## Buy

Target price
Rs2116.00
Price
Rs1809.05
Short term (0-60 days)
n/a
Market view
Underweight


Market capitalisation Rs361.25bn (US\$7.89bn)

Average (12M) daily turnover
Rs935.09m (US\$20.39m)

[^0]
## Researched by

RBS Equities (India) Limited Institutional Team

Mafatlal Chambers - C Wing, Ground Floor, N.M. Joshi Marg, Lower Parel (E), Mumbai 400 013, India. Tel : +91 022 67548411 Fax : +91 02267548420

## Hero Honda Motors Favourable technology options

We recently met management at Hero Honda. The company has favourable technology options when/if the JV ends, either from Honda itself or global consultants. Capacity can be dealt with at existing plants and, so, we believe HH is well placed to benefit from rising rural demand given the good monsoon. Buy.

## Key forecasts

|  | FY09A | FY10A | FY11F | FY12F | FY13F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Revenue (Rsm) | 123,192 | 158,605 | 193,274 | 214,905 | 234,226 |
| EBITDA (Rsm) | 17,098 | 27,670 | 29,536 | 33,193 | 35,375 |
| Reported net profit (Rsm) | 12,818 | 22,318 | 24,737 | 28,523 | 30,980 |
| Normalised net profit (Rsm) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Normalised EPS (Rs) | 12,818 | 22,318 | 24,737 | 28,523 | 30,980 |
| Dividend per share (Rs) | 64.20 | 111.8 | 123.9 | 142.8 | 155.1 |
| Dividend yield (\%) | 20.00 | 110.0 | 34.00 | 42.00 | 46.00 |
| Normalised PE (x) | 1.11 | 6.08 | 1.88 | 2.32 | 2.54 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 28.20 | 16.20 | 14.60 | 12.70 | 11.70 |
| Price/book value (x) | 19.10 | 12.00 | 10.70 | 8.95 | 7.85 |
| ROIC (\%) | 9.51 | 10.40 | 7.02 | 5.15 | 3.99 |

1. Post-goodwill amortisation and pre-exceptional items
year to Mar, fully diluted
Accounting standard: Local GAAP
Source: Company data, RBS forecasts

## Favourable technology options

Rumours that the Hero Honda JV is to end continue, despite chairman Brij Mohan Munjal stating at the AGM that there was no immediate threat. If the rumours prove true, the JV agreement gives Hero the option of extending its technology sharing agreement with Honda until 2017 (vs the current 2014 expiry) or to discontinue the agreement and stop royalty payments immediately. Hero has limited in-house component design and testing capabilities and we believe it would take three years for it to establish full model development capabilities with the help of global design and technology consultants and at a cost of around $1.5 \%$ of net sales (ie, in line with peers).

## Alternative capacity plans on track

Given the delays to its new plant, management is looking to set up additional assembly lines in existing plants to meet strong expected demand. This, plus capacity de-bottlenecking, may address short-term capacity issues until next year's festival season, beyond which we believe the new plant will be necessary. But, with new plants reducing in-house component manufacture drastically (to $18 \%$ the Haridwar plant vs $26 \%$ at the older Gurgaon plant), management is believes it can get new plants off the ground faster.

## Valuation looks attractive on JV split fears: Buy

Hero Honda shares have underperformed the Sensex by $20 \%$ over the last three months on concerns about capacity constraint and that Honda will exit. We feel the JV agreement works in Hero's favour with regards to technology support and that the current valuation (12.7x FY12F) is attractive bearing in mind: 1) $44 \%$ of Hero Honda's sales come from the rural sector, which is best positioned for high growth from a good monsoon; and 2) $75 \%$ of its sales are from 100 cc products, where incremental technology support is less critical and where Hero Honda has ambitious distribution plans. We reiterate our Buy recommendation. Our three-stage DCF-based target price of Rs2,116 is supported by cash in hand of Rs236 per share and a high ROE. At our target price, the stock would be trading at 14.8 FY F12F.

## Favourable technology options

If Honda exits the JV, Hero looks well positioned on the technology front and would, in our view, face limited issues during any transformation. It could choose between paying for support from Honda and building its own capabilities. We reiterate our Buy rating.

## More clarity emerges on technology agreement with Honda, Japan

We have discussed the JV agreement with management and understand that, if Honda should sell its $25.5 \%$ stake in the Hero Honda JV, the Hero group has the following options as regards technology support from Honda:

- To extend the technical agreement with Honda till 2017 (vs its current 2014 expiry) at the same royalty rate (currently averaging $2.7 \%$ of net sales);
- To cut all ties with Honda and stop paying royalties immediately - importantly, this means not having to pay in relation to vehicles in production from already-absorbed technology; or
- Renew the technical agreement (on new terms) when it expires in 2014 for sustaining longterm technology inputs from Honda.

