## Hero Honda Ltd

Reuters: HROH.BO Bloomberg: HH IN Exchange: BSE Ticker: HROH

# Current price discounts most of the positive factors 

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## Hero Honda - strong performance and healthy outlook, but likely priced in

 Hero Honda's strong performance in FY09 has been a result of 1) its strong distribution network, 2) rising production from its tax-advantaged plant in Haridwar, and 3) a dramatic fall in competitive intensity in its core market of entry/midsegment motorcycles. These same factors are likely to underpin its performance in the medium term. Our estimates factor in further improvement in market share and rising pricing power for Hero Honda. However, we see minimal upside from the current price level and hence maintain our Hold recommendation.
## Hero Honda's dominance akin to a monopoly

Hero Honda's leadership position in the Indian two wheeler market is reflected by its $49 \%$ market share in a $5-6$ player market. This dominance is underpinned by its $80 \%$ market share in the 100 cc motorcycle segment ( $55 \%$ of the 2 W market). We believe that this segment will remain the mainstay of the industry over the next two years and forecast Hero Honda's volumes to grow by 8\% p.a. over FY09-11E (compared to industry growth of $5.5 \%$ p.a.).

## Franchisee business model has its pros and cons

Access to technology from Honda has helped Hero Honda to focus its energies on manufacturing and distribution, thus helping it power ahead of competition. However, this also limits Hero Honda's growth to the Indian market, as it can export only to a handful of countries with a small addressable market.

## Trading at 12.5 x FY10E core EPS - fairly valued

Our DCF-based target price is Rs 1050 (Rf $8.1 \%$, Rm $5.4 \%$, beta 0.7 , cost of debt $9 \%$ WACC $11.9 \%$ and $4 \%$ terminal growth rate). Our target price implies $12 x$ FY10E core EPS (Rs 75) plus Rs 150/share of excess cash. We define core profit as net profit less after-tax financial income. Upside risks are higher growth in domestic two wheelers and better-than-expected improvement in margins. Downside risks include increasing competition from Bajaj and the impending entry of HMSI in the 100 cc motorcycle segment. See pages $8-10$ for details.


## Forecast Change

## Hold

| Price at 22 Apr 2009 (INR) | $\mathbf{1 , 0 8 1 . 9 0}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Price target - 12mth (INR) | $\mathbf{1 , 0 5 0 . 0 0}$ |
| 52-week range (INR) | $\mathbf{1 , 1 2 4 . 6 0} \mathbf{- \mathbf { 6 3 8 . 7 5 }}$ |
| BSE 30 | $\mathbf{1 0 , 8 9 8}$ |


| Key changes |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Price target 760.00 to $1,050.00$ 个 | $\mathbf{3 8 . 2} \%$ |  |  |
| Sales (FYE) | 115,003 to 123,500 | $\uparrow$ | $\mathbf{7 . 4} \%$ |
| Op prof margin (FYE) | 10.6 to 12.6 | $\uparrow$ | $\mathbf{1 9 . 1} \%$ |
| Net profit (FYE) | $10,979.1$ to $12,826.5$ | $\uparrow$ | $\mathbf{1 6 . 8} \%$ |

Price/price relative


| Performance (\%) | 1 m | 3 m | 12 m |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Absolute | 8.6 | 27.7 | 45.5 |
| BSE 30 | 21.5 | 23.6 | -35.1 |


| Stock data | $\mathbf{2 1 6 , 0 5 5}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Market cap (INRm) | $\mathbf{4 , 2 9 3}$ |
| Market cap (USDm) | $\mathbf{1 9 9 . 7}$ |
| Shares outstanding (m) | Munjals (29\%) |
| Major shareholders | $\mathbf{4 5}$ |
| Free float (\%) | $\mathbf{1 3 . 1}$ |
| Avg daily value traded (USDm) |  |
|  | $\mathbf{3 8 . 0}$ |
| Key indicators (FY1) | $\mathbf{- 7 9 . 8}$ |
| ROE (\%) | $\mathbf{1 8 9 . 5 6}$ |
| Net debt/equity (\%) | $\mathbf{5 . 7}$ |
| Book value/share (INR) | $\mathbf{6 2 4 . 5}$ |
| Price/book (x) | $\mathbf{1 2 . 6}$ |
| Net interest cover (x) |  |

Deutsche Bank AG/Hong Kong
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## Model updated:22 April 2009

