Military Hazards to Civial Aviation. (Was: Re: Wave flying at Cal City (sans transponder))
Larry Dighera
On Thu, 24 Jan 2002 18:36:11 GMT, "Greg Arnold"
<soarxc...@home.com> wrote in Message ID
<vuY38.49807$B61.16...@news1.rsm1.occa.home.com>:
>Sounds like they blamed the glider pilot for being in a location where he
>had a right to be.
While it is the responsibility of ALL pilots to familiarize themselves
with ALL available information (including NOTAMS) before EVERY flight,
the NTSB report suggests that the cause of the mishap was the glider
pilot's failure to check with FSS for the status of all the MTRs on
his intended route. I doubt that it would have been practicable to
see-and-avoid an A7 fighter traveling at high-speed (probably near 500
knots) against the desert backdrop in time to maneuver out of its
path, even if he had. Today, there are so many MTRs in the western
US, that VFR charts look like a spider web.
I find it curious that the NTSB failed list as a probable cause the
fighter pilot's failure to see-and-avoid the glider that apparently
had the right-of-way due to it's being in a different Category. FAR
91.113(d)(2) mandates that the pilot of a powered airplane shall give
way to a glider and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless
well clear. It would seem that the military pilot failed to comply
with that regulation, but the NTSB report doesn't mention that.
(Perhaps FAR 19.113 was worded differently in 1986?)
Why the NTSB failed to find the military pilot to share in the cause
of the accident is unclear. Surely the A7 pilot was at least
responsible to see-and-avoid. Perhaps the NTSB feels that the
military, while operating on a visual MTR, is not obligated to avoid
civil aircraft operating in VMC within the MTR structure.
This incident, and the fatal midair collision which occurred between a
Cessna 172 and F-16 on November 16, 2000
<http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1>,
illustrate the safety hazard high-speed low-level military operations
create for civil flights.
Now the military wants to be permitted to turn off their external
lights (further reducing their conspicuity) while operating without
speed limit in MOAs at night.
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2001/01-4-110x.html
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/lights_out.html
Where will military-aviation's irresponsibility end?
FAR 91.117(d) permits operation below 10,000' at the minimum safe
speed published in the aircraft flight manual; in the case of an F-16,
minimum safe cruise speed is 300 knots IAS! FARs fail to place the
responsibility for the safety hazard caused by operation under FAR
91.117(d) on the aircraft invoking that exemption to FAR 91.117(a)'s
250 knot maximum speed. Further, FARs fail to mandate the use of on
board radar and conspicuous lighting to augment collision avoidance
procedures.
This begs the question: At what speed does the FAA feel that visual
see-and-avoid techniques are inadequate for flight safety? If it's
not 250 KIAS, what speed is it? At some speed there just isn't enough
time for a human pilot to attend to flight, navigation, and mission
duties, and still have enough time to see a converging aircraft and
take evasive action.
Subsequent to the Cessna/F-16 midair, the military made changes to
it's MTR operations
<http://www.naplesnews.com/01/06/florida/d647425a.htm>. But, if I
infer correctly, they are just now advocating compliance with the
letter of FAR 19.117(d). It makes me curious about how their safety
procedures were previously worded.
Reference:
----------
http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
An experimental scan training course conducted with military pilots
found the average time needed to conduct the operations essential to
flying the airplane was 20 seconds – 17 seconds for the outside scan,
and three seconds for the panel scan. Without the benefit of intensive
military training, most pilots will need more time than this. But as
demonstrated by the military pilots, considerably more time should be
spent on the external scan than the panel scan.
http://www.aopa.org/members/files/pilot/1999/military9909.html
Sec. 91.113 Right-of-way rules: Except water operations.
(a) Inapplicability. This section does not apply to the operation
of an aircraft on water.
(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether
an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual
flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating
an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this
section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give
way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it
unless well clear.
(c) In distress. An aircraft in distress has the right-of-way over
all other air traffic.
(d) Converging. When aircraft of the same category are converging
at approximately the same altitude (except head-on, or nearly so), the
aircraft to the other's right has the right-of-way. If the aircraft
are of different categories--
(1) A balloon has the right-of-way over any other category of
aircraft;
(2) A glider has the right-of-way over an airship, airplane, or
rotorcraft; and
(3) An airship has the right-of-way over an airplane or
rotorcraft. However, an aircraft towing or refueling other aircraft
has the right-of-way over all other engine-driven aircraft.
(e) Approaching head-on. When aircraft are approaching each other
head-on, or nearly so, each pilot of each aircraft shall alter course
to the right.
(f) Overtaking. Each aircraft that is being overtaken has the
right-of-way and each pilot of an overtaking aircraft shall alter
course to the right to pass well clear.
(g) Landing. Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while
landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or
operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of
this rule to force an aircraft off the runway surface which has
already landed and is attempting to make way for an aircraft on final
approach. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the
purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the
right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in
front of another which is on final approach to land or to overtake
that aircraft.
>"Liam Finley" <fado...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:d14b8f27.02012...@posting.google.com...
>> Larry Dighera <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
>news:<1b805ucvnk0urfbuv...@4ax.com>...
>> > On Sun, 30 Dec 2001 21:20:21 -0800, "Caracole" <Cara...@ccis.com>
>> > wrote in Message ID <3c2f...@news.antelecom.net>:
>> >
>> > >The reference to the midair between glider and an A-4 actually
>> > >took place near San Diego, not in a MOA, in thermaling conditions,
>> > >below Class A airspace on a nicely VFR day. Glad to say both machines
>> > >flew home and landed safely. Ask Chip Garner about it sometime,
>> > >after he gets home from the US World Team in South Africa.
