## Contents

Strategy: What to do when one can do what one may not want to do

- Take money off the table in technology, telecom-nothing has changed
- Stay invested in banking, infrastructure-things may improve
- Reverse valuation exercises suggest large earnings upgrades, asset inflation required


## Results

Dr. Reddy's Laboratories: Higher exclusivity sales help beat our forecasts

Punj Lloyd: Results beset by one-offs; remain positive based on strong backlog providing near-term earnings visibility

HT Media: 4QFY09 standalone results largely in with expectations but surprisingly weak FY2009 consolidated financials

Sobha Developers: Balance sheet restructuring key for stock performance

## Updates

BPCL, HPCL, IOCL: Sell at 5-10\% higher levels with or without deregulation

Technology: Election outcome euphoria detrimental for Indian IT stocks
Banks/Financial Institutions: Prudence called for during times of optimism; Be selective

Telecom: Impact of election outcome - some technical positive triggers, nothing fundamental

Industrials: Government can make difference in key sectors; however there was no constraint in previous term also

Cement: Healthy volume growth sustains, prices inch upwards

EQUITY MARKETS

| India | Change, \% |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18-May | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Sensex | 14,284 | 17.3 | 29.6 | 58.4 |
| Nifty | 4,323 | 17.7 | 27.7 | 55.7 |
| Global/Regional indices |  |  |  |  |
| Dow Jones | 8,504 | 2.8 | 4.6 | 12.6 |
| FTSE | 4,446 | 2.3 | 8.6 | 11.0 |
| Nikkie | 9,312 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 23.2 |
| Hang Seng | 17,023 | 1.4 | 9.1 | 30.7 |
| KOSPI | 1,420 | 2.4 | 6.8 | 28.2 |
| Value traded - India |  |  |  |  |
|  | Moving avg, Rs bn |  |  |  |
|  | 18-May |  | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Cash (NSE+BSE) | 2.9 |  | 215.0 | 158.8 |
| Derivatives (NSE) | 26.0 |  | 754.4 | 411 |
| Deri. open interest | 935.2 |  | 853 | 595 |

Forex/money market

|  | Change, basis points |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 18-May | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Rs/US $\$$ | 47.9 | $(149)$ | $(243)$ | $(204)$ |
| 10yr govt bond, \% | 6.2 | $(17)$ | $(18)$ | 15 |

Commodity market

|  | Change, \% |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 18-May | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |  |
| Gold (US $\$ / O Z)$ | 920.9 | 0.3 | 6.0 | $(5.5)$ |  |
| Silver (US $\$ / O Z)$ | 13.8 | 0.4 | 16.3 | $(1.6)$ |  |
| Crude (US $\$ / B B L)$ | 57.7 | $(0.2)$ | 10.1 | 39.6 |  |

Net investment (US\$mn)

|  | 15-May | MTD | CYTD |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FIls | 202 | 1,871 | 1,893 |
| MFs | 82 | 75 | $(48)$ |

Top movers -3mo basis

| Change, \% |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Best performers | 18-May | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Jsw Steel Limited | 488 | 16.5 | 54.5 | 133.7 |
| Unitech Limited | 65 | 26.6 | 22.4 | 125.5 |
| Tata Motors Ltd | 301 | 13.6 | 27.8 | 123.9 |
| Mahindra \& Mahinc | 636 | 23.9 | 40.7 | 119.0 |
| Bharat Forge Limite | 177 | 16.8 | 46.8 | 118.9 |
| Worst performers |  |  |  |  |
| Housing Developme | 228 | 24.9 | 77.2 | 187.9 |
| Hindustan Unilever | 240 | 6.8 | 0.2 | $(3.9)$ |
| Satyam Computer | 47 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 1.8 |
| Bharat Petroleum C | 426 | 15.1 | 9.7 | 2.8 |
| Hindustan Petroleur | 306 | 17.7 | 14.5 | 2.9 |

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What to do when one can do what one may not want to do
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- Take money off the table in technology, telecom-nothing has changed
- Stay invested in banking, infrastructure-things may improve
- Reverse valuation exercises suggest large earnings upgrades, asset inflation required

We believe the thunderous reception given to the formation of the UPA government by the market with large re-rating across sectors and stocks presents investors an opportunity to realign portfolios and exit sectors/stocks trading at overly stretched valuations. We find the re-rating in the technology and telecom sectors to be the least convincing and accordingly advise investors to book profits if and when the market stabilizes and stock prices are at current or higher levels. We also find the valuations of global commodity stocks full or expensive and see the euphoria associated with the formation of a stable government in these names unjustified; their earnings will largely depend on global commodity cycles. We recommend investors unemotionally book profits in stocks (including several that we have liked over the past six months) such as Cairn, ONGC, Reliance Industries and metal stocks (Hindalco, Sterlite Industries, Tata Steel).

## Realign portfolio whenever the chance occurs with renewed focus on valuations

We would recommend investors use the recent euphoria in the market to realign positions as and when the market presents an opportunity-when proper trading resumes, along with visibility on actual stock prices. Our reverse valuation exercises in Exhibit 1 and 2 may help investors assess the level of divergence between fundamentals and reality and act accordingly. Exhibit 1 presents the amount of new capacity or implied commodity price required to justify current valuations and compares the same with current capacity or prices. Exhibit 2 compares the required earnings of stocks in auto, consumer, technology and telecom to justify current stock prices with our actual forecasts for FY2011E.

We recommend the following strategy if stock prices trade at current levels whenever the market stabilizes.

- Book profits in technology and telecom. We recommend investors book profits in high-profile names such as Infosys, TCS, Wipro, Bharti and RCOM since we do not see any change in their fundamentals and earnings with the formation of a new government.
- Technology. We do not see any real change in the companies' operating environment other than extension of certain taxation benefits that may be moderately positive for IT companies' earnings. As such we find the large re-rating on the formation of a new government largely unwarranted. Also, we see increased risks to companies' earnings from a stronger rupee, a possibility under high capital flows into India.
- Telecom. We expect the new (unchanged) government to continue implementing its announced plans/policies for the sector, none of which are likely to be positive for companies' earnings. These include MNP and uniform license fees across segments. Finally, we see continued pricing competition to preclude meaningful earnings upgrades (stable government or not).
- Exit downstream oil stocks if prices stabilize at 5-10\% prices higher. We see limited value in downstream oil stocks at 5-10\% higher levels even under a scenario of full deregulation. The Street seems to be speculating on an eventual deregulation of the sector, particularly removal of current government controls on pricing of auto fuels. We believe deregulation will be a positive for the sector and economy but we are not overly excited by its benefits on the downstream oil companies. We see continued pressure on other business drivers-(1) refining margins due to large global oversupply, (2) deregulated products' margins due to the advent of natural gas and (3) large losses on cooking fuels. Exhibit 3 shows our fair valuation of the stocks under a free-market scenario.
- Reduce positions in global commodities on further re-rating. We would use further re-rating ( $5-10 \%$ ) in commodity stocks to sell them. We would look at better entry points for the stocks. We have liked this space over the past 6-7 months but we find valuations starting to look full without evidence of stronger-than-expected global prices and margins. It would be illogical to relate the formation of a stable government in India with the fact that the fundamentals of global cyclical commodity businesses such as crude oil, metals and refining are going to change meaningfully.

Exhibit 4 gives our Model Portfolio.

Significant changes in assumptions/estimates is required to justify current stock prices
Comparison of implied capacity versus assumed capacity of stocks with embedded assets, March fiscal year-end, FY2010E

|  | Price |  | Unit | Capacity | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18-May | Target |  | Implied Assumed |  |
| Cairn India | 220 | 225 | US\$/bbl | 6971 | Current stock price is implying full valuations of the stock |
| DLF | 323 | 190 | mn sq. ft | 511425 | Current stock price implies land bank accretion of 86 mn sq. ft at average margins of Rs1,000/sq. ft |
| HDFC | 2,374 | 1,730 | RoE (\%) | $32 \quad 16$ | Current stock price implies a terminal RoE of $32 \%$ in perpetuity against our expectation of $15 \%$ |
| HDFC Bank | 1,378 | 1,150 | RoE (\%) | $24 \quad 18$ | Current stock price implies a terminal RoE of $23.8 \%$ in perpetuity against our expectation of $18 \%$ |
| ICICI Bank | 707 | 475 | RoE (\%) | $25 \quad 14$ | Current stock price implies a terminal RoE of $25 \%$ in perpetuity against our expectation of $15 \%$. Note that we maintain our value for subsidiaries and near-term earnings as in our base-case |
| Jaiprakash Associates | 168 | 140 | Rs bn | 141106 | Current stock price ascribes a valuation of Rs141 bn for future business (power and real estate) versus our estimate of Rs106 bn |
| Jindal Steel and Power | 1,945 | 1,400 | Rs/unit | 95 | Current stock price implies a merchant power tariff of Rs9/unit (Rs5 currently) till FY2013E or steel prices at 25\% higher levels |
| JSW Steel | 488 | 340 | US\$/ton | 625480 | Current stock price implies average realisation of US $\$ 625 /$ ton for FY2010E (higher by $30 \%$ from our base-case assumption) |
| NTPC | 207 | 180 | GW | $70 \quad 50$ | Implied capacity addition of 70 GW by FY2017E ahead of our assumption of 50 GW |
| Reliance Industries | 2,368 | 1,650 | tcf of gas | 86 - | To be brought under production in next six years |
| Reliance Infrastructure | 1,011 | 970 | GW | 22.20 | Current stock price is implying full valuations of the stock |
| State Bank of India | 1,577 | 1,600 | RoE (\%) | $15 \quad 15$ | Current stock price is implying full valuations of the stock |
| Sterlite Industries | 552 | 490 | P/BV | $4 \quad 1$ | Current stock price implies a P/BV of 3.5 X for Sterlite Energy's 2,400 MW |
| Tata Power | 1,045 | 1,000 | GW | $5 \quad 5$ | Current stock price is implying full valuations of the stock |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

Technology and telecom companies need to deliver high earnings growth for FY2010E to justify current stock prices
Comparison of KIE EPS estimate versus implied EPS based on current stock prices, March fiscal year-end, 2010E

|  | Price |  | Target P/E | EPS (2010E) |  | $\frac{\text { Difference }}{(\%)}$ | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18-May | Target | (X) | Implied | KIE estimate |  |  |
| Automobiles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bajaj Auto | 890 | 615 | 9.9 | 90 | 62 | 45 | A stable government would not result in meaningful upgrades in our earnings estimates. A tight fiscal stuation may result in (1) reversal of excise duty cuts implemented earlier and (2) higher interest rates |
| Hero Honda | 1,487 | 1,000 | 11.9 | 125 | 84 | 49 |  |
| Maruti Suzuki | 938 | 780 | 13.4 | 70 | 58 | 20 |  |
| Tata Motors | 301 | 195 | 10.3 | 29 | 19 | 55 |  |
| Consumers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hindustan Unilever | 240 | 235 | 23.0 | 10.4 | 10.2 | 2 | Stocks are currently discounting full valuation with limited opportunity for absoulte returns |
| ITC | 207 | 200 | 20.5 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 3 |  |
| Technology |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Infosys Technologies | 1,800 | 1,500 | 14.4 | 125 | 104 | 20 | We do not expect any upgrades in our estimates due to the formation of a stable government. In fact, risk to our earnings has increased as rupee appreciation is likely if current strong capital inflows sustain |
| TCS | 744 | 510 | 9.9 | 75 | 51 | 46 |  |
| Tech Mahindra | 392 | 360 | 9.5 | 41 | 38 | 9 |  |
| Wipro | 417 | 325 | 12.1 | 35 | 27 | 28 |  |
| Telecom |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti Airtel | 1,003 | 775 | 14.8 | 68 | 52 | 29 | No new policy dynamics. Expected policy decisions (spectrum, 3G auction, M\&A regulations being the main ones) are well known and discounted by the Street |
| IDEA | 76 | 55 | 19.0 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 38 |  |
| Reliance Communications | 290 | 180 | 8.9 | 33 | 20 | 61 |  |

