
#### Abstract

Be in the right boats when the tide goes out. We find valuations expensive across most sectors; most large-cap stocks are trading at or above our FY2009E fair valuations despite our aggressive earnings growth expectations. However, India's long-term growth story will undoubtedly continue; thus, we recommend investors to switch/increase exposure to BFSI, infrastructure and power/utilities based on a combination of earnings resilience, long-term growth prospects and favorable economic factors. We see the telecom sector as the most vulnerable; too many players wanting to get into the 'telecom' boat may capsize it.


Rich valuations versus liquidity; liquidity can only take the market so far
We find the market richly valued on all our traditional valuation parameters and thus, see no defense against any reversal in liquidity. The BSE-30 Sensex is trading near the top-end of our 14,750-18,500 band based on 12-15X FY2009E earnings (previously $14,250-16,750$ ) and valuations of 'embedded' assets also look stretched. The speed of the recent market rally without any real change in fundamental factors points to a largely liquidity-driven rally and makes us cautious about any reversal in liquidity.

What will sustain the rally? Nothing but liquidity; earnings surprises remote
We are now comfortable with only two (BFSI, infrastructure) of the traditional five largecapitalization sectors given good earnings visibility (strong volume growth, moderate margins) and/or 'reasonable' valuations. Influx of several new players may derail telecom; appreciating rupee may pressure IT; and energy faces huge expectations (Reliance Industries) or policy risks (government-owned names).

Economic environment good; interest rate down, exchange rate up
We believe that the interest rate-cycle may have peaked and in fact, will start moving down. This will likely be positive for auto and real estate sectors; however, we expect residential real estate prices to likely correct (10-20\%). A strengthening rupee may hurt the earnings of IT and commodity sectors although the IT sector can respond appropriately to partially offset the impact.

Political situation unsettled; early elections may delay crucial policy decisions
In the event of early elections, we expect crucial policy decisions to get delayed and do not rule out a populist budget. Downstream oil \& gas (cap on retail prices) and telecom (no decision on spectrum issue) may get hit. Infrastructure players may tide over a potential lean phase of fresh government-related orders due to their healthy order books. However, early elections potentially open up a source of good investment opportunities (sell-down of good government assets) but it is too early to speculate on the same.

## Top-10 portfolio

Key changes in Top-10 portfolio


## INSIDE

Valuations are expensive for most sectors and stocks....pg3

Top-10 portfolio and analysis of sectors....pg10

Economic environment good....pg26

Unsettled politics....pg31

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Important disclosures appear at the back of this report.

## Table of contents

3 Valuations: Expensive, full and just to make sure, rich
10 Be in the right boats when the tide goes out
26 Economy: Problem of plenty from plenty of problems
31 Politics: Early elections, if held, negative for certain sectors
38 Ratings and other definitions/identifiers

## Valuations: Expensive, full and just to make sure, rich

We find valuations of the Indian stock market rich with all our valuation indicators pointing to an overbought market. The BSE-30 Sensex is trading near the top-end of our 12-month fair band of $14,750-18,500$ based on FY2009E earnings. It is simply too early to focus on FY2010E earnings, global risks (sub-prime, slowdown in certain key economies) have not disappeared with a 50-bps Fed Funds Rate reduction and earnings upgrades look remote.

## Market fully valued even on FY2009E basis

We see the market fully valued on FY2009E earnings. Exhibit 1 gives our projected earnings, earnings growth and valuations for BSE-30 Sensex broken down by sectors. We find valuations rich for most sectors in the context of our projected earnings growth and issues facing certain sectors; most stocks in every sector are trading near or above our fair valuations of the stocks based on either (1) FY2009E earnings or (2) 12-month forward DCF. We discuss the same in more detail in the next section.

Exhibit 1: Valuation summary of BSE-30 sectors

|  | Mkt cap. | EPS growth (\%) |  |  | PER (X) |  |  | EV/EBITDA (X) |  |  | Price/BV (X) |  | Div Yield (\%) |  | RoE (\%) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (US\$ mn) | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E | 2007 | 2008E | 2007 | 2008E | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E |
| Automobiles | 27,365 | 28.9 | 8.9 | 25.0 | 19.4 | 17.8 | 14.2 | 10.2 | 9.2 | 7.3 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 23.3 | 21.3 | 22.0 |
| Banking | 83,669 | 14.2 | 23.1 | 29.2 | 31.9 | 25.9 | 20.0 | - | - | - | 5.3 | 3.3 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 16.5 | 12.6 | 14.5 |
| Cement | 19,805 | 89.5 | 21.3 | 8.6 | 18.0 | 14.9 | 13.7 | 10.5 | 8.2 | 7.4 | 4.8 | 3.7 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 26.5 | 25.0 | 21.9 |
| Consumers | 29,956 | 19.4 | 15.2 | 14.3 | 27.9 | 24.2 | 21.2 | 19.1 | 15.4 | 13.1 | 8.7 | 7.7 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 31.3 | 31.8 | 31.9 |
| Energy | 142,613 | 19.9 | 18.1 | 17.0 | 19.2 | 16.2 | 13.9 | 9.5 | 8.3 | 6.6 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 18.4 | 19.0 | 18.0 |
| Industrials | 46,911 | 56.3 | 35.8 | 28.0 | 43.6 | 32.1 | 25.1 | 25.4 | 18.8 | 14.6 | 11.5 | 8.8 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 26.4 | 27.4 | 26.9 |
| Metals | 24,653 | 33.1 | (3.3) | (11.6) | 14.0 | 14.5 | 16.4 | 9.0 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 23.5 | 13.7 | 11.0 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 10,627 | 136.7 | (17.3) | 20.2 | 18.4 | 22.3 | 18.6 | 13.3 | 14.9 | 12.8 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 21.2 | 15.6 | 16.7 |
| Technology | 80,352 | 44.4 | 21.5 | 23.0 | 26.1 | 21.5 | 17.5 | 19.5 | 15.6 | 12.2 | 8.8 | 6.9 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 33.5 | 31.9 | 30.9 |
| Telecom | 79,069 | 182.9 | 63.9 | 33.8 | 43.1 | 26.3 | 19.6 | 22.9 | 14.8 | 11.3 | 9.0 | 6.8 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 20.9 | 26.0 | 26.4 |
| Utilities | 55,815 | 16.1 | 11.4 | 9.1 | 28.9 | 26.0 | 23.8 | 15.4 | 15.7 | 16.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 12.9 | 13.3 | 13.5 |
| BSE-30 | 600,836 | 34.5 | 19.9 | 19.2 | 25.1 | 21.0 | 17.6 | 13.6 | 11.6 | 9.8 | 5.1 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 20.4 | 19.3 | 19.2 |
| BSE-30 ex-Energy | 458,223 | 42.3 | 20.7 | 20.1 | 27.8 | 23.1 | 19.2 | 16.3 | 13.6 | 11.6 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 21.5 | 19.4 | 19.9 |
| BSE-30 ex-Energy, Com. | 413,765 | 40.7 | 23.8 | 24.2 | 30.4 | 24.6 | 19.8 | 18.2 | 14.8 | 12.3 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 20.9 | 19.9 | 20.9 |
| BSE-30 ex-Technology | 520,484 | 33.1 | 19.7 | 18.6 | 25.0 | 20.9 | 17.6 | 13.0 | 11.1 | 9.5 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 19.3 | 18.2 | 18.2 |

Note:
(a) EV/EBITDA excludes Banking sector

Source: Company reports, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Our lead indicators (see Exhibit 2) now unanimously indicate that the market is overbought. The market has moved ahead of our comfortable band of 12-15X 1-year forward earnings, even factoring in the valuation of 'embedded value' assets (investments in listed and unlisted stocks, projects yet to contribute to earnings), which do not contribute to earnings currently.

Exhibit 2: 1-year rolling forward P/E above the normal trading range, M3 adjusted P/E above the trend 1 -year rolling forward P/E, P/B, ROE, EV/EBITDA and M3 growth rate adjusted valuations


Source: BSE, RBI, Kotak Institutional Equities.

Our proprietary free cash flow model (Whizdom) shows that the equity risk premium for the market is about 350 bps (see Exhibit 3). We see this as extremely low and reflecting a more expansive attitude towards valuations and increased risk-appetites, perhaps emboldened by strong liquidity.

Exhibit 3: Equity risk premium is low currently
Equity risk premium (\%) for BSE Universe, using our proprietary tool, Whizdom

| Equity risk <br> premium | Implied BSE Sensex |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathbf{R f}=\mathbf{7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{R f}=\mathbf{7 \%}$ |  |
| 5.5 | 12,599 | 13,575 | 14,711 |
| 5.0 | 13,342 | 14,435 | 15,721 |
| 4.5 | 14,178 | 15,411 | $\mathbf{1 6 , 8 7 8}$ |
| 4.0 | 15,124 | $\mathbf{1 6 , 5 2 8}$ | 18,221 |
| 3.5 | 16,205 | $\mathbf{1 7 , 8 2 1}$ | 19,801 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.
(1) Strong earnings growth across most sectors and (2) embedded value largely known

We believe strong expected earnings growth for most sectors in FY2008E and FY2009E is already factored in current valuations. So is embedded value in most cases, in our view.

1. Earnings. We believe significant earnings upgrades look remote currently in the face of (1) aggressive earnings growth forecast across sectors (23.8\% for FY2008E and 24.2\% for FY2009E for BSE-30 Sensex without energy and commodities) , (2) a likely slowdown in industrial activity and (3) exchange rate pressures on certain large sectors (technology, commodities). We will have to wait for evidence of earnings upgrades (2QFY08 results may provide some guidance). We give the history of earnings upgrades/downgrades for BSE-30 stocks (composite basis) by our research team in Exhibit 4.

## Exhibit 4: Sensex (ex-energy) earnings growth

Expected growth in sensex ex-energy earnings for FY2007, FY2008E and FY2009E (\%)


Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Exhibit 5 gives our sensitivity analysis of earnings of key sectors to exchange rate assumptions. As can be seen, the earnings of IT, energy (excluding downstream oil) and metals sectors face significant risks from an appreciation in the rupee versus US Dollar. However, we would caution that (a) the IT sector has a few levers to mitigate the impact of the appreciating rupee and (b) underlying commodity prices in US Dollar terms will also increase to adjust for a US Dollar depreciation, if the US Dollar declines against all major global currencies (a likely scenario unless the US trade deficit situation improves).

Exhibit 5: Commodities and IT negatively affected, downstream oil \& gas positively affected by a stronger rupee
Impact of rupee appreciation on earnings estimate

|  | EPS estimate (Rs/share) |  |  |  | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | FY2009E |  | FY2010E |  |  |
|  | Base case | Rs38 | Base case | Rs36 |  |
| Media |  |  |  |  |  |
| HT Media | 9.9 | 10.7 | 12.7 | 14.3 | Positive impact as stronger rupee would result in lower newsprint costs. |
| Metals |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jindal Steel and Power | 400.0 | 272.0 | 307.5 | 164.1 | Standalone EPS |
| JSW Steel | 90.5 | 66.5 | 113.3 | 65.5 |  |
| Sesa Goa | 195.6 | 143.2 | 182.9 | 109.8 |  |
| Tata Steel | 43.1 | 32.4 | 37.9 | 20.1 | Standalone EPS |
| Oil \& Gas |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharat Petroleum | 35.4 | 45.7 | 44.3 | 52.3 | Positive for earnings as a stronger rupee would improve margins. The government currently controls the price of $70 \%$ of products (diesel, gasoline, kerosene and LPG). On the raw material side, the price of crude will decline in rupee terms benefiting composite margins. Assuming that the current subsidy sharing scheme remains in place, a Rs2/US\$ appreciation will result in lower under-recoveries of Rs5.3 bn. |
| Hindustan Petroleum | 34.0 | 48.9 | 46.4 | 60.0 | Positive for earnings as a stronger rupee would improve margins. The government currently controls the price of $70 \%$ of products (diesel, gasoline, kerosene and LPG). On the raw material side, the price of crude will decline in rupee terms benefiting composite margins. Assuming that the current subsidy sharing scheme remains in place, a Rs2/US\$ appreciation will result in lower under-recoveries of Rs5 bn. |
| Indian Oil Corporation | 45.2 | 60.3 | 44.1 | 58.0 | Positive for earnings as a stronger rupee would improve margins. The government currently controls the price of $70 \%$ of products (diesel, gasoline, kerosene and LPG). On the raw material side, the price of crude will decline in rupee terms benefiting composite margins. Assuming that the current subsidy sharing scheme remains in place, a Rs2/US\$ appreciation will result in lower under-recoveries of Rs13.5 bn. |
| Cairn india | 1.0 | 0.7 | 10.6 | 8.5 | Negative impact as stronger rupee would lead to lower crude price in rupee terms. |
| Castrol India | 20.7 | 23.6 | 23.4 | 28.0 | Positive for Castrol as it will reduce the cost of raw materials (LOBS and additives), which constitute a significant portion of its overall costs. |
| GAlL (India) | 32.3 | 31.6 | 34.1 | 31.6 | Negative impact due to lower prices of certain products but fixed raw material costs. However, this will be partially compensated by lower burden of subsidy losses |

Negative impact due to lower crude prices in rupee terms; however, this will be partly compensated by a reduction in the subsidy loss. Assuming the current subsidy sharing scheme continues, a Rs2/US\$ appreciation will result in lower burden of subsidies of Rs21 bn.
Negative impact as a stronger rupee would impact margins negatively as prices of its products and raw materials are based on import parity basis. A stronger rupee would have negative impact on margins as prices of RPL's products and raw materials are based on import parity basis.

| Technology |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| HCL Technologies | 22.3 | 19.8 | 25.0 | 20.5 |
| Hexaware Technologies | 12.7 | 11.0 | 14.1 | 10.1 |
| i-flex solutions | 28.1 | 56.6 | 80.2 | 61.7 |
| iGate Global Solutions | 99.9 | 24.2 | 31.3 | 21.9 |
| Infosys Technologies | 18.8 | 16.4 | 109.8 | 93.3 |
| Mphasis BFL | 33.8 | 29.5 | 40.9 | 16.3 |
| Mindtree | 34.2 | 30.2 | 39.8 | 30.6 |
| Patni Computer Systems | 12.9 | 10.9 | 14.1 | 10.0 |
| Polaris Software Lab | 31.5 | 28.4 | 33.4 | 29.1 |
| Satyam Computer Services | 61.9 | 56.3 | 70.4 | 58.5 |
| TCS | 96.0 | 88.5 | 113.4 | 96.4 |
| Tech Mahindra | 29.2 | 26.7 | 32.2 | 27.4 |
| Wipro |  |  |  |  | Rupee appreciation against the US\$ has a huge negative impact on earnings; most companies, except Tech Mahindra have $>60 \%$ of their billing in US\$. A $1 \%$ appreciation in the Re/US\$ rate impacts EPS by 1.5-3\% for various companies. Note that hedging can absorb some of the rupee impact; our numbers do not factor in any hedging gains.

