

## EPS, TP and Rating changes

(% change)	EPS		TP		Rating
	T+1	T+2	Chg	Up/Dn	
Navitas Ltd	(2)	6	8	12	O (O)
Treasury Wine	(22)	(21)	(16)	(13)	U (U)
Adani Enterprises Ltd.	(21)	(1)	(1)	(18)	U (U)
Bank of India	(9)	(13)	(26)	(13)	U (N)
Grasim	(16)	(28)	(10)	14	O (O)
Hero Motocorp Ltd	(4)	(3)	2	(3)	U (U)
Indian Overseas Bank	(6)	(38)	(44)	(18)	U (U)
IDFC	3	(8)	(11)	37	O (O)
Marico Ltd	2	(4)	0	14	O (O)
Petronet LNG Limited	(22)	(15)	(11)	7	N (N)
Punjab National Bank	(9)	(4)	0	1	N (N)
Union Bank of India	(2)	(10)	(19)	(10)	U (U)
VGI Global Media PCL	(13)	(21)	(29)	14	N (O)

## Connecting clients to corporates

## Hong Kong / China

## Seoul Semiconductor Co Ltd (046890.KQ)

Date 19-21 February, Hong Kong  
Analyst Keon Han

## Linc Energy (LINC.SI)

Date 25 February, Hong Kong  
Analyst David Hewitt

## Singapore

## Seoul Semiconductor Co Ltd (046890.KQ)

Date 17-18 February, Singapore  
Analyst Keon Han

## Linc Energy (LINC.SI)

Date 24 February, Singapore  
Analyst David Hewitt

## US

## China Mobile Games and Entertainment Group Limited (CMGE.O)

Date 10-12 February, US  
Analyst Dick Wei

## Others

## PT Indoritel Makmur International Tbk (DNET.JK)

Date 13 February, Kuala Lumpur  
Analyst Ella Nusantoro

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Date 24-28 March, Hong Kong

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## Top of the pack ...

## India IT Services Sector

New report: The 3QFY14 chartbook

Anantha Narayan (3)

## India Market Strategy

Sustainable improvement in sales tax collections in States

Neelkanth Mishra (4)

## Bank of India (BOI.BO) – Downgrade to U

Still not reached the bottom

Ashish Gupta (5)

## PTT Global Chemical (PTTGC.BK) – Maintain O


Positive outlook, a buying opportunity

Paworamon (Poom) Suvarnatemee, CFA (6)

## CS pic of the day

## How close to trough valuations? – MSCI Asia ex. Japan price-to-book

The biggest concerns in our recent client visits in Singapore were EM contagion and China financial system fragility. Given these concerns, we highlight that MSCI Asia ex. Japan price-to-book has now dropped to 1.45x, just shy of the 1.42x reached at last June's lows. MSCI Korea and China appear closest to trough valuations. Given the differences between Asia and Turkey/ Argentina on current account position, forex reserves and inflation, we continue to suggest buying the dips.



Source: MSCI

## ... and the whole pack

## Regional

## Jump-Start

How close to trough valuations — Jump-Start highlights the best of our research this week

Manish Nigam (7)

## Australia

## Navitas Ltd (NVT.AX) – Maintain O

Expensive, but could remain that way

Paul Buys (8)

## Treasury Wine (TWE.AX) – Maintain U

Not time to buy: Stock has not been derated on diminished growth prospects

Larry Gandler (9)

## Hong Kong

## Today is a public holiday in this market

## Sands China (1928.HK) – Maintain O

Improvement in Cotai Central to continue driving growth in 2014

Kenny Lau, CFA (10)

## India

## India Market Strategy

Sustainable improvement in sales tax collections in States

Neelkanth Mishra (4)

## India IT Services Sector

New report: The 3QFY14 chartbook

Anantha Narayan (3)

## Adani Enterprises Ltd. (ADEL.BO) – Maintain U

3Q14 below estimates; trading volumes and margins witness sharp decline

Amish Shah, CFA (11)

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Asian indices - performance					
(% change)	Latest	1D	1W	3M	YTD
ASX300	5,136	(0.9)	(2.6)	(4.6)	(3.2)
CSEALL	6,252	0.5	0.6	5.4	5.7
Hang Seng	21,902	(1.1)	(3.7)	(6.0)	(6.0)
H-SHARE	9,732	(1.7)	(3.7)	(8.5)	(10.0)
JCI	4,373	(1.0)	(2.7)	(4.4)	2.3
KLSE	1,792	0.2	(0.9)	(1.4)	(4.0)
KOSPI	1,941	1.3	(1.5)	(5.8)	(3.5)
KSE100	26,596	(0.2)	(1.7)	19.2	5.3
NIFTY	6,120	(0.1)	(3.6)	(2.1)	(2.9)
NIKKEI	14,872	(3.3)	(5.2)	2.6	(8.7)
TOPIX	1,218	(3.0)	(5.4)	1.1	(6.5)
PCOMP	6,020	(0.8)	(2.4)	(8.7)	2.2
RED CHIP	4,184	(2.1)	(4.6)	(7.9)	(8.1)
SET	1,265	(0.5)	(3.3)	(11.6)	(2.6)
VNINDEX	557	(0.7)	0.5	12.1	10.3

Thomson Financial Datastream

Asian currencies (vs US\$)					
(% change)	Latest	1D	1W	3M	YTD
A\$	1.1	(0.5)	(0.4)	(7.9)	(2.1)
Bt	33.0	0.2	(0.4)	(5.7)	(0.9)
D	21,080.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
JPY	102.2	0.6	1.1	(3.6)	3.1
NT\$	30.4	(0.1)	(0.1)	(3.0)	(1.8)
P	45.4	0.0	(0.1)	(5.0)	(2.1)
PRs	105.4	(0.1)	0.0	1.1	(0.1)
Rp	12,211.0	(0.2)	(0.4)	(8.5)	(0.3)
Rs	62.4	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.7)	(1.0)
S\$	1.3	0.2	0.2	(2.8)	(1.0)
W	1,080.6	(1.0)	(0.6)	(1.9)	(2.8)

Thomson Financial Datastream

Global indices					
(% change)	Latest	1D	1W	3M	YTD
DJIA	15,739	(1.2)	(3.9)	0.8	(5.1)
S&P 500	1,774	(1.0)	(3.8)	0.6	(4.0)
NASDAQ	4,051	(1.1)	(4.5)	3.1	(3.0)
SOX	525	(0.5)	(4.1)	4.1	(1.8)
EU-STOX	2,846	(0.6)	(4.5)	(0.5)	(2.5)
FTSE	6,544	(0.4)	(4.1)	(3.4)	(3.0)
DAX	9,337	(0.7)	(3.9)	3.6	(2.3)
CAC-40	4,157	(0.7)	(3.9)	(2.7)	(3.2)
10 YR LB	3	0.3	(3.3)	5.8	(11.3)
2 YR LB	0	0.0	(2.3)	12.4	(7.5)
US\$E	1.37	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.6)	(0.6)
US\$Y	102.15	0.1	1.1	(3.6)	3.1
BRENT	108.97	0.5	(0.2)	(1.0)	(1.7)
GOLD	1,262.2	(0.4)	(0.2)	(6.1)	4.7
VIX	17.4	9.8	35.1	27.1	26.5

Thomson Financial Datastream

MSCI Asian indices – valuation & perf.						
MSCI Index	EPS grth.		P/E (x)		Performance	
	13E	14E	13E	14E	1D	1M YTD
Asia F X Japan	10	13	12.1	10.8	0.0	(4.5) (4.8)
Asia Pac F X J.	7	12	12.9	11.5	0.0	(4.4) (4.7)
Australia	(3)	7	15.6	14.6	0.8	(3.3) (4.3)
China	11	9	9.2	8.4	1.8	(6.1) (6.3)
Hong Kong	10	9	15.6	14.3	(0.4)	(4.5) (5.2)
India	8	18	16.1	13.7	0.4	(3.3) (3.3)
Indonesia	3	11	14.6	13.2	2.3	7.0 4.5
Korea	4	22	10.6	8.7	2.2	(5.9) (6.0)
Malaysia	(1)	7	16.4	15.3	0.5	(5.7) (6.2)
Pakistan	2	22	10.6	8.7	(0.3)	0.9 0.9
Philippines	8	7	19.0	17.7	0.9	1.1 1.1
Singapore	(4)	8	14.2	13.1	(0.5)	(5.0) (5.7)
Sri Lanka	30	11	15.8	14.3	(0.2)	(1.7) (1.7)
Taiwan	12	12	12.1	10.8	(0.2)	(1.9) (1.9)
Japan	35	71	23.7	15.6	0.0	0.0 0.0

\* IBES estimates

<b>Bank of India (BOI.BO) – Downgrade to U</b>	Ashish Gupta (5)
Still not reached the bottom	
<b>Grasim (GRAS.BO) – Maintain O</b>	Anubhav Aggarwal (12)
Holding company discount to narrow driven by Chinese anti-dumping duty	
<b>Hero Motocorp Ltd (HROM.BO) – Maintain U</b>	Jatin Chawla (13)
Disappointing quarter on margin miss	
<b>Indian Overseas Bank (IOBK.BO) – Maintain U</b>	Ashish Gupta (14)
3QFY14:	
<b>Infrastructure Development Finance Co Ltd (IDFC.BO) – Maintain O</b>	Ashish Gupta (15)
In a waiting mode	
<b>Marico Ltd (MRCO.BO) – Maintain O</b>	Arnab Mitra (16)
3QFY14: Volume growth weakness clouds earnings beat	
<b>Maruti Suzuki India Ltd (MRTI.BO) – Maintain O</b>	Jatin Chawla (17)
Intent seems fine; more specifics would have helped	
<b>Petronet LNG Limited (PLNG.BO) – Maintain N</b>	Sanjay Mookim (18)
Lower utilisations, high LNG prices hurt; valuations supported by long-term contracts	
<b>Punjab National Bank Ltd (PNBK.BO) – Maintain N</b>	Ashish Gupta (19)
Rising opex burden drags pre-provision profitability	
<b>Union Bank of India (UNBK.BO) – Maintain U</b>	Ashish Gupta (20)
Weak profitability; constrained for capital	
<b>Japan</b>	
<b>Honda Motor (7267) – Maintain O</b>	Issei Takahashi (21)
3Q results: 4Q EPS guidance near ¥100 is noteworthy	
<b>Pakistan</b>	
<b>Pakistan 360° Tracker – Maintain OW</b>	Farhan Rizvi, CFA (22)
New report: Picking up where we left off in December	
<b>Philippines</b>	
<b>Philippines Economics: GDP (4Q13)</b>	Michael Wan (23)
Unfazed by the Typhoon	
<b>South Korea</b>	
<b>Korea Economics</b>	Christiaan Tuntono (24)
Export growth slowed in January, narrowing the trade surplus as per seasonal trend	
<b>Thailand</b>	
<b>PTT Global Chemical (PTTGC.BK) – Maintain O</b>	Paworamon (Poom) Suvarnatemee, CFA (6)
Positive outlook, a buying opportunity	
<b>VGI Global Media PCL (VGI.BK) – Downgrade to N</b>	Warayut Luangmettakul (25)
Overwhelming cyclical elements	

**2014 II All-Asia Research Poll**

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Top of the pack ...

India IT Services Sector

New report: The 3QFY14 chartbook

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Sagar Rastogi / Research Analyst / 91 22 6777 3851 / sagar.rastogi@credit-suisse.com

- We look at growth trends in the sector on a rolling 12-month basis (excluding acquisitions) – this smoothens out the element of seasonality and any spike in a particular quarter caused by a particular client group, geography, etc. Click [here](#) for full report.
- Revenue growth has been accelerating for the past three quarters. US, financials, Europe are all accelerating. Telecom remains muted but is picking up as well – expectations are low and this segment can be a dark horse. Discretionary spend is picking up.
- The street is still not expecting acceleration in FY15. The above trends indicate that there could be some upside surprise to revenue growth numbers in FY15. While we think a FY11 type acceleration is unlikely, any upside surprise will drive upward earnings revisions and keep P/E multiples steady or possibly even re-rate them to some extent.
- HCLT and TCS remain our top picks. They are growing the fastest and with tremendous margin performance. Wipro has significant scope to improve margins. Some of Infosys' cited margin buffers may not necessarily be so, in our view.

Valuation metrics

Company	Ticker	Rating	Price		Year	P/E (x)		P/B (x)
			Local	Target		T	T+1	
Tata Consultancy	TCS.BO	O	2,236	2,750	03/13	23.4	20.3	8.7
Infosys Ltd	INFY.BO	N	3,699	3,800	03/13	19.7	16.9	4.7
Wipro	WIPR.BO	O	575	650	03/13	18.5	15.7	4.2
HCL Tech	HCLT.BO	O	1,465	1,675	06/13	16.7	14.6	5.4

Note: O = OUTPERFORM, N = NEUTRAL, U = UNDERPERFORM

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Dec-13 results indicate clear acceleration in growth

Whichever way the Dec-13 results of the top four India-listed companies are dissected, there are clear indications of a pick-up in trends. Overall revenue growth has been accelerating for the past three quarters and US, financials, Europe – three important segments – are all accelerating. Discretionary spending is picking up, and this can create incremental growth. Telecom remains muted but is showing some signs of a pick-up and can be a "dark horse" in 2014


Consensus revenue growth expectations currently do not build in a significant pick-up in FY15 vs. FY14

While we think a FY11 type acceleration is unlikely, any upside surprise will drive upward earnings revisions and keep P/E multiples steady or possibly even re-rate them to some extent.

HCLT and TCS remain top picks


They are growing the fastest and with tremendous margin performance. HCLT's cash flow growth has been significantly ahead of peers for three quarters now. Utilisation and employee provisions have been cited as margin buffers for Infosys - in the past 12 months, Infosys has had the highest utilisation increase but the lowest margin increase. Employee provisions have also only normalised to historical levels.

Figure 1: Revenue growth has been accelerating for three quarters




Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

Figure 2: TCS and HCLT have best growth with strong margin performance




Notes: \*LTM, US\$ \*\*LTM EBIT margin, \*\*\*Change in LTM EBIT margin over the past two years in bp. Source: Company data

Figure 3: Discretionary spending can create extra growth



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

Figure 4: Consensus is still not building in any acceleration



Source: Company data, Consensus estimates (Thomson Reuters)


India Market Strategy

Sustainable improvement in sales tax collections in States

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- During 2010-13, state-level receipts witnessed a 20% CAGR despite a slowing economy, keeping state fiscal deficits low. 54% of the rise in receipts came from sales tax (Fig 1): as % of total receipts it has risen since 2002, and the growth is widespread (Fig 3).
- Contrary to popular belief taxes on Property (12%) and Liquor (11%) were relatively small contributors to the growth in receipts. They are also concentrated in just 5-6 states: those with metros in case of property tax, and TN, Karnataka, AP, UP & MH for liquor.
- Remarkably, the growth in sales tax collections has been faster than nominal GDP growth, implying better compliance/a wider tax net. While the increase in petrol/diesel prices has helped sales tax collections, they have only contributed to a fourth of the increase, and have grown slower than average: their share has fallen.
- Thus, the rise in sales tax collections looks sustainable and likely due to delayed gains from the start of VAT (2005), better enforcement (computerisation) and a wider base. It shows how structural reforms show up with a lag, and how focusing only on the central govt. paints a misleading picture of the economy.

Figure 1: Sales tax growth explains more than half of incremental growth




Source: Budget documents, RBI, Credit Suisse estimates.

State's own revenue receipts: Structural shift

In our note on 30-Jan, we showed how state deficits are stabilising at low levels, thanks to the strong growth in revenue receipts (see [here](#)). Here, we investigate the source of this growth in receipts.

During 2010-13, state receipts witnessed a 20% CAGR. 54% of this came from the growth in sales tax (Fig 1), much in excess of the 44% share of total receipts it had in FY10.

Figure 2: Sales taxes grew much faster than average (FY10-13)




Source: Budget documents, RBI, Credit Suisse estimates.

Liquor/Property taxes have mattered less than sales tax

Taxes on Property and Liquor, widely believed to be driving the surge in taxes, also grew, but had a much smaller contribution to overall growth in receipts. Moreover, these are concentrated in a few states: two-thirds of all property taxes come from the six states that have metros: MH (Mumbai, Pune), UP (Noida, Ghaziabad), TN (Chennai), WB (Kolkata), KA (Bangalore) and AP (Hyderabad). Similarly, almost two-thirds of liquor taxes from just five states: TN, KA, AP, UP and MH.

Sales tax growth on the other hand has been growing across states (Fig 3). As a result, the proportion of sales tax in revenue receipts has been consistently growing since at least 2002.

Figure 3: All major states have seen 20%+ sales tax growth since 2010




Source: Budget documents, RBI, Credit Suisse estimates.

Sales tax collection growing faster than state GDPs

Activity-based taxes such as sales tax are generally not as cyclical as profit-based taxes such as, say, corporate income tax, and also benefit from inflation. However, we note that sales tax as a % of state GDPs has been climbing, implying better compliance/wider tax net.

Figure 4: Barring Rajasthan, all major states grew sales tax as % of GDP



Source: Budget documents, RBI, Credit Suisse estimates.

While the proportion of sales tax on oil products such as diesel and petrol has slipped from 36% in FY08 to 27% in FY13, rising petrol and diesel prices have helped increase collections: a fourth of the incremental sales tax growth came from sales tax on oil products. But bulk of the increase came from elsewhere: likely delayed gains from the VAT implementation, computerisation, and better enforcement and compliance.

**Bank of India----- Downgrade to UNDERPERFORM**

**Still not reached the bottom**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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Prashant Kumar / Research Analyst / 91 22 6777 3942 / prashant.kumar.3@credit-suisse.com

- Bank of India's 3Q14 net profit fell 27% YoY, 33% below estimate, on a significant rise in NPL provisions (~1.6% vs 1.1% in 2Q13). Asset quality worsened, contrary to management guidance of a QoQ improvement, with impaired asset additions rising to ~3.3%.
- Loan growth, surprisingly, continued to be very high, at 27% YoY, across almost all segments. PPOp growth was muted at 14% YoY, even as balance sheet grew 29% YoY, primarily as opex growth (+20% YoY) remained high, driven by employee provisions.
- Restructuring in 3Q was at Rs11.5 bn with further Rs15-17 bn restructuring likely in 4Q. Gross NPL declined ~12 bp QoQ despite high slippages (2.1% annual.) as the bank sold NPLs (of ~Rs12 bn in 3Q) to ARCs, boosting recoveries. Including security receipts, total unprovided for problem loans for the bank are ~93% of its net worth.
- Tier 1 ratio continues to be low at ~7.85% despite equity infusion by Gol. As loan growth remains high and profitability remains weak (ROA 0.6%, ROE 13%), we believe the bank will further need large capital injections. We cut EPS 9-15% on higher provisions and frequent dilution; reduce TP to Rs162; downgrade to UNDERPERFORM.

restructuring of ~Rs15-17 bn in 4Q, including accounts of ~Rs4 bn from NPLs likely being upgraded post restructuring. Including security receipts, total unprovided for problem loans for the bank is ~93% of its net worth.