Asia

## India

Automobiles \& Components

## Hero Honda Ltd

| Reuters: HROH.BO | Bloomberg: HH IN |
| :--- | ---: |
| Hold |  |
| Price (22 Apr 09) | INR 1,081.90 |
| Target price | INR 1,050.00 |
| 52-week Range | INR 638.75-1,124.60 |
| Market Cap (m) | INRm 216,055 |
|  | USDm 4,293 |

## Company Profile

Hero Honda is the largest manufacturer of motorcycles in India. Splendour, the flagship brand, is the largest selling motorcycle in the world. It is one of Honda's most profitable two wheeler subsidiary.

| Fiscal year end 31-Mar | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Financial Summary |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DB EPS (INR) | 48.46 | 42.96 | 48.47 | 64.23 | 85.39 | 94.90 |
| Reported EPS (INR) | 48.46 | 42.96 | 48.47 | 64.23 | 85.39 | 94.90 |
| DPS (INR) | 20.00 | 17.00 | 19.00 | 20.00 | 24.00 | 30.00 |
| BVPS (INR) | 100.6 | 123.7 | 148.7 | 189.6 | 246.9 | 306.7 |
| Weighted average shares (m) | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| Average market cap (INRm) | 142,462 | 149,287 | 138,200 | 216,055 | 216,055 | 216,055 |
| Enterprise value (INRm) | 122,113 | 130,842 | 112,541 | 185,806 | 175,152 | 161,498 |
| Valuation Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| P/E (DB) (x) | 14.7 | 17.4 | 14.3 | 16.8 | 12.7 | 11.4 |
| P/E (Reported) (x) | 14.7 | 17.4 | 14.3 | 16.8 | 12.7 | 11.4 |
| P/BV (x) | 8.83 | 5.54 | 4.64 | 5.71 | 4.38 | 3.53 |
| FCF Yield (\%) | 4.5 | 1.4 | 8.6 | 4.3 | 7.5 | 9.6 |
| Dividend Yield (\%) | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.8 |
| EV/Sales ( x ) | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.1 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 8.9 | 11.2 | 8.3 | 10.7 | 7.6 | 6.4 |
| EV/EBIT (x) | 9.8 | 12.7 | 9.5 | 11.9 | 8.5 | 7.1 |
| Income Statement (INRm) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales revenue | 87,140 | 99,000 | 103,318 | 123,500 | 138,611 | 151,369 |
| Gross profit | 15,563 | 14,145 | 15,712 | 17,414 | 23,009 | 25,430 |
| EBITDA | 13,645 | 11,730 | 13,494 | 17,414 | 23,009 | 25,430 |
| Depreciation | 1,146 | 1,398 | 1,603 | 1,800 | 2,326 | 2,560 |
| Amortisation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| EBIT | 12,498 | 10,333 | 11,891 | 15,614 | 20,684 | 22,871 |
| Net interest income(expense) | 61 | -16 | -20 | -25 | -20 | -20 |
| Associates/affiliates | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Exceptionals/extraordinaries | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other pre-tax income/(expense) | 1,527 | 2,145 | 2,232 | 2,226 | 2,380 | 2,587 |
| Profit before tax | 14,087 | 12,461 | 14,103 | 17,815 | 23,044 | 25,438 |
| Income tax expense | 4,409 | 3,882 | 4,424 | 4,988 | 5,991 | 6,487 |
| Minorities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other post-tax income/(expense) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net profit | 9,678 | 8,579 | 9,679 | 12,826 | 17,052 | 18,951 |
| DB adjustments (including dilution) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DB Net profit | 9,678 | 8,579 | 9,679 | 12,826 | 17,052 | 18,951 |
| Cash Flow (INRm) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash flow from operations | 10,370 | 7,085 | 15,428 | 11,763 | 19,761 | 22,664 |
| Net Capex | -3,929 | -5,017 | -3,536 | -2,500 | -3,500 | -2,000 |
| Free cash flow | 6,442 | 2,068 | 11,892 | 9,263 | 16,261 | 20,664 |
| Equity raised/(bought back) | 0 | 0 | 161 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Dividends paid | -4,553 | -3,972 | -4,439 | -4,673 | -5,608 | -7,009 |
| Net inc/(dec) in borrowings | -160 | -206 | -332 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other investing/financing cash flows | 85 | 880 | -5,930 | -1,000 | -1,500 | -1,500 |
| Net cash flow | 1,813 | -1,230 | 1,352 | 3,590 | 9,154 | 12,155 |
| Change in working capital | -633 | -2,986 | 4,174 | -2,863 | 383 | 1,153 |
| Balance Sheet (INRm) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash and other liquid assets | 22,172 | 20,062 | 26,945 | 31,535 | 42,188 | 55,843 |
| Tangible fixed assets | 9,936 | 13,555 | 15,487 | 16,187 | 17,361 | 16,802 |
| Goodwill/intangible assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates/investments | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| Other assets | 6,625 | 8,775 | 8,057 | 10,996 | 12,312 | 13,002 |
| Total assets | 38,767 | 42,426 | 50,523 | 58,752 | 71,896 | 85,681 |
| Interest bearing debt | 1,858 | 1,652 | 1,320 | 1,320 | 1,320 | 1,320 |
| Other liabilities | 16,816 | 16,074 | 19,501 | 19,577 | 21,276 | 23,119 |
| Total liabilities | 18,674 | 17,725 | 20,821 | 20,897 | 22,596 | 24,439 |
| Shareholders' equity | 20,093 | 24,701 | 29,702 | 37,855 | 49,300 | 61,242 |
| Minorities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total shareholders' equity | 20,093 | 24,701 | 29,702 | 37,855 | 49,300 | 61,242 |
| Net debt | -20,314 | -18,410 | -25,625 | -30,215 | -40,868 | -54,523 |