>> >
>> > Can you provide a date, or ideally, a NTSB report number?
>>
>> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X33340&key=2
>
Aaron Hopper
> >Sounds like they blamed the glider pilot for being in a location where he
> >had a right to be.
>
A civil pilot has the right to fly through MTRs and MOAs. And many times, I
have heard civil pilots adamantly defend this right. The important question
is to ask, though, is not "What do I have a right to do", but "What is the
smart and safe thing to do".
I am a civil pilot and do not like alter my course significantly for MOAs
and other operating areas. It's a pain, for sure. But I am also a military
pilot, and on more than one occasion, I have had someone in a light twin or
small single blitz through the MOA in which I was agressively maneuvering.
Fortunately, I saw them and orbited at a safe altitude until they left --
and all was well. It could have turned out differently
If you are planning to fly through a MOA, please consider the following (at
a minimum):
-- Read the charts and check on MOA operation times
-- Contact the controlling agency to ensure the MOA will not be hot
-- In flight, PLEASE contact the approach control or center agency
responsible for the MOA and get flight following. If they know you are
there, they can at least make advisory traffic calls to the military
aircraft in the area. Dogfighting at 300-500 knots does not afford the
opportunity to clear well for civil aircraft not talking or squawking.
> While it is the responsibility of ALL pilots to familiarize themselves
> with ALL available information (including NOTAMS) before EVERY flight,
> the NTSB report suggests that the cause of the mishap was the glider
> pilot's failure to check with FSS for the status of all the MTRs on
> his intended route. I doubt that it would have been practicable to
> see-and-avoid an A7 fighter traveling at high-speed (probably near 500
> knots) against the desert backdrop in time to maneuver out of its
> path, even if he had. Today, there are so many MTRs in the western
> US, that VFR charts look like a spider web.
It is also difficult for an A7 at high speed to see and avoid a glider --
especially when the pilot is also trying to navigate a low level, stay in
formation with another aircraft, find a target, operate a radar, clear for
other aircraft, defend against adversaries and simulated threats, and get a
bomb on target, on time.
An F-16 flies its final target run at 510+ knots at 500' AGL. At this
speed, only a split second is available to react to a potential midair
threat. When flying across and in the vicinity of MTRs, consider flying at
least 1000 AGL (and if possible above the published MTR ceiling) to avoid
aircraft that might be training there.
> Now the military wants to be permitted to turn off their external
> lights (further reducing their conspicuity) while operating without
> speed limit in MOAs at night.
> http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2001/01-4-110x.html
> http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/lights_out.html
> Where will military-aviation's irresponsibility end?
Military aviation's "irresponsibility" keeps this nation safe and ends wars
quickly and decisively.
All pilots make mistakes, and unfortunately, military pilot mistakes often
produce more devastating results. But, to describe the training and and
operations we do as "irresponsible" is itself irresponsible and not based on
a good understanding of the way the military trains and does business.
Emphasis is constantly placed on safety and professionalism in the air. My
life depends on operating my jet responsibly and safely . . .every day.
We could of course fly around at 250KIAS, never navigate a low level, and
limit our maneuvering in MOAs to daytime, level, 30-degree turns to ensure
there are no C-150's buzzing happily through the airspace. We could in
fact, never fly at all. Then there would be zero risk to anyone.
I am sure the military would be well prepared to go to war.
>
> FAR 91.117(d) permits operation below 10,000' at the minimum safe
> speed published in the aircraft flight manual; in the case of an F-16,
> minimum safe cruise speed is 300 knots IAS! FARs fail to place the
> responsibility for the safety hazard caused by operation under FAR
> 91.117(d) on the aircraft invoking that exemption to FAR 91.117(a)'s
> 250 knot maximum speed. Further, FARs fail to mandate the use of on
> board radar and conspicuous lighting to augment collision avoidance
> procedures.
>
FARs do not exempt military pilots from responsibility.
Pilots of aircraft with radars use that radar because it's the smart and
safe thing to do. The FAA does not need to mandate radar usage.
> This begs the question: At what speed does the FAA feel that visual
> see-and-avoid techniques are inadequate for flight safety? If it's
> not 250 KIAS, what speed is it? At some speed there just isn't enough
> time for a human pilot to attend to flight, navigation, and mission
> duties, and still have enough time to see a converging aircraft and
> take evasive action.
>
> Subsequent to the Cessna/F-16 midair, the military made changes to
> it's MTR operations
> <http://www.naplesnews.com/01/06/florida/d647425a.htm>. But, if I
> infer correctly, they are just now advocating compliance with the
> letter of FAR 19.117(d). It makes me curious about how their safety
> procedures were previously worded.
>
Safety is something the military (and all of the pilots I fly with) take
very seriously. As both a military and civil pilot, I place safety above
all training objectives.
Cheers,
Grass
Larry Dighera
<aaron_...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in Message ID
<uT248.874$Ab1....@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net>:
>> >Sounds like they blamed the glider pilot for being in a location where he
>> >had a right to be.
>>
>
>A civil pilot has the right to fly through MTRs and MOAs. And many times, I
>have heard civil pilots adamantly defend this right. The important question
>is to ask, though, is not "What do I have a right to do", but "What is the
>smart and safe thing to do".