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

## Limited upside to fair valuations in a free-market scenario

Comparison of earnings and normalized marketing margins with FY2010E estimates (Rs/ton)

|  | BPCL |  | HPCL |  | IOCL |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010E | Normalized | 2010E | Normalized | 2010E | Normalized |
| LPG | $(7,289)$ | 1,500 | $(7,289)$ | 1,500 | $(7,289)$ | 1,500 |
| Naphtha | 1,000 | 400 | 1,000 | 400 | 1,200 | 900 |
| Gasoline | 1,688 | 1,900 | 1,688 | 1,900 | 1,900 | 2,100 |
| Jet fuel | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,700 | 1,700 |
| Kerosene | $(19,501)$ | 600 | $(19,501)$ | 600 | $(19,501)$ | 600 |
| Diesel | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,700 | 1,700 |
| Light diesel oil | 1,200 | 500 | 1,200 | 500 | 1,450 | 700 |
| Low sulphur heavy stock | 700 | 500 | 700 | 500 | 1,000 | 700 |
| Fuel oil | 700 | 500 | 700 | 500 | 1,000 | 700 |
| Bitumen | 2,000 | 1,000 | 2,000 | 1,000 | 2,000 | 1,200 |
| EPS (Rs) | 42.0 | 37.6 | 30.2 | 36.3 | 48.2 | 54.6 |
| EBITDA (Rs bn) | 39.4 | 37.0 | 38.0 | 41.1 | 119.0 | 130.5 |
| EV (5X normalized EBITDA) (Rs bn) |  | 185 |  | 206 |  | 652 |
| Value of investments (Rs bn) |  | 45 |  | 31 |  | 179 |
| Net debt (Rs bn) |  | 99 |  | 124 |  | 212 |
| Equity value (Rs/share) |  | 360 |  | 333 |  | 520 |
| Current target price |  | 425 |  | 300 |  | 500 |

Note:
(a) Our normalized earnings estimates are based on normalized marketing margins and actual refining margin estimates for FY2010E.
(b) The higher marketing margins for IOCL reflects its high market share in land-locked North India.

## Overweight banking, metals, industrials and pharmaceuticals

Kotak Institutional Equities Model Portfolio

| Company | 18-May | Rating | Weightage (\%) |  | $\frac{\text { Diff. }}{\text { (bps) }}$ | Company | $\frac{\text { 18-May }}{\text { Price (Rs) }}$ | Rating | Weightage (\%) |  | $\frac{\text { Diff. }}{\text { (bps) }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Price (Rs) |  | BSE-30 | KS reco. |  |  |  |  | BSE-30 | KS reco. |  |
| Mahindra \& Mahindra | 600 | ADD | 1.2 | 1.2 | - | Larsen \& Toubro | 1,232 | ADD | 6.2 | 6.2 | - |
| Maruti Suzuki | 930 | REDUCE | 1.4 | 1.4 | - | Nagarjuna Construction | 100 | BUY | - | 1.0 | 100 |
| Tata Motors | 305 | SELL | 1.1 | - | (112) | Punj Lloyd | 163 | ADD | - | 1.0 | 100 |
| Automobiles |  |  | 3.7 | 2.6 | (112) | Industrials/Construction |  |  | 9.6 | 10.6 | 100 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Punjab National Bank | 660 | BUY | - | 1.5 | 150 | Hindalco Industries | 80 | ADD | 1.0 | - | (101) |
| State Bank of India | 1,585 | BUY | 4.4 | 6.9 | 250 | Jindal Steel and Power | 1,945 | BUY | - | 2.0 | 200 |
| Union Bank | 195 | BUY | - | 1.5 | 150 | Sterlite Industries | 536 | ADD | 1.5 | 3.5 | 200 |
| PSU Banking |  |  | 4.4 | 9.9 | 550 | Tata Steel | 320 | BUY | 1.8 | 1.8 | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Metals |  |  | 4.4 | 7.3 | 299 |
| Axis Bank | 800 | BUY | - | 3.0 | 300 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HDFC | 2,390 | SELL | 5.5 | - | (546) | Ranbaxy Laboratories | 228 | REDUCE | 0.4 | - | (40) |
| HDFC Bank | 1,380 | BUY | 4.6 | 2.6 | (200) | Sun Pharmaceuticals | 1,412 | BUY | 1.3 | 3.8 | 250 |
| ICICI Bank | 720 | ADD | 7.5 | 6.5 | (100) | Pharmaceuticals |  |  | 1.7 | 3.8 | 210 |
| Rural Electrification Corp. | 134 | BUY | - | 1.0 | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pvt. Banking/Financing |  |  | 17.6 | 13.1 | (446) | DLF | 325 | REDUCE | 0.8 | 0.8 | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Real estate |  |  | 0.8 | 0.8 | - |
| ACC | 730 | REDUCE | 0.8 | - | (76) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Grasim Industries | 2,150 | REDUCE | 1.5 | 1.5 | - | Infosys Technologies | 1,800 | BUY | 9.1 | 7.1 | (200) |
| Jaiprakash Associates | 168 | ADD | 1.4 | 2.9 | 150 | TCS | 744 | REDUCE | 1.8 | - | (184) |
| Cement |  |  | 3.6 | 4.4 | 74 | Wipro | 430 | ADD | 1.3 | 1.3 | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Technology |  |  | 12.2 | 8.3 | (384) |
| Hindustan Unilever | 239 | REDUCE | 2.8 | 1.8 | (100) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITC | 207 | ADD | 5.7 | 5.7 | - | Bharti Airtel | 1,003 | ADD | 6.2 | 4.2 | (200) |
| Consumers |  |  | 8.6 | 7.6 | (100) | Reliance Communications | 285 | SELL | 2.0 | - | (196) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Telecom |  |  | 8.1 | 4.2 | (396) |
| Cairn India | 216 | BUY | - | 4.0 | 400 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oil \& Natural Gas Corporation | 920 | ADD | 4.1 | 5.1 | 100 | Lanco Infratech | 287 | BUY | - | 1.0 | 100 |
| Reliance Industries | 2,368 | REDUCE | 15.6 | 9.8 | (576) | NTPC | 207 | REDUCE | 2.7 | - | (270) |
| Energy |  |  | 19.7 | 18.9 | (76) | Reliance Infrastructure | 999 | BUY | 1.4 | 2.4 | 100 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Tata Power | 1,045 | BUY | 1.6 | 5.1 | 350 |
| Bharat Heavy Electricals | 2,266 | REDUCE | 3.4 | 1.4 | (200) | Utilities |  |  | 5.8 | 8.6 | 280 |
| IVRCL | 203 | BUY | - | 1.0 | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | BSE-30 | 14,284 |  | 100.0 | 100.0 | - |

Note:

1. Weights are with respect to May 15, 2009 prices

Valuation summary of BSE-30 sectors, March fiscal year-ends, 2009E-11E

|  | Mkt cap. | Adj mkt cap. | EPS growth (\%) |  |  | PER (X) |  |  | EV/EBITDA ( X ) |  |  | Price/BV (X) |  |  | Div. yield (\%) |  | RoE (\%) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (US\$ mn) | (US\$ mn) | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2009E | 2010E | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| Automobiles | 12,660 | 7,733 | (40.5) | 30.9 | 14.8 | 21.7 | 16.6 | 14.5 | 13.6 | 9.0 | 7.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 9.9 | 11.3 | 11.5 |
| Banking | 63,422 | 47,419 | 16.7 | (4.1) | 16.3 | 17.5 | 18.2 | 15.7 | - | - | - | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 13.7 | 12.7 | 13.3 |
| Cement | 7,011 | 4,694 | (18.1) | (11.5) | (7.5) | 10.8 | 12.2 | 13.1 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 19.4 | 15.2 | 12.7 |
| Consumers | 27,120 | 16,808 | 7.6 | 12.3 | 14.1 | 24.7 | 22.0 | 19.3 | 16.7 | 13.9 | 12.1 | 8.3 | 7.3 | 6.4 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 33.4 | 33.2 | 33.4 |
| Diversified | 4,906 | 2,944 | 51.3 | 20.0 | 49.6 | 25.6 | 21.3 | 14.3 | 13.7 | 11.8 | 11.1 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.3 | 16.0 | 19.9 |
| Energy | 109,964 | 42,316 | 9.0 | 7.1 | 35.1 | 14.0 | 13.1 | 9.7 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 4.4 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 16.2 | 15.5 | 18.5 |
| Industrials | 35,870 | 20,978 | 14.9 | 30.7 | 17.7 | 29.5 | 22.6 | 19.2 | 16.3 | 12.7 | 11.0 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 20.2 | 21.4 | 20.9 |
| Metals | 16,515 | 9,117 | 13.7 | (47.5) | 54.5 | 5.3 | 10.1 | 6.5 | 4.2 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 14.1 | 7.1 | 10.1 |
| Pharmaceuticals | 8,889 | 3,556 | (37.8) | 4.7 | 41.2 | 29.1 | 27.8 | 19.7 | 20.8 | 18.5 | 13.2 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 12.4 | 10.8 | 13.8 |
| Property | 11,463 | 1,719 | (36.6) | (45.2) | 8.4 | 11.0 | 20.1 | 18.6 | 10.8 | 15.3 | 13.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 20.3 | 10.2 | 10.2 |
| Technology | 49,407 | 24,636 | 15.9 | 0.8 | 10.0 | 16.0 | 15.9 | 14.4 | 11.4 | 10.5 | 8.7 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 30.3 | 25.0 | 23.3 |
| Telecom | 52,141 | 18,249 | 15.3 | (1.1) | 11.4 | 17.1 | 17.3 | 15.5 | 10.6 | 9.6 | 8.2 | 3.8 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 22.1 | 17.9 | 16.6 |
| Utilities | 45,118 | 11,819 | 9.7 | 19.2 | 12.0 | 21.2 | 17.8 | 15.9 | 12.1 | 11.7 | 11.3 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 11.8 | 12.9 | 13.3 |
| BSE-30 | 444,486 | 211,988 | 5.8 | (1.7) | 22.5 | 15.9 | 16.2 | 13.2 | 9.1 | 8.5 | 7.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 16.8 | 14.8 | 16.1 |
| BSE-30 ex-Energy | 334,522 | 169,672 | 4.6 | (5.2) | 17.0 | 16.6 | 17.6 | 15.0 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 8.8 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 17.0 | 14.5 | 15.1 |
| BSE-30 ex-Energy, Com. | 310,997 | 155,861 | 4.2 | 3.2 | 14.2 | 19.1 | 18.5 | 16.2 | 12.6 | 11.3 | 9.9 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 17.7 | 16.2 | 16.2 |

Note:
(a) EV/EBITDA excludes Banking sector

Source: Companies, Boomberg and Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| Pharmaceuticals |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| REDY.BO, Rs613 |  |
| Rating | BUY |
| Sector coverage view | Attractive |
| Target Price (Rs) | 740 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) | $740-355$ |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) | 103.7 |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | 2010E | 2011E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 67.9 | 75.0 | 80.5 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 5.5 | 7.6 | 7.9 |
| EPS (Rs) | 32.4 | 45.5 | 47.0 |
| EPS gth | 24.5 | 40.2 | 3.3 |
| P/E (x) | 18.9 | 13.5 | 13.0 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 9.2 | 7.5 | 6.7 |
| Div yield (\%) | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |

Pricing performance

| Perf-1m | Perf-3m | Perf-6m | Perf-1y |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 14.4 | 51.0 | 46.6 | $(5.9)$ |

## Shareholding, March 2009

|  | \% of <br> Pattern |  | Over/(under) <br> weight |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Promoters | 26.4 | - | - |
| Flls | 37.9 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| MFs | 6.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| UTI | - | - | $(0.3)$ |
| LIC | 12.9 | 0.9 | 0.6 |

## Dr. Reddy's Laboratories: Higher exclusivity sales help beat our forecasts

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- Revenues at Rs 19.8 bn and PAT at Rs2 bn (Indian GAAP consl) beat our estimates
- DRRD forecasts sales growth of $10 \%$ and improved profitability in FY2010E
- Maintain BUY rating with SOTP-based target price at Rs740 (was Rs700)

DRRD reported revenues at Rs 19.8 bn, 20\% higher than our estimates due to (1) higher generic Imitrex revenues (US\$72 mn vs our estimate of US\$30 mn) Revenues excluding Imitrex were up 23\% yoy and 8\% above KIE as PSAI segment and Betapharm beat our estimates. Adjusted margins were at $27 \%$ vs KIE $24 \%$ due to higher Immitrex sales. PAT at Rs2 bn vs KIE Rs1.1 bn due to (1) stronger operating performance (2) lower-than-expected forex losses. DRRD expects 10\% Rupee sales growth in FY2010E. DRRD has included omeprazole OTC revenues in this guidance but not generic Arixtra. The stock trades at 13.5X FY2010E and 13X FY2011E earnings. Maintain BUY rating with an SOTP-based target price of Rs740. Price target increase is due to inclusion of generic Arixtra opportunity in estimates. Key risk to share price is performance of German operations.

