Should evidence which ambiguously supports a concept be a concern for physics?
Phil
consensus that it should not. Evidence is often bandied about as
proof of some conceptual system consisting of concepts which can not
be directly observed. It begs the question. What is evidence?
I propose that evidence is just something one sees or measures. Even
so, we can find disagreement in what was observed or how what one
observed came to be in the context of physical law. There is a
growing consensus that the more one interprets an observation to be
conceptualized a specific way, the more evidence one has to support
the conceptualization. I see this bandied about quite frequently
with statements like "The decades of empirical confirmation leave
little if any doubt that the world really is like (this conceptual
model)".
In affect, one is saying if we preferentially interpret empirical
results a certain way and long enough we have shown beyond any doubt
that world is just like we say it is. I don't mean to sound critical
but that is really all we are saying. Ambiguous evidence has always
been around and always will be I figure and at some level one must
select a conceptualization which works even if the evidence does not
support the conceptualization unambiguously. And so, for practical
reasons, I have no problem with the selection of a given
conceptualization, even on the argument of aesthetics (though
aesthetics is metaphysics).
Even so, should the lack of unambiguous empirical support ever be a
concern? I think so, enough so that other ambiguously supported
conceptualizations with equal ability to predict know phenomena be
allowed to be further conceptualized. Take for example, light, in the
17th century there was an argument about what light is. On one side
it was argued that light was particulate while on the the other side
it was argued that light was waves. Ultimately we have resorted to
understand that light is really both and that the only way to
adequately model light is to model it to have two properties. In
other words, a conceptualization which models light as both
particulate and wave-like is consistent with "all of the evidence"
while a conceptualization which models light as one or the other is
only consistent with part of the evidence.
Over the years I have found it disturbing that astronomers claim to be
answering the questions of who we are, why are we here, and so on.
This idea that science can answer these questions unambiguously is
threatening science IMHO. It is as though there is purpose beyond
science in their activities and one has to wonder under what direction
are they encouraged to answer the questions which transcend
understanding? It is more like scientific inquiry is becoming the
formation of a transcendental metaphysical understanding of reality
meant to be a replacement of other transcendental philosophies
(religions). As with any religion, it is important to control thought
and inhibit disagreement. Furthermore, proof is alway anecdotal,
notwithstanding that anecdotal evidence isn't wholly without value.
But really, just because someone assumed a conceptualization and wound
up getting the result he anticipated doesn't mean the assumption was
proven. Assuming a conceptualization is what what makes it anecdotal
because the very assumption is a personal experience and not the
evidence. Literally, it is like saying, " I know this guy who assumed
this concept and guess what? He got the result he wanted so he must
have been right." Fact is, science is no more reliable at
conceptualizing transcendental concepts than is any religion.
I noticed in another thread it was made mention that the current
conceptual model has been confirmed under intense scrutiny. I would
disagree with this statement. I would describe the confirmation as
being made under intense justification. There is only one way to
scrutinize a concept. One must give consideration to competing
concepts which the evidence supports ambiguously. Without doing that,
there is no scrutiny whatsoever. Here is an example. We observe
more distant objects to displace at an accelerated pace. From this
observation (evidence) we interpret that it means the universe itself
is expanding at an accelerated pace and in order to defend the prior
concept (universal expansion) we add a new concept (dark energy) ad
hoc and call this new concept a discovery. This is not scrutiny.
Granted we have been meticulous with experiments but scrutinizing a
concept is entirely different than being meticulous with experiments
or being meticulous to defend concepts with ad hoc
conceptualizations.
In any event, I think science runs the risk of not being science any
longer if it doesn't nurture competing viable conceptualizations.
Only then can it truly scrutinize concepts. True science will always
say that the world can be conceptualized but that it may never be
shown that a conceptualization is unambiguously supported by the
evidence. To interpret evidence to mean anything more than that is
merely the practice of meta-physics and is not science.
Dirk Van de moortel
bc5900bc-75bf-4386...@j12g2000vbl.googlegroups.com
[snip]
> ...
> Fact is, science is no more reliable at
> conceptualizing transcendental concepts than is any religion.
Science is not even interested in conceptualizing transcendental
concepts - by definition.
Dirk Vdm
Phil
<dirkvandemoor...@nospAm.hotmail.com> wrote:
> Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
> bc5900bc-75bf-4386-81dd-c32129028...@j12g2000vbl.googlegroups.com
>
> [snip]
>
> > ...
> > Fact is, science is no more reliable at
> > conceptualizing transcendental concepts than is any religion.
>
> Science is not even interested in conceptualizing transcendental
> concepts - by definition.
>
> Dirk Vdm
I think that is what I said. That doesn't prevent scientists from
doing so, however.
Dirk Van de moortel
So what?
The Police fights crime - by definition. That doesn't prevent some
policemen to be criminals.
Dirk Vdm
Phil
<dirkvandemoor...@nospAm.hotmail.com> wrote:
> Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
The unwritten code most policemen practice make the vast majority of
them criminals and not policemen by definition and yet policemen
anyway.
For example, they don't enforce the law on each other. One who
doesn't follow this unwritten code is generally ostracized and forced
into a different profession. So that couldn't have been a worse
example of the point you were trying to make.
Bill Hobba
> Over the years I have found it disturbing that astronomers claim to be
> answering the questions of who we are, why are we here, and so on.
> This idea that science can answer these questions unambiguously is
> threatening science IMHO.
Exactly what scientists claim they can answer any question unambiguously?
The nature of science precludes that. This has long been recognised great
scientists such as Poincare and Feynman (of course they are not the only
ones).
Thanks
Bill
Bill Hobba
Huh? Having worked for the police for many years I can assure you they
enforce it to a much higher standard than the general public. You only need
someone to suggest to a police internal investigation unit a police officer
may be less than perfect for them to be investvcated. No evidence etc is
required like it is for John Q Citizen. Many police are not exactly happy
with this, but its what they do so ensure as much as possible they are above
reproach. The same in science by the way. A non scientist can make fairly
silly statements with maybe a bit of a chuckle from scientists. But a
practising scientist, especially a well known one, will elicit an entirely
different response.
Thanks
Bill
Androcles
"Bill Hobba" <rub...@junk.com> wrote in message
news:c08El.2656$y61....@news-server.bigpond.net.au...
You mean like Einstein's stupid
the speed of light from A to B is c-v,
the speed of light from B to A is c+v,
the "time" each way is the same?
Ref:
http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/einstein/specrel/www/figures/img22.gif
Some cop/scientist you are... fucking useless. No.. wait! rub...@junk.com.
Phil
Bill,
I am merely repeating what I watched in videos supporting a college
astronomy course I took. Literally they described their practice as
finding the answers to the questions I described. I'm not kidding.
And since their is no way to find evidence which unambiguously
supports an answer to these these questions, how do they hope to
answer them to begin with? Its outside the realm of science. It is
meta-physics.
Science should attempt to eliminate the ambiguity of evidence. But to
do so, it must have clear understanding and a complete development of
competing conceptualizations. For example, the invariance of light-
speed, to unambiguously and objectively interpret this evidence, one
can only come to the conclusion that light-speed is invariant to
measurement. One can conceptualize transcendental concepts to model
this reality. And there at least two ways to accomplish this. In any
event to say the evidence of invariant lightspeed measurement supports
either of the conceptualizations preferentially is just metaphysics
because the evidence just doesn't do that. Fact is, except by
metaphysical arguments, one can not suggest one or the other
conceptualization is more suitable and to do so would be a violation
of objectivity in evaluating evidence.
My main point here is that there is truly little bonafide scrutiny in
science any more. Yes there has been meticulousness, but not
scrutiny. The pursuit of preventing competing conceptualizations from
development is not practical for science but it is practical for meta-
physics where transcendental truth which can not be evidenced is
assumed.
Phil
In essence Bill you are saying there has to be the "Police police".
And the reason there has to be is the very reason I have already
mentioned. I've known my share also. I've hung out with a few on a
personal level and I can tell all of them sped when I rode with them
without any worry of the law being enforced upon them. And by the way
at speeds I myself would be at risk of losing my license for.
Phil
I will add. They are all good people who would risk their lives in
service to others. I'm not badmouthing policemen. I am merely saying
that what defines a practice isn't always practical and that there
exist exceptions imposed by unwritten practical expectations. In the
same way it is impractical for a policeman to give a speeding ticket
to another policeman ... it is impractical for a practicing scientist
to give consideration to a conceptualization which though consistent
with evidence is not allowed for metaphysical non-scientific reasons.
If one is not allowed to to inquire and develop conceptualizations
with are consistent with evidence ... then he is actually not allowed
to practice science. If there be consequences for doing so ...
particularly if economic or professional then the practice ceases to
scientific inquiry and instead the gratification of practical
metaphysics.
Eric Gisse
[snip]
> My main point here is that there is truly little bonafide scrutiny in
> science any more.
What a load of horse shit.
Let's perform a little experiment. Name any two literature references
for astrophysics you have gone to the library to look up and read.
[snip]
xxe...@gmail.com
xxein: Just go back inside your church and leave him alone to do
science. This is exactly what he is referring to.
doug
xxe...@gmail.com wrote:
Don't be so silly. Phil want to introduce metaphysics and philosophy
to replace physics. It will not work. Phil keeps wanting the universe
to work in a way that he feels is reasonable. The universe is not
subject to Phil's prejudices. Remember that philosophy is what you
do when you cannot do physics.
pmb
> I ask this question because my general sense is that there exists a
> consensus that it should not. Evidence is often bandied about as
> proof of some conceptual system consisting of concepts which can not
> be directly observed. It begs the question. What is evidence?
Evidence is information provided to support a theory.
Eric Gisse
People who think a library is a church shouldn't be posting in a
science newsgroup.
Phil
Evidence is nothing more than an observation, and much evidence must
require theory to interpret. In that sense, evidence does not
necessarily support theory particularly when the evidence creates or
modifies theory.
Even so, relationships exist which allow for the prediction of
evidence not yet observed. This is important for any physical theory
and yes, predictions support theory. Of interest, measured light-
speed invariance is "a prediction" of Lorentz' conceptualization. And
so if predicted evidence supports theory then invariant light-speed
invariance is "evidence supporting Lorentz' conceptualization" with
the same evidence does not support the special relativity, because in
the special relativity it is not a prediction, rather it is assumed.
In the spirit of science, I stand by what I have stated through out
this thread. Evidence and evidence alone should determine the
viability conceptualizations. Furthermore, scientific inquiry is not
genuine if it disallows conceptualizations which are consistent with
evidence on grounds not founded in evidence. To do so represents
activity outside scientific practiced but consistently represented in
all metaphysical pursuits.
Phil
And this comment really makes the point to what I am saying. How does
one know physics isn't going into the selection of a model? Well
first one will present concepts, most every one of them, as
"principles". Rather than relying on evidence and inquiring all
conceptualizations, he would present these concepts as being
conceivable without the benefit of experience or evidence. He would
present the concepts as self-evident. Now what conceptualization does
that sound like?
pmb
> On Apr 11, 8:33 pm,pmb<pm...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Apr 11, 2:27 pm, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > I ask this question because my general sense is that there exists a
> > > consensus that it should not. Evidence is often bandied about as
> > > proof of some conceptual system consisting of concepts which can not
> > > be directly observed. It begs the question. What is evidence?
>
> > Evidence is information provided to support a theory.
>
If that's what *you* mean by it then that's fine. However it's not
what other people mean by it.
What you've defined is nothing more than a different word to mean the
exact same thing as "observation" and I see no reason to take a
commonly used term from science and use it to mean exactly the same
thing as another word used in science. If you want to call something
an observation then just call it that. When people use the term
"evidence" then they have something very particular in mind. E.g. if I
say "This hair is evidence" then it's meaningless to say try to
interpret that to mean simply "I observer this piece of hair." But if
it was found at a crime scence on a muder victim and a root on the
hair contains the DNA from a suspect who claims he never met the
victim then it the fact the piece of hair was at the crime scene and
probably belongs to the suspect is an observation which supports the
theory which holds that the suspect murdered the victim.