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.
2. Embedded value. Exhibit 6 gives our computation for embedded value for BSE-30 Sensex stocks. This value has expanded $210 \%$ compared to a similar computation made in September 2006. It is very difficult to value embedded assets or take a view on the market solely on expectations of further upside to embedded value. In fact, the market has already extrapolated developments and expected developments in certain stocks and sectors and rewarded the same with large increase in market capitalization. We fear significant erosion in the valuation of such assets if the investment climate turns more pragmatic. Exhibit 7 gives appreciation in the price of certain stocks with large perceived embedded value.

Exhibit 6: Embedded value accounts for a significant portion of market value
Embedded value computation of BSE-30 Sensex stocks

|  | Price | Shares o/s | Free float mkt cap. | Embedded value |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | Value | FF market cap. |
|  | (Rs) | (mn) | (US\$ mn) | (Rs) | (US\$ mn) |
| Reliance Industries | 2,423 | 1,453 | 44,595 | 1,185 | 21,814 |
| ICICI Bank | 1,061 | 1,037 | 27,881 | 421 | 11,060 |
| Larsen \& Toubro | 2,896 | 286 | 18,875 | 585 | 3,812 |
| Bharti Airtel Limited | 961 | 1,898 | 16,172 | 83 | 1,397 |
| HDFC | 2,495 | 287 | 16,308 | 590 | 3,857 |
| Tata Steel | 865 | 860 | 13,185 | 42 | 640 |
| State Bank of India | 1,900 | 526 | 11,401 | 455 | 2,730 |
| Oil \& Natural Gas Corporation | 986 | 2,139 | 10,684 | 39 | 423 |
| Grasim Industries | 3,592 | 92 | 6,257 | 326 | 568 |
| Reliance Communications | 635 | 2,045 | 11,502 | 33 | 598 |
| Bajaj Auto | 2,580 | 101 | 4,628 | 1,191 | 2,137 |
| Tata Motors | 799 | 405 | 4,919 | 272 | 1,675 |
| Hindalco Industries | 176 | 1,307 | 4,362 | 65 | 1,614 |
| Mahindra \& Mahindra | 758 | 257 | 3,946 | 389 | 2,024 |
| Reliance Energy | 1,478 | 228 | 6,394 | 330 | 1,428 |
| BSE 30 : | 17,777 |  | 304,753 | - | 55,776 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Exhibit 7: Companies with embedded value have outperformed the Sensex
Performance of embedded value companies versus Sensex

| Company | Mkt cap. | Performance (\%) |  |  |  | YTD growth in mkt cap (US\$ bn) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (US\$ bn) | 1 month | 3 months | 6 months | YTD |  |
| Reliance Industries | 86 | 23 | 41 | 78 | 91 | 40.7 |
| ICICI Bank | 29 | 17 | 8 | 29 | 19 | 4.7 |
| State Bank Of India | 25 | 18 | 22 | 103 | 53 | 8.7 |
| Larsen \& Toubro | 21 | 10 | 26 | 87 | 101 | 10.5 |
| Reliance Petroleum | 18 | 32 | 42 | 126 | 157 | 11.3 |
| HDFC | 17 | 21 | 26 | 67 | 54 | 6.0 |
| Tata Steel | 13 | 27 | 40 | 97 | 79 | 5.9 |
| Reliance Capital | 11 | 45 | 59 | 185 | 192 | 7.2 |
| Cairn India | 8 | 20 | 20 | 41 | - | - |
| Reliance Energy | 9 | 79 | 142 | 203 | 184 | 5.5 |
| GMR Infrastructure | 7 | 10 | 17 | 160 | 150 | 4.5 |
| Jaiprakash Associates | 6 | 23 | 47 | 122 | 55 | 2.2 |
| Jindal Steel \& Power | 5 | 56 | 74 | 174 | 177 | 3.1 |
| Aditya Birla Nuvo | 4 | 26 | 25 | 67 | 39 | 1.2 |
| Reliance Natural Resources | 3 | 89 | 143 | 321 | 320 | 2.6 |
| IDBI | 3 | 15 | 27 | 107 | 97 | 1.4 |
| Pantaloon Retail India | 2 | 9 | 8 | 49 | 39 | 0.6 |
| IFCI | 1 | 30 | 51 | 186 | 648 | 1.3 |
| IVRCL Infrastructures \& Proj | 1 | 13 | 13 | 64 | 14 | 0.2 |
| Max India Limited | 1 | 22 | 1 | 24 | 44 | 0.4 |
| GVK Power \& Infrastructure | 1 | 27 | 45 | 110 | 148 | 0.7 |
| Average of embedded value companies |  | 29 | 42 | 114 | 127 |  |
| Sensex | 601 | 15 | 19 | 39 | 29 | 134 |

Note:
Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities.

## Liquidity can take the market so far only; eventually valuations will take over

We believe the recent market rally is largely led by strong capital inflows and this makes us uncomfortable about the extent of the rally (liquidity-driven rallies are impossible to forecast) without the comfort of reasonable valuations. The market has bounced back strongly over the past few weeks (13.5\% increase since September 18, 2007, the date of the Fed Funds Rate cut and $21 \%$ since August 21, 2007, the date of the most recent bottom of the market) without any real change in the fundamentals of most sectors or stocks; in fact, conditions have probably worsened in certain large sectors (telecom, technology, commodities).

Exhibit 8 shows that fewer stocks have contributed to the rally in the market, which suggests that the rally may not sustain if the street finds valuations of these stocks full or expensive. We use the BSE-30 Sensex for this exercise but an exercise on more broad-based indices also supports this conclusion. Nonetheless, there have been interesting ideas outside the stocks in the BSE-30 Sensex, and presumably, there will continue to be some at all market levels although this is becoming increasingly difficult with new ideas getting discounted fairly rapidly.

Exhibit 8: Fewer and fewer stocks have contributed to the rally
Contribution of major stocks to increase in BSE-30 Sensex

| Sensex level | Date |  | No. of trading sessions | Contribution by top-3 gainers |  | Details of top gainer |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | (\#) | (Points) | (\%) | Company | Points cont. |
| 10,000-11,000 | 7-Feb-06 | 27-Mar-06 | 27 | 379 | 37.9 | ITC | 154 |
| 11,000-12,000 | 27-Mar-06 | 29-Apr-06 | 22 | 504 | 50.4 | Reliance Ind. | 300 |
| 12,000-13,000 | 29-Apr-06 | 1-Nov-06 | 130 | 906 | 90.6 | Infosys | 324 |
| 13,000-14,000 | 1-Nov-06 | 12-Jan-07 | 50 | 548 | 54.8 | ICICI Bank | 271 |
| 14,000-15,000 | 12-Jan-07 | 9-Jul-07 | 119 | 1,108 | 110.8 | Reliance Ind. | 464 |
| 15,000-16,000 | 9-Jul-07 | 19-Sep-07 | 51 | 769 | 76.9 | Reliance Ind. | 489 |
| 16,000-17,000 | 19-Sep-07 | 26-Sep-07 | 5 | 559 | 55.9 | Reliance Ind. | 277 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10,000-14,000 | 7-Feb-06 | 12-Jan-07 | 229 | 2,337 | 58.4 | Reliance Ind. | 758 |
| 14,000-17,000 | 12-Jan-07 | 26-Sep-07 | 175 | 2,436 | 81.2 | Reliance Ind. | 1,111 |

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities.

Exhibit 9 shows the performance of the Indian stock market (measured in 10-day periods) before and after a strong inflow of liquidity and also gives FII inflows before major corrections in the market. There is no correlation between Fll flows and market meltdowns and there is no advance warning of market 'crashes' as we saw in May 2006, February 2007 and August 2007. We note that Flls have invested US $\$ 4.9$ bn in the past 10 trading sessions, the highest in any period since Flls started investing in the Indian market. However, we are reluctant to rely on liquidity as an investment argument in the face of expensive valuations even though the performance of a market tends to naturally create its own liquidity.

Exhibit 9: Liquidity does not tell any story
Flls flows and stock market performance during periods of major flows or major market meltdowns

| Historical performance of Sensex pre and post major FII inflows |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Date | FII inflows (US\$ mn) | Sensex mkt cap. <br> (US\$ mn) | FII inflows Mkt cap. (\%) | 10 days Sensex performance (\%) |  |
|  |  |  |  | Pre | Post |
| 23 Mar-5 Apr 2004 | 1,678 | 193,424 | 0.9 | 8.8 | 0.7 |
| 1 Mar-14 Mar 2005 | 1,887 | 225,629 | 0.8 | 3.7 | (6.5) |
| 19 Nov-3 Dec 2004 | 1,302 | 209,493 | 0.6 | 4.9 | 0.4 |
| 6 Oct-17 Oct 2003 | 889 | 163,374 | 0.5 | 8.3 | (0.5) |
| 27 Jan-9 Feb 2005 | 1,163 | 218,472 | 0.5 | 7.0 | (0.2) |
| Average | 1,384 | 202,079 | 0.7 | 6.5 | (1.2) |
| 19 Sep-3 Oct 2007 | 4,939 | 585,696 | 0.8 | 11.8 | - |


| FIl inflows for 30 trading days before a major market crash |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Date | Sensex levels |  | Change | Fll inflows |
|  | At peak | At bottom | (\%) | (US\$ mn) |
| May-06 | 12,612 | 9,823 | (22.1) | 1,449 |
| Feb-07 | 14,652 | 12,415 | (15.3) | 363 |
| Aug-07 | 15,795 | 13,989 | (11.4) | 6,489 |

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities.

We believe valuations will eventually prevail and thus, we advocate investors focus on valuations in the current environment. We do not know how long the current deluge of liquidity will continue; it can go on for a long time or it could reverse swiftly with a negative development in any part of the world. It's not as if recent financial problems (related to subprime mortgage lending in the US) have been resolved fully and several large economies (Euro zone, Japan, US) may continue to struggle to grow.

## Be in the right boats when the tide goes out

Admittedly, we find it difficult to construct a portfolio given rich valuations across most sectors and stocks. All our favorite stocks are trading at or above our FY2009E fair valuations despite our aggressive growth assumptions. Also, there are issues facing certain large-cap sectors. Nonetheless, investors excited about India's long-term growth (as we are) may switch positions to 'India' sectors with relatively more resilient earnings and/or reasonable valuations.

## Favorites are investment and domestic consumption stories

Exhibit 10 gives our revised Top-10 portfolio while Exhibit 11 gives the investment argument for the stocks. Our portfolio is biased towards:

Exhibit 10: Heavily biased towards banking/insurance, domestic consumption and infrastructure Kotak Institutional Equities Top-10 List

|  |  |  | Mkt cap. | CMP | Target | EPS (Rs) |  |  | P/E (X) |  |  | EV/EBDITA (X) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Companies | Sector | Rating | (US\$ mn) | (Rs) | (Rs) | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E |
| ICICI Bank | Banking | OP | 27,881 | 1,061 | 1,200 | 34.6 | 36.8 | 56.8 | 30.7 | 28.9 | 18.7 | - | - | - |
| Larsen \& Toubro | Industrials | OP | 20,972 | 2,896 | 2,725 | 65.1 | 88.0 | 112.4 | 44.5 | 32.9 | 25.8 | 28.8 | 20.7 | 16.1 |
| ITC | Consumer Products | OP | 17,516 | 185 | 225 | 7.2 | 8.3 | 9.6 | 25.6 | 22.2 | 19.3 | 16.3 | 13.9 | 11.7 |
| Maruti Udyog | Automobiles | OP | 7,623 | 1,041 | 1,110 | 54.0 | 62.4 | 84.1 | 19.3 | 16.7 | 12.4 | 11.3 | 9.8 | 7.3 |
| Bharat Heavy Electricals | Industrials | OP | 25,939 | 2,092 | 2,025 | 49.3 | 66.4 | 84.1 | 42.4 | 31.5 | 24.9 | 22.9 | 17.2 | 13.5 |
| Bajaj Auto | Automobiles | OP | 6,612 | 2,580 | 2,750 | 127.2 | 114.5 | 151.9 | 20.3 | 22.5 | 17.0 | 14.0 | 15.1 | 11.8 |
| NTPC | Utilities | IL | 47,290 | 226 | 215 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 10.2 | 27.2 | 24.3 | 22.1 | 17.9 | 17.5 | 17.6 |
| Aditya Birla Nuvo | Diversified | OP | 4,102 | 1,735 | 1,660 | 22.8 | 25.0 | 26.8 | 76.2 | 69.4 | 64.8 | 34.7 | 32.8 | 29.8 |
| Punjab National Bank | Banking | OP | 4,276 | 535 | 610 | 48.8 | 55.2 | 63.3 | 11.0 | 9.7 | 8.5 | - | - | - |
| Mid-cap. basket |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | Banking | OP | 1,204 | 98 | 120 | 11.1 | 12.4 | 13.0 | 8.8 | 7.9 | 7.5 | - | - | - |
| Kalpataru Power Transmission | Transmission | OP | 1,098 | 1,636 | 1,650 | 60.2 | 77.4 | 91.8 | 27.2 | 21.1 | 17.8 | 16.9 | 13.5 | 11.0 |
| Nagarjuna Construction Co. | Construction | OP | 1,411 | 268 | 221 | 6.5 | 9.6 | 13.0 | 41.1 | 27.9 | 20.7 | 24.0 | 16.3 | 12.8 |
| Mahindra Gesco | Property | OP | 661 | 621 | 920 | 8.9 | 11.3 | 47.5 | 70.1 | 54.8 | 13.1 | 43.0 | 33.7 | 10.9 |
| PSL | Pipes | OP | 418 | 398 | 420 | 21.2 | 27.6 | 41.1 | 18.8 | 14.4 | 9.7 | 11.7 | 8.9 | 6.2 |
| BSE-30 |  |  |  | 17,777 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities.