3QFY09 revenues at Rs19.8 bn. Revenues were 20\% above KIE driven by

1. Immitrex revenues were US $\$ 72 \mathrm{mn}$, similar ton 3 QFY09 vs KIE US $\$ 30 \mathrm{mn}$. DRRD launched the product in November 2008 and registered strong sales despite the entry of Teva and Ranbaxy in February 2009. This represents the biggest divergence from revenue expectations.
2. Betapharm revenues at Rs2.6 bn were higher than KIE Rs2.1 bn. Overall, FY2009 sales remained flat yoy at Euro150 mn despite volume growth at 16\%.
3. PSAI segment sales at Rs 4.8 bn was $20 \%$ higher than KIE due to strong performance in Europe. For FY2009, this segment grew 13\% due to (1) slowdown in orders from big pharma due to inventory reduction (which the company says has now normalized), (2) reduced orders from firms hit by credit crisis and (3) no major patent expiries. In FY2009, the top-10 products comprised $50 \%$ of sales while top-10 clients comprised $54 \%$ of sales in this segment
4. Russia and CIS continued to show good yoy growth this quarter with revenues at US $\$ 36 \mathrm{mn}$, in line with KIE. In Russia, DRRD continued to grow at $11 \%$ in volume terms in 2009 and also increased prices by around $30 \%$ in certain products to combat adverse currency movement seen in 1Q2009. The management pointed out that DRL deals with top distributors in this market and currently only $10 \%$ of sales are overdue from the Russian market.
5. Indian finished dosages revenues were Rs2 bn was 7\% lower than KIE. The sales growth in FY2009 stood at 5\%. The management attributed muted sales growth to (1) delayed product launches, (2) change in supply chain model towards a replenishmentbased model and (3) restructuring of sales and marketing network. DRRD has guided towards growth normalizing from 2QFY10E.

Adjusted EBITDA margin at 27\%. Margins were higher than our estimates of $24 \%$ due to a higher proportion of sales from high-margin Immitrex. We estimate margins ex Immitrex (assuming margins of $45 \%$ ) at $22 \%$ this quarter vs KIE 23\%: (1) Materials cost at $34 \%$ and other expenses at $15 \%$ of sales was in line with KIE and (2) staff cost at $13 \%$ of sales was lower than KIE 16\%.

PAT at Rs2 bn vs KIE Rs1.1 bn. PAT at Rs2 bn vs KIE Rs1.1 bn due to (1) stronger operating performance (2) higher other income and lower forex related losses. Tax rate has varied qoq with effective tax rate of $44 \%$ this quarter due to higher proportion of sales from Immitrex vs KIE 22\% and 22\% in 3QFY09.

## FY2010 guidance from the management

1. DRRD management expects $10 \%$ Rupee sales growth in FY2010E. DRRD guidance is based on an exchange rate of US\$=Rs48. DRRD has included omeprazole OTC revenues in this guidance but not generic Arixtra. DRRD mentioned that the time taken for the approval of generic Arixtra remains uncertain and, as a matter of caution, they have excluded these sales from FY2010E estimates. This sales growth has to be seen in the context of inclusion of two quarters of sales of generic Immitrex with limited competition in FY2009. In FY2010, such low competition sales are likely only for one quarter. DRRD targets 20\% sales growth in the medium term.
2. DRRD expects that 2HFY10E will be stronger than 1HFY10E. It did not comment on the growth rate of each region but mentioned that US sales will grow faster than the 10\% forecast. In Germany, DRRD expects revenues to remain flat in local currency.
3. DRRD expects ROCE to be $16-18 \%$ compared to $14 \%$ in FY2009. We think this is achievable.
4. There was no specific guidance on EBITDA margin but DRRD said that net profitability will rise faster than sales.

## FY2010E KIE estimates - key assumptions

1. Our sales growth forecast for FY2010E is $10 \%$ in Rupee terms. Our FY2010E forecast is based on US\$ = Rs50.75.
2. We forecast adjusted EBITDA margin to decline from $21.5 \%$ in FY2009 to 20.6\%. One of the reasons for this is lower margin in generic Imitrex that we forecast from 2QFY10E. We expect that Indian revenues will start growing strongly from 3QFY10E and this will reduce margin pressure to some extent. DRRD gave no specific guidance for German operations but we believe that EBITDA margin will expand as more production will shift to cheaper manufacturing locations of India and Emerging Europe.
3. DRRD expects tax rate to fall to $15 \%$ level but we forecast tax rate of $20 \%$ in FY 2010 E rising to $22 \%$ in FY2011E. The effective tax rate for FY2009 was $32 \%$. This was due to a significant share of profits coming from the generic Imitrex opportunity-largely captured in the US subsidiary which does not have any tax shelters. Since these profits are expected to decline in FY2010E, we forecast a decline in the tax rate.

## FY2011 revision to our estimates

We have included revenues from generic Arixtra in US for a full 12 months amounting to US\$27 mn (DRRD share of revenues) with EBITDA margin of 55\%. This, along with omeprazole OTC, will likely contribute Rs4.8 to EPS in FY2011E. We forecast 7\% sales growth. The cautious view comes from the assumption that generic Imitrex in the US may become a commodity product with low revenues. This would also lead to a minor decline in the EBITDA margin. We expect the tax rate to rise further to $22 \%$. As a result, we forecast a margin increase in PAT in FY2011E.

Betapharm impairment of intangible assets. DRRD has written off Rs 14.6 bn relating to impairment of goodwill and intangible assets. It did not get any benefits related to deferred tax in Indian GAAP. After this provision, DRRD is carrying intangible assets of Euro210 mn. This provision was necessary due to the changes in German market from branded generic nature to generic. DRRD believes that no material amortization related to these intangible assets may be necessary in FY2010E. This provision was widely expected by the street though its size may still be considered large. We maintain that investors are unlikely to react negatively to this impairment charge. We have not included any amount in our FY2010E for such impairment based on DRRD guidance.

Maintain BUY rating with SOTP-based target price Rs740. There have been a few positive announcements from DRRD in the past three months. These include generic Arixtra filing, crossing US $\$ 150$ mn revenues in Russia/CIS in FY2009, favorable summary judgment Omeprazole Mg OTC. We believe investors are likely see 4QFY09 results favorably as DDRD has given 10\% sales growth guidance despite a high base of FY2009. We reiterate our BUY rating with a price target of Rs740. Election results, with a clear mandate for the incumbent government, have taken the share price to Rs613, we would wait for the next few days to see where it settles before making any changes to the rating.

Interim results- Dr Reddy , March fiscal year-ends (Rs mn)

|  | 4QFY09 | 4QFY09E | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 | \% change |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 4QFY09E | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 |
| Net sales | 19,282 | 16,174 | 12,712 | 18,050 | 19 | 52 | 7 |
| (Increase)/decrease in stock | 1,115 | - | (922) | (314) | NM | NM | NM |
| Material consumed | 5,425 | 5,499 | 5,676 | 6,156 | (1) | (4) | (12) |
| Excise duty | - | - | 103 | - | NM | NM | NM |
| R\&D | 1,072 | 1,000 | 992 | 1,010 | 7 | 8 | 6 |
| Personnel costs | 2,554 | 2,600 | 1,955 | 2,529 | (2) | 31 | 1 |
| Selling expenses | 1,989 | 1,600 | 1,657 | 1,723 | 24 | 20 | 15 |
| Other expenditure | 2,980 | 2,500 | 1,378 | 3,374 | 19 | 116 | (12) |
| Total expenditure | 15,135 | 13,199 | 10,839 | 14,478 | 15 | 40 | 5 |
| EBITDA | 4,146 | 2,975 | 1,874 | 3,572 | 39 | 121 | 16 |
| Interest expenses | 207 | 300 | 273 | 276 | (31) | (24) | (25) |
| Other Income | 1,134 | 100 | 1,212 | (17) | 1034 | (6) | NM |
| Depreciation \& Amortisation | 1,336 | 1,300 | 1,119 | 1,234 | 3 | 19 | 8 |
| PBT | 3,738 | 1,475 | 1,694 | 2,044 | 154 | 121 | 83 |
| Current Tax | 1,660 | 324 | 811 | 452 | 412 | 105 | 267 |
| Deferred Tax | - | - | (343) | - | NM | NM | NM |
| Fringe Benefit tax | - | - | 30 | - | NM | NM | NM |
| Net Profit before minority interes1 | 2,078 | 1,150 | 1,196 | 1,592 | 81 | 74 | 31 |
| Minority interests in loss of subsidiarie | - | - | 2 | - | NM | NM | NM |
| Profit for shareholders | 2,078 | 1,150 | 1,198 | 1,592 | 81 | 74 | 31 |
| PSAI | 4,860 | 4,062 | 4,373 | 4,457 | 20 | 11 | 9 |
| India | 572 | 450 | 548 | 432 | 27 | 4 | 32 |
| North America | 833 | 1,015 | 441 | 865 | (18) | 89 | (4) |
| Europe | 2,153 | 1,076 | 1,730 | 1,752 | 100 | 24 | 23 |
| Others | 1,302 | 1,522 | 1,654 | 1,408 | (14) | (21) | (8) |
| Generics | 14,669 | 12,306 | 8,744 | 13,683 | 19 | 68 | 7 |
| India | 2,072 | 2,232 | 1,993 | 1,967 | (7) | 4 | 5 |
| Russia \& CIS | 1,834 | 1,776 | 1,055 | 2,006 | 3 | 74 | (9) |
| North America | 7,205 | 5,074 | 2,466 | 6,652 | 42 | 192 | 8 |
| Europe | 3,096 | 2,565 | 2,905 | 2,505 | 21 | 7 | 24 |
| Others | 462 | 660 | 325 | 553 | (30) | 42 | (16) |
| Others | 322 | 201 | 136 | 261 | 60 | 137 | 23 |
| Total | 19,851 | 16,570 | 13,253 | 18,401 | 20 | 50 | 8 |

[^0]India Daily Summary - May 19, 2009

Forecasts and valuation, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2011E

|  | Net sales |  | Adjusted EBITDA |  | Net Profit |  | EPS | ROCE | ROE | P/E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (Rs mn) | Growth (\%) | (Rs mn) | Growth (\%) | (Rs mn) | Growth (\%) | (Rs) | (\%) | (\%) | (X) |
| 2007 | 64,229 | 173.7 | 18,164 | 264.1 | 9,659 | 558.3 | 60.9 | 21.9 | 31.8 | 10.1 |
| 2008 | 49,142 | (23.5) | 11,061 | (39.1) | 4,381 | (54.6) | 26.1 | 6.7 | 10.3 | 23.5 |
| 2009 | 67,904 | 38.2 | 17,578 | 58.9 | (9172) | NM | (54.5) | 14.7 | 13.6 | NM |
| 2010E | 74,957 | 10.4 | 20,121 | 14.5 | 7,650 | NM | 45.5 | 17.4 | 19.8 | 13.5 |
| 2011E | 80,460 | 7.3 | 21,260 | 5.7 | 7,901 | 3.3 | 47.0 | 15.7 | 17.3 | 13.0 |