Phil
But PMB, what you call evidence is actually a conceptual argument. A
conceptual argument isn't evidence but a theory as to what the
evidence means. Evidence literally means "what is seen" but what it
has been construed to mean is "proof supporting a conceptual
argument". I'm a reasonable man. I am more than willing to consider
an argument that the man who claims he never met the victim and yet
his hair resided on the victims dead body is likely lying. Any
reasonable person would. But the evidence isn't the argument. The
evidence is strictly the time and place of the discovery of the hair,
who that hair belongs to, and what the owner of that hair says his
relationship to the victim is. This is is the unambiguous and
objective observation of "what can be seen". Conceptualization of
what this evidence means is theory.
Dirk Van de moortel
Other than killing the silly point you were trying to make, I was
not trying to make any point.
Dirk Vdm
harry
> I am merely saying
> that what defines a practice isn't always practical and that there
> exist exceptions imposed by unwritten practical expectations. In the
> same way it is impractical for a policeman to give a speeding ticket
> to another policeman ... it is impractical for a practicing scientist
> to give consideration to a conceptualization which though consistent
> with evidence is not allowed for metaphysical non-scientific reasons.
"Not allowed for metaphysical non-scientific reasons"?
I'm not sure what you mean, but many discussions about QM concern the
comparison of metaphysical models, and a discussion about how much sense
they seem to make.
> If one is not allowed to to inquire and develop conceptualizations
> with are consistent with evidence ... then he is actually not allowed
> to practice science. If there be consequences for doing so ...
> particularly if economic or professional then the practice ceases to
> scientific inquiry and instead the gratification of practical
> metaphysics.
Well, happily that is not the case!
Cheers,
Harald
harry
>I ask this question because my general sense is that there exists a
> consensus that it should not. Evidence is often bandied about as
> proof of some conceptual system consisting of concepts which can not
> be directly observed. It begs the question. What is evidence?
> Even so, should the lack of unambiguous empirical support ever be a
> concern? I think so, enough so that other ambiguously supported
> conceptualizations with equal ability to predict know phenomena be
> allowed to be further conceptualized. Take for example, light, in the
> 17th century there was an argument about what light is. On one side
> it was argued that light was particulate while on the the other side
> it was argued that light was waves. Ultimately we have resorted to
> understand that light is really both and that the only way to
> adequately model light is to model it to have two properties. In
> other words, a conceptualization which models light as both
> particulate and wave-like is consistent with "all of the evidence"
> while a conceptualization which models light as one or the other is
> only consistent with part of the evidence.
That makes it sound as if some impossible choice is required. We know that
both the simple wave model and the simple (waveless!) particle model are
flawed. It does not mean that no model can be made that has both aspects
(think of phonons).
[..]
> But really, just because someone assumed a conceptualization and wound
> up getting the result he anticipated doesn't mean the assumption was
> proven.
Indeed, the particle and wave experiments showed that strikingly well.
> Assuming a conceptualization is what what makes it anecdotal
> because the very assumption is a personal experience and not the
> evidence. Literally, it is like saying, " I know this guy who assumed
> this concept and guess what? He got the result he wanted so he must
> have been right." Fact is, science is no more reliable at
> conceptualizing transcendental concepts than is any religion.
Science basically tests theories and can only disprove them; if a theory has
greater predictive power and as long as it is not disproved, the hypotheses
of the theory are accepted as useful working hypotheses.
> I noticed in another thread it was made mention that the current
> conceptual model has been confirmed under intense scrutiny. I would
> disagree with this statement. I would describe the confirmation as
> being made under intense justification. There is only one way to
> scrutinize a concept. One must give consideration to competing
> concepts which the evidence supports ambiguously. Without doing that,
> there is no scrutiny whatsoever. Here is an example. We observe
> more distant objects to displace at an accelerated pace. From this
> observation (evidence) we interpret that it means the universe itself
> is expanding at an accelerated pace
That is only one interpretation, as Hubble stressed.
> and in order to defend the prior
> concept (universal expansion) we add a new concept (dark energy) ad
> hoc and call this new concept a discovery. This is not scrutiny.
> Granted we have been meticulous with experiments but scrutinizing a
> concept is entirely different than being meticulous with experiments
> or being meticulous to defend concepts with ad hoc
> conceptualizations.
>
> In any event, I think science runs the risk of not being science any
> longer if it doesn't nurture competing viable conceptualizations.
> Only then can it truly scrutinize concepts. True science will always
> say that the world can be conceptualized but that it may never be
> shown that a conceptualization is unambiguously supported by the
> evidence.
Indeed. It is not always explicitly stated that evidence is discussed
according to a certain theory; but generally that is implied (or it should
be the case!).
> To interpret evidence to mean anything more than that is
> merely the practice of meta-physics and is not science.
It depends on what you call science; metaphysical models are useful for
physics.
Harald
pmb
A "conceptual arument"? What is that supposed to be? In any case the
definition of evidence is just that, a definition. It is not an
argument. Also, it isn't "my" definition.
> Evidence literally means "what is seen" ...
No. That's what *you* want it to mean.
Phil
PMB,
To you evidence is a conceptual story of what observations mean. You
clearly stated that. And that "definition" of evidence might serve a
prosecutor or a defense attorney well. However, it does not serve the
scientist well if he genuine in his pursuit of scientific inquiry. A
scientist shouldn't embellish observation with stories. That's
lawyerism (for lack of a better word). A scientist's job is to
consider "what can be seen" as a guide to conceptualizing the world
consistent with this evidence. Objectivity requires understanding
which conceptualizations can model the evidence, giving consideration
to these conceptualizations, and finally developing these
conceptualizations until evidence supports a conceptualization is
under-conceptualized (doesn't predict observable evidence) or over-
conceptualized (predicts evidence which observation fails in
experience). Certainly any scientist can delude himself and others
that subjective embellishment of observation is "evidence". But that
just puts the scientist on par with a defense attorney (or
prosecutor). The scientist should set a higher standard than that.
Phil
>
> > To interpret evidence to mean anything more than that is
> > merely the practice of meta-physics and is not science.
>
> It depends on what you call science; metaphysical models are useful for
> physics.
>
> Harald
Actually, science is a type of metaphysics when one thinks about it.
Beginning with time and space which are transcendental concepts. We
know they are transcendent because we can can not unambiguously
determine the nature of their existence. (ie Minkowski or Lorentz-
Fitzgerald).
On the other hand, consider light-speed invariant measurement. This
is an eminent concept.
What differentiates science from other metaphysical practice is the
focus on objective evaluation of the eminent (that which is observable
as opposed to focusing on transcendent truth which must be taken on
faith). This thread largely deals with whether competing
conceptualizations which are consistent with evidence should be
developed. I would argue they should because otherwise the focus is
shifted from the eminent to the transcendent and that is the what
distinguishes religion from science. If science is going to start
acting like religion deciding what transcendent conceptualization is
"acceptable" and suppressing scientifically justified development of
evidence consistent conceptualizations then in truth, this activity
can not be distinguished from activities which are common in any
religion.
Darwin123
> been around and always will be I figure and at some level one must
> select a conceptualization which works even if the evidence does not
> support the conceptualization unambiguously.
You are skipping the possibility that the physical system itself
may be intrinsically ambiguous in some perfectly valid way. In fact,
every time there is an intrinsic symmetry to the physical system there
is an ambiguity. The symmetry is based on the invariance of some
physical system to a transformation. As Noether pointed out, the
existence of such an invariance almost always leads to a conservation
law. It is the conservation laws, and the underlying symmetry, that
often shows a robustness that lasts through generations of physicists.
The symmetry properties of a system often are more robust than
the interaction details of the system. The symmetry of a crystal is
clear, and physicists have to take the symmetry properties in
account. However, modeling a particular experiment may be done with
Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodyamics, or quantum mechanics.
The symmetry of a crystal used by a 21st century physicist uses may
have been determined by a minerologist in the 18th century. So I would
say the long history of that symmetry would be strong evidence the
crystal really has that invariance.
>There is a
>growing consensus that the more one interprets an observation to be
>conceptualized a specific way, the more evidence one has to support
>the conceptualization. I see this bandied about quite frequently
>with statements like "The decades of empirical confirmation leave
>little if any doubt that the world really is like (this conceptual
>model)".
I would say that decades of empirical evidence really leave very
little doubt as to an invariance property of the system. The symmetry
of a system really isn't a matter of the investigators psychology. It
think this is really clear in the case of symmetry properties.
Example: The symmetry of a system often is more robust than the
details of the theory. For example, the gravitational interaction
between a point mass and another mass is spherically symmetrical. This
symmetry seems to have survived Newton, Einstein, and dozens of lesser
known physicists working on the theory of gravity. Even earlier, there
was a theory that the earth was round. This of course is a logical
consequence of the spherical symmetry of gravity. The spherical
symmetry of the earth has lasted thousands of years before Newton.
I will generalize the idea of symmetry a bit in order to
describe my philosophy of the matter. Although symmetry has an exact
mathematical meaning these days, I see some scientists use the word to
describe any type of equivalence that is experimentally demonstrated.
With this type of spacious generalization, I conclude that the most
important aspects of quantum mechanics are going to remain useful for
centuries.
The main "symmetry" in quantum mechanics is the equivalence of
wave and particle descriptions. The correspondence between the
particle and the wave has been experimentally verified again and
again. I think that quantum mechanics will see much development and
many changes in the next few decades. However, I don't see the
equivalence of wave and particle descriptions going away. I don't
think the "Copenhagen interpretation" is going to be long for this
world, despite the few decades of its popularity. The "Copenhagen
interpretation" isn't doesn't really add very much to the idea that
waves and particles are somehow closely related. The theoretical
details of the relationship are bound to change. The "symmetry" is
robust, the philosophy behind the "symmetry" is not.
Similarly, relativity has the "invariance of the speed of light
within a frame." There is some variation as to what a frame really is,
or what a speed is, but I think this basic concept is very robust. I
don't think that all this stuff about black holes and singularities
has been solved. However, the speed of light really is invariant to
the local observer. This is a powerful idea that decades of
experiments have shown correct. I think the speed of light invariance
is a really robust idea.
harry
> On Apr 12, 6:48 am, "harry" <harald.vanlintelButNotT...@epfl.ch>
> wrote:
>> "Phil" <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
>>
>> > To interpret evidence to mean anything more than that is
>> > merely the practice of meta-physics and is not science.
>>
>> It depends on what you call science; metaphysical models are useful for
>> physics.
>>
>> Harald
>
> Actually, science is a type of metaphysics when one thinks about it.
> Beginning with time and space which are transcendental concepts. We
> know they are transcendent because we can can not unambiguously
> determine the nature of their existence. (ie Minkowski or Lorentz-
> Fitzgerald).
>
> On the other hand, consider light-speed invariant measurement. This
> is an eminent concept.
Hmmm... I have noticed a confusion between metaphysical speed and the
operational definition of speed for physical measurements.
> What differentiates science from other metaphysical practice is the
> focus on objective evaluation of the eminent (that which is observable
> as opposed to focusing on transcendent truth which must be taken on
> faith). This thread largely deals with whether competing
> conceptualizations which are consistent with evidence should be
> developed. I would argue they should because otherwise the focus is
> shifted from the eminent to the transcendent and that is the what
> distinguishes religion from science. If science is going to start
> acting like religion deciding what transcendent conceptualization is
> "acceptable" and suppressing scientifically justified development of
> evidence consistent conceptualizations then in truth, this activity
> can not be distinguished from activities which are common in any
> religion.
Such unscientific indoctrination has happened in the recent past. However, I
have the impression that serious science is slowly making a comeback,
perhaps in part due to the discussions about interpretation of QM which
bring the metaphysical issues to the attention.
Regards,
Harald
Bill Hobba
I am not saying there has to be anything. I was simply pointing out your
statement that police don't enforce the law on each other does not stand up
to scrutiny, and that scientists react in a similar way.
> And the reason there has to be is the very reason I have already
> mentioned. I've known my share also. I've hung out with a few on a
> personal level and I can tell all of them sped when I rode with them
> without any worry of the law being enforced upon them. And by the way
> at speeds I myself would be at risk of losing my license for.
Well this is getting rather off topic. However anyone that reports such
behaviour to a police internal investigation unit will automatically get
that policeman investigated. I am not passing any moral judgement on if
such is warranted, worthwhile, or whatever, or even works that well in
practice. I am simply noting that's how it is, and scientists usually
respond in a similar way. In fact most professions are like that. They
usually hold members of the profession to higher standards than those that
aren't.
