F-16/cessna crash near sarasota
Larry Dighera
<rwti...@swbell.net> wrote:
>I know, Ninja 1 said he saw a white flash which indicated the cessna was
>turning,
Actually, the preliminary NTSB report credits "Ninja 2" with this:
"Ninja 2 stated that while he was maintaining visual formation
with his flight lead he saw a blur "like a sheet of white"
instantly in front of him at his 11 or 12 o'clock position."
REF: http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
>As to military speeds, I asked a former F/A-18 driver about that, and he said
>the planes which couldn't safely fly an approach at less than 250 knots had
>waivers for the speed limits.
The "Ninja" flight was _not_ flying an approach (to a landing), they
were descending at ~400 knots. Presumably, an F-16 flight manual does
not contain an airspeed recommendation or requirement for descending
flight at 400 knots.
>He said his F-4 had a waiver, but his F/A-18 (and the F-16 by the same
>reasoning) did not.
Perhaps a crosspost to rec.aviation.military will produce some more
information on this.
>I believe this is consistent with both FAR 91.117 a,d
Only FAR 91.117(a) states:
"(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no
person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an
indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.)."
So, the "Ninja" flight was clearly operating in violation of FAR
91.117(a).
FAR 91.117(d) states:
"(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation
is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section,
the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed."
I find it difficult to believe that the F-16 flight manual states that
the F-16 is incapable of safely flying a descent at less than 250
knots, but who knows what the manufacture did to win a military
contract.
>and the letter of authorization quoted by Steven McNicoll.
To which particular condition of the SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO
DOD are you referring?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>I suspect that the air traffic controllers union will probably take action if
>the NTSB does not.
To what sort of action are you referring, filing a Pilot Deviation
Report?
>It happened on their watch, and they weren't too happy about
>it.
Actually, the way I read the Air Force position, they are _blaming_
ATC for not issuing a timely traffic alert to the Cessna pilot:
"Second, Tampa air traffic controllers failed to transmit a
safety alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system generated
"Conflict Alert" warnings, indicating that two aircraft were
in danger of a collision. Investigators determined that if the
controllers had issued a safety alert to the Cessna when the
first Conflict Alert began, it is likely the pilot would have
had time to maneuver to avoid the collision."
>They will probably file some sort of formal complaint against the Air Force
>for violating Class B airspace without clearance
>and violating the speed limit within that Class B airspace.
One can only hope.
BUFDRVR
> person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an
> indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.)."
All USAF fighters, and the B-1B (I'm pretty sure) have waivers. Unfortunately,
in the BUFF, we only have an exemption for our departures where our tech order
climb speed is 280 KIAS. In UPT, I flew T-38's where the "standard" (for lack
of a better word) airspeed everywhere was 300 KIAS. I flew a VFR cross country
from Vance AFB, OK to Whiteman AFB, MO at 7500 MSL and 300 KIAS. Completely
legal.
BUFDRVR
"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
Larry Dighera
>>"(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no
>> person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an
>> indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.)."
>
>All USAF fighters, and the B-1B (I'm pretty sure) have waivers.
The only waver with which I am familiar is the Speed Authorization
granted DOD by the FAA:
http://www.faa.gov/ATPubs/MIL/Apdices/milapd18.html
Can you cite any others?
>Unfortunately,
>in the BUFF, we only have an exemption for our departures where our tech order
>climb speed is 280 KIAS. In UPT, I flew T-38's where the "standard" (for lack
>of a better word) airspeed everywhere was 300 KIAS. I flew a VFR cross country
>from Vance AFB, OK to Whiteman AFB, MO at 7500 MSL and 300 KIAS. Completely
>legal.
How would you characterize the ability to 'see and avoid' (FAR 91.113
(b)) at that speed? Is it safe to rely on 'see and avoid' at 300
knots in your opinion? Does scanning the windscreen for conflicting
aircraft leave adequate time to attend to navigation when below 10,000
feet at 300 knots?
Tarver Engineering
§ 91.117 Aircraft speed.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may
operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more
than 250 knots (288 mph).
(b) Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, no person may operate
an aircraft at or below 2,500 feet above the surface within 4 nautical miles
of the primary airport of a Class C or Class D airspace area at an indicated
airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph). This paragraph (b) does not apply
to any operations within a Class B airspace area. Such operations shall
comply with paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) No person may operate an aircraft in the airspace underlying a Class
B airspace area designated for an airport or in a VFR corridor designated
through such a Class B airspace area, at an indicated airspeed of more than
200 knots (230 mph).
(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater
than the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be
operated at that minimum speed.
John
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
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BUFDRVR
>(b)) at that speed?
Just need a quicker scan then if you were at 250 KIAS.
>Is it safe to rely on 'see and avoid' at 300
>knots in your opinion?
Yes, absolutely.
>Does scanning the windscreen for conflicting
>aircraft leave adequate time to attend to navigation when below 10,000
>feet at 300 knots?
Need to have a quicker composite cross check, challenging for student pilots in
SUPT, but it comes in time.
Larry Dighera
>>How would you characterize the ability to 'see and avoid' (FAR 91.113
>>(b)) at that speed?
>
>Just need a quicker scan then if you were at 250 KIAS.
Can you explain how the 3 pilots involved in the subject fatal midair
collision were each unable to see-and-avoid quickly enough to avert
the collision? The failure of visual scan to prevent that "mishap"
would seem inconsistent with your assertion above.
Perhaps, now that we are in the 21st century, it is time to require
military pilots to use the radar equipment that the citizens of this
nation installed in military aircraft. The RESPONSIBILITY for those
military operations which impose a hazard on the public MUST BE BORN
BY THE MILITARY. Currently, the FAA regulates military operations in
the NAS, but fails to place responsibility for their hazard squarely
on military shoulders.
This "accident" illustrates the hazard military high-speed low-level
operations create for civil air safety . However, the military does
nothing to assume responsibility for the threat to safety their
operations cause. That is not just. Worse than that, it is stupid.
The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best.
:-)
But, it gets better. The airlines have installed TCAS collision
avoidance systems on their aircraft. TCAS relies on the transponder
transmissions of other aircraft to determine their position, and if
they are a collision threat. When a warning is necessary, TCAS issues
evasive maneuver instructions based upon those transponder
transmissions.
Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
daily, hourly, ....
Wingmen, part of a formation flight, can trail the Flight Lead by over
a mile, but they are intentionally prevented from displaying a target
on ATC radar. That is unacceptable in the NAS on safety grounds, in
my opinion.
The time for military airspace reform is upon us now. I'm thinking
along the lines of:
The Jaques Oliver Memorial Military Airspace Reform Bill
If the military will not police its operations, and the FAA will not
hold them responsible for the hazards they create, then congress must.
Story here:
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/06/pilot.crash/index.html
>>Is it safe to rely on 'see and avoid' at 300
>>knots in your opinion?
>
>Yes, absolutely.
>
>>Does scanning the windscreen for conflicting
>>aircraft leave adequate time to attend to navigation when below 10,000
>>feet at 300 knots?
>
>Need to have a quicker composite cross check, challenging for student pilots in
>SUPT, but it comes in time.
How long does a full windscreen traffic scan take?
How long does it take you to spot an F-16 against low-level ground
clutter at 12'O clock and one mile? How frequently do you fail to see
traffic called by ATC? We're both pilots. You know what I'm talking
about.
How long does it take to make navigational position checks? System
checks? ...
How much time do you have between full windscreen traffic scans before
impact at 300 knots, 400 knots?
Can you keep that up continually during the flight?
Why not let the on-board electronics assist the pilot in collision
avoidance? Does it have something to do with the legal liability that
might imply?
What is really fair?
What is SUPT?
C.D.Damron
Larry Dighera wrote in message ...
> Currently, the FAA regulates military operations...
The military voluntarily complies with some FAA regulations for the mutual
benefit of civil and military aviation.
Kerryn Offord
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> On 10 May 2001 12:49:06 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
<SNIP>
> >>Is it safe to rely on 'see and avoid' at 300
> >>knots in your opinion?
> >
> >Yes, absolutely.
> >
> >>Does scanning the windscreen for conflicting
> >>aircraft leave adequate time to attend to navigation when below 10,000
> >>feet at 300 knots?
> >
> >Need to have a quicker composite cross check, challenging for student pilots in
> >SUPT, but it comes in time.
>
> How long does a full windscreen traffic scan take?
I believe that the FAA or NTSB standard requires/suggests 15 seconds to
scan left to right (but this assumes only one person scanning the whole
field of view).
> How long does it take you to spot an F-16 against low-level ground
> clutter at 12'O clock and one mile? How frequently do you fail to see
> traffic called by ATC? We're both pilots. You know what I'm talking
> about.
It is estimated that the average person can detect an object on a
collision course (stationary in the field of view rather than moving)
when it occupies 12 minutes of arc in the field of view (1/5th of a
degree) or (ISTR - badly :)) something like 450-500m range for each m
radius of the central mass.
Assuming no glare reflection, which can confound any calculation on
detection range and probability, statistically, it would take 7.5
seconds to reach 12 O'clock using approved search patterns. (OTOH, if
its against low level ground clutter, then its probably not on a
collision course with you :))
Randy Haskin
> The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
> collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
> FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
> knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best.
I'm not sure where you're getting this notion from. Every day when I
fly (the F-15E), the flight lead specifically briefs the topic of
midair collision avoidance and we cover what altitudes each member of
the flight is responsible for covering. We also set up our IFF
interrogators to specifically look for Mode 3 1200 squawks, so even if
the guy's in a Piper Cub and we won't get a radar hit, we will still
get a hit off his transponder.
Perhaps AFI 11-202V3 doesn't specifically denote where and when radars
will be used for collision avoidance, but more specific operating
manuals (for my jet, 11-2F-15E v 3, for example) do specifically talk
about this. To assume that, because you didn't read it in whatever
AFI you did your research in then it isn't a requirement, is not only
shoddy research but it is also just plain *wrong*.
> Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
> TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
> effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
> daily, hourly, ....
>
> Wingmen, part of a formation flight, can trail the Flight Lead by over
> a mile, but they are intentionally prevented from displaying a target
> on ATC radar. That is unacceptable in the NAS on safety grounds, in
> my opinion.
Want to know who *asks* us to turn our squawks off when we're in
"standard" formation (standard means within 1 nm and 100')? ATC!
Whenever we're *out* of standard formation (e.g. 2NM trail), the
trailing formation members definitely squawk subset code.
If it's so "unacceptable," then perhaps you should be telling ARTCC to
stop asking us to do it.
> Why not let the on-board electronics assist the pilot in collision
> avoidance? Does it have something to do with the legal liability that
> might imply?
Again, see above. We do this on a daily basis. As someone who flies
fast down in the weeds, nobody is more interested in collision
avoidance than I am. I *know* that the GA aircraft out there are
*not* going to see me, so I know it's my responsibility to detect,
see, and avoid them. Let's look at this empirically -- you've got two
aircraft: one's white and flies at 100 KIAS, the other one's dark
gray, was painted *sepcifically* so that it would be difficult to see,
and travelling at 500 KIAS. Who's more likely to see who? Well, as
you may guess, it's far more likely that the fast mover will get a
tally on the slow mover before the GA airplane sees the tactical
fighter down in the weeds. All of us who fly fighters know this, and
we're all vigilant.
Now, a few things that you probably haven't thought of. First of all,
a radar's no good if nobody's looking at it. That's one benefit I
have being in the F-15E is that there's a second set of eyes in the
cockpit to monitor the sensors when I'm unable to. Why would I be
unable to? Well, you'll be interested to know that my job as a
wingman is to NOT LOSE SIGHT OF MY FLIGHT LEAD. This means I spend
80% of my time clearing the airspace in the line of sight behind my
flight lead because that's where my eyes are padlocked.
If we are doing any kind of maneuvering, especially while low, I'm
concentrating on not hitting the ground or anything attached to it and
keeping sight of my flight lead. When my eyes are outside, the Queen
Mary could be showing up on my radar screen, and if I'm not looking at
it, I won't see it.
Before GA starts throwing stones at military aviators when it comes to
these kinds of things, I think a little dose of "walking in our shoes"
is required. I was a Private Pilot before I became a military aviator
and I had no idea what those guys did.
> What is SUPT?
Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training -- it's USAF flight school.
Steven P. McNicoll
"C.D.Damron" <dam...@lex.infi.net> wrote in message
news:9g4235$563$1...@slb5.atl.mindspring.net...
>
> The military voluntarily complies with some FAA regulations for the mutual
> benefit of civil and military aviation.
>
The military complies with applicable FARs because they are required to do
so.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Randy Haskin" <str...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:ddcb5c20.01061...@posting.google.com...
>
> I'm not sure where you're getting this notion from. Every day when I
> fly (the F-15E), the flight lead specifically briefs the topic of
> midair collision avoidance and we cover what altitudes each member of
> the flight is responsible for covering. We also set up our IFF
> interrogators to specifically look for Mode 3 1200 squawks, so even if
> the guy's in a Piper Cub and we won't get a radar hit, we will still
> get a hit off his transponder.
>
Not too many Piper Cubs have transponders.
C.D.Damron
pilots have a license. For the mutual benefit of civilian and military
aviation, the military chooses to follow some FARs.
Steven P. McNicoll wrote in message ...
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Required by the military. There isn't even a requirement that military
> pilots have a license. For the mutual benefit of civilian and military
> aviation, the military chooses to follow some FARs.
>
No, the military complies with applicable FARs because they are required to
do
so by higher civilian authority.
Michael Bandor
--
Mike Bandor, Software Engineer, BS-CS/SE
Ada83, Ada95, C++, Delphi, JavaScript, WinHelp, PL/SQL, SQL, JOVIAL, MASM,
Java, HTML
Creator of MEGATERMS, Military Terms & Acronyms
http://home.att.net/~mike.bandor/megaterm/megaterm.htm
"Randy Haskin" <str...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:ddcb5c20.01061...@posting.google.com...
C.D.Damron
in the sense it is with the civilian sector. Screw up and you must deal
with your command for breaking the military code - you were under orders to
follow certain FARs.
I guess you want to ignore the FARs that deal with licensing and rating of
pilots.
There are scores of FARs that the military doesn't follow as a matter of
policy. While there is a relationship between the military and FAA, it
would be inaccurate to categorize the military as being subordinate to the
FAA.
Steven P. McNicoll wrote in message ...
>
BUFDRVR
>"standard" formation (standard means within 1 nm and 100')? ATC!
>
>Whenever we're *out* of standard formation (e.g. 2NM trail), the
>trailing formation members definitely squawk subset code.
Even better than that. We (B-52H) are often told by some ARTCC's (mostly ABQ,KC
and SLC)to have our wingman squawk standby and we fly *non-standard* formation.
Our wingman can be as close as 1/2 mile abeam or as far back as 1 nm in trail.
> All of us who fly fighters know this, and
>we're all vigilant.
Throw in us bomber guys as well. The BONE flys low at your airspeeds while us
BUFF guys are anywhere from 280 KIAS to 380KIAS. I'm not sure what airspeed
this guy thinks is safe. Is 250KIAS some magical see and avoid airspeed ? We
fly IR-178 which goes down the boarder of Texas and Mexico near El Paso. I've
avoided numerous GA aircraft (many are undoubtedly drug smugglers, I've spied
and reported quite a few Cessna Twin engines flying at night with lights out
along that route)who I'm sure never even saw me, and I've got a 180' wingspan!!
BUFDRVR
>collision were each unable to see-and-avoid quickly enough to avert
>the collision?
Hopefully only 2 were clearing their flight as the #2 F-16 should be station
keeping off of his lead. Trust me, there are far more military-on-military mid
air collisions then there are military-on-GA and 75% of them are interformation
hits.
>The failure of visual scan to prevent that "mishap"
>would seem inconsistent with your assertion above.
Why, because of 1 mishap? That's ludicrous. There are literally thousands of
military flights each day, you expect no mistakes ? That's not too realistic.
>Perhaps, now that we are in the 21st century, it is time to require
>military pilots to use the radar equipment that the citizens of this
>nation installed in military aircraft.
While I don't fly a jet with an A-A radar, I'm sure its standard practice, if
not required by AFI 11-2XX Vol 3 to use your radar in search mode while
transiting civilian or dual use airspace. *However*, in a single seat fighter,
the pilot has more to do than just stare at his radar, he must clear visually
for aircraft, surface objects and the ground, navigate and communicate with
controlling agencies.
>Currently, the FAA regulates military operations in
>the NAS, but fails to place responsibility for their hazard squarely
>on military shoulders.
How are we relieved of responsibility if we are at fault ? While the FAA may
not be able to take action, rest assured our MAJCOM will if its proven we were
negligant or incompetant.
>This "accident" illustrates the hazard military high-speed low-level
>operations create for civil air safety .
This accident illustrates how 2 aircraft operating see and avoid could screw it
up. While I realize you have no idea about military aviation, your bias comes
through loud and clear.
>However, the military does
>nothing to assume responsibility for the threat to safety their
>operations cause. That is not just. Worse than that, it is stupid.
You continue to assume this mishap was caused because 250KIAS was exceeded
below 10,000 MSL, I disagree. What is so magic about 250 KIAS any way ? When I
fly 251KIAS am I suddenly a hazard ? I've avoided GA crossing MTR's with their
lights out at night before (drug runners on Texas-Mexico boarder) and I've been
on a simulated bomb run doing 380 KIAS while doing so. Is 380 KIAS the "magic"
number ?
>The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
>collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
>FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
>knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best.
And you know this because....? I'm fairly certain if you read 11-2F16 Vol. 3 it
will strongly suggest, if not mandate, that the radar is to be operated in
search outside the confines of an MTR or MOA.
>Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
>TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
>effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
>daily, hourly, ....
Boy, I really hate to burst your safety bubble here, but quite often ATC *tells
us to have our wingman squawk standby*. This is for an aircraft roughly the
size of a DC-9 who may be flying as far as 1nm trail and stacked up 500' from
lead. Take it up with center, not with the military.
>The time for military airspace reform is upon us now. I'm thinking
>along the lines of....
If you only knew of the numerous restictions placed on military airspace over
just the last 5 years.....
C.D.Damron
price is military lives. Rarely, the cost includes civilians. While I
think that reasonable efforts to protect civilians are in order, I think the
balance is about right.
BUFDRVR wrote in message <20010612222002...@ng-fa1.aol.com>...
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> While the military does have a civilian higher authority, it is not the
> FAA in the sense it is with the civilian sector.
>
That's not correct, the FAA does have authority over military aviation. The
Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 gave the FAA sole responsibility for developing and
maintaining a
common civil-military system of air navigation and air traffic control. The
Act contained an exception for military emergencies and procedures for use
in the event of war, but outside of those situations, the military complies
with applicable FARs because they are required to do so.
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
TITLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
DECLARATION OF POLICY: THE ADMINISTRATOR
Sec. 103 [49 U.S. Code 1303]. In the exercise and performance of his
powers and duties under this Act the Administrator shall consider the
following, among other things, as being in the public interest:
(a) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its
development and safety and fulfill the requirements of national defense;
(b) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics;
(c) The control of the use of the navigable airspace of the United
States and the regulation of both civil and military operations in such
airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both;
(d) The consolidation of research and development with respect to air
navigation facilities, as well as the installation and operation thereof;
(e) The development and operation of a common system of air traffic
control and navigation for both military and civil aircraft.
>
> Screw up and you must deal with your command for breaking the military
code - you
> were under orders to follow certain FARs.
>
If such orders didn't exist the military would be no less subject to
applicable FARs.
>
> I guess you want to ignore the FARs that deal with licensing and rating of
> pilots.
>
I want to ignore all non-applicable FARs. The various Parts of the FARs
contain regulations as to their applicability. FAR Part 61 pertains to the
certification of pilots. FAR 61.3 states "a person may not act as pilot
flight crewmember in command or in any other capacity as a required pilot of
a civil aircraft of U.S. registry, unless that person has a valid pilot
certificate or special purpose pilot authorization issued under this part in
that person's physical possession or readily accessible in the aircraft when
exercising the privileges of that pilot certificate or authorization". Note
that it applies only to CIVIL aircraft of US registry.
>
> There are scores of FARs that the military doesn't follow as a matter of
policy.
>
That's correct, they have been excluded as a matter of FAA policy.
>
> While there is a relationship between the military and FAA, it would be
inaccurate to
> categorize the military as being subordinate to the FAA.
>
That's not correct. Outside of military emergencies and procedures for use
in the event of war, in matters of aircraft operations in the US National
Airspace System, the military IS subordinate to the FAA.
C.D.Damron
The 1958 Act does outline the relationship between the military and the FAA.
However, it is limited in scope and falls far short of stating that all FARs
apply to military aviation. You do not see military pilots appearing in
front of administrative law judges as a result of FAR violations.
Question? How is the FAA going to punish a military pilot operating without
a license?
What is the gate sentry going to tell the FAA enforcement agent when he
arrives at the base? "Come right in"? Not likely. It doesn't happen.
They arrive as an invited guest of a commanding officer, if not the base CO.
Hmmm, I better get my muli-engine endorsement because I'm moving up to a
T-37 trainer. Ha, Ha!
Steven P. McNicoll wrote in message ...
>
C.D.Damron
committed by the military, they don't.
§ 13.21 Military personnel.
If a report made under this part indicates that, while performing official
duties, a member of the Armed Forces, or a civilian employee of the
Department of Defense who is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(10 U.S.C. Ch. 47), has violated the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, or a
regulation or order issued under it, the Chief Counsel, the Assistant Chief
Counsel, Enforcement, the Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations, the
Assistant Chief Counsel, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Area Office, each
Regional Counsel, and the Aeronautical Center Counsel send a copy of the
report to the appropriate military authority for such disciplinary action as
that authority considers appropriate and a report to the Administrator
thereon.
[Doc. No. 18884, 44 FR 63723, Nov. 5, 1979, as amended by Amdt. 13-19, 54 FR
39290, Sept. 25, 1989; Amdt. 13-29, 62 FR 46866, Sept. 4, 1997]
C.D.Damron
military having a subordinate role when the military is responsible for
enforcement and discipline among its ranks.
Steven P. McNicoll wrote in message ...
Ron
>pilots have a license.
Same with FAA, DEA, and probably Customs also
Ron Chambless
Pilot C-340 - Weather Modification
Edwards Aquifer Precipitation Enhancement Program
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> My, God. Where does your knowledge begin?
>
> The 1958 Act does outline the relationship between the military and the
FAA.
>
> However, it is limited in scope and falls far short of stating that all
FARs
> apply to military aviation. You do not see military pilots appearing in
> front of administrative law judges as a result of FAR violations.
>
> Question? How is the FAA going to punish a military pilot operating
without
> a license?
>
> What is the gate sentry going to tell the FAA enforcement agent when he
> arrives at the base? "Come right in"? Not likely. It doesn't happen.
> They arrive as an invited guest of a commanding officer, if not the base
CO.
>
> Hmmm, I better get my muli-engine endorsement because I'm moving up to a
> T-37 trainer. Ha, Ha!
>
Go look up the word "applicable", then come back here and we'll continue
your education.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Yes, the 1958 Act states as much.
>
Now you're catchin' on.
C.D.Damron
make.
The Aviation Act of 1958 is really a paper tiger when it comes to the
military. Basically, it says that if military pilots break applicable FARs,
the FAA will notify their military command for appropriate discipline.
This is where my argument that the military isn't subordinate to the FAA
comes from. My assertion that compliance was voluntary was wrong, a leap in
logic made from my belief that if the military is responsible for
punishment, it is possible to avoid compliance.
For those that have served, thank you for your service to our country.
Steven P. McNicoll wrote in message ...
>
Larry Dighera
Not only was Randy Haskin's follow-up article "well said", it was
informative, contained reference citations and first hand accounts of
his experience with military flying (unlike yours)
.
On Tue, 12 Jun 2001 22:50:00 GMT, "Michael Bandor"
<mike....@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>Well said!
>
>--
>Mike Bandor, Software Engineer, BS-CS/SE
>
Mary Shafer
Steven P. McNicoll <ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>That's not correct, the FAA does have authority over military aviation. The
>Federal
>Aviation Act of 1958 gave the FAA sole responsibility for developing and
>maintaining a
>common civil-military system of air navigation and air traffic control.
I think you have confused maintaining the airspace with regulating the
military.
The FAA itself says that it cannot, and does not, regulate public
aviation, including military aviation. However, in 1995 the
definition of public aviation was amended to exclude passenger
transportation.
To see what is and isn't regulated as public aviation, in the FAA's
own words, go to
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/cfrhtml_00/Title_14/14cfr1_00.html
and scroll down to "public aircraft".
"Public aircraft means an aircraft used only for the US gov't, plus
those owned and operated (except for commercial purposed), or
exclusively leased for at least 90 continuous days by a government
(except the USG), including a State, the District of Columbia, or a
territory or possession of the US, or political subdivision of that
government; but does not include a government-owned aircraft
transporting property for commercial purposes, or transporting
passengers other than transporting (for other than commercial
purposes) crewmembers or other persons aboard the aircraft whose
presence is required to perform, or is associated with the performace
of, a governmental function such as firefighting, search and rescue,
law enforcement, aeronautical research, or biological or geological
resource management; or transporting (for other than commercial
purposes) persons aboard the aircraft if the aircraft is operated by
the Armed Forces or an intelligence Agency of the United States. An
aircraft described in the preceding sentence shall, notwithstanding
any limitation relating to the use of the aircraft for commercial
purposes, be considered to be a public aircraft for the purposes of
the Chapter without regard to whether the aircraft is operated by a
unit of government on behalf of another unit of government, pursuant
to a cost reimbursement agreement between such units of government, if
the unit of government on whose behalf the operation is conducted
certifies to the Administrator of the FAA that the operation was
necessary to respond to a significant and imminent threat to life or
property (including natural resources) and that no service by a
private operator was reasonably available to meet the threat."
In other words, public aircraft are all government-owned or operated
or leased (on a long lease) aircraft used for governmental functions,
not commercial functions, and, for everyone but the Armed Forces and
intelligence agencies, not used for transporting persons. One agency
loaning another agency an airplane on a cost-reimbursement basis, in
an emergency isn't a commercial function.
The limitation of the FAA to civil aviation and passenger-carrying
non-military, non-intelligence-agency government aviation isn't in the
FARs, or I can't find it there. I think it's in the DOT regulations.
Wherever it is, I know it exists because I have spent my entire career
involved in the flight of government aircraft and have never once had
anything to do with the FAA or the FARs, except to ensure that our
aircraft remained within the restricted area below 60,000 ft. We have
flown supersonic over land, exceeded 250 kt below 10,000 ft, allowed
unlicensed pilots without FAA medical certificates to fly our
uncertified aircraft, allowed non-crewmember passengers in the
cockpit, said naughty words on UHF and otherwise communicated using
terms that are not approved Aviation English, flown over occupied
structures at less that 500 ft AGL, intentionally dropped objects from
an airplane over land, danced the sky on laughter-silvered wings, and
done a thousand things you have not dreamed of, and never, ever gotten
even so much as a funny look from Authority.
However, I can say honestly that our two Kingairs, used for
transporting passengers, are FAA certified, maintained in accordance
with FAA regulations, and flown by FAA-licensed pilots.
--
Mary Shafer DoD #0362 KotFR sha...@ursa-major.spdcc.com
"Some days it don't come easy/And some days it don't come hard
Some days it don't come at all/And these are the days that never end...."
Michael Bandor
I'm not a pilot, I'm a software engineer (active duty USAF). I did 4
years with the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron at Hill AFB, UT, writing their
radar evaluation software (also used by the FAA I might add) so I know what
the radar shows, how it works, etc. I was going to post something but
between BUFFDRIVER and Randy, my points were already covered.
Mike
--
Mike Bandor, Software Engineer, BS-CS/SE
Ada83, Ada95, C++, Delphi, JavaScript, WinHelp, PL/SQL, SQL, JOVIAL, MASM,
Java, HTML
Creator of MEGATERMS, Military Terms & Acronyms
http://home.att.net/~mike.bandor/megaterm/megaterm.htm
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:nSOV6.10600$Ts6.7...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Larry Dighera
[Randy, thank you for the input on your firsthand experiences.]
On 12 Jun 2001 04:34:25 -0700, str...@hotmail.com (Randy Haskin)
wrote:
>Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message news:<s6fV6.134972$mu1.27...@typhoon.we.rr.com>...
>
>> The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
>> collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
>> FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
>> knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best. :-)
>
>I'm not sure where you're getting this notion from.
There was no mention in the Air Force's accident report of the fact
that neither the Flight Lead, James Parker (
http://www.af.mil/photos/Nov1997/971371a.html ), nor the wingman of
the Ninja flight, which killed Jaques Oliver, were using radar for
collision avoidance at the time of the "mishap" [sic]. I'd be happy
to e-mail you a copy of the Air Force investigative report, so that
you can see where I'm "getting this notion from." (For your immediate
convenience, I have place an admittedly poor copy of that report at
the end of this article.)
>Every day when I
>fly (the F-15E), the flight lead specifically briefs the topic of
>midair collision avoidance and we cover what altitudes each member of
>the flight is responsible for covering. We also set up our IFF
>interrogators to specifically look for Mode 3 1200 squawks, so even if
>the guy's in a Piper Cub and we won't get a radar hit, we will still
>get a hit off his transponder.
While I commend the attention to midair collision avoidance during
your briefings, I wonder if specifically looking for Mode-3 '1200'
squawks is REQUIRED by military regulations.
I further wonder how effective looking for Mode-3 '1200' (VFR)
squawks in Class B and C airspace (where individual transponder codes
are issued to aircraft) would have been in saving the life of Jaques
Oliver. The Flight Lead, Parker, of Ninja flight deliberately chose
to descend into Tampa Class B airspace without ATC clearance. Even if
he'd had his IFF set look for 1200 squawks, it wouldn't have prevented
the "mishap" [sic].
But, let us turn to the matter of adequately scanning the windscreen
for conflicting traffic at high-speed below 10,000 feet.
In the absence of more verifiable/reputable data, let's use Kerryn
Offord's numbers below, and see just how practical
visual-traffic-scanning is in realistically preventing midair
collisions between civil aircraft and military aircraft operating at
high-speed.
On Tue, 12 Jun 2001 15:55:56 +1200, Kerryn Offord
<ka...@student.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote in Message-ID:
<3B2592CC...@student.canterbury.ac.nz>:
>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>
>> How long does a full windscreen traffic scan take?
>
>I believe that the FAA or NTSB standard requires/suggests 15
>seconds to scan left to right (but this assumes only one person
>scanning the whole field of view).
>
>> How long does it take you to spot an F-16 against low-level
>>ground clutter at 12'O clock and one mile? How frequently do
>>you fail to see traffic called by ATC? We're both pilots. You
>>know what I'm talking about.
>
>It is estimated that the average person can detect an object on a
>collision course (stationary in the field of view rather than
>moving) when it occupies 12 minutes of arc in the field of view
>(1/5th of a degree) or (ISTR - badly :)) something like 450-500m
>range for each m radius of the central mass.
>
>Assuming no glare reflection, which can confound any calculation
>on detection range and probability, statistically, it would take
>7.5 seconds to reach 12 O'clock using approved search patterns.
>(OTOH, if its against low level ground clutter, then its probably
>not on a collision course with you :))
[This last sentence may be somewhat true in _level_ flight over
_level_ terrain with meteorologically restricted visibility; it
is not pertinent otherwise.]
If we generously assume that the head-on frontal-area "central mass"
of an F-16 is approximately 2 meters, we find that it should be
humanly detectable at a distance of ~1,000 meters, or ~3,250 feet.
This is roughly 1/2 of a nautical mile.
The table of airspeeds equated to feet-per-second below can be used to
compute the time-budget available to pilots for visually _detecting_
conflicting air traffic at that distance. It does not take into
consideration lighting, contrast, the time necessary to deduce and
make _appropriate_ control inputs, nor the time for the aircraft to
actually maneuver out of the path of the conflicting aircraft's path.
Time Until Impact
Closing-speed Feet Per Second At 3,250 Foot Distance
------------- --------------- ----------------------
250 knots 417 feet per second 7.8 seconds
300 knots 500 feet per second 6.5 seconds
350 knots 583 feet per second 5.6 seconds
400 knots 667 feet per second 4.9 seconds
480 knots 800 feet per second 4.1 seconds
From this table it is evident that the pilot of a military aircraft
traveling at a 400 knot _closing-speed_ has inadequate time to
"see-and-avoid". Using Kerryn Offord's figures, the pilot would have
the impossible task of repeatedly, spending 15 seconds, 8 to 12 times
a minute, scanning the entire windscreen during that portion of the
flight conducted below 18,000 feet. Clearly, there is only time for 4,
not 8 to 12, full scans in a minute. So it is not possible to rely
solely on visual detection of conflicting air traffic to prevent
midair collisions at high-speed. Even if the scan for conflicting air
traffic is divided among 4 pilots, there is no time left to do
anything else such as visual navigation, tuning radios, ...
These calculations only concern detecting the conflicting air traffic,
not avoiding collision with it. So, it is patently evident that some
other means of collision avoidance must be _required_ to insure the
hazard to air-safety posed by high-speed low-level military operations
is mitigated.
It is also evident that the FAA IS FAILING TO PROVIDE SAFE SKIES for
the public when it permits the military to indulge in this reckless
high-speed low-level operation.
Lack of Military Requirement for Radar Use
------------------------------------------
in Detection of Conflicting Air Traffic
---------------------------------------
>Perhaps AFI 11-202V3 doesn't specifically denote where and when radars
>will be used for collision avoidance, but more specific operating
>manuals (for my jet, 11-2F-15E v 3, for example) do specifically talk
>about this.
I would be very interested in the specific wording of your operating
manual. I would also be interested in whether that manual's authority
is regulatory, or just a suggestion. Do you know where I might find
copies of such manuals?
>To assume that, because you didn't read it in whatever
>AFI you did your research in then it isn't a requirement, is not only
>shoddy research but it is also just plain *wrong*.
To be completely candid, I was unaware of any AFI you mention. My
information was taken from the Air Force accident report (below).
>> Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
>> TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
>> effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
>> daily, hourly, ....
>>
>> Wingmen, part of a formation flight, can trail the Flight Lead by over
>> a mile, but they are intentionally prevented from displaying a target
>> on ATC radar. That is unacceptable in the NAS on safety grounds, in
>> my opinion.
>
>Want to know who *asks* us to turn our squawks off when we're in
>"standard" formation (standard means within 1 nm and 100')? ATC!
I presume the reasoning behind this practice is due to the
illegibility of overlapping targets that would be presented on the
Controller's radar scope from aircraft in such close proximity. If
this is indeed the reason, I submit that it would be considerably
safer to modify the radar display software to deal with the issue.
With regard to Air Force regulations concerning the use of
transponders by military aircraft engaged in formation flight, the Air
Force report (below) states:
"In accordance with Air Force directives, a wingman in standard
formation does not squawk a Mode III beacon code since the lead
aircraft is already squawking a code for the flight."
So, while it may be ATC who issues the instruction, it seems it is the
Air Force who requires the practice of placing the military wingman's
transponder in standby mode. Perhaps it would be safer if s/he turned
on a landing light.
>Whenever we're *out* of standard formation (e.g. 2NM trail), the
>trailing formation members definitely squawk subset code.
I don't mean to be pedantic, but that is not exactly accurate; here's
the Air Force regulation:
AFI11-202V3 (9 FEBRUARY 2001)
5.4.2. Transponder Operations during Formation Flight.
Unless otherwise specified in Allied Communications Publication 160,
US Supplement 1:
5.4.2.1. Only one aircraft (normally the lead) of a standard formation
will squawk the assigned code.
5.4.2.1.1. Unless otherwise directed by ATC, all aircraft within a
nonstandard formation flight will squawk the ATC-assigned Mode 3A/C
beacon code until established within the assigned altitude block and
closed to the proper en route interval. Unless otherwise directed by
ATC, when aircraft interval exceeds 3 NMs, both the formation leader
and the last aircraft will squawk the assigned Mode 3A/C beacon code.
5.4.2.1.2. During refueling, when the receiver formation is within 3
NMs of the tanker air-craft, the receiver formation squawks standby
unless the T.O. specifies different distances.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubs/publist.asp?puborg=AF&series=11
>If it's so "unacceptable," then perhaps you should be telling ARTCC to
>stop asking us to do it.
If the cause of the practice is a result of inadequate radar-scope
display software, that is what should be changed.
The news article titled "Holiday plane in near miss" at the end of
this post details a near midair collision which occurred recently
despite the practice you cite.
>> Why not let the on-board electronics assist the pilot in collision
>> avoidance? Does it have something to do with the legal liability that
>> might imply?
>
>Again, see above. We do this on a daily basis.
There is no mention of radar being used by Ninja flight for collision
avoidance in the Air Force report (below). Again I ask, which
_regulatory_ document mandates the use of radar for collision
avoidance by military flights?
>As someone who flies
>fast down in the weeds, nobody is more interested in collision
>avoidance than I am. I *know* that the GA aircraft out there are
>*not* going to see me,
It is your life on the line. You appreciate the hazard involved. You
want to go on living, so you personally make every effort to avoid a
midair collision. But, given the physics involved, is it reasonable
to expect visual see-and-avoid regulations to prevent a midair
collision? Don't you feel considerably safer from suffering a midair
collision because you are using radar to detect conflicting air
traffic? Don't you agree that the use of on-bord radar should be
mandatory for military flights to assist in the prevention of midair
collisions?
>so I know it's my responsibility to detect, see, and avoid them.
Your conduct is commendable, but the military's responsibility for the
hazard high-speed low-level military operations create for civil
flights is not legally mandated by law (to my knowledge). That should
be changed.
>Let's look at this empirically -- you've got two
>aircraft: one's white and flies at 100 KIAS, the other one's dark
>gray, was painted *sepcifically* so that it would be difficult to see,
>and travelling at 500 KIAS. Who's more likely to see who? Well, as
>you may guess, it's far more likely that the fast mover will get a
>tally on the slow mover before the GA airplane sees the tactical
>fighter down in the weeds.
Agreed.
>All of us who fly fighters know this, and we're all vigilant.
I take exception to your use of the word "all" here. Certainly,
Flight Lead Parker's visual vigilance (among other things) was
questionable, and a cause of this fatal "mishap" [sic]. The Ninja
flight did not have their landing/taxi lights on while operating at
low level.
>Now, a few things that you probably haven't thought of. First of all,
>a radar's no good if nobody's looking at it.
That statement is not entirely true.
Ground-based radar is capable of issuing warnings based on the tracks
of the aircraft it "sees", without the necessity of controller input.
TCAS (while not radar based) overcomes the necessity for constant
surveillance by verbally warning the pilot of an imminent collision
without pilot intervention.
>That's one benefit I
>have being in the F-15E is that there's a second set of eyes in the
>cockpit to monitor the sensors when I'm unable to.
Unfortunately, the Ninja flight F-16s were single-seat. But, they
could have lit their landing/taxi lights while operating at high-speed
low-level to enhances their conspicuity.
>Why would I be unable to? Well, you'll be interested to know that my
>job as a wingman is to NOT LOSE SIGHT OF MY FLIGHT LEAD. This means I
>spend 80% of my time clearing the airspace in the line of sight behind
>my flight lead because that's where my eyes are padlocked.
That makes good sense. But, it only leaves you 20% of your time for
other duties; you realize that your visual scan is critical enough to
flight safety, that you devote nearly all of your concentration to it.
But, the physics involved may cause even your well-intentioned visual
vigilance to be inadequate in a situation similar to Ninja flight's.
>If we are doing any kind of maneuvering, especially while low, I'm
>concentrating on not hitting the ground or anything attached to it and
>keeping sight of my flight lead. When my eyes are outside, the Queen
>Mary could be showing up on my radar screen, and if I'm not looking at
>it, I won't see it.
I see your point. Perhaps a radar-based collision avoidance system or
TCAS is needed to increase air safety. Certainly, you could turn on
your landing/taxi lights when operating at low level.
>Before GA starts throwing stones at military aviators when it comes to
>these kinds of things, I think a little dose of "walking in our shoes"
>is required.