**Figure 1: 3Q14 results summary**

(Rs mn)	3Q14	3Q13	YoY (%)	2Q14	QoQ (%)
<b>Nil</b>	<b>27,190</b>	<b>23,085</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>25,269</b>	<b>8%</b>
Core non-interest income	9,701	8,511	14%	10,393	-7%
Total income	36,892	31,596	17%	35,661	3%
Total opex	16,722	13,898	20%	15,249	10%
Pre-prov profits	20,170	17,698	14%	20,412	-1%
Total provisions	13,697	8,958	53%	12,773	7%
<b>Operating profits</b>	<b>6,472</b>	<b>8,740</b>	<b>-26%</b>	<b>7,639</b>	<b>-15%</b>
Treasury*	930	660	41%	1,060	-12%
PBT	7,402	9,400	-21%	8,699	-15%
<b>Reported profit</b>	<b>5,858</b>	<b>8,035</b>	<b>-27%</b>	<b>6,215</b>	<b>-6%</b>
<b>Key parameters (Rs bn)</b>					
Advances	3,517	2,765	27%	3,322	6%
Deposits	4,541	3,491	30%	4,323	5%
NIM (%)	2.4%	2.4%	1	2.4%	-2
CASA (%)	30.0%	33.8%	-383	29.7%	27
Tier 1 (%)	8.1%	7.6%	46	8.1%	-3
<b>ROA (%)</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>-35</b>	<b>0.5%</b>	<b>-5</b>
Gross NPA (%)	2.8%	3.1%	-27	2.9%	-12
<b>Net NPA (%)</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>	<b>-23</b>	<b>1.9%</b>	<b>-11</b>
Coverage ratio (%)	38.7%	36.7%	192	37.7%	98
Restr'd loans (%)	5.2%	6.6%	-134	5.3%	-5

\*Treasury = profit from sales of investments - investment depreciation. Source:

Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

ibg/RIC	BOI IN / BOI.BO	Price (30 Jan 14 , Rs)	186.35		
Rating (prev. rating)	U (N) [V]	TP (prev. TP Rs)	162.00 (220.00)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	642.26	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	(13)		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	4.25	52-wk range (Rs)	353.9 - 130.9		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	13.8	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	119.7/ 1.9		
Free float (%)	25.0	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M</b>	<b>3M</b>	<b>12M</b>
Major shareholders	LIC (13.5%)	Absolute (%)	(23.3)	(15.9)	(47.2)
		Relative (%)	(20.3)	(12.6)	(50.2)
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
Pre-prov Op profit (Rs mn)	62,456.5	69,669.2	79,033.8	97,229.4	120,415.8
Net profit (Rs mn)	26,381	27,048	29,833	34,962	44,296
EPS (CS adj. Rs)	47.0	46.2	48.1	51.6	62.3
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(9)	(13)	(15)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	49.0	56.8	64.7
EPS growth (%)	2.5	(1.8)	4.2	7.3	20.6
P/E (x)	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.0
Dividend yield (%)	3.7	5.4	5.4	5.9	7.5
BVPS (CS adj. Rs)	343	381	405	424	471
P/B (x)	0.54	0.49	0.46	0.44	0.40
ROE (%)	14.8	12.7	12.2	12.4	13.9
ROA (%)	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Tier 1 Ratio (%)	8.59	8.20	7.81	7.80	7.48

Note 1: Bank of India is the 5th largest government-owned bank in India with 3,500 branches and an asset base of Rs3500bn at March 31, 2011.


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**All-round weakness in operating performance**

Loan growth, surprisingly, continued to remain very high at 27% YoY and is a cause of concern given Bol's weak Tier 1 and deteriorating asset quality. NIM was stable at 2.4%, while core non-interest income was steady at 14% YoY. Pre-provision profit growth was muted at 14% YoY even as balance sheet grew 29% YoY. Operating profit growth decline was muted during 1Q (-9% YoY), primarily as opex growth (+20% YoY) remained high, driven by employee provisions (Rs400 mn during 3Q, outstanding Rs2.4 bn). ROA was low at 0.6% despite healthy treasury (~Rs0.9 bn) and tax writebacks (tax rate of 21%).

Asset quality worsened with gross slippages high at Rs17.5 bn (2.1% annualised). Restructuring was also higher at Rs11.5 bn (vs Rs8.6 bn in 2Q). Credit cost was elevated (1.6%), despite NPL cover remaining below <40%. Gross NPL declined ~12 bp QoQ as the bank sold NPLs (of ~Rs12 bn in 3Q) to ARCs boosting recoveries. It further expects

**Figure 2: Pre-provision profitability continue to weaken**



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

**Weak profitability, frequent dilutions likely; Downgrade to UNDERPERFORM**

Core Equity Tier 1 ratio continues to be low at ~7.85% despite equity infusion by Gol in the last quarter (8% dilution). Continued high loan growth remains a cause of concern as given its weak profitability (ROA 0.6%, ROE 13%), this would require frequent equity dilution for the bank. Asset quality stress remains high with the degree of under-provisioning being large (unprovided for problem loans at 93% of net worth, NPL coverage at 39%). We cut our EPS estimate by 9-15% on higher provisions and build in dilution in FY14 and FY15. We reduce TP to Rs162 (from Rs220) and downgrade the stock to UNDERPERFORM (from Neutral).

**PTT Global Chemical ----- Maintain OUTPERFORM**

**Positive outlook, a buying opportunity**


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EPS: ◀▶ TP: ◀▶

- Petrochemical stocks in Asia declined 3-13% over the past one month with PTTGC amongst the worst performers. Apart from fundamental concerns on weak earnings (reported earlier by Korean companies) and weaker Paraxylene margins, the news of potential co-investments with IRPC hurt PTTGC's share price.
- We believe that investors should assume the amalgamation of PTTGC and IRPC will happen by 2016-17 with the pricing to be done in 2H15 at the earliest. In the past transaction, the share price direction ahead of the pricing was determined by the margin outlook of each company.
- PTTGC has good product exposure in PE and MEG, which are expected to recover strongly. PX margins are already low and expected to bounce with delays in new supplies. Refining GRM has already rebounded from the low in 4Q13.
- We believe the recent pullback in share price is a buying opportunity for investors on a 12-month view. We expect margin recovery and multiple expansion to be key drivers. Maintain OUTPERFORM.

decide to co-invest, we see a higher chance of the merger plan between PTTGC and IRPC getting accelerated.

Figure 1: IRPC's expansion road map



Source: Company data

**What to expect? Merger with IRPC in 2016-17**

PTT's long-term plan appears clear. All of its petrochemical affiliates would be merged into one. As such, we believe that investors should assume the amalgamation of PTTGC and IRPC will happen by 2016-17 with the pricing to be done in 2H15, at the earliest. In the previous mergers of ATC (delisted) and RRC (delisted), both companies co-invested in a few expansion projects with initial agreements signed as two separate entities. One year prior to project completion, the two companies merged. We expect a similar arrangement for IRPC and PTTGC, suggesting a merger in 2016 at the earliest.

**Margins of ethylene, PX and GRM likely to be share price driver**

In the past mergers of the PTT group, the share price direction ahead of the pricing was determined by the margin outlook of each company. We are positive on the outlook of the PTTGC business, especially PE and MEG. Demand and supply balance is expected to improve over the next two years. As PX margins have fallen faster than expected over the past month to below US\$400/t, we see limited downside and the possibility of a bounce in 2Q14, especially with delays to new projects earlier scheduled for 1H14 start-up in Korea, India and China.

**4Q13 results unlikely to disappoint**

PTTGC is due to announce its earnings in mid-Feb. From management guidance in the analyst preview meeting yesterday, we do not expect earnings to disappoint. Our full-year forecast implies 4Q13 net profit of Bt4.1 bn as we include Bt2 bn of unrealised forex loss. Management indicated that the company would be able to offset some forex loss with hedging gains and book some inventory gains from higher oil prices.

**Recent pullback provides a buying opportunity**

We think investors should consider the current weakness in share price as an opportunity to accumulate. We maintain our OUTPERFORM rating on PTTGC with a target price of Bt95.

<b>Bbg/RIC</b>	<b>PTTGC TB / PTTGC.BK</b>	<b>Price (30 Jan 14, Bt)</b>	<b>69.50</b>		
<b>Rating (prev. rating)</b>	<b>O (O) TP (prev. TP Bt)</b>		<b>95.00 (95.00)</b>		
Shares outstanding (mn)	4,505.98	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	37		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	10.25	52-wk range (Bt)	80.5 - 65.3		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	23.1	Mkt cap (Bt/US\$ bn)	313.2/ 9.5		
Free float (%)	51.0	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M</b>	<b>3M</b>	<b>12M</b>
Major shareholders	PTT(49%)	Absolute (%)	(12.0)	(9.4)	(13.1)
		Relative (%)	(9.4)	2.1	1.1
<b>Year</b>	<b>12/11A</b>	<b>12/12A</b>	<b>12/13E</b>	<b>12/14E</b>	<b>12/15E</b>
Revenue (Bt mn)	500,305	562,811	565,396	598,013	586,562
EBITDA (Bt mn)	47,051	57,279	57,556	64,495	64,691
Net profit (Bt mn)	23,255	34,001	29,584	36,951	36,192
EPS (Bt)	5.17	7.55	6.57	8.20	8.03
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	0
- Consensus EPS (Bt)	n.a.	n.a.	7.42	8.41	8.67
EPS growth (%)	42.3	46.0	(13.0)	24.9	(2.1)
P/E (x)	13.5	9.2	10.6	8.5	8.7
Dividend yield (%)	4.8	4.9	4.6	5.3	5.2
EV/EBITDA (x)	8.7	6.8	6.5	5.5	5.1
P/B (x)	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2
ROE (%)	12.5	17.2	13.6	15.8	14.2
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	46.8	32.3	24.5	14.8	6.2

Note 1: PTTGC, formed following the merger of PTTC and PTTAR in 2011, is the largest fully integrated petrochemical and refining firm in Thailand both in terms of size and product diversification.

Click here for detailed financials

**Studying plans to co-invest with IRPC**

IRPC and PTTGC have jointly studied co-investing in four of IRPC's six projects targeted to start in 2017. Total investment for the 6 IRPC projects is Bt65 bn (US\$2 bn). According to IRPC's plan, these projects are scheduled to start up during 2017-18. IRPC's 6 projects include: (1) 1.2mnt/yr of PX + 0.372mnt/yr of BZ, (2) PP Compound (0.3mnt/yr), (3) Polyol (0.1mnt/yr), (4) AA/SAP (0.1mnt/yr, and 0.08mnt/yr), (5) Bio-Hydrogenated diesel (BHD) (0.2m litre/month), and (6) SM 0.35mnt/year.

**Potential investments hurt share price**

The share price has fallen by 3% after this news, as (1) new projects (non-gas) are likely to dilute return to PTTGC's existing gas-based business, and (2) there is the possibility of a merger with IRPC (the company with the weakest profitability in PTT's listed downstream affiliates according to its reported financial numbers). If both companies

Regional

Jump-Start

How close to trough valuations — Jump-Start highlights the best of our research this week

Manish Nigam / Research Analyst / 852 2101 7067 / manish.nigam@credit-suisse.com

- Asia Equity Strategy: How close to trough valuations. The biggest concerns in our recent client visits in Singapore were EM contagion and China financial system fragility. Sakthi Siva in her report highlights that MSCI Asia ex. Japan price-to-book has now dropped to 1.45x, just shy of the 1.42x reached at last June's lows.
- Focusing on key concerns – valuation and crowdedness – Sakthi has taken out Japan from the Expensive-4 club. Japan's premium to the region has halved from 35% in June 2013 to 19% currently as its ROE has risen from 6.1% in June 2013 to 8% currently.
- HSBC PMI falls below 50... sell cyclicals? Sakthi argues that she is staying Overweight cyclicals as rest of world demand looks strong, supply/capex is being cut, currency weakness provides a translation tailwind and valuations are still attractive.
- Net foreign buying. After eight consecutive months of net foreign selling, foreigners are net buyers of Indonesia to the tune of US\$297 mn. But the other TIPs—Thailand and the Philippines—are associated with (small) net foreign selling so far in Jan. [Click here](#) for Jump-Start.

**Asia Equity Strategy: How close to trough valuations.** The biggest concerns in our recent client visits in Singapore were EM contagion and China financial system fragility. Sakthi Siva in her report highlights that MSCI Asia ex. Japan price-to-book has now dropped to 1.45x, just shy of the 1.42x reached at last June's lows. Given the differences between Asia and Turkey/Argentina on current account position, forex reserves and inflation, she continues to suggest buying the dips. [Link](#).

**Focusing on key concerns – valuation and crowdedness –** Sakthi has taken out Japan from the Expensive-4 club. Japan's premium to the region has halved from 35% in June 2013 to 19% currently as its ROE has risen from 6.1% in June 2013 to 8% currently. [Link](#).

**HSBC PMI falls below 50... sell cyclicals?** In a [report](#) that analyses whether it is time to sell cyclicals, Sakthi argues that she is staying Overweight cyclicals (in particular Tech, Consumer Cyclicals, Materials) as rest of world demand looks strong, supply/capex is being cut, currency weakness provides a translation tailwind (particularly for Indian IT, Australian and Indian Materials) and valuations are still attractive. When it comes to **net foreign buying**, Sakthi ponders if interest is returning to TIPS. She highlights that after eight consecutive months of net foreign selling, foreigners are net buyers of Indonesia to the tune of US\$297 mn. But the other TIPs—Thailand and the Philippines—are still associated with (small) net foreign selling so far in Jan.

Figure 1: NJA equities events calendar

Date	Co./Analyst	Location	Market	Sector
<b>Analyst Marketing</b>				
Jan 28 - Feb 3	Amish Shah	India	India	Utilities
Jan 30 - Feb 3	Fraser McLeish	Europe	Australia	Software & Services
Jan 29 - Feb 7	James Ellis	Australia	Australia	Banks
Feb 1 - Feb 12	Andy Shaw	Australia	Global	Commodities
Feb 3 - Feb 7	Gil Kim/A-Hyung Cho	Europe	South Korea	Other sec
Feb 3 - Feb 7	David Hewitt/ Mark Samter	US	Regional	Oil & Gas
Feb 3 - Feb 12	Andy Shaw	Australia	NJA	-
Feb 3 - Mar 13	Hitoshi Hayakawa	Japan	Japan	Div. Telecomms Services
Feb 4	Hasan Tevfik	Australia	Australia	Strategy
Feb 4 - Feb 7	Fraser McLeish	US	Australia	Software & Services
Feb 4 - Feb 7	Hiro Shirakawa	Japan	Japan	Economics
Feb 4 - Feb 7	Jahanzeb Naseer	Indonesia	Indonesia	Quantitative
Feb 5 - Feb 14	Dick Wei	US	HK/China	Internet
Feb 6 - Feb 7	Grant Saligari	Australia	Australia	Retail
<b>Non-Deal Road Show</b>				
Feb 3	Rajawali Corporation	Singapore	Indonesia	Metals & Mining
Feb 4	Navitas	Australia	Australia	Education & Learning
Feb 4 - Feb 6	Rajawali Corporation	US	Indonesia	Metals & Mining
Feb 5	Starhill REIT	Europe	Singapore	Property
Feb 5 - Feb 6	PTT Public Company Ltd	Singapore	Thailand	Oil & Gas
Feb 5 - Feb 7	Start Today	Japan	Japan	Internet
Feb 6	istyle Inc.	Japan	Japan	Advt & Marketing Services
Feb 7 - Feb 10	Malaysia Airports	Malaysia	Malaysia	Airport Services

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Figure 2: Forthcoming results (stocks with market cap > US\$500 mn)

Date of Results*	Period	Company	Ctry	Bberg	Price (local\$)		Rating	Net profit (local\$ mn)		CS vs Consensus (%)	EPS (local\$)		What we expect
					27 Jan	Target		Consensus	CS		Consensus	CS	
Feb-04 (E)	2013	Baidu	CN	BIDU US	US\$158.68	US\$220.00	O	10,754	11,296	5	30.46	32.06	
Feb-05 (E)	2013	Glorious Property	CN	845 HK	HK\$1.28	HK\$1.00	U	786	769	(2)	0.11	0.10	
Feb-05 (E)	2013	Kalbe Farma	ID	KLBF J	1,355	1,220	N	1,975,269	1,956,299	(1)	41.54	41.73	
Feb-01	2014Q3	Godrej Consumer	IN	GCPL IN	692.50	940.00	O	8,151	7,987	(2)	23.95	23.47	
Feb-01	2014Q3	Grasim	IN	GRASIM IN	2,594	3,280	O	24,815	24,636	(1)	261.71	268.60	
Feb-01	2014Q3	Oberoi Realty	IN	OBER IN	187.30	275.00	O	5,501	7,219	31	17.03	21.99	
Feb-03	2014Q3	Jaiprakash Power	IN	JPVL IN	13.65	35.00	O	2,832	2,145	(24)	1.13	0.73	
Feb-03	2014Q3	Lupin	IN	LPC IN	895.75	1,025	O	16,842	17,093	1	37.30	38.31	
Feb-04	2014Q3	Cummins India	IN	KKC IN	435.00	382.00	N	6,113	6,190	1	22.01	22.33	
Feb-04 (E)	2014Q3	J&K Bank	IN	JKBK IN	1,302	1,700	O	11,758	11,885	1	241.07	245.09	
Feb-04	2014Q3	Jubilant Foodworks	IN	JUBI IN	1,114	1000.00	U	1,520	1,490	(2)	23.25	22.82	
Feb-04 (E)	2014Q3	Taro Pharma	IN	TARO US	US\$101.00	US\$85.00	O	US\$265	US\$265	(0)	US\$5.93	US\$5.93	
Feb-04	2014Q3	Tech Mahindra	IN	TECHM IN	1,764	1,925	O	27,587	27,404	(1)	121.89	115.56	
Feb-04 (E)	2014Q3	United Spirits	IN	UNSP IN	2,620	2,650	O	4,421	5,605	27	30.51	39.16	
Feb-05	2014Q3	BHEL	IN	BHEL IN	162.55	99.00	U	39,541	30,295	(23)	16.30	12.38	
Feb-05	2013	GSK Consumer	IN	SKB IN	4,258	5,000	N	5,170	5,108	(1)	122.30	121.46	
Feb-05	2013	Ranbaxy	IN	RBXY IN	310.25	345.00	N	n.a	2,873	n.a	n.a	6.81	
Feb-04 to 06 (E)	2013	Amorepacific	KR	090430 KS	1,024,000	1,100,000	O	266,411	257,079	(4)	41,987	37,247	
Feb-04 morning	2013	CJ OS	KR	035760 KS	407,000	400,000	O	124,872	148,468	19	20,451	24,675	
Feb-04 (E)	2013	Hyundai Dev	KR	012630 KS	24,450	30,000	O	(102,896)	(79,663)	n.m	(1,279)	(1,083)	
Feb-04 @ 10:00	2013	SK Innovation	KR	096770 KS	128,500	170,000	O	1,080,814	1,064,479	(2)	11,659	11,607	
Feb-05 (E)	2013	GS Holdings	KR	078930 KS	52,200	52,000	N	514,048	544,536	6	5,565	5,861	
Feb-05	2013	Hyundai Home	KR	057050 KS	182,000	175,000	O	200,403	162,486	(19)	16,691	13,541	
Feb-05	2013	Lotte Chemical	KR	011170 KS	204,500	280,000	O	392,650	383,640	(2)	11,557	11,194	
Feb-05 (E)	2013	SECB	PH	SECB PM	118.50	112.50	U	5,659	4,287	(24)	9.50	7.11	
Feb-01 (E)	2013	HPHT	SG	HPHT SP	US\$0.67	US\$0.82	O	HK\$1,949	HK\$1,986	2	HK\$0.23	HK\$0.23	In line
Feb-03 (E)	2013	CMA	SG	CMA SP	1.80	2.58	O	286	254	(11)	0.07	0.07	In line