Exhibit 11: Investment arguments for Top-10 stocks

| Company | Investment argument |  | Valuations |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | P/E (X) | Earnings growth (\%) |  |
|  | Sector | Stock | 2008 | 2008 | 2009 |
| ICICI Bank | Robust macroeconomic outlook and stable margin enviornment provide strong growth opportunities. Rising penetration of banking and insurance will drive volumes | (1) Likely expansion of margin on balance sheet restructuring i.e moderate loan growth and shift to retail deposit from bulk deposits; (2) reducing bulk deposit rate to benefit ICICI Bank as $60 \%$ of interest paying liabilities are bulk in nature; (3) unlocking of value in subsidiaries like insurance, mutual fund; (4) listing of subsidiaries to reduce pressure on ICICI Bank capital requirement | 18.7 | 6.3 | 54.3 |
| Larsen \& Toubro | Investment-led growth phase for the economy offers immense opportunities in both corporate capex and infrastucture investments | (1) Strong order backlog providing visibility; (2) Ability to build sizeable businesses in related segments of engineering; (3) Possible value unlocking in subsidiaries | 25.8 | 35.2 | 27.8 |
| ITC | (1) Strong real per-capita income growth; (2) Robust growth in rural economy aided by strong agri-commodity prices | (1) Will likely post strong earnings growth (~15\% yoy) during FY2008 despite an estimated $2.5 \%$ volumes decline in cigarettes; (2) Expansion of margins in cigarettes division | 19.3 | 15.4 | 15.1 |
| Maruti Udyog | (1) Low penetration of 4 -wheelers and rising incomes to drive volume growth; (2) Likely decline in interest rates to lead to recovery in volume growth across the 4-wheeler industry; high interest rates had hit volume through postponement of demand; (3) Implementation of $\mathrm{VI}^{\text {th }}$ Pay Commission recommendations to drive consumption | (1) Maruti's volumes have grow $19 \%$ in 1HFY08 mainly due to the success of its new launches despite a slowdown in industry demand growth; (2) Aggressive sales drive and strategic move to be present across all car segments along with successful new launches will continue to drive volume growth for Maruti | 12.4 | 15.5 | 34.6 |
| Bharat Heavy Electricals | (1) Healthy macro scenario due to increasing power investments; (2) Structural changes in financial condition of state electricity boards; (3) 10 years of investments visible | (1) Likely strong order inflows in near-term from state and central utilities; (2) Significant percentage of XIt ${ }^{\text {th }}$ plan orders (greater than 25 GW ) yet to be placed-likely over next three years; and (3) Higher-than-expected business in the industry segment | 24.9 | 34.7 | 26.6 |
| Bajaj Auto | (1) 2-wheeler volumes will likely recover on the back of softer interest rates and onset of festival season; (2) New launches across segments to drive volume growth; (3) Insurance sector growth to continue strongly for the next several years | (1) Positive triggers include the launch of the muchawaited, higher-margin new bike (XCD) to replace the current entry segment in Sep '07 and higher valuation for the insurance business; (2) A successful new launch of the bike would enable Bajaj Auto regain market share, steer ahead of competition and improve profitability | 17.0 | (10.0) | 32.7 |
| NTPC | (1) 72 GW capacity additions likely in $\mathrm{Xl}^{\text {th }}$ plan followed by 92 GW in XIIth plan; (2) Allocation of coal mining blocks to reduce dependence on Coal India Limited and ensure speedy implementation of power projects | (1) 22 GW of capacity addition ( $30 \%$ of India's planned capacity addition) likely in $\mathrm{XI}^{\text {th }}$ plan of which 13.4 GW is already under construction; (2) Preferntial allottment of coal link ages and captive coal - allocated seven coal mines (estimated reserves of $\sim 3,492 \mathrm{mn}$ tonnes); (3) Increase in UI charges to further improve RoE from operational power plants. Introduction of availability based incentives will result in higher RoE from gas-based power projects as well. | 22.1 | 11.9 | 9.7 |
| Aditya Birla Nuvo | We believe insurance companies will validate their rapid growth with high steady stage IRRs of $25-30 \%$ and ROEs of $40-50 \%$. Most players are looking to invest between 85 $140 \%$ of FY2007's outstanding capital over the next two years and doubling their agency and branch networks in the next year | (1) Upside to our SOTP-based target price of Rs 1,650 exists from higher valuation of insurance business (Birla Sun Life); individual premiums have increased $245 \%$ in August versus our full-year estimate of $50 \%$; (2) Valuation of Idea Cellular may be at risk if wireless pricing environment deteriorates | 64.8 | 9.9 | 7.1 |
| Punjab National Bank | Robust macroeconomic outlook and stable margin enviornment provide strong growth opportunities | (1) Low cost deposits at $47 \%$ to likely support the NIMs; (2) Strong core profit growth; (3) attractive valuations | 8.5 | 13.1 | 14.7 |
| Mid-cap. basket |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | Robust macroeconomic outlook and stable margin enviornment provide strong growth opportunities | (1) Likely focus on smaller corporate and retail loans enables the bank to earn superior yields of $10.3 \%$ (amongst the highest for public banks); (2) Despite focus on smaller loan portfolio, the bank has maintained asset quality with net NPLs being $0.2 \%$ | 7.5 | 11.5 | 5.1 |
| Kalpataru Power Transmission | (1) We expect power grid capital spending to increase $>2 X$ in the $\mathrm{XI}^{\text {th }}$ five-year plan; (2) Return ratios are expected to improve with higher operating margins and free cash generation | Robust growth in earnings driven by stronger execution in the T\&D segment (especially international transmission and domestic distribution) and meaningful revenue and earning accrual from the infrastructure segment | 17.8 | 28.7 | 18.6 |
| Nagarjuna Construction Co. | Strong outlook for commercial construction, industrial investment, real estate and infrastructure development activity in the country | (1) Strong order backlog provides revenue visibility; (2) NCCL is adequately capitalized; and (3) Domestoc order flow will likely remain strong | 20.7 | 47.4 | 35.0 |
| Mahindra Gesco | (1) Stabilization of interest rate along with rising incomes to result in incresing affordability; (2) Clarity on SEZ policy by the government has improved | (1) Experience in SEZ development lends confidence; (2) Strong brand name in the residential space; (3) Currently has 138 acres of land with developable potential of 6.9 mn sq. ft | 13.1 | 27.8 | 319.4 |
| PSL | (1) Strong global pipeline demand especially in USA and Middle East over the next 5-7 years; (2) Large domestic pipelines announced, where mainly spiral pipe is expected to be used | (1) Leader in spiral pipe market with $60 \%$ of domestic capacity; (2) Setting up plants in high demand regions like USA and Middle East at low investment; (3) Strong order book presents near-term visibility | 9.7 | 30.2 | 48.8 |

[^0]1. Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI)—ICICI Bank, Punjab National Bank, Andhra Bank (part of mid-cap basket). Although we do not rule out further CRR hikes by the RBI in order to mop up excess liquidity, we retain a positive view on banks given reasonable valuations, long-term growth prospects and likely decline in interest rates.
2. Infrastructure (construction, engineering, industrials and infrastructure)—L\&T, BHEL, Kalpataru, Mahindra Gesco (mid-cap basket), Nagarjuna Construction, PSL), the latter four being part of a five-company mid-cap basket.
3. Domestic consumption—Aditya Birla Nuvo (ABNL), Bajaj Auto, ITC and Maruti; ABNL and Bajaj Auto also offer exposure to insurance, another fast-growing domestic consumption play.
4. Power/utilities. We have included NTPC in place of Reliance Energy. We have removed Reliance Energy from our Top-10 portfolio given corporate finance action.

The various boats-we like BFSI and infrastructure; others look very rich or
have issues
Exhibit 12 gives our Kotak Model Portfolio. We follow the same themes for our broader portfolio. Our sector preference is given below.

Exhibit 12: Over-weighting Industrials, Infrastructure basket and PSU banks Kotak Institutional Equities Model Portfolio

| Company | $\begin{gathered} \text { 4-Oct } \\ \text { Price (Rs) } \end{gathered}$ | Rating | Weightage (\%) |  | $\frac{\text { Diff. }}{\text { KS Reco. }}$ | Company | $\begin{gathered} \text { 4-Oct } \\ \text { Price (Rs) } \end{gathered}$ | Rating | Weightage (\%) |  | $\frac{\text { Diff. }}{\text { (bps) }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | BSE-30 | KS reco. |  |  |  |  | BSE-30 | KS reco. |  |
| Tata Motors | 799 | - | 1.6 | 0.0 | (160) | Bharat Heavy Electricals | 2,092 | OP | 3.0 | 5.0 | 200 |
| Maruti Udyog | 1,041 | OP | 1.0 | 3.0 | 200 | ABB | 1,365 | OP | - | 1.5 | 150 |
| Bajaj Auto | 2,580 | OP | 1.5 | 2.5 | 100 | Larsen \& Toubro | 2,896 | OP | 6.2 | 8.2 | 200 |
| Mahindra \& Mahindra | 758 | - | 1.3 | 2.3 | 100 | Industrials |  |  | 9.2 | 14.7 | 550 |
| Automobiles |  |  | 5.4 | 7.8 | 240 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Tata Steel | 865 | IL | 4.3 | 2.3 | (200) |
| State Bank of India | 1,900 | 1 L | 3.7 | 2.2 | (150) | Hindalco Industries | 176 | OP | 1.4 | 1.4 | - |
| Punjab National Bank | 535 | OP | - | 2.0 | 200 | Sterlite Industries | 763 | OP | - | 1.5 | 150 |
| Andhra Bank | 98 | OP | - | 0.6 | 60 | Metals |  |  | 5.8 | 5.3 | (50) |
| PSU Banking |  |  | 3.7 | 4.8 | 110 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Ranbaxy Laboratories | 442 | - | 1.0 | - | (96) |
| HDFC Bank | 1,404 | 1 L | 3.2 | 2.7 | (50) | Dr Reddy's Laboratories | 654 | - | 0.7 | - | (68) |
| ICICI Bank | 1,061 | OP | 9.1 | 12.1 | 300 | Cipla | 189 | - | 0.8 | - | (78) |
| HDFC | 2,495 | IL | 5.4 | 2.9 | (250) | Pharmaceuticals |  |  | 2.4 | - | (243) |
| Pvt Banking/Financing |  |  | 17.7 | 17.7 | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Infosys Technologies | 1,995 | OP | 8.1 | 5.8 | (225) |
| Grasim Industries | 3,592 | IL | 2.1 | 2.1 | - | Satyam Computer Services | 450 | OP | 2.4 | 1.4 | (100) |
| ACC | 1,214 | U | 1.1 | - | (114) | TCS | 1,079 | IL | 1.8 | - | (175) |
| Ambuja Cements | 147 | IL | 1.5 | - | (149) | Wipro | 461 | OP | 1.1 | 1.1 | - |
| Cement |  |  | 4.7 | 2.1 | (263) | Technology |  |  | 13.3 | 8.3 | (500) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hindustan Unilever | 223 | 1. | 2.0 | - | (204) | Bharti Airtel Limited | 961 | U | 5.3 | 3.1 | (225) |
| ITC | 185 | OP | 4.0 | 6.0 | 200 | Reliance Communications | 635 | U | 3.8 | 1.3 | (250) |
| Consumers |  |  | 6.1 | 6.0 | (4) | Telecom |  |  | 9.1 | 4.3 | (475) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aditya Birla Nuvo | 1,735 | OP | - | 2.0 | 200 | NTPC | 226 | IL | 2.3 | 4.3 | 200 |
| Diversified |  |  | - | 2.0 | 200 | Reliance Energy | 1,478 | 1 L | 2.1 | 2.1 | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Utilities |  |  | 4.4 | 6.4 | 200 |
| Reliance Industries | 2,423 | U | 14.6 | 13.0 | (155) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oil \& Natural Gas Corporation | 986 | OP | 3.5 | 3.5 | - | Nagarjuna Construction Co. | 268 | OP | - | 0.6 | 60 |
| Reliance Petroleum | 162 | OP | - | 1.5 | 150 | Mahindra Gesco | 621 | OP | - | 0.6 | 60 |
| Energy |  |  | 18.1 | 18.1 | (5) | Kalpataru Power Transmission | 1,636 | OP | - | 0.6 | 60 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | PSL | 398 | OP | - | 0.6 | 60 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Infrastructure basket |  |  | - | 2.4 | 240 |

[^1]Overweight: Automobiles, BFSI, Infrastructure (engineering, construction, industrials, infrastructure), Power/Utilities

Neutral: Consumer, Energy (including Reliance Industries), Metals, Real Estate
Underweight: Cement, Media, Pharmaceuticals, Technology, Telecom
We analyze key issues facing the various sectors and areas of positive or negative surprise and conclude that the BFI, infrastructure and power sectors offer the best combination of growth and defensiveness in an increasingly uncertain market. We focus on large-cap sectors, which can move the market up or down significantly or be in a position to absorb large liquidity, and others where we differ from consensus. In a light-hearted manner, we have ascribed the qualities of various boats to give 'personality' to the sectors, appropriate given that the market is floating on liquidity.

1. Reliance Industries-aircraft carrier; neutral. We would recommend a neutral position on the stock (including Reliance Petroleum) given (1) the difficulty in assessing the valuation of the stock; it is practically impossible to factor in potential new E\&P discoveries beforehand and/or other new initiatives and (2) the sheer size of the stock.

