

Voting criteria	Approval voting	Instant runoff voting	Plurality voting with ranked ballot	Criterion that FairVote likes the most
Supporting your 1 <sup>st</sup> choice can't hurt your 1 <sup>st</sup> choice	✓	X	✓	Nope
Supporting your 1 <sup>st</sup> choice can't hurt your 2 <sup>st</sup> choice (unless your 1 <sup>st</sup> choice wins)	✓	X	✓	Nope
Supporting your 2 <sup>nd</sup> choice can't hurt your 2 <sup>nd</sup> choice	✓	X	✓	Nope
Supporting your 2 <sup>nd</sup> choice can't hurt your 1 <sup>st</sup> choice <i>Later-No-Harm criterion</i>	X	✓	✓	Bingo

**Why all of the criteria from above are not actually useful to modern electoral scientists**

Right now, based on all four of these criteria, plurality voting appears as though it is the least resistant voting method to strategic voting! But have you noticed the very clever wording of all of these pointless criteria? All of them don't dare to use the words "favorite candidate" when referring to a voter's favorite choice. In fact, they don't even refer to a voter's **honest** preferences of all the candidates at all! These criteria simply referring to whatever candidate a voter happens to rank at the top of their ballot. For approval voting, this gets a little weird because approval voting does not actually use a preferential ballot. However approval voting can still be applicable to these very warped voting criteria because an approval voting election can be ran with a preferential ballot as long as an approval threshold is also used. Because this version of approval voting can be used to classify which of the very useless criterion from above approval voting passes, the same thing can also be done to plurality voting.

## What would those criteria all look like if they actually referred to a voter's honest preferences of all of the candidates?

Voting criteria	Approval voting	Instant runoff voting	Plurality voting with ranked ballot	Criterion that CES likes the most
Giving the most support to your <b>favorite</b> candidate can't hurt your <b>favorite</b> candidate	✓	X	✓	Nope
Giving the most support to your <b>favorite</b> candidate can't hurt your <b>2<sup>nd</sup> favorite</b> candidate (unless your <b>favorite</b> wins)	✓	X	X	Nope
Giving at least the <b>2<sup>nd</sup></b> most support to your <b>2<sup>nd</sup> favorite</b> candidate can't hurt your <b>2<sup>nd</sup> favorite</b> candidate	✓	X	✓	Nope
Giving the <b>2<sup>nd</sup></b> most support to your <b>2<sup>nd</sup> favorite</b> candidate can't hurt your <b>favorite</b> candidate	X	X	X	Nope
There is never a reason not to give full support your <b>favorite</b> candidate! <i>Favorite Betrayal criterion</i>	✓	X	X	Bingo