Notes: Credit Suisse and consensus net profit and EPS forecasts are based on FY forecasts. This calendar excludes stocks with market cap < US\$500 mn. The date of release for stocks listed in US are based on HK date and time, all other stocks are based on the date and time of the listed exchange. \* Confirmed dates but are subject to change, (E) = estimated date, 🟢 Positive surprise, 🟡 Negative surprise. Source: the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL™ service, company data, Datastream, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Australia**
**Navitas Ltd ----- Maintain OUTPERFORM**
**Expensive, but could remain that way**
**EPS: ▲ TP: ▲**

Paul Buys / Research Analyst / 61 2 8205 4538 / paul.buys@credit-suisse.com

- Reaffirmation of FY14 guidance and the composition of a 1H14 result marked by a sharp increase in costs but very strong top-line growth increase our conviction for both FY14 and the growth outlook beyond that. [Click here](#) for full report.
- NVT remains undeniably expensive, but as long as growth looks to be on an increasing trajectory supported by favourable tailwinds at both industry (regulatory, international student drivers) and company levels (new colleges, currency), we believe the stock will continue to trade at a significant premium to the market.
- NVT reported 1H14 EBITDA of \$63.2 mn (+6% on pcp) and NPAT of \$36.1 mn (+3%). The result was moderately below our expectation (~5% at EBITDA level), but the miss was at the cost line, with strong revenue growth (+19%) well ahead of our estimate.
- We stay towards the upper end of the FY14 guidance range (\$138-148 mn), with ~6-7% EPS upgrades for outer years. Our TP moves from \$6.80 to \$7.35. NVT trades around 1 standard deviation above its long-run P/E relative to the Small Industrial index (XSI).

Bbg/RIC	NVT AU / NVT.AX		Price (30 Jan 14 , A\$)		6.57
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)	TP (prev. TP A\$)	7.35 (6.80)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	375.42	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	12		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	0.95	52-wk range (A\$)	6.57 - 4.78		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	6.4	Mkt cap (A\$/US\$ mn)	2,466.5/ 2,152.8		
Free float (%)	61.2	<b>Performance</b>		<b>1M</b>	<b>3M</b>
Major shareholders	Absolute (%)		2.2	15.3	37.4
	Relative (%)		5.2	19.4	31.5
Year	06/12A	06/13A	06/14E	06/15E	06/16E
Revenue (A\$ mn)	688	730	869	984	1,067
EBITDA (A\$ mn)	126.8	130.0	144.0	176.9	197.6
Net profit (A\$ mn)	73.1	74.6	82.6	108.1	125.8
EPS (A\$)	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.29	0.34
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	-1.8	6.1	6.7
- Consensus EPS (A\$)	n.a.	n.a.	0.23	0.28	0.34
EPS growth (%)	(8.5)	1.9	10.7	30.9	16.4
P/E (x)	33.7	33.1	29.9	22.8	19.6
Dividend yield (%)	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.1
EV/EBITDA (x)	20.4	19.7	17.5	13.8	12.0
P/B (x)	10.5	10.4	10.0	9.0	8.1
ROE (%)	30.8	31.6	34.2	41.7	43.5
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	50.1	40.2	20.6	(7.8)	(29.8)

*Note 1: Navitas Limited provides educational services to domestic and overseas students. The Company operates five segments: University Programs, English, Workforce segment delivers vocational and job skills training, Student Recruitment & Corporate.*

[Click here](#) for detailed financials

**Key takeaways**

1H14 result was slightly below our estimates due to costs, but composition and reaffirmed guidance increase our conviction for FY14. NVT reported 1H14 EBITDA of \$63.2 mn (+6% on the pcp) and NPAT of \$36.1 mn (+3%). The result was below our expectation (~5% at the EBITDA level) but the miss was at the cost line, with strong revenue growth (+19%) well ahead of our estimate.

The strong revenue growth/increased cost story was consistent with NVT's previous trading update (October 2013) where it provided FY14 guidance and we were not surprised to see NVT reaffirm its expectation for FY14 EBITDA of \$138-148 mn. As discussed further below, leading operational indicators and current momentum point to further top-line growth, while the cost base should start to stabilise at its higher level.

**FX gains support revenue growth, but that's part of the attraction!** Stripping out the benefit of currency gains from a weaker AUD, revenue growth would have dropped from +19% to +14%, with SAE one of the biggest beneficiaries (UP was as well, but US college losses were actually pronounced as a result of fx moves). We see currency as a key part of the attraction of the NVT story, with benefits from translation gains from its international portfolio, as well as potentially increased attractiveness of its Australian colleges supportive of the investment thesis.

**Cost growth mainly ascribed to investment and implies future margin expansion.** Again consistent with the trading update, most of the cost growth was due to increased investment in systems and people. NVT provided a long list of examples, including corporate and operational staff hires (finance, administration, HR, marketing, academic), a complete overhaul of SAE US management (an initiative coming out of the strategic review, which identified that area as a key growth opportunity), increased focus on placing marketing resource in source (rather than destination) countries and CRM and student navigation systems. As expected, higher EVA (incentive) payments further contributed to increased corporate costs.

The scale of the cost growth (+21% on the pcp) had a concomitant negative impact on margins, but NVT is adamant that the nature of the increased expenditure (investment for future growth) means that the historical operating leverage of the business model should continue to be evident in future periods. Based on what we have seen so far, we largely accept this view at face value, and our forecasts imply a degree of margin expansion FY15 onwards. That said, we have stopped short of expecting margins to revert all the way back to historical levels, preferring a more cautious approach for now.

**University Programs (UP) commentary implies student enrolments are tracking well ahead of 1-Sem-14.** NVT stopped short of giving a quantified update on how student enrolments are tracking for the key 1-Sem-14 period (especially important for Australian colleges), but based on their commentary and momentum from the third semester of CY13 (where new student recruitment was tracking >30%), we believe it is likely to post a strong result in that regard as regulatory (and, to a lesser extent, AUD) tailwinds continue to see enrolments recover to historical levels.

Achievement of operational breakeven for US colleges and the benefit of new colleges (New Zealand and the UK) provide further impetus to the FY14 enrolment outlook. Likewise, FX-adjusted price increases are having a positive effect, with the currency impact offsetting a slightly lower underlying rate of price increase than in previous periods. Mix effect is also supportive as higher fee jurisdictions such as Australia and the US are growing faster than lower-fee countries.

UP remains the key stock and earnings driver for NVT. NVT expects 2H14 growth to exceed that posted in 1H14, notwithstanding continued impact from investment.

*(This is an extract from the [Navitas Ltd](#) report published on 30 January 2013. Please see R&A for details.)*

**Treasury Wine ----- Maintain UNDERPERFORM**

**Not time to buy: Stock has not been derated on diminished growth prospects**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- We cut EPS by over 20% across forecast period. TWE downgraded its EBITs guidance range by 17%, measured from midpoint (A\$190-210 mn). TWE cited China austerity, Australian X-mas and destocking in North America as contributing factors.
- The TWE board was late to understand the severity of a US inventory crisis and the impaired state of the US operations, and also late to acknowledge a China slowdown. It persisted with aggressive earnings guidance for several months.
- FY14 guidance implies 2H EBITs growth of 5-22%. Remarkably, this is broadly unchanged from the previous guidance in August; however, FX rates moved in TWE's favour since the original guidance in August such that a further A\$11 mn of FX benefit was factored in.
- Our DCF-based target price falls to A\$3.15. We cut back future working capital and capex. We expect the board to take a more realistic approach to growth. This supported the valuation somewhat. Our sum-of-the-parts valuation falls to A\$3.25 on reduced multiple for Penfolds and higher net debt. We reduce our Penfolds valuation by 20% to A\$1.2 bn. [Full report](#)

(c) A\$1.1 bn wine inventory should be valued at book, not a multiple of book. Generally, unbranded wine inventory – especially commercial-grade wine – is worth less than book value. Aged luxury wine in barrels that cannot be sold under TWE's famous brands is unlikely to be worth much more than book value. Most of the luxury wine value is in the brand, not in the liquid. The purpose of an NTA approach is to ignore intangible brand value. A multiple of earnings approach or DCF can capture that value.

(d) FY14 net debt is estimated to blow out to A\$380 mn from zero when TWE was first listed.

**Penfolds brand damaged in liquor trade, in our view; sum-of-the-parts valuation reduced**

Our brand-based, sum-of-the-parts valuation has been reduced to A\$3.25/share from A\$3.75 on a lower Penfolds valuation. We reduced our Penfolds brand valuation by 20% or A\$300 mn on less optimistic prospects for Asia. China austerity is a new order to reduce corruption. The gifting and banqueting market – where 95% of imported wine in China is consumed – is unlikely to grow at previous rates. We also believe that damage was done to the Penfolds brand as TWE disappointed liquor retailers/wholesalers in North America and Australia by executing strong price increases – 40% on one line – and severely limiting allocations on the basis that the company can sell into infinite demand in Asia. TWE now acknowledges that China volumes have declined and it is widely believed that there is excess Penfolds inventory in China. We believe TWE will be unable to leverage the inferior 2011 Penfolds to drive its commercial volume as it did in 2H13 and in the Sep quarter of 2013.

Penfolds was previously estimated to generate around A\$300 mn in sales and about A\$150 mn of brand contribution (brand gross profit less brand marketing, no overhead allocation). These estimates may now have to be reviewed once new data becomes available.

Many advocate that TWE sell Beringer USA; we don't see it happening.

Bbg/RIC	TWE AU / TWE.AX	Price (30 Jan 14, A\$)	3.64		
Rating (prev. rating)	U (U)	TP (prev. TP A\$)	3.15 (3.75)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	647.23	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	(13)		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	3.85	52-wk range (A\$)	6.43 - 3.64		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	20.0	Mkt cap (A\$/US\$ mn)	2,355.9/ 2,056.2		
Free float (%)	99.9				
Major shareholders	<b>Performance</b>		<b>1M</b>	<b>3M</b>	<b>12M</b>
	Absolute (%)		(24.5)	(22.1)	(23.2)
		Relative (%)		(21.4)	(17.9)
			(29.2)		
Year	06/12A	06/13A	06/14E	06/15E	06/16E
Revenue (A\$ mn)	1,641	1,689	1,713	1,873	1,939
EBITDA (A\$ mn)	276.8	285.0	275.9	337.2	356.9
Net profit (A\$ mn)	136.1	136.8	162.4	196.4	155.3
EPS (A\$)	0.21	0.21	0.25	0.30	0.24
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	-22.1	-21.2	-20.9
- Consensus EPS (A\$)	n.a.	n.a.	0.26	0.30	0.29
EPS growth (%)	(36.1)	(1.2)	20.9	20.9	(21.0)
P/E (x)	17.4	17.6	14.6	12.1	15.2
Dividend yield (%)	3.6	3.6	3.3	4.1	3.3
EV/EBITDA (x)	8.6	9.1	9.9	8.0	7.4
P/B (x)	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
ROE (%)	4.7	4.6	5.4	6.4	4.9
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	1.3	7.4	12.6	10.8	9.3

Note 1: ORD/ADR=1.00. Note 2: Treasury Wine Estates Ltd. Its engaged in international wine business with a portfolio of wines. Its business is structured into four regions: Australia and New Zealand (ANZ); Americas; Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA), and Asia Pacific.


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**NTA valuation approach never held water with CS**

The NTA valuation approach *does not* support a share price over A\$4.00 or an equity value of A\$2.7 bn.

(a) TWE's A\$1.0 bn of PPE at book has a market value well below book value. Firstly, there is excess winery capacity around the world. In Australia, the third-largest winery was sold to The Wine Group in 2011 for an estimated mere A\$30 mn. Secondly, used barrels have little value.

(b) Vineyard valuations were stretched to over A\$1.0 bn vs book value of A\$230 mn. TWE management conceded that such valuations were stretched in an analyst brief. Our review of the vineyards suggests about A\$800 mn.



Source: Nielsen

This is an extract from the [TWE](#) report published on 30 January 2014. Please see CS's R&A website for more details.

**Hong Kong**
**Sands China ----- Maintain OUTPERFORM**
**Improvement in Cotai Central to continue driving growth in 2014**

EPS: ▲ TP: ◀▶

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- Sands China's property EBITDA grew 34% YoY to a quarterly record of US\$836 mn in 4Q13, in line with consensus estimates. On a luck-adjusted basis, the property EBITDA should have been 6% higher at US\$888 mn (+56% YoY).
- Property EBITDA of Cotai Central inflated 120% YoY to US\$238 mn in 4Q13. We expect the under-utilised Cotai Central to continue to grow its mass-market table daily win by 60% YoY to US\$18,400 and property EBITDA by 67% YoY in 2014.
- Sands China sees strong operating cash flow, with many liquefiable assets. Management revealed that it has the financial flexibility to distribute all its EBITDA to shareholders. It intends to increase the dividend in 2014.
- After the two-year valuation premium contraction, we believe Sands China is at the inflexion point to turn around its underperformance trend. Amid recent market volatility, we believe that HK\$56.5 (12.6x 2015E EV/EBITDA, or its average valuation since 2010) is a good entry price for it.

Bbg/RIC	1928 HK / 1928.HK	Price (29 Jan 14, HK\$)	58.40		
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)	TP (prev. TP HK\$)	78.20 (78.20)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	8,063.19	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	34		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	11.6	52-wk range (HK\$)	66.1 - 34.2		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	81.8	Mkt cap (HK\$/US\$ bn)	470.9/ 60.7		
Free float (%)	29.8				
Major shareholders	Las Vegas Sands				
	(70.22%)				
		<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
		Absolute (%)	(7.8) 4.1 49.7		
		Relative (%)	(2.8) 8.9 56.8		
<b>Year</b>	<b>12/12A</b>	<b>12/13A</b>	<b>12/14E</b>	<b>12/15E</b>	<b>12/16E</b>
Revenue (US\$ mn)	6,511	8,914	11,079	13,022	14,693
EBITDA (US\$ mn)	1,935	2,854	3,731	4,640	5,054
Net profit (US\$ mn)	1,236	2,215	3,035	3,791	4,060
EPS (US\$)	0.15	0.27	0.38	0.47	0.50
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	2	1	
- Consensus EPS (US\$)	n.a.	n.a.	0.38	0.45	0.54
EPS growth (%)	9.0	79.3	36.9	24.9	6.8
P/E (x)	49.0	27.4	20.0	16.0	15.0
Dividend yield (%)	2.3	4.1	5.0	6.2	6.7
EV/EBITDA (x)	32.0	21.7	16.5	13.5	12.3
P/B (x)	10.8	11.3	10.0	9.4	9.2
ROE (%)	22.3	40.5	53.0	60.4	62.2
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	23.4	26.5	17.7	28.4	22.4

Note 1: ORD/ADR=10.00. Note 2: Sands China Ltd. (Sands China) is a developer, owner and operator of integrated resorts and casinos in Macau. The integrated resorts in Macau contain not only gaming areas but also meeting space, convention and exhibition.

Click here for detailed financials

**Record EBITDA in 4Q13, driven by Cotai Central**

According to the operating results from the parent Las Vegas Sands, Sands China's property EBITDA grew 34% YoY to a quarterly record of US\$836 mn in 4Q13, in line with consensus estimates. On a luck-adjusted basis, the property EBITDA should have been 6% higher at US\$888 mn (+56% YoY).

**Cotai Central sees plenty of room for improvement**

Property EBITDA of Cotai Central inflated 120% YoY to US\$238 mn, backed by the 60% increase in gross gaming revenue (GGR) in 4Q13. The mass-market table daily win grew 113% YoY to US\$14,000. With the most hotel rooms in Cotai Strip to accommodate visitor growth, we expect the under-utilised Cotai Central to continue to grow its mass-market table daily win by 60% YoY to US\$18,400 and property EBITDA by 67% YoY in 2014E.