| Key Company Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sales growth (\%) | 17.4 | 13.6 | 4.4 | 19.5 | 12.2 | 9.2 |
| DB EPS growth (\%) | 19.4 | -11.4 | 12.8 | 32.5 | 32.9 | 11.1 |
| EBIIDA Margin (\%) | 15.7 | 11.8 | 13.1 | 14.1 | 16.6 | 16.8 |
| EBIT Margin (\%) | 14.3 | 10.4 | 11.5 | 12.6 | 14.9 | 15.1 |
| Payout ratio (\%) | 41.3 | 39.6 | 39.2 | 31.1 | 28.1 | 31.6 |
| ROE (\%) | 55.3 | 38.3 | 35.6 | 38.0 | 39.1 | 34.3 |
| Capex/sales (\%) | 4.5 | 5.1 | 3.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 1.3 |
| Capex/depreciation (x) | 3.4 | 3.6 | 2.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 0.8 |
| Net debt/equity (\%) | -101.1 | -74.5 | -86.3 | -79.8 | -82.9 | -89.0 |
| Net interest cover (x) | $n m$ | 641.8 | 594.5 | 624.5 | nm | nm |

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## Hero Honda - key issues

## 4009 results: robust but in line with expectations

Hero Honda's 4009 results were in line with our expectations. EBITDA margins expanded by 150bps QoQ to $16 \%$ (Deutsche Bank estimate $16.2 \%$ ) mainly on account of a decrease in raw material costs by 120bps QoQ. However, RM cost/bike was flat QoQ, which implies that the softening in commodity prices is not yet entirely reflected in the financials. Realisations improved $2 \%$ QoQ to Rs 34,192 which we believe is due to an increase in the share of premium bikes to $6 \%$ from $5 \%$ in Q 3 . At Rs 5,503, EBITDA/motorcycle is at its highest level in the last nine years.

| Figure 1: Hero Honda - quarterly trends |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Rs mn | Q4FY08 | Q1FY09 | Q2FY09 | Q3FY09 | Q4FY09 |
| Motorcycles(nos) | 884,025 | 894,244 | 972,095 | 857,856 | 997,855 |
| $\%$ growth (YoY) | $3.3 \%$ | $11.4 \%$ | $28.6 \%$ | $-4.0 \%$ | $12.9 \%$ |
| Net Sales | 27,887 | 28,435 | 31,897 | 28,740 | 34,118 |
| $\%$ growth (YoY) | $5.6 \%$ | $16.2 \%$ | $35.6 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $22.3 \%$ |
| Net realisation/motorcycle (Rs) | 31,545 | 31,798 | 32,813 | 33,503 | 34,192 |
| EBITDA | 4,231 | 3,410 | 4,349 | 4,170 | 5,491 |
| EBITDA margin (\%) | $15.1 \%$ | $12.0 \%$ | $13.6 \%$ | $14.5 \%$ | $16.0 \%$ |
| EBITDA/motorcycle (Rs) | 4,786 | 3,814 | 4,474 | 4,861 | 5,503 |
| Adjusted PAT | 2,987 | 2,729 | 3,063 | 3,004 | 4,022 |
| $\%$ growth (YoY) | $53.2 \%$ | $43.7 \%$ | $49.9 \%$ | $9.2 \%$ | $34.7 \%$ |
| Source: Company, Deutsche Bank |  |  |  |  |  |