I agree with you completely. Military flying is extremely demanding
of the pilot. It is so demanding, that his skills should be augmented
with a reasonable collision avoidance system to lesson those demands.
>I was a Private Pilot before I became a military aviator
>and I had no idea what those guys did.
Then you, unlike Ninja Flight Lead Parker, are able to fully
appreciate the hazard high-speed low-level operation poses to the
concentration of civil aircraft operating in Class B & C airspace.
I still believe that the military should assume LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
for the hazard their high-speed low-level flights impose on civil
aviation, and that the military should be LEGALLY REQUIRED to use
RADAR and/or TCAS for collision avoidance when operating below 10,000
feet. Anything less is stupid and unjust.
Speaking of unjust, read this Air Force accident report, and see if
you can explain to me why Brigadier General ROBIN E. SCOTT, President
of the Accident Investigation Board, wrote, "There is no evidence to
suggest either of them [Ninja pilots] acted with a deliberate
disregard for the safety of others."? Is not the deliberate descent
into Class B airspace in excess of 400 knots a disregard for the
safety of others?
--------- Air Force Accident Report begins ----------------
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF OPINION
F-16CG/CESSNA 172 MIDAIR COLLISION ACCIDENT
16 NOVEMBER 2000
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS i
COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS iii
GLOSSARY AND TERMS iv
SUMMARY OF FACTS 1
1. AUTHORITY, PURPOSE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES 1
a. Authority 1
b. Purpose. 1
c. Circumstances. 1
2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY 1
3. BACKGROUND 2
4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 2
a. Mission. 2
b. Planning. 2
c. Preflight. 3
d. Flight. 3
e. Impact. 7
f. Life Support Equipment, Egress and Survival. 7
g. Search and Rescue. 7
h. Recovery of Remains. 7
5. MAINTENANCE 8
a. Forms Documentation. 8
b. Inspections. 8
c. Maintenance Procedures. 8
d. Maintenance Personnel and Supervision: 8
e. Fuel, Hydraulic and Oil Inspection Analysis. 9
f. Unscheduled Maintenance. 9
6. AIRCRAFT AND AIRFRAME, MISSILE, OR SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS
9
a. Condition of Systems. 9
b. Testing. 10
7. WEATHER 10
a. Forecast Weather. 10
b. Observed Weather. 10
c. Space Environment. 10
d. Conclusions. 10
8. CREW QUALIFICATIONS 11
a. Ninja 1, Flight Lead 11
b. Ninja 2, Mishap Pilot 11
c. Cessna 829, Mishap Pilot 11
9. MEDICAL 12
a. Qualifications. 12
b. Health. 12
c. Pathology. 12
d. Lifestyle. 13
e. Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time. 13
10. OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISION 13
a. Operations. 13
b. Supervision. 13
11. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS 13
a. Lieutenant Colonel Parker, Ninja 1 13
b. Captain Kreuder, Ninja 2 14
c. Mr. Olivier, Cessna 829 14
12. AIRSPACE AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ANALYSIS 15
a. Class B Airspace 15
b. Class C Airspace 15
c. VR-1098 16
d. Air Traffic Control 16
e. Airspeed Requirements 17
13. GOVERNING DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS 17
a. Primary Operations Directives and Publications. 17
b. Maintenance Directives and Publications. 18
c. Known or Suspected Deviations from Directives or Publications.
18
(1) Mishap Pilots . 18
(2) Lead Pilot 18
(3) Air Traffic Control. 18
14. NEWS MEDIA INVOLVEMENT 18
STATEMENT OF OPINION 18
COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS
AB After Burner
ACC Air Combat Command
ACES-II Air Crew Ejection System-II
ACM Air Combat Maneuvering
ACMI Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation
AF Air Force
AFB Air Force Base
AFI Air Force Instruction
AFM Air Force Manual
AFTO Air Force Technical Order
AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
AGL Above Ground Level
AIM Aeronautical Information Manual
AIM-9 Air Intercept Missile-9
ALE-50 Active towed decoy
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATP Airline Transport Pilot
BAM Bird Avoidance Model
BDU Bomb Dummy Unit
BSA Basic Surface Attack
CAMS Core Automated Maintenance System
CAP Critical Action Procedure
CBU Cluster Bomb Unit
CCIP Continuously Computed Impact Point
CCRP Continuously Computed Release Point
CFPS Combat Flight Planning System
CJs F-16CJ Aircraft
COMACC Commander, Air Combat Command
CSMU Crash Survivable Memory Unit
CT Continuation Training
DED Data Entry Display
DLO Desired Learning Objective
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DMPI Desired Munitions Point of Impact
DoD Department of Defense
EMS Emergency Medical Service
EOR End of Runway
EP Emergency Procedure
EPU Emergency Power Unit
EST Eastern Standard Time
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAAO Federal Aviation Administration Order
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
FCC Fire Control Computer
FLIP Flight Information Publication
FOD Foreign Object Damage
FS Fighter Squadron
Ft Feet
G Gravitational
GAC General Avionics Computer
GeoRef Geographic Reference
G-Suit Anti-gravity suit
GP General Planning
GPS Global Positioning System
HSD Horizontal Situation Display
HSI Horizontal Situation Indicator
HUD Heads Up Display
IAW In Accordance With
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
INS Inertial Navigation System
INU Inertial Navigation Unit
IP Initial Point or Instructor Pilot
JFS Jet Fuel Starter
JOAP Joint Oil Analysis Program
KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed
KCAS Knots Calibrated Airspeed
KTAS Knots True Airspeed
L Local
LANTIRN Low Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night
LPU Life Preserver Unit
MANTIRN Medium Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night
MANT Short for MANTIRN
MARSA Military Authority Assumes Responsibility for Separation of
Aircraft
MAU Miscellaneous Armament Unit
MIA Miami Center
MFD Multi-function Display
MOA Military Operations Area
MPS Mission Planning Software
MSL Mean Sea Level
MTR Moving Target Reject
NM Nautical Mile
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
OCA Offensive Counter-Air
PA-2000 Phoenix Aviator-2000
PCS Permanent Change of Station
PFPS Portable Flight Planning System
PLF Parachute Landing Fall
PRC-90 Survival Communication Radio
RALT Radar Altimeter
RAP Ready Aircrew Program
RCC Rescue Coordination Center
RPM Revolutions per Minute
RTB Return to Base
SA Situational Awareness
SA-3 Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR Search and Rescue
SAT Surface Attack Tactics
SDR Seat Data Recorder
SEC Secondary Engine Control
SFO Simulated Flame Out
SIB Safety Investigation Board
SII Special Interest Item
S/N Serial Number
SOF Supervisor of Flying
SUU-20 Suspension Utility Unit
SRQ Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport
SWA Southwest Asia
TAC Tactical
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation
TCI Time Change Item
TCTO Time Compliance Technical Order
TPA Tampa Approach Control
TD Target Designator
TDY Temporary Duty
T.O. Technical Order
UFC Up-Front Controls
USAF United States Air Force
U.S.C. United States Code
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VORTAC Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Tactical Air
Navigation
VR Visual Route
Z Zulu or Greenwich Meridian Time (GMT)
ZVEL Zero Velocity
The above list was compiled from the Summary of Facts, the Statement
of Opinion, the Index of Tabs, and witness testimony (Tab V).
GLOSSARY AND TERMS
Class A accident: A mishap in which there is loss of life, permanent
total disability, destruction of a USAF aircraft, or at least
$1,000,000 property damage or loss.
Cursor slew: An adjustment to the aircraft General Avionics Computer
(GAC) navigational solution normally used to correct small position
errors and refine attack steering. These refinements are typically
used to aid in target acquisition and on-board sensor cueing.
Cursor slew bias: A change to the navigational guidance symbology
resulting from a cursor slew input.
Fence check: A cockpit procedure used to ensure all switches and
avionics are set up properly for entry into a tactical environment.
The actions accomplished in the fence check are threat/scenario
dependent.
Fighting wing formation: A two-ship formation which gives the wingman
a maneuvering cone from 30 to 70 degrees aft of line abreast and
lateral spacing between 500 feet (ft) and 3000 ft from lead’s
aircraft.
G-awareness exercise: Moderate increased G maneuvers used to
determine aircraft and pilot capabilities in terms of tolerance for
increased G maneuvering on a given day.
Hot-pit refueling: Aircraft refueling that is accomplished on the
ground with aircraft engine running.
HUD/INS steering cue: The steering symbology displayed in the HUD
that shows the direction of turn necessary to follow the most direct
route to the selected INS steer point.
Mark 82/Mark 84: General purpose bombs.
Mode C: Automatic altitude reporting equipment.
Mode III: Four-digit beacon code equipment used to identify aircraft
in the National Airspace System.
Motherhood items: Non-tactical, administrative items in a pre-flight
briefing that are required for mission completion.
Radar in the notch: Positioning the radar elevation search in such a
manner that the radar scan pattern is oriented in the direction of the
aircraft’s flight path.
Sensor of interest: The avionics system that the pilot has selected
for hands-on control (e.g., radar, targeting pod, HUD, Maverick
missile, etc.).
Situational Awareness: The continuous perception of self and aircraft
in relation to the dynamic environment of flight, threats, and
mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks based on that
perception.
Spin entry: The initial stages of an aircraft departing controlled
flight.
Stereo flight plan/Stereo route: A pre-coordinated flight plan.
10/10 trap attack: A tactical element air-to-ground attack.
Top-3: Squadron operations officer or designated representative
responsible for oversight of daily flying operations at the squadron
level.
VAD-2: Moody AFB stereo departure route.
VAD-25: Moody AFB stereo departure route.
Windscreen: Aircraft canopy or windshield.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
AUTHORITY, PURPOSE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Authority.
On 12 December 2000 General John P. Jumper, Commander, Air
Combat Command (COMACC), appointed Brigadier General Robin E. Scott to
conduct an aircraft accident investigation of the midair collision
involving an Air Force F-16 fighter and civilian Cessna 172 that
occurred near Bradenton, Florida on 16 November 2000. The
investigation was conducted at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida,
and Moody AFB, Georgia, from 15 December 2000 through 19 January 2001.
Technical advisors were Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Tauchen (Legal),
Lieutenant Colonel Marcel V. Dionne (Medical), Captain Jay T. Stull
(Air Traffic Control), Captain John R. Fountain (Maintenance), and
Captain Todd A. Robbins (Pilot) (Tabs Y-2, Y-3).
Purpose.
This aircraft accident investigation was convened under Air Force
Instruction (AFI) 51-503. The primary purpose was to gather and
preserve evidence for claims, litigation, and disciplinary and
administrative actions. In addition to setting forth factual
information concerning the accident, the board president is also
required to state his opinion as to the cause of the accident or the
existence of factors, if any, that substantially contributed to the
accident. This investigation was separate and apart from the safety
investigation, which was conducted pursuant to AFI 91-204 for the
purpose of mishap prevention. This report is available for public
dissemination under the Freedom of Information Act (5 United States
Code (U.S.C.) §552) and AFI 37-131.
Circumstances.
This accident board was convened to investigate the Class A accident
involving an F-16CG aircraft, serial number (S/N) 89-2104, assigned to
the 69th Fighter Squadron (FS), 347th Wing, Moody AFB, Georgia, which
crashed on 16 November 2000, after a midair collision with a Cessna
172, registration number N73829.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY
Aircraft F-16CG, S/N 89-2104 (Ninja 2), and a Cessna 172,
N73829 (Cessna 829), collided in midair near Bradenton, Florida. The
F-16 was part of a two-ship low-level, Surface Attack Tactics (SAT)
sortie. The F-16 pilot, Captain Gregory Kreuder of 69 FS, ejected
safely less than a minute after the collision. The Cessna 172,
registered to Crystal Aero Group, had taken off from the
Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. The pilot, Mr. Jacques
Olivier of Hernando, Florida, was killed in the mishap (Tabs, A-2,
B-2-4). The F-16 crashed in an unpopulated area, causing fire damage
to surrounding vegetation, but there was no damage to any structures.
The Cessna 172 broke up in midair, with the major portions of the
wreckage impacting a golf course and surrounding homes causing minor
damage. There were no injuries to civilians on the ground (Tab P-2).
Both aircraft were totally destroyed in the accident. The loss of the
F-16 was valued at $24,592,070.94 (Tab M-2). Media interest was
initially high, with queries from local, regional, and national news
outlets. Air Combat Command (ACC) Public Affairs handled media
inquiries with support from the 347th Wing Public Affairs, Moody AFB,
Georgia, and 6th Air Refueling Wing Public Affairs, MacDill AFB,
Florida.
BACKGROUND
The 347th Wing, stationed at Moody AFB, Georgia, is host to
two operational F-16C/D fighter squadrons, one HH-60G rescue squadron,
one HC-130P rescue squadron, 17 additional squadrons, and several
tenant units. The Wing has operational control over Avon Park Air
Force Range in central Florida and a deployed unit complex at MacDill
AFB, Florida. The mission of the 347th Wing is to rapidly mobilize,
deploy and employ combat power in support of theater commanders. The
69th FS is an F-16 fighter squadron assigned to the 347th Wing,
capable of employing aircraft in conventional surface attack and
counter-air roles. The wing and its subordinate units are all
components of ACC (Tab CC-4).
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Mission.
The mishap mission was scheduled and planned as the second of
two SAT sorties, with hot-pit refueling between the sorties. The
first sortie was scheduled for the local training areas around Moody
AFB. The mishap sortie profile included a medium altitude cruise to
Lakeland, Florida, an enroute descent for low-level tactical
navigation on the published low-level visual route VR-1098, simulated
air-to-surface attacks on the Avon Park Air Force Range, and climbout
to medium altitude for return to Moody AFB (Tab V-6.21-22).
Lieutenant Colonel James Parker was the flight lead (Ninja 1) for both
sorties, and Captain Gregory Kreuder was the wingman (Ninja 2). The
sorties were continuation training for both pilots (Tab V-6.16).
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Picton, 69 FS Director of Operations,
authorized the flight (Tab K-2).
Planning.
(1) Most of the mission planning was accomplished the
evening prior to the mishap (Tabs
V-6.9, V-8.7). Based on fuel considerations, the pilots determined
that VR-1098 would be the best low-level route for their mission.
Lieutenant Colonel Parker tasked Captain Kreuder to produce a
low-level route map and schedule the route with the appropriate
scheduling agency (Tabs V-6.10, V-8.7, V-8.8, V-8.9, V-8.13, CC-10).
Neither pilot had flown VR-1098 before (Tabs V-6.24, V-8.12). As part
of his mission planning, Lieutenant Colonel Parker referred to a FLIP
L-19 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Enroute Low Altitude Chart and
determined that their planned route of flight would keep them clear of
the Tampa Class B and the Sarasota-Bradenton Class C airspace
(hereafter referred to as Sarasota Class C airspace) (Tabs V-6.11,
V-6.59). Lieutenant Colonel Parker also planned the simulated attack
for the Avon Park targets and prepared the briefing room for the next
day’s mission. The next morning, Captain Kreuder reviewed the weather
and NOTAMs prior to the flight briefing and filed a composite
IFR/VFR/IFR flight plan in accordance with unit procedures (Tabs K-2,
K-5, V-8.13). He also checked the Bird Avoidance Model (BAM) for
forecast bird activity in the Florida area (Tab
V-8.13).
(2) The mission briefing included a mission overview,
scenario of simulated threats for the mission, routing to the
low-level entry point, and possible divert airfields along the route
of flight. Additionally, the flight lead covered wingman
responsibilities and formation positions. The pilots discussed the
specific details of VR-1098, the planned attacks on Avon Park, and
tactical considerations during the simulated attacks (Tab V-6.19).
Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B and Class
C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the flight briefing
(Tab V-6.28). Air Force directives require the flight lead to brief
applicable airspace restrictions (Tabs BB-2.2, BB-2.7). Although
Lieutenant Colonel Parker checked to make sure their planned route to
the low-level would not enter these areas, they would be flying in
close proximity to them. This information would have enhanced the
wingman’s awareness of the boundaries of these controlled airspaces
and their accompanying altitude restrictions (Tabs R-2, V-6.11,
V-8.14, V-8.15). All other appropriate items were covered in adequate
detail in accordance with Air Force directives (Tabs V-6.19-6.28,
BB-2.2, BB-2.6). According to Captain Kreuder, the briefing was
thorough and understood by him (Tab V-8.15).
Preflight.
(1) After the mission briefing, the pilots gathered their
flight equipment and assembled at the 68th FS duty desk, where they
received a final update from squadron operations system management
personnel before proceeding to the aircraft (Tabs V-6.29, V-8.19,
V-8.22). Aircraft pre-flight inspections, engine starts, before taxi
checks, taxi, and end-of-runway inspections were all uneventful (Tabs
V-6.29, V-8.19).
(2) Both aircraft were configured with two 370-gallon
wing tanks, a training Maverick air-to-ground missile, a training
heat-seeking Air Intercept Missile-9 (AIM-9), an Air Crew Maneuvering
Instrumentation (ACMI) pod, a Suspension Utility Unit-20 (SUU-20), and
a targeting pod (Tab M-2). The SUU-20 was empty for the mishap flight
because the training ordnance had been expended during the first
sortie of the day (Tabs V-6.30, V-8.19).
Flight.
(1) The first sortie was flown uneventfully and both
aircraft landed with no noted discrepancies (Tabs V-6.36-6.37,
V-8.19). Ninja 2 landed first and proceeded to the hot-pit for
refueling. Ninja 1 landed shortly thereafter, completed hot-pit
refueling, and taxied to the departure end of the runway (Tabs V-6.30,
V-8.19).
(2) Ninja flight took off for their second sortie at 1513
(Tab CC-11). The takeoff, rejoin, and climbout to 25,000 ft mean sea
level (MSL) were uneventful (Tabs V-6.38, V-8.23). Ninja 2
accomplished a targeting pod check on the Taylor TACAN and confirmed
that the flight was navigating correctly to that steer point (Tab
V-8.30). With the exception of Ninja 2’s check on the Taylor TACAN,
neither flight member recalled confirming their INS system accuracy
with ground based navigational aids (Tabs V-6.41, V-8.28). Enroute to
the Lakeland TACAN, Ninja flight was cleared direct to the VR-1098
start route point by Miami Center (Tab V-7). The flight then received
step-down altitude clearances for their descent to low level (Tabs
N-18, CC-3.2).
(3) At some time, between when Ninja 1’s aircraft tape
recorder was turned off on the first sortie to when the aircraft tape
was turned on during the second sortie, Ninja 1’s Inertial Navigation
System (INS) had developed a 9-11 NM error (Tab J-15). The true
extent of the INS position error could only be determined in
post-mishap flight review of aircraft components and tapes (Tab J-13).
The error was such that following INS steering to a selected point
would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the desired location (Tab
J-13). Ground radar plots of the flight’s ground track during the
medium altitude cruise revealed no significant course deviations. (Tab
CC-5.4). Ninja 1 pointed out landmarks to Ninja 2 during the medium
altitude portion of the flight, reinforcing the fact that Ninja flight
seemed to be navigating properly (Tab V-8.24).
(4) Also during this time period, a cursor slew of
approximately 26 NM and 20-30 degrees of right bias had been input to
the General Avionics Computer (Tab J-14). In certain ground-attack
steering modes, this cursor bias is added to the current INS steer
point and repositions various avionics symbology, including the Heads
Up Display (HUD) steering cues. In short, the cursor bias adjusts
navigation symbology. Normally, cursor inputs are used to correct for
small position errors, refine attack steering, and aid in target
acquisition. It is possible, however to inadvertently enter cursor
biases (Tab V-6.62). The cursor switch is a multifunction switch
dependent on the specific avionics mode and location of the sensor of
interest. Therefore, it is possible to enter unintentional cursor
slews when changing between modes and sensors (Tab
V-6.62). A crosscheck of system indications is required so that
unintentional slews are recognized and zeroed out. These errors came
into play later when Ninja flight began maneuvering for low-level
entry.
(5) Miami Center cleared Ninja flight to 13,000 ft and
directed them to contact Tampa Approach on radio frequency 362.3 (Tab
N-18, CC-3.2). The use of this frequency for Tampa Approach was
discontinued in August 2000 (Tabs N-18, CC-9). Ninja 1 thought he was
given frequency 362.35 and attempted contact there. (Tab V-6.40). In
either case, Ninja 1 would have been on the wrong frequency for Tampa
Approach. After his unsuccessful attempt to contact Tampa Approach,
Ninja 1 returned to the previous Miami Center frequency (Tabs N-19,
CC-3.2). Ninja 1 then determined that the flight was rapidly
approaching the low-level route start point and they needed to descend
soon for low-level entry (Tab V-6.40). At 1544:34, Ninja 1 cancelled
IFR with Miami Center. Miami Center acknowledged the IFR cancellation
and asked if he wanted flight following service, which Ninja 1
declined. Miami Center then terminated radar service and directed
Ninja 1 to change his Mode III transponder code to a VFR 1200 code
(Tabs J-38, N-19, CC-3.3, CC-5.1). Miami Center also gave Ninja
flight a traffic advisory on a Beech aircraft 15 NM away at 10,000 ft
MSL, which Ninja acknowledged. Ninja flight started a descent and
maneuvered to the west in order to de-conflict with that traffic (Tabs
N-19, V-6.41, V-8.26, CC-3.3). Ninja 1 was above the Class B airspace
at the time he cancelled IFR (Tabs J-38, CC-2, CC-5).
(6) At 1540:59, Sarasota Tower cleared Cessna 829 for
takeoff. The pilot, Mr. Jacques Olivier, was the only person onboard
the aircraft (Tab CC-3.2, CC-6.2). The Cessna’s planned profile was a
VFR flight at 2,500 ft MSL to Crystal River Airport (Tab N-3).
Shortly after departure, Cessna 829 contacted Tampa Approach, and the
controller called Cessna 829 radar contact at 1545:23 (Tabs N-6,
CC-3.3).
(7) At 1545:42, Ninja flight descended into Tampa Class B
airspace, approximately 15 NM northeast of Sarasota-Bradenton
International Airport, without clearance from Tampa Approach (Tabs
J-38, CC-5.1). Since Ninja 1 had already cancelled IFR and was
unaware that he was in Tampa airspace, he directed the flight to
change to UHF channel 20 (frequency 255.4, Flight Service Station) in
preparation for entry into VR-1098 (Tabs AA-2.2, BB-3.2, CC-3.3).
Ninja flight then accomplished a G-awareness exercise. This exercise
involves maneuvering the aircraft under moderate gravitational (G)
loads for 90-180 degrees of turn to ensure pilots are prepared to
sustain the G forces that will be encountered during the tactical
portion of the mission (Tabs BB-2.3, BB-4.2, BB-6.6, BB-13.3). Ninja
flight accelerated to approximately 440 knots calibrated airspeed
(KCAS) and accomplished two 90-degree turns while continuing their
descent (Tab CC-3.3). Following the G-awareness exercise, Ninja 1
directed his wingman to a fighting wing position (Tabs V-8.32,
CC-3.3).
(8) At 1547, Ninja 1 turned the flight to center up the INS
steering cues for the low-level start route point. As previously
mentioned, the INS had a 9-11 NM position error. (Tab J-15). Ninja
1’s airspeed was decreasing through approximately 390 KCAS (Tab
CC-3.4). Ninja 1 thought he was due north and within 9 NM of the
start route point, which was Manatee Dam. In reality, he was
approximately 5 NM west of the steer point (Tabs V-6.47, J-38,
CC-5.1). Also at 1547, Tampa Approach directed Cessna 829 to turn
left to a heading of 320-degrees and then follow the shoreline
northbound. Tampa also directed a climb to 3,500 ft MSL. Cessna 829
acknowledged and complied with the instructions (Tabs N-7, CC-3.4).
(9) Ninja 1 next called for a “fence check,” directing the
flight to set up the appropriate switches and onboard avionic systems
for the tactical phase of the mission (Tab CC-3.4). Shortly after
calling “fence check,” Ninja 1 entered Sarasota Class C airspace in a
descent through 4,000 ft MSL. During the descent, Ninja 1 called
“heads up, birds,” alerting his wingman of birds flying in their
vicinity (Tabs V-6.48, V-8.37, CC-3.5). As part of his “fence check,”
Ninja 1 changed from a navigational mode to an air-to-ground attack
mode (Tabs
V-6.46, CC-3.4). This mode adjusted the system steering 20 degrees
right, commanding a new heading of approximately 180-degrees (Tab
CC-3.4). This steering was the result of the cursor slew bias that
had previously been input to the system (Tab J-12). The HUD also
displayed a range of approximately 35 NM (Tabs J-10, CC-3.4). Ninja
1 turned to follow the steering cues (Tabs J-37, J-38, CC-2, CC 3.5,
CC-5.1).
(10) In addition, this air-to-ground mode displays a metric of
navigational system accuracy when the system determines anything less
than “high” accuracy (Tab J-11). When Ninja 1 switched to this mode,
the system showed a navigational system accuracy of “medium”, which
eventually degraded to “low” prior to the collision (Tab J-13). Ninja
1 did not notice this degradation in system accuracy (Tab V-6.49).
Ninja 2 thought they were on course and close to the start route
point. However, he did not recall specifically checking his own INS
steering to confirm they were on track to the point (Tabs V-8.34,
V-8.35, V-8.36).
(11) At 1547:39, approximately 30 seconds prior to the
midair collision, the Tampa Approach radar system generated an initial
Mode C Intruder (Conflict) Alert between Cessna 829 and Ninja 1’s 1200
code (Tab CC-8.2). Between 1547:55 and 1548:05, Tampa Approach
communicated with Miami Center and discussed the altitude of Ninja 1
(Tabs N-7, CC-3.5). No safety alert was ever transmitted to Cessna
829 (Tabs N-7, CC-3.5).
(12) At 1548:09, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 collided near
Bradenton, Florida (Tabs U-5.1,
CC-3.5). The collision happened approximately 6 NM from the
Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at approximately 2000 ft,
within the confines of the Sarasota Class C airspace (Tabs J-36, J-37,
J-40, R-2, BB-7.2, CC-2, CC-5.1). Ninja 1 was not aware that the
flight was in Class C airspace when the collision occurred (Tab
V-6.69). Ninja 1’s displayed airspeed at the time of the midair was
356 KCAS with a heading of 178 degrees (Tab CC-3.5). Ninja 1’s
attention was focused on finding the start route point and looking
where the HUD steering was pointed (Tab V-6.51). Again, these
indications were incorrect due to the INS position error and cursor
slew, neither of which was recognized by the pilot. Ninja 1 was
unable to find the start route in front of his aircraft because it was
actually about 5 NM at his left eight-o’clock (Tabs J-38, V-6.47,
CC-2). Ninja 1 looked over his left shoulder at approximately one
second prior to impact and saw the Cessna in a turn just in front of
his wingman (Tab V- 6-52).
(13) Ninja 2 was looking in the direction of Ninja 1,
anticipating a left turn for entry into the low-level route. He was
clearing his flight path visually, primarily looking for birds (Tabs
V-8.37, V-8.38). He was flying about 60-degrees aft of his flight
lead and 3,000-5,000 feet in trail (Tab V-8.38). Ninja 2 saw a white
flash that appeared to travel from low left ten- to eleven-o’clock and
simultaneously felt a violent impact (Tab V-8.38). There are
conflicting witness statements about the flight attitude of Cessna 829
immediately prior to the midair (Tabs V-2,
V-3, V-4, V-5, V-6.53). The nearest witnesses on the ground stated
that they saw no evasive maneuvering by the Cessna immediately prior
to the collision (Tabs V-2, V-3, V-4). Other witnesses, including
Ninja 1, perceived that Cessna 829 turned or banked immediately prior
to the collision (Tabs V-5, V-6.53).
(14) Also at 1548:09, Tampa Approach issued Cessna 829 a
traffic advisory on Ninja 1’s position (Tabs N-7, CC-3.5).
(15) The collision created a large hole in the left side of
Ninja 2’s canopy and there was accompanying airflow noise (Tab S-5).
The impact disabled all of his primary flight instruments, and there
was nothing displayed in the HUD (Tab V-8.39). Ninja 2 initially
turned the jet right to the west in an attempt to recover at MacDill
AFB. The aircraft then decelerated and the engine began to spool
down. A few moments later, he determined he would be unable to fly
the aircraft to MacDill AFB, based on its current altitude and
airspeed. Ninja 2 then began a turn back to the left, looking for an
unpopulated area in the event he had to eject (Tabs V-8.39, V-8.40,
V-8.41). Ninja 2 initiated the critical action procedures to restart
the engine, which was unsuccessful due to foreign object ingestion
(Tabs J-24, V-8.40, V-8.41). As altitude and airspeed continued to
decrease, he maneuvered his aircraft towards an uninhabited area (Tab
V-8.42). The aircraft then began an uncontrollable roll to the left
and Ninja 2 ejected (Tabs
V-8.2, V-8.43).
Impact.
After ejection, the aircraft continued to roll left and
transitioned to what appeared to be a spin entry (Tabs V-8.43,
V-8.44). It impacted the terrain at approximately 1549, at
coordinates N 27 23.5, W 82 27.5 (Tabs U-5.1, R-2). The aircraft
impacted the ground in a level attitude, pointing to the north (Tab
V-8.43). It crashed in an uninhabited area in a sparsely wooded
location (Tab S-3). Aside from fire damage to the surrounding
vegetation, there was little damage to the area surrounding the crash
site (Tab S-4).
Life Support Equipment, Egress and Survival.
(1) Upon impact with the Cessna, the left side of Ninja
2’s canopy was shattered, and Ninja 2’s helmet visor was lost (Tab
V-8.39). Ninja 2 safely ejected from his disabled aircraft in a
low-speed, nose-low, approximate 135-degree left-bank at an altitude
of approximately 700 ft (Tab V-8.43).
(2) The helmet, aviator mask, G-suit, Air Crew Ejection
System-II (ACES-II) seat, parachute and seat-kit functioned normally
(Tabs V-8.43, V-8.44, V-8.45). There was a twist in the parachute
risers after the chute opened, but Ninja 2 was able to untwist them
before he reached the ground (Tab V-8.44). Ninja 2 stated that his
PRC-90 radio had marginal reception during his communications with
Ninja 1, who was orbiting overhead the crash site (Tab V-8.45). All
life support and egress equipment had current inspections (Tab U-3).
Life support and egress equipment were not factors in the mishap.
Search and Rescue.
Within moments of his parachute landing, Captain Kreuder was
approached by a civilian who loaned him a cell-phone to call the
operations desk at Moody AFB (Tab V-8.44). Ninja 2 was evaluated by
civilian Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel at the crash site.
Within a couple hours of the crash, he was flown by helicopter to the
6th Medical Group Hospital at MacDill AFB (Tabs X-2, V-8.45).
Recovery of Remains.
The remains of the Cessna pilot were recovered in the vicinity of the
Rosedale Golf and Country Club. An autopsy was performed on 18
November 2000 at the District Twelve Medical Examiner Facility (Tab
X-4).
MAINTENANCE
Forms Documentation.
(1) A complete review was performed of active Air Force
Technical Order (AFTO) 781 series forms along with automated
maintenance/equipment history stored in the Core Automated Maintenance
System (CAMS) for both F-16 aircraft involved. This review covered
the time period from the last major phase inspection to the mishap
sortie and yielded no indication of any pending mechanical, electrical
or jet engine failure (Tabs H-2, H-3, H-4, H-5).
(2) A detailed listing of open items in both the AFTO 781
series forms and CAMS is included at Tab H. There is no evidence that
any of the open items were factors in the mishap (Tabs H-2, H-3).
(3) A detailed review of the AFTO Form 781K and the
automated history report showed no airframe or equipment Time
Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO) overdue at the time of the mishap
(Tabs H-2, H-3).
Inspections.
All required scheduled inspections and Time Change Items (TCI)
for aircraft 89-2104 were properly completed and documented (Tabs H-2,
H-3). There was an overdue 50-hour throttle inspection on aircraft
89-2058 (Tab H-4). This overdue inspection was not a factor in the
mishap (Tabs H-4, H-5).
Maintenance Procedures.
There is no evidence that maintenance procedures or practices
with respect to daily operations of aircraft 89-2058 and aircraft
89-2104 were factors in this mishap (Tabs H-2, H-3, H-4, H-5, U-2,
U-3, U-4, U-6).
Maintenance Personnel and Supervision:
(1) All personnel involved with servicing, inspections
(pre-flight and thru-flight), and aircraft launches were adequately
trained to complete all of these tasks, as documented in their AF Form
623s, On the Job Training Records, and AF Form 797s, Job Qualification
Standard Continuation/Command Job Qualification Standard (Tab U-2).
(2) Quality Verification Inspection and Personnel
Evaluation results for the four months prior to the mishap, provided
by the 347th Wing Quality Assurance section, demonstrated a trend of
quality job performance in the 69th FS (Tab U-2).
Fuel, Hydraulic and Oil Inspection Analysis.
(1) Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP) samples taken from
the mishap aircraft prior to the last sortie revealed no engine oil
abnormalities (Tab U-7.1). Aircraft 89-2104 was destroyed upon impact
with the ground and post-impact fire; thus, no post-flight JOAP
samples were taken (Tab D-3).
(2) The JOAP Lab at Moody AFB, GA noted no deficiencies in
fuel taken from fuel storage tank samples (Tabs U-8.1, U-8.2, U-8.3,
U-8.4, U-8.5, U-8.6, U-8.7).
(3) Sample results from the oil-servicing, liquid nitrogen
and liquid oxygen carts met required limits (Tabs U-7.3, U-7.4, U-7.5,
U-7.6, U-7.7, U-9, U-10).
Unscheduled Maintenance.
(1) A review of the Maintenance History Report for
aircraft 89-2104, covering the period from 14 January 2000 to 16
November 2000, revealed 192 unscheduled on-equipment maintenance
events. Maintenance History Report review revealed no evidence that
unscheduled maintenance was a factor in the mishap (Tab U-4).
(2) A review of the Maintenance History Report for
aircraft 89-2058, covering the period from 15 May 2000 to 16 November
2000, revealed 194 unscheduled on-equipment maintenance events.
Maintenance History Report review revealed no evidence that
unscheduled maintenance was a factor in the mishap (Tab U-4).
(3) Maintenance personnel working both aircraft the day of
the mishap were unaware of any undocumented discrepancies (Tabs V-11,
V-12). A hot-pit crewmember indicated that both aircraft were
functioning properly at the completion of all launch procedures (Tab
V-11). Lockheed Martin analysis of Crash Survivable Memory Unit
(CSMU), Seat Data Recorder (SDR), Global Positioning System (GPS),
General Avionics Computer (GAC) and INS data, as well as both pilots’
testimony, show no evidence of system performance outside of normal
operating parameters (Tabs J-12, J-13, J-14, V-6.29, V-6.32, V-8.19,
V-8.20).
AIRCRAFT AND AIRFRAME, MISSILE, OR SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS
Condition of Systems.
(1) Aircraft 89-2104 was completely destroyed by ground impact
and post-impact fire (Tabs M-2, S-3, S-4).
(2) Prior to the midair collision, aircraft 89-2104 had all
required equipment (Tab H-2). The equipment was functioning properly
and not a factor in the mishap (Tabs J-14, U-4, V-8.19,
V-8.20).
Testing.
(1) The CSMU and SDR from aircraft 89-2104 were
successfully retrieved and sent to Lockheed Martin Flight and System
Safety, Fort Worth, Texas, for analysis (Tab J-2). The HUD and
Multi-Function Display (MFD) recording tapes were destroyed in the
post impact fire (Tab J-3.31). Components retrieved from aircraft
89-2058 included: GAC, Inertial Navigation Unit (INU), GPS receiver
and recorded HUD and MFD tapes. All components were sent to Lockheed
Martin Flight and System Safety, Fort Worth, Texas for analysis (Tab
J-2).
(2) Analysis of data received from Lockheed Martin Flight
and System Safety of component downloads from both aircraft 89-2058
and 89-2104 substantiate that all systems were functional and
operating within design parameters (Tabs J-14, J-15). Evaluation of
system operation showed that aircraft 89-2058’s INS had a 9-11 NM
steering error on the mishap sortie (Tab
J-15). There is no indication that any other system operations of
either aircraft were a factor in this mishap.
WEATHER
Forecast Weather.
Forecast weather for MacDill AFB, Florida, located
approximately 27 nautical miles north of Sarasota, received on 16
November 2000, at 1217L (1717Z), was wind 160 degrees at 8 knots and
unlimited visibility. Sky condition forecast was few clouds at 5,000
ft. After 1500L, wind was forecasted to be 250 degrees at 10 knots.
No turbulence was forecasted at the time of the mishap (Tab K-6).
Observed Weather.
Observations were taken for Sarasota, Florida, at 1453L and
1553L. Observed winds were 210 degrees at 9-11 knots. Reported
visibility was 10 statute miles and sky condition was clear (Tab K-7).
Ninja 2 observed visibility to be better than 5 statute miles and sky
condition better than 3,000 ft, with “typical Florida haze” (Tabs
V-8.36, V-8.37). Ninja 2 also stated that the sun was in his
two-o’clock position (southwest) and not a factor in the mishap (Tabs
V-8.37,
V-8.38).
Space Environment.
There were no space weather-related events affecting the GPS
during the time of the mishap (Tab J-27).
Conclusions.
The flight was conducted during the day in visual
meteorological conditions (VMC). Weather conditions were good, and
there is no evidence that weather was a factor in the mishap.
CREW QUALIFICATIONS
Ninja 1, Flight Lead
(1) Lieutenant Colonel Parker was a qualified four-ship
flight lead. He completed his four-ship flight lead qualification in
February 2000 (Tab T-3). He had previously finished two-ship flight
lead upgrade in September 1999 (Tab T- 3). Lieutenant Colonel Parker
had a total of 2865.1 hours in USAF aircraft to include 991.9 hours in
the F-16, 701.4 hours in the F-106, and 954.5 in the T-33 (Tab G-3).
He also had 36.6 hours as an instructor in the F-106 and 80.5 hours as
an instructor in the T-33 (Tab G-3). He was current and qualified in
all areas of the briefed mission.
(2) Recent flight time is as follows (Tab G-2):
Ninja 2, Mishap Pilot
(1) Captain Kreuder was a qualified four-ship flight lead,
mission commander, functional check flight pilot and Supervisor of
Flying (SOF). He finished his mission commander upgrade on 21 August
2000 and had been a four-ship flight lead since 11 January 2000. He
was initially certified as a two-ship flight lead in March 1999. He
was certified combat mission ready at Moody AFB in December 1998 (Tab
T-2). Captain Kreuder had 706.3 hours in the F-16 (Tab G-9). He was
current and qualified in all areas of the briefed mission.
(2) Recent flight time is as follows (Tab G-7):
c. Cessna 829, Mishap Pilot
Mr. Jacques Olivier was a qualified Airline Transport Pilot
(ATP). He was issued his ATP qualification on 15 December 1999 (Tab
T-4).
MEDICAL
Qualifications.
(1) The medical and dental records of Lieutenant Colonel
Parker (Ninja 1) and Captain Kreuder (Ninja 2) were reviewed. Both
pilots were medically qualified for flight duties and had current USAF
class II flight physicals at the time of the mishap (Tabs X-2, X-3).
(2) The Cessna pilot (Mr. Olivier) was medically qualified
and had a current 1st class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
airman medical certificate at the time of the mishap (Tab X-2).
Health.
(1) Lieutenant Colonel Parker sustained no injuries from
the mishap and did not seek medical attention. He had a normal
post-mishap physical examination on 24 November 2000 (Tab X-4).
(2) On the day of the mishap, Captain Kreuder was
hospitalized overnight for observation and evaluation. The only
significant findings on exam were a small superficial skin abrasion on
the left leg and a minor scratch on the right forearm. There was no
evidence of other injury, and full spine x-rays did not reveal any
acute abnormality or fracture (Tab X-4).
(3) Mr. Olivier sustained fatal injuries from the mishap
(Tab X-4).
(4) Neither the F-16 pilots nor the Cessna pilot appeared
to have any pre-existing medical condition that may have been a factor
in this mishap (Tab X-2).