**Figure 1: Sands China's 4Q13 property EBITDA**

Sands Macao (US\$ mn)	4Q13	4Q12	YoY % chg.	3Q13	QoQ % chg.
- Mass-market	190	157	20.6	172	10.3
- High-roller	161	190	-15.2	154	4.7
- Slots	26	26	1.5	26	2.6
<b>GGR</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>7.3</b>
Non-gaming revenue	20	19	1.6	19	3.7
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>-3.8</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Venetian Macao (US\$ mn)	4Q13	4Q12	YoY % chg.	3Q13	QoQ % chg.
- Mass-market	572	363	57.3	479	19.3
- High-roller	556	412	35.2	429	29.8
- Slots	67	71	-5.3	65	3.3
<b>GGR</b>	<b>1195</b>	<b>846</b>	<b>41.3</b>	<b>973</b>	<b>22.8</b>
Non-gaming revenue	187	153	22.1	150	24.8
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>433</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>21.3</b>
The Plaza (US\$ mn)	4Q13	4Q12	YoY % chg.	3Q13	QoQ % chg.
- Mass-market	74	57	31.5	77	-3.4
- High-roller	166	288	-42.1	301	-44.7
- Slots	14	19	-22.6	15	-2.6
<b>GGR</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>-29.6</b>	<b>393</b>	<b>-35.0</b>
Non-gaming revenue	69	48	44.4	53	31.2
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>-14.4</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>-32.0</b>
Cotai Central (US\$ mn)	4Q13	4Q12	YoY % chg.	3Q13	QoQ % chg.
- Mass-market	382	192	98.6	334	14.1
- High-roller	443	318	39.1	421	5.0
- Slots	66	46	44.6	60	11.0
<b>GGR</b>	<b>891</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>816</b>	<b>9.2</b>
Non-gaming revenue	128	78	64.9	113	13.4
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>120.2</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>6.0</b>
	<b>4Q13</b>	<b>4Q12</b>	<b>YoY % chg.</b>	<b>3Q13</b>	<b>QoQ % chg.</b>
<b>Overall GGR (US\$ mn)</b>	<b>2,718</b>	<b>2,138</b>	<b>27.1</b>	<b>2,533</b>	<b>7.3</b>
Non-gaming revenue	403	297	35.5	334	20.8
<b>Property EBITDA</b>	<b>836</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>6.6</b>

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

**Strong cash flow, more dividend**

Sands China sees strong operating cash flow, with many liquefiable assets, such as retail malls and service apartments at the Four Seasons. Management revealed that it has the financial flexibility to distribute all its EBITDA to the shareholders. It increased the interim dividend by 30% YoY to HK\$0.87, with a special dividend of HK\$0.77 for 2013. Given the anticipated growth and strong cash flow, Sands China intends to increase the dividend in 2014.

**At inflexion point to turn around underperformance trend**

We increase our 2014-15 earnings forecasts by 1-2% by fine-tuning our margin assumptions. After the two-year valuation premium contraction, it is now trading at par with the sector average valuation. We believe that it is at the inflexion point to turn around its underperformance trend. Amid the recent market volatility, we believe HK\$56.5 (12.6x 2015E EV/EBITDA, or its average valuation since 2010) is a good entry price for Sands China.

India

**Adani Enterprises Ltd. ----- Maintain UNDERPERFORM**

**3Q14 below estimates; trading volumes and margins witness sharp decline**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- Adjusting for Rs185 mn of net forex gain, ADE's 3Q14 recurring PAT at Rs867 mn was significantly below estimates. Trading volumes at 10.5 MT in 3Q14 declined 36% YoY on account of lower stock and sale coal volumes, and lower imported coal procurement by NTPC.
- Coal trading EBITDA margin at US\$4.4/t declined 38% YoY due to: (1) hedging cost incurred on coal LCs, (2) one-time provision of Rs600-800 mn made for coal supplies to NTPC, and (3) profitability getting impacted on 1.2-1.3 MT of fixed price contracts due to increase in sea freight charges.
- Clearances are being pursued in Australia and expected by 2Q CY14 (CS est. CY14 end). On MDO contracts, Parsa Kente block has sold 0.6 MT in 9M FY14 and 2-3 MT production expected in FY15. Machhakata mine's approvals are pending with MoEF.
- Led by lowering of trading volume and margin assumptions for FY14, we cut our FY14 EPS estimate by 21%. Owing to continued stress in power business, and leverage expected to remain high, we maintain UNDERPERFORM with a revised TP of Rs196.

declined 36% YoY mainly on account of lower stock and sale coal volumes, and lower imported coal procurement by NTPC.

Coal trading EBITDA margin at US\$4.4/t declined 38% YoY due to: (1) hedging cost incurred on coal LCs, (2) one-time provision of Rs600-800 mn made for coal supplies to NTPC, and (3) profitability getting impacted on 1.2-1.3 MT of fixed price contracts due to increase in sea freight charges.

Figure 2: ADE—3Q14 consolidated results summary

(Rs mn)	3Q13	3Q14	% YoY	3Q14E	% diff.
Net sales	136,492	137,468	1%	144,252	-5%
Total expenditure	116,116	116,845	1%	123,232	-5%
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>20,376</b>	<b>20,623</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>21,019</b>	<b>-2%</b>
EBITDA margin (%)	14.9%	15.0%	7	14.6%	43
Depreciation	6,486	8,333	28%	8,952	-7%
Net interest expense	8,861	10,070	14%	8,436	19%
Taxes	1,601	1,862	16%	1,525	22%
Minority interest	(1,870)	(509)	-73%	(563)	-10%
<b>Recurring profit</b>	<b>5,298</b>	<b>867</b>	<b>-84%</b>	<b>2,669</b>	<b>-68%</b>
Exceptional income	(1,137)	(185)	n.a.	-	n.a.
<b>Reported profit</b>	<b>4,161</b>	<b>682</b>	<b>-84%</b>	<b>2,669</b>	<b>-74%</b>

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Australian capex plans continue to get pushed out**

Management indicated that clearances are being pursued in Australia for mine and rail project. Supplementary EIS (Environmental Impact Statement) has been submitted, public scrutiny is ongoing and final approvals are expected by 2Q CY14. However, we expect clearances to face delays and not materialise until CY14 end. We currently build in coal production commencing from FY18/19 and the project contributes negative Rs37/share to our SoTP for ADE.

On MDO contracts, Parsa Kente block has sold 0.6 MT in 9M FY14 and 2-3 MT production expected in FY15. Machhakata mine's approvals are pending with MoEF.

Led by lowering of trading volume and margin assumptions for FY14, we cut our FY14 EPS estimate by 21% and maintain UNDERPERFORM with a revised TP of Rs196.

Figure 3: ADE—consolidated segmental performance summary

(Rs mn)	3Q13	3Q14	% YoY	1Q14	QoQ (%)
<b>Revenue</b>					
Trading	65,964	48,469	-27%	45,876	6%
Power	18,974	41,970	121%	25,672	63%
Port	11,006	7,372	-33%	12,772	-42%
Agro	23,331	27,772	19%	19,946	39%
Others	17,218	11,884	-31%	11,201	6%
<b>EBIT margin</b>					
Trading	8.5%	2.2%	(630)	3.3%	(112)
Power	-7.0%	9.6%	1,661	-3.3%	1,286
Port	67.0%	69.1%	216	60.8%	832
Agro	2.9%	1.7%	(120)	3.8%	(209)
Others	2.5%	-0.2%	(273)	6.6%	(678)

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

Bbg/RIC	ADE IN / ADEL.BO	Price (31 Jan 14, Rs)	238.15		
Rating (prev. rating)	U (U) [V]	TP (prev. TP Rs)	196.00 (198.00)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	1,099.81	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	(18)		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	2.65	52-wk range (Rs)	278.6 - 133.0		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	8.7	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	261.9/ 4.2		
Free float (%)	25.0	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
Major shareholders	Promoters (75%)	Absolute (%)	(11.4) 16.7 (4.7)		
		Relative (%)	(8.4) 19.9 (7.8)		
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
EBITDA (Rs mn)	49,978	63,015	94,838	112,845	131,447
Net profit (Rs mn)	18,296	10,077	12,059	20,597	31,183
EPS (Rs)	16.6	9.2	11.0	18.7	28.4
Core EPS (Rs)	16.6	9.2	11.0	18.7	28.4
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(21)	(1)	0
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	11.1	24.6	38.0
EPS growth (%)	(22.3)	(44.9)	19.7	70.8	51.4
P/E (x)	14.3	26.0	21.7	12.7	8.4
Core P/E (x)	14.3	26.0	21.7	12.7	8.4
Dividend yield (%)	0.4	0.6	0	0.5	0
EV/EBITDA (x)	17.8	14.0	10.0	8.5	7.6
P/B (x)	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0
ROE (%)	9.8	4.9	5.6	9.3	12.6
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	273.9	251.9	284.5	265.8	253.0

Note 1: Adani Enterprises Ltd is an India-based company. The company is engaged in 4 business sectors: energy, trading, real estate & agro-related businesses. It operates from more than 30 offices in India & abroad.

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Figure 1: ADE coal trading business performance summary

	3Q13	4Q13	1Q14	2Q14	3Q14	YoY (%)
Trading volumes (MT)	16.5	12.4	9.5	11.0	10.5	-36%
Coal realisation (Rs/t)	4,008	4,149	4,829	5,322	4,620	15%
Coal trading EBITDA (Rs/t)	382	339	400	360	272	-29%
Coal trading EBITDA (US\$/t)	7.1	6.2	7.2	5.8	4.4	-38%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**3Q14 results disappoint; trading margins decline further**

Adjusting for Rs185 mn of net forex/derivatives gain, Adani Enterprises' 3Q14 recurring PAT at Rs867 mn was significantly below estimates led by 27% YoY decline in trading revenue and 630 bp YoY fall in trading EBIT margin to 2.2%, and lower other income. Management indicated that trading volumes at 10.5 MT in 3Q14

**Grasim** ----- **Maintain OUTPERFORM**

**Holding company discount to narrow driven by Chinese anti-dumping duty**

**EPS: ▼ TP: ▼**

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
- The implied holding company discount for Grasim (for the cement business) currently is at ~50% as: (1) global VSF utilisation is low at ~75% and (2) pulp prices are low, negating the advantage of vertical integration with Grasim. However, we expect the discount to narrow as pulp prices rise with anti-dumping duty being imposed by China.
- China announced preliminary anti-dumping duties (7-51%) on pulp producers from the US, Canada and Brazil. As pulp is 50% of VSF cost, it increases the VSF cost curve. Duties impact >50% of China's pulp imports and increases cost by US\$100-150/t. Since duties were announced, pulp price rose US\$40/t and once duties are finalised, the impact should be higher. VSF prices could increase by 4-5%.
- However, we do not expect a strong recovery in VSF as overhang of high cotton inventory in China continues. USDA expects China to account for 60% of global cotton inventory in 2014 versus 56% currently and global inventory level at 84% of annual consumption.
- Grasim's Dec-13 quarter EBITDA missed by 8% due to high pulp cost. We cut our FY14/15 EPS by 16/28% to reflect EPS cut for Ultratech and our TP for Grasim reduces by 10% to Rs2,940.

DWP imports. The net impact of the duties is an increase in DWP cost by \$100-150/t. As one unit of VSF requires one unit of DWP, this could raise VSF prices by 5-6%. Post the announcement of duties, DWP prices in China have moved up from \$860/t to \$900/t and once the final duties are announced, increase in DWP prices could be higher.

**High cotton inventories continue to cap VSF prices**

Cotton inventory continues to rise and Jan USDA report expects 2014 inventories at 89% of annual consumption vs. 84% in 2013 (global cotton production for 2014 is expected at 25.6mt). 60% of global cotton inventory is expected in China (vs. 56% currently). Therefore, the pace of inventory disposal by Chinese government will influence cotton and VSF prices. We expect an orderly replenishment of the inventory but the scale of inventory will continue to pressurise VSF.

**Figure 1: Chinese cotton inventories further rising**



Source: USDA, Credit Suisse research

**Grasim's Dec-13 quarter impacted by high DWP cost**


Grasim's Dec-13 quarter EBITDA missed by 8% with most of the miss being led by VSF division. The surprise on VSF was driven by high DWP cost which was impacted by higher NBSK index and impact of currency depreciation. Cost pressure from DWP is expected to continue and profitability improvement should be driven by VSF price increase.

**Figure 2: Dec-13 quarter impacted by high DWP cost**

	3Q13	4Q13	1Q14	2Q14	3Q14	Q/Q	YY
VSF volumes (kt)	78.6	95.2	77.5	93.0	97.0	4%	24%
VSF ASP (Rs/t)	131,078	127,821	126,391	130,159	128,803	-1%	-2%
VSF cost (Rs/t)	107,153	105,123	102,268	104,359	111,389	7%	4%
<b>VSF EBITDA (Rs/t)</b>	<b>23,925</b>	<b>22,698</b>	<b>24,123</b>	<b>25,800</b>	<b>17,414</b>	<b>-33%</b>	<b>-27%</b>
<b>EBITDA (Rs mn)</b>	<b>2,154</b>	<b>2,141</b>	<b>2,024</b>	<b>2,613</b>	<b>1,945</b>	<b>-26%</b>	<b>-10%</b>
Dep (Rs mn)	395	451	484	530	547	3%	38%
Interest cost (Rs mn)	107	145	78	95	134	41%	25%
PBT (Rs mn)	2,603	2,770	2,420	2,950	1,757	-40%	-33%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Figure 3: Grasim's Holding company discount running close to ~50%**



Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates.

Bbg/RIC	GRASIM IN / GRAS.BO	Price (31 Jan 14 , Rs)	2,573.85		
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	2,940 (3,280)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	91.82	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	14		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	0.15	52-wk range (Rs)	3124.6 - 2171.5		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	3.6	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	236.3/ 3.8		
Free float (%)	74.7				
Major shareholders	Promoter: 25.3%				
		<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
		Absolute (%)	(2.2) (8.0) (14.4)		
		Relative (%)	(0.6) (4.6) (18.1)		
<b>Year</b>	<b>03/12A</b>	<b>03/13A</b>	<b>03/14E</b>	<b>03/15E</b>	<b>03/16E</b>
EBITDA (Rs mn)	53,184	56,590	45,099	58,411	68,808
Net profit (Rs mn)	23,798	27,044	20,660	22,920	28,254
EPS (Rs)	259	295	225	250	308
Core EPS (Rs)	259	295	225	250	308
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(16)	(28)	
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	262	299	348
EPS growth (%)	25.5	13.6	(23.5)	10.9	23.3
P/E (x)	9.9	8.7	11.4	10.3	8.4
Core P/E (x)	9.9	8.7	11.4	10.3	8.4
Dividend yield (%)	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.0	0
EV/EBITDA (x)	4.8	4.9	6.3	4.9	4.5
P/B (x)	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0
ROE (%)	15.0	14.7	10.1	10.3	12.0
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	7.6	16.1	17.2	16.6	22.2

Note 1: m is a conglomerate and primarily involved in cement (through Ultratech) and Viscose Staple Fibre.

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**Chinese anti-dumping duty to support VSF prices**

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced preliminary anti-dumping duties ranging from 7-51% on Dissolving wood pulp (DWP) producers from the US, Canada and Brazil. DWP accounts for 45-50% of VSF production cost and China produces 55-60% of global VSF. Therefore, dumping duty on DWP raises VSF cost curve (Chinese players are marginal players) and is an advantage to vertically-integrated producer such as Grasim (80% vertically integrated on DWP).

The final set of duties will be announced in Feb-2014 and that will determine whether some of the capacities which were planning to shift from paper grade pulp to VSF grade pulp change their decision (such as Jari's DWP capacity in Brazil, Paper Excellence capacity, Fortress' Thurso mill in Quebec etc). Anti-dumping duties impact >50% of China's

**Hero Motocorp Ltd ----- Maintain UNDERPERFORM**

**Disappointing quarter on margin miss**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▲

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- Results were below expectations with earnings growth of ~8% YoY (vs expectation of ~28%). Hero reported a big disappointment on margins, which contracted 150 bp QoQ, despite positive operating leverage at play and a 70 bp benefit from cost-reduction efforts.
- The margin miss was led by both higher raw material expenses and higher other expenses. Gross margins declined 120 bp QoQ due to a lagged impact of adverse FX in 2Q. Other expenditure was higher due to lumpiness of publicity spends in 3Q, higher royalty payments on the new products and higher freight expenses.
- Management commented that post a decent festival season, things have again slowed. Inventory levels across industry are on the high side at six-seven weeks; it guided for 5% industry growth in 4Q.
- Hero's margins (adjusted for royalty) have fallen 600 bp since FY10, indicating a difficult pricing environment in the industry. Honda has not participated in the price increases taken by all other manufacturers in Oct/Nov. Given the market share situation is also yet to stabilise, we maintain our UNDERPERFORM and cut our estimates by 3-4% to account for the quarter's miss; our TP changes to Rs1,930.

**Continues to target big margin savings:** The second phase of its cost-reduction plan (which is being carried out in five phases) has now started. In Phase 1, the focus was on logistics, vendor consolidation, e-bidding of components and product rationalisation. This resulted in Rs450 mn in savings (~70 bp) in 3Q and should gradually increase each quarter. The company expects margins to increase 300 bp by FY17 from the current 13-14% range from these endeavours.

We remain sceptical of such a sizeable margin improvement. In our view, almost all auto companies work on some or the other cost-reduction programmes and part of it always gets passed on to the customer in terms of lower price increases than what is warranted by the cost increases. From FY10, Hero's margins (adjusted for royalty) have fallen 600 bp, indicating the loss in pricing power in the industry with Honda's aggressiveness. While all other players had taken a price hike in Oct-13 to pass on the rise in input costs, Honda didn't follow them—again showing its readiness to compete on price in order to gain share.

**Others:** Current capacity is 6.9 mn units per year and this should expand to 7.6 mn units from April once the new Rajasthan plant comes on stream, and will further increase in FY16 once the Gujarat plant comes (capacity of 1.8 mn units). Capex for the current year should be about Rs12 bn, and it will likely be higher for FY15 at about Rs15 bn, given the large capacity increase, and should moderate post that. Current scooter capacity is 60,000 per month which is being ramped up to 75,000 per month given the full utilisation.

Bbg/RIC	HMCL IN / HROM.BO	Price (30 Jan 14, Rs)	1,999.75		
Rating (prev. rating)	U (U)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	1,930 (1,900)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	199.69	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	(3)		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	0.4	52-wk range (Rs)	2203.1 - 1437.3		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	12.4	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	399.3/ 6.4		
Free float (%)	47.8	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M</b>	<b>3M</b>	<b>12M</b>
Major shareholders	Brijmohan Munjal Family	Absolute (%)	(3.6)	(4.8)	11.1
		Relative (%)	(0.4)	(1.5)	8.6
<b>Year</b>	<b>03/12A</b>	<b>03/13A</b>	<b>03/14E</b>	<b>03/15E</b>	<b>03/16E</b>
Revenue (Rs mn)	235,790	237,681	252,001	278,734	305,683
EBITDA (Rs mn)	36,188	32,845	35,469	40,232	44,676
Net profit (Rs mn)	23,781	21,182	21,125	28,629	33,215
EPS (Rs)	119	106	106	143	166
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(4)	(3)	(2)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	108	143	167
EPS growth (%)	23.4	(10.9)	(0.3)	35.5	16.0
P/E (x)	16.8	18.9	18.9	13.9	12.0
Dividend yield (%)	2.3	3.0	2.6	3.6	4.2
EV/EBITDA (x)	10.1	11.2	10.3	8.8	7.5
P/B (x)	9.3	8.0	6.8	5.6	4.7
ROE (%)	65.6	45.6	38.8	44.1	42.7
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	(78.5)	(63.7)	(59.3)	(61.6)	(73.7)

Note 1: Hero Motocorp Ltd. (formerly Hero Honda) is the largest two-wheeler manufacturer in India with ~50% market share and annual sales of over 6 mn units. The company is engaged in manufacturing of motorcycles, scooters across three manufacturing facilities.