## 2W market growth forecast at 5.5\% over next two years

We expect the two-wheeler market to grow at a CAGR (FY09-11E) of $5.5 \%$. As in the past, we expect higher end (B3) motorcycles and scooters to continue to increase their segment shares at the expense of entry/mid segment motorcycles. Credit availability is less of an issue for the buyers in this segment, as they are generally more affluent.

## Motorcycles remain the mainstay of the 2W market, but uptrading is likely to continue

We forecast motorcycle volumes to grow in line with the overall market, driven largely by $9.5 \%$ p.a. growth in the premium segment over the same period. The share of motorcycles in the overall two-wheeler sales should remain flat at $c .79 \%$ over this period. Within motorcycles, we expect a continued shift in demand away from the B2 segment to the B3 (125cc+) segment. The B3 segment's share is $30 \%$ in FY09 ( $27 \%$ in FY08), and we expect the shift to continue.

Figure 2: Indian two wheeler industry - segment market shares

|  | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10E | FY11E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Scooter | $14.9 \%$ | $12.7 \%$ | $11.9 \%$ | $14.5 \%$ | $15.4 \%$ | $15.4 \%$ | $15.4 \%$ |
| Motorcycle | $80.0 \%$ | $82.6 \%$ | $83.5 \%$ | $79.6 \%$ | $78.5 \%$ | $78.6 \%$ | $78.5 \%$ |
| Moped | $5.2 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $4.5 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $5.8 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ |
| Electric | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.3 \%$ | $0.3 \%$ | $0.4 \%$ | $0.4 \%$ |
| Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), Deutsche Bank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Figure 3: Structural shift in motorcycle demand


Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), Deutsche Bank

## A big fish growing faster than the pond

Hero Honda has increased its dominance in the B2 (75-124cc) motorcycle segment and currently has $80 \%$ market share ( $71 \%$ in FY 08 ) in this segment, which comprises c.55\% of the overall two-wheeler market in India. Hero Honda is effectively now a monopoly in the 100 cc motorcycle segment, which has resulted in the company controlling almost half (49\% market share) of the overall Indian two-wheeler market. This is a reflection of its distribution reach (3500 touch points), the strength of the Splendor and Passion brands and the concurrent weakening of competition. Hence, Hero Honda was able to increase its 100cc motorcycle volumes by $11 \%$ in FY09 compared to other manufacturers' $34 \%$ decline. This enabled the company to maintain its pricing power and retain the excise duty benefits that have accrued in the tax-exempt plant at Haridwar.

## Hero Honda likely to consolidate its dominant position

We believe that Hero Honda's market share in the B2 segment will further increase over the next two years to 87\%, as we expect its B2 volumes to grow at a CAGR (FY09-11E) of 8\% (compared to $4 \%$ for the industry). However, we note that it is relatively weak in the premium (B3) segment; it only has a market share of $12 \%$, and this will likely affect its competitive position in the medium to long term. It does have a cushion in the short term, as both Splendor and Passion (100cc bikes) continue to retail at upwards of Rs 40000, which compares with Bajaj's XCD 125 (B3 segment bike). Overall, we expect Hero Honda to control c. $51 \%$ of the overall two-wheeler market by the end of FY11E.