Nonetheless, we are not sure if Reliance Industries stock can provide further positive surprises on earnings and developments (as it has in the past), which can result in further re-rating of the stock. We believe the stock already faces large street expectations on (1) very strong refining margins for the next few years and (2) significantly higher reserves than announced officially. Exhibit 13 shows the large valuation gap between Reliance's current stock price and our estimated fair value of its extant assets, investments and known E\&P discoveries. We translate the valuation gap to implied hydrocarbon reserves, which Reliance would need to announce today ( 60 tcf ) or bring into production (120 tcf) in six years, a typical discovery-to-production cycle (see Exhibit 14).

Exhibit 13: The street is implying about US $\$ 20-25$ bn as value of potential oil and gas discoveries
Estimation of implied valuation of new businesses of Reliance Industries (US\$ bn)

| Comments |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Valuation of extant businesses |  | Chemicals, RIL refinery, extant oil and gas |
| FY2008E EPS of Reliance (Rs) | 88 | M oderately higher than FY2007 EPS |
| FY2008E EPS adjusted for treasury shares (Rs) | 102 | Adjusted for 199 mn treasury shares |
| Effective tax rate in FY2008E (\%) | 23.1 |  |
| FY2008E EPS adjusted for tax rate | 87.4 | Normalized for 34\% tax rate for extant earnings |
| Appropriate P/E multiple (X) | 9.0 | Generous given above mid-cycle margins, earnings and cost of equity of 12.5\% |
| Valuation of extant businesses (Rs) | 787 |  |
| Valuation of extant businesses | 25 | High versus replacement value |
| 2. Valuation of investments |  | RPL, IPCL, others (without Reliance Retail) |
| Reliance Petroleum | 436 | 3.375 bn shares at Rs162 (current stock price) |
| Others | 8 |  |
| Total value of investments | 444 |  |
| Valuation of RIL ex-new E\&P, retailing, SEZs | 1,231 |  |
| Current stock price | 2,422 |  |
| 3. Valuation of new businesses |  | Emerging E\&P business, retailing, SEZs |
| Market-ascribed value of new businesses | 1,191 |  |
| Market-ascribed value of new businesses (US\$ bn) | 37 |  |
| Estimated valuation of retailing (US\$ bn) | 4.3 | Reliance has invested about US\$1 bn in Reliance Retail as at end-FY2007 |
| Estimated valuation of SEZs (US\$ bn) | - | Value will take time to emerge |
| Market-ascribed value of emerging E\&P business | 33 | Seems very high to us based on official reserves, announed discoveries |
| Estimated value of Reliance's stake in KG D-6 (gas) | 5.9 | NPV based on gas production of 17 tcf , US $\$ 8.8$ bn capex, US $\$ 4.2 / \mathrm{mn}$ BTU net price |
| Estimated value of Reliance's stake in KG D-6 (oil) | 1.8 | 0.5 bn bbls of gross OOIP assumed versus current announced reserves of 180 mn bbls |
| Estimated value of Reliance's stakes in NEC-25, CBM | 2.1 |  |
| Implied value of new discoveries | 23 | Higher reserves in KG D-6, NEC-25, Cauvery-III-D5, GS-01, MN-D4 blocks? |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Exhibit 14: Reliance's current stock price is implying additional recoverable reserves of $\sim 55$ tcf of gas today Valuation of Reliance's E\&P segment and implied valuation for potential discoveries (US\$ bn)

|  | Commnets |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
| DCF valuation of KG D-6 block, gas for D1 \& D3 fields | 5.9 | 15.4 tcf of net recoverable gas reserves |
| Valuation of KG D-6 block, oil for MA-1 field | 1.8 | 450 mn bbls of net proved reserves of oil at EV/bbl of US\$10 |
| Valuation of Reliance's stakes in NEC-25, CBM | 2.1 | 5.7 tcf of net recoverable gas reserves |
| Total valuation of extant announced reserves | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |  |
| Total recoverable reserves (tcf) | $\mathbf{2 4}$ |  |
| Implied valuation of E\&P segment | 33 |  |
| Implied valuation of new E\&P discoveries | 23 |  |
| Implied additional recoverable reserves in stock price (tcf) | $\mathbf{5 6}$ | This is what Reliance needs to announce today |
| \# of years from discovery to production | 6 | KG D-6 first gas discovered in Oct-02, production in 2HFY 09 |
| Cost of capital (\% ) | 12.0 |  |
| Additional gas reserves required to be added in six years (tcf) | $\mathbf{1 1 1}$ | This is what Reliance needs to bring in production in six years |

Note:
(a) The above exercise assumes for simplicity that all future gas and oil discovery would have similar PSC terms as the KG D-6 block.

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

We believe the comparison with an aircraft carrier is appropriate given the majesty and mystique surrounding these behemoths. Reliance Industries stock has been the biggest contributor to the increase in the Sensex over the past several months (see Exhibit 15) and has naturally carried the market and a whole armada of ships and boats along with it (including mini-Reliance stocks). Also, it is difficult to assess the strength of an aircraft carrier (valuation of Reliance Industries) given (1) difficulty in counting the number of aircrafts on the deck in the buzz of activity (some planes taking off, some landing, some under wrapssymbolic of volatile prices and margins of chemicals and refining) and (2) presence of submarines in the flotilla below the sea (new E\&P discoveries, retailing, SEZs and other unannounced new initiatives). We might add here that certain kamikaze pilots (suicidal analysts) keep trying to dive-bomb an aircraft carrier; the latest attempt is given in Exhibit 16.

Exhibit 15: Reliance Industries is the largest contributor to the Sensex rise since January 1, 2007
Largest gainers and losers, January 1, 2007-October 1, 2007


Source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit16: RPL's hypothetical margins are significantly lower than RIL's reported margins in certain quarters Refining margins for RIL and RPL, March fiscal year-ends (US $\$ / b b l$ )

|  | 1QFY08 | 4QFY07 | 3QFY07 | 2QFY07 | 1QFY07 | 4QFY06 | 3QFY06 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| RIL's reported margins | 15.4 | 13.0 | 11.7 | 9.1 | 12.4 | 10.4 | $\mathbf{9 . 1}$ |
| Singapore margins as computed by IEA (a) | 4.7 | 3.1 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 4.9 | 1.2 | 2.9 |
| Premium over reported Singapore margins | $\mathbf{1 0 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 2}$ |
| Hypothetical margins for RPL (b) | 13.1 | 11.1 | 8.5 | 11.4 | 13.8 | 5.8 | 9.1 |
| Premium of RPL's computed margins over RIL's reported margins | $\mathbf{( 2 . 3 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 1 . 9 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 2 )}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{( 4 . 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 0 )}$ |

## Note:

(a) Singapore hydrocracking margins over Dubai.
(b) Margins computed without considering use of gas for heating.

Source: Bloomberg, company, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.
2. Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI)—tanker; overweight. We continue to recommend an overweight position on the BFSI sector noting (1) reasonable valuations in case of certain banks (ICICI Bank, PSU banks), (2) large embedded value from fast-growing areas (insurance, asset management), (3) likely decline in interest rates (but relatively steeper decline in deposit rates versus lending rates), which would be positive for Net Interest Margins (NIM) of banks. We discuss our view on interest rates in the section on economics.

We expect the size of this sector to increase as a proportion of India's GDP led by increased penetration of BFSI in India. Exhibit 17 compares the market capitalization of the BFI sector in India with other markets and also shows the relative sizes of the top three BFSI companies. An ultra large crude carrier (ULCC) is the largest vessel currently and we expect the BFSI sector to eventually take a similar dominant position in the Indian market. To reinforce our analogy, we note that the size of tankers has increased tremendously over the past decades-an ULCC now measures up to 550,000 DWT compared to tanker size of 25-45,000 DWT in the 1950s.

Exhibit 17: BFSI accounts for lowest \% of total market cap. in India BFSI market cap. and total market cap. of various countries

| Country | BFSI mkt cap. | Total mkt cap. (US\$ bn) | (\%) | Country | Market cap. of the top-3 banks (US\$ bn) |  |  |  | \% of total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (US\$ bn) |  |  |  | \#1 | \#2 | \#3 | Top three |  |
| USA | 3,570 | 18,767 | 19.0 | USA | 237 | 224 | 184 | 645 | 3.4 |
| China | 1,487 | 3,372 | 44.1 | China | 282 | 222 | 219 | 723 | 21.4 |
| UK | 1,052 | 4,001 | 26.3 | UK | 217 | 101 | 82 | 400 | 10.0 |
| Japan | 770 | 4,771 | 16.1 | Japan | 101 | 65 | 61 | 227 | 4.8 |
| France | 645 | 2,863 | 22.5 | France | 189 | 105 | 81 | 375 | 13.1 |
| Germany | 452 | 2,187 | 20.7 | Germany | 105 | 79 | 48 | 232 | 10.6 |
| Brazil | 336 | 1,233 | 27.3 | Brazil | 61 | 59 | 43 | 163 | 13.2 |
| India | 188 | 1,320 | 14.2 | India | 29 | 25 | 17 | 71 | 5.4 |

Note:
(a) Excludes market cap. of Life Insurance Corp. and a few private insurance companies which are not listed currently.

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities.
3. Infrastructure (Construction, Engineering, Industrials, Infrastructure)—drill ship; overweight. Despite high valuations, we are still comfortable with the dynamics of the sector versus other 'high' valuation sectors given (1) continued strong investment in the infrastructure in India for the next several years (see Exhibits 18 and 19), (2) stable and even improving margins in certain cases and (3) strong visibility on earnings of most companies given large order books (see Exhibit 20).

Exhibit 18: Rising infrastructure spend can result in sustained growth in sales
Estimates of $y$-o-y growth in construction sector assuming different scenaios of infrastructure spending

## Assumptions: <br> Current infrastructure growth as \% of GDP $\mathbf{4 . 6 0}$

| Estimate of infrastructure sector CAGR sales growth 2006-10 (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | GDP CAGR growth (2006-2010) |  |  |  |
|  | $(\%)$ | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 14.0 |
|  | 4.6 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 14.0 |
| Infrastructure |  |  |  |  |  |
| spend/ GDP | 5.0 | 14.9 | 15.4 | 15.9 | 16.4 |
|  | (\%) | 6.0 | 20.2 | 20.8 | 21.3 |
|  | 7.0 | 25.0 | 25.5 | 26.1 | $\mathbf{2 6 . 6}$ |

Source: KSA Technopack, Images retail, Kotak Institutional Equities.

Exhibit 19: US $\$ 275$ bn of infrastructure spend likely during FY2008-2012E
Infrastructure spending in FY2008-FY2012E (Rs bn)

|  | Remarks |  |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| Transportation | $\mathbf{4 , 9 2 7}$ |  |
| Roads | 2,474 | NHDP III-VIII, state and rural roads to drive the growth, $60 \%$ BOT funding |
| Ports | 500 | NMDP-led investments, $50 \%$ through private-public partnerships |
| Airports | 458 |  |
| Railways | 1,495 | Dedicated Freight Corridor and National Rail Vikas Yojana, apart from regular spends |
| Telecom | $\mathbf{1 , 0 3 1}$ | Over $65 \%$ spend in wireless, most funding to come from internal accruals |
| Power | $\mathbf{5 , 0 8 0}$ | Over 30\% private participation expected compared to 14-15\% in past five years |
| Generation | 3,530 | Over 50 GW of capacity likely to be added over next five year compared to 19-20 GW in past five years |
| T\&D | $\mathbf{1 , 5 5 0}$ | Ratio of T\&D spend / generation to rise to around 0.4X compared to 0.2 Ca earlier. T\&D spend includes regular <br> maintenance spend by SEBs, hence not too significant for private sector |
| Water supply | $\mathbf{1 , 1 8 6}$ | Investments driven by urbanisation and drivers such as JNURM |
| Urban infrastructure | $\mathbf{1 , 0 3 1}$ | Investmetns in metro transportation etc. |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 1 , 0 3 8}$ |  |

[^2]Exhibit 20: Strong order book of infrastructure companies to provide earnings visibility
Order book of major infrastructure companies

|  | Current order book | FY2008E revenues | FY2008E visibility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Company | (Rs bn) | (Rs bn) | (X) |
| ABB | 46 | 66 | 0.7 |
| AIA Engineering | 4 | 8 | 0.5 |
| Bharat Electronics | 91 | 48 | 1.9 |
| Bharat Heavy Electricals | 624 | 220 | 2.8 |
| JSL | 29 | 38 | 0.8 |
| Larsen \& Toubro | 423 | 264 | 1.6 |
| Nagarjuna Construction Co. | 78 | 41 | 1.9 |
| PSL (1) | 23 | 20 | 1.1 |
| Punj | 152 | 87 | 1.7 |
| Siemens | 108 | 92 | 1.2 |
| Suzlon Energy | 135 | 131 | 1.0 |
| Welspun Gujarat Stahl Rohren | 45 | 37 | 1.2 |

Note:
(1) September fiscal year-ends.

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

The analogy with a drill ship reflects (1) strong demand for a drill ship of any vintage for the next several years and (2) steady improvement in the day rates of a drill ship given strong demand; drill ships are anyway a part of the infrastructure sector.
4. Power/utilities—speedboat; overweight. We believe this sector may emerge as a highgrowth sector and finally cast the dowdy image typically associated with the utilities sector. We expect the power sector (generation and associated sectors-transmission and distribution) to see large investment over the next several years. Exhibit 21 gives our expected capacity additions in the power generation sector over the next two five-year plans (XIth and XIIth).