In the case of a low flying civil flight observing ground surface
artifacts there is the issue of not being able to contact the
controlling authority due to the low altitude and limited radio/radar
range. It's not really possible to receive radar traffic advisory
service from ATC when you're at 500' AGL out in the boonies. And, the
fact is that FSS Briefers don't have the activity information (for
many reasons). So, that leaves the civil flight at a definite
disadvantage due to the differences in speed and mass between
aircraft.
>I am a civil pilot and do not like alter my course significantly for MOAs
>and other operating areas. It's a pain, for sure. But I am also a military
>pilot, and on more than one occasion, I have had someone in a light twin or
>small single blitz through the MOA in which I was agressively maneuvering.
>Fortunately, I saw them and orbited at a safe altitude until they left --
>and all was well. It could have turned out differently
Unfortunately, I'm sure that type of behavior occurs, probably due to
a lack of knowledge of the magnitude of the danger potential and a
lack of appreciation for the frequency of MTR activity. Any sane and
informed pilot would not intentionally commit such folly. But, FARs
rely on see-and-avoid and right-of-way for separation. That is so
blatantly archaic that it is criminal.
>If you are planning to fly through a MOA, please consider the following (at
>a minimum):
>-- Read the charts and check on MOA operation times
Many more MTRs than need be are charted as Continuous operation. That
should change to reflect the _actual_ use.
>-- Contact the controlling agency to ensure the MOA will not be hot
If the civil photo-mission is localized, it is always part of the
planning. On a long flight cross country flight, that could be a lot
of work. Often it requires several phone calls before the correct
military person is found.
>-- In flight, PLEASE contact the approach control or center agency
>responsible for the MOA and get flight following. If they know you are
>there, they can at least make advisory traffic calls to the military
>aircraft in the area.
Radar traffic advisory service is essential when transiting a MOA. At
times ATC will hand the civil flight off to the military controller,
and civil ATC is out of the loop. That eliminates one layer of delay
and potential error.
>Dogfighting at 300-500 knots does not afford the
>opportunity to clear well for civil aircraft not talking or squawking.
That is an understandable, if euphemistic, statement. The same can be
said of most military fighter operations below 10,000'.
>> While it is the responsibility of ALL pilots to familiarize themselves
>> with ALL available information (including NOTAMS) before EVERY flight,
>> the NTSB report suggests that the cause of the mishap was the glider
>> pilot's failure to check with FSS for the status of all the MTRs on
>> his intended route. I doubt that it would have been practicable to
>> see-and-avoid an A7 fighter traveling at high-speed (probably near 500
>> knots) against the desert backdrop in time to maneuver out of its
>> path, even if he had. Today, there are so many MTRs in the western
>> US, that VFR charts look like a spider web.
>
>It is also difficult for an A7 at high speed to see and avoid a glider --
>especially when the pilot is also trying to navigate a low level, stay in
>formation with another aircraft, find a target, operate a radar, clear for
>other aircraft, defend against adversaries and simulated threats, and get a
>bomb on target, on time.
Agreed. It's not only "difficult" but not to expect it to occur.
But, I hope you're not implying that, because the military pilot is
saturated with duties, it's okay to create a hazard to civil aviation.
It's not. And, the FAA needs to address the issue by providing timely
and _accurate_ information for civil flights.
During the brief interval the MTR is active, civil aviation should be
excluded from flight in its vicinity. But, this will only work if
those that are charted as Continuous are revised to their _true_
periods of _use_ (as opposed to possible use), and a real-time
activity schedule (via the internet?) is provided civil pilots.
>An F-16 flies its final target run at 510+ knots at 500' AGL. At this
>speed, only a split second is available to react to a potential midair
>threat. When flying across and in the vicinity of MTRs, consider flying at
>least 1000 AGL (and if possible above the published MTR ceiling) to avoid
>aircraft that might be training there.
It is virtually impossible to obtain MTR activity information from FSS
briefers. Center, on a time permitting basis, will sometimes provide
IR MTR status. The real life situation is appalling. It's outgrown
the FARs.
Do you believe that a military pilot, while operating on a visual MTR,
is not obligated by regulation to see-and-avoid civil aircraft
operating in VMC within that MTR structure?
>> Now the military wants to be permitted to turn off their external
>> lights (further reducing their conspicuity) while operating without
>> speed limit in MOAs at night.
>> http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2001/01-4-110x.html
>> http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/lights_out.html
>> Where will military-aviation's irresponsibility end?
>
>Military aviation's "irresponsibility" keeps this nation safe and ends wars
>quickly and decisively.
Hmm... Not exactly true. And, your statement fails to address the
safety hazard such a proposition poses to civil aviation.
>All pilots make mistakes,
That is evidently true of, not only those of meat, but mechanical as
well.
>and unfortunately, military pilot mistakes often produce more devastating
>results.
That is why the regulations should change.
>But, to describe the training and and
[I've got him stuttern' now :-)]
>operations we do as "irresponsible" is itself irresponsible and not based on
>a good understanding of the way the military trains and does business.
I believe that subsequent to the November 16, 2000 midair collision
the military ammended their MTR operation regulations to enhance
safety. That implies that the regulations were not as safe as they
could have been before the Cessna pilot lost his life. It makes one
wonder if the system couldn't be made safer yet.
The irresponsibility to which I was referring is the fact that the
Ninja flight lead, Parker, was permitted to retire without loss of
rank, pay, nor pension subsequent to his reckless piloting which lead
to the death of the civil pilot. That is not only a good way to
encourage irresponsibility among young fighter "jocks," but unjust.