We feel this puts Hero Honda in a good position as it would only need to pay royalties for future technology support and not for what it has already received. This gives it the option of evaluating incremental benefits from paying $2.7 \%$ of net sales as a royalty vs developing in-house R\&D capabilities (peers spend 1.5-2\% of net sales).

Currently Hero Honda spends $0.3 \%$ of net sales towards in-house R\&D (in addition to its $2.7 \%$ royalty payment). This is primarily towards component design and testing, initial market research and road testing of vehicles.

## Hero Honda has component development capabilities but not full model capabilities

From discussions with industry experts and management, we understand that Hero Honda has inhouse component development and testing capabilities, but lacks full model development capabilities. Given the experiences of new entrants like Mahindra and TVS (post its split with Suzuki), our industry sources believe it would take just three years for Hero Honda to build up full model development capabilities with the help of global design and technical consultants.

As regards emission technology, the same experts suggest that two-wheelers have the advantage of already complying with much stricter norms than the rest of the world. Hero Honda crossed one crucial short-term technology hurdle having successfully moved to BS-III norms by including catalytic converters on its 100 cc bikes. Given it derives more than $75 \%$ of sales volume from 100 cc bikes, we believe relatively less incremental technology is required in the medium term to compete in the bike segment.

## Our estimates rely on a steep rise in sales during the festival period

Our FY11 sales volume assumption of 5.47 m units requires a sharp increase in monthly sales volume for the rest of FY11, especially in the festival seasons. We forecast $15.7 \%$ sequential growth in sales volume for 2HFY11, over 1HFY11. We believe Hero Honda's strong hold in the rural market ( $44 \%$ of its sales volume) will help it benefit from the surge in rural demand expected following a good monsoon and lead it to outperform industry sales growth for the rest of its financial year.


Source: SIAM

## Capacity build-up plan at existing plants as new plant is delayed

Hero Honda's current capacity of 5.8 m vehicles per annum is enough to cater for volume growth till mid-CY11.

Plans to a new assembly and components plant are currently have still to receive final approval. Management therefore aims to add assembly lines at one of its existing plants to make sure it can meet peak festival demand in September 2011. Once the plans are approved it will take about 12 months to construct the new plant.


Source: Company data, RBS forecasts

## Best placed to benefit from strong monsoon-driven rural demand

For coming quarters, price increases put through in June and July should help absorb the cost of meeting emission standards and increased steel prices. Elsewhere on the cost front, a qoq easing of marketing expenses may help qoq EBITDA margin expansion driven by improved festivaldriven volume.

The sharp improvement in rainfall in recent weeks (vs the relative drought faced till early August) augurs well for the rural economy in the medium term. Hero Honda derives $44 \%$ of its sales volume from the rural sector - the highest of India's auto companies - which should mean it is well placed to benefit from any improvement in demand from this segment. In addition, Hero Honda should benefit from the increased availability of credit as it derives nearly $30 \%$ of sales volume through bank- or NBFC-financing.

To capture the rapid growth of lower-middle income household expected in the coming decade in India, Hero Honda plans to expand distribution in smaller towns aggressively in coming years by converting authorised service centres into dealers. By end-March 2010, Hero Honda had 4,300
customer touch points (covering 750 dealers, 3,000 authorised representatives and 1,000 authorised service centres).

| Income statement |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rsm | FY09A | FY10A | FY11F | FY12F | FY13F |
| Revenue | 123192 | 158605 | 193274 | 214905 | 234226 |
| Cost of sales | -91907 | -112967 | -140545 | -156568 | -170744 |
| Operating costs | -14187 | -17969 | -23193 | -25144 | -28107 |
| EBITDA | 17098 | 27670 | 29536 | 33193 | 35375 |
| DDA \& Impairment (ex gw) | -1807 | -1915 | -2146 | -2496 | -2820 |
| EBITA | 15291 | 25755 | 27390 | 30697 | 32556 |
| Goodwill (amort/impaired) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| EBIT | 15291 | 25755 | 27390 | 30697 | 32556 |
| Net interest | 2524 | 2563 | 3150 | 4300 | 5225 |
| Associates (pre-tax) | n/a | n/a | n/a | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | n/a |
| Forex gain / (loss) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Exceptionals (pre-tax) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Other pre-tax items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Reported PTP | 17815 | 28317 | 30540 | 34997 | 37781 |
| Taxation | -4997 | -5999 | -5803 | -6474 | -6801 |
| Minority interests | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Exceptionals (post-tax) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Other post-tax items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Reported net profit | 12818 | 22318 | 24737 | 28523 | 30980 |
| Normalised Items Excl. GW | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Normalised net profit | 12818 | 22318 | 24737 | 28523 | 30980 |