Exhibit 21: Power generation capacity set to rise sharply
Power generation projects in the XIth and Xllth Plans (MW)
Total projects in the $\mathrm{XI}^{\text {th }}$ plan

|  | Thermal |  |  |  | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coal |  |  | Gas |  |  |  |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | 6,600 | 17,660 | 24,260 | 750 | 9,685 | 3,160 | 37,855 |
| NTPC | 6,600 | 9,460 | 16,060 | - | 1,920 | - | 17,980 |
| NHPC | - | - | - | - | 4,833 | - | 4,833 |
| DVC | - | 6,200 | 6,200 | - | - | - | 6,200 |
| Others | - | 2,000 | 2,000 | 750 | 2,932 | 3,160 | 8,842 |
| State | 2,400 | 17,440 | 19,840 | 612 | 2,637 | - | 23,089 |
| Private | 660 | 6,550 | 7,210 | 752 | 3,263 | - | 11,225 |
| Total | 9,660 | 41,650 | 51,310 | 2,114 | 15,585 | 3,160 | 72,169 |

Total projects in the XII $^{\text {th }}$ plan

|  | Thermal |  |  |  | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coal |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total | Gas |  |  |  |
| Centre | 5,502 | 4,564 | 10,066 | 3,413 | 11,520 | 8,020 | 33,018 |
| NTPC | 5,502 | 250 | 5,752 | 3,413 | 2,778 | 1,000 | 12,943 |
| NHPC | - | - | - | - | 5,950 | - | 5,950 |
| DVC | - | 1,050 | 1,050 | - | - | - | 1,050 |
| Others | - | 3,264 | 3,264 | - | 2,792 | 7,020 | 13,076 |
| State | 800 | 20,256 | 21,056 | 1,422 | 4,174 | - | 26,652 |
| Private | 3,260 | 3,503 | 6,763 | 4,332 | 4,189 | - | 15,283 |
| Ultra mega p | 17,650 | - | 17,650 | - | - | - | 17,650 |
| Total | 27,212 | 28,323 | 55,535 | 9,166 | 19,883 | 8,020 | 92,604 |

Source: Ministry of Power, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

We expect a speedboat to provide high-paced rides for a few years, at the very least. However, we do not rule out intermittent spills into the sea (and sputtering engines). Although most of the issues plaguing the power generation sector have been resolved, certain issues such as (1) fuel linkages and pricing, (2) delays in government approvals and clearances, and (3) unnecessary litigations continue to act as counter-currents for the sector.
5. Automobiles—cruise ship; overweight. We see a likely peaking of interest rates to kickstart volume growth in the industry, particularly in the 2-W sector; the 4-W sector continues to grow robustly. High interest rates and problems in defaults and collections have resulted in banks going slow on pushing loans to potential customers. Nonetheless, we expect demand to resurface ( $2-\mathrm{W}$ and $\mathrm{M} \& H C V s$, in that order) supported by (1) normal strong wage increase in the services sector and likely implementation of Sixth Pay Commission's report for central government employees by early 2008 and (2) latent buying demand due to pushback of purchase in the past few months on concerns about higher interest rates.

The demand for cruises typically emerges when the economy is doing well, consumer confidence is high, inflation is low and consumer discretionary expenditure is strong. We expect the favorable economic conditions and potentially lower interest rates to result in demand for automobiles.
6. Energy-ferryboat (excluding Reliance); neutral. The government's stranglehold on this sector has made this large sector almost invisible from an investment perspective despite the great utility provided by the sector (as with a ferryboat, one uses it at times when other forms of transportation become very expensive, typically paying less-than-market price and hardly caring about the price or the ferry). Continued government control on pricing and inadequate compensation (amount of oil bonds) makes it difficult for this sector to attract interest (or absorb large liquidity if it continues uninterrupted). The stocks have rallied of late probably indicating that liquidity is finding fewer and fewer worthwhile investment opportunities.

We do not see much downside to the downstream oil stocks since they are trading at well below their normalized valuations (see Exhibit 22, which gives the normalized valuation of the downstream oil stocks). We see potential to make absolute returns in the stocks occasionally but rule out a sustained re-rating without the government exiting the sector (deregulation and/or privatization).

Exhibit 22: Normalized earnings forecasts are significantly higher versus actual forecasts Comparison of normalized marketing margins with FY2009 estimates (Rs/ton)

|  | BPCL |  | HPCL |  | 10CL |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2009E | Normalized | 2009E | Normalized | 2009E | Normalized |
| LPG | $(10,750)$ | 1,500 | $(10,750)$ | 1,500 | $(10,750)$ | 1,500 |
| Naphtha | 2,000 | 500 | 2,000 | 500 | 2,250 | 1,000 |
| Gasoline | $(2,500)$ | 1,700 | $(2,500)$ | 1,700 | $(2,500)$ | 2,000 |
| Jet fuel | 2,000 | 1,400 | 2,000 | 1,400 | 2,000 | 1,700 |
| Kerosene | $(16,250)$ | 600 | $(16,250)$ | 600 | $(15,000)$ | 600 |
| Diesel | (750) | 1,500 | (750) | 1,500 | (750) | 1,800 |
| Light diesel oil | 1,000 | 500 | 1,000 | 500 | 1,800 | 1,000 |
| Low sulphur heavy stock | 1,600 | 500 | 1,600 | 500 | 2,200 | 1,000 |
| Fuel oil | 1,600 | 500 | 1,600 | 500 | 2,200 | 1,000 |
| Bitumen | 1,800 | 1,000 | 1,800 | 1,000 | 2,600 | 1,600 |
| EPS (Rs) | 39.3 | 69.3 | 34.8 | 65.4 | 45.2 | 68.3 |
| EBITDA (Rs bn) | 28.9 | 45.6 | 27.7 | 45.4 | 102.0 | 143.7 |
| EV ( 5 X normalised EBITDA) (Rs bn) |  | 228 |  | 227 |  | 719 |
| Value of investments (Rs bn) |  | 92 |  | 48 |  | 274 |
| Net debt (Rs bn) |  | 75 |  | 91 |  | 137 |
| Equity value (Rs/share) |  | 676 |  | 544 |  | 717 |
| Equity value at 40\% discount (R | e) (b) | 406 |  | 326 |  | 502 |

Note:
(a) Our normalized earnings estimates are based on normalized marketing margins and actual refining margin estimates for FY2009.
(b) Target price for IOC is based $30 \%$ discount to fair value ( 5 X normalized EBITDA plus investments).

[^3]7. Real estate-yacht; neutral. We like the very strong growth prospects of the industry given (1) almost infinite demand for housing and commercial property and (2) the likely peaking of the interest rate cycle, which may spur demand. However, our enthusiasm for the sector is tempered by likely correction (10\%-20\%) in residential real estate prices in most markets. We would take a more aggressive stance on the sector once valuations reflect our expected decline in residential real estate prices. We expect huge latent demand, which we believe exists at lower prices, to translate into strong volumes. DLF would be our top pick in the sector at the right prices (our 12-month fair valuation is Rs750 based on NAV of Rs646/share).

As with a yacht, the price of residential real estate in most cities is virtually out of the reach of most individuals given a sharp increase in prices in most cities (see Exhibit 23). Nonetheless, at the right price, all of us (we exclude hedge-fund managers from this list; they already have a few, we hear) would like to buy a yacht or two. The steep increase in real estate prices has led to a sharp slowdown in residential sales as can be seen in (1) a decline in loan disbursements by leading housing finance companies (3.5\% yoy decline in 1QFY08), (2) no fresh launches in most cities by the major developers; developers are reluctant to reduce prices and launch new projects (sadly, real estate developers and yacht makers do not yet fully appreciate the volume potential of the Indian market at the right prices), and (3) lower pre-sales figures in the books of all listed real estate developers.

Exhibit 23: Residential real estate prices have increased sharply over the past two years
Residential real estate prices in major cities, indexed to 100


Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.
8. Technology-destroyer; underweight. We have a cautious stance on the sector reflecting the negative impact of a strengthening rupee on earnings and sentiment despite (1) reasonable valuations relative to the market and other high growth sectors and (2) moderately strong volume growth. The technology's sector battle with the runaway rupee might have only begun; our base case is that rupee will likely keep on appreciating gradually against the US Dollar led by (1) sustained capital inflows into India and (2) US economy's own problems with massive current account deficit and potential interest rate reductions.

The sector would require all the maneuverability and firepower of a destroyer to deliver the performance, which investors have come to expect over the years. Thankfully, we see certain levers for the sector, which it can use to partially fight the hostile environment. The levers include- (1) modest increase in billing rates, (2) control on costs through lower bench-strength destroyer or two is always and more modest increases in salaries and (3) increased proportion of off-shoring. Finally, a destroyer or two is helpful for a country although nobody is expecting a third world war; one never knows when the rupee may start depreciating again if capital inflows into India decline to lower-than-expected levels.
9. Telecom—Noah's ark; underweight. Our cautious view reflects potential risks to earnings (the street expects strong earnings growth for the next few years) from (1) a possible (but not factored in our or consensus estimates) deterioration in pricing environment due to the entry of new players in the market and introduction of mobile number portability (MNP) and (2) any unexpected slowdown in subscriber additions. We find it tough to justify the valuations despite our assumptions of a very benign pricing environment throughout our forecast period (see Exhibit 24, which also gives sensitivity of valuations to pricing assumptions). The entry of new players in the market begs the question: Will the very high ROIC (see Exhibit 25) of wireless telecom companies sustain in perpetuity? Basic microeconomic theory says that this is unlikely.

Exhibit 24; We model very high ROACE in the terminal year of our forecast
Valuation sensitivity to change in pricing and ROACE

|  | Change in pricing from base case |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -15\% | -10\% | -5\% | Base case | 5\% | 10\% | 15\% |
| 12-month forw ard DCF valuation (Rs) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 543 | 585 | 626 | 668 | 710 | 752 | 794 |
| Idea | 75 | 87 | 100 | 112 | 125 | 138 | 152 |
| RCL | 355 | 390 | 426 | 461 | 497 | 532 | 568 |
| RoACE in terminal year, FY2017E (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 46 | 48 | 50 | 52 | 54 | 56 | 58 |
| Idea | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 32 |
| RCL | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 25 |

## Note:

(a) Lower sensitivity of RCL versus peers reflects a lower proportion of revenues from wireless.
(b) Valuations of Bharti and Reliance are for the core business only.

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Exhibit 25: The wireless business in India generates remarkably high CROCI, which provides sufficient scope for weaker pricing CROCI of wireless segment of Bharti, Idea and RCL (\%)

|  | Jun-05 | Sep-05 | Dec-05 | Mar-06 | Jun-06 | Sep-06 | Dec-06 | Mar-07 | Jun-07 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bharti Airtel |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBIT (Rs mn) | 3,932 | 4,341 | 5,319 | 5,522 | 6,961 | 8,085 | 9,184 | 11,424 | 13,321 |
| Tax rate (\%) | 13.6 | 8.9 | 13.4 | 7.4 | 11.1 | 12.8 | 14.8 | 9.0 | 19.0 |
| EBIT* (1-t) (Rs mn) | 3,396 | 3,956 | 4,604 | 5,113 | 6,190 | 7,052 | 7,821 | 10,398 | 10,788 |
| Add: Depreciation | 2,141 | 2,608 | 2,613 | 3,224 | 3,380 | 4,094 | 4,945 | 5,180 | 5,766 |
| Cash return (Rs mn) | 5,537 | 6,564 | 7,217 | 8,337 | 9,570 | 11,146 | 12,766 | 15,578 | 16,554 |
| Annualized cash return (Rs mn) | 22,148 | 26,256 | 28,870 | 33,348 | 38,281 | 44,582 | 51,063 | 62,313 | 66,216 |
| Gross cash invested (Rs mn) | 124,643 | 133,258 | 141,555 | 159,227 | 177,633 | 205,084 | 220,672 | 231,414 | 264,494 |
| CROCI (\%) | 17.8 | 19.7 | 20.4 | 20.9 | 21.6 | 21.7 | 23.1 | 26.9 | 25.0 |
| Idea Cellular |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBIT (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,905 | 2,599 | 3,241 |
| Tax rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3.2 | 1.0 | 0.5 |
| EBIT* (1-t) (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,845 | 2,573 | 3,224 |
| Add: Depreciation |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,801 | 1,761 | 1,887 |
| Cash return (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,646 | 4,334 | 5,111 |
| Annualized cash return (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 14,584 | 17,336 | 20,446 |
| Gross cash invested (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 66,187 | 75,105 | 79,201 |
| CROCI (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 22.0 | 23.1 | 25.8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reliance Communications |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBIT (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  | 3,998 | 5,131 | 5,542 | 6,991 | 9,284 |
| Tax rate (\%) |  |  |  |  | 5.0 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 7.8 |
| EBIT* (1-t) (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  | 3,797 | 5,088 | 5,465 | 6,891 | 8,561 |
| Add: Depreciation |  |  |  |  | 3,573 | 4,163 | 4,751 | 4,520 | 4,108 |
| Cash return (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  | 7,370 | 9,251 | 10,216 | 11,411 | 12,669 |
| Annualized cash return (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  | 29,478 | 37,004 | 40,864 | 45,642 | 50,676 |
| Gross cash invested (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  | 155,117 | 170,100 | 182,190 | 192,050 | 207,023 |
| CROCI (\%) |  |  |  |  | 19.0 | 21.8 | 22.4 | 23.8 | 24.5 |

[^4]Exhibit 26: Release of 20 MHz of spectrum can accommodate 2-4 new players in most circles, if TRAI's recent recommendations are accepted Additional spectrum requirements of existing GSM operators based on M arch-2010 subs estimates


[^5]The sector is starting to resemble a modern-day Noah's Ark given that all kinds of 'species' are keen to get into the sector-consumer durable manufacturers, diversified conglomerates, global telecom companies and real estate developers; incidentally, there's also a 'Swan' and a 'Cheetah' among the list of companies, which have applied for telecom licenses/spectrum. However, we would be very respectful of those two entities as they are affiliates/subsidiaries of Reliance Communications (RCL). In our view, RCL stands to benefit most from potential receipt of GSM spectrum in 15 non-GSM circles and introduction of M NP.
10. Cement-tugboat; negative. We have a negative view on the cement sector due to (1) potential erosion in pricing from a weakening supply-demand balance (see Exhibit 27) and (2) rich valuations. The street (at least the investment community) is optimistic about positive demand surprises and likely delay in supply due to delay in commissioning of new projects. However, most cement companies appear confident about their expansion plans and any slowdown in industrial activity would result in significant over-supply.