So, the regulations could use a review, and if the military fails to
discipline its ranks with punishment commensurate with the act (3rd
degree murder in this case), it is tantamount to encouraging careless
and reckless operation. That is irresponsible.
>Emphasis is constantly placed on safety and professionalism in the air.
I would expect nothing less.
> My life depends on operating my jet responsibly and safely . . .every day.
Perhaps. But, you are many times faster and heavier than the typical
General Aviation aircraft, and the people of this nation have provided
you with the luxury of an ejection system, should you screw up. The
pilot of the aircraft which disintegrated the Cessna (according to
multiple witnesses) walked away unharmed.
So, we have a situation where military aircraft operate in excess of
FAR 91.117(a)s 250 knot mandate in congested airspace below 10,000',
thus causing a safety hazard to civil flights. But, the burden for
mitigating the hazard they create is shifted to the shoulders of the
least well equipped to succeed in preventing a MAC in this situation:
the civil pilot. That is not only unjust, it is ridiculous arrogant.
>We could of course fly around at 250KIAS, never navigate a low level, and
>limit our maneuvering in MOAs to daytime, level, 30-degree turns to ensure
>there are no C-150's buzzing happily through the airspace. We could in
>fact, never fly at all. Then there would be zero risk to anyone.
>
>I am sure the military would be well prepared to go to war.
It is my understanding that military airspace comprises over half the
conterminous US airspace. There are Restricted areas for hazardous
military operations. Since the military's low-level operations were
denied in Germany several years ago, MTRs have blanked the western
Desert. The situation has changed and regulations need to catch up.
>> FAR 91.117(d) permits operation below 10,000' at the minimum safe
>> speed published in the aircraft flight manual; in the case of an F-16,
>> minimum safe cruise speed is 300 knots IAS! FARs fail to place the
>> responsibility for the safety hazard caused by operation under FAR
>> 91.117(d) on the aircraft invoking that exemption to FAR 91.117(a)'s
>> 250 knot maximum speed. Further, FARs fail to mandate the use of on
>> board radar and conspicuous lighting to augment collision avoidance
>> procedures.
>>
>
>FARs do not exempt military pilots from responsibility.
That's not the point I'm attempting to make. My point is, that if you
create a hazard to safety, you need to take responsibility for it. If
you create a situation where it is not possible for civil aircraft to
see-and-avoid you, you should be _completely_ responsible for
separation, not _share_ that responsibility with the civil pilot.
Isn't that reasonable?
If the military were _truly_ interested in enhancing air safety, they
would figure out a way to put a bright light on the front of their
training fighters, and regulations would _require_ on board radar to
be used for separation. The military is either too obtuse to correct
the situation, or not _truly_ concerned with the safety hazard it
causes civil aviation.
>Pilots of aircraft with radars use that radar because it's the smart and
>safe thing to do. The FAA does not need to mandate radar usage.
I've had other fighter pilots assert that there isn't time to use
radar for separation. Parker didn't use it. If the people of this
nation provide you with radar, they have a right to the safety benefit
that it may provide. It is my understanding that TCAS is slowly being
phased-in for military training aircraft. That's a step, but not
enough.
>> This begs the question: At what speed does the FAA feel that visual
>> see-and-avoid techniques are inadequate for flight safety? If it's
>> not 250 KIAS, what speed is it? At some speed there just isn't enough
>> time for a human pilot to attend to flight, navigation, and mission
>> duties, and still have enough time to see a converging aircraft and
>> take evasive action.
>>
>> Subsequent to the Cessna/F-16 midair, the military made changes to
>> it's MTR operations
>> <http://www.naplesnews.com/01/06/florida/d647425a.htm>. But, if I
>> infer correctly, they are just now advocating compliance with the
>> letter of FAR 19.117(d). It makes me curious about how their safety
>> procedures were previously worded.
>>
>
>Safety is something the military (and all of the pilots I fly with) take
>very seriously. As both a military and civil pilot, I place safety above
>all training objectives.
That is admirable. But, it fails to address the question: how fast
is too fast in the congested airspace below 10,000'? As the FARs are
currently written, there is no quantified limit. Yet, human eyesight,
attention, and reflexes are relied upon to separate aircraft. That's
not reasonable.
>Cheers,
>Grass
Thank you for your input. It's always good to hear what a military
pilot thinks is reasonable and safe.
Aaron Hopper
> Agreed. It's not only "difficult" but not to expect it to occur.
>
> But, I hope you're not implying that, because the military pilot is
> saturated with duties, it's okay to create a hazard to civil aviation.
> It's not. And, the FAA needs to address the issue by providing timely
> and _accurate_ information for civil flights.
>
Yes, you're right -- it's definitely not okay for the pilot to create a
hazard just because he is task saturated. Just emphasizing the difficulty
we have clearing for aircraft under high pilot workloads. All pilots have
responsibility -- especially those of us running around at 500 knots with
helmets fires.
> It is virtually impossible to obtain MTR activity information from FSS
> briefers. Center, on a time permitting basis, will sometimes provide
> IR MTR status. The real life situation is appalling. It's outgrown
> the FARs.
>
That's very true -- a better system for informing civil pilots of active
MTRs would be helpful. All the more reason for civil pilots to fly 1000 AGL
or more above MTRs (when possible). I realize some jobs (pipeline
surveying, for instance) require low altitudes across MTR routes, so that
doesn't solve all problems.
> Do you believe that a military pilot, while operating on a visual MTR,
> is not obligated by regulation to see-and-avoid civil aircraft
> operating in VMC within that MTR structure?