Figure 4: Domestic motorcycle market shares

|  |  | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10E | FY11E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| B2 Motorcycle (entry \& mid segment) | Bajaj | 22.7\% | 21.8\% | 24.4\% | 17.5\% | 10.6\% | 9.2\% | 8.0\% |
|  | Hero Honda | 58.1\% | 58.5\% | 59.0\% | 70.7\% | 80.2\% | 83.7\% | 86.5\% |
|  | TVS | 12.8\% | 14.0\% | 13.4\% | 9.8\% | 7.9\% | 6.1\% | 4.7\% |
|  | Others | 6.4\% | 5.7\% | 3.2\% | 2.0\% | 1.4\% | 1.0\% | 0.8\% |
| $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{B} 3+\mathrm{B} 4 \\ \text { Motorcycles } \\ \text { (premium segment) } \end{gathered}$ | Bajaj | 50.7\% | 69.6\% | 59.0\% | 58.6\% | 48.5\% | 46.1\% | 44.8\% |
|  | Hero Honda | 15.6\% | 7.7\% | 7.7\% | 11.3\% | 11.7\% | 11.8\% | 12.0\% |
|  | HMSI | 8.4\% | 9.8\% | 11.9\% | 16.1\% | 20.8\% | 21.6\% | 22.0\% |
|  | TVS | 13.7\% | 8.0\% | 10.8\% | 5.9\% | 7.7\% | 7.7\% | 7.6\% |
|  | Yamaha | 6.7\% | 2.0\% | 3.8\% | 1.9\% | 6.1\% | 7.5\% | 8.3\% |
|  | Others | 4.9\% | 2.9\% | 6.8\% | 6.1\% | 5.1\% | 5.3\% | 5.4\% |
| Overall | Bajaj | 27.1\% | 30.1\% | 31.7\% | 28.7\% | 21.9\% | 20.7\% | 19.8\% |
|  | Hero Honda | 51.5\% | 49.8\% | 48.2\% | 54.5\% | 59.8\% | 61.3\% | 62.6\% |
|  | TVS | 12.9\% | 12.9\% | 12.9\% | 8.7\% | 7.8\% | 6.6\% | 5.6\% |
|  | HMSI | 1.3\% | 1.7\% | 2.5\% | 4.4\% | 6.2\% | 6.7\% | 7.1\% |
|  | Others | 7.2\% | 5.5\% | 4.7\% | 3.6\% | 4.3\% | 4.7\% | 5.0\% |

## Franchisee model has been extremely successful until now...

Hero Honda's business is essentially a franchisee business that uses the technology and R\&D of its JV partner Honda and leverages on its own manufacturing quality, deep distribution and strong vendor base. Vendors play a major role in the auto industry and shoulder a larger proportion of "system capex", whereas OEMs increasingly concentrate on assembly and distribution. As a result, the company's capital employed has been relatively lower, which in turn has led to high asset turn and ROCE over the years.

## ...however, it may pose restrictions on long-term growth

Every franchisee model entails an additional cost burden of royalty and model fees to be paid to the provider of technology and/or products. Royalty payments account for c.3\% of Hero Honda's revenues; it also pays model fees (around Rs $400 \mathrm{~m} /$ model) to Honda for every new model launched in the Indian market. This contrasts with its competitor Bajaj, which has invested in its own R\&D to build in-house capabilities. Changing consumer preferences have meant that companies need to come up with new models at a faster pace than in the past. This trend will likely put a higher financial burden on Hero Honda.

Figure 5: Annual royalty and R\&D spend (Rs m)
Figure 6: Hero Honda - model fees paid to Honda (Rs m)


Source: Deutsche Bank, Company


Source: Deutsche Bank, Company

## Dependence on domestic demand limits opportunities for growth

We estimate that two-wheeler penetration on a household basis will be at $39 \%$ by FY11E end. We believe this will be close to the medium-term cap for India, which implies that twowheeler manufacturers have to incrementally shift their focus to export markets to drive growth; however, HH's JV agreement with Honda curbs its export growth. HH exports only $2 \%$ of its total volumes, compared to the industry's $20 \%$. Bajaj, in particular, benefited from
robust growth in export volumes (+31\% in FY09) partially offsetting a $23 \%$ fall in domestic volumes.

Figure 7: 2W export as \% of total volumes - Hero Honda limited to domestic market


Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), Deutsche Bank

## Financial analysis

## Revenue - 2-year CAGR (FY09-11E) of 11\%

We forecast Hero Honda's volume to grow at a CAGR (FY09E-11E) of 8\%, compared to industry growth of $5.5 \%$. The company's volumes grew $12 \%$ in FY09, which compares with overall industry volume growth of just $2.5 \%$. We believe that Hero Honda will continue to outperform the industry and increase its market share; we also expect net realisations to grow at 3\% p.a., resulting in overall revenue growth of $11 \%$ p.a.