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities

Profit and loss statement, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-2011E

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1 E}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Gross operating revenues | $\mathbf{2 4 , 6 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{6 5 , 1 2 6}$ | $\mathbf{4 9 , 7 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{6 8 , 3 2 6}$ | $\mathbf{7 5 , 3 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{8 1 , 0 9 9}$ |
| Excise duty | $(1,139)$ | $(897)$ | $(558)$ | $(422)$ | $(442)$ | $(638)$ |
| Net sales | $\mathbf{2 3 , 4 6 6}$ | $\mathbf{6 4 , 2 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 9 , 1 4 2}$ | $\mathbf{6 7 , 9 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{7 4 , 9 5 7}$ | $\mathbf{8 0 , 4 6 0}$ |
| Operating expenses |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Materials | $(8,165)$ | $(27,432)$ | $(17,847)$ | $(23,610)$ | $(24,736)$ | $(29,801)$ |
| Selling and administration | $(5,613)$ | $(9,735)$ | $(10,561)$ | $(16,795)$ | $(19,100)$ | $(17,299)$ |
| Employee cost | $(3,495)$ | $(6,433)$ | $(7,311)$ | $(9,921)$ | $(11,000)$ | $(12,100)$ |
| R\&D | $(1,737)$ | $(2,446)$ | $(3,447)$ | $(4,093)$ | $(4,700)$ | $(5,230)$ |
| Others | $(1,403)$ | $(2,539)$ | $(2,363)$ | $(969)$ | 0 | 0 |
| Total expenditure | $\mathbf{( 2 0 , 4 1 3 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 4 8 , 5 8 4 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 4 1 , 5 2 8 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 5 5 , 3 8 7 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 5 9 , 5 3 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 6 4 , 4 3 0 )}$ |
| License fees and service income | 161 | 910 | 775 | $\mathbf{1 , 1 0 3}$ | 0 | 0 |
| EBITDA | $\mathbf{3 , 2 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 , 5 5 5}$ | $\mathbf{8 , 3 8 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 , 6 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 , 4 2 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 , 0 3 0}$ |
| Depreciation and amortisation | $(1,617)$ | $(3,791)$ | $(4,019)$ | $(4,978)$ | $(5,550)$ | $(6,000)$ |
| EBIT | $\mathbf{1 , 5 9 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 , 7 6 4}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 3 7 0}$ | $\mathbf{8 , 6 4 2}$ | $\mathbf{9 , 8 7 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 , 0 3 0}$ |
| Net finance cost | $(644)$ | $(1,526)$ | $(958)$ | $(972)$ | $(1,050)$ | $(900)$ |
| Other income | 1,061 | 1,162 | 2,038 | 394 | $\mathbf{8 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 0 0 0}$ |
| Pretax profits before extra-ordinaries | $\mathbf{2 , 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 , 3 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{5 , 4 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{8 , 0 6 4}$ | $\mathbf{9 , 6 2 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 , 1 3 0}$ |
| Current tax | $(173)$ | $(2,435)$ | $(1,058)$ | $(2,608)$ | $(1,547)$ | $(1,804)$ |
| Deferred tax | $(304)$ | $(238)$ | 159 |  | 0 | $(325)$ |
| Fringe benefit tax | $(70)$ | $(71)$ | $(178)$ | 0 | $(100)$ | $(100)$ |
| Reported net profit | $\mathbf{1 , 4 6 7}$ | $\mathbf{9 , 6 5 6}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 3 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{5 , 4 5 6}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 6 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 9 0 1}$ |
| Minority Interests | 0 | $(4)$ | $(9)$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Reported net profit after minority interests | $\mathbf{1 , 4 6 7}$ | $\mathbf{9 , 6 5 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 3 8 1}$ | $\mathbf{5 , 4 5 6}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 6 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 9 0 1}$ |
| Exceptional items |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{1 4 , 6 2 8}$ |  |
| Reported net profit after minority interests anc | $\mathbf{1 , 4 6 7}$ | $\mathbf{9 , 6 5 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 3 8 1}$ | $\mathbf{( 9 , 1 7 2 )}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 6 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 9 0 1}$ |

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities

SOTP based price target, FY2010-FY2011E

|  | PAT (Rs mn) |  | $\frac{P / E}{(X)}$ | Valuation (Rs mn) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | FY2010E | FY2011E |  | FY2010E | FY2011E |
| API - US | 40 | 58 | 15.0 | 599 | 867 |
| API-Europe | 51 | 70 | 15.0 | 769 | 1,049 |
| API - Rest of the World | 63 | 86 | 15.0 | 943 | 1,290 |
| Finished dosage |  |  |  |  |  |
| India | 1,082 | 1,376 | 19.0 | 20,561 | 26,149 |
| Russia, ROW | 2,378 | 2,953 | 15.0 | 35,674 | 44,293 |
| USA | 3,379 | 2,705 | 15.0 | 50,681 | 40,580 |
| Generics - Rest of Europe | 172 | 226 | 15.0 | 2,583 | 3,383 |
| Betapharm | 404 | 470 | 13.6 | 5,488 | 6,387 |
| Promius, Others | 56 | 62 | 17.0 | 946 | 1,061 |
| Value per share (Rs) |  |  |  | 701 | 741 |
| Price target |  |  |  |  | 741 |

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities.

## Breakup of profits (Rs mn)



Source: Kotak Institutional Equities.

| Construction |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| PUJL.BO, Rs163 |  |
| Rating | ADD |
| Sector coverage view | 170 |
| Target Price (Rs) | $355-66$ |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) | 50.7 |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) |  |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | 2010E | 2011E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 119.1 | 121.8 | 130.9 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | $(2.4)$ | 5.3 | 5.7 |
| EPS (Rs) | $(7.4)$ | 16.5 | 17.6 |
| EPS gth | $(174.4)$ | - | 6.6 |
| P/E (x) | $(22.0)$ | 9.9 | 9.3 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 25.7 | 6.5 | 5.8 |
| Div yield (\%) | $(0.2)$ | 0.5 | 0.5 |

Pricing performance

|  |  |  |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Perf-1m | Perf-3m | Perf-6m | Perf-1y |
| 36.5 | 89.0 | 5.9 | $(52.8)$ |


| Shareholding, March 2009 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Pattern | \% of Portfolio | Over/(under) weight |
| Promoters | 41.5 | - | - |
| Flls | 18.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| MFs | 10.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| UTI | - | - | (0.1) |
| LIC | 1.4 | 0.0 | (0.1) |

## Punj Lloyd: Results beset by one-offs; remain positive based on strong backlog providing near-term earnings visibility

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- Large one-off provisioning for SABIC order leads to negative earnings
- Strong revenue growth at standalone level muted by steep decline in margins
- Several accounting treatment changes result in slightly higher profits for the year

We highlight that the strong revenue growth reported by Punj at the consolidated and standalone level was dampened by several one-offs. A provision of Rs2.2 bn towards the SABIC order has resulted in a net loss of Rs2.6 bn for the quarter. Several other one-offs in Simon Carves compounded margin pressures. Even at the standalone level, the margins were depressed, most likely due to cost escalations in the ONGC platform order. However, several accounting treatment changes have helped boost profits for the year. Punj reported a strong order backlog of Rs208 bn diversified across geographies and sectors. We highlight a continuing shift in focus from India to other international geographies with India contributing to only about $25 \%$ of the order book. We maintain our earnings estimates of Rs17.2 and Rs18.3 for FY2010E and FY2011E, respectively. We maintain our target price of Rs170/ share and reiterate our ADD rating on the stock. We would be revisiting our estimates after this afternoon's conference call.

## Large one-off provisioning for SABIC order leads to negative earnings

Punj Lloyd reported strong consolidated revenue growth of $37.1 \%$ to Rs32.2 bn in 4QFY09 from Rs23.5 bn in the previous year (Exhibit 1). Consolidated EBITDA, including other income, was at negative Rs651 mn resulting in negative EBITDA margin of 2.4\%. The company reported a net loss of Rs2.6 bn for this quarter versus a net profit of Rs1.2 bn in 4QFY08. The negative EBITDA margin was mainly due to provision of Rs2.2 bn towards a SABIC order executed by its subsidiary, Simon Carves Ltd (SCL). Pursuant to the decision of the adjudicator in favour of SABIC Punj has provided for the entire amount of GBP 28.5 mn in this quarter's income statement. Adjusted for the provision for the SABIC order, Punj Lloyd margins would have been at 4.5\% for the quarter versus $9.8 \%$ in 4QFY08. The bottom line of the company was further depressed by higher interest expense (up 124\% yoy) of Rs 729 mn due to (a) higher debt levels of Rs33 bn at the group level and (b) higher cost of loans. However, we believe this would start easing up given the recent decline in interest rates.

For the full year ending March 31, 2009, Punj Lloyd reported revenue growth of 53.6\% and EBITDA margin of $2.6 \%$. Loss after tax reported was Rs2.2 bn versus a profit of Rs3.6 bn for the previous year.

## Strong revenue growth at standalone level dampened by steep decline in margins

Punj Lloyd reported a strong revenue growth of $32 \%$ to Rs 19.8 bn at the standalone level in 4QFY09 (Exhibit 2). The impact of this was however, muted by low EBITDA margins of $8.8 \%$ during the quarter versus EBITDA margin of $16.5 \%$ in 4QFY08. The steep decline in margins was primarily led by (a) 460 bps yoy increase in contractor charges and (b) 230 bps yoy increase in other income as a percentage of sales. This is likely to have been led by higher costs incurred in the ONGC platform order. We highlight that the LDs and cost escalation claims for the project would be taken up only once the project has completed and is most likely to be settled through a dispute settlement mechanism. Low margins along with high interest expenses led to a yoy decline of $52 \%$ in net earnings to Rs596 mn in this quarter from Rs1.3 mn in 4QFY08.

For the full-year ending March 31, 2008 the company reported standalone revenues of Rs68.9 bn, up 53.5\% and EBITDA margin contraction of about 100 bps yoy to $11.5 \%$. Standalone profit after tax for the full year was up 39\% yoy to Rs3.1 bn.

## Several accounting treatment changes result in slightly higher profit for the year

In order to give its Middle East and North Africa branch operations more independence, Punj has decided not to integrate the operations of these branches from October 1, 2008. Thus, the translation-related foreign exchange differences would now be routed through the balance sheet rather than the income statement. This has boosted the company's fullyear profit by about Rs388 mn. Additionally, the company has also opted to defer the exchange difference charges to the PnL. This would now be accumulated in a "Foreign Currency Monetary Item Translation Difference Account" which would be amortized over a period of time.

## Additional losses in key subsidiary Simon Carves contributed towards low margins

We highlight that even adjusted for the Rs2.2 bn of provisions for the SABIC order the consolidated EBITDA margins of Punj would be $4.5 \%$ versus our expectation of $9 \%$. Simon Carves Ltd reported revenues of GBP 169 mn and a net loss of GBP 109 mn for FY2008. Even adjusted for the provision of GBP28.5 mn the losses for the company came in at about GBP80 mn. This was led by certain other one-offs arising from (a) losses in the wheat based bio-ethanol production facility order and (b) retrenchment losses. These have compounded margin pressures, leading to the lower-than-expected margin levels for the quarter.