>
No. A pilot on an MTR is definitely obligated to see and a void. We brief
collision avoidance on every low level flight. And we use our radars and
eyes to clear as best we can.
> >> Now the military wants to be permitted to turn off their external
> >> lights (further reducing their conspicuity) while operating without
> >> speed limit in MOAs at night.
> >> http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2001/01-4-110x.html
> >> http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/lights_out.html
> >> Where will military-aviation's irresponsibility end?
> >
> >Military aviation's "irresponsibility" keeps this nation safe and ends
wars
> >quickly and decisively.
>
> Hmm... Not exactly true. And, your statement fails to address the
> safety hazard such a proposition poses to civil aviation.
My main point here is that some amount of risk must be accepted for the
military to be properly trained and prepared to fight. Leaders in military
aviation continually balance training needs with the risks created by that
training.
Anytime we train, we pose a hazard to civil aviation. But some amount of
risk must be accepted and regularly is. Unfortunately, that inherent risk
leads to accidents. This in and of itself does not make the military
irresponsible.
>
> >operations we do as "irresponsible" is itself irresponsible and not based
on
> >a good understanding of the way the military trains and does business.
>
> I believe that subsequent to the November 16, 2000 midair collision
> the military ammended their MTR operation regulations to enhance
> safety. That implies that the regulations were not as safe as they
> could have been before the Cessna pilot lost his life. It makes one
> wonder if the system couldn't be made safer yet.
>
The system can always be made safer. The military constantly changes as it
balances risk and training requirements. Everytime there is an accident,
the military evaluates procedures and policy and makes changes where
necessary. The fact that an accident occurred and procedures were ammended
does not make the military irresponsible.
> The irresponsibility to which I was referring is the fact that the
> Ninja flight lead, Parker, was permitted to retire without loss of
> rank, pay, nor pension subsequent to his reckless piloting which lead
I've read the safety report, and there were many factors contributing to the
accident, including but not limited to pilot action. I cannot speak for
those who made disciplinary decisions.
> to the death of the civil pilot. That is not only a good way to
> encourage irresponsibility among young fighter "jocks," but unjust.
>
None of us young fighter "jocks" is encouraged by this type of accident. We
had thorough briefings on the things that went wrong, and we do not admire
or hope to repeat any of the mistakes made.
> So, the regulations could use a review, and if the military fails to
Always. And the military does review its procedures and regulations on a
regular basis.
> So, we have a situation where military aircraft operate in excess of
> FAR 91.117(a)s 250 knot mandate in congested airspace below 10,000',
> thus causing a safety hazard to civil flights. But, the burden for
> mitigating the hazard they create is shifted to the shoulders of the
> least well equipped to succeed in preventing a MAC in this situation:
> the civil pilot. That is not only unjust, it is ridiculous arrogant.
>
Flying at 250 or below in an F-16 actually creates a bigger safety hazard.
We fly at 300, because it gives us the maneuverability we need to react to
other aircraft that could pose a hazard. Below 200 knots, the jet can be a
real pig and does not maneuver well at all.
> That's not the point I'm attempting to make. My point is, that if you
> create a hazard to safety, you need to take responsibility for it. If
I fully understand your point -- and it is reasonable. If the military
creates a safety hazard, it ought to take responsibility for it. But from
a view on the inside, I believe that we do.
We make mistakes but work hard to fix them -- and furthermore prevent them
from occuring in the first place. As a whole, I think the military is
extremely responsible in what it does.
> you create a situation where it is not possible for civil aircraft to
> see-and-avoid you, you should be _completely_ responsible for
> separation, not _share_ that responsibility with the civil pilot.
> Isn't that reasonable?
>
No. We do and must share that responsibility all the time. Two sets of
eyeballs are better than one.
> If the military were _truly_ interested in enhancing air safety, they
> would figure out a way to put a bright light on the front of their
> training fighters,
The military _truly_ is interested in enhancing safety, but I doubt a bright
light in bright daylight at closure rates of 400+ knots between aircraft
would not make much of a difference in pilot reaction time.
> and regulations would _require_ on board radar to
> be used for separation. The military is either too obtuse to correct
> the situation, or not _truly_ concerned with the safety hazard it
> causes civil aviation.
>
Radar already is used by pilots -- we are very interested in going home to
see our families at night.
> >Pilots of aircraft with radars use that radar because it's the smart and
> >safe thing to do. The FAA does not need to mandate radar usage.
>
> I've had other fighter pilots assert that there isn't time to use
> radar for separation. Parker didn't use it. If the people of this
> nation provide you with radar, they have a right to the safety benefit
> that it may provide. It is my understanding that TCAS is slowly being
> phased-in for military training aircraft. That's a step, but not
> enough.
>
Sometimes, there is not time. There are many tasks to be done while
airborne. Most pilots, I believe, do use their radars as much as they
can -- especially in congested areas. If a lazy pilot decides not to
employ his radar, though, no regulation is going to change his mind.
> That is admirable. But, it fails to address the question: how fast
> is too fast in the congested airspace below 10,000'? As the FARs are
> currently written, there is no quantified limit. Yet, human eyesight,
> attention, and reflexes are relied upon to separate aircraft. That's
> not reasonable.
>
Except on low levels, we fly 300-350 for safety reasons mentioned above.
We're not out to set new speed records when below 10,000'. The FARs
indirectly quantify a maximum, because they allow us to operate at our
minimum safe speed, not at whatever speed above that we choose to fly. But
regardless, new regulations would not (and should not) change the speeds we
fly.
> Thank you for your input. It's always good to hear what a military
> pilot thinks is reasonable and safe.