Exhibit 27: Incemental supply to exceed incremental consumption over the next few years Cement demand supply balance, M arch fiscal year-ends, 2006-2010E (mn tons)

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 E}$ |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Effective capacity (mn tpa) | 156 | 165 | 181 | 212 | $\mathbf{2 4 4}$ |
| Incremental capacity (mn tpa) |  | $\mathbf{9 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 1 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 2 . 0}$ |
| growth \% |  | 5.8 | 9.5 | 17.5 | 15.1 |
| Cement consumption | 136 | 148 | 163 | 180 | 198 |
| Growth \% |  | 9.5 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Exports | 4.1 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| Growth \% |  | 47.7 | - | - | - |
| Cement depatches | 142 | 154 | 169 | 186 | $\mathbf{2 0 4}$ |
| Growth \% |  | 9.0 | 9.7 | 9.6 | 9.7 |
| Capacity utilization (\%) | $\mathbf{9 1}$ | $\mathbf{9 3}$ | $\mathbf{9 3 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{8 7 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{8 3 . 3}$ |

Source: CMA, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

We expect this rather unglamorous but highly functional sector to provide the backbone to India's infrastructure growth; a tugboat plays a similar role in terms of tow ing much larger vessels safely in and out of ports/harbors. However, the size of the sector is a natural limitation in terms of it achieving center-stage or being a driver of the market; the same holds true for tugboats.
11. Media—sailboat; underweight. This lightweight sector may do well when the winds are favorable as is the case currently but could run into strong headwinds when the weather turns inclement; a sailboat can get swept out into the ocean along with the tide. We expect conditions in the India media sector to deteriorate with (1) the entry of several new players in the television broadcasting and distribution market (see Exhibit 28) and (2) aggressive expansion plans of newsprint companies outside their traditional bastions.

Exhibit 28: New channel launches to intensify competition
Number of existing and proposed new channels across various segments

| Channels | Existing | Proposed | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Hindi - GE | 15 | 5 | 20 |
| English - GE | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Hindi - News | 23 | 10 | 33 |
| English - News | 12 | 5 | 17 |
| Cinema | 19 | 8 | 27 |
| Music | 22 | 4 | 26 |
| Sports | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| Religious | 16 | 1 | 17 |
| Niche | 31 | 13 | 44 |
| Tamil | 17 | 10 | 27 |
| Telugu | 14 | 10 | 24 |
| Marathi | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Kannada | 10 | 2 | 12 |
| Malayalam | 13 | 2 | 15 |
| Punjabi | 11 | 2 | 13 |
| Bengali | 14 | 1 | 15 |
| Gujarati | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| Others | 41 | 54 | 95 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

We expect valuations to correct significantly if the companies fail to meet with street expectations; we find valuations very rich despite our strong projected growth in earnings over the next few years (see Exhibit 29).

Exhibit 29: Valuations of media companies are expensive despite our strong projected growth in earnings Comparative valuations of media companies, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-2011E

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9 E}$ | 2010E | 2011E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| P/E (X) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dish TV | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM |  |
| HT M edia Ltd | 88.0 | 50.8 | 30.6 | 21.3 | 16.5 | 13.5 |
| Sun TV Netw ork Ltd | 71.2 | 58.9 | 37.5 | 27.8 | 21.8 | 16.3 |
| ZEEL | 63.7 | 61.9 | 35.9 | 27.1 | 21.4 | 17.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dish TV | NM | NM | NM | NM | 21.9 | 11.0 |
| HT M edia Ltd | 41.0 | 29.8 | 18.0 | 12.7 | 9.9 | 8.4 |
| Sun TV Netw ork Ltd | 73.2 | 36.6 | 23.6 | 17.1 | 13.4 | 9.9 |
| ZEEL | 51.8 | 43.8 | 24.5 | 18.5 | 14.1 | 11.5 |
| EPS (Rs) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dish TV |  | $(5.9)$ | $(7.7)$ | $(6.0)$ | $(3.7)$ | $10.5)$ |
| HT M edia Ltd | 2.4 | 4.1 | 6.9 | 9.9 | 12.7 | 15.6 |
| Sun TV Network Ltd | 5.3 | 6.3 | 10.0 | 13.4 | 17.2 | 20.9 |
| ZEEL | 4.9 | 5.0 | 8.7 | 11.5 | 14.6 | 17.5 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

## Economy: Problem of plenty from plenty of problems

We see surplus liquidity as the biggest issue facing the Indian economy. Continued strong capital inflows may provide upward pressure to the rupee and downward pressure on interest rates. A slow down in industrial activity may result in more moderate GDP growth (8.5\% for FY2008E) versus 9.4\% in FY2007.

## Rupee on the way up; bad for technology, commodities

We expect the Indian Rupee to appreciate to around Rs39/US Dollar by end-FY2008E if capital flows remain as in our base case model for India's balance of payments for FY2008E (see Exhibit 30). However, if net Fll inflows (probably the most volatile component of foreign capital inflows) were to be lower versus our estimate of US\$23.8 bn for FY2008E, we expect the rupee to decline to Rs40.5/US Dollar by end-FY2008E. Nonetheless, we expect capital inflows in other forms to continue to be strong due to the interest rate differential.

Exhibit 30: RBI's net forex purchase will likely be US\$45 bn
India's balance of payments (US\$ bn)

|  | FY2007 | FY2008E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Current account | $\mathbf{( 9 . 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 1 9 . 7 )}$ |
| $\%$ of GDP | $(1.1)$ | $(1.7)$ |
| Trade balance | $124.9)$ | $(93.2)$ |
| - Exports | 192.0 | 150.4 |
| - Imports | 56.0 | 243.6 |
| o/w oil imports | 55.3 | 71.6 |
| Invisibles | 7.5 | 73.6 |
| o/w income from forex reserves | $\mathbf{4 6 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{7 1 . 0}$ |
| Capital account | 15.5 | 34.8 |
| Foreign investment | 8.4 | 11.0 |
| - FDI | 7.1 | 23.8 |
| - FII | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| Banking capital | 3.9 | 1.5 |
| - NRI deposits | 3.3 | 5.4 |
| Short term credit | 16.1 | 13.0 |
| ECBS | 9.2 | 15.0 |
| Others | $\mathbf{3 6 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 . 8}$ |
| Overall balance |  |  |
| Memo | $\mathbf{2 8 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{4 5 . 0}$ |
| RBI's net forex purchases |  |  |

Source: RBI, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

We expect intervention (US Dollar purchase) by the RBI in the forex market in FY2008E to the extent of US\$45 bn in order to manage an orderly movement in the Indian rupee. This would lead to injection of large rupee liquidity in the system, which would need to be balanced through M arket Stabilization Scheme (MSS) auctions and further CRR hikes.

Interest rates on the way down; good for banks, automobiles, real estate
A perceptible slowdown in credit off-take over the past few months (see Exhibit 31) and continued strong capital inflows will likely lead to a decline in interest rates (see Exhibit 32). Our money supply equation in Exhibit 33 suggests ample liquidity in the system. The recent 50-bps CRR hike, increase in MSS limit (Rs2.0 tn) and removal of ceiling on LAF reverse repo amount highlights the thinking of the policy makers towards handling surplus liquidity in the system. We expect the RBI to remove surplus liquidity through M SS auctions and further CRR hikes. We also note that banks have built a comfortable SLR position (no compulsion to buy more government bonds), which provides one more leg to a slacker credit situation.

Exhibit 31: Banking sector loan growth has shown a moderation in recent months Loan growth yoy (\%)


Source: RBI.

Exhibit 32: A persistent credit gap will likely keep lending rates firm
Sources and uses of bank funds, FY2008E (Rs bn)

| Key sources/uses | $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ SLR | $\mathbf{2 4 \%}$ SLR |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1. Deposits | 5,621 | 5,621 |
| 2. Non-deposit sources | 260 | 260 |
| 3. Primary issuances | 430 | 430 |
| 4. Bank reserves | 978 | 978 |
| 5. Investment in government securities | 910 | 658 |
| 6. Net foreign assets | 150 | 100 |
| 7. Resources available for interest rate-neutral credit offtake | 4,273 | 4,575 |
| $(1+2+3-4-5-6)$ | 4,000 | 4,134 |
| 8. Credit offtake/demand | $(273)$ | $(441)$ |
| 9. Credit gap (8-9) |  |  |

[^6]Exhibit 33: US\$ 4bn forex intervention will square the money market again Liquidity projections in Rs bn

## Liquidity indicator

FY2008E

| 1.0 | Bank CRR demand | 978 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| 2.0 | Autonomous liquidity position $(2.1+2.2+2.3-2.4)$ | 1,271 |
| 2.1 | RBI's loans to government | 100 |
| 2.2 | RBI's market net foreign currency purchases | 1,800 |
|  | in USD | 45.0 |
| 2.3 | Others | - |
| 2.4 | Currency | 629 |
| 3.0 | Net liquidity (2-1) | 293 |
| 4.0 | Policy position (4.1+4.2+4.3) | 881 |
| 4.1 | Net LAF repos | $(200)$ |
| 4.2 | M arket Stabilization Scheme | 1,091 |
| 4.3 | OM O (net outright sales) | $(10)$ |
|  | M emo items | 7.75 |
|  | CRR at end March 2008 (\% ) |  |

Source: RBI, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

We expect banks to start reducing lending rates gradually although the pace of reduction will depend on the growth in credit. However, a slowdown in IIP over the past few months (see Exhibit 34), particularly in the manufacturing sector, may lead to slower credit off-take. Nonetheless, we expect banks to reduce deposit rates in 2HFY08 (currently banks are still aggressive in mobilizing deposits and thus keeping deposit rates high) on the back of likely slower off-take in credit. This should improve the NIM s of banks.

Exhibit 34: IIP growth has tapered off in the most recent months 4MMA and yoy growth in IIP (\%)


[^7]WPI inflation has declined significantly over the past few weeks from end-April peaks (see Exhibit 35) and will likely remain at low levels (3.5-4\%) during 2HFY08. A robust monsoon will likely keep food prices under check; this had been a major contributor to the surge in WPI in January-April 2007. Also, we rule out a price increase in case of auto fuels given (1) the current fluid political situation and (2) likely issue of Rs120 bn of oil bonds to the downstream oil companies in October, which may prop up company earnings. Even if the government was to raise fuel prices (now is a good time given low inflation and no state elections), we do not see this as having a material impact on inflation; auto fuel prices are significantly lower than in 2HFY07.

Exhibit 35: Inflation under control


Source: Ministry of Industry, Government of India.

## Strong GDP growth in FY2008E too but lower than in FY2007

We expect FY2008E expected GDP growth rate at 8.5\%; the grow th rate versus $9.4 \%$ in FY2007 reflects lower growth rate for the industry (see Exhibit 36). How ever, a good kharif crop (see Exhibit 37) helped by good South-W est M onsoon rainfall (see Exhibit 38), suggests that agriculture growth would be reasonably robust this year (4\%) compared to only $2.7 \%$ in FY2007.

| Exhibit 36: Resilient real GDP growth <br> Real GDP at factor cost and components (growth rates in \%) <br>  <br> Sector | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Agriculture and allied activities | $\mathbf{6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8 E}$ |
| Industry | $\mathbf{8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 0}$ |
| M ining and quarrying | 3.6 | 5.1 | 3.4 |
| Manufacturing | 9.1 | 12.3 | 9.5 |
| Electricity, gas and water supply | 5.3 | 7.4 | 8.2 |
| Services | $\mathbf{1 0 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 8}$ |
| Construction | 14.2 | 10.7 | 10.0 |
| Trade, hotels, transport, storage and communication | 10.4 | 13.0 | 10.5 |
| Financing, insurance, real estate and business services | 10.9 | 10.6 | 10.6 |
| Community, social and personal services | $\mathbf{7 . 7}$ | 7.8 | $\mathbf{7 . 5}$ |
| Real GDP at factor cost | $\mathbf{9 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 5}$ |

[^8]Exhibit 37: Progress of area under Kharif crops
Area covered by kharif crops ( mn hectares)

|  |  | Area covered as on |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Crop | Normal area | 20-Sep-06 | 21-Sep-07 |
| Rice | 38.2 | 36.2 | 36.3 |
| Coarse cereals | 22.9 | 22.1 | 21.5 |
| Bajra | 9.4 | 9.2 | 8.3 |
| Jowar | 4.4 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
| Maize | 6.2 | 7.2 | 7.6 |
| Total pulses | 10.9 | 11.1 | 12.1 |
| Total oilseeds | 15.4 | 16.3 | 17.5 |
| Groundnut | 5.5 | 4.7 | 5.4 |
| Soyabean | 6.6 | 8.1 | 8.8 |
| Sugarcane | 4.2 | 4.8 | 5.1 |
| Cotton | 8.3 | 8.7 | 8.3 |
| All crops | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 2 . 6}$ |

Source: M inistry of Agriculture, Government of India.

Exhibit 38: Normal monsoon likely in the current year
Progress of south-west monsoons across India

|  | Total rainfall above | Number of sub-divisions |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{C Y}$ | Excess <br> $(+) /$ below $(-)$ normal (\%) | Normal <br> rainfall | Deficient <br> rainfall | Scanty/ <br> no rainfall |  |
| 2000 | $(8.0)$ | 5 | 23 | 8 | - |
| 2001 | $(8.0)$ | 1 | 30 | 5 | - |
| 2002 | $(19.0)$ | 1 | 14 | 19 | 2 |
| 2003 | 2.0 | 7 | 26 | 3 | - |
| 2004 | $(13.0)$ | - | 23 | 13 | - |
| 2005 | $(1.0)$ | 9 | 23 | 4 | - |
| 2006 | $(1.0)$ | 6 | 20 | 10 | - |
| $2007(\mathrm{a})$ | 2.0 | 12 | 18 | 6 | - |

Note:
(a) For the period June 1, 2007 to September 26, 2007.
(b) Excess rainfall implies $20 \%$ or more of long term average rainfall.
(c) Normal rainfall implies rainfall in the $+19 \%$ to $-19 \%$ of long term average rainfall.
(d) Deficient rainfall implies-20\% to -59\% of long term average rainfall.
(e) Scanty rainfall implies $-60 \%$ to $-99 \%$ of long term average rainfall.