## Strong and diversified order backlog provides a revenue visibility of about $\mathbf{2}$ years

Order inflows for the company continue to remain strong (Exhibit 3) with the company reporting an order backlog of Rs208 bn which provides a revenue visibility of about 1.8 years based on FY2009 earnings. The order backlog of the company continues to remain geographically diversified (Exhibit 4). The company does seem to be continuing its shift in focus away from India to other international geographies with India contributing to only about $25 \%$ of the order book. Infrastructure and pipelines segment continue hold a majority stake ( $36 \%$ and $31 \%$, respectively) in the order book with Process and Plants segment reducing its stake from $39 \%$ in FY2008 to $29 \%$ at the end of FY2009 (Exhibit 5).

Additional auditor qualification of Rs605 mn highlighted during the quarter
We highlight the company has received a further auditor qualification of Rs605 mn towards amount withheld by customers and Rs 95.4 mn of work-in-progress inventory. We highlight a potential loss to the tune of these qualifications. However, the management has stated its confidence in recovering the withheld amount.

## 10 mn of warrants allotted to promoter not exercised

We highlight that the 10 mn warrants allotted to Indtech Construction Private Ltd on August 2007 have not been exercised. Hence the warrants stand lapsed and the Rs254 mn of advance received by Punj has been forfeited and credited to the capital reserve of the company.

## Retain earnings estimates and target price; would revisit estimate post the conference call

We maintain our earnings estimates of Rs17.2 and Rs18.3 for FY2010E and FY2011E respectively. We maintain our target price of Rs170/ share based on 10X FY2010E earnings. We reiterate our ADD rating on the stock based on (a) negative events have already panned out and are already reflected in the price and (b) strong and diversified order backlog provides near-term earnings visibility. Key risks to the earnings originate from (1) slower-than-expected execution, (2) exposure to high-risk geographies such as Libya and (3) deterioration in working capital situation of the company.

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We would be revisiting our estimates post today's conference call at 3:00pm.

Exhibit 1. Punj Lloyd (consolidated) - 4QFY09 - key numbers (Rs mn)

| (in Rs mn) |  | 4QFY09E | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 | \% change |  |  | FY2009 | FY2008 | \% change |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 4QFY09 |  |  |  | 4QFY09E | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 |  |  |  |
| Net Sales | 32,173 | 33,032 | 23,467 | 31,200 | (2.6) | 37.1 | 3.1 | 119,120 | 77,529 | 53.6 |
| Expenditure | $(32,958)$ | $(28,270)$ | $(20,981)$ | $(32,163)$ | 16.6 | 57.1 | 2.5 | $(116,028)$ | $(71,122)$ | 63.1 |
| Material | $(11,101)$ | $(17,937)$ | $(7,478)$ | $(8,453)$ |  | 48.4 | 31.3 | $(37,505)$ | $(28,285)$ | 32.6 |
| Contractor charges | $(12,344)$ |  | $(5,966)$ | $(13,011)$ |  | 106.9 | (5.1) | $(42,365)$ | $(21,339)$ | 98.5 |
| Staff cost | $(3,783)$ | $(4,247)$ | $(2,889)$ | $(3,176)$ | (10.9) | 31.0 | 19.1 | $(12,922)$ | $(8,924)$ | 44.8 |
| Other expenditure | $(5,729)$ | $(6,087)$ | $(4,648)$ | $(7,523)$ | (5.9) | 23.3 | (23.8) | $(23,235)$ | $(12,575)$ | 84.8 |
| Operatin profit | (785) | 2,808 | 2,486 | (963) | (128.0) | (131.6) | (18.5) | 3,093 | 6,407 | (51.7) |
| Other Income | 134 | 214 | (183) | 237 | (37.6) | (173.1) | (43.6) | 745 | 811 | (8.1) |
| EBITDA | (651) | 3,022 | 2,303 | (726) | (121.6) | (128.3) | (10.2) | 3,838 | 7,218 | (46.8) |
| Interest | (729) | (723) | (326) | (620) | 0.9 | 124.0 | 17.6 | $(2,208)$ | $(1,292)$ | 70.9 |
| Depreciation | (508) | (449) | (409) | (433) | 13.0 | 24.1 | 17.3 | $(1,771)$ | $(1,462)$ | 21.1 |
| Profit before Tax | $(1,888)$ | 1,850 | 1,568 | $(1,779)$ | (202.1) | (220.4) | 6.2 | (141) | 4,464 | (103.1) |
| Tax | (667) | (518) | (374) | (416) | 28.8 | 78.3 | 60.5 | $(2,260)$ | $(1,235)$ | 83.0 |
| Profit after Tax | $(2,555)$ | 1,332 | 1,194 | $(2,194)$ | (291.8) | (314.0) | 16.5 | $(2,401)$ | 3,229 | (174.4) |
| Minority interest \& Associates + exceptional items | (1) | - | (17) | (72) |  | (94.6) | (98.8) | 148 | 356 | (58.4) |
| Net Profit | $(2,556)$ | 1,332 | 1,177 | $(2,266)$ | (291.9) | (317.1) | 12.8 | $(2,253)$ | 3,584 | (162.9) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Key ratios |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Material | 34.5 | 60.2 | 31.9 | 27.1 |  |  |  | 31.5 | 36.5 |  |
| Contractor charges | 38.4 |  | 25.4 | 41.7 |  |  |  | 35.6 | 27.5 |  |
| Staff cost | 11.8 | 12.9 | 12.3 | 10.2 |  |  |  | 10.8 | 11.5 |  |
| Other expenditure | 17.8 | 18.4 | 19.8 | 24.1 |  |  |  | 19.5 | 16.2 |  |
| OPM Margin | (2.4) | 8.5 | 10.6 | (3.1) |  |  |  | 2.6 | 8.3 |  |
| EBITDA Margin | (2.0) | 9.1 | 9.9 | (2.3) |  |  |  | 3.2 | 9.2 |  |
| PBT margin (\%) | (5.9) | 5.6 | 6.7 | (5.7) |  |  |  | (0.1) | 5.8 |  |
| PAT margin (\%) | (7.9) | 4.0 | 5.0 | (7.0) |  |  |  | (2.0) | 4.6 |  |
| Effective tax rate (\%) | 35.3 | (28.0) | 23.9 | (23.4) |  |  |  | $(1,608.8)$ | 27.7 |  |

Source: Company, KotAM Institutional Equities

Exhibit 2. Punj Lloyd (standalone) - 4QFY09 - key numbers (Rs mn)

|  |  | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 | (\% chg) |  | FY2009 | FY2008 | \% change |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 4QFY09 |  |  | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 |  |  |  |
| Net Sales | 19,771 | 14,994 | 17,907 | 31.9 | 10.4 | 68,880 | 44,886 | 53.5 |
| Expenditure | $(18,070)$ | $(12,574)$ | $(15,619)$ | 43.7 | 15.7 | $(61,477)$ | $(39,741)$ | 54.7 |
| Material | $(6,655)$ | $(4,953)$ | $(5,416)$ | 34.4 | 22.9 | $(23,364)$ | $(16,254)$ | 43.7 |
| Contractor charges | $(4,658)$ | $(2,839)$ | $(3,830)$ | 64.1 | 21.6 | $(15,722)$ | $(9,963)$ | 57.8 |
| Staff cost | $(1,586)$ | $(1,210)$ | $(1,440)$ | 31.1 | 10.1 | $(5,746)$ | $(3,585)$ | 60.3 |
| Other expenditure | $(5,172)$ | $(3,572)$ | $(4,933)$ | 44.8 | 4.8 | $(16,645)$ | $(9,939)$ | 67.5 |
| EBITDA | 1,701 | 2,421 | 2,289 | (29.7) | (25.7) | 7,402 | 5,144 | 43.9 |
| Other Income | 36 | 72 | 204 | (49.8) | (82.4) | 594 | 532 | 11.6 |
| PBIDT | 1,737 | 2,492 | 2,493 | (30.3) | (30.3) | 7,996 | 5,676 | 40.9 |
| Interest | (629) | (301) | (573) | 109.2 | 9.8 | $(1,943)$ | $(1,133)$ | 71.5 |
| Depreciation | (359) | (318) | (290) | 13.1 | 23.8 | $(1,195)$ | $(1,134)$ | 5.4 |
| Profit before Tax | 748 | 1,874 | 1,629 | (60.1) | (54.1) | 4,858 | 3,409 | 42.5 |
| Tax | (127) | (577) | (664) | (78.0) | (80.9) | $(1,676)$ | $(1,195)$ | 40.2 |
| Current | 234 | (549) | (588) | (142.6) | (139.8) | $(1,232)$ | $(1,033)$ | 19.3 |
| Deferred | (358) | (60) | (68) | 494.2 | 424.5 | (418) | (157) | 167.1 |
| Fringe benefit tax | (3) | 32 | (8) | (109.3) | (62.5) | (26) | (6) | 344.8 |
| Profit after Tax | 622 | 1,297 | 965 | (52.1) | (35.6) | 3,182 | 2,214 | 43.7 |
| Exceptional items | (25) | - | (72) |  | (64.9) | (97) | - |  |
| Net Profit | 596 | 1,297 | 893 | (54.0) | (33.2) | 3,085 | 2,214 | 39.3 |
| Key ratios |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Material | 33.7 | 33.0 | 30.2 |  |  | 33.9 | 36.2 |  |
| Contractor charges | 23.6 | 18.9 | 21.4 |  |  | 22.8 | 22.2 |  |
| Staff cost | 8.0 | 8.1 | 8.0 |  |  | 8.3 | 8.0 |  |
| Other expenditure | 26.2 | 23.8 | 27.5 |  |  | 24.2 | 22.1 |  |
| OPM Margin | 8.6 | 16.1 | 12.8 |  |  | 10.7 | 11.5 |  |
| PBIDT margin (\%) | 8.8 | 16.5 | 13.8 |  |  | 11.5 | 12.5 |  |
| PAT margin (\%) | 3.0 | 8.7 | 5.0 |  |  | 4.5 | 4.9 |  |
| Effective tax rate (\%) | (16.9) | (30.8) | (40.8) |  |  | (34.5) | (35.1) |  |

Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 3. Key orders won by Punj Lloyd since FY2008 (Rs mn)