Source: Company data, RBS forecasts
year to Mar

## Balance sheet

| Rsm | FY09A | FY10A | FY11F | FY12F | FY13F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cash \& market secs (1) | 35883 | 30462 | 45763 | 65210 | 84709 |
| Other current assets | 7939 | 11452 | 14584 | 15161 | 17358 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 16943 | 18528 | 20381 | 21886 | 24066 |
| Intang assets (incl gw) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Oth non-curr assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total assets | 60765 | 60442 | 80729 | 102256 | 126133 |
| Short term debt (2) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Trade \& oth current liab | 20528 | 23206 | 26520 | 29129 | 32548 |
| Long term debt (3) | 784.9 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |
| Oth non-current liab | 1444 | 1586 | 1739 | 1914 | 2102 |
| Total liabilities | 22757 | 25792 | 29258 | 32043 | 35651 |
| Total equity (incl min) | 38008 | 34650 | 51470 | 70213 | 90482 |
| Total liab \& sh equity | 60765 | 60442 | 80729 | 102256 | 126133 |
| Net debt | -35098 | -29462 | -44763 | -64210 | -83709 |

Source: Company data, RBS forecasts year ended Mar

## Cash flow statement

| Rsm | FY09A | FY10A | FY11F | FY12F | FY13F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EBITDA | 17098 | 27670 | 29536 | 33193 | 35375 |
| Change in working capital | 847.3 | 218.1 | -145.5 | 306.1 | 261.9 |
| Net interest (pd) / rec | 2524 | 2563 | 3150 | 4300 | 5225 |
| Taxes paid | -4806 | -5857 | -5650 | -6300 | -6612 |
| Other oper cash items | 1551 | -1053 | 326.5 | 1727 | 960.3 |
| Cash flow from ops (1) | 17214 | 23540 | 27217 | 33226 | 35211 |
| Capex (2) | -3102 | -3500 | -4000 | -4000 | -5000 |
| Disposals/(acquisitions) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Other investing cash flow | -8019 | 5000 | -16000 | -18000 | -20000 |
| Cash flow from invest (3) | -11121 | 1500 | -20000 | -22000 | -25000 |
| Incr / (decr) in equity | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Incr / (decr) in debt | -535.1 | 215.1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Ordinary dividend paid | -4673 | -25676 | -7917 | -9780 | -10711 |
| Preferred dividends (4) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Other financing cash flow | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Cash flow from fin (5) | -5208 | -25461 | -7917 | -9780 | -10711 |
| Forex \& disc ops (6) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Inc/(decr) cash (1+3+5+6) | 884.8 | -420.7 | -699.7 | 1447 | -500.3 |
| Equity FCF ( $1+2+4$ ) | 14112 | 20040 | 23217 | 29226 | 30211 |

[^1]

Priced as follows: HROH.BO - Rs1809.05; BAJA.BO - Rs1458.40; MRTI.BO - Rs1413.10
Source: Company data, RBS forecasts


[^2]
## Company description

Buy Price relative to country
Hero Honda is the largest Indian two-wheeler company with an overall market share of $48 \%$. The company is a joint venture between India's Hero Group, run by the Munjals, and Honda of Japan. While the Munjals concentrate on the day-to-day management of operations, Honda provides technology support. Hero Honda focused only on motorcycles until now, but it has recently entered the high-growth scooter segment. With the lauch of a third plant in a tax-haven state, the company plans to continue its volume momentum trend through its widespread rural network.


| Strategic analysis | Average SWOT company score: | 3 | Shareholding as of June 2010 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Strengths 4

Hero Honda has the largest customer base in the Indian two-wheeler industry and enjoys strong customer goodwill. We believe this is key to it maintaining its leadership status.

## Weaknesses

2
Poor presence in the premium motorcycle segment is an apparent weakness for Hero Honda, as is its dependence upon Honda Japan for new models.

## Opportunities 2

An extended product portfolio and new plant capacity should help the company build on its leadership position. Entry into the scooter market should help it leverage its brand image and customer goodwill.