## EBITDA - margin and EBITDA/bike to improve

We expect EBITDA margins to improve by 270bps by FY11E to $16.8 \%$ from the FY09 level of $14.1 \%$. We believe that the impact of the fall in commodity prices has yet to be reflected in raw material costs and we thus expect raw material/bike to fall by $1.5 \%$ in FY 10 E . We expect EBITDA/bike to improve from Rs 4678/bike in FY09 to Rs 5886/bike in FY11E. Overall, we expect EBITDA to grow at a CAGR (FY09-11E) of $21 \%$.

Figure 8: Hero Honda - Revenues and growth


Source: Company, Deutsche Bank

Figure 9: Hero Honda - EBITDA/bike at all-time high


Source: Company, Deutsche Bank

## Core profit - 2-year CAGR (FY09-11E) of 24\% assumes impact of tax exemption

We expect core profit to grow faster on account of a lower tax incidence. We have assumed that by FY10E the company will be producing c. $20 \%$ of its motorcycles at its Haridwar plant. This plant is $100 \%$ income tax exempt for five years, and the company has announced that its capacity will be scaled up to 1 m units by end of FY10. We calculate core profit as net profit adjusted for after-tax financial income. Since financial income accounts for c.13\% of PBT in FY09, we believe that core profit gives a better picture than headline profit growth for Hero Honda. We believe looking at profitability on a per-bike basis also provides an alternative perspective on Hero Honda. Over FY09-11E, we expect core profit/bike to grow by 15\% p.a.

Figure 10: Hero Honda - Calculation of core earnings

|  | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10E | FY11E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Recurring PAT (A) | 8,104 | 9,678 | 8,579 | 9,679 | 12,826 | 17,052 | 18,951 |
| Other income (B) | 1,410 | 1,527 | 2,145 | 2,232 | 2,226 | 2,380 |  |
| Assumed tax rate on other income (C) | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| Post tax other income (D) | 1,269 | 1,375 | 1,930 | 2,009 | 2,003 | 2,142 | 2,329 |
| Core PAT (A-D) | 6,835 | 8,303 | 6,649 | 7,670 | 10,823 | 14,910 | 16,623 |
| Core EPS | 34.2 | 41.6 | 33.3 | 38.4 | 54.2 | 74.7 | 83.2 |
| Source: Company, Deutsche Bank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Valuation

## Valuation methodology

We continue to value Hero Honda using DCF, our primary methodology for Indian automotive stocks. We believe that the maturity of the sector provides a fair degree of predictability on cash flows and avoids the pitfalls of relative multiples during inflection points.

## DCF - assumptions and valuation

Our DCF-based target price for Hero Honda is Rs 1050/share. We have used a 12-year time frame for our DCF forecasts, and we assume revenue growth will trend down over our forecast period from 9\% in FY11E to 4\%. We expect capex/sales to stabilise at around $2.5 \%$ and the EBIT margin to trend down to $11 \%$ from $15 \%$ in FY11E. Our DCF assumptions are as follows: a risk-free rate of $8.1 \%$, a risk premium of $5.4 \%$, a beta at 0.7 and a terminal growth rate of cash flows at 4\%. Our terminal growth rate is in line with our expectation of the longterm growth rate of number of households in India. Our resultant WACC is 11.9\%.

Figure 11: DCF assumptions and sensitivity (abridged table)
Assumptions

| WACC 11.9\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Terminal growth rate of cash flow | 4\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Terminal value (Rs mn) | 251,130 |  | Terminal growth rate |  |  |  |  |
| PV of terminal value (Rs mn) | 65,436 |  |  | 2.0\% | 4.0\% | 6.0\% | 8.0\% |
| Enterprise value (Rs mn) | 179,914 | $\begin{aligned} & U \\ & 0 \\ & 3 \end{aligned}$ | 10.9\% | 1,070 | 1,171 | 1,354 | 1,794 |
| TV as \% of Total | 36\% |  | 11.4\% | 1,023 | 1,108 | 1,255 | 1,578 |
| Net debt (Rs mn) | $(30,215)$ |  | 11.9\% | 981 | 1,052 | 1,173 | 1,417 |
| Equity value (Rs mn) | 210,128 |  | 12.4\% | 942 | 1,003 | 1,102 | 1,293 |
| Equity Value per share (Rs) | 1,052 |  | 12.9\% | 907 | 960 | 1,042 | 1,193 |

## Current valuations imply unrealistic growth expectations

If we assume Hero Honda's current level of free cash flow is sustainable, we can derive the terminal growth rate of cash flows being implied by the market. The current share price implies a terminal cash flow growth at 7\%, assuming a WACC of $11.9 \%$.