Source: Indian M eteorological Department.

## Politics: Early elections, if held, negative for certain sectors


#### Abstract

We do not think that earlier-than-scheduled elections may be bad for the Indian stock market. Anyway, we expect the market to take a breather given expensive valuations or find its level eventually at the 'right' valuations irrespective of liquidity. Early elections, if held, may be negative for certain sectors such as oil and gas and telecom.


Stalemate in the government; early elections one way to break it
We believe early elections, if held, need not be bad for the Indian stock market. We could see the formation of a more 'cohesive' government, which may be positive from a legislative perspective. The composition of the current government (see Exhibit 39) makes it difficult for the government to legislate on certain important economic and political issues. We would clarify that we are not commenting on the ideological position of any political party or group of parties; India is a democracy and everybody/political party is entitled to his/her/its opinion and ideology.

Exhibit 39: Left-supported coalition at the center
Lok Sabha composition of ruling coalition and left parties (\# of seats)

| Party |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| INC or Congress - Indian National Congress | $\mathbf{1 5 0}$ |
| RJD - Rashtriya Janata Dal | 24 |
| DM K - Dravida M unnetra Kazhagam | 26 |
| NCP - Nationalist Congress Party | 11 |
| LJP | 4 |
| JD(S) | 3 |
| Congress allies | $\mathbf{6 8}$ |
| Congress + allies | $\mathbf{2 1 8}$ |
| CPI (M) - Communist Party of India (M arxist) | 43 |
| CPI - Communist Party of India | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Other Left parties | 6 |
| Left parties | $\mathbf{5 9}$ |
| Congress+allies+Left | $\mathbf{2 7 7}$ |
| Simple majority | $\mathbf{2 7 2}$ |

Source: Election Commission of India, India Elections, NIC, Kotak Institutional Equities.

The earlier-than-scheduled termination of the monsoon session of the parliament in the midst of a standoff between the coalition government and the left parties on the India-USA civilian nuclear cooperation deal has raised the specter of early national elections. The next national elections are due in middle of 2009.

There is no communication or statement from the government, which would suggest early elections. However, we note that the government appears to be planning for elections, if it is forced to call for early elections. It announced a series of social packages recently - (1) National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme extended to all 604 districts from 330; (2) Rashtriya Swastha Bima Yojna (health insurance) for unorganized sector workers; (3) extension of midday meal scheme to upper-primary students; (4) increase in dearness allowance to central government staff; and (5) National Old Age Pension Scheme eligibility criteria changed to include more families.

The winter session of the parliament (starting in November 2007) may be crucial. If the 'nuclear' standoff continues, we could expect the government deciding in favor of early elections after the FY2009 budget in February 2008. The government may be emboldened by the results of a poll survey done by Indian Express-CNN/IBN (see Exhibit 40).

Exhibit 40: Results of poll survey for Lok Sabha elections done by Indian Express-CNN/IBN
Breakup of Lok Sabha seats as per the Indian Express-CNN/IBN survey


Source: Indian Express-CNN/IBN.

## Oil and gas, telecom may be the worst hit by early elections

We expect the oil and gas and telecom sector to be the worst hit by early elections. The infrastructure sector may tide over a period of potential low government orders given their healthy order books. We discuss the impact of various sectors below.

1. Oil and gas. We can rule out price increases on auto fuels in case of early elections. Forthcoming state elections (see Exhibit 41) also reduce the flexibility of the government to raise prices; it would need to time the price increase astutely after considering inflation and state elections. Early elections would also put the issue of oil bonds to the downstream oil companies in jeopardy since issue of oil bonds requires parliamentary approval; the government will likely give Rs120 bn of the Rs240 bn of oil bonds for FY2008E in October 2007. The government does not have an established mechanism for compensation to the downstream oil companies and decides the compensation system and amount annually. It would not have mattered if the government had established a mechanism to pay the companies from the budget (as in the case of the fertilizer sector).

Exhibit 41: There's never a dull day in Indian politics
Forthcoming state assembly elections

## Expected election

| State | schedule |
| :--- | :--- |
| Gujarat | Dec-07 |
| Tripura | Feb-08 |
| Nagaland | Feb-08 |
| Meghalaya | Feb-08 |
| Himachal Pradesh | Feb-08 |
| Rajasthan | Dec-08 |
| Mizoram | Dec-08 |
| Madhya Pradesh | Dec-08 |
| Delhi | Dec-08 |
| Chhattisgarh | Dec-08 |

Source: Election Commission of India, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.
2. Telecom. Early national elections may result in the government deferring crucial decisions on spectrum allocation for 2G wireless service or awarding licenses for 3G service. A delay in the aw ard of spectrum would be negative for all players, as operators would need to install more cell sites to compensate for the lower spectrum. However, the incumbents may be better off since the new entrants would not be able to start services; in any case, we note that the incumbents may not get much additional spectrum if the government accepts the revised spectrum allocation policy recommended by the regulator.
3. Infrastructure. The government may not aw ard contracts for government projects (power projects, highways, ports) close to national elections in order to conform to the electoral code of conduct. However, we expect the strong order books of all infrastructure-provider companies to tide over a potential lean phase of fresh government-related orders.

## Government anyway reduced to a passive player in the market

We note that government is one of the few major shareholders or groups that has not raised money in the four-year bull-run and/or whose stocks have not performed as well with the exception of a few names; the government's share of the market has dwindled over the past few years (see Exhibit 42). The composition of the government has made divestment of minority stakes difficult; privatization is unthinkable. Also, its policies in certain sectors have resulted in erosion of or creation of relatively lower wealth in government-majority companies.


Source: BSE, Kotak Institutional Equities.

It is worthless to speculate on any change in divestment policy without the formation of a new government; even at the best of times, divestment is fraught with political and legislative difficulties. Early elections may potentially open this opportunity but this would depend on the outcome of the elections and the composition and ideology of the new government. How ever, we can wistfully mention that a sell-down by the government in large government-ow ned companies (listed and unlisted) such as PSU banks, Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), Coal India, Bharat Sanchar Nigam, commodity/resources companies (ONGC, SAIL, others), would have helped absorb liquidity and provided several more interesting investment opportunities.


Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

| Valuation summary of key Indian companies (contd.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 4-0ct.07 |  | mkt cap. |  | 0/5 Shares | EPS (Rs) |  |  | EPS Growth (\%) |  |  | PER ( X ) |  |  | EV/EEBTDA ( x ) |  |  | Price/sv (x) |  |  | Dividend Yield (\%) |  |  | RoE (\%) |  |  | Target <br> Price | Upside | $\begin{gathered} \text { ADVT- } \\ \text { Bmo } \end{gathered}$ |
| Company | Price (Rs) | Rating | (Rs m) | (USS m) | (mn) | 2007 | 2008E | 2009E | 2007 | 20088 | 20095 | 2007 | 20088 | 2009 E | 2007 E | 2008E | 2009 E | 7 E | 2088 |  | 20072 | 208E 20 | 2009 E | 2007 E | 2008E 2 | 209E |  |  | USS mn |
| Infrastructure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dishitv | 73 | op | 31,174 | 790 | 428 | (5.9) | (7.7) | (6.0) | n/a | 31.3 | (21.7) | (12.4) | (9.4) | (12.1) | (17.2) | (22.4) | 1,708 | (79.0) | (8.4) | (5.0) | - |  |  | (331) | 161.4 | 51.8 | 100 | 37.4 | 6.8 |
| HT Media | 211 | 1 | 49,434 | 1,252 | 234 | 4.1 | 6.9 | 9.9 | 53.6 | 66.2 | 43.5 | 51.1 | 30.7 | 21.4 | 28.3 | 17.0 | 12.1 | 6.2 | 5.3 | 4.5 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 12.8 | 18.7 | 22.8 | 220 | 4.2 | 0.8 |
| Sun TV Network | 326 | $u$ | 128,588 | 3,257 | 394 | 6.3 | 10.0 | 13.4 | 20.8 | 57.4 | 34.6 | 51.5 | 32.7 | 24.3 | 28.7 | 18.1 | 13.3 | 10.8 | 8.7 | 7.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 32.9 | 29.6 | 32.2 | 310 | (5.0) |  |
| Zee Entertainment Enterprises | 341 | 4 | 148,248 | 3,755 | 435 | 5.0 | 8.7 | 11.5 | 2.9 | 72.6 | 32.4 | 67.5 | 39.1 | 29.5 | 47.3 | 26.1 | 19.5 | 5.5 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 9.1 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 230 | (32.5) | 20.6 |
| Media |  | Cautious | 357,445 | 9,055 |  |  |  |  | (1.7) | 93.8 | 66.4 | 114.9 | 59.3 | 35.6 | 48.4 | 26.0 | 17.3 | 7.7 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 6.7 | 12.0 | 17.6 |  |  |  |
| Metals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hindalco Industries | 176 | OP | 229,610 | 5.817 | 1,307 | 19.6 | 17.5 | 15.9 | 55.2 | (10.9) | (8.8) | 9.0 | 10.1 | 11.0 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 21.0 | 14.3 | 10.8 | 200 | 13.8 | 18.1 |
| Hindustan Zinc | 858 | op | 362,505 | 9,183 | 423 | 105.1 | 98.9 | 107.5 | 201.7 | (5.9) | 8.7 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 8.0 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 73.4 | 42.2 | 32.4 | 1,110 | 29.4 | 3.4 |
| Jindal Steel and Power | 6,292 | op | 193,737 | 4,908 | 31 | 228.3 | 318.9 | 400.0 | 20.0 | 39.7 | 25.5 | 27.6 | 19.7 | 15.7 | 16.4 | 12.0 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 24.2 | 24.8 | 23.2 | 4,500 | (28.5) |  |
| jsw Steel | 912 | 1 | 156,787 | 3,972 | 172 | 73.3 | 82.6 | 89.4 | 51.3 | 12.8 | 8.1 | 12.4 | 11.0 | 10.2 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 22.1 | 19.6 | 17.5 | 580 | (36.4) | 13.7 |
| National Aluminium Co. | 287 | 1 | 184,659 | 4,678 | 644 | 37.0 | 27.8 | 25.2 | 55.4 | (24.7) | (9.5) | 7.8 | 10.3 | 11.4 | 3.8 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 32.1 | 20.1 | 16.2 | 315 | 9.9 | 1.4 |
| Sesa Goa | 2,756 | op | 108,499 | 2,749 | 39 | 154.1 | 157.0 | 297.9 | 12.5 | 1.9 | 89.8 | 17.9 | 17.6 | 9.3 | 11.9 | 11.0 | 5.4 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 45.4 | 36.1 | 50.7 | 2,850 | 3.4 |  |
| Sterite industries | 763 | op | 540,475 | 13,692 | 708 | 83.1 | 58.2 | 62.7 | 37.5 | (29.9) | 7.7 | 9.2 | 13.1 | 12.2 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 |  |  |  | 50.7 | 24.5 | 18.0 | 850 | 11.4 | 18.2 |
| Tata Steel | 865 | 1 | 743,556 | 18,836 | 860 | 50.9 | 51.4 | 44.7 | (20.9) | 1.1 | (13.0) | 17.0 | 16.8 | 19.3 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 11.9 | 4.7 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 36.8 | 19.0 | 10.4 | 670 | (22.5) | 66.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharat Petroleum | 374 | " | 135,036 | 3,421 | 362 | 52.3 | 39.3 | 35.4 | 577.3 | (24.8) | (10.0) | 7.1 | 9.5 | 10.5 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 16.2 | 10.9 | 9.2 | 400 | 7.1 | 4.2 |
| Cairn india | 179 | u | 315,912 | 8,003 | 1,765 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.0 | (66.0) | (29.2) | 126.4 | 291.9 | 412.0 | 182.0 | 53.1 | 37.5 | 36.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |  |  |  | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 140 | (21.8) | 14.8 |
| Castrol India (a) | 262 | op | 32,425 | 821 | 124 | 12.2 | 18.2 | 20.7 | 3.3 | 49.3 | 13.4 | 21.5 | 14.4 | 12.7 | 12.4 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 3.4 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 36.6 | 50.3 | 51.3 | 310 | 18.2 |  |
| GALI (India) | 382 | 1 | 323,207 | 8,188 | 846 | 25.3 | 31.0 | 32.3 | (9.5) | 22.4 | 4.3 | 15.1 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 8.8 | 7.4 | 6.5 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 16.8 | 18.1 | 16.7 | 350 | (8.4) | 8.2 |
| GSPL | 62 | 1 | 33,808 | 856 | 544 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 4.3 | 40.0 | 39.9 | 85.7 | 38.0 | 27.1 | 14.6 | 14.2 | 10.9 | 7.1 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 8.8 | 11.2 | 18.5 | 59 | (5.1) | 1.2 |
| Hindustan Petroleum | 270 | 1 | 91,449 | 2.317 | 339 | 40.0 | 31.8 | 34.0 | 503.8 | (20.6) | 6.9 | 6.7 | 8.5 | 7.9 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 6.7 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 11.9 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 325 | 20.5 | 6.0 |
| Indian Oil Corporation | 496 | 1 | 591,536 | 14,985 | 1,192 | 49.3 | 60.7 | 43.7 | 16.7 | 23.1 | (28.0) | 10.1 | 8.2 | 11.4 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 5.2 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 15.8 | 16.8 | 10.8 | 500 | 0.8 | 4.3 |
| Oil \& Natural Gas Corporation | 986 | op | 2,108,836 | 53,422 | 2,139 | 80.9 | 102.5 | 108.8 | 10.2 | 26.6 | 6.1 | 12.2 | 9.6 | 9.1 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 19.6 | 21.8 | 20.4 | 1,075 | 9.0 | 29.2 |
| Petronet LNG | 81 | u | 60,863 | 1,542 | 750 | 4.2 | 5.7 | 5.2 |  | 35.5 | (8.0) | 19.4 | 14.3 | 15.6 | 10.6 | 10.1 | 10.6 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 22.4 | 24.0 | 18.4 | 53 | (34.7) | 15.3 |
| Reliance Industries | 2,423 | u | 3,520,813 | 89,191 | 1,453 | 83.0 | 87.9 | 123.6 | 31.5 | 5.9 | 40.7 | 29.2 | 27.6 | 19.6 | 17.9 | 16.4 | 10.8 | 5.0 | 4.3 | 3.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 19.2 | 16.7 | 19.4 | 1.800 | (25.7) | 184.8 |
| Reliance Petroleum | 162 | op | 729,000 | 18,467 | 4.500 | (0.0) | (0.0) | 4.2 | n/a | n/a n/a |  | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | Na | 30.8 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 4.8 |  |  |  | (0.0) | (0.1) | 13.2 | 170 | 4.9 | 61.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| dLF | 862 | 1 | 1,469,961 | 37,238 | 1,705 | 12.7 | 36.3 | 51.0 | 25.1 | 186.2 | 40.4 | 67.9 | 23.7 | 16.9 | 55.8 | 18.9 | 13.6 | 37.1 | 8.0 | 5.7 |  | 0.6 | 0.8 | 79.0 | 55.4 | 39.4 | 790 | (8.4) |  |
| Mahindra Gesco | 621 | op | 26,079 | 661 | 42 | 8.9 | 11.3 | 47.5 | 66.7 | 27.8 | 319.4 | 70.1 | 54.8 | 13.1 | 43.0 | 33.7 | 10.9 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 7.2 | 5.5 | 20.5 | 920 | 48.2 | 5.9 |
| Sobha | 900 | op | 65,575 | 1,661 | 73 | 22.2 | 30.7 | 41.4 | (47.5) | 38.3 | 34.9 | 40.5 | 29.3 | 21.7 | 27.6 | 19.9 | 14.1 | 8.0 | 6.5 | 5.1 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 34.0 | 24.5 | 26.3 | 930 | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| Property |  | Neutral | 1,561,615 | 39,560 |  |  |  |  | 619.2 | 202.0 | 42.2 | 72.9 | 24.2 | 17.0 | 53.3 | 19.1 | 13.6 | 27.8 | 7.7 | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 120.2 | 85.4 | 86.2 |  |  |  |
| Pipes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jindal Saw <br> PS | 599 398 | ${ }_{\text {Op }}^{\text {op }}$ | 33,545 16,512 | 850 418 | ${ }_{41}^{56}$ | 51.7 21.2 | 53.8 27.6 | 87.1 41.1 | 68.0 22.1 | 4.1 30.2 | 61.9 48.8 | 11.6 18.8 | 11.1 14.4 | ${ }_{9.7}^{6.9}$ | 71.1 11.7 | 5.1 8.9 | ${ }_{6.2}^{3.3}$ | 1.9 4.3 | ${ }_{2}^{1.2}$ | 2.1 | 1.0 1.0 | 1.1 1.4 | 1.1 | 18.9 10.3 | 14.0 12.6 | 16.4 15.0 | 790 420 | 31.9 5.4 | 2.5 1.4 |
| Welspun Guiarat Stahl Rohren | 311 | $u$ | 58,025 | 1.470 | 187 | 10.6 | 17.4 | 18.2 | 48.7 | 64.6 | 4.5 | 29.4 | 17.9 | 17.1 | 20.8 | 12.8 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 22.0 | 24.4 | 18.8 | 210 | (32.4) | 19.8 |
| Pipes |  | Attractive | 108,081 | 2,738 |  |  |  |  | 67.0 | 45.2 | 43.4 | 19.9 | 13.7 | 9.6 | 11.7 | 9.4 | 6.1 | 4.8 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pantaloon Retail | 557 | 1 | 81,791 | 2,072 | 147 | 6.1 | 10.5 | 15.0 | 26.7 | 73.1 | 42.7 | 92.0 | 53.2 | 37.3 | 36.3 | 25.6 | 18.6 | 7.8 | 7.2 | 6.3 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 10.7 | 13.2 | 16.3 | 425 | (23.7) | 4.7 |
| Shipyards |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HCL Technologies | 305 |  | 212,079 | 5,372 | 695 | 18.9 | 18.4 | 22.3 | 65.7 | (2.4) | 21.2 | 16.2 | 16.6 | 13.7 | 14.7 | 11.9 | 9.4 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 28.4 | 24.2 | 25.9 | 360 | 18.0 | 7.2 |
| Hexaware Technologies | 121 | 1 | 17,240 | 437 | 142 | 8.9 | 10.0 | 12.7 | 16.1 | 12.3 | 27.3 | 13.7 | 12.2 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 7.7 | 5.7 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 22.8 | 17.6 | 19.2 | 140 | 15.4 | 0.6 |
| i.flex solutions | 1,914 | u | 159,394 | 4,038 | 83 | 33.2 | 41.7 | 64.1 | 15.9 | 25.4 | 53.7 | 57.6 | 45.9 | 29.9 | 42.4 | 31.9 | 21.3 | 7.1 | 6.4 | 5.5 |  | 0.5 | 0.6 | 15.3 | 14.6 | 19.6 | 1,675 | (12.5) | 2.8 |
| iGate Global Solutions | 219 | u | 6,937 | 176 | 32 | 15.7 | 22.3 | 28.5 | 101.5 | 42.0 | 28.0 | 14.0 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 5.7 | 4.1 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 17.2 | 20.7 | 22.2 | 260 | 18.8 | 0.2 |
| Infoys Technologies | 1,995 | op | 1,145,187 | 29,010 | 574 | 67.0 | 80.7 | 99.9 | 48.7 | 20.5 | 23.8 | 29.8 | 24.7 | 20.0 | 24.7 | 20.5 | 15.6 | 10.1 | 7.7 | 5.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 40.7 | 35.2 | 33.5 | 2,250 | 12.8 | 94.2 |
| Mphasis BFL | 281 | 1 | 58,669 | 1,486 | 208 | 7.3 | 14.1 | 18.8 | (21.5) | 92.5 | 33.7 | 38.5 | 20.0 | 15.0 | 28.1 | 12.3 | 9.1 | 5.8 | 0.8 | 3.9 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 14.4 | 26.4 | 28.8 | 300 | 6.6 |  |
| Mindree | 502 | $u$ | 19,394 | 491 | 39 | 21.8 | 25.7 | 33.8 | 18.2 | 18.0 | 31.2 | 23.0 | 19.5 | 14.9 | 17.4 | 15.0 | 10.9 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 2.9 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 30.5 | 21.0 | 22.4 | 550 | 9.5 | 2.5 |
| Patri Computer Systems | 459 | 1 | 63,864 | 1,618 | 139 | 25.7 | 30.0 | 34.2 | 19.2 | 16.7 | 13.9 | 17.9 | 15.3 | 13.4 | 10.6 | 9.5 | 7.6 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 12.5 | 18.6 | 18.2 | 450 | (2.1) | 13.1 |
| Polaris Sotware Lab | 126 | $\cup$ | 12,401 | 314 | 98 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 12.9 | 359.1 | 1.8 | 23.3 | 12.3 | 12.1 | 9.8 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 5.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 17.7 | 16.0 | 17.2 | 110 | (12.8) |  |
| Satyam Computer Services | 450 | OP | 302,252 | 7.657 | 671 | 21.4 | 25.3 | 31.5 | 41.7 | 18.0 | 24.5 | 21.0 | 17.8 | 14.3 | 17.2 | 13.7 | 10.3 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 27.9 | 26.4 | 26.7 | 570 | 26.5 | 40.3 |
| TCS | 1.079 | 1 | 1.055,578 | 26,740 | 979 | 42.2 | 51.8 | 61.9 | 43.3 | 22.7 | 19.5 | 25.5 | 20.8 | 17.4 | 20.4 | 16.8 | 13.5 | 11.8 | 9.1 | 7.1 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 55.8 | 49.3 | 45.8 | 1,300 | 20.5 | 35.5 |
| Tech Mahindra | 1.304 | " | 158,925 | 4,026 | 122 | 47.0 | 66.0 | 96.0 | 124.3 | 40.5 | 45.6 | 27.8 | 19.8 | 13.6 | 21.5 | 15.9 | 10.0 | 17.8 | ${ }^{9.3}$ | 5.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 81.3 | 66.0 | 54.1 | 1.500 | 15.0 |  |
| Wipro | 461 | op | 668,885 | 16,945 | 1,450 | 19.8 | 23.1 | 29.2 | 39.3 | 16.7 | 26.4 | 23.3 | 19.9 | 15.8 | 18.2 | 15.4 | 11.3 | 6.6 | 5.3 | 4.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 31.7 | 29.4 | 29.8 | 560 | 21.4 | 17.5 |
| Technology |  | Cautious | 3,880,806 | 98,310 |  |  |  |  | 48.4 | 21.1 | 24.6 | 25.6 | 21.1 | 17.0 | 20.4 | 16.6 | 12.6 | 7.7 | 6.2 | 4.9 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 30.2 | 29.3 | 28.9 |  |  |  |
| Telecom |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti Airtel Ltd | ${ }_{9} 91$ | $u$ | 1.822,277 | 46,163 | ${ }^{1,896}$ | 21.4 | 34.4 | 45.8 | n/a | 60.9 | 33.1 | 44.9 | 27.9 | 21.0 | 25.1 | 16.2 | 11.8 | 15.6 | 10.2 | 7.1 |  | 0.2 | 0.4 | 42.4 | 4.2 | 39.8 | 750 | ${ }^{(22.0)}$ | 28.9 |
| IDEA | 132 | u | 348,821 | ${ }^{8.836}$ | 2,635 | 2.2 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 146.3 | 125.9 | 21.8 | 60.7 | 26.9 | 22.1 | 25.5 | 15.6 | 11.7 | 9.8 | 7.2 | 5.4 | 0.7 |  |  | 21.5 | 30.8 | 27.9 | 110 | (16.9) | 20.6 |
| mTNL | 159 |  | 99,950 | 2,532 | 630 | 7.2 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 8.1 | 31.4 | 6.5 | 22.1 | 16.9 | 15.8 | 8.6 | 6.5 | 6.2 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 135 | (14.9) | 6.5 |
| Reliance Communications | 635 | $\cup$ | 1,297,311 | 32,864 | 2,045 | 14.2 | 23.9 | 32.1 | n/a | 68.4 | 34.4 | 44.7 | 26.5 | 19.7 | 23.1 | 15.3 | 11.3 | 5.7 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 17.8 | 20.3 | 22.3 | 500 | (21.2) |  |
| VSNL | 451 | op |  | 3,254 | 285 | 17.2 | 18.1 | 20.6 |  | 5.3 | 13.7 |  |  | 21.9 | 10.7 | 10.8 | 9.6 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 8.0 | 550 | 22.0 | 4.3 |
| Telecom |  | Cautious | 3,696,794 | 93,649 |  |  |  |  | 134.0 | 65.6 | 30.8 | 42.8 | 25.9 | 19.8 | 22.6 | 15.2 | 11.3 | 6.6 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 15.4 | 20.7 | 21.8 |  |  |  |

Valuation summary of key Indian companies (contd.)

Note:
(a) 2003 means calendar year 2002, similarly for 2004 and 2005 for these particular companies.
(b) EV/Sales \& EV/EBTDA for KS universe excludes Banking Sector.
Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.
"I, Sanjeev Prasad, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject company or companies and its or their securities. I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report."

## Kotak Institutional Equities Research coverage universe

Distribution of ratings/investment banking relationships


Source: Kotak Institutional Equities.

## Analyst coverage

Companies that the analyst mentioned in this document follow

| Covering Analyst: Sanjeev Prasad |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Company name | Ticker |
| Bharat Petroleum | BPCL.BO |
| Bharti Airtel | BRTI.BO |
| Cairn India | CAlL.BO |
| Castrol India | CAST.BO |
| Dish TV | DSTV.BO |
| GAlL (India) | GAIL.BO |
| Gujarat State Petronet | GSPT.BO |
| Hindustan Petroleum | HPCL.BO |
| HT Media | HTML.BO |
| Idea Cellular | IDEA.BO |
| Indian Oil Corp. | IOC.BO |
| Indian Petrochemicals Corp. | IPCL.BO |
| Mahanagar Telephone Nigam | MTNL.BO |
| Oil \& Natural Gas Corporation | ONGC.BO |
| Petronet LNG | PLNG.BO |
| Reliance Communications | RLCM.BO |
| Reliance Industries | REL.BO |
| Reliance Petroleum | RPET.BO |
| Sun TV Network | SUTV.BO |
| Videsh Sanchar Nigam | VSNL.BO |
| Zee Entertainment Enterprises | ZEE.BO |

[^9]
## Ratings and other definitions/identifiers

## Current rating system

## Definitions of ratings

OP = Outperform. We expect this stock to outperform the BSE Sensex over the next 12 months.
$\mathbf{I L}=\mathbf{I n}$-Line. We expect this stock to perform in line with the BSE Sensex over the next 12 months.
$\mathbf{U}=$ Underperform. We expect this stock to underperform the BSE Sensex over the next 12 months.

## Other definitions

Coverage view. The coverage view represents each analyst's overall fundamental outlook on the Sector. The coverage view will consist of one of the following designations: Attractive (A), Neutral (N),
Cautious (C).

Other ratings/identifiers
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NC $=$ Not Covered. Kotak Securities does not cover this company.
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NA = Not Available or Not Applicable. The information is not available for display or is not applicable.
$\mathbf{N M}=$ Not Meaningful. The information is not meaningful and is therefore excluded.

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## Kotak Securities Ltd.


[^0]:    Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

[^1]:    Source: Bloomberg, BSE, Kotak Institutional Equities. Note the weightages are with respect to October 4, 2007 prices.

[^2]:    Source: Kotak Institutional equities estimates.

[^3]:    source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

[^4]:    Source: Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

[^5]:    Source: COAI, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

[^6]:    Source: RBI, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

[^7]:    Source: CSO, Government of India

[^8]:    Source: Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

[^9]:    Source: Kotak Institutional Equities Research