Thanks
Bill
Phil
Bill, I'm going to agree with you. I understand the context of which
you speak and I trust you understand the context by which I spoke.
Phil
I would find further comment on the symmetry of a crystal as it
relates to modern physics of particular interest.
I agree that light invariance (measurement) is a robust idea. I don't
see how this concept can be left out of physics whether it be deduced
by theorem or assumed. The measurement method flows naturally in
every viable conceptualization and is identical in all.
In any event, I think we ultimately would like to remove some level of
ambiguity from the evidence of measured light invariance. Either it
arises from the space-time construction of Minkowski or it is related
to something more like Lorentz-Fitzgerald. Ultimately, I think we
will. Gravity in particular holds promise in this regard ... when
conceptualized consistent with the Lorentz-Fitzgerald construct ...
one can predict phenomena at odds with Minkowski. Basically because
Minkowski can not be endowed with the properties Lorentz-Fitzgerald
can. Either Lorentz-Fitzgerald is over-conceptualized or Minkowski is
under-conceptualized.
Evidence should lead the way here. I think it pointless to argue one
conceptualization more suitable to nature than the other as doing so
isn't really science. It is far better to know how they both work and
let experiment guide us going forward.
pmb
Nope. That's a story you created from what I said.
> And that "definition" of evidence might serve a
> prosecutor or a defense attorney well.
It serves scientists well. What you call evidence is what the rest of
the world calls an observation. I see no reason to change that term to
fit your needs. You certaintly haven't given a valid reason so far.
Pete
Phil
Pete, all I can say is that your standard for evidence is quite low.
It would seem that "what you think about an observation" carries more
weight than the observation itself. If scientists are really
"sophists" (lawyers) as you claim then all I can say its no wonder
there is no concern about ambiguity.
pmb
> Pete, all I can say is that your standard for evidence is quite low.
So you claim and as such, so what? That's only according to you.
Philosophers and physicists alike have no problem with it since
they're the ones who originated the idea, not I.
Phil
Pete, you are the only one defending the advocacy, have you noticed?
Some have stated they disagree that there is advocacy (in so many
words). But you are the sole one who remarked in this thread that you
support advocacy as a practice and that one should evaluate evidence
solely with regard to advocating theory he favors.
In the way the prosecutor never considers the possible innocence of
the accused or the way a defense attorney never considers the possible
guilt of the accused, you support the same practice in science. In
other words, you support a scientist evaluating empirical results with
the sole purpose of advocating a theory.
I'm not at all convinced that most scientists think this way. It is
important that they don't. Because unlike the court of law where both
sides are always represented, the scientific community has made no
arrangements for any such "scrutiny".
PD
> I ask this question because my general sense is that there exists a
> consensus that it should not. Evidence is often bandied about as
> proof of some conceptual system consisting of concepts which can not
> be directly observed. It begs the question. What is evidence?
>
> so, we can find disagreement in what was observed or how what one
> observed came to be in the context of physical law. There is a
> growing consensus that the more one interprets an observation to be
> conceptualized a specific way, the more evidence one has to support
> the conceptualization. I see this bandied about quite frequently
> with statements like "The decades of empirical confirmation leave
> little if any doubt that the world really is like (this conceptual
> model)".
>
> results a certain way and long enough we have shown beyond any doubt
> that world is just like we say it is. I don't mean to sound critical
> but that is really all we are saying.
I disagree with this statement the most in everything you've said
here. An increasing body of empirical confirmation does NOT represent
"doing what it takes to get comfortable with an idea," as you seem to
be implying.
Generally speaking, a given experimental result is able to distinguish
one model from another model, or in most cases, one family of models
from another family of models. One family of models is favored, and
another family of models is disfavored.
However, a theory makes not just one prediction but a whole set of
them, of the sort:
"If condition set A, then expect outcome L in quantity Q;"
"If condition set B, then expect outcome M in quantity R;"
"If condition set C, then expect outcome N in quantity S;"
and so on.
A competing theory will make an analogous set of predictions:
"If condition set A, then expect outcome L in quantity Q;"
"If condition set B, then expect outcome M' in quantity R';"
"If condition set C, then expect outcome N' in quantity S';"
and so on.
Where a third one may make the following predictions:
"If condition set A, then expect outcome L' in quantity Q';"
"If condition set B, then expect outcome M' in quantity R';"
"If condition set C, then expect outcome N" in quantity S";"
and so on.
In this way an experiment that sets up condition set A, and outcome L
is observed in quantity Q, favors the first and second model but rules
out the third. A second experiment is required that sets up condition
set B, and supposing that outcome M' is observed in quantity R', what
we learn is the first model is ruled out, but there is no
distinguishing from this experiment whether the second or third model
is favored.
In this way, the *collective* body of evidence slowly serves to rule
out competing models, while no single experiment can do that. And
under no circumstances is a model favored *at the exclusion of all
possible competing models* -- though because an experimental result
can exclude whole classes of models at one time, pretty soon you run
out of reasonable ideas to test.
Long series of experimental confirmations, then, really represent
explorations of all the conditions A, B, C, D, E... where a theory can
make predictions that distinguish it from sets of other models, to
ever-increasing elimination of alternatives.
> Ambiguous evidence has always
> been around and always will be I figure and at some level one must
> select a conceptualization which works even if the evidence does not
> support the conceptualization unambiguously. And so, for practical
> reasons, I have no problem with the selection of a given
> conceptualization, even on the argument of aesthetics (though
> aesthetics is metaphysics).
>
> Even so, should the lack of unambiguous empirical support ever be a
> concern? I think so, enough so that other ambiguously supported
> conceptualizations with equal ability to predict know phenomena be
> allowed to be further conceptualized. Take for example, light, in the
> 17th century there was an argument about what light is. On one side
> it was argued that light was particulate while on the the other side
> it was argued that light was waves. Ultimately we have resorted to
> understand that light is really both and that the only way to
> adequately model light is to model it to have two properties. In
> other words, a conceptualization which models light as both
> particulate and wave-like is consistent with "all of the evidence"
> while a conceptualization which models light as one or the other is
> only consistent with part of the evidence.
A better way to say this is that light is of a *third* class of
physical entities, which are *neither* subsumable under particles nor
waves as previously understood. There's not a thing wrong with
discovering a new class of objects.
>
> Over the years I have found it disturbing that astronomers claim to be
> answering the questions of who we are, why are we here, and so on.
Well, on this, I agree. That is merely promotional marketing-speak,
and it has absolutely nothing to do with what is really going on. It
is designed to get people *interested* by sounding grand, and nothing
more.
> This idea that science can answer these questions unambiguously is
> threatening science IMHO. It is as though there is purpose beyond
> science in their activities and one has to wonder under what direction
> are they encouraged to answer the questions which transcend
> understanding? It is more like scientific inquiry is becoming the
> formation of a transcendental metaphysical understanding of reality
> meant to be a replacement of other transcendental philosophies
> (religions). As with any religion, it is important to control thought
> and inhibit disagreement. Furthermore, proof is alway anecdotal,
> notwithstanding that anecdotal evidence isn't wholly without value.
> But really, just because someone assumed a conceptualization and wound
> up getting the result he anticipated doesn't mean the assumption was
> proven. Assuming a conceptualization is what what makes it anecdotal
> because the very assumption is a personal experience and not the
> evidence. Literally, it is like saying, " I know this guy who assumed
> this concept and guess what? He got the result he wanted so he must
> have been right." Fact is, science is no more reliable at
> conceptualizing transcendental concepts than is any religion.
>
> I noticed in another thread it was made mention that the current
> conceptual model has been confirmed under intense scrutiny. I would
> disagree with this statement. I would describe the confirmation as
> being made under intense justification. There is only one way to
> scrutinize a concept. One must give consideration to competing
> concepts which the evidence supports ambiguously.
And that is PRECISELY what is done. See above.
> Without doing that,
> there is no scrutiny whatsoever. Here is an example. We observe
> more distant objects to displace at an accelerated pace. From this
> observation (evidence) we interpret that it means the universe itself
> is expanding at an accelerated pace and in order to defend the prior
> concept (universal expansion) we add a new concept (dark energy) ad
> hoc and call this new concept a discovery. This is not scrutiny.
> Granted we have been meticulous with experiments but scrutinizing a
> concept is entirely different than being meticulous with experiments
> or being meticulous to defend concepts with ad hoc
> conceptualizations.
>
> In any event, I think science runs the risk of not being science any
> longer if it doesn't nurture competing viable conceptualizations.
> Only then can it truly scrutinize concepts. True science will always
> say that the world can be conceptualized but that it may never be
> shown that a conceptualization is unambiguously supported by the
> evidence. To interpret evidence to mean anything more than that is
Phil
PD,
I agree with everything you mentioned.
However, here is where that procedure can fail do its job.
If a competing conceptualization has been under-developed, then one
may not have a clue as to how to make a prediction for a particular
experiment. It "takes a commitment" to develop a competing
conceptualization to a point where it can make predictions the more
developed conceptualization can. For example, under a gravity theory
consistent with Lorentz-Fitzgerald, how will GPS clocks relate to
surface clocks? If one has written off the conceptualization and has
not developed it enough to understand how it will predict the outcome,
he isn't able to determine if it be insufficiently conceptualized,
over-conceptualized, or was "just right". The temptation is to make
reference to the "failure" of the competing conceptualization to make
a prediction at all. Even so, any reasonable man knows, that it is
not the fault of an under-developed conceptualization that a
prediction is unknown. Predictions arise from understanding and
relating the conceptualization. That's the work of human beings and
as I mentioned earlier, it will not happen unless human beings make a
commitment to completely develop a competing conceptualization. It is
when a conceptualization makes a prediction which can not be observed
or an observation is made which is inconsistent with its prediction
that one can rule out a conceptualization.
I appreciate your response because I think this is how most every
scientist in his everyday practice want to evaluate evidence. I do
not believe for a minute that anyone wants to "be an advocate". I
pose this question. If after having giving consideration, you found
interest in developing Lorentz-Fitzgerald under the suspicion that it
may predict gravity phenomena which would allow you to ... perhaps ...
eliminate it as a competing conceptualization to Minkowski, would you
feel comfortable requesting resources both human and monetary needed
for this task? Would you feel comfortable telling colleagues that
your are developing a Lorentz-Fitzgerald conceptualization? Would you
worry it might jeopardize your career (assuming here you are involved
in research)? And finally do you think you would receive the support
you would need to carry out the task?
marika
"Eric Gisse" <jow...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:f10e90b7-1d98-4ba2...@i28g2000prd.googlegroups.com...
.
>What a load of horse shit.
Plus what exactly is a lamb stick?
mk5000
" Wait! We are doctors. We won't hurt you, we only want your organs!
"--Monkeybone
doug
Phil wrote:
It makes a correct prediction or it does not. If it makes a wrong
prediction, it is wrong. However much you are trying to weasel
your way into saying that relativity must be wrong and is only
accepted since the other theories were suppressed.
The temptation is to make
> reference to the "failure" of the competing conceptualization to make
> a prediction at all. Even so, any reasonable man knows,
That phrase always means you are going to say something that
is wrong and hope no one calls you on it.
that it is
> not the fault of an under-developed conceptualization that a
> prediction is unknown.
Yep, see what I predicited. However, it is the fault of the theory
if it makes a wrong prediction.
Predictions arise from understanding and
> relating the conceptualization. That's the work of human beings and
> as I mentioned earlier, it will not happen unless human beings make a
> commitment to completely develop a competing conceptualization. It is
> when a conceptualization makes a prediction which can not be observed
> or an observation is made which is inconsistent with its prediction
> that one can rule out a conceptualization.
Yes, when a theory makes a wrong prediction, it is wrong.
>
> I appreciate your response because I think this is how most every
> scientist in his everyday practice want to evaluate evidence. I do
> not believe for a minute that anyone wants to "be an advocate". I
> pose this question. If after having giving consideration, you found
> interest in developing Lorentz-Fitzgerald under the suspicion that it
> may predict gravity phenomena which would allow you to ... perhaps ...
> eliminate it as a competing conceptualization to Minkowski, would you
> feel comfortable requesting resources both human and monetary needed
> for this task?
If you want it done, why don't you pay for it? Why don't you look
for money for it? Do you think it is only worth someone else's money?