In FY09E, Hero Honda should generate operating cash flow of Rs 11.8 bn . We estimate that capex for FY09E will be Rs 2.5 bn , resulting in a FCFF of Rs 9.2 bn . This capex is relatively higher than the normalised maintenance capex, as the Haridwar plant is still being scaled up. If we assume a lower capex of Rs 1.5 bn, which we believe will be the sustainable level as the industry matures, the FCFF is Rs 10bn. Assuming a stable growth scenario, the terminal value of the company's business would be defined as:
$V=C^{*}(1+K c) /(K c-g)$
Where $V$ is the terminal value, $C$ is the cash flow in the terminal year, $K c$ is the WACC and $g$ is the terminal growth rate of cash flows.

Figure 12: Hero Honda - terminal growth rate analysis
Assumptions

| Ex-growth FCFF (Rs mn) | 10,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Current price (Rs) | 1,100 |  | Ex-growth FCFF (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |
| No of shares | 199.7 |  |  | 9000 | 10,000 | 11000 | 12000 |
| Market cap (Rs mn) | 219,670 | क | 900 | 6.2\% | 5.5\% | 4.9\% | 4.2\% |
| Surplus cash (Rs mn) | 30,215 | 』 | 1,000 | 6.9\% | 6.3\% | 5.7\% | 5.1\% |
| Adjusted market cap (Rs mn) | 189,455 | 늘 | 1,100 | 7.5\% | 6.9\% | 6.4\% | 5.9\% |
| WACC | 11.9\% | $\frac{\stackrel{y}{0}}{\substack{0}}$ | 1,200 | 7.9\% | 7.4\% | 7.0\% | 6.5\% |
| Implied terminal growth rate of cashflows | 6.9\% | の | 1,300 | 8.3\% | 7.8\% | 7.4\% | 7.0\% |

Figure 13: Hero Honda - trading at median valuations


Source: Bombay Stock Exchange, Company, Deutsche Bank

## Risks

## Upside risks

## Better-than-expected growth in two-wheeler demand

We have assumed that Hero Honda's volume growth will be at a CAGR (FY09E-11E) of 8\%, despite the $12 \%$ growth exhibited in YTD volumes in FYO9E. We do so because the growth has come from market share gains rather than market growth. However, if Hero Honda is able to grow at volumes greater than our estimated rate of $8 \%$ or improve realisations by more than anticipated ( $2 \%$ p.a.), then our volume and revenue assumptions could face upside risk.

## Softer-than-expected raw material prices

We have assumed a 190bps fall in raw material prices as a percentage of net sales on account of lower steel and aluminium prices. However, if this fall is sharper than anticipated, then it will have a further favourable impact on Hero Honda's profitability.

## Successful launches in the premium segment

Hero Honda has traditionally been weak in the premium motorcycle segment. It has a market share of only $12 \%$ in the premium segment, compared to its $80 \%$ market share in the 100 cc segment. We have assumed that Hero Honda's market share will not change materially in the premium segment over the next two years. Any successful launches in this segment could help the company expand market share in the premium segment and would have a favourable impact on realizations and margins.

## Downside risks

## Competition from Bajaj could affect margins negatively

Bajaj has been rapidly losing market share in the domestic market since last year and has been expanding its volumes in the export market. However, Bajaj has a few model launches lined up in the near future and could try to wrest back its domestic market share from Hero Honda through aggressive marketing tactics. This could affect Hero Honda's market share and margins.

## Aggressive entry of HMSI in 100cc segment

HMSI has recently announced plans to enter the 100 cc segment, which is Hero Honda's stronghold. Hero Honda dominates this segment with c.80\% market share and HMSI's aggressive entry could take away some of this market share, putting pressure on its pricing power. This would have a significantly negative impact on Hero Honda's volume growth and profitability.

## Appendix 1

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## Additional information available upon request

| Disclosure checklist |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Company | Ticker | Recent price* | Disclosure |
| Hero Honda Ltd | HROH.BO | 1081.90 (INR) 22 Apr 09 | 6 |

*Prices are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies.

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Historical recommendations and target price: Hero Honda Ltd (HROH.BO)


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