of foam is common case with Shuttle,
> just lethal result was first time.
>
>
I have a bad feeling that if MASA addresses the foam issue they
will screw it up since manageers lack engineering sense. One example
is it might be better to make a foam that quickly comes off before
there is enough speed to allow it to gain energy it would save wieght
its really not needed in flight. But its the kind of solution managment
would veto they only like costely solutions.
David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://bijective.dogma.net/crypto/scott19u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"
MasterShrink
>
>No I am stating the 2010 date is totally smoke and mirrors. Management will
>be
>careful, with lots of stand downs for safety, and the station completion date
>will stretch on and on and on...
So, you are saying NASA will be delibertly with-holding ISS components from
launching. That is the only way ISS completion will stretch on and on is iff
the necessary modules just sit here on Earth.
Will these safety concerns just be pulled out of managements ass? Since ISS
construction began, all delays have been caused by damned legitimate safety
concerns. The near-miss on STS 93, the cracks found in the Shuttle fleet's
plumbing, and now the loss of Columbia. Were these examples of management
intentionally delaying ISS construction?
And if so, then why did the CAIB accuse NASA of compromising safety to complete
ISS?
-A.L.
Vello
"hop" <hellso...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:afd00ef7.04081...@posting.google.com...
> >
> If I recall correctly, some boosters have used intank insulation.
>
> However, it is worth noting that shedding on the *inside* is quite
> likely to be just as much of a problem as shedding on the outside.
> Chunks of foam clogging your inlet, or being injested by a turbopump
> would most likely be a Very Bad Day. A number of rocket failures have
> been blamed on internal FOD. Designing an insulation to survive and
> adhere while immersed in LH2 is likely non-trivial.
Is there any else fast-moving-in-the-air object designed with foam on
surface? What is the "inlet" on non-breathing, i.e. rocket space device?
Just wondering.
dave schneider
> I have a bad feeling that if MASA addresses the foam issue they
> will screw it up since manageers lack engineering sense. One example
> is it might be better to make a foam that quickly comes off before
> there is enough speed to allow it to gain energy it would save wieght
> its really not needed in flight. But its the kind of solution managment
> would veto they only like costely solutions.
I see you still have an open mind about NASA managers....
And isn't the foam needed up to Max Q to avoid heating the tank from
atmospheric friction? Seems to me that some of the engineers familiar
with ET issues have indicated that in this newsgroup before.
/dps
David A. Scott
news:28326d49.04081...@posting.google.com:
>
> And isn't the foam needed up to Max Q to avoid heating the tank from
> atmospheric friction? Seems to me that some of the engineers familiar
> with ET issues have indicated that in this newsgroup before.
>
>
I am sure it was brought up before. But it my understanding since the
tanks are being rapidly emptied if anything any additional heating would
actaully be more of a help in emptying the tanks.
hop
>
> Is there any else fast-moving-in-the-air object designed with foam on
> surface?
I can't think of many. Aside from rockets and spacecraft (which
sometimes do) the only fast-moving-in-the-air things I can think of
are aircraft and bullets/cannon shells. A few aircraft have exotic
coatings, but I don't think most of them would qualify as foam. But as
I understand it, the problem on the ETs has less to do with moving
fast through the air than the extreme temperature range, and the
accompanying possibility of condensed air in voids in the foam going
from liquid to gas.
> What is the "inlet" on non-breathing, i.e. rocket space device?
> Just wondering.
By inlet, I meant the where the fuel (or oxidizer) is taken out of the
tank.
BTW, I apologize for the triple post on the previous reply. Silly me
for assuming the error meant the message hadn't been posted...
bob haller
>So, you are saying NASA will be delibertly with-holding ISS components from
>launching. That is the only way ISS completion will stretch on and on is iff
>the necessary modules just sit here on Earth.
>
>Will these safety concerns just be pulled out of managements ass? Since ISS
>construction began, all delays have been caused by damned legitimate safety
>concerns. The near-miss on STS 93, the cracks found in the Shuttle fleet's
>plumbing, and now the loss of Columbia. Were these examples of management
>intentionally delaying ISS construction?
No as a matter of fact they were careless...
>And if so, then why did the CAIB accuse NASA of compromising safety to
>complete
>ISS?
>
>-A.L.
>
AHH THATS MY POINT! They will be extremely careful and station completion will
be delayed for many years,
HAVE A GREAT DAY!
Andrew Gray
>
> And a couple of years after that ISS will be at the end
> of it's life according to NASA and will be deorbited. No
The US has not indicated any desire to spend a large amount of money
putting things in orbit in order to immediately drop them in the
Pacific. The ISS is currently operating without a Shuttle; when ATV
comes on line it will be able to operate without Shuttle on slightly
less of a shoestring.
It will be interesting to see what happens with US involvement in ISS
post-ICC, but there's no reason to suspect Imminent Death Of Station.
--
-Andrew Gray
andre...@dunelm.org.uk
Vello
news:<41237a42$1...@news.estpak.ee>...
>
> >
> > Is there any else fast-moving-in-the-air object designed with foam on
> > surface?
> I can't think of many. Aside from rockets and spacecraft (which
> sometimes do) the only fast-moving-in-the-air things I can think of
> are aircraft and bullets/cannon shells. A few aircraft have exotic
> coatings, but I don't think most of them would qualify as foam. But as
> I understand it, the problem on the ETs has less to do with moving
> fast through the air than the extreme temperature range, and the
> accompanying possibility of condensed air in voids in the foam going
> from liquid to gas.
>
> > What is the "inlet" on non-breathing, i.e. rocket space device?
> > Just wondering.
> By inlet, I meant the where the fuel (or oxidizer) is taken out of the
> tank.
Sorry, for sure my idea wasn't put foam into actual LOX or hydrogen
reservoir but simply on the inner side of ETs surface panels.
Herb Schaltegger
wrote:
> Sorry, for sure my idea wasn't put foam into actual LOX or hydrogen
> reservoir but simply on the inner side of ETs surface panels.
That's the point you haven't gotten yet: there *are* no surface panels
except for the intertank structure. The tank walls themselves are the
surface of the ET.
--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
"Never underestimate the power of human stupidity."
~ Robert A. Heinlein
<http://www.angryherb.net>
Jorge R. Frank
>
> "hop" <hellso...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:afd00ef7.04081...@posting.google.com...
>> "Vello" <vell...@hot.ee> wrote in message
> news:<41237a42$1...@news.estpak.ee>...
>>
>> >
>> > Is there any else fast-moving-in-the-air object designed with foam on
>> > surface?
>> I can't think of many. Aside from rockets and spacecraft (which
>> sometimes do) the only fast-moving-in-the-air things I can think of
>> are aircraft and bullets/cannon shells. A few aircraft have exotic
>> coatings, but I don't think most of them would qualify as foam. But as
>> I understand it, the problem on the ETs has less to do with moving
>> fast through the air than the extreme temperature range, and the
>> accompanying possibility of condensed air in voids in the foam going
>> from liquid to gas.
>>
>> > What is the "inlet" on non-breathing, i.e. rocket space device?
>> > Just wondering.
>> By inlet, I meant the where the fuel (or oxidizer) is taken out of the
>> tank.
>
> Sorry, for sure my idea wasn't put foam into actual LOX or hydrogen
> reservoir but simply on the inner side of ETs surface panels.
The tanks are single-layer; if you put the foam "on the inner side of ETs
surface panels", you *are* putting them into the LOX or hydrogen
reservoirs.
Vello
"Herb Schaltegger" <herb.sch...@gmail.com.invalid> wrote in message
news:herb.schaltegger-87...@news.newsguy.com...
"and yaw rates between the left and right boosters. At 73.124 seconds,
cameras recorded a circumferential white vapor pattern blooming from the
side of the bottom dome on the ET, indicating that a structural failure was
in progress. This failure soon resulted in the entire aft dome of the ET
dropping away from the rest of the tank, releasing massive amounts of liquid
hydrogen. The loss of so much mass caused a sudden surge in acceleration
that actually pushed the hydrogen tank upward into the region separating it
from the oxygen tank at the top of the ET. "
Is it this way? Coz here in cut from Challenger report on Aerospaceweb. org.
one can read: that "actually pushed the hydrogen tank upward into the region
separating it from the oxygen tank" - how to read if there is no inner
reservoirs? Please answer quickly as topic is related with my job as
journalist - or do you have website with detailed description of ET?
Best,
Vello
Dan Foster
>
> "and yaw rates between the left and right boosters. At 73.124 seconds,
> cameras recorded a circumferential white vapor pattern blooming from the
> side of the bottom dome on the ET, indicating that a structural failure was
> in progress. This failure soon resulted in the entire aft dome of the ET
> dropping away from the rest of the tank, releasing massive amounts of liquid
> hydrogen. The loss of so much mass caused a sudden surge in acceleration
> that actually pushed the hydrogen tank upward into the region separating it
> from the oxygen tank at the top of the ET. "
>
> Is it this way? Coz here in cut from Challenger report on Aerospaceweb. org.
> one can read: that "actually pushed the hydrogen tank upward into the region
> separating it from the oxygen tank" - how to read if there is no inner
> reservoirs? Please answer quickly as topic is related with my job as
> journalist - or do you have website with detailed description of ET?
I think this diagram may explain everything:
http://www.lmco.com/michoud/et/description.htm
It has a great diagram of the ET, and the web site is from the company
(Lockheed Martin) and facility (Michoud in New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.)
that makes them.
Basically the ET itself is two separate tanks with an intertank
structure to hold the two (Liquid Hydrogen and Liquid Oxygen) tanks
together.
As others has said, there are no additional enclosures for the tanks
themselves. The 'ET walls' around the two tanks *ARE* the tank walls
themselves.
-Dan
G EddieA95
>separating it from the oxygen tank" - how to read if there is no inner
>reservoirs? Please answer quickly as topic is related with my job as
>journalist - or do you have website with detailed description of ET?
It also said that LH2 was escaping. That means the tank itself was broken.
The "tank" that pushed forward was the top half of the broken H2 tank.
Vello
Vello
"Dan Foster" <use...@evilphb.org> wrote in message
news:slrncibggg...@gaia.roc2.gblx.net...
starman
> > had put foam islation outside as it is fragile per se.
>
> Nope, incorrect. The Saturn V's S-II stage had foam on the exterior. So
> does the Delta 4, I think.
What kind of foam did they use on the S-II?
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Jorge R. Frank
> "Jorge R. Frank" wrote:
>>
>> "Vello" <vell...@hot.ee> wrote in news:4122c2a8$1...@news.estpak.ee:
>> >
>> > One more simple silly idea: nobody in aviation and space exploration
>> > had put foam islation outside as it is fragile per se.
>>
>> Nope, incorrect. The Saturn V's S-II stage had foam on the exterior. So
>> does the Delta 4, I think.
>
> What kind of foam did they use on the S-II?
Spray-on urethane foam like the ET, but I don't know the brand name, so I
can't say whether or not it's the same as what's used on the ET.
Richard Lamb
>
> d_sch...@emulex.com (dave schneider) wrote in
> news:28326d49.04081...@posting.google.com:
>
> > [...]
> >> How many think the 2010 deadline will be honored?
> >>
> >> next spring we return to flying. a few months later some new safety
> >> concerns surface. The fleet gets grounded for 4 months. this reoccurs
> >> regurally. the station build flights fall seriously behind. 2010 is a
> >> pipe dream.....
> >
> > While it is true that the shuttle ages even when it doesn't fly, the
> > key part of the 2010 *target* is the number of flights, since most of
> > the shuttle's aging comes from the wear and stress of flight.
> > Stand-downs and groundings don't increase the number of flights.
> >
> > So I'm not particularly concerned about 2010. Is there some evidence
> > that President Bush considers 2010 to be a hard limit, rather than a
> > target based on the expected assembly schedule?
>
> President Bush didn't set the 2010 deadline. The CAIB did, by recommending
> a complete recertification (R9.2-1) if the fleet is to be flown past that
> date. It was NASA's desire to avoid such an expensive recertification that
> drove the 2010 retirement date.
>
> JRF
>
If there is nothing else comparable flyable at the time?
I think that's Bob's point.
The economics of space flight will make recertification viable.
Richard Lamb
Jorge R. Frank
news:41316906...@earthlink.net:
> "Jorge R. Frank" wrote:
>>
>> d_sch...@emulex.com (dave schneider) wrote in
>> news:28326d49.04081...@posting.google.com:
>>
>> > hal...@aol.com (bob haller) wrote:
>> > [...]
>> >> How many think the 2010 deadline will be honored?
>> >>
>> >> next spring we return to flying. a few months later some new
>> >> safety concerns surface. The fleet gets grounded for 4 months.
>> >> this reoccurs regurally. the station build flights fall seriously
>> >> behind. 2010 is a pipe dream.....
>> >
>> > While it is true that the shuttle ages even when it doesn't fly,
>> > the key part of the 2010 *target* is the number of flights, since
>> > most of the shuttle's aging comes from the wear and stress of
>> > flight. Stand-downs and groundings don't increase the number of
>> > flights.
>> >
>> > So I'm not particularly concerned about 2010. Is there some
>> > evidence that President Bush considers 2010 to be a hard limit,
>> > rather than a target based on the expected assembly schedule?
>>
>> President Bush didn't set the 2010 deadline. The CAIB did, by
>> recommending a complete recertification (R9.2-1) if the fleet is to
>> be flown past that date. It was NASA's desire to avoid such an
>> expensive recertification that drove the 2010 retirement date.
>
> If there is nothing else comparable flyable at the time?
Then the US flies nothing for a while.
> I think that's Bob's point.
>
> The economics of space flight will make recertification viable.
Nope. Shuttle recertification at the level the CAIB recommends (at the
"material, component, subsystem, and system" levels) will *never* be
economically viable - at least not under any *rational* theory of
economics. That was quite deliberate on their part; the intent was to force
the US to develop a shuttle replacement prior to 2010, or get out of the
human spaceflight business altogether. Since NASA does not consider it
possible to develop a shuttle replacement prior to 2014-15, the unintended
side effect will be to force a 4-5 year hiatus in US human spaceflight
capability, *if* NASA obeys the letter of the CAIB recommendation.
My point (*and* Bob's point) is that if ISS assembly runs past the end of
FY2010, NASA is *not* going to call a halt to everything and standdown for
a full recerfification. Rather, they will continue to run a bit past 2010,
as long as necessary to complete ISS assembly.
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