Click here for detailed financials

**Margin miss leads to results disappointment:** Gross margins declined 120 bp QoQ, primarily on adverse FX. The company partially compensated its vendors with a quarter's lag for FX losses, hence the big INR depreciation in 2Q had an impact. Net import exposure was 12.5% of sales (half of it was direct—alloy wheel imports, which are USD denominated) and half of it was indirect (vendor imports, which are in JPY).


Other expenses rose on different factors—publicity expenses were skewed in 3Q because of the festival season, freight expenses went up as the diesel price hike was passed on to transport operators and royalty on new products—primarily "Mastero" (sales of new products on which Hero pays extra royalty moved from 190,000 last year to 550,000 units).

Figure 1: Hero Motocorp—3Q results summary

(Rs mn)	3Q13A	2Q14A	3Q14A	% YoY	% QoQ
Volumes (units)	1,573,135	1,416,211	1,680,940	6.9	18.7
<b>Net sales</b>	<b>61,876</b>	<b>57,262</b>	<b>68,768</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>20.1</b>
Raw material	45,854	40,955	49,989	9.0	22.1
Raw mat/sales	74.1	71.5	72.7	-141 bps	117 bps
Employee costs	1,982	2,290	2,439	23.0	6.5
Other expenditure	6,253	5,690	7,360	17.7	29.4
<b>EBIDTA</b>	<b>7,787</b>	<b>8,327</b>	<b>8,979</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>7.8</b>
EBIDTA margin	12.6	14.5	13.1	47 bps	-148 bps
Depreciation	2,832	2,869	2,732	(3.5)	(4.8)
Interest	30	30	30	0.7	0.7
Other income	901	1,155	956	6.1	(17.2)
PBT	5,826	6,583	7,173	23.1	9.0
Tax	949	1,769	1,928	103.2	9.0
Tax Rate	16	27	27	1,059 bps	0 bps
<b>Reported PAT</b>	<b>4,877</b>	<b>4,814</b>	<b>5,245</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>9.0</b>

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Figure 2: Both raw materials and other expenditure rose sharply



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

**Indian Overseas Bank ----- Maintain UNDERPERFORM**

**3QFY14: Asset quality pressure still elevated; capital requirements significant**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- IOB's 3Q FY14 net profits were down 36% YoY (24% below estimates) as credit cost remained quite high (~1.9% vs 1.5% for 2Q) on continued elevated problem asset addition (~5.7% annualised). Pre-prov profit declined as well (-3% YoY) on lower NIMs (down 13bp QoQ) and weak core non-int income (-8% YoY).
- Loan growth moderated to 10% YoY, and with NIMs under further pressure, NII was flat on YoY basis. Pullback in opex (down 10% QoQ) helped maintain cost income at ~49% despite weak topline.
- Asset quality deteriorated further with Gross NPA up a further 50 bp QoQ (to 5.2%). Including restructuring (of Rs12 bn in 3Q), total impaired addition was a high 6% of loans (annualised). Credit cost was elevated at 1.9%, still NPL cover remained at a low of ~40%. Unprovided NPAs have reached 44% of network.
- Despite the recent 25% equity dilution (Rs12 bn from GOI), it is still grossly under-capitalised with Tier-I at 7.5%. UNDERPERFORM for its 0.3x nominal book, unprovided problem loan at 145% of book & need for large capital injection. Cut 14/15/16E EPS by 6%/38%/31% on higher provisions; TP cut to Rs35 (from Rs63).

Figure 1: 3Q14 results summary

(Rs mn)	3Q14	2Q14	QoQ (%)	3Q13	YoY (%)
<b>NII</b>	<b>13,981</b>	<b>14,518</b>	<b>-4%</b>	<b>13,816</b>	<b>1%</b>
Non-int income	4,527	3,309	37%	5,138	-12%
Total income	18,509	17,828	4%	18,954	-2%
Total opex	8,901	9,917	-10%	8,783	1%
<b>Pre-prov profit</b>	<b>9,607</b>	<b>7,910</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>10,171</b>	<b>-6%</b>
Total provisions	8,112	6,199	31%	8,110	0%
PBT	1,495	1,711	-13%	2,061	-27%
<b>Reported profit</b>	<b>751</b>	<b>1,326</b>	<b>-43%</b>	<b>1,165</b>	<b>-36%</b>
<b>Key parameters</b>	<b>3Q14</b>	<b>2Q14</b>	<b>QoQ (%)</b>	<b>3Q13</b>	<b>YoY (%)</b>
Deposits (Rs bn)	2,133	2,127	0%	1,856	15%
Net advances (Rs bn)	1,741	1,713	2%	1,576	10%
<b>NIM (%)</b>	<b>2.3%</b>	<b>2.4%</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>-25</b>
CASA (%)	24.8%	25.4%	-62	25.0%	-22
Gross NPA (%)	5.2%	4.7%	46	4.1%	110
Credit cost (%)	1.7%	1.5%	-152	2.1%	-210
Coverage ratio (%)	40.2%	40.6%	-35	44.8%	-461
<b>Restructured loans (%)</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>-766</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>-990</b>
Tier I (%)	7.48%	7.02%	0.46%	7.33%	0.15%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

**Unprovided problem loans now 145% of network**

Asset quality deteriorated further with Gross NPAs up a further 50 bp QoQ (to 5.2%). Including restructuring (of Rs12 bn in 3Q), total impaired addition was a high 6% of loans (annualised). Credit cost was elevated at 1.9%, still NPL cover remained at a low of ~40%. Total problem loans are at ~12% and unprovided NPAs have reached 44% of network.

Bbg/RIC	IOB IN / IOBK.BO	Price (30 Jan 14, Rs)	42.90		
Rating (prev. rating)	U (U)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	35.00 (63.00)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	1,153.85	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	(18)		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	1.4	52-wk range (Rs)	80.9 - 38.5		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	1.1	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ mn)	49,500.1/791.2		
Free float (%)	35.0	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
Major shareholders	LIC, HDFC Standard Life	Absolute (%)	(17.7) (17.4) (47.0)		
		Relative (%)	(14.6) (14.1) (50.0)		
<b>Year</b>	<b>03/12A</b>	<b>03/13A</b>	<b>03/14E</b>	<b>03/15E</b>	<b>03/16E</b>
Pre-prov Op profit (Rs mn)	35,691.3	38,853.6	38,885.3	44,359.7	50,845.4
Net profit (Rs mn)	10,851	6,356	6,134	9,499	14,227
EPS (CS adj. Rs)	15.3	7.4	5.9	8.2	12.3
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(6)	(38)	(31)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	6.25	7.13	
EPS growth (%)	(20.8)	(51.8)	(20.1)	39.5	49.8
P/E (x)	2.8	5.8	7.3	5.2	3.5
Dividend yield (%)	10.9	4.9	3.3	5.1	7.7
BVPS (CS adj. Rs)	135	133	121	127	135
P/B (x)	0.32	0.32	0.36	0.34	0.32
ROE (%)	11.5	5.5	4.7	6.7	9.4
ROA (%)	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4
Tier 1 Ratio (%)	8.36	7.80	7.92	7.21	6.63


Note 1: Indian Overseas Bank provides various banking services, including saving bank, current accounts, credit facilities and other services. The Bank's services also include personal banking services, non-residential Indian (NRI) accounts.

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**Core profitability weak; problem assets rise**

IOB reported its 3Q FY14 results, which were worse than expected with profits down 36% YoY (24% lower than estimates) and asset quality continuing to deteriorate. Loan growth was muted at 10% YoY as expected but with NIMs under further pressure (down 13 bp QoQ), net interest income was 7% lower than estimates, leading to a 6% decline in pre-prov profit even though the bank pulled back on opex (down 10% QoQ) with cost income stable at ~49%. Core non-int income growth (-8% YoY) has been weak for past several quarters. Pre-prov profitability of the banks continue to weaken significantly, inadequate to provide for elevated level of problem loan additions (Provisions at ~84% as a % of PPoP).

Figure 2: Credit cost still not adequate for level of problem asset additions



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

**Large dilution needed given low tier I, high under-provisioning**

The bank despite the recent 25% equity dilution (Rs12bn capital infusion from government during the quarter), is still grossly under-capitalised with Tier-I at 7.5%. In order to reach 9% Tier-I capital, the bank would need further dilution of 31%. Despite its 0.3x nominal book, with unprovided problem loan at 145% of book and need for large capital injection, maintain UNDERPERFORM. We cut 14/15/16E EPS by 6%/38%/31% on weak core profitability and continued high impairments. Cut target price to Rs35 from Rs63.

**Infrastructure Development Finance Co Ltd----- Maintain OUTPERFORM**

**In a waiting mode**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- IDFC's 3Q14 earnings rose 11% YoY, 2% ahead, tracking better-than-management guidance of 0-5% growth for full year, on the back of better fees (AMC & broking) and investment write-backs. Gross NPA moved up 30 bp QoQ to 0.6% of loans.
- Loan growth continued to be muted, though approvals were higher (+25% YoY) in 3Q on the back of an increase in short-term corporate exposure. Operating profit was flat YoY, while spreads (rolling) were down marginally to 2.3%. Fees picked up due to better AMC fees on benefit from closure of its new project's equity fund.
- Gross NPA moved up (0.6%) in line with management guidance and is expected to rise to 1.5% in next few quarters. Additionally, restructuring of 1-2% of loans book is also likely.
- IDFC remains in a consolidation mode given subdued infra activities and as it awaits bank license approval, loan growth is likely to be muted. We cut our EPS estimate by ~8% on lower growth and reduce our target price to Rs128. Clarity on transition structure on issuance of banking license will be the key catalyst. Its valuations are un-demanding at 0.8x book, 6.5x earnings. Maintain OUTPERFORM.

**Gross NPLs likely to move up to 1.5%**


NPLs moved up 22 bp QoQ (to 0.6%) on certain infra related accounts turning NPAs. Management maintains its guidance for gross NPA to reach 1.5% in next few quarters. Management is awaiting more clarity on recent restructuring norms for NBFCs, which aims to bring parity in regulatory norms with banks. Currently, gas based projects (~3.5% of loans) are likely to be restructured. We expect ~1-2% of loans to be restructured in next few quarters. IDFC's existing loan loss reserve (of ~2% of loans) would partly cushion the impact on earnings of these expected increase in impaired assets.

**Figure 1: 3Q14 results summary**

Rs mn	2Q14	2Q13	YoY (%)	1Q14	QoQ (%)
<b>NII—Infrastructure</b>	<b>6,100</b>	<b>6,110</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>6,420</b>	<b>-5%</b>
NII—Treasury	540	480	13%	440	23%
<b>Total NII</b>	<b>6,640</b>	<b>6,590</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>6,860</b>	<b>-3%</b>
Loan processing fees	210	390	-46%	100	110%
Asset management fees	1,020	870	17%	1,040	-2%
IDFC SSKI	190	80	138%	80	138%
<b>Total non-interest income</b>	<b>1,430</b>	<b>1,710</b>	<b>-16%</b>	<b>1,260</b>	<b>13%</b>
Total operating income	8,070	8,300	-3%	8,120	-1%
Total operating expenses	1,315	1,340	-2%	1,375	-4%
Pre-provisioning profits	6,755	6,960	-3%	6,745	0%
Provisions & write offs	365	520	-30%	501	-27%
<b>Operating profits</b>	<b>6,390</b>	<b>6,440</b>	<b>-1%</b>	<b>6,245</b>	<b>2%</b>
Principal investment	460	70	557%	780	-41%
PBT	6,850	6,510	5%	7,025	-2%
<b>PAT</b>	<b>5,039</b>	<b>4,545</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>4,926</b>	<b>2%</b>
Loans (Rs bn)	536	533	0%	550	-3%
Gross disbursements	20	26	-22%	24	-18%
<b>Gross NPA (%)</b>	<b>0.64%</b>	<b>0.27%</b>	<b>0.37%</b>	<b>0.33%</b>	<b>0.31%</b>

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

**Figure 2: Approvals were higher driven by short-term corporate exposure**



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Clarity on banking license could be a key catalyst**

IDFC remains in a waiting mode given subdued infra activities. With uncertainties surrounding banking licenses and subsequent transition, IDFC is likely to continue to follow the path of consolidation. We cut our FY15 EPS estimate by ~8% on lower growth estimate. Clarity on transition structure on likely issuance of banking license could be the key catalyst. Valuations are un-demanding at 0.8x book, 6.5x earnings. We reduce our target price to Rs128 (versus Rs144 earlier) and maintain our OUTPERFORM rating on the stock.

Bbg/RIC	IDFC IN / IDFC.BO	Price (31 Jan 14 , Rs)	93.15		
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	128.00 (144.00)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	1,516.20	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	37		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	12.45	52-wk range (Rs)	168.3 - 79.2		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	19.3	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	141.2/ 2.3		
Free float (%)	79.0				
Major shareholders	GO				
		<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
		Absolute (%)	(11.1) (18.1) (44.6)		
		Relative (%)	(9.3) (14.7) (48.3)		
<b>Year</b>	<b>03/12A</b>	<b>03/13A</b>	<b>03/14E</b>	<b>03/15E</b>	<b>03/16E</b>
Pre-prov Op profit (Rs mn)	24,566.8	29,431.9	31,086.2	33,390.1	37,511.8
Net profit (Rs mn)	15,502	18,424	20,612	21,663	23,454
EPS (CS adj. Rs)	10.2	12.2	13.6	14.3	15.5
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	3	(8)	
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	12.9	14.2	15.9
EPS growth (%)	17.4	18.7	11.9	5.1	8.3
P/E (x)	9.1	7.7	6.8	6.5	6.0
Dividend yield (%)	2.9	3.3	4.1	4.7	4.7
BVPS (CS adj. Rs)	81	90	100	110	121
P/B (x)	1.15	1.03	0.93	0.85	0.77
ROE (%)	13.7	14.2	14.3	13.6	13.4
ROA (%)	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Tier 1 Ratio (%)	—	—	—	—	—

Note 1: Infrastructure Development Finance Company Limited is an India-based company. The Company's main business is to provide finance for infrastructure projects including through ownership of infrastructure assets.

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**Operationally in line**

Approvals were higher (+25% YoY) driven by short-term corporate exposure in the telecom segment; however, disbursements remained subdued (-22% YoY). Mix of exposure continues to shift towards corporate exposure, contributing ~41% of total as of 3Q. Loan book was flat YoY tracking management guidance of 0-5% loan growth. Rolling spreads (12 months) declined marginally to 2.3%. Capital market related fee income (AMC and investment banking) showed healthy traction. IDFC has recently concluded its second project's equity fund and has launched real estate funds as well. This should further drive improved traction from alternative assets fee income. Opex was contained as well (-3% YoY) with cost income stable at ~16%.

**Marico Ltd ----- Maintain OUTPERFORM**

**3QFY14: Volume growth weakness clouds earnings beat**

EPS: ▲ TP: ◀▶

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- Marico's 3QFY14 adjusted earnings grew 32% YoY, which was significantly ahead of estimates. The beat was driven by higher EBITDA margins in both India and international businesses.
- However, volume growth at only 3% YoY was very weak. Parachute rigids grew only 2% YoY, while overall coconut oils volume was flat, in an environment of rising loose oil prices, which should have normally helped growth. A part of the slowdown was contributed by multiple price changes in a short span of time which have destabilised the trade channel.
- International business grew 15% YoY helped by a 12% currency translation gain. Margins at 18.1% were the highest ever and will not be sustainable, in our view, as they were helped by a sharp drop in ad spends in Bangladesh. However, international margins should be higher YoY over the next couple of quarters due to a low base.
- Our FY14 estimates increase marginally, but we lower our FY15-16 estimates by ~4% to build in lower margins to factor in inflation in copra prices. The key trigger for the stock will be a recovery in volume growth. Maintain OUTPERFORM.

Bbg/RIC	MRCO IN / MRCO.BO	Price (31 Jan 14 , Rs)	214.45		
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)TP (prev. TP Rs)	245.00 (245.00)			
Shares outstanding (mn)	644.87	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	14		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	0.4	52-wk range (Rs)	230.7 - 187.5		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	1.5	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	138.3/ 2.2		
Free float (%)	40.0	Performance	1M 3M 12M		
Major shareholders	Promoter	Absolute (%)	(1.8) 2.6 (3.7)		
		Relative (%)	1.2 5.8 (6.9)		
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
Revenue (Rs mn)	40,083	45,962	47,299	53,955	61,590
EBITDA (Rs mn)	4,844	6,258	7,319	8,076	9,211
Net profit (Rs mn)	3,189	3,627	4,897	5,559	6,568
EPS (Rs)	5.2	5.6	7.6	8.6	10.2
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	2	(4)	(4)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	7.4	8.7	10.2
EPS growth (%)	25.4	8.5	35.0	13.5	18.1
P/E (x)	41.4	38.1	28.2	24.9	21.1
Dividend yield (%)	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.0
EV/EBITDA (x)	29.8	23.1	19.2	17.0	14.5
P/B (x)	11.5	7.0	5.9	5.0	4.3
ROE (%)	31.0	23.2	22.7	21.8	21.9
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	54.8	30.5	9.7	(3.8)	(15.7)

Note 1: Marico is a leading fast moving consumer goods company in India with market leadership in hair oils and edible oils. The company also draws over 30% of revenues from international markets.

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**Volume growth pickup key to the stock, a high copra price environment should help:** The slippage in volume growth was driven by flat volumes for coconut oils. Management explained that the multiple price changes (one decrease and two increases) in a short span of four months has caused instability in the sales channel, and adversely impacted the pick-up of higher priced stocks post October by trade. With the pipeline being corrected, they expect growth to return for Parachute to over 5% levels. Also the high copra price environment tends to favour branded players as the premium over loose oil shrinks substantially. A recovery to 6-8% overall volume growth is key to the stock performing even if earnings growth trends remain strong.