## Threats

Entry of MNCs such as Suzuki and Honda into the Indian motorcycle market is a significant threat to Hero Honda. Tata's mini car (for Rs 100,000 ) could lead to faster upgrades by two-wheeler owners to cars, and thus have an impact on two-wheeler replacement demand.

Scoring range is $1-5$ (high score is good)

|  | 199.7m <br>  <br>  <br>  <br> Freefloat <br> 48\% <br>  <br> Country view: IndiaMajority shareholders <br> Copthall (4\%), Aberdeen $(2 \%)$, Europacifio <br> Growth $(2 \%)$ |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | Country rel to Asia Pacific |

The macro picture for India has been constructive recently, with GDP and industrial production tracking in line with expectations, while portfolio allocators continue to favour the market for its domestic consumption orientation. However, these positives have already been priced in and we believe risks are rising from the increasing double deficit, demanding valuations and tightening liquidity.

The country view is set in consultation with the relevant company analyst but is the ultimate responsibility of the Strategy Team.



## Substitute products

2+


Scooters are motorcycle substitutes. Ungeared scooters in particular, targeted at women and middle-aged men, may take off. Low-cost cars like the Nano and electric two-wheeler are emerging as threats.

## Rivalry

 2-Low product differentiation and very few defensible entry barriers have resulted in intense rivalry in the sector. However, low maintenance cost and sustained product performance build brand value.
Scoring range 1-5 (high score is good) Plus = getting better Minus = getting worse

## Global disclaimer

This document is not for public distribution and has been furnished to you solely for your information and must not be reproduced or redistributed to any other person. Persons into whosepossession this document may come are required to observe these restrictions. This material is for the personal information of the authorized recipient and we are not soliciting any actionbased upon it. This report is not be construed as an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security in any jurisdiction where such an offer or solicitation would be illegal. It is for the general information of clients of RBS Equities (India) Limited (RBSEIL). It does not constitute a personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situation or needs of individual clients. We have reviewed the report and in so far as it includes current or historical information, it is believed to be reliable though its accuracy orcompleteness cannot be guaranteed. Neither RBSEIL nor any person connected with it accepts any liability arising from the use of this document. The information contained in the saidreport should be construed as non-discretionary in nature and the recipient of this material should rely on their own investigations and take their own professional advice. Price and value of investments referred to in this material may go up or down. Past performance is not a guide for future performance. Certain transactions - including those involving futures and options and other derivatives as well as non-investment grade securities - involve substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Reports based on technical analysis centre on studyingcharts of a stock's price movement and trading volumes, as opposed to focusing on a company's fundamentals, and as such, may not match with a report on fundamentals Opinions expressed are our current opinions as of the date appearing on this material only. Clients should not await such reports at regular intervals / frequency and should not hold RBSEILresponsible for failure to send such reports. While we endeavor to update on a reasonable basis the information discussed in this material, there may be regulatory, compliance or otherreasons that prevent us from doing so. Prospective investors are cautionedthat any forward looking statements are not predictions and may be subject to change without notice. Ourproprietary trading and investment businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations expressed herein. RBSEIL has two independent equity research groups: Institutional Equities (IE) and Retail Broking Services. This report has been prepared by IE and is being distributed to Retail Broking clients after the report is beingdistributed to IE Clients. The views and opinions expressed in this document may or may not match or may be contrary with the views, estimates, rating, target price of the IE research ofRBSEIL. We and our affiliates, officer, directors and employees worldwide may (a) from time to time have long or short positions in and buy or sell securities thereof, of company(ies) mentioned therein or (b) be engaged in any other transactions involving such securities and earn brokerage or other compensation or act as a market maker in the financia instruments ofthe company (ies) discussed herein or act as advisor or lender/borrower to such company (ies) or have other potential conflict of interest with respect to any recommendation and relatedinformation and opinions. The analyst for this report certifies that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about the subject company orcompanies and its or their securities and no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly related to specific recommendations and related information and opinions. No part of this material may be duplicated in any form and / or re-distributed without RBSEIL's prior written consent.


[^0]:    Sector: BBG AP Autos
    RIC: $\mathrm{HROH} . \mathrm{BO}, \mathrm{HH}$ IN
    Priced Rs 1809.05 at close 21 Sep 2010
    Source: Bloomberg

[^1]:    Lines in bold can be derived from the immediately preceding lines.
    Source: Company data, RBS forecasts

[^2]:    1. In periods following the Explicit Period i.e. Phase 2 and Phase 3
    2. Remaining Business is defined as Capital as at the end of Phase 1 and capex = depreciation thereafter
    3. Net Investment is defined as capex over and above depreciation after Phase 1

    Source: Company data, RBS forecasts