Phil
> Phil wrote:
>
> > I appreciate your response because I think this is how most every
> > scientist in his everyday practice want to evaluate evidence. I do
> > not believe for a minute that anyone wants to "be an advocate". I
> > pose this question. If after having giving consideration, you found
> > interest in developing Lorentz-Fitzgerald under the suspicion that it
> > may predict gravity phenomena which would allow you to ... perhaps ...
> > eliminate it as a competing conceptualization to Minkowski, would you
> > feel comfortable requesting resources both human and monetary needed
> > for this task?
>
> If you want it done, why don't you pay for it? Why don't you look
> for money for it? Do you think it is only worth someone else's money?
Wow ... decided to answer for PD there Doug? Now see this shows the
other extreme and what one might run into in trying do the science I
proposed.
Keep in mind we are talking about sufficient development of a concept
to deduce a prediction which may validate or invalidate Lorentz-
Fitzgerald (or Minkowski). I thought that is what science is about.
You know ... doing experiments and discovering how to best
conceptualize nature.
It is important to note that the outcome of an experiment which would
be inconsistent with Lorentz-Fitzgerald would, in effect, would be
evidence that Lorentz-Fitzgerald is over-conceptualized and not an
accurate conceptualization of space-time. I think that information
would be just as important to validating Minkowski as any other
experiment which supports the Minkowski conceptualization. Indeed, I
think even more important because it would remove the ambiguity and
show scrutiny in reaching that conclusion.
doug
Phil wrote:
> On Apr 14, 7:59 pm, doug <x...@xx.com> wrote:
>
>>Phil wrote:
>>
>>
>>>I appreciate your response because I think this is how most every
>>>scientist in his everyday practice want to evaluate evidence. I do
>>>not believe for a minute that anyone wants to "be an advocate". I
>>>pose this question. If after having giving consideration, you found
>>>interest in developing Lorentz-Fitzgerald under the suspicion that it
>>>may predict gravity phenomena which would allow you to ... perhaps ...
>>>eliminate it as a competing conceptualization to Minkowski, would you
>>>feel comfortable requesting resources both human and monetary needed
>>>for this task?
>>
>>If you want it done, why don't you pay for it? Why don't you look
>>for money for it? Do you think it is only worth someone else's money?
>
>
> Wow ... decided to answer for PD there Doug? Now see this shows the
> other extreme and what one might run into in trying do the science I
> proposed.
You are not proposing any science. You want to have someone pay
to follow your fantasies. If you really believe, pay for it
yourself. You can look for funding if you cannot pay. Why
should large amounts of money be spent just to make you happy?
>
> Keep in mind we are talking about sufficient development of a concept
> to deduce a prediction which may validate or invalidate Lorentz-
> Fitzgerald (or Minkowski). I thought that is what science is about.
Science is about being able to make predictions. You want science to
be about following your fantasies. Relativity works, we have the
standard model, people are moving forward. You want to reinvent
the wheel.
> You know ... doing experiments and discovering how to best
> conceptualize nature.
>
> It is important to note that the outcome of an experiment which would
> be inconsistent with Lorentz-Fitzgerald would, in effect, would be
> evidence that Lorentz-Fitzgerald is over-conceptualized and not an
> accurate conceptualization of space-time.
You are over-conceptualizing in your desire to find something
wrong with relativity. A century of experiments has found no
problems so why should precious money be spent to indulge
your dislike of relativity?
I think that information
> would be just as important to validating Minkowski as any other
> experiment which supports the Minkowski conceptualization. Indeed, I
> think even more important because it would remove the ambiguity and
> show scrutiny in reaching that conclusion.
There is no ambiguity, there is only your philosophical dislike of
relativity. This is like wanting continuous recounts of elections
because you do not like the results.
Phil
> Phil wrote:
> > On Apr 14, 7:59 pm, doug <x...@xx.com> wrote:
>
I've already developed it (gravity consistent with Lorentz-Fitzgerald)
conceptually and yes it makes predictions which if confirmed would
invalidate Minkowski.
I haven't a clue how the experiment would turn out. As far as I know
Lorentz-Fitzgerald would be invalidated.
I think experiments should decide. Not Doug. Let people interested
in science perform the experiments with facilities and funds allocated
for the purpose of doing science.
doug
Phil wrote:
> On Apr 14, 8:43 pm, doug <x...@xx.com> wrote:
>
>>Phil wrote:
>>
>>>On Apr 14, 7:59 pm, doug <x...@xx.com> wrote:
>>
>>(Snipped doug's rant)
You snipped the comments about science that you do not like.
Phil does not know anything about science and wants to spend
othere people's money on a wild goose chase to follow his
delusions.
>
>
> I've already developed it (gravity consistent with Lorentz-Fitzgerald)
> conceptually and yes it makes predictions which if confirmed would
> invalidate Minkowski.
So it makes wrong predictions and you hope no one will notice.
>
> I haven't a clue how the experiment would turn out. As far as I know
> Lorentz-Fitzgerald would be invalidated.
So you do not have a clue but you think you know how it comes out.
That is not science.
>
> I think experiments should decide. Not Doug. Let people interested
> in science perform the experiments with facilities and funds allocated
> for the purpose of doing science.
So allocate some of your funds for doing science. Phil does not believe
he is right. If he believed, he would spend his own money. Phil just
wants to waste other people's money.
>
>
>
>
>
>
PD
That's correct. The decision not to pursue a particular theory further
can motivated by a variety of considerations:
- There is already counterevidence against the model in condition set
B, so there is no reason to develop a prediction for condition set C
or D.
- A competing theory is already known to be broader in application,
and this theory in question is *known* not to afford application in
similar scope. (This is the one that targets L-F theory most.)
- The people involve just feel in their gut that it is not worth
pursuing. (This is in fact the rarest, since it may drive individual
decisions, but there is always somebody who will pick up the unclaimed
ball.)
> For example, under a gravity theory
> consistent with Lorentz-Fitzgerald, how will GPS clocks relate to
> surface clocks?
This is the fundamental problem. L-F theory does not have application
to gravity. In its purest form, it is a theory about electromagnetic
interactions ONLY. In its broadest form, it restricts the nature of
all interactions as viewed in different inertial frames. But it makes
NO statement whatsoever about the tidal effects that gave rise to
general relativity. Any elaboration of L-F theory that would attempt
to do so would be so dramatically different structurally from L-F
theory that it could no longer be called L-F theory. And in fact, it's
not clear that the product of that result would be distinguishable as
a model from GR, either in terms of prediction or in concept.
> If one has written off the conceptualization and has
> not developed it enough to understand how it will predict the outcome,
> he isn't able to determine if it be insufficiently conceptualized,
> over-conceptualized, or was "just right". The temptation is to make
> reference to the "failure" of the competing conceptualization to make
> a prediction at all. Even so, any reasonable man knows, that it is
> not the fault of an under-developed conceptualization that a
> prediction is unknown. Predictions arise from understanding and
> relating the conceptualization. That's the work of human beings and
> as I mentioned earlier, it will not happen unless human beings make a
> commitment to completely develop a competing conceptualization. It is
> when a conceptualization makes a prediction which can not be observed
> or an observation is made which is inconsistent with its prediction
> that one can rule out a conceptualization.
>
> I appreciate your response because I think this is how most every
> scientist in his everyday practice want to evaluate evidence. I do
> not believe for a minute that anyone wants to "be an advocate". I
> pose this question. If after having giving consideration, you found
> interest in developing Lorentz-Fitzgerald under the suspicion that it
> may predict gravity phenomena which would allow you to ... perhaps ...
> eliminate it as a competing conceptualization to Minkowski, would you
> feel comfortable requesting resources both human and monetary needed
> for this task?
Of course, but it's a big "if".
> Would you feel comfortable telling colleagues that
> your are developing a Lorentz-Fitzgerald conceptualization?
Given the caveats above about it no longer really being a L-F
conceptualization, yes.
> Would you
> worry it might jeopardize your career (assuming here you are involved
> in research)?
Not at all.
> And finally do you think you would receive the support
> you would need to carry out the task?
It stands as much a chance as some of the other crazy stuff that does
get support.
There's one other reality that needs to be folded in. Physicists will
work on ideas that show promise. They don't work on all possible
ideas. Pigeon-covered loons and self-absorbed artists have original
ideas, but this doesn't mean those ideas should be looked at just
because they are different.
And so if you're interested in seeing L-F theory developed further,
you can expect to field the perfectly understandable question, "Why do
you think it's worth pursuing?" Be warned that "Because it's something
other than relativity, and ideas other than relativity should be
pursued, just because of that," will not be considered motivational.
This is not how science works, nor should it. If you have reasons to
believe that L-F theory shows promise if developed, then the onus is
actually on you to demonstrate it. If you don't know how to
demonstrate that, then the fact is you don't really have a basis for
believing that it shows promise.
PD
Phil
> On Apr 14, 7:14 pm, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
The conceptualization I have been working with will definitely predict
experimental outcomes which are in common with GR and also it will
predict outcomes for which GR is under-conceptualized to predict. So
obviously it models in one respect similar to GR (an inertial
theory). But it is additionally conceptualized and it is this
additional conceptualization which prevents Minkowski from
participating as the underlying space-time but it is clearly
compatible with L-F construct.
>
> > And finally do you think you would receive the support
> > you would need to carry out the task?
>
> It stands as much a chance as some of the other crazy stuff that does
> get support.
>
> There's one other reality that needs to be folded in. Physicists will
> work on ideas that show promise. They don't work on all possible
> ideas. Pigeon-covered loons and self-absorbed artists have original
> ideas, but this doesn't mean those ideas should be looked at just
> because they are different.
>
> And so if you're interested in seeing L-F theory developed further,
> you can expect to field the perfectly understandable question, "Why do
> you think it's worth pursuing?" Be warned that "Because it's something
> other than relativity, and ideas other than relativity should be
> pursued, just because of that," will not be considered motivational.
> This is not how science works, nor should it. If you have reasons to
> believe that L-F theory shows promise if developed, then the onus is
> actually on you to demonstrate it. If you don't know how to
> demonstrate that, then the fact is you don't really have a basis for
> believing that it shows promise.
Its not so much L-F as its the conceptualization of gravity. L-F
works well with the conceptualization and supports the relativity of
physical law and (measured) light-speed invariance and in this regard
was chosen to work with a concept which is incompatible with
Minkowski. I think it shows promise but I am also keenly aware that
it can also be eliminated it as a viable conceptualization simply by
failing under experimental testing. I think this should appeal to
everyone, even those who may be predisposed to think it would fail
anyway. At the very least they could say "I told you so ;o)"
The conceptualization is rich with possible testable predictions and I
have merely scratched the surface of developing the
conceptualization. Developing a conceptualization of course is an
ongoing project and certainly would be aided by the participation of
others. I could never hope to complete it on my own. But it is
sufficiently developed to predict gravitational time dilation which
supports GR and certain other unique and testable predictions.
Some cool "qualitative" predictions are:
Ghost gravity which is a kind of secondary gravitational field which
arises from a distribution of matter. This is a counter-concept to
"dark matter"
A corollary that the universe must be closed.
The concept that the accelerating displacement of distant objects is
"tidal separation" in a collapsing universe (counter-concept is dark
energy).
In as much as those are "qualitative" they don't have to be. I don't
have the information I need to make quantified predictions for ghost
gravity. Tidal acceleration of distant objects could be confirmed
empirically though to make a prediction of what the value would be one
would need to know more about the universe (like size, age, our
placement, etc.). Even so, empirical tests over time "might" help one
to understand those things (like size, age, our placement, etc)
Naturally, I think the conceptualization has promise. I am presently
publishing the conceptualization on the web and should have it
completed in a few days or couple of weeks.
PD, your commentary among some of the others gives me hope that the
conceptualization may be evaluated and hopefully tested. I appreciate
your commentary and also the commentary of others in this thread.
doug
Phil wrote:
> On Apr 15, 6:59 am, PD <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>On Apr 14, 7:14 pm, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>PD, when I speak of L-F I am primarily speaking of the space-time construct.
>
>
> The conceptualization I have been working with will definitely predict
> experimental outcomes which are in common with GR and also it will
> predict outcomes for which GR is under-conceptualized to predict. So
> obviously it models in one respect similar to GR (an inertial
> theory). But it is additionally conceptualized
These kind of words send shivers down the spines of real
scientists. This sounds like a politician talking.