Figure 1: Marico 3QFY14 results

MRCO Rs mn – FMCG business	3QFY13	3QFY14	% YoY
Net sales	10,850	11,984	10.4%
EBITDA	1,550	1,995	28.7%
EBITDA margin (%)	14.3	16.6	236 bp
Interest	-120	-73	-39.1%
Depreciation	-160	-207	29.4%
Other income	130	204	56.8%
PBT	1,400	1,918	37.0%
Adj. Tax	-350	-501	NM
Tax rate (%)	25.0	26.1	114 bp
PAT before Minority	1,050	1,417	35.0%
PAT	1,030	1,354	31.4%
Cost Details	3QFY13	3QFY14	% YoY
Raw Materials	50.6	51.8	119 bp
Staff Costs	5.5	5.7	14 bp
Advertisement	14.0	11.2	-282 bp
Other Expenses	15.6	14.7	-86 bp


Source: Company data, Credit Suisse

Figure 2: Segment wise growth

Category	Growth (% YoY)
India FMCG	Volume growth 3%
Parachute Rigids	Value 6%, Volume 2%
Value added oil	Value 16%, Volume 8%
Saffola	Value 7%, Volume 9%
Youth Brands	Value 13%
International	15% in INR, 3% constant currency
Bangladesh	Decline of 14%
MENA	10% (Egypt 22%)
South Africa	5%
SE Asian	24%


Source: Company data, Credit Suisse.

Figure 3: Parachute growth did not pick up in 3Q as well



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse.

Figure 4: International margins expanded sharply, 14% is the sustainable level



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Maruti Suzuki India Ltd----- Maintain OUTPERFORM**

**Intent seems fine; more specifics would have helped**

EPS: ◀▶ TP: ◀▶

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- Maruti conducted an analyst meet with its Chairman Mr. Bhargava explaining the rationale for Suzuki's decision to set up a 100% sub which would take care of Maruti's future manufacturing expansion.
- While Mr. Bhargava's mentioning that Suzuki wanted to set it up as a 100% subsidiary does raise some questions, his strong intent on protecting minority rights gives us comfort. He reiterated that at no point will the Suzuki subsidiary accumulate any cash.
- The specifics on how the second and third phases of expansion, where internal cash generation will not be sufficient, will be done are still not clear as the final agreement has not yet been signed. He has made it clear that it will not fund the expansion and hinted that Suzuki may decide to bring it in as a soft loan.
- He mentioned that whilst Maruti saves Rs15,600 per car (13% cost of capital); Suzuki gains by the cost of capital arbitrage on its 56% holding in Maruti and by strengthening Maruti which will spend its cash largely on further expansion of its marketing and distribution network and R&D. The 15-year agreement will have a clause of renewal on the same terms for another 15 years.

... some more specifics though would have given more comfort. Whilst the Chairman gave us comfort on protecting minority interest, details on how the capacity expansion beyond 250,000 would be funded remained elusive as the final contract has not yet been signed and this issue has not yet been discussed with Suzuki. The plan is to fund the capacity expansion from 250,000 to 1.5 mn units largely through internal accruals. Given that the subsidiary will need to invest into capacity almost every two years and also need to invest in power-trains, internal accruals will not be sufficient for at least the second and third phases. There is still a question on how this gap will be funded. Maruti's management is sure that they will not invest anything in the subsidiary and reckon that it may be funded by a short-term loan from Suzuki. In the later phases, the plant will be self-sustaining and once the capex expansion reaches completion, the benefit per car for Maruti will increase.

The other big issue on the deal is that Suzuki is investing Rs30 bn and will have assets of ~Rs250 bn at the end of 15 years. Management gave comfort that there will be a clause in the agreement whereby this agreement can be extended on the same terms for another 15 years and the lease on the land (owned by Maruti) on which the plant will be set up will be linked to the renewal of the agreement.

**How does this benefit Suzuki?** The financial benefit to Maruti is obvious as it saves on the money to be invested in capex and can generate additional income by investing in FMP's with this excess cash. Moreover, cost of capital for Maruti stands at ~13% versus ~5% for Suzuki; so it indirectly makes more money and higher RoCE if Suzuki does the investments. Maruti will make an extra Rs15,600 per car (cost of capital applied to capex) less the capex. As for Suzuki, its primary motive has been the lack of opportunities of utilisation of Rs250 bn cash it has—it does not need to invest for capacity expansion in any geography and was getting low returns on its excess cash. Hence, it will be better for Suzuki if Maruti makes extra money and 56% of that gets consolidated in Suzuki.

**Maruti will have full control over exports.** Given that the Gujarat plant may be used as an exports hub, there was doubt over Maruti's roll if the production would be done by Suzuki and they would be sold under Suzuki's brand. Management clarified that when Suzuki had made the decision that some export markets (Africa, Latin America and South-Asia) would be handled by Maruti; it is now Maruti's role to develop competency and infrastructure for exports. Maruti would have to take the lead in dealer expansion, brand handling and customer care and targets for these markets will go to Maruti only.

**Maruti will use cash for strengthening brand.** Maruti has no plans of any share buy-back now that it has less use of it with Suzuki doing all the capex. The management said that the company will use the extra cash for increasing the marketing efforts, increasing dealers, etc. Globally, between different car companies there is not much difference in technology; hence, it is important to differentiate on the marketing and sales network. Suzuki respects that Maruti has done a good job in India on this front and wants Maruti to focus on the same both in India and export markets with this extra cash. Maruti is also strengthening its R&D network which will entail extra spends.

Bbg/RIC	MSIL IN / MRTI.BO	Price (31 Jan 14 , Rs)	1,635.35		
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	2,080 (2,080)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	302.08	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	27		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	0.95	52-wk range (Rs)	1846.5 - 1235.8		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	22.5	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	494.0/ 7.9		
Free float (%)	43.8	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M</b>	<b>3M</b>	<b>12M</b>
Major shareholders	Suzuki Motor Corporation	Absolute (%)	(7.3)	0	3.3
		Relative (%)	(4.3)	3.2	0.2
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
Revenue (Rs mn)	355,871	435,879	439,211	496,761	588,103
EBITDA (Rs mn)	25,130	42,296	54,301	63,938	76,437
Net profit (Rs mn)	16,352	23,921	30,181	35,417	44,127
EPS (Rs)	57	79	100	117	146
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	0
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	96	114	138
EPS growth (%)	(28.6)	40.0	26.2	17.3	24.6
P/E (x)	28.9	20.6	16.4	13.9	11.2
Dividend yield (%)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
EV/EBITDA (x)	15.1	9.6	7.2	4.9	2.9
P/B (x)	3.1	2.7	2.3	2.0	1.7
ROE (%)	11.3	14.2	15.1	15.4	16.6
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	(75.1)	(46.4)	(48.6)	(72.2)	(95.7)

Note 1: Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL) is a passenger car company. The company is engaged in the business of manufacturing, purchase and sale of motor vehicles and spare parts (automobiles).

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**The intent from Maruti's board seems right...** Whilst the intent from Suzuki can be questioned given that they intended to set it up as a 100% subsidiary to establish a plant in India, Maruti's independent directors have done their job and got a fair deal for Maruti. So Suzuki will now enter into a contract manufacturing arrangement with Maruti and instead of benefiting from the profits of the plant, Suzuki will benefit only from its 56% stake in Maruti; a benefit which will be available to Maruti's minority shareholders as well. Management gave a strong commitment that at no point in time will the sub have any extra cash. It will also not give any dividends, so Suzuki will not get any direct returns from this plant and merger is also ruled out as it will need to be approved by minority shareholders which will never happen.

**Petronet LNG Limited**-----**Maintain NEUTRAL**

**Lower utilisations, high LNG prices hurt; valuations supported by long-term contracts**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- PLNG reported 3Q PAT c.7-9% below CS and consensus estimates. Volumes were the weakest in over three years, and declined 2% QoQ. Total EBITDA fell 4% QoQ, though stronger other income helped. 9MFY14 PAT is 65% of full-year consensus.
- Higher interest/DD&A at Kochi hurt in 3QFY14; high LNG prices hurt demand at Kochi and Dahej. The completion of pipelines later in 2014 may help Kochi off-take, but high LNG prices mean terminal utilisations can remain subdued, keeping earnings in check.
- With the 1/1.5MT contracts with BPCL/IOC, PLNG has now signed ship-or-pay contracts for 14.75 MT out of the 15 MT capacity its Dahej terminal will have by end 2016. On a DCF basis, just these volumes can be worth Rs.98/sh; assuming a 0% tariff increase post 2017.
- We update our models for 9M14 and build in lower near-term trading gains. Our FY14/15 EPS falls 22/15% and our TP reduces to Rs118 (from Rs132). While longer-term utility earnings provide strong valuation support, we maintain our NEUTRAL rating on the stock due to the near-term Kochi earnings drag and lack of near-term catalysts.

Figure 1: Results summary

INR Million	3Q13	2Q14	3Q14	3Q14E	QoQ (%)	YoY (%)	vs Est(%)
Sales	84,228	94,935	93,821	98,794	(1)	11	(5)
Raw materials	78,162	90,316	89,171	93,872	(1)	14	(5)
EBITDA	5,289	3,639	3,499	3,822	(4)	(34)	(8)
Depreciation	472	597	1,017	992	70	116	3
Interest	291	386	783	896	103	169	(13)
PBT	4,675	2,818	1,915	2,150	(32)	(59)	(11)
Tax	1,490	1,000	560	699	(44)	(62)	(20)
PAT	3,185	1,818	1,355	1,451	(25)	(57)	(7)
EPS	4.25	2.42	1.81	1.93	(25)	(57)	(7)
Volumes (TBTU)	3Q13	2Q14	3Q14	3Q14E	QoQ (%)	YoY (%)	vs Est(%)
Sales quantity	127	111	102	112	(8)	(19)	(9)
Regas quantity	14	12	18	13	48	31	37

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Dahej expansion key to earnings growth**

The second jetty at Dahej is expected to complete by Mar-14, when part of assured GSPC volumes begin—although 100% terminal utilisation could require an improvement in demand. The signing of tolling contracts with BPCL/IOC mean that regas earnings for c.98% of headline capacity is now assured. Other positives discussed on the analyst call were: (1) financial closure for the expansion as well as awarding of contracts is complete, (2) capex has been revised down by Rs6 bn (c.20%) and (3) half of the expansion will be financed by advances from BPCL/GAIL/IOC/GSPC (Not Listed)—resulting in lower gearing on PLNG's balance sheet and better cash flows.

Bbg/RIC	PLNG IN / PLNG.BO	Price (31 Jan 14, Rs)	109.90		
Rating (prev. rating)	N (N)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	118.00 (132.00)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	750.00	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	7		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	1.1	52-wk range (Rs)	154.8 - 104.2		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	2.1	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ mn)	82,425.0 / 1,315.0		
Free float (%)	50.0	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
Major shareholders	GAIL IN, BPCL IN, IOCL IN, ONGC IN	Absolute (%)	(9.5) (12.7) (27.1)		
		Relative (%)	(7.9) (9.3) (30.8)		
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
Revenue (Rs mn)	226,959	314,674	408,306	488,114	585,066
EBITDA (Rs mn)	19,141	20,253	15,806	18,310	21,066
Net profit (Rs mn)	10,575	11,493	7,249	7,257	8,992
EPS (Rs)	14.1	15.3	9.7	9.7	12.0
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(22)	(15)	(11)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	10.8	12.0	14.9
EPS growth (%)	70.7	8.7	(36.9)	0.1	23.9
P/E (x)	7.8	7.2	11.4	11.4	9.2
Dividend yield (%)	2.3	2.3	1.4	1.4	1.8
EV/EBITDA (x)	5.5	4.9	7.1	6.2	5.1
P/B (x)	2.3	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.3
ROE (%)	34.1	28.8	15.3	13.6	15.0
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	62.3	39.7	59.4	54.1	39.1

Note 1: Petronet LNG Limited is engaged in the import and regasification of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The Company has an operating terminal located at Dahej, Gujarat. The Company was formed as a joint venture by the Government of India to import LNG.


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**Results disappoint on lower volumes**

PLNG's 3Q PAT came in c.7-9% below CS/consensus expectations; Dahej volumes during the quarter declined further to 120TBTU—and utilisations were the lowest reported in over three years. Management suggests this is due to the weak demand environment, compounded by high LNG prices. Some industrial units in Gujarat had switched to coal during the quarter—which have now returned to gas; PLNG expects demand to improve incrementally once prices come off.

The Kochi terminal operated at c.5% utilisation and appears to have been break-even at the EBITDA level; interest and depreciation expenses amount to Rs1 bn per quarter, and amount to a likely Rs3.5/sh drag on annualised EPS (c.20-25% of FY13A).

Figure 2: PLNG on our DCF valuations



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Implied stock expectations low, but lacks catalysts**

PLNG's 9M14 EPS is only 65% of full-year consensus expectations, and with 4Q likely to be relatively subdued as well, the stock could see material earnings cuts near-term. On a DCF basis, assured earnings from the terminal alone work out to Rs97/sh, assuming the 5% annual escalation in regas tariffs stops in FY17. We update our models for 9M14 delivered numbers and the announced BPCL/IOC tolling agreements. Our FY14/15 EPS falls 22/15%. Given escalating costs, we believe there is reduced risk to regas tariff cuts—although the 5% annual escalation could have some downside. We maintain our NEUTRAL rating on the stock on the back of continued drag on earnings from Kochi and lack of near-term catalysts.

**Punjab National Bank Ltd -----Maintain NEUTRAL**

**Rising opex burden drags pre-provision profitability**

EPS: ▼ TP: ◀▶

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- PNB's 3Q net profit declined 42% YoY, 28% below estimate, on elevated credit cost (1.7% vs 1.1% in 3Q13). Pre-provision profit was muted (+3% YoY) as rising opex burden (+22% YoY) offset pick-up in loan growth (+10% YoY). With weakening pre-provision profitability and elevated provisioning, ROAs fell to 0.6%.
- Management is targeting further acceleration in loan growth to 14-15% by March 2014. SME loan growth picked up (25% YoY), incrementally contributing >50% of loan growth in the last 12 months. NIM improved (10 bp QoQ to 3.6%) on improvement in yields on advance (+15 bp QoQ) due to likely lower interest income reversals.
- Gross NPA fell 18 bp QoQ on lower gross slippage (2.1% annualised). Total problem asset addition, though, was still high at 3.2% (annualised) on high restructuring (Rs21 bn). NPL cover improved to 45% (4% QoQ) on higher provisions and was the key positive.
- While the bank is better positioned versus peers on capital (Tier I of ~9.5%), with high under-provisioning and weakening of pre-provision profitability, ROEs (at 8.5%) are unlikely to improve meaningfully. We cut our EPS estimates by 4-9% on higher opex. Maintain NEUTRAL.

**Increase in NPL cover incrementally positive**

Gross NPA declined 18 bp QoQ on lower gross slippage (2.1% annualised vs 4.3% for 2Q14). Total problem asset addition, though significantly improved from earlier quarters, still remains high at 3.2% (annualised) on high restructuring (Rs21 bn). Credit cost was elevated (1.7% vs 1.1% in 3Q13), as NPL cover improved to 45% (4% QoQ). Adequate provisioning for problem assets during the quarter was a key positive from the result. Total problem loans at ~14.6% is one of the highest among peers. Unprovided problem loans for the bank remain high at ~114% of network.

Bbg/RIC	PNB IN / PNBK.BO	Price (31 Jan 14, Rs)	548.60		
Rating (prev. rating)	N (N)TP (prev. TP Rs)	555.00 (555.00)			
Shares outstanding (mn)	362.07	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	1		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	2.05	52-wk range (Rs)	899.4 - 409.6		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	16.5	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ bn)	198.6/ 3.2		
Free float (%)	37.2	<b>Performance</b>			
Major shareholders	LIC (14.2%)	Absolute (%)	1M	3M	12M
		Relative (%)	(10.2)	(4.7)	(39.0)
			(8.4)	(1.3)	(42.7)
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
Pre-prov Op profit (Rs mn)	106,142.9	109,074.3	111,274.4	128,835.7	157,416.4
Net profit (Rs mn)	52,364	51,233	36,554	49,877	62,179
EPS (CS adj. Rs)	160	148	102	138	172
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(9)	(4)	(5)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	113	140	172
EPS growth (%)	6.5	(7.3)	(30.9)	34.8	24.7
P/E (x)	3.4	3.7	5.4	4.0	3.2
Dividend yield (%)	4.1	5.6	4.8	5.7	7.2
BVPS (CS adj. Rs)	777	884	949	1,051	1,178
P/B (x)	0.71	0.62	0.58	0.52	0.47
ROE (%)	22.6	17.8	11.1	13.8	15.4
ROA (%)	1.3	1.1	0.7	0.9	0.9
Tier 1 Ratio (%)	9.3	9.8	9.5	9.1	8.8

Note 1: Punjab National Bank is the 2nd largest government-owned bank in India with 5,190 branches and an asset base of Rs3780bn at March 31, 2011.

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**Earnings miss on elevated NPL provisions and MTM depreciation**


Management is targeting further acceleration in loan growth to 14-15% by Mar-14. SME loan growth picked-up (25% YoY), incrementally contributing >50% of loan growth in the last 12 months. Retail loan growth was healthy as well at 18% YoY. NIM improved (10 bp QoQ to 3.6%) on improvement in yields on advance (+15 bp QoQ) due to likely lower interest reversals on the back of a decline in gross slippages. Core fee income was sluggish (+2% YoY) primarily on drop in forex income (-34% QoQ). Opex growth (+21% YoY) outpaced top-line growth driven by employee provisions. Further impact on wage cost may come from pension liabilities post finalisation of wage revision and impact of change in mortality and wage growth assumptions.