Thank you for the discussion. I hope this helps folks better understand
safety hazards present to all of us who enjoy flying.
Eric Greenwell
aaron_...@worldnet.att.net says...
> Sometimes, there is not time. There are many tasks to be done while
> airborne. Most pilots, I believe, do use their radars as much as they
> can -- especially in congested areas. If a lazy pilot decides not to
> employ his radar, though, no regulation is going to change his mind.
How effective is the radar with composite gliders? Cessna 150's?
Does a transponder in the other aircraft improve the radar's ability?
When you are only 1000' agl, can you even distinguish another aircraft
from the ground clutter?
Do you have to observe the screen, or can it alert you to other
aircraft automatically?
Have you ever discovered a general aviation aircraft in your path with
radar before you saw it visually?
--
Delete the REMOVE from my e-mail address to reply directly
Eric Greenwell
Richland, WA (USA)
Aaron Hopper
> How effective is the radar with composite gliders? Cessna 150's?
>
We have a substantial amount of glider and light civil traffic around the
base here. The radar is fairly effective at finding small aircraft --
especially at close range when the greatest potential for a midair exists.
Composite gliders can be more difficult to pick up (slow and no moving
engine parts to reflect radar), but they can still be seen. One limitation,
though: our radar, like all fighter radars, is limited in azimuth. We
cannot see traffic off our wing or behind us.
> Does a transponder in the other aircraft improve the radar's ability?
>
No, our radars in the F-16, at least, do not query transponders. Some
military aircraft have that capability. Transponders DO help ATC help us,
though. Flight following is a big benefit and allows ATC to provide us
with information such as aircraft type and altitude, instead of a
nerve-racking advisory, "aircraft 12'o'clock, three miles, type and altitude
unknown"
> When you are only 1000' agl, can you even distinguish another aircraft
> from the ground clutter?
>
Yes, but ground clutter can make that distinction more difficult.
> Do you have to observe the screen, or can it alert you to other
> aircraft automatically?
>
Generally, we have to observe the screen to see traffic. There is no alert
as with TCAS.
> Have you ever discovered a general aviation aircraft in your path with
> radar before you saw it visually?
> --
Yes, it happens everytime I fly. And actually, I often see an aircraft on
my scope without ever gaining a visual on that aircraft. The radar is a
very valuable tool for collision avoidance.
During normal travel to and from MOAs, MTRs, and other training areas, we
search for all traffic within 20-miles. We will talk to other members of
our flight about traffic co-altitude within 10 miles, and we will probably
ask ATC for avoidance vectors away from aircraft within 3-5 miles (if we
cannot find them on our scope or visually).
Cheers,
Grass
Bruce Hoult
"Aaron Hopper" <aaron_...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> One limitation,
> though: our radar, like all fighter radars, is limited in azimuth. We
> cannot see traffic off our wing or behind us.
With 300 knot F16 vs 60 knot glider, any collision danger is never going
to be more than 10 degrees off your centerline.
-- Bruce
Darrel
> On Fri, 25 Jan 2002 01:52:26 GMT, "Aaron Hopper"
> <aaron_...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in Message ID
> <uT248.874$Ab1....@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net>:
>
> The irresponsibility to which I was referring is the fact that the
> Ninja flight lead, Parker, was permitted to retire without loss of
> rank, pay, nor pension subsequent to his reckless piloting which lead
> to the death of the civil pilot. That is not only a good way to
> encourage irresponsibility among young fighter "jocks," but unjust.
>
> So, the regulations could use a review, and if the military fails to
> discipline its ranks with punishment commensurate with the act (3rd
> degree murder in this case), it is tantamount to encouraging careless
> and reckless operation. That is irresponsible.
>
Before you place too much blame, let me add a piece of information not
generally known. The Ninja lead had a problem where his aircraft position
as reported by his instruments was different by a significant amount from
his actual position. I can't elaborate, as the reason for the anomaly is
not yet understood and may never be clear. But he was not entirely at fault
for being in the area of the collision.
I don't mean to imply he was completely blameless, but as pilots we are
endlessly reminded to trust our instruments. When they lie, it is not
always immediately evident.
FWIW, I have also had occasion to work with a number of military pilots,
their commanders and crews. To a person, they are concerned above all with
safety - both their own and that of others. It is not uncommon for a
military pilot to place the concern for the lives of strangers above his own
by waiting to eject from a dying aircraft until its impact point is an
uninhabited area or lake.
Darrel
Larry Dighera
>> But, I hope you're not implying that, because the military pilot is
>> saturated with duties, it's okay to create a hazard to civil aviation.
>> It's not. And, the FAA needs to address the issue by providing timely
>> and _accurate_ information for civil flights.
>>
>
>Yes, you're right -- it's definitely not okay for the pilot to create a
>hazard just because he is task saturated. Just emphasizing the difficulty
>we have clearing for aircraft under high pilot workloads. All pilots have
>responsibility -- especially those of us running around at 500 knots with
>helmets fires.
Perhaps it would be less hazardous for all if those high-speed
activities were conducted within airspace that doesn't contain civil
aircraft. Seems reasonable ...
>> It is virtually impossible to obtain MTR activity information from FSS
>> briefers. Center, on a time permitting basis, will sometimes provide
>> IR MTR status. The real life situation is appalling. It's outgrown
>> the FARs.
>>
>
>That's very true -- a better system for informing civil pilots of active
>MTRs would be helpful.
What can _WE_ do to effect such a better system?