How much time have you spent looking at the century of experiments
available to you right now? Typically cranks want new experiments
done and are unwilling to look at what is already there.
Developing a conceptualization of course is an
> ongoing project and certainly would be aided by the participation of
> others. I could never hope to complete it on my own. But it is
> sufficiently developed to predict gravitational time dilation which
> supports GR and certain other unique and testable predictions.
>
> Some cool "qualitative" predictions are:
>
> Ghost gravity which is a kind of secondary gravitational field which
> arises from a distribution of matter. This is a counter-concept to
> "dark matter"
>
> A corollary that the universe must be closed.
>
> The concept that the accelerating displacement of distant objects is
> "tidal separation" in a collapsing universe (counter-concept is dark
> energy).
>
> In as much as those are "qualitative" they don't have to be.
So they are your philosophical ideas and are not science.
I don't
> have the information I need to make quantified predictions for ghost
> gravity. Tidal acceleration of distant objects could be confirmed
> empirically though to make a prediction of what the value would be one
> would need to know more about the universe (like size, age, our
> placement, etc.). Even so, empirical tests over time "might" help one
> to understand those things (like size, age, our placement, etc)
>
> Naturally, I think the conceptualization has promise. I am presently
> publishing the conceptualization on the web and should have it
> completed in a few days or couple of weeks.
So, in other words, you have only philosophy to put up and no
real science.
Phil
> Phil wrote:
> > On Apr 15, 6:59 am, PD <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote
>Snipped another doug rant
Wow, doug you are definitely a pistol. You must have been waiting for
my next post with baited breath also. LOL.
The "qualitative" stuff was just to hint at the "secondary concepts
which will follow confirmation of the basic concepts". The idea of
mentioning them was to hint at the richness of the concepts. In that
one would expect some of the observations as a "matter of conceptual
necessity" as opposed to just discovering them and inventing a concept
to explain it. That was the point of mentioning them.
There are quantitative predictions which can be tested. One important
prediction is qualitative but once the experiment is completed certain
important empirically sourced data will allow one to make quantitative
predictions thenceforth.
For the record, I'm not responding to your comments any longer other
than to say I'm not commenting on your comments.
doug
Phil wrote:
> On Apr 15, 6:27 pm, doug <x...@xx.com> wrote:
>
>>Phil wrote:
>>
>>>On Apr 15, 6:59 am, PD <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote
>
>
>>Snipped another doug rant
Phil does not like comments about the difference between
science and dreaming.
>
>
> Wow, doug you are definitely a pistol. You must have been waiting for
> my next post with baited breath also. LOL.
>
> The "qualitative" stuff was just to hint at the "secondary concepts
> which will follow confirmation of the basic concepts". The idea of
> mentioning them was to hint at the richness of the concepts.
From here it just sounds like you have been dreaming and hoping.
That is not science. You need to actually have a theory which
includes real calculations (unless, of course, you are doing
string theory where even numbers are seen as much too applied
for their tastes.)
In that
> one would expect some of the observations as a "matter of conceptual
> necessity" as opposed to just discovering them and inventing a concept
> to explain it. That was the point of mentioning them.
What does this mean in english? Quotes around fuzzy phrases do
not constitute and explanation.
>
> There are quantitative predictions which can be tested.
Such as?
One important
> prediction is qualitative but once the experiment is completed certain
> important empirically sourced data will allow one to make quantitative
> predictions thenceforth.
Do you correctly predict all past experiments? If not, there is
no point in going forward.
>
> For the record, I'm not responding to your comments any longer other
> than to say I'm not commenting on your comments.
So you do not like it when people point out you are dreaming and not
doing science. Most cranks are like that.
Eric Gisse
4 days of words and not a damn thing relevant to
sci.physics.relativity
Let's try something basic. What's the divergence of the Einstein
tensor equal to?
PD
> On Apr 15, 6:59 am, PD <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Apr 14, 7:14 pm, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >PD, when I speak of L-F I am primarily speaking of the space-time construct.
>
> The conceptualization I have been working with will definitely predict
> experimental outcomes which are in common with GR and also it will
> predict outcomes for which GR is under-conceptualized to predict.
This is your challenge. You claim it will "definitely predict
experimental outcomes" that distinguish it from GR. This is precisely
what you need to demonstrate. Note that so far, none of what you
mention below carries that promise.
> So
> obviously it models in one respect similar to GR (an inertial
> theory). But it is additionally conceptualized and it is this
> additional conceptualization which prevents Minkowski from
> participating as the underlying space-time but it is clearly
> compatible with L-F construct.
Small point of order. Minkowski space is not the structure used by GR.
Minkowski space is flat and does not support curvature. In particular,
it has a uniform metric.
Not asking you to complete it. Asking you to generate two or three
quantitative predictions. Just two or three. Einstein didn't produce
all the predictions of general relativity either, and in this sense,
he didn't complete it either. But he did generate two or three, and
that was enough to show promise and to get other people on board to
develop it further and generate dozens.
> But it is
> sufficiently developed to predict gravitational time dilation which
> supports GR and certain other unique and testable predictions.
Sorry, but replicating previous results are not unique predictions.
What you need are predictions of *measurable* quantities that are
*different* than what other models predict.
>
> Some cool "qualitative" predictions are:
>
> Ghost gravity which is a kind of secondary gravitational field which
> arises from a distribution of matter. This is a counter-concept to
> "dark matter"
And how would that show up with an experimental signature?
>
> A corollary that the universe must be closed.
With what measurable consequence?
>
> The concept that the accelerating displacement of distant objects is
> "tidal separation" in a collapsing universe (counter-concept is dark
> energy).
With what measurable consequence?
Jonathan Doolin
Phil,
Keep hanging in there!
To begin the tradition of clarity over ambiguosity, you acknowledge,
for instance, an irreconcilable difference between Lorentz-Fitzgerald,
and Minkowski. Something I rarely see acknowledged, and in fact, I am
not sure which is which.
Do either one of these ideas embrace the relativity of simultaneity?
Regards,
Jonathan Doolin
Phil
> On Apr 15, 6:08 pm, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Apr 15, 6:59 am, PD <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Apr 14, 7:14 pm, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > So
> > obviously it models in one respect similar to GR (an inertial
> > theory). But it is additionally conceptualized and it is this
> > additional conceptualization which prevents Minkowski from
> > participating as the underlying space-time but it is clearly
> > compatible with L-F construct.
>
> Small point of order. Minkowski space is not the structure used by GR.
> Minkowski space is flat and does not support curvature. In particular,
> it has a uniform metric.
I do understand that. When I say Minkowski I am speaking of a 4-space
hyperbolic construct.
>
> > But it is
> > sufficiently developed to predict gravitational time dilation which
> > supports GR and certain other unique and testable predictions.
>
> Sorry, but replicating previous results are not unique predictions.
> What you need are predictions of *measurable* quantities that are
> *different* than what other models predict.
Well, it predicts outcomes consistent with GR and time dilation
outcomes not consistent with GR. All tests of time dilation for GR
have source and detection at fixed potential. For example, if a clock
be in an elliptical orbit, one can calculate the rate during descent
would be faster than the rate during ascent when compared to a surface
clock. So it would predict differently in this particular case.
I very much disagree that a qualitive prediction has no value.
Sometimes one has to do some experiments to get the numbers to plug
into equations so that he can make quantitative predictions. Consider
Cavendish's experiment which result allowed one to calculate G. This
particular experiment had no expected experimental outcome. It was
conducted to discover something. Even so, the results were able to
provide the following information.
A force could be detected and measured between two test masses.
A value for G could be calculated.
Finally the Mass of the Earth could be calculated.
As you know even GR uses G.
Same with this conceptualization. Basically, it qualitatively
predicts that a body's gravity is related to acceleration.
Similarly Newton predicted a mutual attraction but could not predict
what it would be for two test masses. In this sense the prediction
was purely qualitative. Even som an experiment designed to test for
and quantify the mutual attraction of two test masses confirmed
something like mutual attraction existed in experience and by
empirically quantifying it one was able to make many other quantified
predictions. In fact, it even helps the practitioner of GR to make
quantified predictions.
Likewise, a test which confirms that gravity is functionally related
to acceleration could be used to isolate the constants required to
make additional quantified predictions. So even while the prediction
is qualitative is no less important that Newton's prediction that two
test masses would be attracted two one another by some "unknown"
amount. It is truly unfair to judge a conceptualization harshly for
having to gain experience to expand its prediction capability.
Particularly when no known gravity conceptualization (to include GR)
can do that without first gaining the experience of what G is.
> > Some cool "qualitative" predictions are:
>
> > Ghost gravity which is a kind of secondary gravitational field which
> > arises from a distribution of matter. This is a counter-concept to
> > "dark matter"
>
> And how would that show up with an experimental signature?
Well one could estimate the distribution of matter of a galaxy and
construct gravity consistent with the model (to include ghost gravity)
and test to see whether doppler velocities confirmed the predictions.
Pretty much the same procedure I suppose they use with dark matter
only one would estimate only the matter he could observe as opposed to
the quantity and placement of dark matter he could not.
> > A corollary that the universe must be closed.
>
> With what measurable consequence?
I think probably the following prediction and this one would be
confirmed by experimental discovery of a tidal gradient. For example,
there would be a directional nature to the acceleration of distant
objects. Objects which have closer proximity to the center of
collapse would have higher measurable acceleration than objects more
distant from the center but equal-distant from our location.
Measuring relative acceleration involves measuring redshift change
over time.
> > The concept that the accelerating displacement of distant objects is
> > "tidal separation" in a collapsing universe (counter-concept is dark
> > energy).
>
> With what measurable consequence?
See above.
PD, if you are interested, I would be happy to forward you a link when
I have sufficiently completed the site.
Phil
Irreconcilable difference?
Regarding gravity, one can conceptualize gravity in a way which can
not be reconciled to GR and its space-time while the conceptualization
is compatible with L-F. That's what I meant. 4-space can not support
the conceptualization.
Regarding the invariance of physical law under transformation and the
invariant measurement of light-speed, the two conceptualization are
"in experience" indistinguishable. An so there is a set of predicted
phenomena (to include relativity of simultaneity) both
conceptualizations hold in common.
Jonathan Doolin
In the interest of clarity, then, I acknowledge I'm unfamiliar with
what you mean by Minkowski or Lorentz-Fitzgerald or GR. I am probably
familiar with the concepts, but I don't know which concept you are
trying to get across by saying each word.
The Lorentz transformations are compatible with Minkowski space, but
by tacking on the name "Fitzgerald" does one add some ambiguity to the
Lorentz transformations?
Minkowski spacetime, (so I have read) is a Cartesian coordinate system
+ time. There is nothing conceptually difficult about Minkowski
spacetime, any more than there is anything conceptually difficult
about a Cartesian coordinate system*.
However, transforming the Minkowski spacetime by a velocity change,
even by Galilean transformation surprises people, as one takes the
stack and skews it, because it creates a physical representation of
something we do not actually physically observe.
The Galilean transformation skews the space-time diagram so that all
events move along and lines of constant t. The Lorentz
Transformation, on the other hand, skews the space-time diagram along
the axes q=ct and q=-ct (where q is a spatial coordinate determined by
the direction of the velocity change.) This has the result of taking
all of the events in the Minkowski space and moving them along
hyperbolic arcs (in the q-t plane) to new positions in space-time.****
We have evidence that gravitation causes a slowing of light**.
However, all the evidence points to, is a SLOWING of the speed of
light near certain materials. As such it is equivalent to placing a
transparent medium with a higher index of refraction in some region.
This is important because it means that all of the spacetime intervals
which had been zero become time-like.
So a Lorentz Transformation on these events does not cause any more
difficulty than a Lorentz Transformation on events resulting from
light traveling through water or glass. So if this is the case, then
I think I have the conceptualization of gravity "is compatible with L-
F."
I've had a strong sense that I have understood gravity "in a way which
can not be reconciled to GR and its space-time" but I have found "GR
and its space-time" to be too ambiguous in its premises and its
argument.
*Some people bring up the fact that Minkowski space is "flat" but
unless you are talking to someone who habitually thinks about the
possibility of extra unseen dimensions, this goes without saying. For
people who DO think about unseen extra dimensions, this ought to go in
a footnote.