Figure 1: 3Q14 results summary

(Rs mn)	3Q14	3Q13	YoY (%)	2Q14	QoQ (%)
<b>Nil</b>	<b>42,211</b>	<b>37,333</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>40,156</b>	<b>5%</b>
Core non-int income	9,144	8,975	2%	8,463	8%
Total income	51,356	46,308	11%	48,619	6%
Total opex	24,572	20,219	22%	23,800	3%
Pre-provisions profit	26,784	26,089	3%	24,819	8%
Total provisions	13,710	7,696	78%	14,557	-6%
<b>Operating profits</b>	<b>13,073</b>	<b>18,393</b>	<b>-29%</b>	<b>10,261</b>	<b>27%</b>
Non-operating income	-1,950	410	-576%	-3,900	-50%
PBT	11,123	18,803	-41%	6,361	75%
<b>Reported profit</b>	<b>7,554</b>	<b>13,056</b>	<b>-42%</b>	<b>5,055</b>	<b>49%</b>
Key parameters					
Deposits	4,206	3,858	9.0%	4,057	3.7%
Net advances	3,261	2,973	9.7%	3,139	3.9%
NIM (%)	3.6%	3.5%	10	3.5%	10
CASA (%)	38.3%	38.4%	-13	40.7%	-243
<b>ROA (%)</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>-51</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>18</b>
Gross NPA (%)	5.0%	4.6%	37	5.2%	-18
Coverage ratio (%)	45.3%	45.8%	-54	41.9%	341
Restructured loans (%)	9.6%	9.6%	0	11.1%	-392
<b>Credit cost (%)</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>1.9%</b>	<b>-15</b>
CASA (%)	38.3%	38.4%	-0.1%	40.7%	-2.4%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

Figure 2: Increasing opex ratio dragging core profitability



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**ROA moderated to 0.6%**

Overall, sharper-than-expected weakening of pre-provision profitability offset positives of adequate provisioning on problem assets. ROAs have declined to just 0.6% vs ~1% for FY13. While the bank is better positioned versus peers on capital (Tier I of ~9.5%), with under-provisioning high and weakening of pre-provision profitability, ROEs (at 8.5%) are unlikely to improve meaningfully. We cut our EPS estimates by 4-9% on higher opex burden. Maintain NEUTRAL.

**Union Bank of India ----- Maintain UNDERPERFORM**

**Weak profitability; constrained for capital**

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- Union Bank's net profit, up 10% YoY, was 14% below estimates. Pre-provision profit growth was weak (negative 4% YoY) due to pressure on NIMs (down 45 bp YoY) and continued high opex (+18% YoY). ROA was at 0.4% despite lower NPL provisions (1.1% vs 1.7% for 2Q).
- Loan growth moderated to 20% YoY (from 26% in 2Q) and is likely to be at ~15% by Mar-13. High loan growth, rise in impairments and weak profitability has resulted in bank's Tier I getting depleted (Core Tier I at 6.7% including 9M profits). Capital needs are significant with dilution of ~75% needed to just raise the CET1 to 9% at CMP.
- Opex (+18% YoY) outpaced top-line with cost-income rising to 52% is one of the highest among peers. Total problem asset addition was still high at ~3.4% (annualised). Even as gross NPA increased by 22 bp QoQ, credit cost was lower (at ~1.1%). Under-provisioning increased with un-provided problem loans at ~96% of networth.
- Even as valuations appear cheap at 0.4x book, given weak profitability (ROE of 8%), large capital needs and high under-provisioning, we maintain UNDERPERFORM. We cut our EPS by 10-13% as we build in dilution for FY14/15. We reduce our TP to Rs97.

Total problem asset addition remained high at ~3.2% (annualised) as gross NPA moves up 22 bp QoQ. Restructuring was high as well at Rs10 bn with further pipeline of Rs18 bn for 4Q14. The bank pulled back on NPL provisions (at 1.1% versus 1.7% in 2Q) resulting in NPL cover being flat at 42%. Under-provisioning increased with total un-provided problem loans as a % of networth at 96%.

**Figure 1: 3Q14 results summary**

(Rs mn)	3Q14	3Q13	YoY (%)	2Q14	QoQ (%)
<b>NII</b>	<b>19,635</b>	<b>18,915</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>19,545</b>	<b>0%</b>
Fee income	5,229	4,185	25%	4,452	17%
Recovery from w/off accounts	870	1,090	-20%	710	23%
Total income	25,734	24,190	6%	24,706	4%
Total opex	13,818	11,726	18%	13,407	3%
<b>Pre-provision profits</b>	<b>11,916</b>	<b>12,464</b>	<b>-4%</b>	<b>11,299</b>	<b>5%</b>
Loan loss provisions	5,430	7,030	-23%	6,730	-19%
Total provisions	5,664	8,163	-31%	9,398	-40%
<b>Operating profits</b>	<b>6,252</b>	<b>4,300</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>1,902</b>	<b>229%</b>
Treasury*	260	710	-63%	980	-73%
PBT	6,512	5,010	30%	2,882	126%
<b>Reported profit</b>	<b>3,489</b>	<b>3,024</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>2,081</b>	<b>68%</b>

Bbg/RIC	UNBK IN / UNBK.BO	Price (31 Jan 14, Rs)	108.05		
Rating (prev. rating)	U (U)	TP (prev. TP Rs)	97.00 (120.00)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	630.31	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	(10)		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	5.05	52-wk range (Rs)	248.8 - 98.6		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	9.6	Mkt cap (Rs/US\$ mn)	68,104.6 / 1,086.5		
Free float (%)	35.7	<b>Performance</b>	<b>1M 3M 12M</b>		
Major shareholders	GOI	Absolute (%)	(14.6) (20.6) (56.6)		
		Relative (%)	(12.8) (17.2) (60.3)		
<b>Year</b>	<b>03/12A</b>	<b>03/13A</b>	<b>03/14E</b>	<b>03/15E</b>	<b>03/16E</b>
Pre-prov Op profit (Rs mn)	48,129.9	51,054.2	47,566.2	59,485.0	76,536.7
Net profit (Rs mn)	17,871	21,579	16,664	24,087	32,687
EPS (CS adj. Rs)	33.3	37.6	27.0	35.0	44.3
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(2)	(10)	(13)
- Consensus EPS (Rs)	n.a.	n.a.	30.9	38.7	48.0
EPS growth (%)	(17.8)	13.1	(28.2)	29.7	26.5
P/E (x)	3.2	2.9	4.0	3.1	2.4
Dividend yield (%)	8.8	8.7	7.6	8.7	10.8
BVPS (CS adj. Rs)	242	273	283	296	309
P/B (x)	0.45	0.40	0.38	0.36	0.35
ROE (%)	14.9	15.0	10.1	12.7	15.2
ROA (%)	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.7
Tier 1 Ratio (%)	8.37	8.23	7.81	7.64	7.18

Note 1: Union Bank of India is a leading government-owned bank in India with 3,100 branches and an asset base of Rs2360bn at March 31, 2011.

Click here for detailed financials

**Weak pre-provision profitability**


Loan growth remains high at 20% YoY despite moderation with growth remaining strong across all segments. SME was the fastest growing segment (+30% YoY), incrementally contributing to most of the growth during the quarter. Management is guiding for loan growth to moderate to ~15% by Mar-13. NIMs remained under pressure (down 4 bp QoQ to 2.5%) on rise in cost of fund (+20bp QoQ). CASA ratio has come down to 28.8% (down 250bp YoY) on strong balance sheet growth. Core fee income showed improved traction (+25% YoY). Opex growth remained high (+18% YoY) as the bank provided (Rs450 mn in 3Q) towards wage re-negotiation. Increasing opex burden (cost-income at 52%) despite slowing top-line has been a significant burden on pre-provisions profits (down 4% YoY). Bank's per-provision ROA of 1.4% is also lower versus its immediate peers—BOI, PNB and BOB. Tax rate for the quarter was high as well at ~46%.

**Key parameters (Rs bn)**

Advances	2,230	1,859	20%	2,173	3%
Deposits	2,851	2,394	19%	2,870	-1%
<b>NIM (%)</b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>3.0%</b>	<b>-45</b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>-4</b>
CASA (%)	28.8%	31.3%	-245	28.2%	55
Tier I (%)	6.8%	8.4%	-165	7.1%	-36
<b>ROA (%)</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>16</b>
Gross NPA (%)	3.9%	3.4%	49	3.7%	22
Net NPA (%)	2.3%	1.7%	56	2.1%	11
Coverage ratio (%)	42.5%	50.4%	-788	42.1%	42
<b>Credit cost (%)</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>1.9%</b>	<b>-80</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>-65</b>

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. \* Treasury = Gains on sale of investments – write-back on inv dep

**Figure 2: Weakening of pre-provision profitability**



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Constrained for capital, maintain UNDERPERFORM**

Core Equity Tier I for the bank (at 6.7% including profit plough-back) has got depleted on high loan growth and weak profitability. To maintain 15%+ growth, the bank would need significant capital injection. We cut our estimate by ~10-13% as we factor in equity dilution for FY14/15. Even as valuations appear cheap at 0.4x book, given weak profitability (ROE of 8%), large capital needs and high under-provisioning, we maintain our UNDERPERFORM rating. We reduce our target price to Rs97 (earlier Rs120).

Japan

**Honda Motor** ----- **Maintain OUTPERFORM**

**3Q results: 4Q EPS guidance near ¥100 is noteworthy**

EPS: ◀▶ TP: ◀▶

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- Honda Motor announced 3Q FY3/14 results. Consolidated OP was ¥228.6 bn, ahead of our ¥224 bn forecast and the ¥220 bn I/B/E/S consensus.
- Although Honda (1) lowered its FY3/14 full-year consolidated sales volume estimate by 50,000 units (similar to our forecast) and (2) reiterated consolidated OP guidance of ¥780 bn, it also (3) raised its equity-method earnings forecast to ¥145 bn from ¥135 bn. Our overall impression from the announcement is neutral.
- Honda expects a QoQ decline in consolidated OP to ¥195 bn in 4Q. We consider this conservative in view of its expense forecasts. Of greater interest, however, is its 4Q EPS forecast of ¥98, up from ¥89 in 3Q. The driver is equity-method earnings.
- We believe the short-term share price impact is likely to be positive. Moreover, we still believe Honda will conduct share buybacks in 4Q aimed at a 30% shareholder return ratio. [Click here](#) for full report.

**Conference call highlights: Company estimates 4Q OP of ¥195 bn, but projection of 4Q EPS around ¥100 is noteworthy**

Honda expects a QoQ decline in consolidated OP to ¥195 bn in 4Q. We consider this conservative in view of its expense forecasts. Of greater interest, however, is its 4Q EPS forecast of ¥98, up from ¥89 in 3Q. The driver is equity-method earnings.

For 4Q, Honda estimates ¥45 bn from equity-method earnings, up from ¥31.6 bn in 3Q, driven by extremely strong Chinese sales volume at 240,000 vehicles in Oct-Dec. Since the Oct-Dec earnings from China are already confirmed, the probability that it will reach this level appears extremely high.

Four times Honda's 4Q consolidated OP forecast of ¥195 bn equals the FY guidance of ¥780 bn. For FY3/15, however, it targets Chinese sales of over 900,000 vehicles. Even if equity-method earnings do not reach ¥180 bn (4 × ¥45 bn), we still expect strong growth.

In sum, the FY3/15 EPS consensus includes: (1) OP growth, (2) equity-method earnings growth centered on China, and (3) YoY improvements in non-operating items. On this basis, we strongly expect upward movement from the current level (¥394).

**Short-term share price impact: Positive**

Honda shares have fallen around 10% in the past month. Its P/E on our FY3/15 forecast has corrected to 9.4x. We think the main factors are: (1) the strong yen combined with instability in emerging markets, and (2) concern about Honda's short-term earnings (or sell-side forecasts). Honda's quarterly OP had been below consensus for the previous eight consecutive quarters. Third-quarter results having come in ahead of consensus could ease the market's short-term earnings concerns to some degree. We therefore believe the short-term share price impact is likely to be positive. Moreover, we still believe Honda will conduct share buybacks in 4Q aimed at a 30% shareholder return ratio.

*This is an extract from the [Honda Motor](#) report published on 31 January 2014. Please see CS's R&A website for more details.*

Bbg/RIC	7267 JP / 7267.T	Price (31 Jan 14, ¥)	3,893.00		
Rating (prev. rating)	O (O)	TP (prev. TP ¥)	5,060 (5,060)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	1,802.29	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	30		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	5.6	52-wk range (¥)	4365.0 - 3330.0		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	219.7	Mkt cap (¥/US\$ bn)	7,016.3/ 68.5		
Free float (%)	80.0	Performance	1M	3M	12M
Major shareholders		Absolute (%)	(10.1)	(0.9)	11.1
		Relative (%)	(3.8)	(4.1)	(18.8)
Year	03/12A	03/13A	03/14E	03/15E	03/16E
Revenue (¥ bn)	7,948	9,878	12,022	13,145	13,408
EBITDA (¥ bn)	525	831	1,190	1,372	1,443
Net profit (¥ bn)	211.5	367.1	608.6	739.5	763.5
EPS (¥)	117	203	340	412	426
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	0
- Consensus EPS (¥)	n.a.	n.a.	335	393	443
EPS growth (%)	(60.3)	72.7	67.7	21.4	3.2
P/E (x)	33.2	19.2	11.5	9.4	9.1
Dividend yield (%)	1.5	2.0	2.1	2.7	2.8
EV/EBITDA (x)	18.8	12.9	9.4	8.3	7.8
P/B (x)	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0
ROE (%)	4.8	7.8	11.3	12.3	11.7
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	63.2	71.0	71.3	68.1	60.0

Note 1: ORD/ADR=1.00. Note 2: "HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD. develops, manufactures, and distributes motorcycles, automobiles, and power products such as generators and farm machinery. The company also operates a financial credit business.

[Click here](#) for detailed financials

**Figure 1: Earnings forecasts summary**

		Sales		Operating profit		Profit Before Tax		Net profit		EPS	
		¥mn	YoY (%)	¥mn	YoY (%)	¥mn	YoY (%)	¥mn	YoY (%)	¥	YoY (%)
<b>Consolidated</b>											
Mar-13	A	9,877,947	24.3	544,810	135.5	488,891	89.9	367,149	73.6	202.7	72.7
Mar-14	1Q A	2,834,095	16.3	184,963	5.1	172,035	-11.7	122,499	-7.0	68.0	-7.0
	2Q A	2,890,221	27.3	171,451	70.0	165,587	55.8	120,368	46.4	66.8	46.4
	3Q A	3,020,889	24.5	228,574	73.2	216,612	141.3	160,732	107.6	89.2	107.6
Mar-14	<b>CS E</b>	<b>12,022,316</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>826,414</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>818,622</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>608,614</b>	<b>65.8</b>	<b>339.9</b>	<b>67.7</b>
	CoE (new)	12,100,000	22.5	780,000	43.2	755,000	54.4	580,000	58.0	321.8	58.8
	(prev)	12,100,000	22.5	780,000	43.2	765,000	56.5	580,000	58.0	321.8	58.8
	IBES E	12,072,580	22.2	816,851	49.9	810,733	65.8	602,622	64.1	335.2	65.4
Mar-15	<b>CS E</b>	<b>13,145,000</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>974,000</b>	<b>17.9</b>	<b>996,000</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>739,515</b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>412.5</b>	<b>21.4</b>
	IBES E	12,915,789	7.0	937,914	14.8	951,143	17.3	707,604	17.4	393.5	17.4
Mar-16	<b>CS E</b>	<b>13,408,000</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>981,000</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>1,003,000</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>763,505</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>425.8</b>	<b>3.2</b>
	IBES E	13,760,145	6.5	1,058,381	12.8	1,081,989	13.8	801,615	13.3	442.9	12.6

Source: Company data, I/B/E/S, Credit Suisse estimates

Pakistan

Pakistan 360° Tracker ----- Maintain OVERWEIGHT


New report: Picking up where we left off in December

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- Sentiments were lifted after an unexpected dip of 1.3% MoM in Dec CPI that ushered in hopes of a status quo in policy rate. The same eventually materialised and along with a resurgence of FII flows (US\$31.8 mn; +6.8x MoM), the market racked up a USD return of +6.1% in January. [Full Report](#).
- Incremental liquidity was visible in the system post the holiday season as ADTO picked up to US\$79.2 mn (+8.2% MoM). Although large-caps drew more liquidity, they failed to outperform and gains were mostly skewed towards second and third tier names.
- In our view, the market should take the upcoming IMF review in its stride, given most deliverables are met. Beyond this, developments on privatisation and materialisation of foreign flows, will serve as a litmus test for the govt's commitment to reforms.
- We prefer ENGRO, PPL, LUCK, UBL & HUBC—names which we also plan to showcase at our upcoming [Asia Frontier Markets Conference](#) on 24-26 Feb, in New York & Boston. Our other top picks include OGDC & MCB.

Figure 1: Along with FIIs, banks also parked fresh allocations in January




Source: NCCPL, Credit Suisse estimates.

Temporary relief in macros pushes KSE +6.1% MoM

Though the market was expecting a cool-off in CPI, a lower than expected reading (9.2%; down 1.3% MoM) lifted sentiments and fuelled the case for a status quo on rates (which eventually materialized). The bourse posted an impressive USD return of 6.1% during January and stability in the PKR also buoyed the mood of FIIs which pumped in a net US\$31.8 mn (+6.8x MoM).

Figure 2: Frontier markets posted impressive USD returns in January



Source: Bloomberg, MSCI, Credit Suisse estimates.

Incremental liquidity was visible in the system

ADTO propped up to US\$79.2 mn (+8.2% MoM) backed by higher FII's post the holiday season in December. A sample of 15 large-cap stocks took up 49% of average volumes which had previously dipped to 39% in December. Nonetheless, many blue chips still lagged the benchmark as gains were seen in smaller caps. While the index has come off its highs of >27,000, we expect that corporate results and high payouts in the near term should restrict further downside.

Among the key event of the month, the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) finally gave its nod of approval for concessionary gas pricing for Engro's Enven plant (at US\$0.7/mmbtu) which drove a sharp rally in Engro Corp (+11.4% MoM) and a stupendous return of 71% MoM in the newly listed Engro Fertilizers.

What lies in store over the next few months?

For now, market expectations do not seem to be pondering excessively over the upcoming IMF review. Statements from govt. officials are mostly positive and we see little hurdles in securing the third tranche of US\$547 mn. However, the IMF could censure the authorities on the pace of the privatisation program and the government's failure to attract foreign flows. While the govt has granted in-principle approvals for divestment of stakes in OGDC, PPL, UBL and ABL, modalities remain unclear. Monetary tightening was avoided for now, however, we continue to pencil in a 50-100 bp rate hike in the March review. Auctions of Treasury bills also substantiate this view with post of the bids being pulled towards 3M paper.