>All the more reason for civil pilots to fly 1000 AGL
>or more above MTRs (when possible). I realize some jobs (pipeline
>surveying, for instance) require low altitudes across MTR routes, so that
>doesn't solve all problems.
Agreed.
>> Do you believe that a military pilot, while operating on a visual MTR,
>> is not obligated by regulation to see-and-avoid civil aircraft
>> operating in VMC within that MTR structure?
>>
>
>No. A pilot on an MTR is definitely obligated to see and a void.
That makes one wonder why the NTSB failed to mention that requirement
in their report of this military/civil midair collision:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X33340&key=1
Is the NTSB biased toward the military in its accident investigations?
Perhaps the DOT IG needs to do some investigation into this apparent
injustice.
[...]
>My main point here is that some amount of risk must be accepted for the
>military to be properly trained and prepared to fight. Leaders in military
>aviation continually balance training needs with the risks created by that
>training.
As a member of the military you have _chosen_ to accept the risks you
mention; I have not. I would prefer that you keep the risks you
create within airspace that doesn't contain my aircraft.
>Anytime we train, we pose a hazard to civil aviation.
Please explain the hazard posed to civil aviation by military
operations conducted _within_ Restricted Areas.
>But some amount of risk must be accepted and regularly is.
Although you have chosen to accept that risk, I would prefer to avoid
it.
[...]
>The system can always be made safer.
Agreed.
[...]
>> The irresponsibility to which I was referring is the fact that the
>> Ninja flight lead, Parker, was permitted to retire without loss of
>> rank, pay, nor pension subsequent to his reckless piloting which lead
>
>I've read the safety report, and there were many factors contributing to the
>accident, including but not limited to pilot action.
But, you've got to admit, that Parker deliberately chose to descend
below 10,000' into congested terminal airspace knowing that he was
vastly in excess of the maximum speed granted by the maximum speed
exemption, without the required ATC clearance nor being in
communication with the controlling authority. That is as good a
definition of careless and reckless as I can imagine. But, he paid no
price for the death of Jaques Olivier his actions caused. That is not
responsible nor just.
>I cannot speak for those who made disciplinary decisions.
>
>> to the death of the civil pilot. That is not only a good way to
>> encourage irresponsibility among young fighter "jocks," but unjust.
>>
>
>None of us young fighter "jocks" is encouraged by this type of accident. We
>had thorough briefings on the things that went wrong, and we do not admire
>or hope to repeat any of the mistakes made.
That is probably true, but you have had it conclusively demonstrated
that, if you should choose to break regulations, you have no
significant disciplinary action to face as evidenced by this real-life
"mishap." If there were no penalty for murder, wouldn't you expect
the rate of homicides to increase?
[...]
>> So, we have a situation where military aircraft operate in excess of
>> FAR 91.117(a)s 250 knot mandate in congested airspace below 10,000',
>> thus causing a safety hazard to civil flights. But, the burden for
>> mitigating the hazard they create is shifted to the shoulders of the
>> least well equipped to succeed in preventing a MAC in this situation:
>> the civil pilot. That is not only unjust, it is ridiculously arrogant.
>>
>
>Flying at 250 or below in an F-16 actually creates a bigger safety hazard.
>We fly at 300, because it gives us the maneuverability we need to react to
>other aircraft that could pose a hazard. Below 200 knots, the jet can be a
>real pig and does not maneuver well at all.
So, why should the civil flight suffer because you are unable to
comply with the maximum safe speed established by the FAA?
>> My point is, that if you create a hazard to safety, you need to take
>>responsibility for it.
>
>I fully understand your point -- and it is reasonable. If the military
>creates a safety hazard, it ought to take responsibility for it. But from
>a view on the inside, I believe that we do.
>
>We make mistakes but work hard to fix them -- and furthermore prevent them
>from occuring in the first place. As a whole, I think the military is
>extremely responsible in what it does.
You claim to have red the AIB report on the November 16, 2000
F-16/Cessna 172 midair collision, so you are aware that the USAF
placed the Cessna pilot at fault for not seeing and avoiding the F-16.
That is _not_ an example of the military taking responsibility for the
hazard it creates.
>>If you create a situation where it is not possible for civil aircraft to
>> see-and-avoid you, you should be _completely_ responsible for
>> separation, not _share_ that responsibility with the civil pilot.
>> Isn't that reasonable?
>>
>
>No. We do and must share that responsibility all the time.
I disagree with that statement.
>Two sets of eyeballs are better than one.
That is true. But, what was Jaques Olivier supposed to do when he saw
the F-16 baring down on him? He apparently attempted to maneuver out
of its path, but there wasn't time enough due to the F-16's high speed
in excess of that established as a safe maximum by the FAA. In this
case, the set of civil eyeballs had no effect on the outcome of the
mishap.
>> If the military were _truly_ interested in enhancing air safety, they
>> would figure out a way to put a bright light on the front of their
>> training fighters,
>
>The military _truly_ is interested in enhancing safety, but I doubt a bright
>light in bright daylight at closure rates of 400+ knots between aircraft
>would not make much of a difference in pilot reaction time.
If you think that enhancing the conspicuity of high-speed fighter
aircraft in civil airspace is not an appropriate course of action to
enhance safety, then what do you think is going to be effective,
exclusively limiting such activity to Restricted Airspace?
I would hazard a guess that I could spot an F-16 in daylight from at
least twice the distance and in half the time if it were burning
strobes or a light with the intensity of a landing light.
Currently, the conspicuity of military aircraft is intentionally
reduced. That must change if they intend to continue to operated in
joint-use airspace and especially civil airspace.