**(Evidence I have heard of, second-hand, includes gravitational
lensing, careful clock measurements at different elevations. Evidence
that I've accessed first-hand is thought experiment considering
acceleration as an equivalent of gravity, and less-convincingly
consideration of warping a 1d+time Minkowski diagram in three
dimensions.)
***(By q-t* plane, I mean the plane which is determined by the the
spatial direction of the velocity change in one axis and time on the
other axis. This hyperbolic arc would not be observed physically, but
only if the Minkowski diagram was viewed from an unchanging origin,
and the Lorentz Transformation was performed over time while the
demonstration was paused. To actually plot the hyperbola, you have to
have the origin at one time and place, and view the event at several
different velocities from that same origin.)
****just as rotation would take all of the events in Minkowski space-
time and move them along circular arcs to new positions in space.
Except rotations affect the observed position of objects, while LT's
affect the coordinates of events, which are not directly observed, but
one must measure the consequences and plot them to see these
hyperbolic arcs.
Regards,
Jonathan Doolin
> conceptualizations hold in common.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Jonathan Doolin
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f8/Milne_Model.jpg
When Milne predicted "The particles near the boundary tend towards
invisibility, as seen by the central observer, and fade into a
continuous background of finite intensity."
This has been ignored because Milne did not predict that the finite
background would correspond to blackbody radiation right around 2.7
Kelvin.
Hence, though he published this in 1935, it is completely left off the
timeline.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discovery_of_cosmic_microwave_background_radiation
> I have sufficiently completed the site.- Hide quoted text -
Phil
> Phil,
>
> In the interest of clarity, then, I acknowledge I'm unfamiliar with
> what you mean by Minkowski or Lorentz-Fitzgerald or GR. I am probably
> familiar with the concepts, but I don't know which concept you are
> trying to get across by saying each word.
>
> The Lorentz transformations are compatible with Minkowski space, but
> by tacking on the name "Fitzgerald" does one add some ambiguity to the
> Lorentz transformations?
Jonathan, I am speaking of the construction of underlying space and
time. Minkowski is a 4-dimensional hyperbolic space. Lorentz-
Fitzgerald is a 3 dimensional space and a separate dimension of time.
The Lorentz-Fitzgerald is an ad-hoc adaptation of a Maxwellian
conceptualization which is often described as Galilean. Lorentz-
Fitzgerald merely assumes the foreshortening of an object in the
direction of its motion (wrt to a homogeneous 3 dimensional space)
whose function relationally leads to Lorentz' transformations.
Lorentz' original presentation of the transformations were presented
as they related to the L-F construction of space and time.
Even so, in Minkowski, coordinates transform by the same relationship
and the transformations were named "Lorentz transformations".
By ambiguity I mean ... For experiments consistent with the Special
Relativity and Minkowski, we have no evidence that excludes the
construction of L-F as a viable conceptualization. In they regard, I
suggest that perhaps we should not rule it out just yet. It not a
matter of there being anything "wrong" with Minkowski. Its a
conceptualization and conceptually it performs a worthy function.
Particularly, the practitioner of modern relativity models free-fall
as a purely inertial state. It is no happy accident that this be the
case. Treating gravity as an acceleration would involve attributing
motion properties to the 4-space object. That's a no-no and so if one
is to assume the 4-space, then a freely falling body is purely in an
inertial state.
If we add conceptualization to the free-fall experience to include
acceleration (in addition to inertia) then we find ourselves at odds
with 4-space. The conceptualization of "acceleration by inertia"
means the freely falling body "accelerates because of its inertia"
Without going into the details of this conceptualization, let it
suffice to say that it predicts phenomena we never imagined might
exist in nature (and which is inconsistent with gravity as
unaccelerated motion). And so one could perform experiments to
determine whether the concept of acceleration by inertia is consistent
with experience.
I don't mean to portray that to mean that L-F and 4-space are
irreconcilable. I think it sufficient to say they are different
constructions of space-time which can support different
conceptualizations of gravity.
doug
You found this big word that you think means something and
you seem to feel you can use it as a substitute for actually
studying physics.
In they regard, I
> suggest that perhaps we should not rule it out just yet.
Well, there is a century of experimental evidence that you
are ignoring.
It not a
> matter of there being anything "wrong" with Minkowski. Its a
> conceptualization and conceptually it performs a worthy function.
>
> Particularly, the practitioner of modern relativity models free-fall
> as a purely inertial state. It is no happy accident that this be the
> case. Treating gravity as an acceleration would involve attributing
> motion properties to the 4-space object.
Lots of words with no meaning.
That's a no-no
Well, your delusions do not count.
and so if one
> is to assume the 4-space, then a freely falling body is purely in an
> inertial state.
>
> If we add conceptualization
There is that big word you do not understand again.
to the free-fall experience to include
> acceleration (in addition to inertia) then we find ourselves at odds
> with 4-space. The conceptualization of "acceleration by inertia"
> means the freely falling body "accelerates because of its inertia"
> Without going into the details
Meaning you have no idea about what this means.
of this conceptualization, let it
> suffice to say that it predicts phenomena we never imagined might
> exist in nature
And you are again demonstrated your ignorance of a century of
experiment. It is easy to remain ignorant than to study.
(and which is inconsistent with gravity as
> unaccelerated motion). And so one could perform experiments to
> determine whether the concept of acceleration by inertia is consistent
> with experience.
>
> I don't mean to portray that to mean that L-F and 4-space are
> irreconcilable. I think it sufficient to say they are different
> constructions of space-time which can support different
> conceptualizations of gravity.
You do love that meaningless word.
Phil
> On Apr 17, 6:35 am, Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
Would someone please remind doug that I am not commenting on his
rants?
doug
Well, this is a public forum and I am free to point out your
silly misconceptions about science. You are not required to
read them.
You seem to want to use your prejudices to replace science.
It does not work that way. You are free to have your delusions
but you should not mistake them for science.
Phil
Jonathan Doolin
> On Apr 17, 6:35 am, Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Phil,
>
> > In the interest of clarity, then, I acknowledge I'm unfamiliar with
> > what you mean by Minkowski or Lorentz-Fitzgerald or GR. I am probably
> > familiar with the concepts, but I don't know which concept you are
> > trying to get across by saying each word.
>
> > The Lorentz transformations are compatible with Minkowski space, but
> > by tacking on the name "Fitzgerald" does one add some ambiguity to the
> > Lorentz transformations?
>
> Jonathan, I am speaking of the construction of underlying space and
> time. Minkowski is a 4-dimensional hyperbolic space. Lorentz-
> Fitzgerald is a 3 dimensional space and a separate dimension of time.
> The Lorentz-Fitzgerald is an ad-hoc adaptation of a Maxwellian
> conceptualization which is often described as Galilean. Lorentz-
> Fitzgerald merely assumes the foreshortening of an object in the
> direction of its motion (wrt to a homogeneous 3 dimensional space)
> whose function relationally leads to Lorentz' transformations.
> Lorentz' original presentation of the transformations were presented
> as they related to the L-F construction of space and time.
>
> Even so, in Minkowski, coordinates transform by the same relationship
> and the transformations were named "Lorentz transformations".
>
I see.
I'm sorry, I find all that to be completely ambiguous. For instance,
when I said what I meant by Minkowski, you snipped it and replaced it
with "Minkowski is a 4-dimensional hyperbolic space."
So I can't tell whether you are agreeing with my definition or
disagreeing with my definition. Unfortunately, I got my definition
from a book that has long sense been returned to the library, and I
don't know remember what it was called.
> By ambiguity I mean ... For experiments consistent with the Special
> Relativity and Minkowski, we have no evidence that excludes the
> construction of L-F as a viable conceptualization. In they regard, I
> suggest that perhaps we should not rule it out just yet. It not a
> matter of there being anything "wrong" with Minkowski. Its a
> conceptualization and conceptually it performs a worthy function.
>
I have realized, since my last post on this topic, that the Lorentz-
Fitzgerald explanation actually predated the Lorentz Transformation
equations, but I've still not seen what that explanation was, I'm
afraid.
The fact that Lorentz thought to replace the Lorentz-Fitzgerald idea
with a better one suggests to me that the reason Lorentz had for
"fixing" it ought to be taken into account. I don't know what that
reason was, though.
> Particularly, the practitioner of modern relativity models free-fall
> as a purely inertial state. It is no happy accident that this be the
> case. Treating gravity as an acceleration would involve attributing
> motion properties to the 4-space object. That's a no-no and so if one
> is to assume the 4-space, then a freely falling body is purely in an
> inertial state.
>
This could be treated unambiguously, too.
An object on the ground senses a force from the ground, just as an
object on the floor of a rocket under acceleration would feel a force
from the floor.
The object in free fall senses no force, just as an object that a
rocket is accelerating toward senses no force.
So in that way, acceleration is the same as gravity.
On the other hand, the object in free-fall accelerates, while the one
on the ground is motionless. The obect on the floor of the rocket is
accelerating while the object that the rocket is accelerating toward
is not.
So of COURSE, treating gravity as acceleration is going to give you
problems as soon as you pretend the object in free-fall is NOT
accelerating.
So I think the equivalence principle should (at best) be applied to
the phenomena which suggest equivalence. We should not treat gravity
as an acceleration in such a way that it attributes acceleration to
the object on the ground. That's a no-no. It does cause motion and
acceleration to an object in free-fall, though. If one is to assume
anything, the freely falling body is not experiencing pressure or
force, but it is experiencing acceleration relative to all inertial
bodies in the universe.
So let's not be ambiguous about the meaning of the equivalence
principle, because in some ways acceleration and gravity are
equivalent, and in some ways they are not.
This is one reason why it is important to make one's premises clear.
Because ambiguity leads to people making really ridiculous claims that
can't be checked because they are ambiguous.
> If we add conceptualization to the free-fall experience to include
> acceleration (in addition to inertia) then we find ourselves at odds
> with 4-space. The conceptualization of "acceleration by inertia"
> means the freely falling body "accelerates because of its inertia"
> Without going into the details of this conceptualization, let it
> suffice to say that it predicts phenomena we never imagined might
> exist in nature (and which is inconsistent with gravity as
> unaccelerated motion). And so one could perform experiments to
> determine whether the concept of acceleration by inertia is consistent
> with experience.
>
I guess I don't know what you mean because I am so attached to the
other idea that my mind cannot even grasp this one. You cut out
everything I said about Minkowski space and the Lorentz
Transformations, so can I presume there is no compatibility whatsoever
between our two concepts of the nature of spacetime?
> I don't mean to portray that to mean that L-F and 4-space are
> irreconcilable. I think it sufficient to say they are different
> constructions of space-time which can support different
> conceptualizations of gravity.
I think that whatever you are saying MAY BE irreconcilable with the
idea that I was presenting. I don't want to mischaracterize your
argument, but it seems like you MAY BE saying that gravity and
acceleration ARE equivalent in ways that they clearly are not based on
common everyday experience.
So we completely agree that evidence should unambiguously support a
theory. We agree that there should be clear premises, and clear
arguments. I wonder if you might re-read and comment on the rest of
my last post, dated April 17, so that I can know unambiguously where
we have common conceptions, and where we don't? Thanks.
Regards,
Jonathan Doolin
Phil
>
> So let's not be ambiguous about the meaning of the equivalence
> principle, because in some ways acceleration and gravity are
> equivalent, and in some ways they are not.
>
This is an incredibly intelligent statement and one which I share.
Alot of effort is spent justifying similarities and to little noting
the differences. Actually it takes TWO concepts to completely
describe the experience. Its not one or the other. Both inertia and
acceleration describe the free-fall experience.
> > If we add conceptualization to the free-fall experience to include
> > acceleration (in addition to inertia) then we find ourselves at odds
> > with 4-space. The conceptualization of "acceleration by inertia"
> > means the freely falling body "accelerates because of its inertia"
> > Without going into the details of this conceptualization, let it
> > suffice to say that it predicts phenomena we never imagined might
> > exist in nature (and which is inconsistent with gravity as
> > unaccelerated motion). And so one could perform experiments to
> > determine whether the concept of acceleration by inertia is consistent
> > with experience.
>
> I guess I don't know what you mean because I am so attached to the
> other idea that my mind cannot even grasp this one. You cut out
> everything I said about Minkowski space and the Lorentz
> Transformations, so can I presume there is no compatibility whatsoever
> between our two concepts of the nature of spacetime?