Figure 3: CS Pakistan coverage cluster—High conviction ideas

Ticker	Company Name	M. Cap (USDmn)	6M ADTO (USDmn)	Price (PRs)	TP (PRs)	Upside (%)	3-yr EPS CAGR	P/E (x)	P/B (x)	D/Y	EV/EBITDA (x)	ROE (%)
OGDC.KA	Oil and Gas Develop. Co	11,114	1.5	273	325	19%	28%	8.8	3.0	5.1	6.0	34
PPL.KA	Pak Petroleum Limited	4,134	3.8	221	255	15%	24%	7.8	2.4	5.0	5.0	30
HPWR.KA	Hub Power Company	708	1.1	65	80	24%	14%	7.3	2.3	13.2	4.9	31
EGCH.KA	Engro Corporation Ltd	864	6.8	178	204	14%	31%	7.6	1.5	-	4.8	20
LUKC.KA	Lucky Cement	950	1.4	310	335	8%	17%	8.7	2.0	3.6	6.0	24
DGKH.KA	DG Khan Cement	397	4.2	96	128	34%	16%	6.3	0.9	2.6	5.0	15
MCB.KA	MCB Bank Limited	2,723	1.7	284	350	23%	16%	11.3	2.3	4.9	na	20
UBL.KA	United Bank Limited	1,555	1.2	134	170	27%	19%	8.1	1.5	6.8	na	18

Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates.

**Philippines**
**Philippines Economics: GDP (4Q13)**
**Unfazed by the Typhoon**

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- Philippines' 4Q real GDP growth came in at 6.5% YoY, better than market expectations of 6% YoY and our own above-consensus estimate for a 6.2% YoY rise. On a sequential basis, GDP growth accelerated to 1.5% QoQ seasonally adjusted (sa), from 1.1% QoQ sa increase in the previous quarter.
- The resilient YoY number and acceleration in sequential GDP growth were impressive, especially given the widespread concerns over the negative impact on economic growth from Super-Typhoon Haiyan.
- We note that stronger net exports helped to offset the moderation in private consumption growth. Exports were a positive contributor to GDP growth for the first time since 2Q 2012, while government consumption declined 5.2% YoY, from +4.6% YoY in the previous quarter—likely impacted by the pork barrel incident last year.
- We see no reason to change our above-consensus 2014 GDP forecast of 6.8% (consensus: 6.3%) partly due to our expectation that the post-typhoon reconstruction work will provide a boost to GDP growth in 2014. Our forecasts also reflect: (1) the lagged impact of monetary policy easing, and (2) stronger global growth.

and Business Process Outsourcing centres (see [Philippines Chartpack](#) and [Focus Asia 1Q 2014](#)).

**Net exports offset weaker private consumption and government spending**

Looking at the details, we note that stronger net exports helped to offset the moderation in private consumption growth (+5.6% YoY, from 6.2% YoY previously). Net exports were a positive contributor to GDP growth for the first time since 2Q 2012, while government consumption declined 5.2% YoY, from +4.6% YoY in the previous quarter—likely impacted by the pork barrel incident last year. Stronger manufacturing activity is also consistent with the healthier export print.

**We see no reason to change our above-consensus 2014 GDP forecast of 6.8% (consensus: 6.3%)**

The Philippines Economic Planning Secretary was quoted as saying that 1Q14 GDP will be impacted negatively by the typhoon. While agriculture production is likely to be dented in 2014, we hold a more sanguine view. This is due in part to our expectation that the post-typhoon reconstruction work will provide a boost to GDP growth in 2014. The government has already pencilled in 1% of GDP worth of reconstruction projects in its budget for this year alone. Our above-consensus GDP forecast also reflects: (1) the lagged impact of monetary policy easing, and (2) stronger global growth, which should continue to boost production and exports over the coming quarters.

**Philippine financial markets not immune from EM sell-off**

While GDP growth should surprise on the upside in 2014, the Philippine financial markets are unlikely to be immune from global developments. In particular, in recent weeks, the combination of renewed Chinese economic concerns, US QE tapering, and Argentina's peso devaluation have triggered another wobble in emerging markets (see [Contagion? Re-testing Asian vulnerability](#)).

**Monetary policy implications?**

Post the GDP release, the central bank governor was quoted as saying that the central bank will 'act as appropriate to ensure CPI inflation is well-anchored' and that the 'fundamental strength of the Philippines economy is intact'. While this could be interpreted as marginally more hawkish, we doubt the central bank will tighten its monetary policy this year, due in part to support economic activity post the typhoon. In addition, we hold the view that the recent rise in CPI inflation is likely to be transitory and temporary, limiting the need for the BSP to respond with a rate hike.

**Figure 1: Philippines' GDP growth breakdown**

	1Q2013	2Q2013	3Q2013	4Q2013
<i>(% YoY unless otherwise stated)</i>				
Overall GDP (% YoY)	7.7	7.6	6.9	6.5
Overall GDP (% QoQ sa)	2.2	1.6	1.1	1.5
<b>By expenditure</b>				
Private consumption	5.5	5.1	6.2	5.6
Government consumption	13.2	18.0	4.6	-5.2
Gross fixed capital formation	15.6	13.2	11.9	7.0
Exports	-7.6	-6.8	12.8	6.4
Imports	2.0	-2.9	16.4	1.9
<b>By industry</b>				
Agriculture	3.1	-0.2	0.3	1.1
Mining	-1.9	-2.7	4.8	-10.4
Manufacturing	9.5	10.3	9.7	12.3
Construction	29.3	17.4	4.5	-0.8
Services	6.8	7.5	7.4	6.5

Source: Bloomberg, NSCB, Credit Suisse estimates.

**4Q GDP surprised on the upside**

Philippines' 4Q real GDP growth came in at 6.5% YoY, better than the market's expectation of 6% YoY and our own above-consensus estimate for a 6.2% YoY rise. On a sequential basis, GDP growth accelerated to 1.5% QoQ seasonally adjusted (sa), from 1.1% QoQ sa increase in the previous quarter. Full year 2013 real GDP growth came in at 7.2%, from 6.8% in 2012.

**Bruised, but not battered: Strong print given the pessimism post Typhoon Haiyan**

The resilient YoY number and acceleration in sequential GDP growth were impressive, especially given the widespread concerns over the negative impact on economic growth from Super-Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the country in early November. We note that at one point, the government itself was forecasting 4Q GDP growth to come in as low as 4.5%. We have argued on several occasions that many analysts were too pessimistic in their GDP growth estimates, noting that the typhoon did not damage the vast majority of manufacturing

South Korea

Korea Economics

Export growth slowed in January, narrowing the trade surplus as per seasonal trend

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- Export and import growth recorded mild contractions in January. Exports declined slightly by 0.2% YoY, slowed from the 7% YoY gain in the prior month. Imports fell 0.9% YoY, also slowed from the 3% YoY gain before.
- The trade surplus has narrowed sharply to US\$735 mn, from over US\$3.6 bn in December, but it is consistent with the seasonal trend seen in prior years. The trend trade surplus has reached US\$44.9 bn (3.6% of GDP) on a 12-month rolling sum basis.
- Details of the trade report shows that exports to Asia rose 3.4% YoY. Growth to China rose to 10.4% YoY, while those to ASEAN rose 8.3% YoY. Outside of Asia, export growth to the US slowed to 1.2% YoY, but those to Europe surged to double-digit level.
- The monthly trade growth figures have been volatile lately, but exports have picked up by 3.8% YoY in 2H13, up from 1H13. We expect to see some cyclical softness in Korea's merchandise trade in 1Q14, but maintain our expectation of continued recovery in 2014.

Product-wise, wireless telecommunication equipment exports grew 13.3% YoY. Semiconductors and automobile exports also recorded double-digit gains at 11.8% YoY and 13.8% YoY, respectively. Steel exports rebounded (19.4% YoY), but metals (-7.9% YoY) and petroleum (-11.9% YoY) contracted.

The monthly trade growth figures have been volatile lately, but exports have picked up by 3.8% YoY in 2H13, up from the 0.6% YoY gain seen in 1H13. We expect to see some cyclical softness in Korea's merchandise trade in 1Q14, but maintain our expectation of continued recovery helped by better demand in the developed markets.

Figure 1: Exports slowed in January, narrowing the trade surplus as per seasonal trend



Source: MITE, Credit Suisse

Export growth slowed, trade surplus narrowed

Export and import growth recorded mild contractions in January. This has undershot market's expectation of a low-single digit gain in exports, though the actual gain in imports was above consensus. Exports declined slightly by 0.2% YoY, slowed from the 7% YoY gain in the prior month. Imports fell 0.9% YoY, also slowed from the 3% YoY gain before. The trade surplus has narrowed sharply to US\$735 mn from over US\$3.6 bn in the prior month, but it is consistent with the seasonal trend seen in prior years. The trend trade surplus has reached another recent high at US\$44.9 bn (3.6% of GDP) on a 12-month rolling sum basis.

Growth to Asia improved, but those to the US slowed

Details of the trade report compiled by Bloomberg shows that exports to Asia rose 3.4% YoY, improved from the 1.5% YoY contraction in the prior month. Growth to China improved to 10.4% YoY, while those to ASEAN rose 8.3% YoY. In ASEAN, exports to Indonesia contracted 15.8% YoY, but those to Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand gained during the first 20 days of the month. Outside of Asia, export growth to the US moderated to 1.2% YoY, but those to Europe surge to double-digit level (at 21.5% YoY).

Thailand

VGI Global Media PCL ----- Downgrade to NEUTRAL

Overwhelming cyclical elements

EPS: ▼ TP: ▼

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- We have cut our earnings by 13-24% for FY14-16E to reflect the disappointing 3Q FY14 result and weaker growth momentum.
- VGI's cyclical business nature overwhelms its structural growth story on an emerging Out-Of-Home (OOH) media. Two unforeseen factors have severely affected the company's performance and led to a major cut in our numbers: (1) worse-than-expected economic growth and (2) a prolonged political uncertainty. Both have weakened the sentiment of corporates who put on hold or cut their advertising expenditure (adex) in mass transit and in-store media since 4Q13 (Oct-Dec).
- The market may have factored in the bad news but we believe the price movement could be stalled as the weak economy and unresolved political issue could get prolonged for an unknown period. While VGI's fundamentals still remain intact, we will likely see another weak quarter (Jan-Mar), and it could take some time before the corporates resume their normal advertising spending.
- Downgrade VGI to NEUTRAL with a new 12-mth TP of Bt9.5/sh.

Bbg/RIC	VGI TB / VGI.BK	Price (30 Jan 14 , Bt)	8.35		
Rating (prev. rating)	N (O)	TP (prev. TP Bt)	9.50 (13.46)		
Shares outstanding (mn)	3,431.97	Est. pot. % chg. to TP	14		
Daily trad vol - 6m avg (mn)	12.7	52-wk range (Bt)	14.04 - 8.35		
Daily trad val - 6m avg (US\$ mn)	4.2	Mkt cap (Bt/US\$ mn)	28,657.0/ 868.4		
Free float (%)	33.7	<b>Performance</b>			
Major shareholders	BTS Group Holdings Public Company Limited	Absolute (%)	1M	3M	12M
		Relative (%)	(14.8)	(31.1)	(10.2)
			(11.9)	(28.0)	(13.4)
<b>Year</b>	<b>03/12A</b>	<b>03/13A</b>	<b>03/14E</b>	<b>03/15E</b>	<b>03/16E</b>
Revenue (Bt mn)	1,977	2,838	3,220	3,707	4,220
EBITDA (Bt mn)	526	1,289	1,625	1,944	2,256
Net profit (Bt mn)	278	908	1,236	1,460	1,701
EPS (Bt)	0.22	0.30	0.36	0.43	0.50
- Change from prev. EPS (%)	n.a.	n.a.	(13)	(21)	(24)
- Consensus EPS (Bt)	n.a.	n.a.	0.38	0.47	0.58
EPS growth (%)	61.6	33.8	21.7	18.1	16.5
P/E (x)	37.7	28.2	23.2	19.6	16.9
Dividend yield (%)	0	1.6	3.5	4.1	4.7
EV/EBITDA (x)	53.8	21.3	16.7	13.9	11.7
P/B (x)	32.6	15.8	12.2	10.5	9.0
ROE (%)	78.8	86.2	59.3	57.3	57.5
Net debt(cash)/equity (%)	(130.1)	(69.1)	(62.5)	(62.8)	(70.5)

Note 1: VGI Global Media (VGI) is a provider of advertising services with exclusive rights to manage spaces on 23 stations of BTS's network and modern trade spaces such as Tesco Lotus, BigC and Watsons. It also provides advertising services in office buildings.


Click [here](#) for detailed financials

Cyclical elements overwhelm structural growth story

We still like VGI's structural growth story on an emerging OOH media, driven by the changing lifestyle, mass transit network buildout and modern trade store expansion.

Unfortunately, VGI's cyclical elements appears to overwhelm the structural growth story. Ad spending is highly cyclical in nature as it depends on overall economic conditions and tends to be one of the first things that firms cut going into a downturn (Figure 1). Despite a lot of interesting growth factors from a combination of ad space expansion, digital media replacement and pricing adjustment, VGI still experienced a weaker growth momentum and posted disappointing result in 3QFY14. Margins held up well but top-line growth across business units was below our expectation.

Figure 1: Ad spending is highly cyclical



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Massive earnings cut to reflect weaker growth momentum

We have revised our earnings downward by 13-24% in FY14-16E on the back of lower revenue growth assumptions and visibility (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Downward revision in revenue growth assumptions

	FY14E	FY15E	FY16E
<b>Old assumptions</b>			
Revenue growth	30.0%	24.2%	18.0%
BTS related media (% YoY)	35.0%	27.5%	20.0%
Modern trade media (% YoY)	25.0%	20.0%	15.0%
Other revenue (% YoY)	25.0%	25.0%	20.0%
<b>New assumptions</b>			
Revenue growth	13.5%	15.1%	13.8%
BTS related media (% YoY)	19.0%	17.5%	15.0%
Modern trade media (% YoY)	8.0%	12.5%	12.5%
Other revenue (% YoY)	7.0%	12.5%	12.5%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

There have been two unforeseen factors that have led to a major cut in our numbers: (1) worse-than-expected economy and (2) a prolonged political uncertainty. Our economist has cut 2014 GDP forecast to 3.0% from 4.5% in Jan, while our strategist sees the political situation to remain unstable for months if not longer. Both factors have materially weakened the sentiment of corporates who cut or delay their advertising activities since 4Q13 (Oct-Dec).

Downgrade to NEUTRAL; bad news being factored in but price movement could be stalled

We downgrade VGI to NEUTRAL with a new 12-month target price of Bt9.5/share. We believe the fundamentals still remain intact and expect VGI's margins and ROE to remain high, given its exclusive rights to manage ad spaces on BTS skytrain for 15 years and modern trade stores and office buildings for three-five years.

While the market has somewhat factored in the bad news, given the falling share price of over 30% over the past 3M when the rally started in Oct 2013, the price movement might be stalled as the weak economy and unresolved political situation could get prolonged for an unknown period. Also, we could see another weak quarter (Jan-Mar) and it could take some time before the corporates resume their normal ad spending.

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**Adani Enterprises Ltd.** (ADEL.BO, Rs238.15, UNDERPERFORM[V], TP Rs196.0)  
**Allied Bank Limited** (ABL.KA, PRs89.0)  
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**Bajaj Auto Limited** (BAJA.BO, Rs1920.45)  
**Bank of India** (BOI.BO, Rs186.35, UNDERPERFORM[V], TP Rs162.0)  
**Bharat Heavy Electricals** (BHEL.BO, Rs170.7)  
**Bharat Petroleum** (BPCL.BO, Rs363.6)  
**CapitaMalls Asia** (CMAL.SI, S\$1.8)  
**CJ O Shopping Co Ltd** (035760.KQ, W402,900)  
**Cummins India** (CUMM.BO, Rs429.8)  
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**Engro Fertilizer** (ENGR.KA, PRs48.25)  
**GAIL (India) Ltd** (GAIL.BO, Rs358.95)  
**Glorious Property Holdings Limited** (0845.HK, HK\$1.26)  
**Godrej Consumer** (GOCP.NS, Rs739.25)  
**Grasim Industries** (GRAS.BO, Rs2573.85, OUTPERFORM, TP Rs2940.0)  
**GS Holdings** (078930.KS, W51,300)  
**HCL Technologies** (HCLT.BO, Rs1464.7, OUTPERFORM, TP Rs1675.0)  
**Hero Motocorp Ltd** (HROM.BO, Rs1999.75, UNDERPERFORM, TP Rs1930.0)  
**Honda Motor** (7267.T, ¥3,893, OUTPERFORM, TP ¥5,060)  
**Hub Power Company** (HPWR.KA, PRs64.57, OUTPERFORM, TP PRs80.0)  
**Hutchison Port Holdings Trust** (HPHT.SI, \$0.66)  
**Hyundai Development** (012630.KS, W24,300)  
**Hyundai Home Shopping Network Corp** (057050.KS, W181,500)  
**Indian Oil Corp Limited** (IOC.BO, Rs245.3)  
**Indian Overseas Bank** (IOBK.BO, Rs42.9, UNDERPERFORM, TP Rs35.0)  
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**Jammu and Kashmir Bank** (JKBK.BO, Rs1295.45)  
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**Kalbe Farma** (KLB.FJ, Rp1,420)  
**Las Vegas Sands Corp.** (LVS.N, \$73.93)  
**Lotte Chemical** (011170.KS, W211,500)  
**Lucky Cement Co Ltd** (LUKC.KA, PRs309.75, OUTPERFORM, TP PRs335.0)  
**Lupin Ltd** (LUPN.BO, Rs865.9)  
**Marico Ltd** (MRCO.BO, Rs214.45, OUTPERFORM, TP Rs245.0)  
**Maruti Suzuki India Ltd** (MRTI.BO, Rs1635.35, OUTPERFORM, TP Rs2080.0)  
**MCB Bank Limited** (MCB.KA, PRs283.81, OUTPERFORM, TP PRs350.0)  
**Navitas Ltd** (NVT.AX, A\$6.57, OUTPERFORM, TP A\$7.35)  
**Oberoi Realty** (OEBO.BO, Rs189.8)  
**Oil & Gas Development Company** (OGDC.KA, PRs272.54, OUTPERFORM, TP PRs325.0)  
**Pakistan Petroleum Limited** (PPL.KA, PRs221.11, OUTPERFORM, TP PRs255.0)  
**Petronet LNG Limited** (PLNG.BO, Rs109.9, NEUTRAL, TP Rs118.0)  
**PTT Global Chemical** (PTTGC.BK, Bt69.5, OUTPERFORM, TP Bt95.0)  
**Punjab National Bank Ltd** (PNBK.BO, Rs548.6, NEUTRAL, TP Rs555.0)  
**Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited** (RANB.BO, Rs327.5)  
**Sands China** (1928.HK, HK\$58.4, OUTPERFORM, TP HK\$78.2)  
**Security Bank Corporation** (SECB.PS, P115.9)  
**SK Innovation** (096770.KS, W127,000)  
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