Pathology.
(1) Blood and urine samples from Lieutenant Colonel Parker
and Captain Kreuder were submitted to the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology for toxicological analysis. Carbon monoxide levels for both
pilots were within normal limits. No ethanol was detected in the
urine or blood samples. Furthermore, no amphetamines, barbiturates,
benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates or phencyclidine were
detected in the urine samples of either pilot (Tabs X-2,
X-5).
(2) Mr. Olivier’s autopsy report from the District Twelve
Medical Examiner Office in Sarasota, Florida was reviewed. He died
instantly in the midair collision as a result of blunt force trauma
(Tab X-4). Post-mortem comprehensive toxicological analysis was
negative (Tab X-2).
Lifestyle.
Based on the 72-hour history questionnaires and interviews
with both Lieutenant Colonel Parker and Captain Kreuder, there is no
evidence that unusual habits, behavior, or stress were a factor in the
mishap (Tabs V-6.5, V-6.6, V-6.7, V-8.5, V-8.6, X-6).
Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time.
Both Lieutenant Colonel Parker and Captain Kreuder had
adequate crew rest and were within maximum aircrew duty limitations
when the mishap occurred (Tabs V-6.7, V-8.5, X-6, BB-10.3, BB-10.4).
OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISION
Operations.
The operations tempo at the time of the mishap was moderate
for an F-16 fighter squadron. The squadron had last deployed in
August 2000, when it participated in a Green Flag Exercise (Tabs V-9,
V-10). The squadron was in the process of deactivating. The
deactivation was going according to plan and morale in the unit
remained high. As personnel left the unit, those who remained were
picking up some additional duties. However, the unit had not received
any new pilots for some time; thus, there was minimum additional
upgrade training. The paperwork load continued to decrease as
personnel left the unit (Tab V-10). The experience level of the
pilots was higher than a typical operational fighter squadron.
Operations tempo was not a factor in this mishap (Tab V-10).
Supervision.
The squadron commander and the operations officer both felt
that Lieutenant Colonel Parker and Captain Kreuder were very
professional, disciplined and competent aviators (Tabs V-9,
V-10). The squadron leadership applied the proper supervisory role
for the experience level of the pilots involved. Due to the
deactivation of the 69th FS, they had combined duty desk operations
with the 68th FS. The 68th FS Top-3 was not available for the
step-brief because he was giving a mass brief. He did, however, tell
the Squadron Operations Systems Manager to pass along to the pilots
that he had no additional words for them (Tab V-6.29). Squadron
supervision was not a factor in this mishap.
HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
a. Lieutenant Colonel Parker, Ninja 1
(1) Mis-prioritization of tasks: Lieutenant Colonel
Parker was navigating VFR and focusing his attention on the ground in
an attempt to find the Manatee Dam (Tabs V-6.46,
V-6.48). This focus on locating the low-level entry point likely
detracted from his flight path deconfliction responsibilities. He did
not see the collision threat in sufficient time to warn his wingman
(Tab V-6.52).
(2) Lost situational awareness: Lieutenant Colonel Parker
did not have proper situational awareness, as demonstrated by his
failure to recognize INS inaccuracies and cursor slew biases, and
flying through Class B and Class C airspace without proper clearance
or communications. As a result of his loss of SA, he ultimately
navigated his flight onto a collision course with Cessna 829.
b. Captain Kreuder, Ninja 2
(1) Mis-prioritization of tasks: In the moments prior to
the mishap, Ninja 2 was in fighting wing formation, slightly low and
to the left, 3,000-5,000 ft behind his flight lead. Captain Kreuder
was looking out for birds and expecting Ninja 1 to turn onto the
low-level route at any moment (Tab V-8.34). His immediate focus was
to “see and avoid” Ninja 1, since he expected him to turn sharply
across his flight path. However, Captain Kreuder did not properly
prioritize his visual lookout for other aircraft, as evidenced by his
failure to see Cessna 829, who was on a collision course to his left.
Captain Kreuder does not recall where he was looking at the instant of
impact, but reported that he saw a white flash at his ten- to
eleven-o’clock position just a split second prior to collision (Tab
V-8.38).
(2) Failure to adequately deconflict flight path: If two
aircraft are on a collision course, the flight geometry results in
little to no relative movement of the other aircraft on their
respective windscreens. The peripheral visual acuity of the average
human eye with 20/20 central vision is in the range of 20/200 to
20/400 (Tabs X-7.3, X-7.4). The eye relies more heavily on an
object’s relative motion and less on visual acuity in the peripheral
field of vision to detect oncoming threats. Cessna 829’s contrast and
small size against a featureless sky with very little or no relative
motion in Ninja 2’s left windscreen would render the collision threat
difficult to detect in the pilot’s peripheral vision. Therefore, a
disciplined and methodical visual scan of all forward sectors is
critical for acquiring flight path conflicts.
c. Mr. Jacques Olivier, Cessna 829
No historical human factors information was available on the
Cessna 829 pilot. However, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr.
Olivier did not perceive the collision threat in time to avoid the
collision. He would have faced the same visual perception problems as
Ninja flight: a small aircraft in a featureless sky with little or no
relative movement across his windscreen.
AIRSPACE AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ANALYSIS
Class B Airspace.
(1) The airspace surrounding Tampa International Airport
is categorized as Class B airspace. Class B airspace normally extends
upward from the surface to 10,000 ft MSL surrounding the nation’s
busiest airports. The configuration of each Class B airspace area is
individually tailored and consists of a surface area and two or more
layers. For the specific dimensions of the Tampa Class B airspace,
refer to the legal description contained in Federal Aviation
Administration Order 7400.9H (Tab BB-7.2). For a visual depiction of
the southeast corner of this airspace, refer to the Tampa/Orlando VFR
Terminal Area Chart (Tab R-2).
(2) Aircraft operating in Class B airspace are required to
obtain Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance, have an operable two-way
radio capable of communications with ATC on appropriate frequencies,
and be equipped with an operating transponder and automatic altitude
reporting equipment (Tabs BB-8.6, BB-9.10).
(3) Ninja 1 entered the Tampa Class B airspace approximately
15 NM northeast of Sarasota without clearance from Tampa Approach. On
17 November 2000, Tampa Approach filed a Preliminary Pilot Deviation
Report against Ninja 1 for this violation (Tab CC-7.1).
Class C Airspace.
(1) The airspace surrounding Sarasota-Bradenton
International Airport is categorized as Class C airspace. This
airspace extends from the surface up to and including 4,000 ft MSL
within a 5-mile radius of the Sarasota-Bradenton International
Airport. It also includes the airspace extending from 1,200 ft MSL up
to and including 4,000 ft MSL within a 10-mile radius of the airport
(Tabs R-2, BB-7.3).
(2) Aircraft operating in Class C airspace are required to
establish two-way radio communications with ATC before entering the
airspace and have an operational transponder (Tabs BB-8.5, BB-9.8).
(3) Ninja 1 entered the Sarasota Class C airspace 9 NM
northeast of Sarasota without establishing two-way radio
communications with Tampa Approach. On 17 November 2000, Tampa
Approach filed a Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report against Ninja 1
for this violation (Tab CC-7.1).
VR-1098.
VR-1098 is a military training route used for flights entering
the Avon Park Bombing Range (R-2901). The entry point (Point A) for
VR-1098 is located approximately 12 NM northeast of the
Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at an altitude between 500 ft
above ground level (AGL) and 1,500 ft AGL. At Point A, the route
extends 3 NM southwest (right) of centerline, slightly penetrating the
Sarasota Class C airspace, and 8 NM northeast (left) of centerline,
underlying the Tampa Class B airspace (Tabs R-2, BB-3.3).
Air Traffic Control.
(1) According to Federal Aviation Administration
directives, the primary purpose of the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the
system and to organize and expedite the flow of traffic. An air
traffic controller’s first duty priority is to separate aircraft and
issue safety alerts. Controllers also have the regulatory
responsibility to issue mandatory traffic advisories and safety alerts
to VFR aircraft operating in Class C airspace (Tabs BB-9.3, BB-9.8).
(2) An air traffic controller receives a Mode C Intruder
Alert when the ATC automated radar system identifies an existing or
pending situation between a tracked radar target and an untracked
radar target that requires immediate attention or action by the
controller. Once a controller observes and recognizes this situation,
his or her first priority is to issue a safety alert. A safety alert
is issued to an aircraft if the controller is aware the aircraft is in
a position which, in the controller’s judgment, places it in unsafe
proximity to other aircraft (Tabs BB-9.4, BB-9.5,
BB-9.6, BB-9.15, BB-9.16).
(3) At the time of the mishap, Cessna 829 was operating
in the Sarasota Class C airspace under the control of Tampa Approach.
At 1547:39, Tampa Approach’s radar system generated the first of a
series of five Mode C Intruder Alerts between Cessna 829 and Ninja 1.
The Mode C Intruder Alerts continued for 19 seconds, until 1547:58,
when the automated radar system no longer identified a conflict
between these two aircraft (Tabs CC-8.2, CC-8.3, CC-8.4). The system
did not identify a conflict between Cessna 829 and Ninja 2 because
Ninja 2 was not squawking a Mode III beacon code. In accordance with
Air Force directives, a wingman in standard formation does not squawk
a Mode III beacon code since the lead aircraft is already squawking a
code for the flight (Tab V-6.39, V-8.25, BB-10.5).
(4) Tampa Approach never issued a safety alert to Cessna
829, despite receiving the first Mode C Intruder Alert approximately
30 seconds before the mishap. The written transcripts do not show any
radio or landline communications by Tampa Approach when the Conflict
Alert activated. Tampa Approach also failed to issue a timely traffic
advisory to Cessna 829, with the first and only traffic advisory being
issued at the approximate time of impact (Tabs N-7,
CC-3.5). This traffic advisory was actually on Ninja 1, who had
already passed in front of Cessna 829.
(5) The accident board was unable to determine why Tampa
Approach failed to issue a safety alert to Cessna 829 because the air
traffic controllers involved in the mishap declined our request for
interviews (Tab CC-12).
e. Airspeed Requirements.
(1) Federal Aviation Regulation Part 91 states “no person may
operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of
more than 250 knots.” However, it also states that “[i]f the minimum
safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the maximum
speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated at that
minimum speed” (Tab BB-8.4).
(2) According to Air Force T.O. 1F-16CG-1 Flight Manual,
page 6-3, the F-16CG should be operated at a minimum airspeed of 300
KIAS during normal cruise operations below 10,000 ft. The closure
rate of Cessna 829 and Ninja 1 based on radar-measured conflict alert
data just prior to the collision was approximately 480 KTAS (Tabs
CC-8.3, CC-13).
GOVERNING DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS
Primary Operations Directives and Publications.
(1) AFI 11-2F-16 Volume 3, F-16 Flight Operations, 1
July 1999 (Tab BB-2).
(2) Area Planning Military Training Routes North and South
America (AP/1B), 5 October 2000 (Tab BB-3).
(3) AFI 11-2F-16 Volume 3, Chapter 8 Moody AFB Supplement
1, 15 October 2000
(Tab BB-4).
(4) AFI 11-214, Aircrew, Weapons Director, and Terminal
Attack Controller
Procedures for Air Operations, 25 February 1997 (Tab BB-5).
(5) AFTTP 3-3 Volume 5, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals -
F-16, 9 April 1999 (Tab
BB-6).
(6) FAAO 7400.9H, Airspace Designations and Reporting
Points, 1 September 2000
(Tab BB-7).
(7) FAR Part 91, General Operating and Flight Rules, 25 April 2000
(Tab BB-8).
(8) FAAO 7110.65M, Air Traffic Control, 24
February 2000 (Tab BB-9).
(9) AFI 11-202 Volume 3, General Flight Rules, 1
June 1998 (Tab BB-10).
(10) General Planning (GP), 18 May 2000 (Tab
BB-11).
(11) AIM, 10 August 2000 (Tab BB-12). (Advisory only).
(12) 347th Wing F-16 Employment Standards, March 1999 (Tab
BB-13).
(13) T.O. 1F-16CG-1, Flight Manual, 27 May 1996.
Maintenance Directives and Publications.
AFM 37-139, Records Disposition Schedule, 1 March 1996.
Known or Suspected Deviations from Directives or Publications.
Ninja 2 and Cessna 829: Failure to See and Avoid
AFI 11-202 Volume 3, Paragraph 5.2, See and Avoid (Tab BB-10.2)
General Planning, Page 2-42, See and Avoid (Tab BB-11.4)
AIM, Paragraph 5-5-8, See and Avoid (Tab BB-12.2) (Advisory only).
FAR Part 91, Section 91.111, Operating near other aircraft; and FAR
Part 91 Section 91.113, Right-of-way rules (Tabs BB-8.2, BB-8.3)
Tampa Approach: Failure to issue a safety alert to Cessna 829
FAAO 7110.65M, Paragraph 2-1-6, Safety Alert (Tab BB-9.4)
Ninja Flight: Failure to establish two-way radio communications with
Tampa Approach prior to entering Sarasota Class C airspace
FAR Part 91, Section 91.130, Operations in Class C airspace (Tab
BB-8.5)
(4) Ninja Flight: Failure to obtain ATC clearance with Tampa
Approach for entry into the Tampa Class B airspace
FAR Part 91, Section 91.131, Operations in Class B airspace (Tab
BB-8.6).
NEWS MEDIA INVOLVEMENT
News media outlets in the area around the crash site covered
this mishap extensively. Air Force officials conducted several press
conferences on-scene, and numerous television, radio, and print
reporters visited the crash site. Several live interviews were
conducted. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board held
press conferences and gave interviews.
18 January 2001 ROBIN E. SCOTT, Brigadier
General, USAF
President, Accident
Investigation Board
STATEMENT OF OPINION
F-16CG/Cessna 172
16 November 2000
1. Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d) any opinion of the accident investigators
as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to, the accident set
forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft
accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of
liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those
conclusions or statements.
2. OPINION SUMMARY.
There were two causes of the midair collision between an Air
Force F-16 and civilian Cessna aircraft near Bradenton, Florida, on 16
November 2000, both supported by clear and convincing evidence.
First, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 failed to “see and avoid” each other in
sufficient time to prevent the mishap. Second, Tampa Approach failed
to transmit a safety alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system
generated “Conflict Alert” warnings.
In addition, there were three factors that substantially
contributed to the mishap, all supported by substantial evidence.
First, Ninja 1 lost situational awareness (SA) and descended under
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into Tampa Class B airspace without
clearance. Second, Ninja 1 failed to recognize a significant position
error in his aircraft’s Inertial Navigation System (INS) and
unknowingly navigated the flight into Sarasota Class C airspace
without the required communications with Tampa Approach. Third, Ninja
1 failed to recognize a cursor slew bias in his ground attack steering
and unknowingly navigated the flight onto a collision course with
Cessna 829.
I base my opinion of these causes and contributing factors on
review and analysis of the following evidence: data released by the
Air Force Safety Investigation Board (SIB), interviews with the two
Air Force pilots, other military personnel from the mishap pilots’
unit, individuals on the ground who witnessed the mishap, applicable
Air Force and FAA directives, videotapes from the lead F-16 aircraft,
radar plots from various ground radar facilities, surveys and
photographs of the crash scenes, and examination of the F-16 wreckage.
3. DISCUSSION OF OPINION.
Three important conditions must be met in order for a midair
collision to occur. First, two aircraft must be in close proximity to
each other in time and space. Second, their flight paths must place
the aircraft on a collision course. Finally, the pilots must fail to
see each other in sufficient time and/or fail to alter their flight
paths enough to avoid the collision. In order to determine the causes
and significant factors that contributed to this mishap, it is
important to understand the circumstances surrounding the critical
chain of events that led to the midair collision.
The First Link in the Chain: The critical chain of events
began at 1544 when Ninja 1 elected to cancel Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR). He based this decision on his determination that the low-level
entry point was fast approaching and he needed to continue the
descent, as well as complete numerous tasks (G-awareness exercise,
fence check, and deploying his wingman to fighting wing position)
before they entered the low-level route. Earlier in the flight, Miami
Center had cleared Ninja 1 to proceed direct to the VR-1098 start
point with a descent to 13,000 ft mean sea level (MSL). When Ninja 1
cancelled IFR, the flight was well inside the lateral confines of
Tampa Class B airspace but still 3,000 ft above its upper limit.
Ninja 1 was not aware of this fact (i.e., he had lost his SA) and
descended the flight into controlled airspace without the required
clearance.
Ninja 1’s loss of SA during his VFR descent was a
substantially contributing factor to this mishap. While proceeding
VFR was permissible under the rules, he was still required to either
avoid entry into the Class B airspace or contact Tampa Approach for
clearance to enter. This loss of SA is the first critical link in the
mishap chain of events.
In Close Proximity: The midair collision occurred within the
confines of Sarasota Class C airspace. Cessna 829 had taken off from
Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport on a VFR flight to Crystal
River Airport and was on a radar-vector climbout with Tampa Approach.
Meanwhile, Ninja flight was still in their VFR descent proceeding to
the low-level start route point, located just northeast of the Class C
airspace. By this time, Ninja 1’s INS had developed a 9-11 nautical
mile (NM) position error that went unnoticed by the pilot. He had
experienced no problems with the INS on the first sortie of the day
and assumed it was still accurate. He did not crosscheck the INS
accuracy with other systems during the medium-altitude portion of the
mishap sortie. However, a review of ground radar plots depicting his
actual ground track on the first three legs of the sortie revealed no
apparent deviations. As he began his descent, the next opportunity to
check his INS accuracy was at the start route point.
Approximately one minute prior to the midair collision, Ninja
1 centered his INS steering and started looking for the start route
ground reference, Manatee Dam. Since both pilots in Ninja flight were
flying VR-1098 for the first time, neither had seen the actual ground
references or local terrain features before. Ninja 1’s INS was
steering him 9-11 NM south of the actual turn point so Manatee Dam
was, in reality, several miles to his left. Consequently, Ninja 1
would never visually acquire the ground reference that could have
clued him in to the INS error.
During this time, Ninja 2 was focused on maintaining his
fighting wing position and looking for birds in the vicinity of his
flight path. His impression was that they were close to the start
route point, and he was anticipating a turn onto the route at any
moment. However, he could not recall checking his own navigation
indications to confirm that their course to the start route point was
correct. Although Ninja 2’s primary non-critical task was to maintain
proper formation, he also had the responsibility to back up his flight
lead on navigation tasks. An opportunity to help his flight lead
regain situational awareness and break the mishap chain of events was
lost.
The INS position error, combined with Ninja 1’s failure to
detect the discrepancy, was another substantially contributing factor
to the mishap. By following this erroneous steering,
Ninja 1 violated Sarasota Class C airspace without the required
communications with Tampa Approach and navigated the flight into the
same airspace with Cessna 829.
On a Collision Course: As stated above, Cessna 829 was under
control of Tampa Approach on a radar-vector climbout. Tampa Approach
issued Cessna 829 a left turn to a 320-degree heading and climb to
3,500 ft MSL at about the time Ninja flight was descending through
4,000 ft MSL and entering the Class C airspace. Ninja 1 directed the
flight to conduct a “fence check” and switched his navigation system
to a ground-attack steering mode. This new mode shifted the steering
indications in the HUD, showing a 180-degree bearing for 35 NM to the
start route point. This shift in the steering indications was the
result of an unintentional cursor slew bias by the pilot. Ninja 1
failed to note this bias, turned the flight south to center up the new
steering, and continued looking for the start route ground reference.
Combined with the Cessna’s 320-degree vector, the collision geometry
for the mishap was complete.
Ninja 1’s failure to recognize and correct the unintentional
cursor slew bias was a substantially contributing factor to the
mishap. Even with the existing INS position error in the system, if
Ninja 1 had noted the cursor bias and zeroed it out, the flight would
still have flown in close proximity to Cessna 829 but would likely not
have ended up on a collision course.
Failure to “See and Avoid”: One cause of this mishap was the
failure of Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 to see each other in sufficient time
to maneuver their aircraft and avoid the midair collision. Both Ninja
flight and Cessna 829 were operating VFR in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC). Under VFR, all pilots are charged with the
responsibility to observe the presence of other aircraft and to
maneuver their aircraft as required to avoid a collision. In aviation
parlance, this responsibility is known as “see and avoid.” Air Force
training manuals emphasize that flight path deconfliction is a
critical task, one that can never be ignored without catastrophic
consequences.
The geometry of a collision intercept and associated visual
perceptions require pilots to conduct a disciplined visual scan in
order to effectively spot potential conflicts. When two aircraft are
on a collision course, there is little to no relative movement of the
other aircraft on their respective windscreens. Therefore, pilots
must constantly scan the airspace around their aircraft in a
disciplined, methodical manner in order to effectively “see and
avoid.”
Visual lookout is a priority task for all flight members,
flight leads as well as wingmen.
In this mishap, Ninja 2 failed to effectively accomplish his visual
lookout responsibilities. His attention, just prior to the mishap,
was on maintaining formation position and looking out for birds in the
vicinity of his aircraft. When the collision occurred, he was focused
on the flight lead’s aircraft at his right one- to two-o’clock
position and anticipating Ninja 1’s left turn onto the low-level
route. Just prior to the midair collision, Ninja 2 saw a white flash
at his ten- to eleven-o’clock position. He thought he had hit a bird.
Nor did Ninja 1’s own visual lookout provide his wingman
effective mutual support in flight path deconfliction. As the flight
leveled off at 2,000 ft MSL, Ninja 1 was focused on navigation tasks,
and his visual scan was towards the ground, looking for Manatee Dam.
Just prior to impact, Ninja 1 looked over his left shoulder to check
his wingman’s position and saw Cessna 829 for the first time. There
was insufficient time for him to warn his wingman before the two
aircraft collided.
There is conflicting testimony as to whether Cessna 829 saw
the impending midair collision at the last moment and attempted to
maneuver his aircraft or whether his aircraft was in wings level
flight at the time of impact. In either case, Cessna 829 failed to
“see and avoid” Ninja 2 in sufficient time to avoid the midair
collision.
Failure to Issue a Warning: ATC directives state that the
primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between
aircraft operating in the system. Additionally, controllers are to
give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts,
as required.
Approximately 30 seconds prior to the midair collision, Tampa
Approach’s ATC radar computer system recorded a series of Mode C
Intruder Alert warnings that lasted for 19 seconds. Air Traffic
Control is supposed to issue a safety alert to aircraft under their
control if they are aware of an aircraft that is not under their
control at an altitude that, in the controller’s judgment, places both
aircraft in close proximity to each other. At the time of the
Intruder Alerts, Cessna 829 was under the control of Tampa Approach
while Ninja flight was flying VFR. Ninja 1 had a 1200 Mode III squawk
in his transponder. All three aircraft were at approximately 2,000 ft
MSL.
In the event of a safety alert, Air Traffic Control is
supposed to offer the pilot an alternate course of action when
feasible (e.g., “Traffic alert, advise you turn right heading zero
niner zero or climb to eight thousand feet”). The only transmission
Tampa Approach gave Cessna 829 was a normal traffic advisory at the
approximate time of the midair collision. This advisory was actually
on Ninja 1, who had already passed in front of Cessna 829. Ninja 2
was still behind his flight lead in a fighting wing position to the
left and approximately 3000-6000 ft in trail. The accident board was
unable to determine why no safety alert was issued to Cessna 829. The
controllers on duty at the time of the mishap declined our request for
interviews.
The failure of Tampa Approach to issue a safety alert to
Cessna 829 was also a cause of this mishap. If Tampa Approach had
issued a safety alert to Cessna 829 when the first Conflict Alerts
began, it is likely the pilot would have had sufficient time to
maneuver his aircraft and avoid Ninja 2.
4. CONCLUSION.
Technological advances, improvements in training, and
refinements in the airspace structure over the past several decades
have served to improve both civilian and military aviation safety
records. Redundancy is designed into the aviation “system,” with
overlapping responsibilities between pilots and air traffic
controllers. On occasion, though, equipment will malfunction and
competent professionals will make mistakes. These are normally
isolated events that are quickly rectified with little or no impact on
the safe conduct of flying operations. There are, however, times when
several such events occur in close sequence to each other and in a
synergistic way to produce tragic results--this mishap is one such
case.
The critical chain of events began when Ninja 1 elected to
cancel IFR and ended three and a half minutes later with a midair
collision between Ninja 2 and Cessna 829, resulting in the death of
the Cessna pilot and the total destruction of two aircraft. The
evidence shows that a combination of avionics anomalies, procedural
errors, and individual mistakes, both on the ground and in the air,
led to this midair collision.
Media interest in this mishap was high. One of the issues
raised in the press concerned the speed of the fighters. Ninja flight
did, in fact, accelerate to 441 KCAS to start their G-awareness
exercise in Class B airspace and then slowly decelerated to
approximately 350 KCAS just prior to the mishap. These are speeds
normally used by fighter aircraft to safely perform tactical
maneuvering, but not appropriate for controlled airspace around busy
airports. Ninja flight’s mistake was in transitioning to the tactical
portion of their flight too early, unaware that they were in
controlled airspace. That being said, it is my opinion that speed was
not a factor in this mishap. Based on their closure rate of
approximately 480 knots, if neither pilot had seen the other until
they were only 1 NM apart, they would have still had seven seconds to
react and maneuver their aircraft enough to avoid the collision.
Both F-16 pilots were experienced aviators and qualified
four-ship flight leads with proven track records of competency in the
air. There is no evidence to suggest either of them acted with a
deliberate disregard for the safety of others. The mishap sortie
began to unravel when Ninja 1 lost situational awareness and descended
into Tampa Class B airspace without clearance. Although training and
experience minimize one’s susceptibility to losing SA, it does not
make you immune. There is an aviator expression, “you never know
you’ve lost your SA until you get it back.” In this case, Ninja
flight did not realize they had lost SA, and the other substantially
contributing factors quickly led to this midair collision before they
could they could get it back.
18 January 2001 ROBIN E. SCOTT, Brigadier
General, USAF
President, Accident
Investigation Board
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A US fighter pilot nearly killed 234 people due to pilot error. The
Brits point out that the usual practice of having wingman's aircraft
transponder off prevents TCAS from detecting an immanent collision,
and call for change in that practice.
http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid%5F1322000/1322873.stm
Thursday, 10 May, 2001, 12:18 GMT 13:18 UK
Holiday plane in near miss
Crew members felt the fighter plane's turbulence
A pilot who missed a radio call has been
blamed for a "near disaster" between a plane
carrying 234 holidaymakers and an American
fighter jet.
Investigators say the two aircraft came within
115 metres [sic] of each other, with the holiday
plane being caught up in the fighter jet's
turbulence.
The incident happened over Daventry,
Northamptonshire in November, shortly after
the Britannia Airways Boeing 737 took off from
Birmingham bound for Cyprus.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)
report says the US Air Force pilot had missed a
call from his controllers clearing his F15 fighter
to climb by 1,000 feet.
In another AAIB report
released on
Wednesday, an
Aberdeen helicopter
crew has been blamed
for a "serious incident"
in July last year.
In that incident a
British Airways Boeing
737 carrying 102
passengers had to
abort take-off at
Aberdeen Airport.
The report says the pilot of the Gatwick-bound
flight managed to stop 100 metres [sic] from the
hovering helicopter, after the crew of the
latter misinterpreted instructions from air
traffic control.
Missed call
In the Daventry incident, the report says the
F15 was one of two from the USAF base at
Lakenheath in Suffolk that had been carrying
out a formation flying exercise.
The pilot of the second plane had not
responded to the call to climb from 10,000ft to
11,000ft in thick cloud.
He and his colleague then noticed their radar
showed the other F15 was above them and
they began discussing it, said the report.
This led to them missing "at least two other
transmissions" that might have led them to
realise [sic] they had failed to climb to the required
height.
Radar recommended
The report said the F15 had not been
transmitting a Secondary Surveillance Radar
(SSR) code, a normal procedure but one which
led to controllers being unaware of the
developing situation.
It also rendered high-tech collision avoidance
systems inoperable.
The report said if these systems could have
been used, they could have turned a "near
disaster" into a "disconcerting, but relatively
low risk, loss of separation."
It recommended that the Civil Aviation
Authority and National Air Traffic Control
Services bring in procedures to ensure that
aircraft operating in formation use SSR.
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Military aviation is the sound of freedom. It has a price. Usually the
>price is military lives. Rarely, the cost includes civilians.
The difference being that the military pilot _chooses_ to engage in
hazardous behavior. The civilians are unaware of the extent of the
hazard military operations pose to their safety, so the significantly
less dangerous behavior they choose is a delusion.
>While I
>think that reasonable efforts to protect civilians are in order, I think the
>balance is about right.
I think it's criminal not to _require_ the military to employ
electronic collision avoidance, or at least turn on a landing light
when operating in excess of 250 knots below 10,000 feet. I also think
it's unjust for the military not to accept FULL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
for any "mishap" [sic] which occurs at those speeds/altitudes.
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>The Aviation Act of 1958 is really a paper tiger when it comes to the
>military. Basically, it says that if military pilots break applicable FARs,
>the FAA will notify their military command for appropriate discipline.
In this case, USAF Brigadier General ROBIN E. SCOTT, President of the
accident investigation Board, found that Flight Lead Parker's decision
to intentionally descend into Class B airspace at over 400 knots not
to constitute "a deliberate disregard for the safety of others."
In fact, his report intimates that the cause of Parker's misbehavior,
which lead to the death of Jacques Olivier, was a malfunction of the
navigation electronics on board Parker's F-16, when in fact, the
documented equipment errors actually placed Parker 10 NM farther from
the center of the Tampa Class B airspace than he believed he was at
the time. That is to say, Parker would have been inside Tampa Class B
airspace without the required ATC clearance for many more miles had he
actually descended at the position he believed he was located instead
of the position the malfunctioning/misoperated navagational.equipment
placed him.
So, you are correct, "the FAA has no real ability to enforce FAR
violations committed by the military."
---------------- Related Information ---------------------------
Saturday, March 31, 2001
Associated Press
BRADENTON — The lead F-16 pilot involved in a crash that killed a
civilian pilot was cleared of criminal wrongdoing Friday and will
retire Saturday.
Air Force officials said the mistakes Lt. Col. Parker [
http://www.af.mil/photos/Nov1997/971371a.html ] made leading up to the
crash over Manatee County deserved only "administrative action" — a
written or verbal reprimand. He will also retain his officer's
pension.
Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not elaborate
on what form of administrative action was taken. They also would not
say which of the mistakes he made the day of the crash led to the
reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported for Saturday editions.
The decision regarding Parker was made by Brig. Gen. John Rosa, [
http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/rosa_jw.html ] commander of Moody
Air Force Base in south Georgia, where the F-16 pilots were stationed
at the time of the crash. The decision came about two weeks after
Kreuder was cleared in the crash.
Parker is on leave pending his retirement, which was planned before
the crash. Kreuder is still flying.
C.D.Damron
>The civilians are unaware of the extent of the
>hazard military operations pose to their safety, so the significantly
>less dangerous behavior they choose is a delusion.
One reason that they are unaware is that such accidents are truly rare, a
sign that the system works. It is a much bigger probem that inexperienced
GA pilots bust controlled airspace. I want that situation improved, as
well. However, I'm not calling for the heads of GA pilots.
>I think it's criminal not to _require_ the military to employ
>electronic collision avoidance, or at least turn on a landing light
>when operating in excess of 250 knots below 10,000 feet. I also think
>it's unjust for the military not to accept FULL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
>for any "mishap" [sic] which occurs at those speeds/altitudes.
The word criminal has a legal meaning. It appears out of context in your
usage. I don't have a problem with your recommendation about lights,
except that in some aircraft the landing light is on the landing gear, which
is often retracted at those speeds.
Larry Dighera
<mike....@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>Larry,
>
> I'm not a pilot, I'm a software engineer (active duty USAF). I did 4
>years with the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron at Hill AFB, UT, writing their
>radar evaluation software (also used by the FAA I might add) so I know what
>the radar shows, how it works, etc. I was going to post something but
>between BUFFDRIVER and Randy, my points were already covered.
>
>Mike
Below a response to some e-mail I received from an Air Force pilot.
It sheds more light on what happened in this "mishap." Perhaps the
group will find it informative:
Mr. XXX, I thank you for the first-hand information you have shared
with me.
On Wed, 13 Jun 2001 23:39:45 -0700, "XXXX XXXXX" <XX...@mindspring.com>
wrote:
>You are spring loaded to assume that it was intentional.
I read the Air Force accident report, and was infuriated by the lack
of responsibility for this "mishap" [sic] it placed on Parker.
The facts presented in the Air Force accident report support my
contention that Parker intentionally, willfully, deliberately and
recklessly descended into a very congested terminal area in excess of
400 knots and without being in communication with the authority
responsible for separating aircraft in that airspace, and without
regard for the life and safety of the civilians operating there nor
those residing under his flight path.
> The accident report doesn't support that.
Assuming the Air Force accident report is 100% factual, it indicates
that Parker, Ninja Flight Lead, began his descent into Tampa Class B
airspace at a point he believed at the time was ~15 miles inside its
boundary. Any airman, even an illustrious Air Force pilot, knows that
the dimensions of Class B areas are roughly a 30 NM radius from the
central airport (KTPA in this case).
Parker was aware he was above Tampa Class B airspace when he
recklessly decided to descend through it, or he is a careless and
incompetent pilot (or both).
>The errors were in systems management that let [sic] to innacurate navigation
The errors in the systems did not cause this "mishap" [sic].
Re-read the Air Force accident report. The INS system mysteriously
developed a ~10 NM southerly steering error spontaneously, subsequent
to the first sortie. This had the effect of indicating that the
aircraft's position was ~10 NM south of its true position. Parker
failed to do the _required_ position check which would have detected
this error.
Parker also erroneously input a slew error, and failed to make the
_required_ check when he engaged that navigation equipment. The
results of that error placed him 5 NM west of his indicated position.
Neither of the errors, electronic nor Parker's erroneous input, were
adequate in explaining why a highly trained Air Force pilot chose to
descend into Tampa Class B airspace at what Parker's navigation
equipment indicated was 15 miles inside the Class B boundary at the
time. The malfunctioning/misdialed navigational errors actually
assisted Parker's flight in being closer to the edge of the Class B
area when he chose to descend (at 140 knots in excess of his
aircraft's minimum safe speed in violation of FAR 19.117(d)) without a
clearance into the congested Class B terminal area. So the
navigational system errors lessened the time Parker's flight posed a
threat to Class B air traffic.
THE NAVIGATIONAL ERRORS DO NOT IN ANY WAY EXCUSE PARKER FOR HIS
RECKLESS ACTIONS. In fact the opposite is true.
>- it's real easy to be off by a few miles
How easy? Are you saying that Air Force pilots are routinely off
course?
15 miles is not "a few miles" in my opinion. A few miles would be 3.
Parker was 5 times a "few miles" off course due to his careless
failure to perform the _required_ crosschecks. Parker was careless.
There is no doubt in my mind that Parker's decision to descend into
the Tampa Class B area without the required ATC clearance was
deliberate and intentional; He had to be aware that he wasn't clear of
the class bravo airspace.
>and there are no big signposts in the air telling you where the Class
>B airspace starts.
Forecast weather for MacDill AFB was for unlimited visibility.
Reported visibility was 10 statute miles and sky condition was clear
in the Sarasota area at the time.
If you don't consider Tampa International airport, the numerous bodies
of water, nor Sarasota/Brandenton airport to be signposts, you haven't
looked at a chart of the Tampa area. I'll attach an annotated scan of
the pertinent portion of the Tampa/Orlando VFR Terminal Area Chart to
assist you in visualizing the situation. [I'm happy to post this
chart to alt.binaries.pictures.aviation or e-mail it to those who
request a copy.]
>Again, do you have any experience in this type of flying?
If you mean flying around busy terminal areas, yes. If you mean
reckless & careless operation of high-speed fighter aircraft in
congested airspace in violation of military and Federal Aviation
Regulations which resulted in the death of an innocent citizen, no I
haven't done that.
>If so you would realise that there is no pattern of intentional
>recklessness in this accident,
You are correct in asserting the fact that the Air Force report does
not indicate a _pattern_ of intentional recklessness.
However, I believe Parker's decision to recklessly descend without a
clearance was a result of the situation created by all the careless
errors he made. Due to Parker's canceling IFR and failure to contact
Tampa Approach Control because he input the wrong frequency in his
radio, he either had to descend without a clearance, or fly past the
MTR entry point. He thought he was ~10 NM closer to the MTR entry
point then he actually was at the time. Parker just chose to chance
what he thought would be only a few moments of violating FARs, and
indulged in unprofessional, unsafe operation, rather than pausing to
safely regain control of the rapidly determining situation.
In light of that information, how do you explain his reckless and
careless operation?
>just a few (individually minor) mistakes and some real bad luck.
Bunk! You can attempt a cover up, but the facts tell the true story.
You are correct that Parker relied on luck/probability to keep the
flight which he was responsible for leading from killing innocent
citizens.
F-16 Flight Lead "Ninja 1" Lieutenant Colonel James Parker made more
than a _few_ careless "mistakes" [sic] and/or reckless decisions.
Some of them were indeed minor, but others were unforgivable and
deadly. The Air Force accident report mentions these:
1. Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B and
Class C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the flight
briefing. Air Force directives _require_ the flight lead to brief
applicable airspace restrictions.
2. Canceled IFR with Miami Center.
3. Declined flight following service.
4. Erroneously thought he was given frequency 362.35 by Miami Center
and attempted to contact Tampa Approach Control there.
5. Failed to obtain ATC clearance from Tampa Approach for entry into
the Tampa Class B airspace.
6. Failed to establish two-way radio communications with Tampa
Approach Control prior to entering Sarasota Class C airspace.
7. Failed to adequately deconflict flight path (Air Force training
manuals emphasize that flight path deconfliction is a critical task,
one that can never be ignored without catastrophic consequences.)
8. Lost situational awareness.
9. Failed to recognize a significant 9 to 11 nautical mile position
error in his aircraft's Inertial Navigation System.
10. Did not crosscheck the INS accuracy with other systems.
11. Parker failed to notice the degradation in INS system accuracy.
The system showed a navigational system accuracy of 'medium', which
eventually degraded to 'low' prior to the collision.
12. Unintentional cursor slew bias input by the pilot. A crosscheck
of system indications is _required_ so that unintentional slews are
recognized and zeroed out. Parker didn't bother to perform the
_required_ crosscheck.
12. Failed to recognize a cursor slew bias in his ground attack
steering.
14. Mis-prioritization of tasks.
15. Parker had a normal post-mishap physical examination on 24
November 2000, 8-days after his flight killed Jacques Olivier!
If you still think Parker only made a "few", "minor" errors, you are
the one who is biased. Parker's list of careless errors bespeaks of
unprofessionalism; I wouldn't want to share the skies with him.
How many errors, regulation violations, and reckless decisions does a
pilot have to make before you considered him incompetent and a hazard
to air safety?
>You are also stuck on the speed -
I believe the high-speed of Parker's flight reduced the time the
pilots had to detect an aircraft on a collision course, and prevented
the late Cessna 172 pilot, Jacques Olivier, from maneuvering his
aircraft out of the path of the F-16s in time to avoid the collision
(which scattered parts of his still warm remains over 4 acres
surrounding the 2nd hole of busy Rosedale Golf and Country Club) that
afternoon. Olivier's aircraft was in a right turn at the time of the
480 knot (~550 mph) impact, so he had seen the rogue F-16 before it
shattered his light aircraft (and virtually caused his body to
explode), but because of its excessive speed, he lacked sufficient
time to get out of its way.
High speed leaves little time for human responses. (I direct your
attention to the table in the article included at the end of this
message.)
>they accelerated to 400+ knots for the
>G-LOC maneuver, then slowed down as they let down to the low level entry;
>the report says they were at about 350 knots at the time of the accident.
Parker penetrated Tampa Class B airspace at approximately 440 knots
calibrated airspeed (KCAS) in violation of FARs 19.117(d) "Aircraft
speed", and 91.131(a)(1) "Operations in Class B airspace." The
closing speed at the time of the impact was estimated at 480 knots.
Olivier was fatally slaughtered as a result of Parker's recklessness;
fortunately, Kreuder walked away unhurt.
>In a fighter, 350 is actually safer than 250, as your nose is lower and you
>have much better maneuverability - needed to "see and avoid" down low.
If you are saying that an F-16 is unsafe cruising at 250 knots, you
are in agreement with the F-16 Flight Manual. But, FAR 19.117(d)
grants aircraft with a minimum safe speed in excess of 250 knots to
operate at that minimum speed, 300 knots in this case, not the 440
knots Parker's flight was traveling when it descended below 10,000
feet.
>But I guess you just want to shoot the guilty bastards, just because they
>were there, doing their job,
The point is, that they weren't doing there job professionally enough
to avoid killing the innocent pilot of a 120 knot Cessna. Parker lead
his flight in a reckless and unsafe manner into congested airspace,
failed to follow Air Force and FAA regulations, and got away with it
(so far). That offends my sense of justice.
>and were unlucky enough to be unlucky.
You are correct about "luck" being involved. I believe that Parker
thought that the odds of his flight impacting another aircraft were
long, and relied on luck for separation. But he was wrong, dead
wrong, as the evidence shows.
>And the sad thing is that your attitude is so prevalent in the civilian world,
Why do you suppose that is? Do you think it has anything to do with
the publicized Air Force "mishap" [sic] which caused the death of so
many in Italy? Or, do you think it is a result of the many
ignominious mishaps the military has had lately? The truth will out.
All people are not stupid enough to miss the impudent hubris exhibited
by the military investigations into these "mishaps". Only a military
too deficient in gray matter to succeed at brazenfaced arrogant denial
of responsibility would attempt such an ignoble sham.
>it's causing many of the younger military pilots to leave what is being
>seen as a dangerous and unappreciated calling.
The smart/talented military pilots don't want to be associated with an
organization which refuses to police its ranks, and indulges in
obvious "cover up" activity.
Did they ever find the cockpit tapes of that flight which killed so
many people riding that Italian gondola. Didn't the pilots destroy
that evidence? It's a matter of record, as I recall.
What responsible, talented, pilot wants to be associated with an out
of control military? Not the smart ones.
>No, your intrepretation of this unfortunate mishap is wrong.
>
>Kirk
We haven't seen the final NTSB report yet, but I have a feeling that
it will find Parker reckless and careless. I invite you to re-read
the Air Force accident report, and see if you can tell me which of the
facts I present are erroneous, please.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Incidently, the reason I object to the word "mishap" as a description
of the butchering of the late Jaques Olivier, is that it is a military
euphemism which attempts to mask a 3rd degree murder (Florida law).
Perhaps "catastrophic tragedy" would be more accurate.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Did you see the post below? It gives you an idea of why I believe
high-speed low-level military operations are unsafe. It's all about
the lack of time to see-and-avoid.
[Randy, thank you for the input on your firsthand experiences.]
On 12 Jun 2001 04:34:25 -0700, str...@hotmail.com (Randy Haskin)
wrote:
>Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message news:<s6fV6.134972$mu1.27...@typhoon.we.rr.com>...
>
>> The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
>> collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
>> FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
>> knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best. :-)
>
>I'm not sure where you're getting this notion from.
There was no mention in the Air Force's accident report of the fact
that neither the Flight Lead, James Parker (
http://www.af.mil/photos/Nov1997/971371a.html ), nor the wingman of
the Ninja flight, which killed Jaques Oliver, were using radar for
collision avoidance at the time of the "mishap" [sic]. I'd be happy
to e-mail you a copy of the Air Force investigative report, so that
you can see where I'm "getting this notion from." (For your immediate
convenience, I have place an admittedly poor copy of that report at
the end of this article.)
>Every day when I
>fly (the F-15E), the flight lead specifically briefs the topic of
>midair collision avoidance and we cover what altitudes each member of
>the flight is responsible for covering. We also set up our IFF
>interrogators to specifically look for Mode 3 1200 squawks, so even if
>the guy's in a Piper Cub and we won't get a radar hit, we will still
>get a hit off his transponder.
While I commend the attention to midair collision avoidance during
>Perhaps AFI 11-202V3 doesn't specifically denote where and when radars
>will be used for collision avoidance, but more specific operating
>manuals (for my jet, 11-2F-15E v 3, for example) do specifically talk
>about this.
I would be very interested in the specific wording of your operating
manual. I would also be interested in whether that manual's authority
is regulatory, or just a suggestion. Do you know where I might find
copies of such manuals?
>To assume that, because you didn't read it in whatever
>AFI you did your research in then it isn't a requirement, is not only
>shoddy research but it is also just plain *wrong*.
To be completely candid, I was unaware of any AFI you mention. My
information was taken from the Air Force accident report (below).
>> Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
>> TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
>> effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
>> daily, hourly, ....
>>
>> Wingmen, part of a formation flight, can trail the Flight Lead by over
>> a mile, but they are intentionally prevented from displaying a target
>> on ATC radar. That is unacceptable in the NAS on safety grounds, in
>> my opinion.
>
>Want to know who *asks* us to turn our squawks off when we're in
>"standard" formation (standard means within 1 nm and 100')? ATC!
I presume the reasoning behind this practice is due to the
illegibility of overlapping targets that would be presented on the
Controller's radar scope from aircraft in such close proximity. If
this is indeed the reason, I submit that it would be considerably
safer to modify the radar display software to deal with the issue.
With regard to Air Force regulations concerning the use of
transponders by military aircraft engaged in formation flight, the Air
Force report (below) states:
"In accordance with Air Force directives, a wingman in standard
formation does not squawk a Mode III beacon code since the lead
aircraft is already squawking a code for the flight."
So, while it may be ATC who issues the instruction, it seems it is the
Air Force who requires the practice of placing the military wingman's
transponder in standby mode. Perhaps it would be safer if s/he turned
on a landing light.
>Whenever we're *out* of standard formation (e.g. 2NM trail), the
>trailing formation members definitely squawk subset code.
I don't mean to be pedantic, but that is not exactly accurate; here's
the Air Force regulation:
AFI11-202V3 (9 FEBRUARY 2001)
5.4.2. Transponder Operations during Formation Flight.
Unless otherwise specified in Allied Communications Publication 160,
US Supplement 1:
5.4.2.1. Only one aircraft (normally the lead) of a standard formation
will squawk the assigned code.
5.4.2.1.1. Unless otherwise directed by ATC, all aircraft within a
nonstandard formation flight will squawk the ATC-assigned Mode 3A/C
beacon code until established within the assigned altitude block and
closed to the proper en route interval. Unless otherwise directed by
ATC, when aircraft interval exceeds 3 NMs, both the formation leader
and the last aircraft will squawk the assigned Mode 3A/C beacon code.
5.4.2.1.2. During refueling, when the receiver formation is within 3
NMs of the tanker air-craft, the receiver formation squawks standby
unless the T.O. specifies different distances.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubs/publist.asp?puborg=AF&series=11
>If it's so "unacceptable," then perhaps you should be telling ARTCC to
>stop asking us to do it.
If the cause of the practice is a result of inadequate radar-scope
display software, that is what should be changed.
The news article titled "Holiday plane in near miss" at the end of
this post details a near midair collision which occurred recently
despite the practice you cite.
>> Why not let the on-board electronics assist the pilot in collision
>> avoidance? Does it have something to do with the legal liability that
>> might imply?
>
>Again, see above. We do this on a daily basis.
There is no mention of radar being used by Ninja flight for collision
avoidance in the Air Force report (below). Again I ask, which
_regulatory_ document mandates the use of radar for collision
avoidance by military flights?
>As someone who flies
>fast down in the weeds, nobody is more interested in collision
>avoidance than I am. I *know* that the GA aircraft out there are
>*not* going to see me,
It is your life on the line. You appreciate the hazard involved. You
want to go on living, so you personally make every effort to avoid a
midair collision. But, given the physics involved, is it reasonable
to expect visual see-and-avoid regulations to prevent a midair
collision? Don't you feel considerably safer from suffering a midair
collision because you are using radar to detect conflicting air
traffic? Don't you agree that the use of on-bord radar should be
mandatory for military flights to assist in the prevention of midair
collisions?
>so I know it's my responsibility to detect, see, and avoid them.
Your conduct is commendable, but the military's responsibility for the
hazard high-speed low-level military operations create for civil
flights is not legally mandated by law (to my knowledge). That should
be changed.
>Let's look at this empirically -- you've got two
>aircraft: one's white and flies at 100 KIAS, the other one's dark
>gray, was painted *sepcifically* so that it would be difficult to see,
>and travelling at 500 KIAS. Who's more likely to see who? Well, as
>you may guess, it's far more likely that the fast mover will get a
>tally on the slow mover before the GA airplane sees the tactical
>fighter down in the weeds.
Agreed.
>All of us who fly fighters know this, and we're all vigilant.
I take exception to your use of the word "all" here. Certainly,
Flight Lead Parker's visual vigilance (among other things) was
questionable, and a cause of this fatal "mishap" [sic]. The Ninja
flight did not have their landing/taxi lights on while operating at
low level.
>Now, a few things that you probably haven't thought of. First of all,
>a radar's no good if nobody's looking at it.
That statement is not entirely true.
Ground-based radar is capable of issuing warnings based on the tracks
of the aircraft it "sees", without the necessity of controller input.
TCAS (while not radar based) overcomes the necessity for constant
surveillance by verbally warning the pilot of an imminent collision
without pilot intervention.
>That's one benefit I
>have being in the F-15E is that there's a second set of eyes in the
>cockpit to monitor the sensors when I'm unable to.
Unfortunately, the Ninja flight F-16s were single-seat. But, they
could have lit their landing/taxi lights while operating at high-speed
low-level to enhances their conspicuity.
>Why would I be unable to? Well, you'll be interested to know that my
>job as a wingman is to NOT LOSE SIGHT OF MY FLIGHT LEAD. This means I
>spend 80% of my time clearing the airspace in the line of sight behind
>my flight lead because that's where my eyes are padlocked.
That makes good sense. But, it only leaves you 20% of your time for
other duties; you realize that your visual scan is critical enough to
flight safety, that you devote nearly all of your concentration to it.
But, the physics involved may cause even your well-intentioned visual
vigilance to be inadequate in a situation similar to Ninja flight's.
>If we are doing any kind of maneuvering, especially while low, I'm
>concentrating on not hitting the ground or anything attached to it and
>keeping sight of my flight lead. When my eyes are outside, the Queen
>Mary could be showing up on my radar screen, and if I'm not looking at
>it, I won't see it.
I see your point. Perhaps a radar-based collision avoidance system or
TCAS is needed to increase air safety. Certainly, you could turn on
your landing/taxi lights when operating at low level.
>Before GA starts throwing stones at military aviators when it comes to
>these kinds of things, I think a little dose of "walking in our shoes"
>is required.
I agree with you completely. Military flying is extremely demanding
of the pilot. It is so demanding, that his skills should be augmented
with a reasonable collision avoidance system to lesson those demands.
>I was a Private Pilot before I became a military aviator
>and I had no idea what those guys did.
Then you, unlike Ninja Flight Lead Parker, are able to fully
appreciate the hazard high-speed low-level operation poses to the
concentration of civil aircraft operating in Class B & C airspace.
I still believe that the military should assume LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
for the hazard their high-speed low-level flights impose on civil
aviation, and that the military should be LEGALLY REQUIRED to use
RADAR and/or TCAS for collision avoidance when operating below 10,000
feet. Anything less is stupid and unjust.
Speaking of unjust, read this Air Force accident report, and see if
you can explain to me why Brigadier General ROBIN E. SCOTT, President
of the Accident Investigation Board, wrote, "There is no evidence to
suggest either of them [Ninja pilots] acted with a deliberate
disregard for the safety of others."? Is not the deliberate descent
into Class B airspace in excess of 400 knots a disregard for the
safety of others?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Larry Dighera wrote in message ...
>>The civilians are unaware of the extent of the
>>hazard military operations pose to their safety, so the significantly
>>less dangerous behavior they choose is a delusion.
>
>One reason that they are unaware is that such accidents are truly rare, a
>sign that the system works.
I believe your assertion about the rarity of F-16 "mishaps" is in
error, as does the current and qualified F-16 fighter pilot and safety
officer who provides this web site:
http://www.jetsafety.com/f16crash.htm
See how many F-16 mishaps you can count, and report back with more
valid information.
>It is a much bigger probem that inexperienced GA pilots bust controlled airspace.
Problem for whom? Not for F-16 pilots; they walk away unscathed from
their midair collisions with Cessna 172s.
>I want that situation improved, as well.
You aren't the only one. All safety-minded pilots want the FARs
complied with. Fortunately, a fleet of FSDO Inspectors are on the job
taking action against civil pilot deviations from FARs.
Who performs that role for military pilots?
>However, I'm not calling for the heads of GA pilots.
That is because you know of on recent GA airspace mishaps which caused
fatalities, and because they aren't as deadly a threat to military
aviation.
>>I think it's criminal not to _require_ the military to employ
>>electronic collision avoidance, or at least turn on a landing light
>>when operating in excess of 250 knots below 10,000 feet. I also think
>>it's unjust for the military not to accept FULL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
>>for any "mishap" [sic] which occurs at those speeds/altitudes.
>
>The word criminal has a legal meaning. It appears out of context in your
>usage.
Why? Are you familiar with the legal term 'criminal negligence'?
It is my belief that the FAA is negligent in its obligation to provide
safe skies for the public by not _requiring_ high-speed military
operations below 10,000 feet to display conspicuous collision
avoidance lighting. But, the FAA and military are both government
agencies, sort of like family, aren't they?
>I don't have a problem with your recommendation about lights,
Then, why don't you suggest it to your Safety Officer, please. You
might also suggest that military aircraft be equipped with, and pilots
be _required_ to use, TCAS or its equivalent while operating at
high-speed below 10,000 feet.
I don't want to be in the next GA aircraft skewered by a reckless and
careless military flight.
>except that in some aircraft the landing light is on the landing gear, which
>is often retracted at those speeds.
Then, perhaps it's time the military started installing collision
avoidance lighting (and REQUIRING ITS USE by military pilots) on its
fighters which operate at high-speed below 10,000 feet. It would go a
long way toward establishing public military credibility for enhancing
flight safety cheaply and effectively.
The alternative is more midairs.
Randy Haskin
think that many of them have been covered previously, so I won't dig
them up again. I'm grouping quotes and topics into 4 main areas, so I
apologize for some of your quotes being out of order (but not out of
context). Bear with me, it's a little lengthy.
First, regarding the "hazard" created by military aircraft operating
in excess of 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet;
[info about visual scan times at higher airspeeds deleted]
> These calculations only concern detecting the conflicting air traffic,
> not avoiding collision with it. So, it is patently evident that some
> other means of collision avoidance must be _required_ to insure the
> hazard to air-safety posed by high-speed low-level military operations
> is mitigated.
What "hazard to air safety" is it you're referring to? Just how is it
that military traffic flying in excess of 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet
are an undue hazard? What are the numbers of mil-on-mil midairs
versus mil-on-civil midiars versis civil-on-civil midairs? I don't
have the numbers in front of me, but an 'N' of one is not a
significant statistical sample. I read about far more private pilots
who inadvertantly entered IMC and killed themselves than I do military
fast-movers who smacked into GA aircraft.
> I still believe that the military should assume LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
> for the hazard their high-speed low-level flights impose on civil
> aviation
Isn't see and avoid a 2-way street? Military aviators bear the same
legal responsibility that GA pilots do and we adhere to it in the same
way. You're assuming that, because we operate sometimes above the 250
KIAS limit that we're an undue hazard and for some reason bear *more*
collision avoidance responsibility than everyone else does. Do you
know why 250 KIAS was notionally picked as the speed limit below
10,000 feet? Was it because of see-and-avoid safety?
While I can appreciate that this airspeed waiver seems to be a hazard,
I submit that it is no more a hazard to aviation than those same
aircraft operating below 250 KIAS.
Second, regarding the suggestion that all military aircraft equipped
with on-board air to air radars operating in excess of 250 KIAS below
10,000 feet be *required* to search a particular airspace volume
and/or interrogate Mode 3 squawks. I think this is a well-intentioned
idea, but I think it's completely over-regulatory, as well as
unneeded. My assumption is that, under your proposed regulation, any
so-equipped aircraft that didn't -- or couldn't -- use it's radar for
traffic avoidance would be in violation. That means any time the air
to air radar on my fighter aircraft is inop or not working
"correctly", I can't fly because I'd be in violation of the reg.
That's ludicrous. A lead-nosed F-15 flies the exact same as a T-38,
yet because I have an APG-70 on board as standard equipment, I am by
law not allowed to fly? There are literally hundreds of T-38 pilot
training flights operating in excess of 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet
occurring safely every day. Many of these flights are conducted in
heavy GA and commercial traffic areas. Nobody seems to have a problem
with that, and furthermore, you don't see a whole slew of mil-on-GA
midairs. These are *students* flying out there, too.
> and that the military should be LEGALLY REQUIRED to use
> RADAR and/or TCAS for collision avoidance when operating below 10,000
> feet. Anything less is stupid and unjust.
Again, it's *smart* to use radars to clear your flightpath and *smart*
aviators will use them as such, but it's definitely *not* negligent to
not use them and it should not be required.
Now, in your post you also asked what documents specifically require
radar use. I did my homework today and here's what you get: there are
no AFIs or ACC supplements to AFIs that specifically denote how radars
should be used for midair collision avoidance. However, attached
briefing guides in those AF and ACC documents mandate that we have to
consider, discuss, and brief radar and visual search responsibilities
while enroute to and returning from working areas during every
preflight brief. It is our local flying regs (both base level and
squadron level) which specifically tell us who's looking where with
their radar and for what.
The bottom line is, yes, we are directed to do it, but the regs are
not so restrictive that, as in the case with your proposal, we
basically can't fly unless we're able to use our radars and IFFs.
> While I commend the attention to midair collision avoidance during
> your briefings, I wonder if specifically looking for Mode-3 '1200'
> squawks is REQUIRED by military regulations.
No, there is not, but that's not the point. You don't have to mandate
common sense. There's also not a federal regulation which requires me
to use my ejection seat if the aircraft I'm in is out of control, but
common sense tells me to do it.
Even if there were such a reg, it would never be so specific so as to
denote what squawks will be interrogated for in particular phases of
flight. If the reg said to only search for M3 1200 squawks, that
would be severely limiting if we were operating on an IMC day and just
wanted to search for *all* Mode 3 squawks, for instance.
> given the physics involved, is it reasonable
> to expect visual see-and-avoid regulations to prevent a midair
> collision? Don't you feel considerably safer from suffering a midair
> collision because you are using radar to detect conflicting air
> traffic?
Yes, of course. A smart aviator uses *all* available tools when able
to enhance safety, whether that be from hitting the ground, hitting
obstructions, or hitting other airplanes.
> Don't you agree that the use of on-bord radar should be
> mandatory for military flights to assist in the prevention of midair
> collisions?
I really don't. I also think it's smart for everyone in an airplane
to have an ejection seat, but I don't advocate having every seat on
commercial airliners being replaced with an ACES II.
Third, the suggestion that if radars are not required, that we
mandatorily retrofit TCAS or "automatic" radar systems on military
aircraft operating in excess of 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet.
Sure...I'm all for new toys, especially when they enhance safety. The
fact is, though, that the Department of Defense barely has enough
money to keep airplanes airworthy these days -- it definitley does not
have the fundage to buy, test, and integrate TCAS into the avionics of
thousands of tactical aircraft. We can't even replace major aircraft
components that break and purchase already approved combat upgrades,
so I seriously doubt the feasability of buying TCAS or some enhanced
radar system.
Finally, regarding the F-16 midair:
> There was no mention in the Air Force's accident report of the fact
> that neither the Flight Lead, James Parker (
> http://www.af.mil/photos/Nov1997/971371a.html ), nor the wingman of
> the Ninja flight,
If you checked that particular reference URL, you'd see it referred to
a Senior Airman cop up at Elmendorf named James Parker, not an F-16
driver out of Florida.
> Oliver. The Flight Lead, Parker, of Ninja flight deliberately chose
> to descend into Tampa Class B airspace without ATC clearance.
[break/break]
> disregard for the safety of others."? Is not the deliberate descent
> into Class B airspace in excess of 400 knots a disregard for the
> safety of others?
There is a BIG difference between deliberate and mistake -- it's a
very clear line. Deliberately ignoring airspace
requirements/laws/regulations/whatever is a *crime* and is punishable.
Mistakes are not. The accident report you are continually referring
to does not make that assertion, so I don't know how it is that you're
in a position to make that accusation.
> this is indeed the reason, I submit that it would be considerably
> safer to modify the radar display software to deal with the issue.
I agree. More money to modify FAA/ARTCC radars for better resolution
is probably about as likely as the money to outfit all fast movers
with TCAS.
> The news article titled "Holiday plane in near miss" at the end of
> this post details a near midair collision which occurred recently
> despite the practice you cite.
Again, radar use is not magic. I'm not sure if you've actually seen
or used a fighter radar before, but it takes disciplined mechanics on
the part of the operator and a trained eye to interpret what appears.
I'm sure the Eagles involved in that situation had radar and visual
search responsibilities. If the correct eyes were not on the scope at
the time the search "hit" of the traffic appeared, they may never have
seen it.
> There is no mention of radar being used by Ninja flight for collision
> avoidance in the Air Force report (below). Again I ask, which
> _regulatory_ document mandates the use of radar for collision
> avoidance by military flights?
AFAIK, none does. But, as above, *why*? It's overly restrictive and
provides too little benefit.
> I take exception to your use of the word "all" here. Certainly,
> Flight Lead Parker's visual vigilance (among other things) was
> questionable, and a cause of this fatal "mishap" [sic]. The Ninja
> flight did not have their landing/taxi lights on while operating at
> low level.
For one, F-15s and F-16s landing lights are safely tucked away inside
their nose gear wheel wells during flight -- there's no way to have
them on while the gear is up.
Second, yes, the flight lead was not clearing for the flight, but
remember what was happening at the time of the collision. They were
off course, the lead's INS was telling him he was somewhere he wasn't,
and he was confused as to what's going on. That's called TASK
SATURATION, and it's a leading cause of accidents. It can happen to
anyone. When pilots start getting task saturated, things start
falling out of the crosscheck; generally pilots start talking less on
the radio and normal checklist items drop out. No doubt, he was
looking at his INS, looking at his low level map, and looking outside,
trying to make heads or tails of the situation. If he couldn't see
slow-moving traffic out the canopy because he was task saturated,
that's a human factors issue, not a negligence issue.
> Ground-based radar is capable of issuing warnings based on the tracks
> of the aircraft it "sees", without the necessity of controller input.
> TCAS (while not radar based) overcomes the necessity for constant
> surveillance by verbally warning the pilot of an imminent collision
> without pilot intervention.
I'm sure there are lots of nice pieces of electronic equipment out
there, but none of it is on my aircraft. If you know of some way of
infusing a large amount of money into the Department of Defense
aviation budget, I'm all for it. Then, maybe, we can get the spare
parts we need to actually fly fully mission capable aircraft. If we
get some new avionics along the way, great. To quote _The Right
Stuff_, "you know what makes these birds go up? FUNDING makes these
birds go up." Indeed, no bucks....no Buck Rogers.
> Unfortunately, the Ninja flight F-16s were single-seat. But, they
> could have lit their landing/taxi lights while operating at high-speed
> low-level to enhances their conspicuity.
It was probably on inside the wheel well under the nose gear door.
You suggest that we chould retrofit our aircraft with some sort of
conspicuous lighting to help see and avoid. Bear one thing in mind --
we are COMBAT AIRCRAFT, not television traffic spotters. We don't
have big, blunt noses or thick wing leading edges to bolt on landing
lights. We're *designed* and painted so that we're not seen. I don't
see any regulation stating that GA aircraft have to be conspicuously
lighted or painted high visibility colors, so why should we be any
different?
Robey Price
wrote:
>It is my belief that the FAA is negligent in its obligation to provide
>safe skies for the public by not _requiring_ high-speed military
>operations below 10,000 feet to display conspicuous collision
>avoidance lighting.
You mean like the flashing anti-collision beacon that I routinely used
EVERYTIME I flew (except when I was "on-the-wing" in close formation)?
>Then, why don't you suggest it to your Safety Officer, please. You
>might also suggest that military aircraft be equipped with, and pilots
>be _required_ to use, TCAS or its equivalent while operating at
>high-speed below 10,000 feet.
Well that certainly is one solution. There is also training.
>I don't want to be in the next GA aircraft skewered by a reckless and
>careless military flight.
Indeed, as a GA pilot you are more likely to die from you own careless
and reckless behavior. Unless of course you dispute NTSB findings. GA
pilots are a greater theat to each other in the traffic pattern than
Military flight ops. That's not screeching hyperbole, merely fact.
>Then, perhaps it's time the military started installing collision
>avoidance lighting (and REQUIRING ITS USE by military pilots) on its
>fighters which operate at high-speed below 10,000 feet.
You mean like the anti-collision beacon installed and REQUIRED to be
used by military pilots?
>The alternative is more midairs.
I'm more concerned with greater threat of driving to the airport.
Spoken as a guy that's been "dusted off" by Philippine AF F-5s in my
Cessna 150 and a guy that nearly split a Grumman Tiger from tail to
prop with the vertical stab of a Phantom...who now feels the biggest
aviation threat is a GA pilot at major airport.
Out of curiosity, are you aware that military pilots don't have to
have a valid FAA pilot's certificate?
Wizard of Draws
>
> Isn't see and avoid a 2-way street? Military aviators bear the same
> legal responsibility that GA pilots do and we adhere to it in the same
> way. You're assuming that, because we operate sometimes above the 250
> KIAS limit that we're an undue hazard and for some reason bear *more*
> collision avoidance responsibility than everyone else does.
>
Randy,
First, thanks for doing a difficult job that needs to be done, even
though I know how much you enjoy it and you'd probably pay to do it.
We're all jealous, I'm sure.
Second, pardon my butting in the middle, but I wanted to express my view
of the situation that occured.
F16's are designed to be difficult to see.
They are faster than us GA drivers.
They have radar.
They are much more maneuverable than us.
(There's more that I won't mention, you get the point.)
In my mind, each of these factors/advantages place a *greater* (not all
by any means) responsibility on the military pilot than on the GA pilot
to 'see & avoid'. Even if we see you, we have less maneuverability to
avoid you. You can pull what...9 G's? straight up to keep from
exchanging paint with me. I have to see you, almost instantly decide
which direction you are headed and choose some other relatively level
vector that insures we won't intersect.
I compare it to boating: the less maneuverable craft has the right of
way. You can't expect a tanker to give way to a speedboat.
Repectfully,
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino "Go Air Force"
http://www.wizardofdraws.com
http://www.cartoonclipart.com
Slips with Flaps T-shirt
http://www.wizardofdraws.com/main/flaps.html
BUFDRVR
>might also suggest that military aircraft be equipped with, and pilots
>be _required_ to use, TCAS or its equivalent while operating at
>high-speed below 10,000 feet.
Why don't you have a bake sale to pay for them. Do you think military funding
grows on trees ?
>Then, perhaps it's time the military started installing collision
>avoidance lighting (and REQUIRING ITS USE by military pilots) on its
>fighters which operate at high-speed below 10,000 feet.
you continually spout off as if you know the procedures we use. Do you know
that military aircraft below 10,000 *don't* turn on lighting ? I'll save you
the embarassment, according to 11-202 Vol. III, you are required to turn on
landing or taxi lights in flight below 10,000. In the BUFF its in our before
low level descent checklist as well as our normal descent checklist.
You've proven time and again to be completely devoid of facts on most matters
discussed here. Why don't you do some reading and we'll re-engage on this at a
later date ?
BUFDRVR
>valid information.
>
Now you're just getting ridiculous, all of those F-16 mishaps are either
mil-on-mil mid airs, engine failures or terrain impacts, not mid airs with GA
aircraft. OK, how many mil-on-GA aircraft mishaps have there been in the last
20 years ? Do you know ? I do, and in comparison to the amount of military and
GA flights daily, this is not a problem.
Randall Cumberworth
facts - some of these address other posts you have made.
First of all...
While flying the F-16 we DO use the radar for collision avoidance. It is
however not a perfect system as so many video games would have you believe.
False contacts, ground returns, co-channel interference from other radars in
the flight, picking up high speed cars on roads as low flying aircraft, etc.
It takes a great deal of training to be able to work the radar effectively
especially in a low altitude, high speed environment. It seems like in your
posts that you assume we aren't using the radar when below 10k. Nothing
could be further from the fact. Every day we avoid civilian aircraft with
the pilot of the civilian aircraft not knowing we even went by. Everyone
knows that a midair collision is one of the highest threats in peacetime.
It is a mandatory briefing item on every flight. Just because a report
doesn't mention that he wasn't using the radar doesn't mean he wasn't using
it.
Secondly, having an INS run by more than 10 miles can be extremely SA
degrading. You made it sound like system updates are easy. System updates
are fairly easy when the system is close. Trying to update a system that is
10 miles off is extremely difficult. For example you may have an update
point that is a road intersection or a peak on a hill, etc. If you are in
the ballpark it is easy, however, 10 miles away often times the best you can
do is know that your system is off and not mess anymore with it. The fact
of the matter is that usually the INS in the F-16 is extremely reliable and
while it is not unheard of for an INS to drift 10 nm, it normally doesn't
happen. As far as having his "slews" off by another 5 nm. I can only
speculate that this generally happens when your INS is extremely off and you
are trying to fix it. Also, FYI - when visually or radar updating the
position of the INS, the radar is not being used. It is either
ground-mapping a return or ranging off the ground to update the system.
TCAS... Not going to work. While it is great for Civilian airliners, it
will not work for a fighter. Basically the problem is that fighters go way
too fast and are turning to different headings with such frequency that it
would have a TCAS warning on almost all the time. TCAS was not designed for
fighter aircraft... period dot.
You mentioned that the military does nothing to assume responsibility for
threat to safety... Where do you get this info. We are constantly modifying
our departures / recoveries to avoid high traffic areas. Our base goes to
every local FBO to try to explain our local procedures to try to deconflict.
We brief visual lookout, collision avoidance, high traffic areas, etc.
before every ride. We hold routine safety meetings sharing info about near
misses to try to learn from each others mistakes.
Civilian flying is nothing like military aviation. It has been addressed in
previous posts so I won't go into much more detail other than give some
info. An F-16 pilot coming out of pilot training generally solos the F-16
in 5 to 6 rides. He spends the next 6 months learning how to employ the jet
/ learning the systems and tactics. Generally he will spend another year or
two before becoming a flight lead and another couple before becoming an
instructor. Needless to say there is much more going on than simply
navigating from point A to point B. I won't argue that sometimes these
tasks get misprioritized (another mandatory briefing item). I've lost more
than one friend that's hit the ground while staring into the radar or some
other system and has hit the ground. Bottom line we are all human and all
make mistakes. Your post that the military needs to assume all
responsibility is simply misinformed. We see civilian aircraft screwing up
everyday. Flying through restricted areas, not following clearances, etc.
Military aviators are extremely well trained. Much, much more than the
average civilian. Military aircraft are much less forgiving to inattention.
For example, in a Cessna, if you leave the throttle in-full you MAY get up
to another 15-20 knots in 30 seconds. In an F-16, you can easily be doing
500 knots.... and you won't even notice it. (Aircraft has very little wind
noise and auto-trims to stay level). Same thing can happen with the
throttle back in idle. Things like this generally happen when someone is
mis-prioritizing cockpit tasks... I'm not saying that's what happened
here...All I'm saying is that comparing civilian flying to military fling is
comparing apples to oranges.
Anticollision lights are on from prior to takeoff to after landing...
always. We can't even take off if it isn't working... The End of Runway
crews will send us back if it isn't functioning.... and the landing light is
attached to the gear. It isn't visible unless the gear is down, so that's
not an option on low-levels.
Fighter pilots are not what you see in the movies or on TV. They are
professional aviators that take pride in what they do. The days of breaking
rules just to have fun have long been gone. Stuff like that isn't tolerated
between pilots much less by the leadership. I'm not saying that stuff like
that doesn't happen.... it seems once a year we have some clown crash
in-front of his house or something, but it is definitely rare. They are
extremely well trained and obey the rules. (Yes... we are bound by the
FAR's). Generally they are amplified in our own instructions.
I'll accept any flames people want to throw (probably for my spelling and
grammar... but oh well... it's late). Anytime there is a mishap, it is
tragic... whether it be military or civilian. When you look at the
thousands of military and civilian flights daily, I'm frankly surprised we
haven't had more... not because of anything more than we are all human.
What we need to do is look at each one and try to learn from whatever
mistakes were made.
Lego
F-16 instructor pilot.
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:s6fV6.134972$mu1.27...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
> On 10 May 2001 12:49:06 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>
> >>How would you characterize the ability to 'see and avoid' (FAR 91.113
> >>(b)) at that speed?
> >
> >Just need a quicker scan then if you were at 250 KIAS.
>
> Can you explain how the 3 pilots involved in the subject fatal midair
> collision were each unable to see-and-avoid quickly enough to avert
> the collision? The failure of visual scan to prevent that "mishap"
> would seem inconsistent with your assertion above.
>
> Perhaps, now that we are in the 21st century, it is time to require
> military pilots to use the radar equipment that the citizens of this
> nation installed in military aircraft. The RESPONSIBILITY for those
> military operations which impose a hazard on the public MUST BE BORN
> BY THE MILITARY. Currently, the FAA regulates military operations in
> the NAS, but fails to place responsibility for their hazard squarely
> on military shoulders.
>
> This "accident" illustrates the hazard military high-speed low-level
> operations create for civil air safety . However, the military does
> nothing to assume responsibility for the threat to safety their
> operations cause. That is not just. Worse than that, it is stupid.
>
> The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
> collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
> FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
> knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best.
> :-)
>
> But, it gets better. The airlines have installed TCAS collision
> avoidance systems on their aircraft. TCAS relies on the transponder
> transmissions of other aircraft to determine their position, and if
> they are a collision threat. When a warning is necessary, TCAS issues
> evasive maneuver instructions based upon those transponder
> transmissions.
>
> Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
> TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
> effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
> daily, hourly, ....
>
> Wingmen, part of a formation flight, can trail the Flight Lead by over
> a mile, but they are intentionally prevented from displaying a target
> on ATC radar. That is unacceptable in the NAS on safety grounds, in
> my opinion.
>
> The time for military airspace reform is upon us now. I'm thinking
> along the lines of:
>
> The Jaques Oliver Memorial Military Airspace Reform Bill
>
> If the military will not police its operations, and the FAA will not
> hold them responsible for the hazards they create, then congress must.
>
>
>
> Story here:
> http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/06/pilot.crash/index.html
>
>
> >>Is it safe to rely on 'see and avoid' at 300
> >>knots in your opinion?
> >
> >Yes, absolutely.
> >
> >>Does scanning the windscreen for conflicting
> >>aircraft leave adequate time to attend to navigation when below 10,000
> >>feet at 300 knots?
> >
> >Need to have a quicker composite cross check, challenging for student
pilots in
> >SUPT, but it comes in time.
>
> How long does a full windscreen traffic scan take?
>
> How long does it take you to spot an F-16 against low-level ground
> clutter at 12'O clock and one mile? How frequently do you fail to see
> traffic called by ATC? We're both pilots. You know what I'm talking
> about.
>
> How long does it take to make navigational position checks? System
> checks? ...
>
> How much time do you have between full windscreen traffic scans before
> impact at 300 knots, 400 knots?
>
> Can you keep that up continually during the flight?
>
> Why not let the on-board electronics assist the pilot in collision
> avoidance? Does it have something to do with the legal liability that
> might imply?
>
> What is really fair?
>
> What is SUPT?
Randy Haskin
> They are faster than us GA drivers.
> They have radar.
> They are much more maneuverable than us.
> (There's more that I won't mention, you get the point.)
>
> In my mind, each of these factors/advantages place a *greater* (not all
> by any means) responsibility on the military pilot than on the GA pilot
> to 'see & avoid'. Even if we see you, we have less maneuverability to
> avoid you. You can pull what...9 G's? straight up to keep from
> exchanging paint with me. I have to see you, almost instantly decide
> which direction you are headed and choose some other relatively level
> vector that insures we won't intersect.
> I compare it to boating: the less maneuverable craft has the right of
> way. You can't expect a tanker to give way to a speedboat.
While I agree with your statements that the military fast movers are
the more maneuverable and harder to see aircraft (and right of way
rules do recognize maneuverability...remember "BGAAR"? Balloons,
Gliders, Airships, Aircraft, and Rotorcraft?), I don't see how this
makes us *more* responsible for see-and avoid. If you were buzzing
around in a Lancair IV and I were in the C-172 I fly on weekends,
you'd certainly be a lot faster and more maneuverable than I, yet we'd
still bear the same collision avoidance responsibility. What's the
difference?
As a couple of other military flyers have mentioned, I have also had
some close passes by GA aircraft who *never* saw me. As a fighter
pilot, I am specifically trained to have good visual lookout. One of
my greatest peacetime duties is to have my cranium on a swivel and
look outside for conflicts. I was also a private pilot before joining
the military and I *know* I didn't have the visual search skill and
discipline that I have now. Why, then, does nobody point any blame or
correction at the GA pilots?
It's a 2-way street, no matter how you look at it. IMHO.
Irish
whom and for what?
We both know, some/most of these restrictions is from our management
doing it to ourselves.
BUFDRVR wrote:
>
<<snip>>
>
> If you only knew of the numerous restictions placed on military airspace over
> just the last 5 years.....
>
<<snip>>
--
"Irish" -I speak for no one, no one speaks for me-
-Normal disclaimer's apply-
Remember the three R's:
Respect for self - Respect for others - Responsibility for all your
actions
NOTICE TO BULK E-MAILERS: Pursuant to US Code, Title 47, Chapter 5,
Subchapter II, 227, and all non-solicited commercial e-mail sent to
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Irish
Do you understand who determines that?
Why would it be a leap in logic that "it is possible to avoid
compliance"? In any government bureaucratic process it is possible to
avoid compliance.
--
Mike Rapoport
laws designed to prevent accidents and by mistakenly violating the same law,
is the difference between murder and manslaughter. It does not change who
was at fault.
Yes, it was an accident, but it was caused by the negligence of the F-16
pilot(s).
It is no different than if I run someone over in my car after I fail to see
a stop sign.
Mike
MU-2
"Randy Haskin" <str...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:ddcb5c20.01061...@posting.google.com...
Steven P. McNicoll
"BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20010612222002...@ng-fa1.aol.com...
>
> If you only knew of the numerous restictions placed on military airspace
over
> just the last 5 years.....
>
What is "military airspace"?
Wizard of Draws
>
> As a couple of other military flyers have mentioned, I have also had
> some close passes by GA aircraft who *never* saw me. As a fighter
> pilot, I am specifically trained to have good visual lookout. One of
> my greatest peacetime duties is to have my cranium on a swivel and
> look outside for conflicts. I was also a private pilot before joining
> the military and I *know* I didn't have the visual search skill and
> discipline that I have now. Why, then, does nobody point any blame or
> correction at the GA pilots?
>
> It's a 2-way street, no matter how you look at it. IMHO.
I won't argue one bit with you that it is a 2 way street. I have as much
responsibility to protect my own life as you do yours.
However, as I stated, I think that your superior a/c capabilities,
vastly greater training and experience mean a somewhat higher
accountability. In your Lancair scenario, I do think the Lancair has a
greater responsibility. Military has no bearing on my reasoning. I'm
relating my personal opinion, no more.
Remember, you guys have ejection seats. This means your probability of
survival probably approaches 100% in any incident with us. The danger to
your life is considerably smaller than ours. Surely you can understand
why I feel you have a greater obligation in this context.
Moreover, a government/military investigation has vested interest in
finding the GA pilot at fault. Look at the accident under discussion,
the GA pilot shouldered nearly all of the blame according to my
interpretation of the investigation so far. And as recent events in the
news have shown, we can't really trust our government to be completely
honest and forthcoming.
Visibility in a Cessna or Piper can't begin to compare to an F16. I
can't reasonably be expected to see 360 degrees, but you can.
Your "visual search skill and discipline" is by your own admission (and
mine) much better than mine. You fly much more than I do and I will
never even begin to approach your level of situational awareness.
Again, I am not looking to place all of the blame on the military in
every accident, just a reasonable apportionment between parties given
the advantages or disadvantages each has to comply with see & avoid.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino
C.D.Damron
Wizard of Draws wrote in message <3B2AA2...@mindspring.com>...
Wizard of Draws
The suvivability of the ejection in the accident under discussion, was
100%.
How many examples do we need to establish a viable statistic?
I'm not claiming to be an expert in the field, but the outcome of this
collision is pretty good emperical evidence to me.
Please note that I did say "probably" in my previous post. I've never
ejected from a plane and don't have any statistics at hand to venture
more than a guess. But I can safely state that an ejection seat is a
better alternative than none in an emergency, controlled or not.
Gord Beaman
Of course, but you're nitpicking here, Jeff is saying that the
ejection seat gives it's user so much more expectation of
survivability that the two aren't comparable. I agree with him.
--
Gord Beaman
PEI, Canada
BUFDRVR
IR Routes, VR Routes, bombing ranges and restricted areas.
As an example, we have a congressional noise complaint avoid area that just
popped up a little over a year ago in the middle of the Utah Test and Training
Range. My way of thinking goes if you decide to build a house (looks like a
rather large farm/ranch) on/near a bombing range you deal with the noise that
comes with it. Apparently that's not so. When I first started flying the BUFF 6
years ago there were at least a dozen IR routes we could go to. Today there are
less then 6, the others were closed due to noise complaints.
Walter Bjorneby
that kill dozens at a time? I can think of 3, offhand, 2 in
California and one over New York City.
And the GA 'lost souls' who wander through an active bombing
range, even through the dive bomb pattern . . .
Change of topic - visual search - a search of a 3-9:00 zone is
not required because of relative speed. The faster the speed
ratio, the smaller the 'collision hazard cone' becomes. Also,
the often-quoted acquisition ranges are for 'naive' searchers. I
would have expected to see a GA aircraft at low altitude well in
excess of 3 miles. After all, that's what keeps a fighter pilot
alive in combat. I had friends who could spot a 104 (rather
smaller than an f16) at 10 miles head-on at altitude. It was a
challenge going against them because my eyes were 'only' 20-15.
All that said - the F16 pilot screwed up. And a 'heads-up' went
out to the fighter community.
BTW - it is rare for an ejection seat to do any good in a
mid-air. Usually the impact is so violent no one survives.
That's one of the reasons a combined visual/radar search is used
by 'aware' crews. Radar for long range, visual inside 10 miles.
As for ground radar alerts, I can recall being advised by ATC
"opposite traffic 12 o'clock 3 miles..." while cruising at 540
KIAS at 35000 feet. 3 miles at 1000 Kts = 11 seconds . . .
Walt BJ
Randy Haskin
> Of course, but you're nitpicking here, Jeff is saying that the
> ejection seat gives it's user so much more expectation of
> survivability that the two aren't comparable. I agree with him.
So is this meant to imply that, because military fighter and trainer
aircraft have ejection seats and are more "survivable" in the event of
a midair, that they bear more responsibility than GA aircraft?
Wizard of Draws
>
> > Of course, but you're nitpicking here, Jeff is saying that the
> > ejection seat gives it's user so much more expectation of
> > survivability that the two aren't comparable. I agree with him.
>
> So is this meant to imply that, because military fighter and trainer
> aircraft have ejection seats and are more "survivable" in the event of
> a midair, that they bear more responsibility than GA aircraft?
Randy, I think you're reading too much into my posts, or perhaps I'm not
expressing myself clearly.
Primarily, the facts of each accident will determine who's at fault.
That's the way it should be. Military status should make no difference.
*But*... in an instance where a military pilot is involved and it is
difficult to ascertain exactly who was at fault, the numerous advantages
given to the F16 pilot over the Cessna give me reason to think that the
F16 pilot was *more* negligent in his duties.
By my thinking, an F16 pilot has more advantages that have to be
discarded, ignored or not implemented in order to be involved in the
first place.
Respectfully,
Larry Dighera
Thanks for your input. I'll post a proper reply later, but I have to
call your attention to the following:
On Fri, 15 Jun 2001 05:58:55 GMT, "Randall Cumberworth"
<leg...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>It seems like in your
>posts that you assume we aren't using the radar when below 10k. Nothing
>could be further from the fact.
If you read the Air Force accident report, you'll see that there is no
mention made of Flight Lead Parker using radar for collision avoidance
or anything else. There is no mention of the Air Force directives
requiring it either. What's up?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Yes, it was an accident, but it was caused by the negligence of the F-16
>pilot(s).
If you read the Air Force accident report, you'll find that Parker's
INS was displaying his location ~10 miles behind his actual position.
He must have been aware that he was above Tampa Class B airspace when
he made the decision to descend into it without ATC clearance. I find
it impossible to believe that Parker could have been unaware that he
was still over the Class B airspace. It was a clear day. He may not
have known his exact position, but his INS was telling him that he was
only ~15 miles from the core airport. His decision to descend was not
an accident, he just gambled that he could get away with it in the big
sky and lost.
(Actually, he hasn't lost much, yet. He still has his rank and
pension, thanks to BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN W. ROSA JR.
<http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/rosa_jw.html> commander, 347th
Rescue Wing, Moody Air Force Base, Ga.)
Larry Dighera
wrote:
[Regarding see-and-avoid]
>It's a 2-way street, no matter how you look at it. IMHO.
The street is not quite equally divided. :-)
On the one hand you have slow moving civil aircraft operating well
below 250 knots, the speed the FAA chose as the de facto limit below
10,000 feet. On the other hand you have (virtually unlit) military
operations below 10,000 feet routinely in excess of 300 knots,
invoking the FAR 91.117(d) exemption.
Given the physical fact that successful see-and-avoid separation
relies upon the time it takes a pilot to scan for conflicting traffic,
the HIGH-SPEED MILITARY TRAFFIC IMPOSE THE NECESSITY OF INCREASING THE
AMOUNT OF TIME A PILOT MUST BUDGET FOR DECONFLICTION. This has the
effect of either reducing the remaining time a pilot has available for
attention to other duties, or more likely results in inadequate time
spent attending to rapid deconfliction windscreen scans.
Because of this military disruption in the low-level aerial
environment, the military should shoulder the hazard their high-speed
operations below 10,000 feet impose on the civil airspace users who
are operating in compliance with FAR 91.117(a).
It is clear from the table below that in the case of this "mishap"
[sic], the late Cessna pilot's available time to see-and-avoid was
unexpectedly reduced very significantly due to the high-speed of the
military F-16s:
Time Until Impact
Closing-speed Feet Per Second At 3,250 Foot Distance
------------- --------------- ----------------------
250 knots 417 feet per second 7.8 seconds
300 knots 500 feet per second 6.5 seconds
350 knots 583 feet per second 5.6 seconds
400 knots 667 feet per second 4.9 seconds
480 knots 800 feet per second 4.1 seconds
So, while see-and-avoid may be a 2-way street, requiring the equal
participation of all pilots, the LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY for the
increased time budget for deconfliction imposed by high-speed military
operations below 10,000 feet SHOULD BE BORN BY THOSE AIRCRAFT
OPERATING UNDER FAR 91.117(d) EXEMPTION. Further, there should be an
FAA REQUIREMENT to increase their conspicuity (lighting) to attempt to
reduce the hazard they impose on other airspace users. And, given the
extremely short time available for high closing rates, there should be
an FAA REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTRONIC AUGMENTATION TO HUMAN SIGHT FOR FAR
91.117(d) OPERATIONS.
Larry Dighera
<wal...@oneimage.com> wrote:
>Misplaced indignation - how about the GA/airliner collisions
>that kill dozens at a time? I can think of 3, offhand, 2 in
>California and one over New York City.
Are you trying to imply that because other types of accidents occur,
the subject accident is acceptable?
>And the GA 'lost souls' who wander through an active bombing
>range, even through the dive bomb pattern . . .
Yes?
>Change of topic - visual search - a search of a 3-9:00 zone is
>not required because of relative speed. The faster the speed
>ratio, the smaller the 'collision hazard cone' becomes.
This is TRUE ONLY FOR THE FASTER AIRCRAFT! Try to see the problem
from both sides.
>Also,
>the often-quoted acquisition ranges are for 'naive' searchers. I
>would have expected to see a GA aircraft at low altitude well in
>excess of 3 miles. After all, that's what keeps a fighter pilot
>alive in combat.
But, I'll bet you don't expect the GA pilot so see you at 3 miles.
>I had friends who could spot a 104 (rather
>smaller than an f16) at 10 miles head-on at altitude. It was a
>challenge going against them because my eyes were 'only' 20-15.
>All that said - the F16 pilot screwed up. And a 'heads-up' went
>out to the fighter community.
You superior fighter pilots are going to have to face the fact that at
low level you are sharing non-positive-control airspace with mere
mortals, and give us a chance to see you comin'. :-)
Randy Haskin
> On the one hand you have slow moving civil aircraft operating well
> below 250 knots, the speed the FAA chose as the de facto limit below
> 10,000 feet. On the other hand you have (virtually unlit) military
> operations below 10,000 feet routinely in excess of 300 knots,
> invoking the FAR 91.117(d) exemption.
I still don't get how we're "virtually unlit" just because we don't
have a landing light on in flight. The F-15 I fly has three flashing
red anticollision beacons as well as the standard red, green, and
white position lights on the wingtips and tails. In case you hadn't
counted, that's one to two lights *more* than most general aviation
aircraft and certainly well within the legal requirements. Tell me
again how we're underilluminated?
> the LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY for the
> increased time budget for deconfliction imposed by high-speed military
> operations below 10,000 feet SHOULD BE BORN BY THOSE AIRCRAFT
> OPERATING UNDER FAR 91.117(d) EXEMPTION. Further, there should be an
> FAA REQUIREMENT to increase their conspicuity (lighting) to attempt to
> reduce the hazard they impose on other airspace users. And, given the
> extremely short time available for high closing rates, there should be
> an FAA REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTRONIC AUGMENTATION TO HUMAN SIGHT FOR FAR
> 91.117(d) OPERATIONS.
I still assert that this is a completely superfluous legal
recommendation. As I mentioned in my earlier post, it would make a
radar-equipped aircraft on which the radar is not functional unable to
fly at a safe airspeed below 10,000 feet.
To digress a moment, that's what we're talking about here, remember?
The FAR exemption is for aircraft who's SAFE OPERATING AIRSPEED is
greater than 250 KIAS. I can tell you for a fact that in the F-15
that I'm a complete pig at 250 knots...that's my gear speed, for
cryin' out loud. A C-172 probably has just as much...or
more...maneuverability at it's average cruise speed (I'm guessing
100-120 KIAS) as the Eagle does below 250 KIAS.
Anyway, regarding requiring "electronic augmentation" (e.g. radar
use)...what does that mean for aircraft like the T-38 and others that
have no air to air radar? Does it mean they're no longer allowed to
fly under the proposed law? If it's okay for *them* to fly sans
radar, then why couldn't I do it in the Eagle, since the performance
is similiar?
I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this one until you have a
chance to walk in my shoes. You haven't met a group of pilots who is
more cognizent of midair collision danger than fighter pilots. Nobody
is more *scared* of GA pilots than we are -- we treat them like
threats, call them out on the radio like threats, and maneuver away
accordingly. I think the average 100 hour VFR-only Cessna driver is
several times more the midair collision risk as your average 400 hour
fighter pilot.
It's tragic when things like midairs occur, but kneejerk reactions and
imposing new laws on the "big guy" aren't the right fix.
Lego
comment about the mishap directly.
Like I said before... Just because the accident report didn't mention that
he was using his radar doesn't mean he wasn't. Midair collision is briefed
in detail... before every flight. We talk about using the radar, search
responsibilities - both radar and visual. I know it may be hard for you to
believe but we are much more conscious of mid air collisions than the
average general aviation type... or at least I am now. Generally when we
brief radar search we brief for everyone to "search in the notch" whenever
flying to / from airspace. This basically provides a search volume directly
in front of the aircraft. Even to our students I brief for them to call out
any traffic within 20 nm and within 5k of our altitude (Again... the radar
isn't something easy to operate especially while flying... and they rarely
until possibly almost completion of the course will be able to do this).
Any traffic inside 10 nm if I haven't targeted the traffic I will let the
wingman direct the flight around the traffic. Anything within 5 nm, I'll
have the flight expand the formation so any individual aircraft has room to
maneuver and all we are doing is visual lookout. This is what is generally
briefed before EVERY sortie. While going to and from our areas we are
constantly calling out traffic anyone sees outside. I really think you have
the impression that we are just flying around doing whatever we want without
regard for midair collision avoidance. I personally think this is one of
the highest threats. We use the radar because we don't want to die either.
The fact of the matter is like I described above, the radar (and us) aren't
perfect. Additionally the radar isn't optimized for slow GA aircraft. I
myself have had a couple of near misses even when center was calling out
traffic and I couldn't get it on radar. Everyone I know has. And as far as
speed goes... I feel much safer going 300 than 250. At 250 knots... we have
almost zero maneuverability (depends on our configuration). It is much
increased at 300. On departures and until the flight is joined up we fly
350 (even heavier with a full load of gas.)That's why we have the exception.
The added maneuverability is much more beneficial than the reduction in
reaction time. You may not believe me... it seems everyone who hasn't flown
military aircraft in this group cites tons of material to the contrary.. but
it is the truth.
One thing to remember is that the guys flying fighters aren't doing this for
fun. (Don't get me wrong... it is incredibly fun)... but we are training on
every sortie. Training that is essential. We haven't dominated every
conflict in the last 10 years just because of technology. It's also the
intense training every pilot in the USAF has. Every single ride we have has
specific training objectives which we brief and debrief to.
Hope this helps.
Lego
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:luAX6.1087$c7.5...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>It's tragic when things like midairs occur, but kneejerk reactions and
>imposing new laws on the "big guy" aren't the right fix.
What is the "right fix?"
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message news:<LiFX6.27$c7.8...@typhoon.we.rr.com>...
[snip]
>> the LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY for the
>> increased time budget for deconfliction imposed by high-speed military
>> operations below 10,000 feet SHOULD BE BORN BY THOSE AIRCRAFT
>> OPERATING UNDER FAR 91.117(d) EXEMPTION. Further, there should be an
>> FAA REQUIREMENT to increase their conspicuity (lighting) to attempt to
>> reduce the hazard they impose on other airspace users. And, given the
>> extremely short time available for high closing rates, there should be
>> an FAA REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTRONIC AUGMENTATION TO HUMAN SIGHT FOR FAR
>> 91.117(d) OPERATIONS.
>
>I still assert that this is a completely superfluous legal
>recommendation.
Would you care to share your line of reasoning for that statement the
way I did?
>As I mentioned in my earlier post, it would make a
>radar-equipped aircraft on which the radar is not functional unable to
>fly at a safe airspeed below 10,000 feet.
Are you implying that the military shouldn't shoulder the liability
for the hazard they cause civil aviation because they wouldn't be able
to fly with inoperative equipment aboard? That'w what it sounds like.
>To digress a moment, that's what we're talking about here, remember?
>The FAR exemption is for aircraft who's SAFE OPERATING AIRSPEED is
>greater than 250 KIAS. I can tell you for a fact that in the F-15
>that I'm a complete pig at 250 knots...that's my gear speed, for
>cryin' out loud. A C-172 probably has just as much...or
>more...maneuverability at it's average cruise speed (I'm guessing
>100-120 KIAS) as the Eagle does below 250 KIAS.
So, you feel that the F-16 above its minimum safe cruise speed (300
knots) possesses superior maneuverability to a Cessna 172?
>Anyway, regarding requiring "electronic augmentation" (e.g. radar
>use)...
The electronics doesn't necessarily have to be radar based; TCAS comes
to mind. Others have pointed out that TCAS would be ineffective, and
radar would require full-time monitoring and interpretation. Perhaps
something new can be developed along the lines of inexpensive TCAS
that would be suitable for high-speed military use.
[snip]
>I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this one until you have a
>chance to walk in my shoes. You haven't met a group of pilots who is
>more cognizent of midair collision danger than fighter pilots.
I guess that you aren't referring to Parker now that he's retired. He
certainly seemed cavalier about operating in Class B airspace without
even talking to ATC, at speeds in excess of ~440 knots.
>Nobody
>is more *scared* of GA pilots than we are -- we treat them like
>threats, call them out on the radio like threats, and maneuver away
>accordingly.
You may. Parker didn't.
>I think the average 100 hour VFR-only Cessna driver is
>several times more the midair collision risk as your average 400 hour
>fighter pilot.
Why?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>I have read the report... and because I'm in the Air Force I won't / can't
>comment about the mishap directly.
>
>Like I said before... Just because the accident report didn't mention that
>he was using his radar doesn't mean he wasn't.
The Air Force report is VERY COMPLETE. It is difficult to imagine
that the Ninja pilots weren't asked if they were using radar for
deconfliction at the time. If it would have tended to support
Parker's diligence, I would expect the invistigator(s) to have
included it in their report.
>Midair collision is briefed
>in detail... before every flight. We talk about using the radar, search
>responsibilities - both radar and visual.
It seems Parker failed to do that, and a lot of things which the Air
Force requires:
1. Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B and
Class C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the flight
briefing. Air Force directives REQUIRE the flight lead to brief
applicable airspace restrictions.
2. Canceled IFR with Miami Center.
3. Declined flight following service.
4. Erroneously thought he was given frequency 362.35 by Miami Center
and attempted to contact Tampa Approach Control there.
5. Failed to obtain REQUIRED ATC clearance from Tampa Approach for
entry into the Tampa Class B airspace.
6. Failed to establish REQUIRED two-way radio communications with
Tampa Approach Control prior to entering Sarasota Class C airspace.
7. Failed to adequately deconflict flight path (Air Force training
manuals emphasize that flight path deconfliction is a critical task,
one that can never be ignored without catastrophic consequences.)
8. Lost situational awareness.
9. Failed to recognize a significant 9 to 11 nautical mile position
error in his aircraft's Inertial Navigation System.
10. Did not crosscheck the INS accuracy with other systems.
11. Parker failed to notice the degradation in INS system accuracy.
The system showed a navigational system accuracy of 'medium', which
eventually degraded to 'low' prior to the collision.
12. Unintentional cursor slew bias input by the pilot. A crosscheck
of system indications is REQUIRED so that unintentional slews are
recognized and zeroed out. Parker didn't bother to perform the
REQUIRED crosscheck.
12. Failed to recognize a cursor slew bias in his ground attack
steering.
14. Mis-prioritization of tasks.
15. Parker had a normal post-mishap physical examination on 24
November 2000, 8-days after his flight killed Jacques Olivier!
>I know it may be hard for you to
>believe but we are much more conscious of mid air collisions than the
>average general aviation type...
As you have presented NO EVIDENCE to support your belief, I remain
unconvinced.
>or at least I am now.
Do you mean to say, now that you've read this accident report?
[Merciless snip of useful first hand information]
>Hope this helps.
>
>Lego
More information is always useful. Thank you for your effort to
present the military's viewpoint.
Randy Haskin
> Would you care to share your line of reasoning for that statement the
> way I did?
Sure -- I think it's over-regulatory and completely pointless to
mandate common sense. Using radars for collision avoidance is
something fighters practice day in and day out and doesn't need
federal law to make occur. Even worse, it would be overly restrictive
(see below) for aircraft with inoperative or malfunctioning systems.
> Are you implying that the military shouldn't shoulder the liability
> for the hazard they cause civil aviation because they wouldn't be able
> to fly with inoperative equipment aboard? That'w what it sounds like.
You're begging the question on this one. First, you've never offered
any proof for your argument that military operations in excess of 250
KIAS below 10,000' pose any more hazard than other aircraft
operations, civil or military. Charts showing vision scan time and
pickup ranges accompanied by the report of *one* accident and *one*
close call in Europe DO NOT make a logical argument. I asked what the
figures were comparing mil-on-mil midairs to mil-on-civil midairs to
civil-on-civil midairs (which I think would at least provide some sort
of statistical baseline to form a hypothesis), yet you didn't take the
time to furnish them. The burden of proof is on *you* to prove why
these operations pose an undue hazard on the "other" users of below
10K airspace because the FAA, ICAO, and the DoD do not see it that
way. Because you haven't proven an undue hazard, there's no reason
for any increased responsibility.
Second, yes it absolutely IS overly regulatory and overly restrictive
to not allow fighters with inoperative radars to fly, as your proposed
"law" would mandate. I'll say this a third time: my F-15 with a dead
radar is EXACTLY the same as a T-38, yet under your proposal the
"white rocket" would be allowed to fly and the Eagle would not. That
simply does not pass the common sense test to begin with and it does
nothing to decrease the "hazard" you assert military fast movers
impose on GA and commercial aircraft. T-38s have been whipping around
at 300 KIAS below 10K WITHOUT RADARS and WITH STUDENT PILOTS IN
COMMAND since the 1960s. I haven't seen a whole lot of midairs caused
by that practice -- have you? By your logic, there should be dead
bodies and smoking craters littering the southern US from this
"hazard." Even more, if you grounded every radar-equipped fast mover
with a partly or fully inoperative radar, we'd get very little flying
done. That's a fact...maintenance these days is bad. There's no
spare parts in the pipeline and, even if there were, there's no money
in the O&M budget to buy them. Until the gravy train rolls into town
with a serious infusion of cash, I don't see it changing soon. I also
forsee a lot of jets with inop radars continuing to fly around.
Radar use is a good idea -- it's something we use pretty religiously.
I don't know of any other pilot, nor have I seen a post from any other
fighter pilot, who feels otherwise. Extracting from an accident
report that radar isn't used because it didn't explicitly say in there
that they *did* is again pretty shoddy logic. Remember, radar is not
magic. I challenge you to see a Cessna *in the beam* travelling at
100 KIAS on any average fighter radar if you're not spending all your
time and attention on it. I could if I was lucky and watching on the
correct bar scan. Could you?
Again, it's a good idea, but it's a stupid idea for a law.
> So, you feel that the F-16 above its minimum safe cruise speed (300
> knots) possesses superior maneuverability to a Cessna 172?
No, I'm saying that every airplane has a safe cruise/maneuvering
airspeed which allows that aircraft adequate performance to maneuver.
For a C-172, that's probably somewhere in the 90-110 KIAS range. For
the Eagle that's somewhere in the 300-350 range. There's nothing
magic about 250 KIAS -- that's why there's a waiver.
> The electronics doesn't necessarily have to be radar based; TCAS comes
> to mind. Others have pointed out that TCAS would be ineffective, and
> radar would require full-time monitoring and interpretation. Perhaps
> something new can be developed along the lines of inexpensive TCAS
> that would be suitable for high-speed military use.
Again, nice idea, but not feasable. We're flying war machines that
were designed with avionics specifically designed for our individual
missions. It's not as simple as "bolting on" a TCAS system (like what
the Navy did with the T-34C they use in training) -- new pieces of
avionics in jets like the Viper, Eagle, and Hornet have to be
integrated with the current avionics suite. Then, they have to be
tested, modified, and retested.
All of this takes time and money AWAY from our primary job of
maintaining and improving war machines. As mentioned earlier, there's
not even enough money to purchase major aircraft parts that are
broken, much less new avionics.
> I guess that you aren't referring to Parker now that he's retired. He
> certainly seemed cavalier about operating in Class B airspace without
> even talking to ATC, at speeds in excess of ~440 knots.
How is it that you extracted that he was "cavalier" from an Air Force
safety report? You have mentioned a number of times that he was
*knowingly* flying in a Class B airspace, that he was *intentionally*
not talking to that sector's controller, and that he was *negligently*
flying at a higher airspeed. What facts are you looking at, because
none of the ones I've read say any of that.
> >I think the average 100 hour VFR-only Cessna driver is
> >several times more the midair collision risk as your average 400 hour
> >fighter pilot.
>
> Why?
I can personally compare my clearing skills as a 100 hour private
pilot to my current skills as a 600 hour F-15E pilot, and I can tell
you that I have a significantly higher level of situational awareness.
I have a visual lookout habit pattern and I have been trained on what
to look for. A relatively low-time private pilot may be vigilant and
he may have a habit pattern, but I bet I could pick up a 10-mile tally
ho about 5 miles before s/he could.
Does that mean I should shoulder more responsibility?
No. The FAA gave that guy his wings, indicating they found his tested
skill level commensurate with being rated a private pilot. The FAA
gave me the same. That pretty much puts us squarely back in the "it's
a 2-way street" arena.
BUFDRVR
>Force requires:
<snip list of 14 things *you* think Parker did wrong>
Interesting that none of those would have been "fixed" flying 250 KIAS.
Lego
change your mind about any of it... The problem with this newsgroup is that
there really is so few true people in the military resources here. As far
as evidence goes... you have 1 mishap report that you are basing an awful
lot of conclusions from.
Let me just summarize my final points.
You are having a difficult time believing that he was using his radar. Did
you know that the radar is always on while flying. It is turned on before
takeoff and turned off after landing. It is always in sweep mode unless you
command a radar lock in which case it is still generally in a sweep mode
until Single Target Track is commanded. It isn't something that you press a
button and get a picture... it is always displaying a picture. You simply
look at the display to see contacts. Yes you have to run cursors over
histories to get an altitude of a target... but it is always on. It doesn't
get turned off. Yes, it is possible to dork up your scope to where you are
searching way above or below your current altitude, but again.. generally we
fly with it in the notch when coming or going to airspace (searching
directly in front of the aircraft). Interpreting the scope is a different
matter (see above post). It requires a great deal of training and targets
can be missed. (especially slow moving low flying aircraft for which the
radar isn't optimized) The radar isn't magic... it isn't like a video game.
The radar will sweep until ... 1- The air to ground radar is selected. This
is used to update the system. 2 - A visual fix is being updated . We don't
fly in air to ground mode as it is worthless unless you are updating your
system or doing some kind of weapon employment. It is a fact that the
radar is always on. Ask any F-16 pilot.
When I say that we are more conscious about midair collision avoidance than
the average civilian you say we've offered no evidence. Again, does the
average civilian brief midair collision avoidance before every sortie.
(required). Does the average civilian brief task saturation /
prioritization before every flight. (required). We discuss these not only
before every flight, but during pilot meetings (within the squadron) and at
quarterly safety meetings (whole wing). When I said that I "at least I am
now" more concerned with midair collision avoidance I was referring to when
I was flying light aircraft. While I only had about 250 hours, I would say
that I was your typical general aviation pilot. I am much much more
concerned about it now. I can only offer that when we talk at the bar just
about every pilot I knows feels this way. I'm not saying that civilians
aren't as concerned... but on average, your fighter pilot goes to a lot more
lengths and has a lot more information before he even steps to the jet.
You continually site the findings of the report. Try finding out more about
some of them before throwing spears. i.e do you know anything about
updating a system, cursor slews, INS reporting medium to low... etc. I
tried to give a couple of examples in my earlier post. You can't compare
the workload in the cockpit in general aviation to that of a fighter. I've
stated before but fighters are much much much less forgiving to
misprioritization, task saturation, and yes... low situational awareness,
etc. Often times reports / the media / etc state something a fighter pilot
did which sounds terrible but could be a very common mistake, especially
given the circumstances.. Ask me how many times I've missed an attack
because I erroneously put a slew into my system. I'm not saying this had
anything to do with the mishap. All I'm saying is that unless you know what
that is / means / happens / how often it happens / how to correct it, you
can't draw conclusions from it, or at least as strongly as conclusions as
you have.
Finally, I'm sorry I can't address the accident directly but kind of dance
around the issues. Every mishap is terrible, and there is something to be
learned from each one.
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:nYRX6.3607$c7.7...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Larry Dighera
On Wed, 20 Jun 2001 04:20:45 GMT, "Lego" <leg...@earthlink.net>
wrote:
>It's clear you've made up your mind about the mishap... and I doubt I can
>change your mind about any of it...
It is my belief that there came a time when Parker had to descend to
reach the MTR start point, or admit that he had lost situational
awareness. At that instant, he chose to descend into Class B airspace
without the REQUIRED ATC clearance, rather than confess his confusion.
This would have been consistent with Parker's failure to perform all
the other REQUIRED items/checks he failed to accomplish on the
"mishap" sortie.
The Air Force AIB failed to find Parker responsible for his reckless
acts, and the death of the civilian Parker flew his wingman into.
That is unjust. It won't help in changing the unsafe military
practices which are still occurring everyday.
Someone needs to bring these hazardous practices to the attention of
the public, so that the military will be forced to make changes in its
high-speed low-level operational procedures.
>As far as evidence goes... you have 1 mishap report that you are
>basing an awful lot of conclusions from.
The topic of this thread is the fatal midair collision in which a
military F-16 pilot failed to adhere to the military and civil
directives and regulations, went unpunished, retained his rank and
pension, and escaped legal responsibility for his deadly act.
One death is too many. No action has been taken to correct the
circumstances that lead to the "mishap". The military is obviously
unwilling to police its ranks by admitting fault in this "mishap", but
instead finds fault with the ATP rated pilot of a light aircraft which
they turned into road-kill in the sky. I find this brazen military
arrogance offensive.
In my mind, Parker's actions are taken as typical of the "Top Gun"
(the movie) military pilot mentality which other high visibility
"mishaps" have illustrated is prevalent today.
>Let me just summarize my final points.
>
>You are having a difficult time believing that he was using his radar. Did
>you know that the radar is always on while flying. It is turned on before
>takeoff and turned off after landing. It is always in sweep mode unless you
>command a radar lock in which case it is still generally in a sweep mode
>until Single Target Track is commanded. It isn't something that you press a
>button and get a picture... it is always displaying a picture. You simply
>look at the display to see contacts. Yes you have to run cursors over
>histories to get an altitude of a target... but it is always on. It doesn't
>get turned off. Yes, it is possible to dork up your scope to where you are
>searching way above or below your current altitude, but again.. generally we
>fly with it in the notch when coming or going to airspace (searching
>directly in front of the aircraft). Interpreting the scope is a different
>matter (see above post). It requires a great deal of training and targets
>can be missed. (especially slow moving low flying aircraft for which the
>radar isn't optimized) The radar isn't magic... it isn't like a video game.
>The radar will sweep until ... 1- The air to ground radar is selected. This
>is used to update the system. 2 - A visual fix is being updated . We don't
>fly in air to ground mode as it is worthless unless you are updating your
>system or doing some kind of weapon employment. It is a fact that the
>radar is always on. Ask any F-16 pilot.
So, you are saying that Parker was unable to avail himself of any
assistance from his radar while rocketing through congested airspace
in excess of ~400 knots sans ATC clearance, but his intense military
training and super human skills were adequate to maintain flight
safety. The facts disagree.
>When I say that we are more conscious about midair collision avoidance than
>the average civilian you say we've offered no evidence.
Because high-speed low-level military aircraft operations are so much
more dangerous than normal civil operations, I would expect nothing
less. I'd venture to say, that most civil pilots are unaware of the
hazard high-speed low-level military operations introduce into the
NAS. They are not informed by the FAA of this hazard. The military
isn't making any attempt to advertize the public safety hazard they
cause. It's a dirty little secret, that the military thinks it can
hide by obscurity, and superior training. It's not working.
>Again, does the average civilian brief midair collision avoidance
>before every sortie. (required).
I always burn a landing light in congested airspace; does the military
do ANYTHING to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft operating at
high-speed low-level beyond that required in the regulations? Given
the fact that military operations are increasing the hazard to air
safety, one would expect the military to make an effort to offset the
life threatening hazard to the public they create.
>Does the average civilian brief task saturation /
>prioritization before every flight. (required). We discuss these not only
>before every flight, but during pilot meetings (within the squadron) and at
>quarterly safety meetings (whole wing).
Does the military airman who fails to perform the REQUIRED items get
held responsible for the fatal results of his omissions? Does the
military make any attempt to prevent repetition of the "mishap"
scenario? Does the military accept the responsibility for the hazard
its high-speed low-level operations creates, and voluntarily implement
enhanced conspicuity measures? Or, does the military attempt to sweep
the matter under the carpet?
>When I said that I "at least I am
>now" more concerned with midair collision avoidance I was referring to when
>I was flying light aircraft. While I only had about 250 hours, I would say
>that I was your typical general aviation pilot. I am much much more
>concerned about it now.
Were you aware of the hazard military high-speed low-level operations
posed to civil aircraft BEFORE you entered the military? Did you have
anywhere near the appreciation of the risk they pose when you had 250
hours?
>I can only offer that when we talk at the bar just
>about every pilot I knows feels this way.
Which way, more concerned about midair collisions than they were when
they were civil pilots?
>I'm not saying that civilians
>aren't as concerned... but on average, your fighter pilot goes to a lot more
>lengths and has a lot more information before he even steps to the jet.
The pilot of an aircraft which is capable of supersonic flight and is
routinely operated at high-speed among civil aircraft operating at
speeds many times slower, should go to greater lengths to assure
safety, because it he who creates the hazard, not the civil pilot
operating within the de facto speed limit.
>You continually site [sic] the findings of the report.
The subject of the report is the subject of this thread.
>Try finding out more about some of them before throwing spears.
I'm trying to gain more information about military operations by
posing questions in this newsgroup. I research the cited references
contained in the responses when provided.
I'm sorry you find my comments to be combative, but I feel there is
injustice being routinely committed by the military. When the
military makes an effort to sheathe it's spears, which kill innocent
civilians, I'll reduce the pitch of my rhetoric. Until then, I'll be
calling attention to their unsafe practices at EVERY OPPORTUNITY.
>i.e do you know anything about
>updating a system, cursor slews, INS reporting medium to low... etc. I
>tried to give a couple of examples in my earlier post. You can't compare
>the workload in the cockpit in general aviation to that of a fighter. I've
>stated before but fighters are much much much less forgiving to
>misprioritization, task saturation, and yes... low situational awareness,
>etc. Often times reports / the media / etc state something a fighter pilot
>did which sounds terrible but could be a very common mistake, especially
>given the circumstances.. Ask me how many times I've missed an attack
>because I erroneously put a slew into my system. I'm not saying this had
>anything to do with the mishap. All I'm saying is that unless you know what
>that is / means / happens / how often it happens / how to correct it, you
>can't draw conclusions from it, or at least as strongly as conclusions as
>you have.
So, you're saying that despite the fact that the military chooses to
operate its supersonic fighter aircraft at high-speed in airspace
congested with civilian air traffic (and fails to enhance the
conspicuity of those meteoric operations), that because the high
workload imposed on the military pilot virtually saturates his
piloting resources, he is operating more safely than civil pilots?
Parker's cursor slew error was nearly irrelevant in causing this
accident. It may have slightly contributed to his loss of situational
awareness, but it was Parker's decision to descend into congested
airspace contrary to regulations which caused the death of an innocent
civilian pilot.
>Finally, I'm sorry I can't address the accident directly but kind of dance
>around the issues. Every mishap is terrible, and there is something to be
>learned from each one.
What has been learned from this one? What is the result of that
enlightenment?
Larry Dighera
>>It seems Parker failed to do that, and a lot of things which the Air
>>Force requires:
>
><snip list of 14 things *you* think Parker did wrong>
The list was derived (virtually verbatim) from the Air Force accident
report. The AIB is the one responsible for crediting Parker with the
items in that list.
8. Lost situational awareness.
14. Mis-prioritization of tasks.
>Interesting that none of those would have been "fixed" flying 250 KIAS.
True. Unfortunately, it took retirement to "fix" Parker.
I find it curious that Parker's post-mishap physical examination took
place 8 days after the "mishap" sortie. Wouldn't it have been more
likely to detect substance abuse if it had been conducted immediately
after the collision? Or, is that the reason it was delayed for a
week, to give his system a chance to clear itself?
Lego
> place 8 days after the "mishap" sortie. Wouldn't it have been more
> likely to detect substance abuse if it had been conducted immediately
> after the collision? Or, is that the reason it was delayed for a
> week, to give his system a chance to clear itself?
After every Class A mishap, bloodwork is taken.. immediately.
Lego
F-16 Instructor Pilot
Lego
[snip]
> The Air Force AIB failed to find Parker responsible for his reckless
> acts, and the death of the civilian Parker flew his wingman into.
> That is unjust. It won't help in changing the unsafe military
> practices which are still occurring everyday.
[snip]
> Someone needs to bring these hazardous practices to the attention of
> the public, so that the military will be forced to make changes in its
> high-speed low-level operational procedures.
Again... you are looking at 1 mishap report... 1 report. Saying that
"unsafe military practices" and "these hazardous practices" is hardly
justified when you look at the number of military flights per day over the
last 50 or so years of jet aircraft flying. How many civilian midairs have
there been during this time? How many military vs civilian midairs have
there been. We are talking about millions and millions of sorties over the
years.
> One death is too many. No action has been taken to correct the
> circumstances that lead to the "mishap". The military is obviously
> unwilling to police its ranks by admitting fault in this "mishap", but
> instead finds fault with the ATP rated pilot of a light aircraft which
> they turned into road-kill in the sky. I find this brazen military
> arrogance offensive.
Having someone killed is tragic. But the same point can be made about
automobile accidents, civilian aviation accidents etc. And as far as no
action being taken... Mine / others posts above discuss how we were all
briefed on the accident and had to sign off on read files to ensure we knew
the circumstances of the incident and what we needed to do to avoid another
one. Education is the best means to prevent another mishap.
> In my mind, Parker's actions are taken as typical of the "Top Gun"
> (the movie) military pilot mentality which other high visibility
> "mishaps" have illustrated is prevalent today.
>
That seems to be one of your core arguments. You want to talk facts yet you
talk about the "Top Gun" military pilot mentality. Top Gun was a movie...
it is so far from fact it is comical. You've said before that you don't
believe some of the stuff we tell you... well... please don't believe a
movie. The personalities / attitudes / actions taken in the movie aren't
tolerated in today's AF. Also, what other high visibility mishaps have you
presented. I can think of a few where we have had some clown go out do
something stupid... Usually it involves trying to show off in-front of a
family member. In each of these the AF came down hard on the leadership for
allowing something like that to happen. It simply isn't tolerated. You
talked about my not having evidence. Using a movie and 1 accident report to
label the entire fighter force or the Air Force in general as unsafe and
hazardous isn't going to cut it.
> I always burn a landing light in congested airspace; does the military
> do ANYTHING to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft operating at
> high-speed low-level beyond that required in the regulations? Given
> the fact that military operations are increasing the hazard to air
> safety, one would expect the military to make an effort to offset the
> life threatening hazard to the public they create.
We've discussed the landing light before. Can't be turned on. As far as
lighting goes... all have more than required by regulations.
> Were you aware of the hazard military high-speed low-level operations
> posed to civil aircraft BEFORE you entered the military? Did you have
> anywhere near the appreciation of the risk they pose when you had 250
> hours?
I would have to say no. I wasn't nearly as familiar of most of the risks of
aviation including midair collision avoidance as a civil pilot. As a
civilian pilot I didn't have near the visual lookout I do now... in fact I
know it sucked. Yes you have less visibility in light aircraft, but by
simply moving your nugget around you can still scan around you. I know I
didn't... or not as much as I do now. Not because of what kind of pilot I
was but because of the type of training I had along with very little
experience. I didn't know where low level routes were... didn't check for
them... didn't talk to local flight service when crossing one to find out if
anyone was on the route (again... didn't even know most of them were there).
I routinely flew through MOA's (VFR - perfectly legal). My instructors had
taught me that we owned the airspace just like the military. I now know
what is going on in the MOA's and would definitly try to avoid it if
possible just because I now know what is going on. While I can't speak
directly for other military flyers, generally everyone (military pilots)
seems to have the same impression.
> Which way, more concerned about midair collisions than they were when
> they were civil pilots?
Much more concerned now than when they flew as civil pilots.
> The pilot of an aircraft which is capable of supersonic flight and is
> routinely operated at high-speed among civil aircraft operating at
> speeds many times slower, should go to greater lengths to assure
> safety, because it he who creates the hazard, not the civil pilot
> operating within the de facto speed limit.
I think I've tried to show that we do go to greater lengths. And again...
you are very hung up on speed limits. As I and other posters have pointed
out... we are given waivers for speed because the aircraft is safer to fly
at that speed. We are flying at the safe airspeed for our aircraft. Try
flying a heavily loaded F-16 that takes off close to 180 knots at 250 knots.
It behaves like a light aircraft in slow flight... with very little ability
to maneuver... often times way behind the power curve. The waivers are for
safety contrary to what you believe.
> So, you're saying that despite the fact that the military chooses to
> operate its supersonic fighter aircraft at high-speed in airspace
> congested with civilian air traffic (and fails to enhance the
> conspicuity of those meteoric operations), that because the high
> workload imposed on the military pilot virtually saturates his
> piloting resources, he is operating more safely than civil pilots?
See above about High speed....
That's wasn't what I was saying at all. I'd appreciate you not trying to
take what I say out of context as I'm just presenting another point of view.
All I was saying is that comparing military flying to civilian flying is
comparing apples to oranges. I never said that the workload saturates his
resources. I did say that military flying is less forgiving to innattention
/ task saturation. And yes.. I did say that military pilots can become task
saturated, especially when executing tactics while working onboard systems.
If you truely believe that the average civilian aviator is safer than your
average military pilot given the differences in training than I think trying
to convince you of anything is going to be fruitless. The differences in
the AVERAGE training the military receives, AVERAGE information available to
the pilot, AVERAGE experience, you can't compare. And yes when I am
including the average civil pilot I am including everyone including the
newly licensed 40+ hour civil pilot.
Lego
F-16 Instructor pilot
BUFDRVR
>isn't making any attempt to advertize the public safety hazard they
>cause. It's a dirty little secret, that the military thinks it can
>hide by obscurity, and superior training. It's not working.
LOL.....you are now so far gone that's its pointless to argue. An F-16C pilot
has told you time and time again that flying in excess of 250 KIAS was not the
cause of the mishap and you continue to blindly yell from the roof tops. You
act like there are military-GA mid airs everyday, when infact its an extremely
rare (did you ever look up how many have happened in the last 20 years?? Of
course not) event. You continue to ignore facts and post untruthful, ridiculous
crap. Two's out.
BUFDRVR
>
>True. Unfortunately, it took retirement to "fix" Parker.
So your problem isn't with supposed "hazordous military action", but with one
pilots actions? Interesting, you've been spouting off the last few weeks about
military flight in general. So which is it ?
>I find it curious that Parker's post-mishap physical examination took
>place 8 days after the "mishap" sortie.
Perhaps 8 days is when the lab results came in. I can assure you blood and
urine were taken within hours of landing.
>Wouldn't it have been more
>likely to detect substance abuse if it had been conducted immediately
>after the collision? Or, is that the reason it was delayed for a
>week, to give his system a chance to clear itself?
More foolish BS. Grow up. Are you sure you're old enough to be a GA pilot ?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
Perhaps we have different definitions of the word 'immediately'. Can
you attempt to quantify the average time interval between the time of
a Class A "mishap" and the time the 'bloodwork' is taken?
This paragraph taken from the Air Force report seems to contradict
your assertion:
"(1) Lieutenant Colonel Parker sustained no injuries from
the mishap and did not seek medical attention. He had a
normal post-mishap physical examination on 24 November 2000
(Tab X-4)."
Lego
is automatic following a Class A mishap. Normal post physical examinations
ensure no injuries were sustained that didn't initially show.. ie. spinal
cord, etc.. Try to stick to the facts.
Lego
F-16 Instructor pilot
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:wHbY6.10859$c7.23...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Robey Price
>Blood / Urine are taken as soon as the pilot reaches a medical facility. It
>is automatic following a Class A mishap. Normal post physical examinations
>ensure no injuries were sustained that didn't initially show.. ie. spinal
>cord, etc.. Try to stick to the facts.
>
Hey Pardner,
You're wasting your time. How do you think LD will feel when he finds
out F-16 (military) pilots don't have to have an FAA
certificate/medical and aren't TYPE rated....GASP!!!
Guess he wants to remove ALL hazards to GA pilots...burner climbs to
the PCA within the airfield boundary...SFOs on recovery.
And yet he doesn't seem the least bit upset that GA pilots mort
themselves and each other in the traffic pattern on a fairly frequent
basis.
He's merely trolling.
Robey
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Again... you are looking at 1 mishap report... 1 report. Saying that
>"unsafe military practices" and "these hazardous practices" is hardly
>justified when you look at the number of military flights per day over the
>last 50 or so years of jet aircraft flying. How many civilian midairs have
>there been during this time? How many military vs civilian midairs have
>there been. We are talking about millions and millions of sorties over the
>years.
You may have a valid point here. Here are the statistics I was able
to easily locate:
30 FLYING SAFETY l December 2000 I U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2000-673-404/53000
Final FY00 Flight Mishap Totals (Oct 99 - Sep 00)
21 Class A Mishaps
7 Fatalities
14 Aircraft Destroyed
03 Oct ¨ While conducting a SAR mission, a UH-1N went down.
17 Nov ¨ Two F-16Cs flying an NVG upgrade sortie collided during a VID
intercept. One F-16 was destroyed;
the other F-16 recovered safely.
22 Nov An OA-10A departed the departure end of the runway.
06 Dec V An RQ-4A Global Hawk UAV was extensively damaged while
taxiing after landing.
10 Dec A C-130E touched down short of the active runway, then diverted
to another airfield and belly-landed.
Three personnel were fatally injured.
15 Dec An HH-60G rolled over at an LZ following a hard landing.
20 Jan ¨ An A-10 crashed on RTB. The pilot was fatally injured.
16 Feb ¨ An F-16CG on a routine training mission experienced an engine
malfunction.
16 Feb ¨ An F-16DG on an NVG upgrade sortie experienced an engine
malfunction.
28 Feb V A maintainer sustained fatal injuries after falling from the
lower crew entry ladder on a C-5.
19 Mar ¨ An F-16C crashed while performing at an airshow. The pilot
was fatally injured.
31 May V An F-15E was damaged after a high-speed abort.
01 Jun (Added) The No. 2 engine on a KC-10 sustained FOD damage during
takeoff roll.
16 Jun ¨ An F-16C on a routine training mission had an engine
malfunction.
21 Jun ¨ A F-16CG egressing off-target sustained a bird strike that
destroyed the canopy and injured the pilot.
02 Aug An MH-53M’s tail rotor contacted the ground during a tactical
NVG approach.
03 Aug ¨ An F-15C crashed during a Green Flag sortie.
03 Aug ¨V An unmanned QF-4G crashed 10 minutes after takeoff.
08 Aug ¨ Two F-16s experienced a mid-air collision. An F-16CG was
destroyed; the F-16CJ recovered safely.
11 Aug V An F-15E was damaged during a ground maintenance run.
28 Aug ¨ An F-16C crashed during RTB. The pilot was fatally injured.
29 Aug An E-8C suffered damage from an overheated radar waveguide.
31 Aug ¨ An F-16C on a training flight crashed and was destroyed.
31 Aug ¨ A T-6A crashed and was destroyed while flying an instrument
approach.
06 Sep ¨ A T-37B crashed one mile from the runway. The pilot was
fatally injured.
12 Sep An F-15E departed the runway on touchdown.
14 Sep ¨V An RQ-1L UAV crashed 45 minutes after takeoff.
46 FLYING SAFETY l January/February 2001
FY00 Flight Mishaps (Oct 99 - Nov 99)
3 Class A Mishaps
0 Fatalities
2 Aircraft Destroyed
FY01 Flight Mishaps (Oct 00 - Nov 00)
4 Class A Mishaps
1 Fatality
4 Aircraft Destroyed
04 Oct ¨V An RQ-1 Predator UAV crashed while on a routine test
mission.
12 Oct ¨ An F-16C crashed during a routine training mission.
23 Oct ¨V An RQ-1 Predator UAV went into an uncommanded descent.
03 Nov An F-15C experienced engine problems on takeoff. The pilot
successfully RTB’d. Both engines
sustained damage from FOD.
07 Nov V Two F-15s were serviced from a contaminated oil cart. There
was engine/accessories damage.
13 Nov ¨¨ There was a midair collision between two F-16CJs. Only one
pilot was recovered safely.
16 Nov ¨ An F-16CG on a routine training mission was involved in a
midair collision.
l A Class A mishap is defined as one where there is loss of life,
injury resulting in permanent total disability, destruction of an AF
aircraft, and/or property damage/loss exceeding $1 million.
l These Class A mishap descriptions have been sanitized to protect
privilege.
l Unless otherwise stated, all crewmembers successfully
ejected/egressed from their aircraft.
l ”¨” denotes a destroyed aircraft.
l “V” denotes a Class A mishap that is of the “non-rate producer”
variety. Per AFI 91-204 criteria, only those mishaps categorized
as “Flight Mishaps” are used in determining overall Flight Mishap
Rates. Non-rate producers include the Class A “Flight-Related,”
“Flight-Unmanned Vehicle,” and “Ground” mishaps that are shown here
for information purposes.
l Flight, ground, and weapons safety statistics are updated daily and
may be viewed at the following web address by “.gov” and
“.mil” users:
http://www-afsc.saia.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Flight/stats/index.html
l Current as of 25 Nov 00.
I U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2001-673-404/53002
I was rather surprised to see the large number of lost aircraft and
men. Unfortunately, the subject "mishap" was only referred to as:
"16 Nov ¨ An F-16CG on a routine training mission was involved in
a midair collision."
So, it is difficult to discern which "mishaps" involved civil
aircraft.
Are you able to provide a URL link to official military "mishap"
statistics?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>[snip]
>
>> The Air Force AIB failed to find Parker responsible for his reckless
>> acts, and the death of the civilian Parker flew his wingman into.
>> That is unjust. It won't help in changing the unsafe military
>> practices which are still occurring everyday.
>
>[snip]
>
>> Someone needs to bring these hazardous practices to the attention of
>> the public, so that the military will be forced to make changes in its
>> high-speed low-level operational procedures.
>
>Again... you are looking at 1 mishap report... 1 report. Saying that
>"unsafe military practices" and "these hazardous practices" is hardly
>justified when you look at the number of military flights per day over the
>last 50 or so years of jet aircraft flying. How many civilian midairs have
>there been during this time? How many military vs civilian midairs have
>there been. We are talking about millions and millions of sorties over the
>years.
If high-speed low-level operations are so safe, as you assert, why
does FAR 91.117(a) exist?
What percentage of those "millions and millions of sorties" were
conducted at high-speed in congested terminal airspace?
>> One death is too many. No action has been taken to correct the
>> circumstances that lead to the "mishap". The military is obviously
>> unwilling to police its ranks by admitting fault in this "mishap", but
>> instead finds fault with the ATP rated pilot of a light aircraft which
>> they turned into road-kill in the sky. I find this brazen military
>> arrogance offensive.
>
>Having someone killed is tragic. But the same point can be made about
>automobile accidents, civilian aviation accidents etc.
Are you saying that the there have been no added safety measures taken
to make automobile travel safer as a result of past accidents? Is not
the installation of air-bags, seat-belts, rubber-bumpers, side door
steal beams, turn signals, always-on headlights, anti-lock brakes, ...
in automobiles an attempt to make them safer?
>And as far as no
>action being taken... Mine / others posts above discuss how we were all
>briefed on the accident and had to sign off on read files to ensure we knew
>the circumstances of the incident and what we needed to do to avoid another
>one.
Are you saying that military pilots were required to read the accident
report? Can you cite the specific order and who issued it?
>Education is the best means to prevent another mishap.
(If your use of the word 'best' here means 'cheapest', I'll agree.
But, the cheap solution may end up being more costly if you take the
~25 million dollar value of the lost F-16 and the ~10 million dollar
wrongful death law suit into account. But hey, it's too expensive for
the military to make any changes, right? :-))
You can educate all the automobile drivers you like, but it's the
air-bags, seat-belts, rubber-bumpers, side door steal beams, turn
signals, always-on headlights, anti-lock brakes, changes in the code,
... which will save their lives. But, aviation reform isn't nearly as
swift as highway safety improvement. That's because it took Ralph
Nader to hold the automobile industry responsible for the "death
traps" they proffered on the public before the automobile industry
began to recall their errant creations.
>> In my mind, Parker's actions are taken as typical of the "Top Gun"
>> (the movie) military pilot mentality which other high visibility
>> "mishaps" have illustrated is prevalent today.
>>
>That seems to be one of your core arguments.
Not really. It is the military's failure to assume responsibility for
the deadly hazards they create for the flying public, and their
failure to implement adequate safeguards to prevent subsequent
occurrences which are the core of my arguments.
>You want to talk facts yet you
>talk about the "Top Gun" military pilot mentality. Top Gun was a movie...
>it is so far from fact it is comical.
Can you cite independent evidence which corroborates your assertion?
The military pilots who cut the funicular cable in Italy recently seem
to offer concrete evidence which substantiates my assertion.
>You've said before that you don't
>believe some of the stuff we tell you... well... please don't believe a
>movie.
I don't recall ever having written that. Can you please supply the
Message ID to which you are referring?
It would also seem that the recent China incident with the EP-3 would
substantiate Chinese pilots' similar 'fun loving' attitude as well.
It's rampant.
>The personalities / attitudes / actions taken in the movie aren't
>tolerated in today's AF.
Were the military pilots involved in the recent Italy 'mishap' jailed
for killing all those civilians? Perhaps they were in "yesterdays"
Air Force. :-)
>Also, what other high visibility mishaps have you
>presented. I can think of a few where we have had some clown go out do
>something stupid... Usually it involves trying to show off in-front of a
>family member. In each of these the AF came down hard on the leadership for
>allowing something like that to happen. It simply isn't tolerated.
Please share your definition of "the AF came down hard."
Specifically, how hard? Scott didn't come down hard on Parker.
Parker certainly was not reprimanded in a manner commensurate with his
actions. He kept his rank and pension, and was permitted to retire
without recompense for his deadly failures to perform the REQUIRED Air
Force directives mentioned in the AIB report. Is that a typical
example of how hard the military "comes down"? Was it just?
>You
>talked about my not having evidence. Using a movie and 1 accident report to
>label the entire fighter force or the Air Force in general as unsafe and
>hazardous isn't going to cut it.
I'm citing the words of the Air Force Accident Investigation Board to
substantiate my assertions. If you were actually required to read the
ENTIRE report, you would know that.
>> I always burn a landing light in congested airspace; does the military
>> do ANYTHING to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft operating at
>> high-speed low-level beyond that required in the regulations? Given
>> the fact that military operations are increasing the hazard to air
>> safety, one would expect the military to make an effort to offset the
>> life threatening hazard to the public they create.
>
>We've discussed the landing light before. Can't be turned on.
I keep hearing "it can't be done," because the F-16's landing lights
are in the wheel wells during cruise flight.
What if a high-intensity light (or something like a hand-held laser
pointer) were fitted in the F-16's cockpit so that it shown forward
during high-speed low-level peacetime military operations, much the
way that brake-lights are now displayed in the rear windows of
automobiles. You know, a little Yankee ingenuity could easily enhance
the F-16's conspicuity.
But, I'm sure that can't be done either. :-)
>As far as
>lighting goes... all have more than required by regulations.
They were not effective in this 'mishap.' Perhaps its time to make
some improvements. Or, should air safety be frozen in its present
antiquated state?
> > Were you aware of the hazard military high-speed low-level operations
>> posed to civil aircraft BEFORE you entered the military? Did you have
>> anywhere near the appreciation of the risk they pose when you had 250
>> hours?
>
>I would have to say no. I wasn't nearly as familiar of most of the risks of
>aviation including midair collision avoidance as a civil pilot. As a
>civilian pilot I didn't have near the visual lookout I do now... in fact I
>know it sucked.
What is the military doing to inform and educate civil pilots about
the hazards it imposes on the flying public?
>Yes you have less visibility in light aircraft, but by
>simply moving your nugget around you can still scan around you. I know I
>didn't... or not as much as I do now. Not because of what kind of pilot I
>was but because of the type of training I had along with very little
>experience. I didn't know where low level routes were... didn't check for
>them... didn't talk to local flight service when crossing one to find out if
>anyone was on the route (again... didn't even know most of them were there).
>I routinely flew through MOA's (VFR - perfectly legal). My instructors had
>taught me that we owned the airspace just like the military. I now know
>what is going on in the MOA's and would definitly try to avoid it if
>possible just because I now know what is going on. While I can't speak
>directly for other military flyers, generally everyone (military pilots)
>seems to have the same impression.
What can we do to correct the civil pilot's lack of appreciation for
the threat military operations pose? Does the military need to issue
a memorandum to CFI's, so that they can change their teaching to
include the hazards military operations create? We both agree that a
need exists. Should the military issue posters to FBOs depicting the
problem, so that they can be hung where civil pilots will see them?
Have you got any other ideas?
>> The pilot of an aircraft which is capable of supersonic flight and is
>> routinely operated at high-speed among civil aircraft operating at
>> speeds many times slower, should go to greater lengths to assure
>> safety, because it is he who creates the hazard, not the civil pilot
>> operating within the de facto speed limit.
>
>I think I've tried to show that we do go to greater lengths.
You've stated a lot of safety measures that are required of military
pilots, but I'm not aware of your having mentioned how the military is
attempting to educate civil pilots.
> And again...
>you are very hung up on speed limits. As I and other posters have pointed
>out... we are given waivers for speed because the aircraft is safer to fly
>at that speed.
Safer for whom, the military pilots?
I doubt that you'll be successful in convincing me that a military
pilot exceeding the de facto FAA speed limit in congested airspace is
enhancing the safety of the civil aircraft in the vicinity. In fact
he is creating an increased safety hazard for them.
>We are flying at the safe airspeed for our aircraft.
Parker exceeded the minimum safe speed of his F-16 (required by FAR
91.117(d)) by ~40% during this "mishap."
>Try
>flying a heavily loaded F-16 that takes off close to 180 knots at 250 knots.
>It behaves like a light aircraft in slow flight... with very little ability
>to maneuver... often times way behind the power curve. The waivers are for
>safety contrary to what you believe.
Military wavers are not issued to enhance the safety of civil
aviation. They are exemptions from regulations that the FAA found
prudent to impose on aviation, presumably for safety reasons.
>> So, you're saying that despite the fact that the military chooses to
>> operate its supersonic fighter aircraft at high-speed in airspace
>> congested with civilian air traffic (and fails to enhance the
>> conspicuity of those meteoric operations), that because the high
>> workload imposed on the military pilot virtually saturates his
>> piloting resources, he is operating more safely than civil pilots?
>
>See above about High speed....
>
>That's wasn't what I was saying at all.
Actually, that is what your words said to me. I'm sure it wasn't your
intent to imply that, but it came through loud and clear.
>I'd appreciate you not trying to
>take what I say out of context as I'm just presenting another point of view.
I didn't take your words out of context, I just discerned what your
words implied.
>All I was saying is that comparing military flying to civilian flying is
>comparing apples to oranges.
Agreed. That is why the two types of flying should not be mixed.
Unfortunately, the military "needs" to control over 50% of the nations
airspace for its operations, yet it still must impose its hazards on
civilians in congested terminal airspace.
>I never said that the workload saturates his
>resources. I did say that military flying is less forgiving to innattention
>/ task saturation. And yes.. I did say that military pilots can become task
>saturated, especially when executing tactics while working onboard systems.
>If you truely believe that the average civilian aviator is safer than your
>average military pilot given the differences in training than I think trying
>to convince you of anything is going to be fruitless.
Now you're putting words in my mouth; I never asserted that civil
pilots possessed superior skills to military pilots. In fact, if I
was forced to generalize, I would presume the opposite to be true.
>The differences in
>the AVERAGE training the military receives, AVERAGE information available to
>the pilot, AVERAGE experience, you can't compare. And yes when I am
>including the average civil pilot I am including everyone including the
>newly licensed 40+ hour civil pilot.
>
>Lego
>F-16 Instructor pilot
What would it take to get you to offer some constructive ideas to
enhance air safety, instead of telling me that it can't be done?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Blood / Urine are taken as soon as the pilot reaches a medical facility.
Can you tell me when Parker was taken to the medical facility?
According to the AIB, it happened 8 days after the "mishap."
>It
>is automatic following a Class A mishap. Normal post physical examinations
>ensure no injuries were sustained that didn't initially show.. ie. spinal
>cord, etc.. Try to stick to the facts.
How much more factual can I get? I quoted the words of the Air Force
report.
Lego
fighter ones especially... how is this hazardous to general avaition.
Lego
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:svfY6.11205$c7.27...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Larry Dighera
question at the end of this post. Please scroll to the end.
On Thu, 21 Jun 2001 05:30:09 GMT, "Lego" <leg...@earthlink.net>
wrote:
Robey Price
>And what do these mishaps have to do with civilian midairs. Looking at the
>fighter ones especially... how is this hazardous to general avaition.
>
>Lego
Lego, I say again...you're beating a dead horse. LD has target
fixation...NOTHING you tell him will satisfy him...
You're the "designated mort" in this exchange. You can't confuse him
with the facts, his mind is already made up.
Every jet could have and use the T-Bird smoke mod...fly around with
their gear down and landing light on...and broadcast position reports
every 30 seconds on VHF Guard and it still would NEVER satisfy LD.
This is his crusade, his jihad, his reason for breathing
k8do
have an axe to grind on this subject, but I do know some truths....
Given that an F15, et. al., is not comfortable below 250 knots, when you
are outside of a charted military ops area and below 10,000', you are a
threat to us Cessna Drivers because we can't see you in time to get out of
the way... Period!
BTW - If us Cessna Drivers could out maneuver an air superiority fighter,
then the taxpayers got ripped...
Now, the reason that this unfortunate midair is getting all this discussion
on these boards is that we recognize that we are helpless to identify and
get clear of folks like you, which causes paranoia... So, when you go below
10,000 feet you have to be aware that you are like hawks dropping through a
flock of sparrows... We are dead meat if you make an error...
Now, I do agree with you that new laws on the big guy aren't the fix...
However, if the big guy had been following the flight rules that we already
have for flight below 10,000', there would not have been a collison... It's
as simple as that... Arguments about how many lights, et. al, are diversions
and truly don't influence the outcome...
Denny
"Randy Haskin" <str...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:ddcb5c20.01061...@posting.google.com...
Randy Haskin
> If high-speed low-level operations are so safe, as you assert, why
> does FAR 91.117(a) exist?
Well, I wasn't around when they wrote the FARs, so I don't know what
the spirit of the writers' intent was...but YOU seem to have some
AMAZING insight into what they were thinking. You seem to "know" it's
because there's some magic thing that happens at 250 KIAS which causes
an outrageous danger to general aviation safety -- below it, good to
go; above it, extreme hazard to all around. Personally, I think it is
rooted in a number of factors, from the fact that the airspace below
10K is the most congested to the update rates on ARTCC and
TRACON/RAPCON radars when the FAR was written. I'm just guessing at
the intent and so are you.
> What percentage of those "millions and millions of sorties" were
> conducted at high-speed in congested terminal airspace?
Well, which is it that you're worried about? High speed ops below
10,000 feet or in terminal airspace? There's a BIG difference.
> Are you saying that military pilots were required to read the accident
> report? Can you cite the specific order and who issued it?
Again, you fail to comprehend that just because something is not
written explicitly in a format you can understand, it still happens.
No, there's no regulation that we're going to be able to cite that
says "All pilots must read accident report...". Do you know what an
FCIF is? It's a Flight Crew Information File...it's a name for flying
procedure-related information that needs to be distributed to pilots.
Squadron pilots MUST sign off their FCIFs or they are *grounded* --
they cannot fly. This is how I had to hear about it...one way, at
least.
The other way was the 4-hour safety briefing I had to sit through on
our quarterly safety down day. Yes, that's right, quarterly all the
pilots in our wing do not fly for a whole day when we are fed in-depth
briefings on these accidents and incidents.
So, don't just say that things were "swept under the rug" or whatever
just because YOU don't know what happened. Remember when I mentioned
that you need to walk a mile in our shoes before you criticize? Well,
this is one of those areas, too. If this is REALLY something that is
eating away at you, email me at the above address and I'll see about
physically showing you all this stuff. Will you believe it when we
show it to you?
> wrongful death law suit into account. But hey, it's too expensive for
> the military to make any changes, right? :-))
Hey, man, it's YOUR money either way....taxpayer dollars. If you can
think of some way to come up with the money to modify our jets to make
them "Larry-D Spec", then good on ya. Otherwise, we'll have to go
through the Congressional funding process which, as of now, cannot
even fund us enough to give us fundamental flying parts we ALREADY
have/need, much less new added toys.
> It is the military's failure to assume responsibility for
> the deadly hazards they create for the flying public,
Rhetoric is not a substitute for logic. You posted a long list of
USAF mishaps and >one< of them happened to involve civil aviation.
That did nothing to improve your hypothesis that military aviation is
"deadly" and "hazardous" to civil aviators. Start showing some
statistical data and maybe we'll start listening to your argument.
Until then, it's just rehtoric. Maybe this is why you've
systematically ignored all the other arguments in my posts.
> Can you cite independent evidence which corroborates your assertion [that flying in the USAF is not like "Top Gun"]?
> The military pilots who cut the funicular cable in Italy recently seem
> to offer concrete evidence which substantiates my assertion.
Did you ever take a logic class in high school or college? If you
did, you'd know that it's NOT POSSIBLE to "prove" a negative. We
can't "prove" we're NOT like something. I do find it humorous that
you're using a movie as a personality baseline to start with.
Hmm. My personality baseline for you is now going to be based on
Larry, Moe, and Curly. You ARE the Three Stooges because I think your
lack of logic in your arguments is just as buffoonerous. Now, prove
you AREN'T. :)
> Were the military pilots involved in the recent Italy 'mishap' jailed
> for killing all those civilians? Perhaps they were in "yesterdays"
> Air Force. :-)
No, they were in the Navy, and remember, members of the DoD are
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is completely
separate from Federal Penal Codes. It seems that the ONLY punishment
you think is appropriate is jail time and, if they don't get it in
cases you think they should, the military somehow got off light.
Well, your misunderstanding of the Military Justice System ALSO shows
your ignorance...there's a lot more going on than you seem to think
there is.
> Please share your definition of "the AF came down hard."
> Specifically, how hard? Scott didn't come down hard on Parker.
Do you know what a Flight Evaluation Board (FEB) is? When you do,
I'll tell you about coming down hard on pilots. That's the type of
coming down hard that hits pilots where it really hurts.
> What if a high-intensity light (or something like a hand-held laser
> pointer) were fitted in the F-16's cockpit so that it shown forward
> during high-speed low-level peacetime military operations, much the
> way that brake-lights are now displayed in the rear windows of
> automobiles. You know, a little Yankee ingenuity could easily enhance
> the F-16's conspicuity.
Just like the "magic" 250 KIAS, why is it that a cockpit-mounted
(oh-my-aching-rod, can you imagine the reflection inside the canopy!?)
high intensity light suddenly makes the difference between "safe" and
"hazard"?
> They were not effective in this 'mishap.' Perhaps its time to make
> some improvements. Or, should air safety be frozen in its present
> antiquated state?
So, you're saying this is a *systemic* problem? Wow, perhaps more
than just those hazardous, cocky, Maverick, low-flyin', speeding
around without fear of reprisal fighter jocks AREN'T all at fault!
> What is the military doing to inform and educate civil pilots about
> the hazards it imposes on the flying public?
Again, a leading question by ASSUMING that the military poses undue
hazard to the civil flying public...but, I'll play your game. EVERY
military base has a Safety office who does this. The bases do
semiannual flight safety seminars in conjunction with state Department
of Aeronautics and the FAA SPECIFICALLY designed to orient GA pilots
to the unique flying environment around a military base.
These happen ALL OVER the country. I personally attended these safety
meetings when I was a GA pilot up in Washington State and I know
they've been conducted in Wichita Falls, TX, Las Vegas, NV, Columbus,
MS, and Goldsboro, NC. These are all places I've flown as both a
General Aviation pilot and a military pilot and I KNOW from personal
experience that they take place.
There are also USAF-furnished posters that hang in the FBOs in these
areas (if the FBOs choose to hang them, I guess, but they ARE
furnished at least) that identify when and where military traffic will
be flying, along with descriptions of what kinds of military aircraft
will be flying in the area.
The military goes to GREAT LENGTHS to educate the public. If you
haven't been able to see any of these meetings, I suggest you contact
your state board of aeronautics or the safety office of your nearest
flying military base.
Randy Haskin
F-15E Driver
k8do
should have done, etc., until we are blue in the face... But, what that
discussion won't change is the simple fact that a tactical fighter passing
through airspace used by GA aircraft is like a hawk passing through a flock
of sparrows... The fighter aircraft is just too fast for us to see and
avoid - period! We are dead meat if the tac fighter blows it...
It is left to the gung ho, tac pilot to understand that he is a lethal
missile passing through GA airspace and he has to see us, and avoid us... It
is his responsibility to do so, because we can't... If he wants to be
contemptuous of a fellow pilot and call him a 100 hour, VFR only, 'threat' -
so be it; I can't change that... But the fact that a person with that
attitude holds my life in his hands every time he operates his high speed,
tactical fighter below 18,000 feet is what really concerns me...
Denny
BUFDRVR
>have for flight below 10,000', there would not have been a collison
Pretty bold assumption. Who's to say that the F-16 involved (flying at 250
KIAS) wouldn't have seen the Cessna, put power in and tried to maneuver to
avoid him, but was unable due to his slow airspeed. People who assume 250 KIAS
would have solved this mishap are not looking or listening to what actual Viper
pilots are telling them.
BUFDRVR
>report? Can you cite the specific order and who issued it?
We were not required to read the accident report, but I (who has no waiver for
250 below 10 and no A-A Radar) was required to sign off 3 seperate FCIF's
(Flight Crew Information Files) dealing with safe airspeeds below 10,000, low
level chart study for airports and use of A-A radar. Needless to say, only the
chart study applied to me, but I was required to sign them all off anyway.
>But hey, it's too expensive for
>the military to make any changes, right? :-))
You want all military aircraft to comply with 250 KIAS below 10,000', I'm
willing to bet more military vs civilian midairs have been avoided because the
military jets could maneuver because there airspeed was up.
>Were the military pilots involved in the recent Italy 'mishap' jailed
>for killing all those civilians? Perhaps they were in "yesterdays"
>Air Force. :-)
First off, they were Marines, but since this discussion involves military in
general, I'll respond. The only wrong doing the pilot and Nav/ECO were
convicted of was carrying along a video camera in violation of Navy regs. The
actual impact with the cable was a result of the cable not appearing on the TPC
the crew was using for navigation and the failure of certain read files to make
it from the HQ level down to the squadron level.
>Perhaps its time to make
>some improvements. Or, should air safety be frozen in its present
>antiquated state?
For being in an "antiquated state", its pretty good. You still have not come up
with the number of military-civilian midairs the last 20 years. The answer is
*2*, including the one were refering to.
>I doubt that you'll be successful in convincing me that a military
>pilot exceeding the de facto FAA speed limit in congested airspace is
>enhancing the safety of the civil aircraft in the vicinity.
You've been told at least 4 times by now that at 250 KIAS, most fighters are
very unmaneuverable which will make collision avoidance much tougher for the
military pilot.
>Agreed. That is why the two types of flying should not be mixed.
>Unfortunately, the military "needs" to control over 50% of the nations
>airspace for its operations, yet it still must impose its hazards on
>civilians in congested terminal airspace.
Can you enlighten us on how the military controls "over 50% of the nations
airspace"? I fly 8-9 hour sorties every week, sometimes twice a week. Out of
those 8-9 hours I'm talking to ARTCC's 7-8 of those hours. Your facts, once
again are waning.
BUFDRVR
>aircraft.
No its not, if the other aircraft isn't listed (obviously each aircraft in a
midair takes some damage) then it was a civilian. To find the only other
civilian-military midair the last 20 years, you'll have to go back to 1987.
Lego
> does FAR 91.117(a) exist?
Are you talking about 300 knots? We are flying at the recommended safe
cruise speed specified in our flight manuals. It is SAFER to operate an F-16
(especially heavily configured) at 300 vs 250.
> What percentage of those "millions and millions of sorties" were
> conducted at high-speed in congested terminal airspace?
A great deal. We are talking literally millions of sorties. I have no idea
of the percentages... but most fighter aircraft have had this waiver... and
the T-38 which has been the primary trainer for the USAF for 30 or so years
has it as well.. and yes many fighter and training bases are in the vicinity
of congested terminal airspace.
> Are you saying that the there have been no added safety measures taken
> to make automobile travel safer as a result of past accidents? Is not
> the installation of air-bags, seat-belts, rubber-bumpers, side door
> steal beams, turn signals, always-on headlights, anti-lock brakes, ...
> in automobiles an attempt to make them safer?
I'm not saying anything like that... but even you have to admit that not one
of these would have happened if there had been only one car accident. Again
you are looking at 1 mishap and generalizing military flying in general.
> Are you saying that military pilots were required to read the accident
> report? Can you cite the specific order and who issued it?
Yes we were required to read it.... or at least be briefed on the mishap.
Everyone at my base had to sign off that they had read it prior to their
flight. We later a few months later got even more amplified guidance on
some stuff that went on in the mishap. We are briefed / required to read
all the F-16 mishaps. If you disbelieve, contact the Flight Safety office
at any fighter base and direct your questions to them.
> >Education is the best means to prevent another mishap.
>
> (If your use of the word 'best' here means 'cheapest', I'll agree.
> But, the cheap solution may end up being more costly if you take the
> ~25 million dollar value of the lost F-16 and the ~10 million dollar
> wrongful death law suit into account. But hey, it's too expensive for
> the military to make any changes, right? :-))
>
> You can educate all the automobile drivers you like, but it's the
> air-bags, seat-belts, rubber-bumpers, side door steal beams, turn
> signals, always-on headlights, anti-lock brakes, changes in the code,
> ... which will save their lives. But, aviation reform isn't nearly as
> swift as highway safety improvement. That's because it took Ralph
> Nader to hold the automobile industry responsible for the "death
> traps" they proffered on the public before the automobile industry
> began to recall their errant creations.
If there was only 1 accident Ralph Nader would not have had much of a case.
> >> In my mind, Parker's actions are taken as typical of the "Top Gun"
> >> (the movie) military pilot mentality which other high visibility
> >> "mishaps" have illustrated is prevalent today.
> >>
> >That seems to be one of your core arguments.
>
> Not really. It is the military's failure to assume responsibility for
> the deadly hazards they create for the flying public, and their
> failure to implement adequate safeguards to prevent subsequent
> occurrences which are the core of my arguments.
You call these deadly hazards with the evidence of one accident report.
Calling our entire flying operation hazardous / irresponsible because of one
mishap in an overgeneralized assumption.
> >You want to talk facts yet you
> >talk about the "Top Gun" military pilot mentality. Top Gun was a
movie...
> >it is so far from fact it is comical.
>
> Can you cite independent evidence which corroborates your assertion?
> The military pilots who cut the funicular cable in Italy recently seem
> to offer concrete evidence which substantiates my assertion.
Did you read that accident report as well? What were the conclusions from
it? It's easy to brandish guilt / responsibility from media reports without
knowing all the facts.
> It would also seem that the recent China incident with the EP-3 would
> substantiate Chinese pilots' similar 'fun loving' attitude as well.
> It's rampant.
So now you are comparing Chinese pilots with the USAF? I can't believe you
even brought this up.
> >The personalities / attitudes / actions taken in the movie aren't
> >tolerated in today's AF.
>
> Were the military pilots involved in the recent Italy 'mishap' jailed
> for killing all those civilians? Perhaps they were in "yesterdays"
> Air Force. :-)
> >Also, what other high visibility mishaps have you
> >presented. I can think of a few where we have had some clown go out do
> >something stupid... Usually it involves trying to show off in-front of a
> >family member. In each of these the AF came down hard on the leadership
for
> >allowing something like that to happen. It simply isn't tolerated.
>
> Please share your definition of "the AF came down hard."
> Specifically, how hard? Scott didn't come down hard on Parker.
> Parker certainly was not reprimanded in a manner commensurate with his
> actions. He kept his rank and pension, and was permitted to retire
> without recompense for his deadly failures to perform the REQUIRED Air
> Force directives mentioned in the AIB report. Is that a typical
> example of how hard the military "comes down"? Was it just?
I'm not even going to go into this, because 1 - I won't directly discuss the
mishap and 2 - I don't have the time to research every incident and what the
punishment was. If you are asking if I know of people who have been fired
and forced out of the Air Force the answer is yes, If you are asking if I
know people (or of people) that have lost their wings then yes. Just
remember that you are reading 1 document. Yes it is the AIB, and while it is
a summary of what they believe happened, there is a lot more evidence than
what is listed in that document. They presented their best guess given the
evidence they had. And, there is a TON of evidence involved in a mishap.
The AIB isn't a jury, They present the information in the hope that it will
help prevent future mishaps - not discipline a pilot / contractor /
manufacturer / ATC personnel etc.. Often times the evidence they draw their
conclusions off of is not strong enough for other types of action. (I'm not
saying anything about this one... in fact I know nothing about it other than
what I read in the report.) How do I know this... I have written several
reports.
> >You
> >talked about my not having evidence. Using a movie and 1 accident report
to
> >label the entire fighter force or the Air Force in general as unsafe and
> >hazardous isn't going to cut it.
>
> I'm citing the words of the Air Force Accident Investigation Board to
> substantiate my assertions. If you were actually required to read the
> ENTIRE report, you would know that.
If you want to talk reports lets talk. Yes I have read the ENTIRE report.
I have read about 100+ ENTIRE reports. I was a squadron safety
representative, am a qualified accident investigation officer, have been to
the Air Force Safety School, have been the interim investigating officer on
1
Class A mishap, and have WRITTEN about 7 or so Class C and 1 Class B
reports. I am a qualified instructor in the F-16, I have flown 4 different
blocks of it, have flown numerous low levels...etc (you get the picture).
Yes you are citing the words of an Air Force report. but you really don't
have a handle on what each one of the findings means and you are way
overgeneralizing calling all of our operations a hazard. I personally have
filed a couple of HATR's, both for civilians flying through restricted
airspace with no idea what they were doing... Would it be equally right for
me to brandish all general aviation as hazardous?
> >> I always burn a landing light in congested airspace; does the military
> >> do ANYTHING to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft operating at
> >> high-speed low-level beyond that required in the regulations? Given
> >> the fact that military operations are increasing the hazard to air
> >> safety, one would expect the military to make an effort to offset the
> >> life threatening hazard to the public they create.
> >
> >We've discussed the landing light before. Can't be turned on.
>
> I keep hearing "it can't be done," because the F-16's landing lights
> are in the wheel wells during cruise flight.
>
> What if a high-intensity light (or something like a hand-held laser
> pointer) were fitted in the F-16's cockpit so that it shown forward
> during high-speed low-level peacetime military operations, much the
> way that brake-lights are now displayed in the rear windows of
> automobiles. You know, a little Yankee ingenuity could easily enhance
> the F-16's conspicuity.
>
> But, I'm sure that can't be done either. :-)
>
> >As far as
> >lighting goes... all have more than required by regulations.
>
> They were not effective in this 'mishap.' Perhaps its time to make
> some improvements. Or, should air safety be frozen in its present
> antiquated state?
So are you saying that your idea for a light would have prevented this.
Look, I'm not saying it's a bad idea. It probably isn't. You've brought up
TCAS which I simply believe won't work for fighters. Perhaps there is
another system. Perhaps all aircraft lighting should be intensified? But
you act as if a simple modification (such as a light) would be easy. Here's
why it wouldn't be. First, it would have to be something that would "prove"
to be safer... I'm talking all kinds of politics and crap. Just because one
person or even a group of people think would help, would have to be tested
and a contract written up .. etc. I'm not saying it can't be done.. but it
would take a great deal of pressure. Also, modifying a military jet is not
a simple task. Every aircraft we have is in some sort of upgrade all the
time. Beef up plates on the wings and fuselage because our jets have been
bent and cracked by repeated high G sorties., new wiring, new software to
fix bugs in the current revisions, new brakes to fix some of the problems
with the old ones, and don't even get me started on engines.... the list
goes on and on. Many of the modifications listed in the 781's won't happen
for several years from now. Unfortunately the aircraft we fly are old and
very beat up. I've flown several F-16's with over 4000 hours. Doesn't
sound bad compared to many civil aircraft except that the lifespan was only
supposed to be 7000 hours...and that was supposed to happen several years
beyond where we are now. Call a local Flight Safety office and ask how many
EP's a day that base has... not minor ones, but major, or better yet look up
how many F-16's or fighters in general we have lost in the last few years.
Yes... maybe there are probably things that could enhance midair collision
avoidance... but look at how many midairs we have had with civilians and
then look at how many F-16's or fighters in general we have lost due to
other things... Let's not forget that when a plane goes down, often there is
collateral damage on the ground. They have made great strides lately
reducing the accident rate again... but there is only so much money to go
around... and we are not even talking about money to keep the aircraft
combat capable here or up to date with current threats which are constantly
evolving. The days where we have money galore have long been gone. Ask
guys about how many jets were on the ramp last year without engines because
of money etc.
> What is the military doing to inform and educate civil pilots about
> the hazards it imposes on the flying public?
I've posted this in earlier posts. In short, our base goes to every local
FBO in the local area... distributes pamphlets to show our departures,
recoveries, radar pattern, prominent land marks we use. They hold meetings
to discuss what we do in the MOA's and what to look out for. Twice a year
we invite all civilians to our base. They fly our sims, get briefed on what
all we do and where we do it. It's an all day event. I could go on and on
but it seems you have made up your mind that we do nothing. Last fly in we
had we couldn't fit another plane on the ramp so many people attended. We
personally changed 2 departures in the last year to try to avoid heavy
civilian traffic.
> >Yes you have less visibility in light aircraft, but by
> >simply moving your nugget around you can still scan around you. I know I
> >didn't... or not as much as I do now. Not because of what kind of pilot I
> >was but because of the type of training I had along with very little
> >experience. I didn't know where low level routes were... didn't check
for
> >them... didn't talk to local flight service when crossing one to find out
if
> >anyone was on the route (again... didn't even know most of them were
there).
> >I routinely flew through MOA's (VFR - perfectly legal). My instructors
had
> >taught me that we owned the airspace just like the military. I now know
> >what is going on in the MOA's and would definitely try to avoid it if
> >possible just because I now know what is going on. While I can't speak
> >directly for other military flyers, generally everyone (military pilots)
> >seems to have the same impression.
>
> What can we do to correct the civil pilot's lack of appreciation for
> the threat military operations pose? Does the military need to issue
> a memorandum to CFI's, so that they can change their teaching to
> include the hazards military operations create? We both agree that a
> need exists. Should the military issue posters to FBOs depicting the
> problem, so that they can be hung where civil pilots will see them?
> Have you got any other ideas?
The memorandum idea isn't bad. and like I said, our base currently does
distribute flyers to local FBO's.
> >> The pilot of an aircraft which is capable of supersonic flight and is
> >> routinely operated at high-speed among civil aircraft operating at
> >> speeds many times slower, should go to greater lengths to assure
> >> safety, because it is he who creates the hazard, not the civil pilot
> >> operating within the de facto speed limit.
> >
> >I think I've tried to show that we do go to greater lengths.
>
> You've stated a lot of safety measures that are required of military
> pilots, but I'm not aware of your having mentioned how the military is
> attempting to educate civil pilots.
See above... and that happens at every base I've been at... except overseas.
> > And again..
> >you are very hung up on speed limits. As I and other posters have
pointed
> >out... we are given waivers for speed because the aircraft is safer to
fly
> >at that speed.
>
> Safer for whom, the military pilots?
> Parker exceeded the minimum safe speed of his F-16 (required by FAR
> 91.117(d)) by ~40% during this "mishap."
Yes safer for everyone. Put your aircraft in slow flight and see how
maneuverable it is. Now imagine that kind of maneuverability or even less
going 4+ miles a minute (at 250). If you can agree that we generally see
civil traffic more often than they see us, it would reason that you would
want us to be able to move our planes out of the way. The tradeoff in
reaction time / speed vs maneuverability is why we have the waivers. As
far as Parker going 40% over...This isn't routine...If you have evidence to
the contrary please present it, but I haven't heard anything other than this
one isolated occurrence. Call your local ATC? Ask them? Ask someone, but
again you are using 1 report / 1 incident as Air Force Standard?
> Military wavers are not issued to enhance the safety of civil
> aviation. They are exemptions from regulations that the FAA found
> prudent to impose on aviation, presumably for safety reasons.
Exactly... for safety reasons.
> >> So, you're saying that despite the fact that the military chooses to
> >> operate its supersonic fighter aircraft at high-speed in airspace
> >> congested with civilian air traffic (and fails to enhance the
> >> conspicuity of those meteoric operations), that because the high
> >> workload imposed on the military pilot virtually saturates his
> >> piloting resources, he is operating more safely than civil pilots?
> >
> >See above about High speed....
> >
> >That's wasn't what I was saying at all.
>
> Actually, that is what your words said to me. I'm sure it wasn't your
> intent to imply that, but it came through loud and clear.
>
> >I'd appreciate you not trying to
> >take what I say out of context as I'm just presenting another point of
view.
>
> I didn't take your words out of context, I just discerned what your
> words implied.
>
> >All I was saying is that comparing military flying to civilian flying is
> >comparing apples to oranges.
>
> Agreed. That is why the two types of flying should not be mixed.
> Unfortunately, the military "needs" to control over 50% of the nations
> airspace for its operations, yet it still must impose its hazards on
> civilians in congested terminal airspace.
You can open a big bag of worms with this one. Show me where "over 50 %" of
the airspace we control is? If you are referring to the infamous charts
that show military airspace, they can be very deceiving if you don't know
all the facts. First - Airspace is three dimensional... The charts
generally only show a 2 dimensional plot.. Often times a very small altitude
block is owned by us. (low level routes) - What we control surface to
infinity generally is a very small chunk. 2) What airspace is MOA's and
civil traffic can transit VFR? (again not advisable when operations are
going on) 3 - They don't show time allotted... A great deal of airspace is
only activated for a very small period of time (often as little as 1 hour a
couple days a week), 4 - Know the letters of agreement between the bases and
the centers... for example... most allow Center to take back airspace or
limit airspace in the event of weather or traffic congestion. I can go on
and on... Saying we own more than 50% of the airspace is completely wrong.
Yes we own a great deal but it's these types of misperceptions that the
military has to fight.
> What would it take to get you to offer some constructive ideas to
> enhance air safety, instead of telling me that it can't be done?
Again... It's tough for me to say a bunch of this stuff because it keeps
coming back to the one incident... which I can't directly comment on. I'm
not saying there aren't things we could do to enhance air safety.. of course
they are... and I don't claim to have all the answers. There is definitely
stuff that can be done. But shouldering the entire responsibility on the
military is wrong as well. Try Looking for the next fly in at a base, call
their local Flight Safety office or the Flight Safety Center in New Mexico.
You aren't going to get many constructive comments from us when you start
out calling us dangerous, irresponsible, arrogant, rule breaking, etc. Just
keep in mind (for the last time)... you have 1 report. 1.
Lego
F-16 Instructor Pilot
Lego
I can't confirm BUFDRVR's stat of 2 in the last 20 years, but I did look
back as far as I could remember, and this is the only mil / civilian mishap
I could find. Sorry, but I don't have an official link other than the one
at the USAF safety center.
Lego
Robey Price
> Given that an F15, et. al., is not comfortable below 250 knots, when you
>are outside of a charted military ops area and below 10,000', you are a
>threat to us Cessna Drivers because we can't see you in time to get out of
>the way... Period!
Okay...except for that last tidbit. I agree about blind spots in GA
airplanes, you can't avoid what you can't see. And if a GA pilot only
clears the airspace from his 10 to 2 o'clock (that he sees out the
front window) then everybody is a threat to the GA pilot, not just
high speed Mil airplanes.
There have been considerably more GA -v- GA midairs that occur than
the two Mil -v- GA cited by BUFDRVR.
Wouldn't you say that GA pilots (based upon the number of GA midairs)
are on an order of magnitude a greater threat to each other than high
speed fighters?
>
>BTW - If us Cessna Drivers could out maneuver an air superiority fighter,
>then the taxpayers got ripped...
You don't think you can turn inside an F-16? I had a glider "arc" me
once...but he couldn't follow me uphill.
>Now, the reason that this unfortunate midair is getting all this discussion
>on these boards is that we recognize that we are helpless to identify and
>get clear of folks like you, which causes paranoia... So, when you go below
>10,000 feet you have to be aware that you are like hawks dropping through a
>flock of sparrows... We are dead meat if you make an error...
Sincerely...honestly, folks that fly high speed Mil aircraft recognize
the threat posed by "getting in amongst" the GA. Again, sincerely, are
you disconcerted that Mil pilots are simply not communicating that
they're "kinder and gentler" touchy-feely professional aviator? Please
don't conclude that the absense of any angst or wailing of mea culpa,
mea culpa by Mil pilots means they don't appreciate the hazard of
mixing GA and Mil airplanes. It is illogical to expect a combat
aviator to merely "cave" to the pressure of a NG request/demand.
>However, if the big guy had been following the flight rules that we already
>have for flight below 10,000', there would not have been a collison... It's
>as simple as that...
True, agree, no argument from me. Now suppose...just suppose, a
perfectly legal GA pilot transits an active low altitude MOA and gets
hit from behind, kills everybody. I suppose the Mil guys would be
pissed and GA guys would say, "The Mil pilot is responsible."
I'm sure Larry D would.
BUFDRVR
>back as far as I could remember, and this is the only mil / civilian mishap
>I could find.
Our safety meeting in May showed a graph of military-military midairs over 20
years (an alarming increase yearly) and military-civilian midairs (all 2 of
them). The point being that we trade paint with each other infinitely more then
with civilians, so keep a craniums up for GA, but also your lead/wingman.
Lego
live with it day in and day out. I personally know people who have been
involved in mil vs. mil midairs. On several occasions I've had students try
to hit me while learning to fly the Viper.
Lego
"BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20010621134853...@ng-fl1.aol.com...
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com>, who has completely failed to answer any of *my* posts,
Mr. Haskin, I call your attention to my rather lengthy and detailed
reply to one of your posts below. Perhaps you missed it:
------------- old message begins ------------------
From: Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.piloting
Subject: Re: F-16/cessna crash near sarasota
Message-ID: <NJRV6.10665$Ts6.8...@typhoon.we.rr.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2001 22:23:41 GMT
[Randy, thank you for the input on your firsthand experiences.]
On 12 Jun 2001 04:34:25 -0700, str...@hotmail.com (Randy Haskin)
wrote:
>Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message news:<s6fV6.134972$mu1.27...@typhoon.we.rr.com>...
>
>> The radar equipment is already in place to prevent this type of
>> collision hazard, but MILITARY PILOTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO USE RADAR
>> FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE when operating at speeds in excess of 250
>> knots below 10,000 feet. This is military "thinking" at its best. :-)
>
>I'm not sure where you're getting this notion from.
There was no mention in the Air Force's accident report of the fact
that neither the Flight Lead, James Parker (
http://www.af.mil/photos/Nov1997/971371a.html [wrong Parker]), nor the
wingman of
the Ninja flight, which killed Jaques Oliver, were using radar for
collision avoidance at the time of the "mishap" [sic]. I'd be happy
to e-mail you a copy of the Air Force investigative report, so that
you can see where I'm "getting this notion from." (For your immediate
convenience, I have place an admittedly poor copy of that report at
the end of this article.)
>Every day when I
>fly (the F-15E), the flight lead specifically briefs the topic of
>midair collision avoidance and we cover what altitudes each member of
>the flight is responsible for covering. We also set up our IFF
>interrogators to specifically look for Mode 3 1200 squawks, so even if
>the guy's in a Piper Cub and we won't get a radar hit, we will still
>get a hit off his transponder.
While I commend the attention to midair collision avoidance during
your briefings, I wonder if specifically looking for Mode-3 '1200'
squawks is REQUIRED by military regulations.
I further wonder how effective looking for Mode-3 '1200' (VFR)
squawks in Class B and C airspace (where individual transponder codes
are issued to aircraft) would have been in saving the life of Jaques
Oliver. The Flight Lead, Parker, of Ninja flight deliberately chose
to descend into Tampa Class B airspace without ATC clearance. Even if
he'd had his IFF set look for 1200 squawks, it wouldn't have prevented
the "mishap" [sic].
But, let us turn to the matter of adequately scanning the windscreen
for conflicting traffic at high-speed below 10,000 feet.
In the absence of more verifiable/reputable data, let's use Kerryn
Offord's numbers below, and see just how practical
visual-traffic-scanning is in realistically preventing midair
collisions between civil aircraft and military aircraft operating at
high-speed.
On Tue, 12 Jun 2001 15:55:56 +1200, Kerryn Offord
<ka...@student.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote in Message-ID:
<3B2592CC...@student.canterbury.ac.nz>:
>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>
>> How long does a full windscreen traffic scan take?
>
>I believe that the FAA or NTSB standard requires/suggests 15
>seconds to scan left to right (but this assumes only one person
>scanning the whole field of view).
>
>> How long does it take you to spot an F-16 against low-level
>>ground clutter at 12'O clock and one mile? How frequently do
>>you fail to see traffic called by ATC? We're both pilots. You
>>know what I'm talking about.
>
>It is estimated that the average person can detect an object on a
>collision course (stationary in the field of view rather than
>moving) when it occupies 12 minutes of arc in the field of view
>(1/5th of a degree) or (ISTR - badly :)) something like 450-500m
>range for each m radius of the central mass.
>
>Assuming no glare reflection, which can confound any calculation
>on detection range and probability, statistically, it would take
>7.5 seconds to reach 12 O'clock using approved search patterns.
>(OTOH, if its against low level ground clutter, then its probably
>not on a collision course with you :))
[This last sentence may be somewhat true in _level_ flight over
_level_ terrain with meteorologically restricted visibility; it
is not pertinent otherwise.]
If we generously assume that the head-on frontal-area "central mass"
of an F-16 is approximately 2 meters, we find that it should be
humanly detectable at a distance of ~1,000 meters, or ~3,250 feet.
This is roughly 1/2 of a nautical mile.
The table of airspeeds equated to feet-per-second below can be used to
compute the time-budget available to pilots for visually _detecting_
conflicting air traffic at that distance. It does not take into
consideration lighting, contrast, the time necessary to deduce and
make _appropriate_ control inputs, nor the time for the aircraft to
actually maneuver out of the path of the conflicting aircraft's path.
Time Until Impact
Closing-speed Feet Per Second At 3,250 Foot Distance
------------- --------------- ----------------------
250 knots 417 feet per second 7.8 seconds
300 knots 500 feet per second 6.5 seconds
350 knots 583 feet per second 5.6 seconds
400 knots 667 feet per second 4.9 seconds
480 knots 800 feet per second 4.1 seconds
From this table it is evident that the pilot of a military aircraft
traveling at a 400 knot _closing-speed_ has inadequate time to
"see-and-avoid". Using Kerryn Offord's figures, the pilot would have
the impossible task of repeatedly, spending 15 seconds, 8 to 12 times
a minute, scanning the entire windscreen during that portion of the
flight conducted below 18,000 feet. Clearly, there is only time for 4,
not 8 to 12, full scans in a minute. So it is not possible to rely
solely on visual detection of conflicting air traffic to prevent
midair collisions at high-speed. Even if the scan for conflicting air
traffic is divided among 4 pilots, there is no time left to do
anything else such as visual navigation, tuning radios, ...
These calculations only concern detecting the conflicting air traffic,
not avoiding collision with it. So, it is patently evident that some
other means of collision avoidance must be _required_ to insure the
hazard to air-safety posed by high-speed low-level military operations
is mitigated.
It is also evident that the FAA IS FAILING TO PROVIDE SAFE SKIES for
the public when it permits the military to indulge in this reckless
high-speed low-level operation.
Lack of Military Requirement for Radar Use
------------------------------------------
in Detection of Conflicting Air Traffic
---------------------------------------
>Perhaps AFI 11-202V3 doesn't specifically denote where and when radars
>will be used for collision avoidance, but more specific operating
>manuals (for my jet, 11-2F-15E v 3, for example) do specifically talk
>about this.
I would be very interested in the specific wording of your operating
manual. I would also be interested in whether that manual's authority
is regulatory, or just a suggestion. Do you know where I might find
copies of such manuals?
>To assume that, because you didn't read it in whatever
>AFI you did your research in then it isn't a requirement, is not only
>shoddy research but it is also just plain *wrong*.
To be completely candid, I was unaware of any AFI you mention. My
information was taken from the Air Force accident report
(below)[deleted for brevity].
>> Military formation flights ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDERS
>> TURNED ON if they are not the Flight Lead. This bone-head idea
>> effectively defeats TCAS installed in all the airline equipment flying
>> daily, hourly, ....
>>
>> Wingmen, part of a formation flight, can trail the Flight Lead by over
>> a mile, but they are intentionally prevented from displaying a target
>> on ATC radar. That is unacceptable in the NAS on safety grounds, in
>> my opinion.
>
>Want to know who *asks* us to turn our squawks off when we're in
>"standard" formation (standard means within 1 nm and 100')? ATC!
I presume the reasoning behind this practice is due to the
illegibility of overlapping targets that would be presented on the
Controller's radar scope from aircraft in such close proximity. If
this is indeed the reason, I submit that it would be considerably
safer to modify the radar display software to deal with the issue.
With regard to Air Force regulations concerning the use of
transponders by military aircraft engaged in formation flight, the Air
Force report (below) states:
"In accordance with Air Force directives, a wingman in standard
formation does not squawk a Mode III beacon code since the lead
aircraft is already squawking a code for the flight."
So, while it may be ATC who issues the instruction, it seems it is the
Air Force who requires the practice of placing the military wingman's
transponder in standby mode. Perhaps it would be safer if s/he turned
on a landing light.
>Whenever we're *out* of standard formation (e.g. 2NM trail), the
>trailing formation members definitely squawk subset code.
I don't mean to be pedantic, but that is not exactly accurate; here's
the Air Force regulation:
AFI11-202V3 (9 FEBRUARY 2001)
5.4.2. Transponder Operations during Formation Flight.
Unless otherwise specified in Allied Communications Publication 160,
US Supplement 1:
5.4.2.1. Only one aircraft (normally the lead) of a standard formation
will squawk the assigned code.
5.4.2.1.1. Unless otherwise directed by ATC, all aircraft within a
nonstandard formation flight will squawk the ATC-assigned Mode 3A/C
beacon code until established within the assigned altitude block and
closed to the proper en route interval. Unless otherwise directed by
ATC, when aircraft interval exceeds 3 NMs, both the formation leader
and the last aircraft will squawk the assigned Mode 3A/C beacon code.
5.4.2.1.2. During refueling, when the receiver formation is within 3
NMs of the tanker air-craft, the receiver formation squawks standby
unless the T.O. specifies different distances.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubs/publist.asp?puborg=AF&series=11
>If it's so "unacceptable," then perhaps you should be telling ARTCC to
>stop asking us to do it.
If the cause of the practice is a result of inadequate radar-scope
display software, that is what should be changed.
The news article titled "Holiday plane in near miss" at the end of
this post [also deleted for brevity] details a near midair collision
which occurred recently despite the practice you cite.
>> Why not let the on-board electronics assist the pilot in collision
>> avoidance? Does it have something to do with the legal liability that
>> might imply?
>
>Again, see above. We do this on a daily basis.
There is no mention of radar being used by Ninja flight for collision
avoidance in the Air Force report (below). Again I ask, which
_regulatory_ document mandates the use of radar for collision
avoidance by military flights?
>As someone who flies
>fast down in the weeds, nobody is more interested in collision
>avoidance than I am. I *know* that the GA aircraft out there are
>*not* going to see me,
It is your life on the line. You appreciate the hazard involved. You
want to go on living, so you personally make every effort to avoid a
midair collision. But, given the physics involved, is it reasonable
to expect visual see-and-avoid regulations to prevent a midair
collision? Don't you feel considerably safer from suffering a midair
collision because you are using radar to detect conflicting air
traffic? Don't you agree that the use of on-bord radar should be
mandatory for military flights to assist in the prevention of midair
collisions?
>so I know it's my responsibility to detect, see, and avoid them.
Your conduct is commendable, but the military's responsibility for the
hazard high-speed low-level military operations create for civil
flights is not legally mandated by law (to my knowledge). That should
be changed.
>Let's look at this empirically -- you've got two
>aircraft: one's white and flies at 100 KIAS, the other one's dark
>gray, was painted *sepcifically* so that it would be difficult to see,
>and travelling at 500 KIAS. Who's more likely to see who? Well, as
>you may guess, it's far more likely that the fast mover will get a
>tally on the slow mover before the GA airplane sees the tactical
>fighter down in the weeds.
Agreed.
>All of us who fly fighters know this, and we're all vigilant.
I take exception to your use of the word "all" here. Certainly,
Flight Lead Parker's visual vigilance (among other things) was
questionable, and a cause of this fatal "mishap" [sic]. The Ninja
flight did not have their landing/taxi lights on while operating at
low level.
>Now, a few things that you probably haven't thought of. First of all,
>a radar's no good if nobody's looking at it.
That statement is not entirely true.
Ground-based radar is capable of issuing warnings based on the tracks
of the aircraft it "sees", without the necessity of controller input.
TCAS (while not radar based) overcomes the necessity for constant
surveillance by verbally warning the pilot of an imminent collision
without pilot intervention.
>That's one benefit I
>have being in the F-15E is that there's a second set of eyes in the
>cockpit to monitor the sensors when I'm unable to.
Unfortunately, the Ninja flight F-16s were single-seat. But, they
could have lit their landing/taxi lights while operating at high-speed
low-level to enhances their conspicuity.
>Why would I be unable to? Well, you'll be interested to know that my
>job as a wingman is to NOT LOSE SIGHT OF MY FLIGHT LEAD. This means I
>spend 80% of my time clearing the airspace in the line of sight behind
>my flight lead because that's where my eyes are padlocked.
That makes good sense. But, it only leaves you 20% of your time for
other duties; you realize that your visual scan is critical enough to
flight safety, that you devote nearly all of your concentration to it.
But, the physics involved may cause even your well-intentioned visual
vigilance to be inadequate in a situation similar to Ninja flight's.
>If we are doing any kind of maneuvering, especially while low, I'm
>concentrating on not hitting the ground or anything attached to it and
>keeping sight of my flight lead. When my eyes are outside, the Queen
>Mary could be showing up on my radar screen, and if I'm not looking at
>it, I won't see it.
I see your point. Perhaps a radar-based collision avoidance system or
TCAS is needed to increase air safety. Certainly, you could turn on
your landing/taxi lights when operating at low level.
>Before GA starts throwing stones at military aviators when it comes to
>these kinds of things, I think a little dose of "walking in our shoes"
>is required.
I agree with you completely. Military flying is extremely demanding
of the pilot. It is so demanding, that his skills should be augmented
with a reasonable collision avoidance system to lesson those demands.
>I was a Private Pilot before I became a military aviator
>and I had no idea what those guys did.
Then you, unlike Ninja Flight Lead Parker, are able to fully
appreciate the hazard high-speed low-level operation poses to the
concentration of civil aircraft operating in Class B & C airspace.
I still believe that the military should assume LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
for the hazard their high-speed low-level flights impose on civil
aviation, and that the military should be LEGALLY REQUIRED to use
RADAR and/or TCAS for collision avoidance when operating below 10,000
feet. Anything less is stupid and unjust.
Speaking of unjust, read this Air Force accident report [omitted in
the interest of brevity], and see if you can explain to me why
Brigadier General ROBIN E. SCOTT, President of the Accident
Investigation Board, wrote, "There is no evidence to suggest either of
them [Ninja pilots] acted with a deliberate disregard for the safety
of others."? Is not the deliberate descent into Class B airspace in
excess of 400 knots a disregard for the safety of others?
--------------- old message ends ----------------------------
>wrote in message news:<rvfY6.11203$c7.27...@typhoon.we.rr.com>...
>> If high-speed low-level operations are so safe, as you assert, why
>> does FAR 91.117(a) exist?
>
>Well, I wasn't around when they wrote the FARs, so I don't know what
>the spirit of the writers' intent was...but YOU seem to have some
>AMAZING insight into what they were thinking.
Just common sense, actually.
>You seem to "know" it's
>because there's some magic thing that happens at 250 KIAS which causes
>an outrageous danger to general aviation safety -- below it, good to
>go; above it, extreme hazard to all around.
Other than a SPECIFIC safe SPEED LIMIT, what method would you use to
control the speed of aircraft in congested (low-level) airspace?
>Personally, I think it is
>rooted in a number of factors, from the fact that the airspace below
>10K is the most congested to the update rates on ARTCC and
>TRACON/RAPCON radars when the FAR was written.
If the 250 knot speed limit of FAR 91.117(a) was established to
accommodate the refresh-rate of ATC radar scopes, it is no less valid
as a measure to assist in insuring air safety.
>I'm just guessing at the intent and so are you.
Like you, I was not present when the regulation was drafted.
>> What percentage of those "millions and millions of sorties" were
>> conducted at high-speed in congested terminal airspace?
>
>Well, which is it that you're worried about? High speed ops below
>10,000 feet or in terminal airspace? There's a BIG difference.
Asking a question in answer to another is a rather obvious
diversionary tactic.
>> Are you saying that military pilots were required to read the accident
>> report? Can you cite the specific order and who issued it?
>
>Again, you fail to comprehend that just because something is not
>written explicitly in a format you can understand, it still happens.
Actually, I was attempting to find out who was responsible for
informing military pilots about safety issues.
>No, there's no regulation that we're going to be able to cite that
>says "All pilots must read accident report...".
The original poster implied that it was an order, not a directive or
regulation.
>Do you know what an
>FCIF is? It's a Flight Crew Information File...it's a name for flying
>procedure-related information that needs to be distributed to pilots.
>Squadron pilots MUST sign off their FCIFs or they are *grounded* --
>they cannot fly. This is how I had to hear about it...one way, at
>least.
Educating pilots about the circumstances surrounding "mishaps" is a
step toward enhancing air safety.
>The other way was the 4-hour safety briefing I had to sit through on
>our quarterly safety down day. Yes, that's right, quarterly all the
>pilots in our wing do not fly for a whole day when we are fed in-depth
>briefings on these accidents and incidents.
Interactive sessions are probably more effective than reading the AIB
reports in getting all the questions answered. I am pleased to find
that the military is making some effort to inform its pilots. It
would also enhance air safety if they made their aircraft operating at
high-speed low-level more conspicuous during peacetime. Don't you
agree?
>So, don't just say that things were "swept under the rug" or whatever
>just because YOU don't know what happened.
Only Parker knows what he was thinking when he decide to descend into
Tampa Class B airspace without the required clearance.
>Remember when I mentioned
>that you need to walk a mile in our shoes before you criticize?
That is why I cross-posted this thread to rec.aviation.military, to
get the military viewpoint.
>Well,
>this is one of those areas, too. If this is REALLY something that is
>eating away at you, email me at the above address and I'll see about
>physically showing you all this stuff.
That would be most enlightening. Thank you for the invitation. I'm
located in southern California.
>Will you believe it when we show it to you?
Believe what?
>> wrongful death law suit into account. But hey, it's too expensive for
>> the military to make any changes, right? :-))
>
>Hey, man, it's YOUR money either way....taxpayer dollars.
My point was, that if the military thinks it is saving dollars by
failing to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft, it is not working.
This "mishap" is going to cost them ~25 million dollars for the lost
aircraft, and an additional $10,000,000 if they lose the law suit.
But, why don't they shoulder their responsibility in this "mishap",
and OFFER TO SETTLE THE DAMAGES with the late Mr. Olivier's estate
BEFORE the family is forced to sue? It would show that the military
is interested in publicly displaying its responsibility to the flying
public.
>If you can
>think of some way to come up with the money to modify our jets to make
>them "Larry-D Spec", then good on ya. Otherwise, we'll have to go
>through the Congressional funding process which, as of now, cannot
>even fund us enough to give us fundamental flying parts we ALREADY
>have/need, much less new added toys.
My point is, that it's more costly for the military to fail to enhance
the conspicuity of its aircraft than it is to do it.
>> It is the military's failure to assume responsibility for
>> the deadly hazards they create for the flying public,
>
>Rhetoric is not a substitute for logic. You posted a long list of
>USAF mishaps and >one< of them happened to involve civil aviation.
You'll notice that the list you refer to above fails to indicate that
the November 16, 2000 "mishap" involved the death of a CIVILIAN. I
used the list as an example of how I was UNABLE to locate military
"mishap" statistics which involved CIVIL aircraft, and asked if YOU
military pilots could PROVIDE a source of such statistics involving
civil aircraft. I'm seeking information as one military poster
directed me to do.
>That did nothing to improve your hypothesis that military aviation is
>"deadly" and "hazardous" to civil aviators.
Correct. That is not why I posted the list.
>Start showing some
>statistical data and maybe we'll start listening to your argument.
While I am happy to listen to your arguments, I have asked you to
provide the data. After all, it is military data. Perhaps, together
we will be able to locate statistics which mention civil involvement.
>Until then, it's just rehtoric. Maybe this is why you've
>systematically ignored all the other arguments in my posts.
You apparently overlooked my lengthy reply to your post, so I included
it above.
[snip]
>> Please share your definition of "the AF came down hard."
>> Specifically, how hard? Scott didn't come down hard on Parker.
>
>Do you know what a Flight Evaluation Board (FEB) is? When you do,
>I'll tell you about coming down hard on pilots. That's the type of
>coming down hard that hits pilots where it really hurts.
Can you point me to a reference which describes FEB, so we can
continue?
>> What if a high-intensity light (or something like a hand-held laser
>> pointer) were fitted in the F-16's cockpit so that it shown forward
>> during high-speed low-level peacetime military operations, much the
>> way that brake-lights are now displayed in the rear windows of
>> automobiles. You know, a little Yankee ingenuity could easily enhance
>> the F-16's conspicuity.
>
>Just like the "magic" 250 KIAS, why is it that a cockpit-mounted
>(oh-my-aching-rod, can you imagine the reflection inside the canopy!?)
>high intensity light suddenly makes the difference between "safe" and
>"hazard"?
I'm attempting to make CONSTRUCTIVE suggestions to counter the "it
can't be done" military attitude I keep seeing.
If a high intensity light mounted on an F-16 is aimed directly
forward, the pilot of the aircraft the F-16 is aimed at (on a
collision course with) would be able to see the light and know he was
in the F-16's sights and needed to take evasive action. It is
fundamental.
Pilots of civil aircraft are advised to burn a landing light in
congested airspace in the Aeronautical Information Manual, and do it
all the time, unlike F-16 pilots. If nothing else, it would
demonstrate a VISIBLE military commitment to enhancing flight safety.
After all, the military is creating the hazard, it would reasonable to
expect them to take useful steps to ameliorate the hazard they create.
Further, if you're so unimaginative as to be unable to think of a
method to control the glare/reflection, I can see why you might have
trouble understanding my reasoning.
>> They were not effective in this 'mishap.' Perhaps its time to make
>> some improvements. Or, should air safety be frozen in its present
>> antiquated state?
>
>So, you're saying this is a *systemic* problem? Wow, perhaps more
>than just those hazardous, cocky, Maverick, low-flyin', speeding
>around without fear of reprisal fighter jocks AREN'T all at fault!
I'm saying that failing to take steps to correct a deficiency
indicates apathy.
>> What is the military doing to inform and educate civil pilots about
>> the hazards it imposes on the flying public?
>
>Again, a leading question by ASSUMING that the military poses undue
>hazard to the civil flying public...but, I'll play your game. EVERY
>military base has a Safety office who does this. The bases do
>semiannual flight safety seminars in conjunction with state Department
>of Aeronautics and the FAA SPECIFICALLY designed to orient GA pilots
>to the unique flying environment around a military base.
It seems that it wasn't an assumption after all.
>These happen ALL OVER the country. I personally attended these safety
>meetings when I was a GA pilot up in Washington State and I know
>they've been conducted in Wichita Falls, TX, Las Vegas, NV, Columbus,
>MS, and Goldsboro, NC. These are all places I've flown as both a
>General Aviation pilot and a military pilot and I KNOW from personal
>experience that they take place.
I've been flying since 1970. I've never been informed of such
military safety meetings. The FAA informs me monthly of the safety
seminars it holds. One would think the military might consider a
direct mail invitation if they sincerely wanted to reach civil pilots.
How does the military advertise their safety meetings? Why don't they
include their meetings in the monthly FAA meeting schedule mailed to
me?
>There are also USAF-furnished posters that hang in the FBOs in these
>areas (if the FBOs choose to hang them, I guess, but they ARE
>furnished at least) that identify when and where military traffic will
>be flying, along with descriptions of what kinds of military aircraft
>will be flying in the area.
I have never seen such a poster. Can you tell me who to contact about
obtaining such posters?
>The military goes to GREAT LENGTHS to educate the public. If you
>haven't been able to see any of these meetings, I suggest you contact
>your state board of aeronautics or the safety office of your nearest
>flying military base.
It's a well kept secret. I'll look into it. The closest military
base is Los Alamitos AAF. If you can provide contact information, it
would be appreciated. I know how difficult it can be to locate the
correct individual on a military post. At least give me the official
name of the program, or the title of the individual. Thanks.
I expected that cross-posting this thread to rec.aviation.military
would generate some heated discussion, but I reasoned that it would be
enlightening to get the view from the other side. It has.
We both want the same thing: safe skies. Perhaps we can work together
to propose innovative measures which will move us in that direction.
It's just my naive hope. Time will tell if it is possible.
Randy Haskin
> Mr. Haskin, I call your attention to my rather lengthy and detailed
> reply to one of your posts below. Perhaps you missed it:
I wasn't trying to be belligerant, but there were two other posts I
made that were pretty detailed that you didn't answer...didn't know if
it was intentional or not.
> Other than a SPECIFIC safe SPEED LIMIT, what method would you use to
> control the speed of aircraft in congested (low-level) airspace?
I didn't say it wasn't a good idea...in fact, I think it *is* a good
idea. What I was attempting to point out is that there's nothing
mystical about 250 knots that makes it the demarcation line between
safe and unsafe -- it's an arbitrary number that someone picked based
on some set of datapoints and logic.
If that number had been arbitrarily set at 300, then this discussion
would probably be a lot different...it would focus more on *one*
pilot's improper flight at 400+ knots instead of thousands of "legal"
flights at 300/350 KIAS.
> Actually, I was attempting to find out who was responsible for
> informing military pilots about safety issues.
At least in the USAF, every base has a Safety Office who is
responsible for, among a number of other things, collecting and
distributing safety reports and lessons learned from them. Each
squadron, as well, has a Safety Officer who works directly for the
Commander, and it is his duty to make sure we, the line pilots, get
that information.
Believe it or not, the USAF is probably one of the most "safety
conscious" groups in aviation. My understanding is that the USAF
operates the *only* school to officially teach and certift flight
safety officers, making them pretty valuable in the commercial market.
> would also enhance air safety if they made their aircraft operating at
> high-speed low-level more conspicuous during peacetime. Don't you
> agree?
Mmmmm, yes, I agree that it probably would. Then again, there are a
*lot* of possible things we could propose to increase safety, but
they're really not all that feasable. More about this below, but I
don't think that adding on an external high-vis light to fighter
aircraft would be all that feasable.
> That would be most enlightening. Thank you for the invitation. I'm
> located in southern California.
Again, shoot me an email and we can talk off line.
> My point was, that if the military thinks it is saving dollars by
> failing to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft, it is not working.
I don't think is has anything to do with "saving" money. It's not
like the famous Ford Pinto sheet where they added up the cost of a
recall versus the costs of court payouts and decided it was cheaper to
just let people explode when they were rear-ended. The money is *not
there*. The money isn't there to simply keep the airplanes flying
as-is, much less ANY kind of add on. There are actual
mission-essential modifications that have been approved -- the list is
no-kidding longer than my arm -- but lack funding.
> and OFFER TO SETTLE THE DAMAGES with the late Mr. Olivier's estate
> BEFORE the family is forced to sue? It would show that the military
> is interested in publicly displaying its responsibility to the flying
> public.
This, I don't know about. I know that whenever the military causes
damage to private property, they pay for it. I know that when an A-10
lost a canopy here at Seymour Johnson a few months ago, when the
safety office went to pick up the canopy in the local farmer's field,
the JAG lawyer showed up with a checkbook ready to compensate for
damages. This is the *usual* practice so I'm surprised that, if
you're right, no compensation has been paid to the deceased's estate
for damages.
> "mishap" statistics which involved CIVIL aircraft, and asked if YOU
> military pilots could PROVIDE a source of such statistics involving
> civil aircraft. I'm seeking information as one military poster
> directed me to do.
Fair enough. Perhaps a FOIA request can help you get the stats you
are looking for.
> Can you point me to a reference which describes FEB, so we can
> continue?
No, but I can tell you a little about it. It's a process in which a
board of inquiry analyzes a pilot's actions in a particular incident
and determines if he will continue on flying status or lose his wings.
It's serious business. I don't know all the possible actions they
can take against a pilot, but I do know that having your wings removed
with prejudice (as would be the case with a glaring safety infraction)
will pretty much ensure that you will never fly again, military or
civil.
A lot of the "famous" military aviation offenders who've not been
court martialed (to the outcry of the public) have ended up FEB'd and
wingless with no future in aviation.
> Further, if you're so unimaginative as to be unable to think of a
> method to control the glare/reflection, I can see why you might have
> trouble understanding my reasoning.
No, this is not a military narrow-mindedness issue, this is a function
of canopy construction. In a bubble-canopied aircraft, *everything*
reflects off the inside of the canopy. In the F-15, often in sunlight
at altitude the reflections off the patches on my shoulder is enough
to make huge portions of the canopy obscured. My point was more that
an in-canopy mount is probably not the place for a high intensity
light.
> I've been flying since 1970. I've never been informed of such
> military safety meetings. The FAA informs me monthly of the safety
> seminars it holds. One would think the military might consider a
> direct mail invitation if they sincerely wanted to reach civil pilots.
> How does the military advertise their safety meetings? Why don't they
> include their meetings in the monthly FAA meeting schedule mailed to
> me?
I don't know, to be honest. I got mailings about them, but they were
always from the Washington Department of Aeronautics. I can't speak
for how it's done in your state.
> I have never seen such a poster. Can you tell me who to contact about
> obtaining such posters?
I'm calling the Wing Safety Office tomorrow to find out for you.
> We both want the same thing: safe skies. Perhaps we can work together
> to propose innovative measures which will move us in that direction.
> It's just my naive hope. Time will tell if it is possible.
Agreed!
Randy Haskin
Strike Eagle Driver/GA pilot
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>> If high-speed low-level operations are so safe, as you assert, why
>> does FAR 91.117(a) exist?
>
>Are you talking about 300 knots?
Subpart (a) limits speed to 250 knots below 10,000 feet.
>We are flying at the recommended safe
>cruise speed specified in our flight manuals.
Right. It is subpart (d) which permits flight at the minimum safe
speed printed in the flight manual. Though not a formal waver, it
serves the same purpose. The waver is here:
<http://www.faa.gov/ATPubs/MIL/Apdices/milapd18.html>.
>It is SAFER to operate an F-16 (especially heavily configured) at 300 vs 250.
With no firsthand experience in an F-16, I'll rely on your (and the
manufacturer's) assessment(s).
> > Are you saying that there have been no added safety measures taken
>> to make automobile travel safer as a result of past accidents? Is not
>> the installation of air-bags, seat-belts, rubber-bumpers, side door
>> steal beams, turn signals, always-on headlights, anti-lock brakes, ...
>> in automobiles an attempt to make them safer?
>
>I'm not saying anything like that... but even you have to admit that not one
>of these would have happened if there had been only one car accident. Again
>you are looking at 1 mishap and generalizing military flying in general.
Until we get quantified statistics on the incidents, we are not sure
there has only been one such "mishap."
Regardless, IT ONLY TOOK A SINGLE CIVIL MIDAIR COLLISION TO CAUSE THE
FAA TO MANDATE THE INSTALLATION AND USE OF TRANSPONDERS IN THE ENTIRE
CIVIL AVIATION FLEET (except those not equipped with electrical
systems), as I recall.
>> Are you saying that military pilots were required to read the accident
>> report? Can you cite the specific order and who issued it?
>
>Yes we were required to read it.... or at least be briefed on the mishap.
>Everyone at my base had to sign off that they had read it prior to their
>flight. We later a few months later got even more amplified guidance on
>some stuff that went on in the mishap. We are briefed / required to read
>all the F-16 mishaps. If you disbelieve, contact the Flight Safety office
>at any fighter base and direct your questions to them.
My question above was not meant to imply that I didn't believe you.
It was meant as a request for more information.
>> >Education is the best means to prevent another mishap.
>>
>> (If your use of the word 'best' here means 'cheapest', I'll agree.
>> But, the cheap solution may end up being more costly if you take the
>> ~25 million dollar value of the lost F-16 and the ~10 million dollar
>> wrongful death law suit into account. But hey, it's too expensive for
>> the military to make any changes, right? :-))
>>
>> You can educate all the automobile drivers you like, but it's the
>> air-bags, seat-belts, rubber-bumpers, side door steal beams, turn
>> signals, always-on headlights, anti-lock brakes, changes in the code,
>> ... which will save their lives. But, aviation reform isn't nearly as
>> swift as highway safety improvement. That's because it took Ralph
>> Nader to hold the automobile industry responsible for the "death
>> traps" they proffered on the public before the automobile industry
>> began to recall their errant creations.
>
>If there was only 1 accident Ralph Nader would not have had much of a case.
Right. Nader was dealing with a situation that had existed for MANY
years. There were multiple examples of the auto industry's negligence
documented.
>> >> In my mind, Parker's actions are taken as typical of the "Top Gun"
>> >> (the movie) military pilot mentality which other high visibility
>> >> "mishaps" have illustrated is prevalent today.
>> >>
>> >That seems to be one of your core arguments.
>>
>> Not really. It is the military's failure to assume responsibility for
>> the deadly hazards they create for the flying public, and their
>> failure to implement adequate safeguards to prevent subsequent
>> occurrences which are the core of my arguments.
>
>You call these deadly hazards with the evidence of one accident report.
A man was killed. How much more deadly does it get?
>Calling our entire flying operation hazardous / irresponsible because of one
>mishap in an overgeneralized assumption.
Without the statistics, we can't know how many instances have
occurred.
High-speed low-level military operations are hazardous, because they
reduce the time to see-and-avoid to the point of virtual impossibility
for the typical certificated civil airman. They are irresponsible,
because the military does assume responsibility for this reduction in
see-and-avoide time they impose on the civil pilot not expecting to
encounter a flight in excess of 250 knots, and the military fails to
enhance conspicuity to overcome the reduced time.
>> >You want to talk facts yet you
>> >talk about the "Top Gun" military pilot mentality. Top Gun was a
>movie...
>> >it is so far from fact it is comical.
>>
>> Can you cite independent evidence which corroborates your assertion?
>> The military pilots who cut the funicular cable in Italy recently seem
>> to offer concrete evidence which substantiates my assertion.
>
>Did you read that accident report as well?
No. My knowledge of that accident was taken from fragmented reports
in the media. The story was that the pilots intentionally destroyed
the cockpit tapes. An innocent pilot wouldn't have done that.
>What were the conclusions from it? It's easy to brandish guilt /
>responsibility from media reports without knowing all the facts.
The media often get it wrong. The Air Force should correct the
media's errors, and communicate the truth to the public. I realize
that isn't easy, but the offending media entity could be forced to
publish a retraction, or face a libel/slander suit.
>> It would also seem that the recent China incident with the EP-3 would
>> substantiate Chinese pilots' similar 'fun loving' attitude as well.
>> It's rampant.
>
>So now you are comparing Chinese pilots with the USAF? I can't believe you
>even brought this up.
A pilot is a pilot regardless of nationality. We all love flight, and
the joy it gives us. Some are better disciplined than others. But,
I'm sure the discipline has to come from the top, or the situation
will rapidly get out of control.
[snip]
>> Please share your definition of "the AF came down hard."
>> Specifically, how hard? Scott didn't come down hard on Parker.
>
>> Parker certainly was not reprimanded in a manner commensurate with his
>> actions. He kept his rank and pension, and was permitted to retire
>> without recompense for his deadly failures to perform the REQUIRED Air
>> Force directives mentioned in the AIB report. Is that a typical
>> example of how hard the military "comes down"? Was it just?
>
>I'm not even going to go into this, because 1 - I won't directly discuss the
>mishap and 2 - I don't have the time to research every incident and what the
>punishment was. If you are asking if I know of people who have been fired
>and forced out of the Air Force the answer is yes,
Moot. It was reported that Parker had planned to retire prior to the
"mishap." He's out, of his own volition.
>If you are asking if I
>know people (or of people) that have lost their wings then yes. Just
>remember that you are reading 1 document.
Where does the Air Force publish the others? I had to request the AIB
report for this "mishap" from the Air Force. There is no on-line
archive, such as the NTSB maintains, for military accident reports of
which I am aware.
>Yes it is the AIB, and while it is a summary of what they believe
>happened, there is a lot more evidence than what is listed in that document.
I'm sure there is a vast body of evidence gathered; the report is just
a summary of that evidence. Perhaps the NTSB will share some more
evidence with us when they release their final report. We can hope.
>They presented their best guess given the
>evidence they had. And, there is a TON of evidence involved in a mishap.
>The AIB isn't a jury,
Although the AIB is not a jury, they do publish their opinions in
addition to the facts. Their conclusions seem to contradict the facts
in this case.
>They present the information in the hope that it will
>help prevent future mishaps - not discipline a pilot / contractor /
>manufacturer / ATC personnel etc.. Often times the evidence they draw their
>conclusions off of is not strong enough for other types of action. (I'm not
>saying anything about this one... in fact I know nothing about it other than
>what I read in the report.)
True. But, my opinion of this report is that Scott was coerced to add
a few comments in his conclusion by military lawyers or superiors. It
is apparent to anyone who writes.
>How do I know this... I have written several reports.
I am indeed flattered that someone with your experience and stature
chose to join the discussion and provide valuable information to this
thread. Thank you for the insight.
>> >You talked about my not having evidence. Using a movie and 1 accident report
>to label the entire fighter force or the Air Force in general as unsafe and
>> >hazardous isn't going to cut it.
>>
>> I'm citing the words of the Air Force Accident Investigation Board to
>> substantiate my assertions. If you were actually required to read the
>> ENTIRE report, you would know that.
>
>If you want to talk reports lets talk. Yes I have read the ENTIRE report.
>I have read about 100+ ENTIRE reports.
Did you plot the position of the Ninja flight as reported in the AIB
report? Did you attempt to understand how the INS error affected
Parker's situational awareness and the position the INS was showing
him to be located versus the position the radar track placed him? It
is interesting. I can e-mail you an annotated copy of the chart if
you're interested. Perhaps you can discover errors in my
interpretation of the facts presented in the AIB report.
>I was a squadron safety
>representative, am a qualified accident investigation officer, have been to
>the Air Force Safety School, have been the interim investigating officer on
>1 Class A mishap, and have WRITTEN about 7 or so Class C and 1 Class B
>reports. I am a qualified instructor in the F-16, I have flown 4 different
>blocks of it, have flown numerous low levels...etc (you get the picture).
>Yes you are citing the words of an Air Force report. but you really don't
>have a handle on what each one of the findings means
Is the report written in code? I can usually understand grammatically
correct English prose.
>and you are way overgeneralizing calling all of our operations a hazard.
My comments were based on the premiss that the FAA established a 250
knot speed limit (presumably) based on sound engineering principles,
and the military flies in excess of that limit routinely without any
enhancements to conspicuity. I feel that constitutes a hazard to
civil aviation. For the FAA to grant that privilege without requiring
any additional safety measures being taken smacks of negligence, to
me. It's a logical conclusion. It is not fact.
>I personally have
>filed a couple of HATR's, both for civilians flying through restricted
>airspace with no idea what they were doing... Would it be equally right for
>me to brandish [sic] all general aviation as hazardous?
While those civil pilots made errors, those errors are NOT indicative
of ROUTINE civil operations, thus the comparison is not valid.
Those pilots who violate FARs should be held responsible for their
transgressions for their own safety, as well as that of the other
users of the airspace. I have no problem with the concept FAR
enforcement.
The fact that violations may occur often is not only a result of civil
pilot's level of training, but of the vastly greater number of civil
operations compared to the military. There are over 600,000 active
civil pilots currently holding certificates.
How many active military pilots are there operating within the borders
of the US?
>> >> I always burn a landing light in congested airspace; does the military
>> >> do ANYTHING to enhance the conspicuity of its aircraft operating at
>> >> high-speed low-level beyond that required in the regulations? Given
>> >> the fact that military operations are increasing the hazard to air
>> >> safety, one would expect the military to make an effort to offset the
>> >> life threatening hazard to the public they create.
>> >
>> >We've discussed the landing light before. Can't be turned on.
>>
>> I keep hearing "it can't be done," because the F-16's landing lights
>> are in the wheel wells during cruise flight.
>>
>> What if a high-intensity light (or something like a hand-held laser
>> pointer) were fitted in the F-16's cockpit so that it shown forward
>> during high-speed low-level peacetime military operations, much the
>> way that brake-lights are now displayed in the rear windows of
>> automobiles. You know, a little Yankee ingenuity could easily enhance
>> the F-16's conspicuity.
>>
>> But, I'm sure that can't be done either. :-)
>>
>> >As far as lighting goes... all have more than required by regulations.
But, perhaps not enough provide adequate conspicuity in the case of
this accident.
>> They were not effective in this 'mishap.' Perhaps its time to make
>> some improvements. Or, should air safety be frozen in its present
>> antiquated state?
>
>So are you saying that your idea for a light would have prevented this.
Perhaps.
It might give me a chance of spotting the F-16 traffic ATC calls. As
it is, head-on F-16 traffic is invisible for all practical purposes.
>Look, I'm not saying it's a bad idea. It probably isn't. You've brought up
>TCAS which I simply believe won't work for fighters. Perhaps there is
>another system. Perhaps all aircraft lighting should be intensified? But
>you act as if a simple modification (such as a light) would be easy. Here's
>why it wouldn't be. First, it would have to be something that would "prove"
>to be safer... I'm talking all kinds of politics and crap. Just because one
>person or even a group of people think [it] would help, [it] would have to be tested
>and a contract written up .. etc. I'm not saying it can't be done.. but it
>would take a great deal of pressure.
So, because it would be difficult, nothing should be done? What if
NASA thought that way. :-) Perhaps enough pressure can be brought to
bear to move the mountain; we won't know if we don't at least try.
Call me Don Quixote. :-)
>Also, modifying a military jet is not
>a simple task. Every aircraft we have is in some sort of upgrade all the
>time. Beef up plates on the wings and fuselage because our jets have been
>bent and cracked by repeated high G sorties., new wiring, new software to
>fix bugs in the current revisions, new brakes to fix some of the problems
>with the old ones, and don't even get me started on engines.... the list
>goes on and on. Many of the modifications listed in the 781's won't happen
>for several years from now. Unfortunately the aircraft we fly are old and
>very beat up. I've flown several F-16's with over 4000 hours. Doesn't
>sound bad compared to many civil aircraft except that the lifespan was only
>supposed to be 7000 hours...and that was supposed to happen several years
>beyond where we are now.
Pardon my saying this; I mean no disrespect, but you are a little too
close to the problem to be objective. If the public was informed that
it would be too difficult for the military to enhance civil air
safety, you can rest assured that there would be many congress(wo)men
who would receive letters and visits. Things would change.
>Call a local Flight Safety office and ask how many
>EP's a day that base has... not minor ones, but major, or better yet look up
>how many F-16's or fighters in general we have lost in the last few years.
>Yes... maybe there are probably things that could enhance midair collision
>avoidance... but look at how many midairs we have had with civilians
Just give me the contact information to obtain those statistics, and I
will.
>and then look at how many F-16's or fighters in general we have lost due to
>other things... Let's not forget that when a plane goes down, often there is
>collateral damage on the ground. They have made great strides lately
>reducing the accident rate again... but there is only so much money to go
>around... and we are not even talking about money to keep the aircraft
>combat capable here or up to date with current threats which are constantly
>evolving.
You're not trying to intimate that the military situation is out of
control I hope.
>The days where we have money galore have long been gone.
Bush/Cheney is/are about to change that.
>Ask guys about how many jets were on the ramp last year without engines
>because of money etc.
>
>> What is the military doing to inform and educate civil pilots about
>> the hazards it imposes on the flying public?
>
>I've posted this in earlier posts. In short, our base goes to every local
>FBO in the local area... distributes pamphlets to show our departures,
>recoveries, radar pattern, prominent land marks we use. They hold meetings
>to discuss what we do in the MOA's and what to look out for.
In 30 years of flying I have not once run into any of that. Strange.
I receive FAA safety meeting schedules monthly from the local FAA
Flight Standards District Office, but nothing from the military.
>Twice a year we invite all civilians to our base.
Which base is that?
>They fly our sims, get briefed on what all we do and where we do it.
>It's an all day event. I could go on and on but it seems you have made up your
>mind that we do nothing.
It's not a matter of having my mind made up. It is just that your
words are the first I have encountered on the subject in 30 years of
flying.
>Last fly in we had we couldn't fit another plane on the ramp so many people
>attended. We personally changed 2 departures in the last year to try to avoid
>heavy civilian traffic.
Interesting.
>> >Yes you have less visibility in light aircraft, but by
>> >simply moving your nugget around you can still scan around you. I know I
>> >didn't... or not as much as I do now. Not because of what kind of pilot I
>> >was but because of the type of training I had along with very little
>> >experience. I didn't know where low level routes were... didn't check for
>> >them... didn't talk to local flight service when crossing one to find out if
>> >anyone was on the route (again... didn't even know most of them were there).
>> >I routinely flew through MOA's (VFR - perfectly legal). My instructors had
>> >taught me that we owned the airspace just like the military. I now know
>> >what is going on in the MOA's and would definitely try to avoid it if
>> >possible just because I now know what is going on. While I can't speak
>> >directly for other military flyers, generally everyone (military pilots)
>> >seems to have the same impression.
>>
>> What can we do to correct the civil pilot's lack of appreciation for
>> the threat military operations pose? Does the military need to issue
>> a memorandum to CFI's, so that they can change their teaching to
>> include the hazards military operations create? We both agree that a
>> need exists. Should the military issue posters to FBOs depicting the
>> problem, so that they can be hung where civil pilots will see them?
>> Have you got any other ideas?
>
>The memorandum idea isn't bad.
Perhaps, you'll take the time to suggest it to those in charge of that
sort of thin.
>and like I said, our base currently does distribute flyers to local FBO's.
I wonder how many other civil pilots are unaware of the military's
effort to educate them about military operations. Or, is it just me?
I've been to the FAA Operation Raincheck TRACON tours, tower tours,
safety seminars, ... But, never heard of similar military
activities.
>> >> The pilot of an aircraft which is capable of supersonic flight and is
>> >> routinely operated at high-speed among civil aircraft operating at
>> >> speeds many times slower, should go to greater lengths to assure
>> >> safety, because it is he who creates the hazard, not the civil pilot
>> >> operating within the de facto speed limit.
>> >
>> >I think I've tried to show that we do go to greater lengths.
>>
>> You've stated a lot of safety measures that are required of military
>> pilots, but I'm not aware of your having mentioned how the military is
>> attempting to educate civil pilots.
>
>See above... and that happens at every base I've been at... except overseas.
I'm happy to know something is being done, but it distresses me to not
have been aware of it for 30 years. Perhaps the military in the Los
Angeles area needs to contact civil flyers directly. It couldn't
hurt.
>> > And again..
>> >you are very hung up on speed limits. As I and other posters have pointed
>> >out... we are given waivers for speed because the aircraft is safer to fly
>> >at that speed.
>>
>> Safer for whom, the military pilots?
>
>> Parker exceeded the minimum safe speed of his F-16 (required by FAR
>> 91.117(d)) by ~40% during this "mishap."
>
>Yes safer for everyone. Put your aircraft in slow flight and see how
>maneuverable it is.
The turning radius is smaller, but it is wallowy and very nose high.
>Now imagine that kind of maneuverability or even less
>going 4+ miles a minute (at 250). If you can agree that we generally see
>civil traffic more often than they see us, it would reason that you would
>want us to be able to move our planes out of the way.
It is my understanding that the flight manual stipulates that the
minimum safe speed of an F-16 in cruise flight is 300 knots. I
wouldn't suggest that F-16s be flown at an unsafe speed.
I might suggest that they be flown in MOAs or restricted airspace
separated from civil airspace users, that they take steps to mitigate
the hazard their excess speed poses to civil aviation sharing airspace
with them, that they legally bear a larger proportion of the
responsibility for see-and-avoid due to their being responsible for
the increased risk they create and the reduced traffic scan time their
operation imposes on all airspace users.
>The tradeoff in reaction time / speed vs maneuverability is why we have the waivers.
That is reasonable, but it raises the issue of who is responsible for
see-and-avoid. As it currently stands, each pilot has 50% of the
responsibility. Perhaps it's time to change the regulations to
reflect the true nature of the issue.
>As far as Parker going 40% over...This isn't routine...
That's good to hear. But, it begs the question, why wasn't Parker
busted/fined/penelized for violating so many FARs and Air Force
directives?
>If you have evidence to
>the contrary please present it, but I haven't heard anything other than this
>one isolated occurrence. Call your local ATC? Ask them? Ask someone,
That information is difficult to obtain, but I'm having some success.
>but again you are using 1 report / 1 incident as Air Force Standard?
And, you are using your own personal experience. Neither of us has
sufficient valid statistics to draw a definitive conclusion on how
often FAR 91.117(d) (speed in excess of 250 knots below 10,000 feet)
is violated by military pilots. But, we both know that the military
routinely flies in excess of the de facto speed limit (FAR 117(a)).
>> Military wavers are not issued to enhance the safety of civil
>> aviation. They are exemptions from regulations that the FAA found
>> prudent to impose on aviation, presumably for safety reasons.
>
>Exactly... for safety reasons.
The exemption is similar to that granted a Law Enforcement Officer in
hot pursuit, but it is ROUTINE, not incident driven. You'll notice
that emergency vehicles are VERY CONSPICUOUS in comparison to an F-16
on a routine flight.
>> >> So, you're saying that despite the fact that the military chooses to
>> >> operate its supersonic fighter aircraft at high-speed in airspace
>> >> congested with civilian air traffic (and fails to enhance the
>> >> conspicuity of those meteoric operations), that because the high
>> >> workload imposed on the military pilot virtually saturates his
>> >> piloting resources, he is operating more safely than civil pilots?
>> >
>> >See above about High speed....
>> >
>> >That's wasn't what I was saying at all.
>>
>> Actually, that is what your words said to me. I'm sure it wasn't your
>> intent to imply that, but it came through loud and clear.
>>
>> >I'd appreciate you not trying to
>> >take what I say out of context as I'm just presenting another point of
>view.
>>
>> I didn't take your words out of context, I just discerned what your
>> words implied.
>>
>> >All I was saying is that comparing military flying to civilian flying is
>> >comparing apples to oranges.
>>
>> Agreed. That is why the two types of flying should not be mixed.
>> Unfortunately, the military "needs" to control over 50% of the nations
>> airspace for its operations, yet it still must impose its hazards on
>> civilians in congested terminal airspace.
>
>You can open a big bag of worms with this one. Show me where "over 50 %" of
>the airspace we control is?
I got that figure here: <http://www.cdi.org/adm/Transcripts/801/>:
"NARRATOR: Estimates of the airspace in use by the military range
from one-third to one-half of all the airspace in the country.
The military itself has no idea of how much airspace it currently
controls because no intra-service, comprehensive inventory of
military airspace has ever been conducted."
The figure may or may not be accurate, but in the absence of other
reliable data, I what figure do you suggest I use?
>If you are referring to the infamous charts
>that show military airspace, they can be very deceiving if you don't know
>all the facts. First - Airspace is three dimensional... The charts
>generally only show a 2 dimensional plot.. Often times a very small altitude
>block is owned by us. (low level routes) - What we control surface to
>infinity generally is a very small chunk. 2) What airspace is MOA's and
>civil traffic can transit VFR? (again not advisable when operations are
>going on) 3 - They don't show time allotted... A great deal of airspace is
>only activated for a very small period of time (often as little as 1 hour a
>couple days a week),
A great deal of military airspace out here in the southwest is
"Continuous."
>4 - Know the letters of agreement between the bases and
>the centers... for example... most allow Center to take back airspace or
>limit airspace in the event of weather or traffic congestion. I can go on
>and on... Saying we own more than 50% of the airspace is completely wrong.
Can you cite correct, verifiable figures? I don't doubt that you feel
you are correct, but without accurate statistics, it is impossible to
rebut the reference I cited above.
>Yes we own a great deal but it's these types of misperceptions that the
>military has to fight.
How is the military fighting them?
> > What would it take to get you to offer some constructive ideas to
>> enhance air safety, instead of telling me that it can't be done?
>
>Again... It's tough for me to say a bunch of this stuff because it keeps
>coming back to the one incident... which I can't directly comment on. I'm
>not saying there aren't things we could do to enhance air safety.. of course
>they [sic] are... and I don't claim to have all the answers.
I haven't heard one other constructive suggestion to enhance military
air safety in this thread.
>There is definitely stuff that can be done. But shouldering the entire
>responsibility on the military is wrong as well.
What proportion of the military air safety enhancements should be the
responsibility of the civil sector?
>Try Looking for the next fly in at a base, call
>their local Flight Safety office or the Flight Safety Center in New Mexico.
Do you have any contact information to offer?
>You aren't going to get many constructive comments from us when you start
>out calling us dangerous, irresponsible, arrogant, rule breaking, etc.
So I can see. What do I have to call you to get some CONSTRUCTIVE
suggestions? :-)
>Just keep in mind (for the last time)... you have 1 report. 1.
No one has provided any additional, verifiable, quantified data, so I
guess I should just overlook Parker's reckless operations. :-)
> Lego
>F-16 Instructor Pilot
What I find interesting is that you have not mentioned ATC's hand in
this "mishap" as others have via e-mail, and the military through
media statements.
Also interesting, is Parker's decision to cancel IFR after he was
cleared by ATC to the MTR start point. If he had not done that, a lot
of what he did may still not have been safe, but it would not have
been in violation of FARs.
If his actions are construed as those of a typical "highly trained"
military aviator, you can see the cause of my concern.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Regardless, IT ONLY TOOK A SINGLE CIVIL MIDAIR COLLISION
> TO CAUSE THE FAA TO MANDATE THE INSTALLATION AND USE
> OF TRANSPONDERS IN THE ENTIRE CIVIL AVIATION FLEET
> (except those not equipped with electrical systems), as I recall.
>
You recall incorrectly, there is no such mandate.
Lego
> My question above was not meant to imply that I didn't believe you.
> It was meant as a request for more information.
Unfortunately I entered this thread to give my opinion and by no means an
expert on where to get this information... especially statistics. If you
look up any AF base information, you can call the base operator... normally
the last 4 digits will be 1110 and ask for Flight Safety. Public Affairs
also may be able to point you to some information.
> Right. Nader was dealing with a situation that had existed for MANY
> years. There were multiple examples of the auto industry's negligence
> documented.
> A man was killed. How much more deadly does it get?
I'm not saying it gets more deadly, but you are going under the supposition
that we are dangerous / irresponsible / etc on the basis on that one
incident. You above just said "multiple examples"... where are the others
in calling us dangerous / irresponsible / etc. I know you asked for
specifics / other statistics but If you are going on the general assumption
that we are dangerous... maybe you should be the one to prove the
statistics? Don't get me wrong... If I had them I would point them to you.
> >Did you read that accident report as well?
> No. My knowledge of that accident was taken from fragmented reports
> in the media. The story was that the pilots intentionally destroyed
> the cockpit tapes. An innocent pilot wouldn't have done that.
As far as the tape destruction, I can't and won't defend that. As far as
the other facts of the case goes, there was a lot more than was portrayed by
the media.
> The media often get it wrong. The Air Force should correct the
> media's errors, and communicate the truth to the public. I realize
> that isn't easy, but the offending media entity could be forced to
> publish a retraction, or face a libel/slander suit. >
If you only knew how wrong the media gets it at times... and as you know the
media is more interested in selling a story than presenting the truth. I
could give you several examples but I think everyone here knows how
inaccurate things are. I personally wish they were forced to publish
retractions etc... but often times the stories are small, the
misrepresentation small enough that it just isn't worth it.
> >> It would also seem that the recent China incident with the EP-3 would
> >> substantiate Chinese pilots' similar 'fun loving' attitude as well.
> >> It's rampant.
> >
> >So now you are comparing Chinese pilots with the USAF? I can't believe
you
> >even brought this up.
> A pilot is a pilot regardless of nationality. We all love flight, and
> the joy it gives us. Some are better disciplined than others. But,
> I'm sure the discipline has to come from the top, or the situation
> will rapidly get out of control.
You are absolutely correct. But the USAF is one of the most if not the most
professional in the world. The training / discipline we have is what makes
the USAF so successful. Comparing us with Chinese AF is just wrong.
> Moot. It was reported that Parker had planned to retire prior to the
> "mishap." He's out, of his own volition.
> >If you are asking if I
> >know people (or of people) that have lost their wings then yes. Just
> >remember that you are reading 1 document.
> Where does the Air Force publish the others? I had to request the AIB
> report for this "mishap" from the Air Force. There is no on-line
> archive, such as the NTSB maintains, for military accident reports of
> which I am aware.
Unfortunately I don't know. In the Flight Safety office we maintained all
of these, but most contained privileged information that was unreleasable to
the public. As you probably know each mishap has 2 seperate investigations.
I generally handled the privileged reports and had an entire catalog of
them. The only thing I could suggest is to search for mishaps and dates and
request the report if you truly need to see it.
> Did you plot the position of the Ninja flight as reported in the AIB
> report? Did you attempt to understand how the INS error affected
> Parker's situational awareness and the position the INS was showing
> him to be located versus the position the radar track placed him? It
> is interesting. I can e-mail you an annotated copy of the chart if
> you're interested. Perhaps you can discover errors in my
> interpretation of the facts presented in the AIB report.
No, I honestly haven't. I would love to be able to and talk about it, but
unfortunately anything I could say or try to explain could end up as me
speaking for the Air Force... yada yada yada. When and if I'm out, I could
comment more. It's clear you've done research on this... I'm just trying to
point some stuff out. Such as how often INS drift is, how easily cursors
can be slewed. etc. Let me ask you this... if what he did was all so wrong,
and the AIB found fault with it.. Why are you blaming all of military flying
at 300 knots?
> Is the report written in code? I can usually understand grammatically
> correct English prose.
No, not written in code. But often times when something is cited as someone
doing something wrong, if you don't have any experience in that airframe or
situation, it's tough to truly know how serious a mistake it was. What can
sound really bad to a civil pilot may be something that is really not as bad
as it seems... and I'm not just referring to this mishap.
> My comments were based on the premiss that the FAA established a 250
> knot speed limit (presumably) based on sound engineering principles,
> and the military flies in excess of that limit routinely without any
> enhancements to conspicuity. I feel that constitutes a hazard to
> civil aviation. For the FAA to grant that privilege without requiring
> any additional safety measures being taken smacks of negligence, to
> me. It's a logical conclusion. It is not fact.
All I can say is that we'll have to disagree here. I would say look back
for the facts as to how many military / civilian midairs there have been.
Since I've been through pilot training ( '90), I haven't heard of any other
one. And again I point out that this have been going on with fighters /
trainers as far back as the 60's. Yes the FAA has had a speed limit, but
you could look at the interstate speed limits and how they have changed over
the years as well. I'm not saying 250 isn't a good rule of thumb, but given
the millions of sorties that have flown over the past 30 + years and the
accident rate, I would hardly call it negligence. Again, everyone has to
make their own mind up.
> Those pilots who violate FARs should be held responsible for their
> transgressions for their own safety, as well as that of the other
> users of the airspace. I have no problem with the concept FAR
> enforcement.
You are exactly right and I agree 100%. However I can't call all civil
aviation as dangerous / a hazard / irresponsible from the actions of a
couple planes flying through restricted airspace. Most violations I have
seen / heard about that have occurred with planes that were operating VFR
rarely are located much less held responsible for their actions. IFR is
generally a different. I'm just trying to point that you can't blame all of
us for the actions of 1 report from one mishap.
> The fact that violations may occur often is not only a result of civil
> pilot's level of training, but of the vastly greater number of civil
> operations compared to the military. There are over 600,000 active
> civil pilots currently holding certificates.
> How many active military pilots are there operating within the borders
> of the US?
There's no question there are more civil pilots than military. Especially
when you throw in airline flights.
>As far as lighting goes... all have more than required by regulations.
>
> But, perhaps not enough provide adequate conspicuity in the case of
> this accident.
Perhaps not.. I won't argue that an F-16 is the easiest aircraft to see when
it is needle nose on.. and yes the paint scheme is designed to make it
difficult to see for a reason.
> So, because it would be difficult, nothing should be done? What if
> NASA thought that way. :-) Perhaps enough pressure can be brought to
> bear to move the mountain; we won't know if we don't at least try.
> Call me Don Quixote. :-)
> Pardon my saying this; I mean no disrespect, but you are a little too
> close to the problem to be objective. If the public was informed that
> it would be too difficult for the military to enhance civil air
> safety, you can rest assured that there would be many congress(wo)men
> who would receive letters and visits. Things would change.
I by no means meant that it would be too difficult for the military to
enhance civil air safety. And yes if congress gets involved things will
change. But you have to face facts about money. No one wants to, but it is
a reality in civil aviation as well as military... and you can't deny that's
true. Since 1975 the F-16 alone (not counting other fighters / or other
aircraft) there have been 273 Class A mishaps in roughly 6.3 million hours
of flying, 1 of which is a civilian / military midair. (that I can find), of
which you have alluded yourself that the AIB found the pilot had made some
mistakes. Now if you were allocating money to enhance air safety where
would you put your limited pool of money. Odds are you would try to put it
to where it would do the most good, and save the most lives. Again, this
doesn't include upgrading the current fleet to combat the current threat in
the world either.
> >Call a local Flight Safety office and ask how many
> >EP's a day that base has... not minor ones, but major, or better yet look
up
> >how many F-16's or fighters in general we have lost in the last few
years.
> >Yes... maybe there are probably things that could enhance midair
collision
> >avoidance... but look at how many midairs we have had with civilians
>
> Just give me the contact information to obtain those statistics, and I
> will.
Again... I haven't found any sites about midairs. The Class A data can be
found at http://safety.kirtland.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Flight/stats/index.html .
There is a lot of good statistics there as far as Class A info.
> You're not trying to intimate that the military situation is out of
> control I hope.
I'm not saying out of control... but it isn't what the average person on the
street thinks either.
> >The days where we have money galore have long been gone.
>
> Bush/Cheney is/are about to change that.
I hope so.
> >Ask guys about how many jets were on the ramp last year without engines
> >because of money etc.
> >
> >> What is the military doing to inform and educate civil pilots about
> >> the hazards it imposes on the flying public?
> >
> >I've posted this in earlier posts. In short, our base goes to every
local
> >FBO in the local area... distributes pamphlets to show our departures,
> >recoveries, radar pattern, prominent land marks we use. They hold
meetings
> >to discuss what we do in the MOA's and what to look out for.
>
> In 30 years of flying I have not once run into any of that. Strange.
> I receive FAA safety meeting schedules monthly from the local FAA
> Flight Standards District Office, but nothing from the military.
>
> >Twice a year we invite all civilians to our base.
>
> Which base is that?
Luke AFB. We also had them when I was stationed at Shaw, but not nearly as
regularly as most of the time our jets were deployed to the Middle East.
Actually for us the turning radius can be larger. It has to do with G
available on the jet vs airspeed. Fighters fly differently than civil
aircraft and are flown differently. The F-16 has a limiter to about 25 AOA.
In a heavily configured CAT III F-16 it's about 15-18 AOA. For any given
airspeed / gross weight this AOA limit will give us a maximum G available.
This G available is significantly less at 250 than 300 and can result in a
larger turn radius. You are absolutely correct as you get faster into the
400 Knot + regime about the turn radius though.
> >Now imagine that kind of maneuverability or even less
> >going 4+ miles a minute (at 250). If you can agree that we generally
see
> >civil traffic more often than they see us, it would reason that you would
> >want us to be able to move our planes out of the way.
>
> It is my understanding that the flight manual stipulates that the
> minimum safe speed of an F-16 in cruise flight is 300 knots. I
> wouldn't suggest that F-16s be flown at an unsafe speed.
> I might suggest that they be flown in MOAs or restricted airspace
> separated from civil airspace users, that they take steps to mitigate
> the hazard their excess speed poses to civil aviation sharing airspace
> with them, that they legally bear a larger proportion of the
> responsibility for see-and-avoid due to their being responsible for
> the increased risk they create and the reduced traffic scan time their
> operation imposes on all airspace users.
In general we try. I am talking about transiting to and from our airspace.
We fly a great portion of it below 10K here (Luke Specific) because we have
to avoid Phoenix's airspace. As far as on low level MTR's, then need to be
long enough to conduct the training. As Far as flying to / from the MOA's
we always attempt to fly IFR. In fact the only time we don't are on VFR
departures to MTR in which we are still in contact with ATC and flying a
depicted ground track. In fact it is required for all Air Force pilots to
fly IFR to the max extent possible.
> >As far as Parker going 40% over...This isn't routine...
>
> That's good to hear. But, it begs the question, why wasn't Parker
> busted/fined/penelized for violating so many FARs and Air Force
> directives?
Again... You are looking at the AIB and not the actual evidence... and like
I said.. there would be a ton.. It is the conclusion of a board and not a
jury. The result is based on what the board believes.. It doesn't have the
same rules of evidence as other things do. All I have read is the actual
report just like you have, and where you may have seen some of the actual
evidence, I guarantee you haven't seen 10% of what the board actually went
through in drawing their conclusion. I can't comment because just like
you... all I have is the report to go off of.
> >If you have evidence to
> >the contrary please present it, but I haven't heard anything other than
this
> >one isolated occurrence. Call your local ATC? Ask them? Ask someone,
>
> That information is difficult to obtain, but I'm having some success.
>
> >but again you are using 1 report / 1 incident as Air Force Standard?
>
> And, you are using your own personal experience. Neither of us has
> sufficient valid statistics to draw a definitive conclusion on how
> often FAR 91.117(d) (speed in excess of 250 knots below 10,000 feet)
> is violated by military pilots. But, we both know that the military
> routinely flies in excess of the de facto speed limit (FAR 117(a)).
You keep bringing that up like it is a magic number. What was it based off
of? I know I don't know and it seems reasonable. It also seems reasonable
to allow 50 more knots to aircraft that can't safely maneuver at 250 knots.
Which is why there are waivers.
> >> Military wavers are not issued to enhance the safety of civil
> >> aviation. They are exemptions from regulations that the FAA found
> >> prudent to impose on aviation, presumably for safety reasons.
> >
> >Exactly... for safety reasons.
>
> The exemption is similar to that granted a Law Enforcement Officer in
> hot pursuit, but it is ROUTINE, not incident driven. You'll notice
> that emergency vehicles are VERY CONSPICUOUS in comparison to an F-16
> on a routine flight.
This analogy is really poor in my opinion. We are not in hot pursuit... we
are navigating to and from our areas. We are going this speed because we
need it to maneuver... A better analogy would be a car that can't be steered
properly at slower speeds but can turn normally and better than other cars
on the road at a slightly higher speed. Actually my analogy probably sucks
too... but we fly this speed for safety... not for hot pursuit or some kind
of emergency.
> I got that figure here: <http://www.cdi.org/adm/Transcripts/801/>:
>
> "NARRATOR: Estimates of the airspace in use by the military range
> from one-third to one-half of all the airspace in the country.
> The military itself has no idea of how much airspace it currently
> controls because no intra-service, comprehensive inventory of
> military airspace has ever been conducted."
>
> The figure may or may not be accurate, but in the absence of other
> reliable data, I what figure do you suggest I use?
I don't have the figure. We had a briefing years ago when one of our MOA's
was threatened and they showed the 2-D graph showing all military airspace
that we could use and it equated to about 50%. Again, see the assumptions
below when they were making this assumption. - They were using every piece
of airspace that the military "could use". i.e. anything that had been used
once was shaded as military airspace, and it didn't look at altitude. (see
below) I don't have a better reference, because it also depends on what
assumptions you want to make. Just make sure you get the facts on what
assumptions are made, and in your source it isn't given.
> >If you are referring to the infamous charts
> >that show military airspace, they can be very deceiving if you don't know
> >all the facts. First - Airspace is three dimensional... The charts
> >generally only show a 2 dimensional plot.. Often times a very small
altitude
> >block is owned by us. (low level routes) - What we control surface to
> >infinity generally is a very small chunk. 2) What airspace is MOA's and
> >civil traffic can transit VFR? (again not advisable when operations are
> >going on) 3 - They don't show time allotted... A great deal of airspace
is
> >only activated for a very small period of time (often as little as 1 hour
a
> >couple days a week),
>
> A great deal of military airspace out here in the southwest is
> "Continuous."
What airspace are you talking about???
> >4 - Know the letters of agreement between the bases and
> >the centers... for example... most allow Center to take back airspace or
> >limit airspace in the event of weather or traffic congestion. I can go
on
> >and on... Saying we own more than 50% of the airspace is completely
wrong.
> Can you cite correct, verifiable figures? I don't doubt that you feel
> you are correct, but without accurate statistics, it is impossible to
> rebut the reference I cited above.
I don't know who keeps the statistics. But... when we were at Shaw, the
W-177 and W-161, and Bulldog MOA would be limited anytime there was weather.
Usually it begins by bringing down our ceiling of our airspace so they can
bring airliners over it. Same thing at Luke. The GladBag MOA's usually go
up to 33 / 28k. As weather or congestion comes in the MOA is usually
limited laterally brining the ceiling down so they can bring IFR traffic
through the MOA. If it gets bad enough, they can even close it or portions
of it although that rarely happens. Contact a base a fighter wing's OGV
office. I have no idea about the releasability of letters of agreement but
I would imagine that it is releasable. Again I don't have statistics but it
is not uncommon to see our airspace somewhat limited several days a week.
> What I find interesting is that you have not mentioned ATC's hand in
> this "mishap" as others have via e-mail, and the military through
> media statements.
Again not commenting on the mishap, ATC can be a great tool. Several times
I have had them call out traffic that wasn't showing up on my radar and
given me a craniums up... They have their limitations as well and I have
seen ATC make their share of mistakes as well... They are human just like
pilots. While ATC can help, If two aircraft are VFR I personally believe
that it is pilots responsibility to avoid each other. When they are IFR or
in combination, they play a bigger role of responsibility.
> Also interesting, is Parker's decision to cancel IFR after he was
> cleared by ATC to the MTR start point. If he had not done that, a lot
> of what he did may still not have been safe, but it would not have
> been in violation of FARs.
I have no idea what or why he did that. Only he knows...
> If his actions are construed as those of a typical "highly trained"
> military aviator, you can see the cause of my concern.
Again... where do you get this as typical? A big basis for most of your
arguments makes this assumption in 1 civilian / military midair of over 6.3
million hours of F-16 flight time. Like I said I could say the same for 1
civilian mishap.
Lego
F-16 Instructor pilot.
Larry Dighera
Do you recall the particulars of the incident and what it
precipitated?
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Do you recall the particulars of the incident and what it
> precipitated?
>
I don't know what incident you're referring to.