>> and regulations would _require_ on board radar to
>> be used for separation. The military is either too obtuse to correct
>> the situation, or not _truly_ concerned with the safety hazard it
>> causes civil aviation.
>>
>
>Radar already is used by pilots -- we are very interested in going home to
>see our families at night.
Can you explain why there is no mention of the use of radar for
collision avoidance in these two military/civil "mishaps?"
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X33340&key=1
Can you cite the specific regulation (civil or military) which
_REQUIRES_ the use of on-board military radar for MAC avoidance?
>> >Pilots of aircraft with radars use that radar because it's the smart and
>> >safe thing to do. The FAA does not need to mandate radar usage.
I disagree. With that line of reasoning, we could abolish all air
regulations; we all want to arrive safely at our destinations.
>> I've had other fighter pilots assert that there isn't time to use
>> radar for separation. Parker didn't use it. If the people of this
>> nation provide you with radar, they have a right to the safety benefit
>> that it may provide. It is my understanding that TCAS is slowly being
>> phased-in for military training aircraft. That's a step, but not
>> enough.
>>
>
>Sometimes, there is not time.
Agreed; military fighter pilots are task saturated most all the time.
Perhaps it would be prudent for the military to provide AWACS support
for their training missions. Perhaps you have a better suggestion
from your "inside" viewpoint.
>There are many tasks to be done while
>airborne. Most pilots, I believe, do use their radars as much as they
>can -- especially in congested areas. If a lazy pilot decides not to
>employ his radar, though, no regulation is going to change his mind.
But, it will shift the responsibility from the unsuspecting civil
pilot.
[...]
>Thank you for the discussion. I hope this helps folks better understand
>safety hazards present to all of us who enjoy flying.
I agree; most civil pilots don't appreciate the magnitude of the
hazard high-speed low-level military operations pose to civil flight.
But, when one considers the large number of military aircraft
operating at high-speed in low-level airspace, and the inability of
the civil pilot to effectively avoid the devastating impact of a
38,000lb fighter piloted by a task-saturated military pilot without
fear of disciplinary consequences nor significant damage to himself,
one should be terrified.
Larry Dighera
Darrel,
Thank you for bringing up the ~10 NM positional errors provided by the
navigation equipment on-board _one_ of the two Ninja aircraft.
According to the AIB report, these errors were a result of equipment
malfunction and the pilot's improper use of the equipment. (It seems
Mr. Parker was having a lot of difficulty operating the avionics in
his F-16 that day; he also failed to dial-in the Tampa Approach
frequency provided by Miami Center before he canceled his IFR flight.)
In Parker's aircraft, the position of Ninja flight was erroneously
displayed as being ~10 NM _north_ of their actual position. That
means that if Mr. Parker believed that information to be accurate, he
chose do descend into congested terminal airspace ~10 miles closer to
the _middle_ of that airspace (at nearly twice the speed the FAA
considers safe for civil pilots, without the required ATC clearance).
The positional errors actually helped to move the flight toward the
edge of the terminal airspace, unfortunately, not far enough to
prevent the death of Jaques Olivier.
So, re-read the AIB report, and verify that I am correct.
On Tue, 29 Jan 2002 04:59:06 GMT, "Darrel"
<skyhaw...@spamnot.starband.net> wrote in Message ID
<Q_p58.2805$m37.121...@twister1.starband.net>:
I have little doubt that Parker's loss of situational awareness was
exacerbated by his incorrect input to and the malfunction of his
navigation equipment. But, that does _not_ explain nor excuse his
deliberate decision to recklessly descend without ATC clearance, his
failure to perform the _required_ cross check of INS accuracy with
other systems, his failure to request positional information from his
wingman or ATC, his failure to specifically brief Class B and Class C
airspace restrictions in the Tampa area as _required_, his decision to
decline Flight Following Service, his failure to notice that his INS
accuracy had degraded to LOW, ...
>FWIW, I have also had occasion to work with a number of military pilots,
>their commanders and crews. To a person, they are concerned above all with
>safety - both their own and that of others. It is not uncommon for a
>military pilot to place the concern for the lives of strangers above his own
>by waiting to eject from a dying aircraft until its impact point is an
>uninhabited area or lake.
>
>Darrel
I don't doubt that the military talks a lot about air safety, but it
doesn't seem that they _REALLY_ do as much about it as they might, as
this recent report shows:
GAO: Military lags behind commercial airlines in safety improvements
http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=6039&archive=true
Larry Dighera
It seems someone else at the USAF thinks it's time to take a look at
military operating procedures with an eye toward enhancing safety?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
AVflash Vol. 8, Issue 07a Monday, February 11, 2002
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR FORCE REASSESSES SAFETY: Air Force chief of staff Gen. John P.
Jumper last Wednesday ordered all units across the globe, including
Afghanistan, to take a hard look at their operating procedures with an
eye on safety. The Associated Press reports that the general was
moved to action by a recent spate of accidents and feels a need to
"step back" and evaluate procedures from a safety viewpoint. "We need
to remind each other not to let our tempo cause us to overreach and do
something unsafe." While the Air Force is by nature in the business
of doing things that are unsafe -- especially for the enemy -- the
general has noted an increase in the Air Force's "mishap rate" that
includes accidents involving both aircraft and land vehicles.
On Sat, 26 Jan 2002 07:03:12 GMT, "Aaron Hopper"
<aaron_...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in Message ID
<Qws48.2920$Ab1.1...@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net>: