Muen Separation Kernel Analysis and isolation testing

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Roadmap Muen Separation Kernel

- Introduction to Muen SK
- Separation Kernel and MCSs
- Muen Subjects
- Isolation mechanisms in Muen
- Isolation test (Qemu)
- Isolation test (Bare-metal)
- Results and conclusions



Introduction to Muen Separation Kernel

- a separation kernel is a specialized microkernel that provides an execution predetermined policy and are otherwise isolated from each other
- Muen runs on **Intel x86** platform
- assisted virtualization technologies, used to achieve full virtualization and separation, delegating certain management tasks to the hardware, greatly simplifying the kernel's code
- run in VMX non-root mode
- code

environment for multiple components that can only communicate according to a

• Muen is heavily based on Intel VT-x, Intel EPT and Intel VT-d DMA hardware-

Muen's kernel runs in VMX root mode, while components (so-called subjects)

• Muen is completely written in Spark/Ada, to formally prove many properties of its

Separation Kernels and Mixed-Criticality Systems

- In MCSs, safety critical functions are called the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and must be isolated from the non-critical parts of the system
- A separation kernel is a fundamental part component-based MCS, since its main purpose is to enforce the **separation** of all software components, by creating for each of them an environment which is indistinguishable from that provided by a physical dedicated system
- A key aspect of a system running on top of a separation kernel is staticity: the entire system policy is verified and compiled to a suitable format at system integration time and cannot change in any way during runtime



Muen Subjects

Multiple software components running on the same hardware

Classification on **Criticality**:

- trusted subjects = critical, isolated parts of the TCB, whose failure would break the safety constraints of the system
- untrusted subjects = non-privileged, non-critical functions, implementing more advanced and complex features

Classification on **execution environment** (execution profiles):

- native application = bare-metal 64-bit application, no OS kernel, no memory management, no hardware exception handling and no control register access
- virtual machine = entity that can run an OS and has more control over its execution environment (32/64 bit mode, memory and page table management via EPT, hardware exception handling)



Muen Separation Kernel

Isolation Mechanisms

Temporal isolation Muen scheduling

- Temporal isolation of all subjects is achieved with a scheduler which must prevent any **interference** between guests
- To achieve this, scheduling is offline, preemptive and cyclic
- Scheduling information is declared in advance in a scheduling plan, which is part of the system policy
- The scheduling plan is specified in terms of **frames**



Major frame example (1 CPU)



Major frame example (2 CPU)

- a minor frame specifies a subject and a precise amount of time for which it has to consecutively execute (without being preempted)
- a major frame consists of a sequence of minor frames
- Major frames are executed cyclically, starting over from their first minor frame, at their end

- On systems with multiple logical CPUs, a scheduling plan must specify a sequence of minor frames (major frame) for each processor core
- In order for the cores to not run out of sync, a major frame must be of equal length on all CPUs
- Subjects never migrate between cores (they can only be scheduled on one particular CPU)
- Scheduling plans cannot be altered at runtime
- But multiple scheduling plans can be specified
- The privileged subject τ O is allowed to change among the scheduling plans, through the major frame index global variable

- The scheduling plan, specified in the policy, is organized in a hierarchical fashion
- Each subject is assigned to a scheduling ulletgroup
- Subjects which are part of the same scheduling group can do efficient, cooperative scheduling using handover events
- A scheduling partition contains one or more scheduling groups, whose subjects do not require strict temporal isolation, but only spatial isolation
- This mechanism allows for a more efficient use of CPU time: all the scheduling groups within a partition are scheduled round robin with preemption and the opportunity to yield and/or sleep







- Prioritization with starvation protection cannot be implemented with low complexity and, therefore, cannot be implemented in a microkernel
- A subject can yield execution for the rest of the minor frame if it does not require further CPU time
- When a subject yields, the kernel resumes execution of the next active scheduling group of the partition; if no other group is active, the subject which yielded will be scheduled again
- Subjects which are event-driven can **sleep** until one of the following events: pending interrupt, pending target event or timed event expiry
- When a subject requests sleep, the kernel resumes execution of the next scheduling group of the partition. If no other group is active, the whole scheduling partition is marked as **sleeping** and the subject will be scheduled but **not execute** any instruction, until it is woken up by an event

• A prioritization is not implemented on purpose to avoid any starvation issues

Resource isolation

- Resource assignment to subjects is static and done prior to the execution of the system, by completely describing it in the system policy
- There is no dynamic resource management, reducing complexity and probability of unwanted interaction
- When a subject tries to access resources, such as devices that are emulated, a system component performs the necessary actions to give the subject the impression that it has unrestricted access to a device, while in reality the necessary operations are effectively emulated by another component

Memory isolation

- All memory resources of the kernel and each subject are **static** and explicitly specified in the system policy
- The exact memory layout of the final sy is fixed at integration time
- Subjects do not have access to any page tables, including their own, to assure that they cannot alter the memory layout
- The hardware memory management mechanism then enforces the address translations specified by the page tables, ultimately restricting the subject to the virtual address space declared by the policy

	m
y	

0x0021	9fff 6000
0.00021	5000
0x0021 0x0021	5fff 4000
00001	2666
0x0021 0x0021	0000
00000	
0x0020	1111
0x0020	4000
0x0020	3fff
0x0020	0000
0x001f	ffff
0x001f	f000
0x001e	ffff
0x0011	e000
0x001f	dfff
0x0011	c000
0	bfff
0x0011	0000
	0000



Device isolation

- I/O ports and interrupts are defined in the subject specification
- A device specification in the system policy defines which hardware interrupt it generates
- Devices are assigned to subjects through device references
- A global mapping of hardware interrupt to destination subject is known at integration time
- Devices that are not allocated to a subject are • not accessible during the runtime of the system
- Interrupts that have no valid interrupt-to-subject ulletmapping are ignored by the kernel.



Fault isolation

- kernel from unwanted access by subjects
- when the kernel is operating
- that exceptions are not expected during regular operation in VMX root-mode
- A root mode exception indicates a serious error and the system is halted
- on the **profile** of the running subject
- using the trap table, and handle the condition according to policy
- VM subjects are able to perform their own exception handling, a trap only occurs if the subject is native subject case

• The kernel executes in VMX root mode, while subjects run in VMX non-root mode, this shields the

• Hardware exceptions can occur in VMX non-root mode, while executing a subject, or in VMX root mode,

• Use of the SPARK programming language with the ability to prove the absence of runtime errors means

• In the case of an exception being caused by the execution of a subject, the exception handling depends

• If a **native subject** performs an illegal resource access or operation (violating its policy), a trap and a transition to VMX root-mode occurs and the Muen kernel is invoked; it can then determine the cause,

somehow not able to handle the exception properly. The trap is then processed by the kernel like in the

solation Test

Project goal

- Demonstrating temporal isolation capabilities of Muen SK, by running two separated subjects on top of it and measuring activation latencies
- a critical native subject running a simple periodical realtime task that only prints its timing informations
- a non-critical Linux virtual machine subject which may (or may not) run a CPU intensive workload





Qemu emulated setup

Activation latency evaluation and comparison

System policy

among which we chose the following as a starting point for this project:

- **example** component, which provides a minimal template for a native subject component's implementation
- demo_system_vtd.xml system policy, which provides a minimal Muen setup with two Linux VMs and all the other mandatory subjects for the correct running of the system, plus the instance of the example component
- gemu-kvm.xml hardware configuration
- qemu-kvm.xml platform configuration
- demo_system_vtd-qemu-kvm.xml **scheduling plan**, in which both tasks are scheduled on the same CPU, for the purpose of the isolation test, but in different scheduling partitions
- An instance of the example component is used to implement the periodical hard real-time task
- The Inx2 storage_linux virtual machine subject is used to generate the CPU intensive workload, through sysbench's CPU test

Muen developers already provide different useful examples both for system policies and components,

Scheduling plan

- In the demo_system_vtd-qemu-kvm.xml scheduling plan: storage_linux and example are inserted in different scheduling groups, each in an independent scheduling partition, named storage_linux and example respectively, which are scheduled on the same CPU core
- Our tick rate is set to 1000 (so 1 tick equals to 1 ms), so minor frame durations are in milliseconds
- The major frame's duration is the same on all CPUs (200 ms)
- The task's period is set at 600 ms (multiple of 200 ms), this way the example subject's jobs will be released on its minor frame's start with no additional latencies

```
<majorFrame>
<cpu id="0">
 <minorFrame partition="tau0" ticks="20"/>
 <minorFrame partition="controller" ticks="20"/>
 <minorFrame partition="ps2_driver" ticks="20"/>
 <minorFrame partition="nic_linux" ticks="140"/>
</cpu>
<cpu id="1">
 <minorFrame partition="storage_linux" ticks="60"/>
 <minorFrame partition="example" ticks="100"/>
 <minorFrame partition="time" ticks="10"/>
 <minorFrame partition="debugserver" ticks="10"/>
 <minorFrame partition="vt" ticks="10"/>
 <minorFrame partition="ahci_driver" ticks="10"/>
</cpu>
</majorFrame>
```



Results Qemu emulation

Two different scenarios were analysed

- running the system without interacting with the Linux VMs (no 1. commands running)
- 2. running the system while executing the sysbench cpu test in the storage linux VM
- All the logs on the serial output were readable through Qemu's serial.out file, and were then compared in both scenarios
- With emulation, timing behaviour is not predictable nor accurate



- it's stressing the CPU, thus the unexpected lower activation latencies of the RT task
- For this reason, we decided to run the tests directly on hardware, with a bare-metal execution of Muen SK and no emulation/virtualization layer in between

• When sysbench is executing, Linux's CFS gives more execution time to Qemu process when

Bare-metal hardware setup

Activation latency evaluation and comparison

- In order to run Muen SK directly on hardware, we used a Lenovo ThinkPad L440 laptop, as it is the most similar hardware (in our possession) to those of Muen's official supported hardware list
- Its specifications are basically the same as the Lenovo ThinkPad T440s, except minor differences

When porting the system from Qemu to real hardware, slight modifications were needed:

- the real-time task (example component) and the demo_system_vtd.xml system policy remained unchanged
- as the L440 still has the same number (2) of CPU cores as the emulated setup, the demo_system_vtd-qemu-kvm.xml scheduling plan was only renamed as demo_system_vtd-lenovo-l440.xml, to match the new hardware configuration

- the hardware description hardware/lenovol440.xml file was extracted with the mugenhwcfg tool, using the mugenhwcfg-live ISO image on a bootable USB drive
 - for the purpose of this project, the platform description provided by Muen developers for the Lenovo ThinkPad T440s laptop was sufficient and was only renamed as platform/lenovol440.xml
 - The Muen system defined via this system policy was then transformed and integrated by the provided toolchain to finally generate an ISO image, which was booted on the L440 laptop



Intel ANTTM **Active Management Technology**

- The Intel Core i5-4300M processor of this laptop supports Intel AMT technology, which turned out to be crucial for this project
- Among all the useful management tools, it includes the **Serial-over-LAN** feature, which allows, when properly configured, to read the serial output on another computer, through the network, using tools like MeshCommander

MeshCommander

Computer: None

Disconnect

System Status Remote Desktop Hardware Information Event Log Audit Log Storage Network Setting: Internet Setting Security Settings Agent Presence System Defense User Accounts Subscriptions Wake Alarms Script Editor WSMAN Browser

Serial-over-LAN Terminal

l	Disconr	nect	Connected	l				
	Ctl-C	Ctl-	XESC	Backspace	Paste			
		Ctl-C	Ctl-C Ctl-2	Ctl-C Ctl-X ESC	CtI-C CtI-X ESC Backspace	Ctl-C Ctl-X ESC Backspace Paste	CtI-C CtI-X ESC Backspace Paste	CtI-C CtI-X ESC Backspace Paste

Results Bare-metal hardware execution

The same two scenarios as before were analysed, running the system with and without the sysbench cpu test.

The RT task's logs in all 4 scenarios were then compared:

- 1. Qemu emulated
- 2. Qemu emulated, sysbench cpu test running
- 3. Bare-metal
- 4. Bare-metal, sysbench cpu test running

With the following interesting findings:

- the overall logic behavior between the emulated setup and bare-metal execution is the same, but it is **temporally accurate** on real hardware
- with the real-time task's period set sufficiently high to match its WCET, on the bare-metal execution no deadline misses occur, and this is not influenced when the CPU is loaded using the sysbench test on the storage_linux VM (which runs on the same processor as the example task)
- not only the CPU load does not cause any deadline misses, but it doesn't induce any noticeable increase in the task's activation latency, either



Hardware results



Overall results