>
> > I don't mean to portray that to mean that L-F and 4-space are
> > irreconcilable. I think it sufficient to say they are different
> > constructions of space-time which can support different
> > conceptualizations of gravity.
>
> I think that whatever you are saying MAY BE irreconcilable with the
> idea that I was presenting. I don't want to mischaracterize your
> argument, but it seems like you MAY BE saying that gravity and
> acceleration ARE equivalent in ways that they clearly are not based on
> common everyday experience.
I am only saying that based on my interpretation of everyday
experience, free fall motion is BOTH like inertial motion and like
accelerated motion. Further I say that it is not possible to
completely describe the experience without using BOTH concepts.
Choosing freefall as purely inertial or purely acceleration fails
adequately describe the everyday experience.
> So we completely agree that evidence should unambiguously support a
> theory. We agree that there should be clear premises, and clear
> arguments. I wonder if you might re-read and comment on the rest of
> my last post, dated April 17, so that I can know unambiguously where
> we have common conceptions, and where we don't? Thanks.
Honestly, I'm not sure what you were driving at. Minkowski is a 4-
dimensional hypberbolic space. Lorentz transformations are the same
thing as a rotation of coordinates in Minkowki. L-F is different and
does not support the concept of invariant interval. They are two
different animals. If that is what you mean by irreconcilable, then I
would say yes, they are not the same thing.
Jonathan Doolin
> On Apr 18, 5:44 pm, Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > So let's not be ambiguous about the meaning of the equivalence
> > principle, because in some ways acceleration and gravity are
> > equivalent, and in some ways they are not.
>
> This is an incredibly intelligent statement and one which I share.
> Alot of effort is spent justifying similarities and to little noting
> the differences. Actually it takes TWO concepts to completely
> describe the experience. Its not one or the other. Both inertia and
> acceleration describe the free-fall experience.
>
The emperor's new clothes were getting a little worn out, anyway. ;)
I'm glad to see just one person acknowledge that, too.
Excellent. That is much less ambiguous.
> > So we completely agree that evidence should unambiguously support a
> > theory. We agree that there should be clear premises, and clear
> > arguments. I wonder if you might re-read and comment on the rest of
> > my last post, dated April 17, so that I can know unambiguously where
> > we have common conceptions, and where we don't? Thanks.
>
> Honestly, I'm not sure what you were driving at. Minkowski is a 4-
> dimensional hypberbolic space. Lorentz transformations are the same
> thing as a rotation of coordinates in Minkowki. L-F is different and
> does not support the concept of invariant interval. They are two
> different animals. If that is what you mean by irreconcilable, then I
> would say yes, they are not the same thing.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
From what I've read elsewhere, Minkowski space-time is simply a
cartesian coordinate system with time. The space is independent of
the transformation. Lorentz Transformation tells you how it is
transformed keeping the speed of light the same. Galilean
transformation tells you how it is transformed keeping time the same.
By analogy: rectangualar coordinate system is to Cartesian Coordinate
system, as rectangular space-time is to Minkowski space-time.
Oh! Hold on a second, I think I am getting an idea where the
confusion lies, because there is another analogy which works just as
well:
CARTESIAN coordinates are to POLAR coordinates, as
MINKOWSKI coordinates are to HYPERBOLIC coordinates.
(x,y) is to (r*cos(theta),r*sin(theta)), x:0,2Pi
(t,x) is to (s*sinh(phi),s*cosh(phi)) phi:-infinity,infinity
(in the present-rightside arc)
Hence, you can call Minkowski spacetime a "Hyperbolic space" with just
as much validity as you call Euclidian a "polar space."
There are some differences though between rotation and LT's though,
because the hyperbolic operation maintains four distinct hyperbolic
paths, whereas the rotation just has one circle. With a rotation, you
can take front to right to back to left, and back to front again.
With a Lorentz Transformation, though, You can't convert past into
present, left-present into right-present, or present into future with
the Lorentz Transformation.
As for whether LT and LF are irreconcilably different, I think that
the LT's fully handle what is required of them without the need for an
additional phenomenon. I think they are different explanations trying
to explain the same effect, and you can either have one or the other,
but by Occom's razor, you shouldn't try to have both.
I'm guessing that L-F is sort of an ether theory where the contraction
effect is real for the body undergoing contraction, but simultaneity
is maintained.
The Lorentz-Transformations embrace a true relativistic theory where
every observer regards himself as stationary, (so they view OTHERS
undergoing contraction, but not themselves) but simultaneity goes out
the window.
That being said, I don't know if the differences are really
"irreconcilable." I can imagine a mathematician deciding "wouldn't it
be interesting if" the contraction effect were three quarters of one
and 25 percent the other, or some other linear combination of the
two. Then you'd get the possibility of time-travel, worm-holes, and
who-knows what other kinds of cool effects?
Phil
>
> From what I've read elsewhere, Minkowski space-time is simply a
> cartesian coordinate system with time. The space is independent of
> the transformation. Lorentz Transformation tells you how it is
> transformed keeping the speed of light the same. Galilean
> transformation tells you how it is transformed keeping time the same.
I don't think you understood what I was saying. The LT's are a linear
function. An equation. By themselves they tell you nothing about the
underlying space and time. They perform different functions in
Minkowski and L-F. In Minkowski they function like rotations, in L-F
they function like Galilean transformations which have been modified
to accomodate measurement tool invariance (the intervals of underlying
space and time measuring tools measure depend upon the motion of the
rest frame)
> By analogy: rectangualar coordinate system is to Cartesian Coordinate
> system, as rectangular space-time is to Minkowski space-time.
>
> Oh! Hold on a second, I think I am getting an idea where the
> confusion lies, because there is another analogy which works just as
> well:
>
> CARTESIAN coordinates are to POLAR coordinates, as
> MINKOWSKI coordinates are to HYPERBOLIC coordinates.
>
> (x,y) is to (r*cos(theta),r*sin(theta)), x:0,2Pi
>
> (t,x) is to (s*sinh(phi),s*cosh(phi)) phi:-infinity,infinity
> (in the present-rightside arc)
>
> Hence, you can call Minkowski spacetime a "Hyperbolic space" with just
> as much validity as you call Euclidian a "polar space."
>
> There are some differences though between rotation and LT's though,
> because the hyperbolic operation maintains four distinct hyperbolic
> paths, whereas the rotation just has one circle. With a rotation, you
> can take front to right to back to left, and back to front again.
> With a Lorentz Transformation, though, You can't convert past into
> present, left-present into right-present, or present into future with
> the Lorentz Transformation.
A Lorentz Transformation transforms the coordinates of an underlying
event to a rotated coordinate system. Since we are talking a single
event, no there is no way to rotate a past event into the future. The
placement of the event in the manifold determines whether "right now"
that event is in one's future or past. Also Lorentz transforms are
only valid for events which lie within a light cone (the tips of which
serve as the origin about which coordinates rotate), they form a group
with symmetry property.
You should get a copy of Spacetime Physics. If you are interested in
relativity, and you seem to be, then it would be a worthwhile
investment.
> As for whether LT and LF are irreconcilably different, I think that
> the LT's fully handle what is required of them without the need for an
> additional phenomenon. I think they are different explanations trying
> to explain the same effect, and you can either have one or the other,
> but by Occom's razor, you shouldn't try to have both.
One needs to know what his assumptions are. Practice consistently and
do not mix concepts.
As to whether both concepts can or should be developed (for sake of
scientific inquiry) I simply disagree. I don't see any conflict in
supporting both concepts in two separate programs of research until
evidence supports that one _must be_ abandoned.
It very easy to abuse Occam's razor. For example:
Does it really mean making as few assumptions as possible? Or does it
mean making only as many as are necessary? Nature isn't necessarily
as simple as it can be. It is possible to view nature to be only as
complex as it is.
Can you see the difference? Making as few assumptions as possible is
metaphysics. While making as many as are necessary is simply
describing experience.
Take for example free fall motion in gravity. There are those who
would say that inertial free-fall must be what nature would prefer
because it assumes fewer concepts about gravity than one which models
free-fall as inertial and as accelerated. But then you have examined
the evidence, after doing so you have found (as have I) that the most
accurate description involves modeling both. And so it would seem
that nature is indeed no more simple than it is complex.
Dirk Van de moortel
a4ab59fe-6fa6-4dff...@e21g2000yqb.googlegroups.com
[snip]
> A Lorentz Transformation transforms the coordinates of an underlying
> event to a rotated coordinate system. Since we are talking a single
> event, no there is no way to rotate a past event into the future. The
> placement of the event in the manifold determines whether "right now"
> that event is in one's future or past. Also Lorentz transforms are
> only valid for events which lie within a light cone (the tips of which
> serve as the origin about which coordinates rotate),
You should get a copy of Spacetime Physics. If you are interested in
relativity, and you seem to be, then it would be a worthwhile investment.
Dirk Vdm
Phil
<dirkvandemoor...@nospAm.hotmail.com> wrote:
> Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
> a4ab59fe-6fa6-4dff-b66e-664429baa...@e21g2000yqb.googlegroups.com
I have a copy Dirk. I merely meant to say that a rotation is about an
origin. If events lie with the cone, then one can transform the
coordinates to other inertial frames sharing that common origin as a
rotation.
Dirk Van de moortel
> On Apr 19, 8:23 am, "Dirk Van de moortel"
> <dirkvandemoor...@nospAm.hotmail.com> wrote:
>> Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>>
>> a4ab59fe-6fa6-4dff-b66e-664429baa...@e21g2000yqb.googlegroups.com
>>
>> [snip]
>>
>>> A Lorentz Transformation transforms the coordinates of an underlying
>>> event to a rotated coordinate system. Since we are talking a single
>>> event, no there is no way to rotate a past event into the future. The
>>> placement of the event in the manifold determines whether "right now"
>>> that event is in one's future or past. Also Lorentz transforms are
>>> only valid for events which lie within a light cone (the tips of which
>>> serve as the origin about which coordinates rotate),
>>
>> You should get a copy of Spacetime Physics. If you are interested in
>> relativity, and you seem to be, then it would be a worthwhile investment.
>>
>> Dirk Vdm
>>
>>> they form a group
>>> with symmetry property.
>>
>>> You should get a copy of Spacetime Physics. If you are interested in
>>> relativity, and you seem to be, then it would be a worthwhile
>>> investment.
>
> I have a copy Dirk. I merely meant to say that a rotation is about an
> origin.
There is no rotation. You rations are around a point.
> If events lie with the cone, then one can transform the
> coordinates to other inertial frames sharing that common origin as a
> rotation.
More nonsense.
You said:
"Also Lorentz transforms are
only valid for events which lie within a light cone (the tips of which
serve as the origin about which coordinates rotate)..."
Lorentz transforms are valid for all events.
Coordinates don't rotate.
Dirk Vdm
Dirk Van de moortel
4eHGl.35670$E45....@newsfe26.ams2
Rotations are around a point :-)
Dirk Vdm
marika
> Rotations are around a point :-)
>
I wait to hear what is coming next
mk5000
"I, I, I don't have anything
Since I don't have you
And I don't have fond desires
And I don't have happy hours"--Guns N Roses
Phil
<dirkvandemoor...@nospAm.hotmail.com> wrote:
> Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
Dirk coordinates systems are conceived to rotate, which is what I
meant.
You are correct. What I said didn't make sense. Jonathan was under
the impression that a rotation could make a future event the past. I
was trying to convey that the light cone limits the rotation and I did
a poor job of that. Worse, I actually said something totally wrong.
For the Jonathan's sake, please describe it better.
Jonathan Doolin
> On Apr 18, 9:07 pm, Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > From what I've read elsewhere, Minkowski space-time is simply a
> > cartesian coordinate system with time. The space is independent of
> > the transformation. Lorentz Transformation tells you how it is
> > transformed keeping the speed of light the same. Galilean
> > transformation tells you how it is transformed keeping time the same.
>
> I don't think you understood what I was saying. The LT's are a linear
> function. An equation. By themselves they tell you nothing about the
> underlying space and time.
Right.
> They perform different functions in
> Minkowski and L-F.
This seems ambiguous. I have the idea that L-F is some kind of
function, whereas Minkowski is a coordinate system.You seem to be
saying that L-F and Minkowski are both coordinate systems, and the
Lorentz Transformations might operate on both of them. Our
definitions of these ideas don't match.
>In Minkowski they function like rotations,
Did you read in "Spacetime Physics" that LT's are like rotations in
Minkowski space?
A Lorentz Transformation does THIS:
http://casa.colorado.edu/~ajsh/sr/lorwheelbig_gif.html
Whereas a Rotation does THIS
http://casa.colorado.edu/~ajsh/sr/wheelbig_gif.html
Go ask a kindergartener whether those two things are "alike" and you
may get a different opinion.
"like" is an ambiguous term. Much like saying that gravity and
acceleration are equivalent, when in many ways they are not equivalent
at all.
How are LTs "like" rotations? They are like rotations in that they
replace sines with hyperbolic sines, and cosines with hyperbolic
cosines.
> in L-F
> they function like Galilean transformations which have been modified
> to accomodate measurement tool invariance (the intervals of underlying
> space and time measuring tools measure depend upon the motion of the
> rest frame)
>
That verifies my concept that L-F is an ether theory if there is
motion of the rest frame.
>
>
>
>
> > By analogy: rectangualar coordinate system is to Cartesian Coordinate
> > system, as rectangular space-time is to Minkowski space-time.
>
> > Oh! Hold on a second, I think I am getting an idea where the
> > confusion lies, because there is another analogy which works just as
> > well:
>
> > CARTESIAN coordinates are to POLAR coordinates, as
> > MINKOWSKI coordinates are to HYPERBOLIC coordinates.
>
> > (x,y) is to (r*cos(theta),r*sin(theta)), x:0,2Pi
>
> > (t,x) is to (s*sinh(phi),s*cosh(phi)) phi:-infinity,infinity
> > (in the present-rightside arc)
>
> > Hence, you can call Minkowski spacetime a "Hyperbolic space" with just
> > as much validity as you call Euclidian a "polar space."
>
> > There are some differences though between rotation and LT's though,
> > because the hyperbolic operation maintains four distinct hyperbolic
> > paths, whereas the rotation just has one circle. With a rotation, you
> > can take front to right to back to left, and back to front again.
> > With a Lorentz Transformation, though, You can't convert past into
> > present, left-present into right-present, or present into future with
> > the Lorentz Transformation.
>
> A Lorentz Transformation transforms the coordinates of an underlying
> event to a rotated coordinate system. Since we are talking a single
> event, no there is no way to rotate a past event into the future.
A Lorentz Transformation CAN just be used, mathematically, on a single
event, if you like. However, just like when you "rotate" a camera,
ALL of the points in the picture are transformed by the rotation
around the center of the camera, when you "accelerate" a camera, all
of the events which will be captured by the camera are transformed by
Lorentz Transformation around the event of the acceleration of the
camera.
>The
> placement of the event in the manifold determines whether "right now"
> that event is in one's future or past. Also Lorentz transforms are
> only valid for events which lie within a light cone (the tips of which
> serve as the origin about which coordinates rotate), they form a group
> with symmetry property.
>
That is not true. The Lorentz Transformations are valid for all
events, both inside and outside of the light-cone, and ON the
lightcone. There are four quadrants: future, past, present-right, and
present-left. And events along the diagonals are Lorentz Transformed
by moving along those diagonals.
> You should get a copy of Spacetime Physics. If you are interested in
> relativity, and you seem to be, then it would be a worthwhile
> investment.
>
Spacetime Physics may well be a very good read, and I may have read it
a few years ago. I'm not sure. But any book on modern cosmology that
does not present a description of a Lorentz Invariant matter
distribution, is, in my opinion, ambiguous. The only two books I've
seen do this are Milne's "Relativity, Gravitation, and World
Structure" and Epstein's "Relativity Visualized." So I recommend you
read those.
> > As for whether LT and LF are irreconcilably different, I think that
> > the LT's fully handle what is required of them without the need for an
> > additional phenomenon. I think they are different explanations trying
> > to explain the same effect, and you can either have one or the other,
> > but by Occom's razor, you shouldn't try to have both.
>
> One needs to know what his assumptions are. Practice consistently and
> do not mix concepts.
>
Right. This is why I want you to know exactly what you mean saying
rotation is like LT's.
Sometimes there are concepts which can be described ambiguously but
they may not actually exist in practice. For instance, the idea of
"Minkowski Space" you seem to be trying to get across is there might
be a space where the Lorentz Transformations actually BECOME a
rotation.
But the domains and ranges of these functions are quite different.
The hyperbolic sine and cosine have noncyclic domains of (-infinity,
infinity). The sine and cosine functions have cyclic domains of
(0,Pi).
Sine has range (-1,1), while Sinh has range (-infinity, infinity)
Cosine has range (-1,1), while Cosh has range (1, infinity)
So you have an idea of concept that I do NOT have. If you have found
some way of mapping any coordinate system so that a Lorentz
Transformation could in ANY way become a rotation, then for clarity's
sake you should present that mapping. As far as I know, though, such
a mapping does not really exist.
> As to whether both concepts can or should be developed (for sake of
> scientific inquiry) I simply disagree. I don't see any conflict in
> supporting both concepts in two separate programs of research until
> evidence supports that one _must be_ abandoned.
>
> It very easy to abuse Occam's razor. For example:
>
> Does it really mean making as few assumptions as possible? Or does it
> mean making only as many as are necessary? Nature isn't necessarily
> as simple as it can be. It is possible to view nature to be only as
> complex as it is.
>
> Can you see the difference? Making as few assumptions as possible is
> metaphysics. While making as many as are necessary is simply
> describing experience.
>
> Take for example free fall motion in gravity. There are those who
> would say that inertial free-fall must be what nature would prefer
> because it assumes fewer concepts about gravity than one which models
> free-fall as inertial and as accelerated. But then you have examined
> the evidence, after doing so you have found (as have I) that the most
> accurate description involves modeling both. And so it would seem
> that nature is indeed no more simple than it is complex.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
No, I don't think any field of research should be abandoned. What
should be pursued at all times, though, is clarity and self-
consistency. One can give clear and self-consistent instructions for
sewing a piece of cloth into the shape of a klein bottle, for
instance. However, when you actually try to do it, you run into the
difficulty that it is impossible to achieve in three dimensions.
On the other hand, if I asked you to produce a mapping of spacetime
such that the Lorentz Transformations become a rotation, I think the
question is clear enough, but I've never seen any solution for this
problem.
Now, I have certain opinions about things--like "when am I ever going
to use a Klein bottle?" or "What possible value could a mapping of
spacetime so that LT's become a rotation have?" It is because the
value and usefulness of these things has not yet been made clear to
me--not because I think the research should actually stop, because
obviously whatever I decide to research may also seem like a waste of
time to others. So even if it seems like a waste of time to me, I
encourage others to seek what they value and seek the truth, and
especially to seek clarity, so that I can see it too.
But in the meantime, I DO have what is clear to me. And that is the
Milne model--it's the only unambiguous description of the universe
I've seen.
Sue...
>
> A Lorentz Transformation CAN just be used, mathematically, on a single
> event, if you like.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_force
The electromagnetic field tensor
http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/em/lectures/node121.html
Sue...
Jonathan Doolin
>
> - Show quoted text -
Phil,
I think I have had the same experience as you have, in reading some
texts, that they seem to support an argument by omission--kind of on
the principle of Sherlock Holmes: "When you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth"
But when I said, "the hyperbolic operation maintains four distinct
hyperbolic paths," I thought it was complete in itself. But I had the
sense that this statement might be too "terse" and could use some
supporting text to help explain what it meant.
The statement is sufficient by itself, if understood, and all the
preclusions (You can't convert past into present, left-present into
right-present, or present into future with the Lorentz Transformation)
are redundant.
I did not mean, by omission, to "ambiguously support" the idea you /
could/ convert future into past, but that idea is contained in the
original statement of four distinct hyperbolic arcs.
Regards,
Jonathan Doolin
Jonathan Doolin
Hi, Sue...!
You are quite welcome to join this discussion about ambiguity! I
consider you one of the greatest champions of ambiguity. Phil is
making a lot of arguments FOR the case of clarity. Won't you take up
the standard for ambiguity and fight for your ideals?
Regards,
Jonathan Doolin
Phil
> On Apr 19, 9:21 am, Phil <acceleratedfreef...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > They perform different functions in
> > Minkowski and L-F.
>
> This seems ambiguous. I have the idea that L-F is some kind of
> function, whereas Minkowski is a coordinate system.You seem to be
> saying that L-F and Minkowski are both coordinate systems, and the
> Lorentz Transformations might operate on both of them. Our
> definitions of these ideas don't match.
It is ambiguous. And yes BOTH L-F and Minkowski are constructions of
space and time. And yes L-F and Minkowski are not the same. And yes
Lorentz Transformations are consistent with either of them.
As to whether you agree with that is a topic for another day.
Sue...
Fitzpatrick maks a convincing case for clarity
in the linked lecture so I think I'll have to take
that side of the argument if I ever feel the need
to champion a cause.
Sue...
>
> Regards,
> Jonathan Doolin
Jonathan Doolin
>
> - Show quoted text -
I did not find your link to Fitzpatrick's convincing case on clarity.
Sue...
> On Apr 20, 11:33 am, "Sue..." <suzysewns...@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Apr 20, 10:28 am, Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Apr 20, 8:44 am, "Sue..." <suzysewns...@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
> > > > On Apr 20, 9:37 am, Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > A Lorentz Transformation CAN just be used, mathematically, on a single
> > > > > event, if you like.
>
> >
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_force
>
> > > > The electromagnetic field tensor
>
> >
http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/em/lectures/node121.html
>
> > > > Sue...
>
> > > Hi, Sue...!
>
> > > You are quite welcome to join this discussion about ambiguity! I
> > > consider you one of the greatest champions of ambiguity. Phil is
> > > making a lot of arguments FOR the case of clarity. Won't you take up
> > > the standard for ambiguity and fight for your ideals?
>
> > in the linked lecture so I think I'll have to take
> > that side of the argument if I ever feel the need
> > to champion a cause.
>
> > Sue...
>
> > > Regards,
> > > Jonathan Doolin- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> I did not find your link to Fitzpatrick's convincing case on clarity.
Good. Now when someone asks you the reason oil
companies use geologists instead of dowsers you will be
able to explain why.
Sue...
Jonathan Doolin
>
> - Show quoted text -
I'm not sure what you mean by, "Good. Now when someone asks you the
reason oil companies use geologists instead of dowsers you will be
able to explain why."
Also, I was still unable to find the link to Fitzpatricks case on
clarity.
Also, I'm not sure what the three dots after your name is supposed to
mean.
Jonathan Doolin
I found a description of Lorentz-Fitzgerald here.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Length_contraction#Historical_relationship_to_special_relativity
I can see why it has become ambiguous, also:
Lorentz did not agree as can be seen from his draft letter of 1915 to
Einstein:
Lorentz later believed that relativity had introduced some doubt about
whether the length contraction was apparent or real. In his view "...
there can be no question about the reality of the change of length ...
[rod II] will be shorter than [rod I], just as it would be if it were
kept at a lower temperature ..."[15]
I believed that Lorentz believed the Lorentz Transformations were
real, but from this comment, it appears that he actually believed the
Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction effect was real.
That might explain why everybody seems so frustratingly ambiguous,
too. It's probably because they are wrong.
Sue...
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by, "Good. Now when someone asks you the
> reason oil companies use geologists instead of dowsers you will be
> able to explain why."
>
Jonathan Doolin <good4us...@gmail.com> wrote:
<< Phil,
Keep hanging in there!
To begin the tradition of clarity over ambiguosity, you acknowledge,
for instance, an irreconcilable difference between Lorentz-Fitzgerald,
and Minkowski. Something I rarely see acknowledged, and in fact, I am
not sure which is which.
Do either one of these ideas embrace the relativity of simultaneity?
Regards,
Jonathan Doolin >>
================
> Also, I was still unable to find the link to Fitzpatricks case on
> clarity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_force
shuba
> I believed that Lorentz believed the Lorentz Transformations were
> real
I believe that you believed Lorentz believed the Lorentz
transformations were real...
> That might explain why everybody seems so frustratingly ambiguous
Sure 'nuf.
---Tim Shuba---