| Date | Segment | Client | Value (Rs mn) | Group entity | Description |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 16-Apr-09 | Infrastructure | Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation | 3,080 | Punj Lloyd | Construction of 8 stations |
| 15-Jan-09 | Infrastructure | Housing and Infra board | 13,112 | Punj Lloyd | Utilities in Souk Al Juma, Tripoli, Libya |
| 7-Jan-09 | Infrastructure | Housing and Infra board | 10,501 | Punj Lloyd | EPC of infra in Tripoli, Libya |
| 7-Jan-09 | Oil and Gas | Cairn India | 1,046 | Punj Lloyd | EPC of pipeline |
| 6-Jan-09 | Infrastructure | Airports Authority of India | 2,640 | Punj Lloyd | Sikkim's first greenfield airport |
| 23-Dec-08 | Infrastructure | Municipal Corp, Delhi | 3,040 | Punj Lloyd | Parking facility near JN Stadium, N Delhi |
| 20-Oct-08 | Oil and Gas | PT Shell Indonesia | 1,069 | PT Punj Lloyd Indonesia | New Fuel Terminal at Kalimantan |
| 23-Sep-08 | Oil and Gas | Qatar Petroleum | 36,360 | Punj Lloyd | 211 km of pipeline |
| 18-Jul-08 | Process | Abu Dhabi Polymers Company | 4,640 | Punj Lloyd | Mechanical works for Borouge project |
| 9-Sep-08 | Process | FWP Joint Venture | 1,670 | Punj Lloyd | Mechanical works for utilities at Jurong Island |
| 3-Jul-08 | Infrastructure | GVK Power Limited, Hyderabad | 10,050 | Punj Lloyd | Balance of Plant work (BOP) and entire Civil work on EPC basis |
| 6-Jun-08 | Process | Indian Oil Corporation Limited | 6,490 | Punj Lloyd | Lump-sum turnkey contract to upgrade the refinery at Barauni |
| 30-Apr-08 | Process | PT Makmur Sejahtera Wisesa, Indonesia | 3,300 | PT Punj Lloyd Indonesia and Punj Lloyd Pte Ltd, Singapore | EPC project for $2 \times 30$ MW Coal Power Plant in Kalimantan Island, Indonesia |
| 11-Apr-08 |  |  | 18,640 | Punj Lloyd Ltd and Punj Lloyd Pte Ltd., Singapore | Technipont SPA order for Rs3.5 bn |
| 11-Apr-08 |  |  | 970 | Sembawang Infrastructure (India) Pvt Ltd |  |
| Order booked in FY2009 |  |  | 116,607 |  |  |
| 31-Mar-08 | Process | Tecnimont S.p.A (Italy) | 2,720 | Punj Lloyd | Mechanical work PE3 and PH areas |
| 7-Mar-08 | Oil and Gas | Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd, Malasia | 20,150 | Punj Lloyd | EPC and commissioning of a $512 \mathrm{~km}, 36$ inch diameter onshore natural gas pipeline and associated facilities |
| 14-Feb-08 | Civil, Infrastructure and Power | Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd, Singapore | 11,192 | Sembawang Engineers and Constructors | Construction of the North Podium in the integrated resort comprising casino, theatres and retail arcade |
| 12-Dec-07 | Process | Indian Oil Corporation | 5,900 | Punj Lloyd | Construction of coker unit \& block for the Vadodara refinery in Gujarat |
| 30-Nov-07 | Civil, Infrastructure and Power | Land Transport Authority, Singapore | 12,720 | Sembawang Engineers and Constructors | Construction of the MRT station in Marina Bay in Singapore |
| 5-Nov-07 | Process | Jurong Aromatics Corporation Pte Ltd, Singapore | 17,700 | Sembawang Engineers and Constructors | EPC work for a new mega aromatics plant at Jurong island |
| 12-Oct-07 | Oil and Gas | Qatar Petroleum | 3,890 | Punj Lloyd | EPC on LSTK basis of 46 km of $18^{\prime \prime}$ multiproduct pipeline |
| 6-Aug-07 | Process | Bharat Oman Refineries Limited | 5,900 | Punj Lloyd | Lump-sum turnkey contract for building a sulphur block at Bina Refinery |
| 2-Aug-07 | Civil, Infrastructure and Power | Sentosa Pte Ltd, subsidiary of Genting Group | 6,660 | Sembawang Engineers and Constructors | Sub-structural works at Sentosa Integrated Resort Development |
| 27-Jul-07 | Oil and Gas | Reliance Gas Transportation Infrastructure Ltd | 3,180 | Punj Lloyd | Laying of pipeline \& associated facilities for East-West Pipeline project |
| 23-Jul-07 | Oil and Gas | Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company (SABIC) | 1587(a) | Dayim Punj Lloyd Construction Contracting Company Ltd | EPC of tanks at Jubail Industrial city, Saudi Arabia |
| 20-Jul-07 | Process | Gulf Fluor | 500(b) | Simon Carves Ltd. | Fluorides plant incorporating a new Sulphuric Acid plant |
| 14-May-07 | Oil and Gas | GAIL (India) Ltd | 1,227 | Punj Lloyd | Phase II of Panvel - Dabhol Pipeline |
| 16-Apr-07 | Oil and Gas | Oman Gas Company | 5,300 | Punj Lloyd | 24", 40 Km pipeline |
| 19-Apr-07 | Oil and Gas | Ras Laffan Olefins Company Ltd, USA | 1,935 | Punj Lloyd | Ethylene pipeline |
| 23-Apr-07 | Oil and Gas | Reliance Gas Transportation Infrastructure Ltd | 1,802 | Punj Lloyd | 48", 122 Km pipeline |
| Total orders announced in FY2008 |  |  | 100,275 |  |  |

(a) Estimated share of Punj Llyod
(b) Estimated order value

Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities

## Exhibit 4. Geographical mix of order backlog of Punj Lloyd group



Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities

## Exhibit 5. Sector-wise order backlog of Punj Lloyd group (Rs bn)



Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities

| Media |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| HTML.BO, Rs71 |  |
| Rating | BUY |
| Sector coverage view | Attractive |
| Target Price (Rs) | 100 |
| $52 W$ High -Low (Rs) | $146-36$ |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) | 16.7 |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | 2010E | 2011E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 13.6 | 15.2 | 17.0 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 0.2 | 0.8 | 1.4 |
| EPS (Rs) | 0.8 | 3.5 | 6.0 |
| EPS gth | $(80.4)$ | 311.0 | 70.9 |
| P/E (x) | 84.1 | 20.5 | 12.0 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 17.6 | 8.2 | 6.0 |
| Div yield (\%) | 0.6 | 1.1 | 2.9 |

Pricing performance
Perf-1m
Perf-3m Perf-6m $\quad$ Perf-1y

| Shareholding, March 2009 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Pattern | \% of <br> Portfolio | Over/(under) weight |
| Promoters | 68.7 | - | - |
| Flls | 15.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| MFs | 12.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| UTI | - | - | - |
| LIC | - | - | - |

## HT Media: 4QFY09 standalone results largely in line with expectations but surprisingly weak FY2009 consolidated financials

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- 4QFY09 ad revenue growth of $4 \%$ but robust circulation revenue growth of $11 \%$
- Lower-than-expected RM costs reflect cost rationalization implemented by HTML
- FY2009 consolidated financials impacted by weak subsidiary performance
- Retain ADD with 12-month DCF-based TP of Rs100; core operations improving but uncertainty on subsidiary financials may constrain stock performance

HT Media (HTML) reported 4QFY09 results with a 26\% yoy decline in EBITDA at Rs439 mn versus our Rs512 mn expectation; the variance largely stems from bonus provision in 4QFY09 employee expenses (Rs80 mn). HTML 4QFY09 ad revenues at Rs 2.8 bn were in line with expectations, but circulation revenues at Rs410 mn were ahead of our Rs390 mn estimate; thus, we believe the core business performance of HTML (standalone) remains on track for substantial improvement in FY2010E. However, consolidated FY2009 results disappointed with 41\% yoy decline in EBITDA at Rs1 bn, much below our Rs1.5 bn expectation; the variance resulted from higher-than-expected losses in the Internet and Metro Now subsidiaries, which are being restructured as per the management. We remain positive on the long-term prospects of HTML given multiple business drivers (HT Delhi, Hindustan, HT Mumbai, Mint and now, FM radio and sharp decline in newsprint prices); however, full valuations (see Exhibit 2) and uncertainty over subsidiary financials may constrain near-term stock performance. We retain our ADD rating and 12-month DCFbased target price of Rs100 on DCF roll-forward balanced by revised subsidiary financials; our revised FY2010E and FY2011E consolidated EPS estimates our Rs3.5 (Rs4.2 previously) and Rs6.0 (Rs7.1); we will revisit HTML's subsidiary financials after its FY2009 result concall tomorro; our standalone financials remain unchanged.

## Standalone 4QFY09 results analysis-improvement in core operations

Robust circulation revenues. HTML reported modest 4\% yoy growth in 4QFY09 ad revenues at Rs 2.8 bn, in line with our expectations; 3Q-4QFY09 has been an unusually difficult period for the media business with the ad revenue market and print media under a lot of pressure. However, signs of a revival are emerging with (1) the auto industry starting to advertise again and (2) expectation of robust recovery from BFSI and retail advertising starting 3QFY10E. HTML's circulation revenues grew a robust $11 \%$ yoy to Rs 410 mn versus our estimate of Rs390 mn, reflecting (1) more rational behavior in the print media market and on the part of HTML's competition given the pressure on ad revenues and (2) expansion of Hindustan in the Hindi-belt markets, where cover prices are usually high. We expect robust circulation revenues from HTML in FY2010E as a countercyclical force to pressure on ad revenues and scope for cover price increases in most markets (HT Mumbai, Mint, Hindustan).

EBITDA performance largely on expected lines. HTML's 4QFY09 EBITDA declined 27\% yoy to Rs439 mn versus our Rs512 mn expectation, the difference on account of Rs 80 mn bonus provision for FY2009. 4QFY09 raw material costs at Rs1.3 bn were largely in line with our expectations; RM costs increased a moderate15\% yoy despite almost 25-30\% yoy increase in newsprint prices and Hindustan expansion, largely on account of robust cost rationalization program implemented by the company. Employee and other operating expenditure were also higher on account of consolidation of radio business in 4QFY09.

Nonetheless, we are a tad surprised by the decision of HTML management to reward employees; we would note that HTML's standalone EBITDA (excluding weak subsidiary financials) of Rs2 bn in FY2009 isn't very different from Rs1.9 bn EBITDA in FY2007. The stock performance has mirrored the weak operating performance of the company. Arguably, FY2009 has been a challenging year given (1) high newsprint prices, (2) weak ad revenue market and (3) investment in new businesses. Nonetheless, we would have appreciated HTML's signal to reign in costs and follow the example of other media companies (BCCL, DMCL etc.).

## Consolidated FY2009 results analysis—disappointing

Weaker-than-expected subsidiary financials. HTML's FY2009 consolidated EBITDA declined $41 \%$ yoy to Rs1 bn, below our Rs 1.5 bn expectation; weaker-than-expected financials in the Internet and Metro Now subsidiaries were the key drivers even though radio business performance was in line with our expectations. HTML started its Metro Now business in FY2008 (English tabloid daily in Delhi) in association with BCCL, the publishers of Tol; Metro Now reported a PAT loss of Rs330 mn in FY2009, of which HTML's share ( $50 \%$ ) was about Rs 165 mn . HTML started its Internet business in FY2008 with the launch of its careers website, Shine.com; the internet venture reported a PAT loss of Rs 350 mn in FY2009. The timing of both the launches coincided with the downturn in the market, which has hurt emerging businesses more than established ones.

Future of subsidiaries and some clarifications. HTML management highlighted that they have already decided to scale back investments in Metro Now; we view this positively as HTML (also BCCL) has a leadership presence in Delhi (Café, Brunch; supplements with HT Delhi). The management also noted the higher-than-expected losses in the Internet subsidiary was on account of launch expenses of Shine (Rs100 mn, largely marketing). HTML does not expect any losses in Metro Now and reduction in Internet losses ( $\sim$ Rs200 mn in FY2010E) going forward. Nonetheless, we built in losses of Rs 120 mn in Metro Now and Rs310 mn in Internet in FY2010E. We are unable to reconcile the difference (Rs380 mn; Rs200 mn on account of Metro Now and Rs50 mn on account of HT Burda) between consolidated and standalone EBIT of the publishing business and would seek clarification in the results concall tomorrow.

## Expectations, valuations, earnings changes

Long-term view unchanged but near-term uncertainty overhang. Our long-term positive view on HTML remains unchanged given multiple business drivers (HT Delhi, Hindustan, HT Mumbai, Mint and Fever FM). We believe the stock price is factoring in only the value of existing profitable businesses and not attributing any value to emerging businesses (HT Mumbai, Mint, Radio). We note that FM Radio is likely to contribute positively to EBITDA in FY2010E. HT Mumbai and Mint have maintained a stable ad revenue run rate in a challenging ad revenue market. The print properties are also going to benefit from lower newsprint prices in FY2010E and FY2011E, given strong correlation of global newsprint prices with world economic growth that is likely to remain subdued. HTML expects HT Mumbai and Mint to achieve EBITDA breakeven in 2HFY11E contingent upon the recovery in ad revenue market.

HTML's valuations at 20.5X consolidated FY2010E EPS estimates largely factor in near-term expectations. Also, 1QFY10E results are going to provide much respite given high-cost newsprint inventory with HTML and continued weakness in ad revenue market; any sustainable financial recovery will only start from 2Q-3QFY10E led by lower newsprint prices (first) and recovery in ad revenue market (thereafter). Therefore, we retain our ADD rating but would opportunistically use any fall in stock price (Rs60 levels, over the next 3-6 months) as a buying opportunity (for the next 9-12 months). We believe improvement in core operations (see our note "IRS 2009 Round 1 analysis" dated May 10, 2009) is more important than near-term pressures. HTML trades at an inexpensive 12.6X standalone FY2010E EPS estimates.

Fine-tuned subsidiary financials. We have revised HTML's earnings estimates to factor in consolidated FY2009 financials. Our revised FY2010E and FY2011E EPS estimates are Rs3.5 (Rs4.2 previously) and Rs6.0 (Rs7.1).

- Revised subsidiary financials. As noted previously, we are now factoring in losses of Rs119 mn in Metro Now and Rs312 mn in the Internet subsidiary for FY2010E. We were particularly surprised by the weak performance of Metro Now as both HTML and BCCL and leading prime media players in Delhi and would had no issues in production, distribution, marketing or ad space sales of the newspaper.
- Lower newsprint prices. We have revised our FY2010E international newsprint price to US\$675/ton versus US\$700/ton previously due to the sharper-than-expected fall in prices in recent months. Our revised FY2010E and FY2011E production costs of HTML are Rs6.9 bn (Rs7.2 bn previously) and Rs7.5 bn (Rs7.7 bn previously). Our standalone EBITDA estimates have increased as a result of these changes.

HT Media interim results, March fiscal year-ends (Rs mn)

|  | 2010E | qoq |  |  | yoy |  |  | yoy |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 4QFY09 | 3QFY09 | \% chg | 4QFY09 | 4QFY08 | \% chg | FY2009 | FY2008 | \% chg |
| Revenues | 15,172 | 3,375 | 3,371 | - | 3,375 | 3,134 | 8 | 13,591 | 12,033 | 13 |
| Advertisement revenues | 12,235 | 2,797 | 2,866 | (2) | 2,797 | 2,686 | 4 | 11,334 | 10,137 | 12 |
| Circulation revenues | 1,773 | 410 | 390 | 5 | 410 | 370 | 11 | 1,560 | 1,449 | 8 |
| Other operating revenue | 1,165 | 168 | 115 | 46 | 168 | 78 | 117 | 697 | 447 | 56 |
| Total expenditure | $(13,020)$ | $(2,936)$ | $(2,914)$ | 1 | $(2,936)$ | $(2,532)$ | 16 | $(12,587)$ | $(10,334)$ | 22 |
| Inc/(Dec) in inventories | - | (2) | 1 |  | (2) | (2) |  | 1 | (4) |  |
| Raw material costs | $(5,703)$ | $(1,283)$ | $(1,463)$ | (12) | $(1,283)$ | $(1,118)$ | 15 | $(5,589)$ | $(4,640)$ | 20 |
| Employee costs | $(2,536)$ | (594) | (495) | 20 | (594) | (497) | 19 | $(2,419)$ | $(1,983)$ | 22 |
| Sales and marketing | $(1,517)$ | (290) | (275) | 5 | (290) | (260) | 11 | $(1,541)$ | $(1,152)$ | 34 |
| Other expenditure | $(3,264)$ | (768) | (682) | 13 | (768) | (654) | 17 | $(3,039)$ | $(2,555)$ | 19 |
| EBITDA | 2,152 | 439 | 457 | (4) | 439 | 601 | (27) | 1,004 | 1,699 | (41) |
| Other income | 194 | 64 | 46 | 41 | 64 | 123 | (48) | 206 | 439 | (53) |
| Interest \& finance charges | (380) | (91) | (101) | (10) | (91) | (43) | 111 | (323) | (178) | 81 |
| Depreciation and amortization | (742) | (155) | (138) | 13 | (155) | (117) | 33 | (688) | (570) | 21 |
| Pretax profits | 1,224 | 256 | 263 | (3) | 256 | 564 | (55) | 198 | 1,390 | (86) |
| Extraordinary items | 0 | (60) | (128) |  | (60) | 4 |  | (190) | - |  |
| Provision for tax | (460) | 42 | (47) | (190) | 42 | (143) | (129) | (86) | (337) | (75) |
| Deferred tax | 54 | - | - |  | - | - |  | - | - |  |
| Fringe benefit tax | - | (4) | (11) |  | (4) | (10) |  | (39) | (39) |  |
| Net income | 818 | 234 | 78 | 200 | 234 | 416 | (44) | 9 | 1,013 | (99) |
| Tax rate (\%) | 33 | (19) | 42 |  | (19) | 27 |  | 1,403 | 27 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBITDA margin (\%) | 14.2 | 13.0 | 13.6 |  | 13.0 | 19.2 |  | 7.4 | 14.1 |  |

Note:
(a) Annual figures represent consolidated numbers with radio, internet and metro now business while quarterly figures represent standalone numbers.

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

## Estimate of implied valuation of emerging businesses of HT Media (Rs mn)

|  | Comments |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Valuation of mature businesses |  | English (HT) and Hindi (Hindustan) |
| FY2010E EBITDA of HT Delhi edition | 2,317 | Flagship print brand, growing at 4-6\% normalized over time |
| Appropriate EV/EBITDA multiple (X) | 7.0 | New printing facilities for HT Delhi in FY2008 |
| FY2010E EBITDA of HT (other) and Hindustan editions | 752 | Robust 15-20\% growth, EBITDA depressed due to new editions |
| Appropriate EV/EBITDA multiple (X) | 8.0 | New printing facilities for Hindustan in FY2009E-2010E |
| Valuation of mature businesses | 22,236 |  |
| 2. Valuation of investments |  |  |
| Net cash position at end-FY2009E | $(1,933)$ |  |
| Total value of investments | $(1,933)$ |  |
| Valuation of HTML ex-emerging businesses | 20,303 |  |
| Enterprise value of HTML | 19,717 |  |
| 3. Valuation of emerging businesses |  | Emerging media businesses |
| Implied value of new media businesses | (586) |  |
| FY2010E revenues of HT Mumbai edition | 1,349 | Circulation of 0.43 mn copies, complements presense in metro market of Delhi |
| FY2010E revenues of HT Mint business newspaper | 500 | Circulation of 0.13 mn copies, Number two in metro markets of Delhi and Mumbai |
| FY2010E revenues of Radio business | 470 | Stations in metro markets of Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Kolkata |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

HT Media's various media properties at their stages of evolution


Notes:
(a) The trend lines represent movement of cash flow to support capex and operating loss

Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

India Daily Summary - May 19, 2009

Our DCF-based target price for HTML is Rs100
Discounted cash flow analysis of HT Media (Rs mn)

|  | 2010E | 2011E | 2012E | 2013E | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E | 2017E | 2018E | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EBITDA | 2,152 | 2,885 | 3,633 | 4,345 | 5,138 | 5,814 | 6,303 | 6,543 | 6,511 | 6,814 | 7,155 | 7,512 | 7,888 |
| Tax expense | (699) | (840) | $(1,075)$ | $(1,310)$ | $(1,574)$ | $(1,798)$ | $(1,952)$ | $(2,054)$ | $(2,085)$ | $(2,222)$ |  |  |  |
| Changes in working capital | (265) | (269) | (300) | (301) | (311) | (328) | (286) | (276) | (218) | (295) |  |  |  |
| Cash flow from operations | 1,189 | 1,777 | 2,258 | 2,734 | 3,253 | 3,689 | 4,065 | 4,213 | 4,208 | 4,298 |  |  |  |
| Capital expenditure | $(1,040)$ | (824) | (848) | (873) | (898) | (925) | (952) | (980) | $(1,008)$ | $(1,038)$ |  |  |  |
| Cash flows for minority interest | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |  |  |
| Free cash flow to the firm | 148 | 953 | 1,410 | 1,861 | 2,354 | 2,764 | 3,113 | 3,233 | 3,199 | 3,260 | 3,423 | 3,594 | 3,774 |
| Dicounted cash flow-now | 132 | 748 | 975 | 1,133 | 1,263 | 1,307 | 1,296 | 1,186 | 1,034 | 928 |  |  |  |
| Discounted cash flow-1 year forward |  | 849 | 1,107 | 1,286 | 1,434 | 1,483 | 1,472 | 1,346 | 1,173 | 1,053 | 975 |  |  |
| Discounted cash flow-2 year forward |  |  | 1,256 | 1,460 | 1,627 | 1,683 | 1,670 | 1,528 | 1,332 | 1,196 | 1,106 | 1,023 |  |

Discount rate (\%)

| Fiscal year-end (March 31, XXXX) | 31-Mar-10 | 31-Mar-11 | 31-Mar-12 | 31-Mar-13 | 31-Mar-14 | 31-Mar-15 | 31-Mar-16 | 31-Mar-17 | 31-Mar-18 | 31-Mar-19 | 31-Mar-20 | 31-Mar-21 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Today | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 | 1-May-09 |
| Years left | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| Discount factor at WACC | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 |


|  | + 1-year | + 2-years |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total PV of free cash flow (a) | 12,177 | 50\% | 13,882 | 52\% |
| FCF in terminal year | 3,594 |  | 3,774 |  |
| Exit FCF multiple ( $X$ ) | 11.8 |  | 11.8 |  |
| Terminal value | 42,281 |  | 44,395 |  |
| PV of terminal value (b) | 12,038 | 50\% | 12,640 | 48\% |
| $\mathrm{EV}(\mathrm{a})+$ (b) | 24,215 |  | 26,522 |  |
| EV (USS mn) | 526 |  | 577 |  |
| Net debt | 923 |  | 573 |  |
| Equity value | 23,292 |  | 25,949 |  |
| Implied share price (Rs) | 99 |  | 111 |  |
| Exit EV/EBITDA multiple (X) | 6.2 |  | 6.2 |  |


| Sensitivity of share price to different levels of WACC and growth rate (Rs)WACC (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 12.0 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 14.0 | 14.5 | 15.0 |
| 1.0 | 94 | 89 | 84 | 80 | 76 | 73 | 70 |
| 2.0 | 99 | 93 | 88 | 84 | 80 | 76 | 72 |
| 3.0 | 105 | 99 | 93 | 88 | 83 | 79 | 75 |
| 4.0 | 113 | 106 | 99 | 93 | 88 | 83 | 79 |
| 5.0 | 123 | 114 | 106 | 99 | 93 | 88 | 83 |
| 6.0 | 137 | 125 | 116 | 107 | 100 | 94 | 88 |
| 7.0 | 156 | 141 | 128 | 118 | 109 | 101 | 94 |
| 8.0 | 184 | 163 | 146 | 132 | 121 | 111 | 103 |
| 9.0 | 231 | 198 | 172 | 153 | 137 | 124 | 114 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

Profit model, balance sheet, cash model of HT Media 2006-2013E, March fiscal year-ends (Rs mn)

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3 E}$ |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Profit model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 8,210 | 10,397 | 12,033 | 13,591 | 15,172 | 16,951 | 18,974 | 20,886 |
| EBITDA | $\mathbf{1 , 1 8 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 6 8 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 6 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 0 0 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 1 5 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 8 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{3 , 6 3 3}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 3 4 5}$ |
| Other income | 177 | 367 | 439 | 206 | 194 | 207 | 227 | 233 |
| Interest | $(135)$ | $(143)$ | $(178)$ | $(323)$ | $(380)$ | $(380)$ | $(353)$ | $(298)$ |
| Depreciation | $(385)$ | $(436)$ | $(570)$ | $(688)$ | $(742)$ | $(621)$ | $(673)$ | $(726)$ |
| Pretax profits | $\mathbf{8 4 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 4 6 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 3 9 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 2 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 0 9 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 8 3 4}$ | $\mathbf{3 , 5 5 3}$ |
| Extraordinary items | $(229)$ | 2 | - | $(190)$ | - | - | - | - |
| Tax | $(65)$ | $(573)$ | $(520)$ | $(125)$ | $(460)$ | $(697)$ | $(957)$ | $(1,209)$ |
| Deferred taxation | $(174)$ | 27 | 143 | - | 54 | 3 | 8 | 15 |
| Net income | $\mathbf{3 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{9 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{( 1 1 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{8 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 3 9 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 8 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 3 5 9}$ |
| Minority interest | - | $(46)$ | - | $(125)$ | - | - | - | - |
| Adjusted net income | $\mathbf{5 3 7}$ | $\mathbf{9 6 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 0}$ | $\mathbf{8 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 3 9 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 8 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 3 5 9}$ |
| Earnings per share (Rs) | $\mathbf{2 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 . 1}$ |


| Balance sheet | 6,932 | 7,642 | 8,529 | 8,429 | 9,027 | 9,853 | 10,966 | 11,945 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Total equity | - | - | 1 | $(124)$ | $(124)$ | $(124)$ | $(124)$ | $(124)$ |
| Minority interest | 296 | 273 | 122 | 122 | 68 | 64 | 56 | 41 |
| Deferred taxation liability | 1,696 | 1,658 | 2,231 | 3,458 | 3,458 | 3,458 | 2,958 | 2,458 |
| Total borrowings | 1,809 | 2,113 | 2,804 | 2,953 | 3,014 | 3,192 | 3,424 | 3,564 |
| Current liabilities | $\mathbf{1 0 , 7 3 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 , 6 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 , 6 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 , 8 3 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 , 4 4 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 , 4 4 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 , 2 7 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 , 8 8 3}$ |
| Total liabilities and equity | 2,678 | 1,104 | 774 | 497 | 478 | 829 | 959 | 975 |
| Cash | 3,276 | 2,863 | 4,425 | 5,102 | 5,428 | 5,874 | 6,406 | 6,848 |
| Other current assets | 3,736 | 4,109 | 4,752 | 6,189 | 6,562 | 6,840 | 7,090 | 7,312 |
| Total fixed assets | 182 | 1,098 | 1,078 | 1,003 | 927 | 852 | 777 | 702 |
| Intangible assets | 861 | 2,510 | 2,656 | 2,056 | 2,056 | 2,056 | 2,056 | 2,056 |
| Investments | $\mathbf{1 0 , 7 3 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 , 6 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 , 6 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 , 8 4 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 , 4 5 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 , 4 5 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 , 2 9 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 , 8 9 4}$ |
| Total assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Free cash flow

| Operating cash flow, excl. working capita | 757 | 1,194 | 1,064 | 566 | 1,312 | 1,808 | 2,323 | 2,838 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Working capital changes | $(232)$ | $(226)$ | $(131)$ | $(528)$ | $(265)$ | $(269)$ | $(300)$ | $(301)$ |
| Capital expenditure | $(327)$ | $(867)$ | $(1,196)$ | $(2,050)$ | $(1,040)$ | $(824)$ | $(848)$ | $(873)$ |
| Investments | 388 | $(319)$ | $(325)$ | 600 | - | - | - | - |
| Other income | 130 | 197 | 298 | 206 | 194 | 207 | 227 | 233 |
| Free cash flow | $\mathbf{7 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{( 2 1 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 2 9 0 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 1 , 2 0 5 )}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1}$ | $\mathbf{9 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 4 0 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 8 9 6}$ |


| Ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Debt/equity | 23.5 | 20.9 | 25.8 | 40.4 | 38.0 | 34.9 | 26.8 | 20.5 |
| Net debt/equity | $(13.6)$ | 7.0 | 16.8 | 34.6 | 32.8 | 26.5 | 18.1 | 12.4 |
| ROAE (\%) | 9.4 | 12.8 | 12.2 | 0.9 | 9.3 | 14.7 | 18.0 | 20.5 |
| ROACE (\%) | $\mathbf{1 2 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 . 9}$ |

Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| Property |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| SOBH.BO, Rs131 |  |
| Rating | REDUCE |
| Sector coverage view | Neutral |
| Target Price (Rs) | 90 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) | $570-61$ |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) | 9.6 |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 10.9 | 11.1 | 15.1 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.1 |
| EPS (Rs) | 15.9 | 11.9 | 14.7 |
| EPS gth | $(50.0)$ | $(24.8)$ | 23.5 |
| P/E (x) | 8.3 | 11.0 | 8.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 8.8 | 12.1 | 10.9 |
| Div yield (\%) | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 |

Pricing performance

|  |  |  |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Perf-1m | Perf-3m | Perf-6m | Perf-1y |
| 31.6 | 61.2 | 45.8 | $(76.5)$ |

## Shareholding, March 2009

|  | \% of <br> Pattern |  | Over/(under) <br> weight |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Promoters | 87.0 | - | - |
| FIls | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| MFs | - | - | - |
| UTI | - | - | - |
| LIC | - | - | - |

## Sobha Developers: Balance sheet restructuring key for stock performance

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- Sharp slowdown in Bangalore real estate results in 32\% yoy drop in revenues and 52\% yoy drop in PAT for FY2009
- Equity raising needed to improve debt serviceability; will result in lower D/E and better interest coverage ratio
- Sobha taking right steps by rationalizing prices; better placed to attract demand because of its good brand image in Bangalore

Sobha Developers (Sobha) reported revenues of Rs1.4 bn (down 70\% yoy and 36\% below estimates) and PAT of Rs27 mn (down 64\% qoq, 96\% yoy) for 4QFY09. Results indicate continued slowdown in Bangalore real estate market and reduced construction pace on account of tight liquidity. Sharp slowdown in core market and large investments in land bank acquisition is putting pressure on balance sheet. Therefore, balance sheet restructuring will be the most important stock driver. Our comfort level for interest servicing is around Rs1.5 bn/annum and for this debt levels need to recede by around Rs7 bn. In order to achieve the same, Sobha needs to sell a few land assets and raise additional equity to improve balance sheet strength. We also highlight that Sobha is taking the right steps by rationalizing prices in Bangalore to attract demand. We currently maintain our REDUCE rating on the stock with a target price of Rs90/share based on $50 \%$ discount to our Mar'10-based NAV of Rs185. Upside risks to our target price include (1) improvement in real estate environment in Bangalore, (2) reduction in 50\% discount due to improved liquidity scenario or successful balance sheet restructuring. Debt as a proportion of land bank valuation is largest for Sobha and therefore NAV sensitivity to valuation of land reserves is very high for the company.

## Results reflects weak demand scenario, slow pace of construction

Sobha announced revenues of Rs9.7 bn (down 32\% yoy) and PAT of Rs1.1 bn (down 52\% yoy) for FY2009. We note that Sobha has been adversely affected by the weak demand scenario in FY2009 and its investment in expansion across cities which led to leveraging of balance sheet. This slowdown came on the back of $45 \%$ revenue growth and $88 \%$ PAT growth for FY2005-08 period. Including FY2009, revenue growth for FY2005-09 dips to $20 \%$ and PAT growth dips to $35 \%$. Operational performance of various divisions is as discussed below.

Residential real estate. We note that Sobha has more than 30 projects aggregating 9.3 mn sq . ft under construction in residential category. Low affordability in Bangalore real estate market has severely affected sales and Sobha is taking steps to reduce prices in Bangalore to revive demand. We believe the good brand image of Sobha places it relatively better amongst its peers. We model Sobha to sell 2.2 mn sq . ft in FY2010E and 3.6 mn sq. ft in FY2011E.

Contractual business. This division is highly dependent on growth in the IT industry. Sobha has 34 projects aggregating 5.9 mn sq . ft under contracts from Infosys and other leading companies in India. Sharp slowdown has resulted in area under execution dipping from 7.3 mn sq. ft as at end-2QFY09.

## Equity raising needed to allay investor's concerns regarding high leverage

We note that the present level of EBITDA of Rs2.6 bn in FY2009 is just sufficient to service interest of around Rs2.5 bn (@ average interest rate of $14 \%$ on Rs18 bn of debt). The management has indicated a long-term capital requirement of Rs7.5 bn during FY2010E as the management intends to bring its D/E below 1 . Sobha has already successfully negotiated with most lenders for rescheduling the debt repayments in the near term and also plans to dispose certain land parcels in which projects cannot be launched in the near future.

We highlight that during the year Sobha received an amount of Rs 475 mn towards the rights issue, which is low compared to the outstanding debt of the company. Sobha will have to refund this advance from promoters towards share subscription by Sept' 09.

## Change in accounting policy creating further volatility in EBITDA margins

With effect from 1QFY09, Sobha has changed its accounting policy for revenue recognition for sale of undivided share of land (group housing) on the basis of 20\% level of collection of dues from the customer and/or agreement for sale being executed rather than criteria relating to the project reaching a significant level of completion. Thus, Sobha would now recognize full land cost (plus margins) for the sold portion as and when level of collection exceeds $20 \%$. We note that such an accounting policy is likely to lead to faster revenue booking as revenues corresponding to land sales will get recognized faster. However, in a period when new sales are minimal, EBITDA margins will tend to get depressed.

We note that such an accounting policy raises issues that what proportion of margins from a sale of project will get recognized on account of land revenues. Management has indicated accounting policy has been changed as sale of apartments were translating into revenue bookings with a lag of 3-4 quarters. We highlight the impact of this change quarter wise below.

1QFY09. Additional revenue recognition and higher PBT of Rs321 mn and Rs150 mn, respectively.

2QFY09. Additional revenue recognition and higher PBT of Rs163 mn and Rs99 mn, respectively.

3QFY09. Lower revenue recognition and lower PBT of Rs393 mn and Rs236 mn, respectively.

4QFY09. Lower revenue recognition and lower PBT of Rs31 mn and Rs2 mn, respectively
The net impact over FY09 is additional revenue recognition and higher PBT of Rs60 mn and Rs 15 mn , respectively.

## We maintain REDUCE rating with target price of Rs90/share

Our target price of Rs90/share is based on a $50 \%$ discount to our Mar'10-based NAV of Rs185/share. We have a discount to $50 \%$ on account of-(1) financial condition (leverage of 1.9 X as of Dec' 08 compared to 0.7 X as of Mar'07) in a tight liquidity environment, (2) cost pressures in contractual business, and (3) lower capital efficiency ratios. Debt as proportion of land bank valuation is largest for Sobha and therefore NAV sensitivity to valuation of land reserves is very high for the company. A $1 \%$ change in valuation of land reserves can increase the NAV by $2.5 \%$.

India Daily Summary - May 19, 2009

Sobha Developers :4QFY2009 results

| (in Rs mn) | 4QFY08 | 3QFY09 | 4QFY09 | \% change |  | Kotak estimates |  | FY08A | FY09A | $\frac{\text { Change (\%) }}{\text { FY09/FY08 }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | qo9 | yoy | 4QFY09 | deviation |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 4,741 | 1,805 | 1,404 | (22.2) | (70.4) | 2,200 | (36.2) | 14,226 | 9,679 | (32.0) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operating costs | $(3,661)$ | $(1,330)$ | $(1,202)$ | (9.6) | (67.2) | $(1,550)$ | (22.5) | $(10,689)$ | $(7,050)$ | (34.0) |
| (Increase)/Decrease intock in inventories | 874 | 811 | 1,135 | 40.0 | 29.9 |  |  | 4,063 |  |  |
| Land cost expenses | $(1,089)$ | (428) | $(1,224)$ | 186.0 | 12.4 |  |  | $(3,900)$ | $(2,453)$ |  |
| Construction expenses \& raw materials | $(2,529)$ | $(1,117)$ | (628) | (43.8) | (75.2) |  |  | $(7,887)$ | $(2,051)$ |  |
| Staff cost | (302) | (248) | (242) | (2.4) | (19.9) |  |  | $(1,025)$ | $(1,009)$ |  |
| Other administrative expenses | (615) | (348) | (243) | (30.2) | (60.5) |  |  | $(1,940)$ | $(1,537)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBITDA | 1,080 | 475 | 202 | (57.5) | (81.3) | 650 | (68.9) | 3,537 | 2,629 | (25.7) |
| Other income | 24 | 71 | 115 | 62.0 | 379.2 | 20 |  | 119 | 225 | 89.1 |
| Interest costs | (192) | (286) | (201) | (29.7) | 4.7 | (300) |  | (597) | $(1,039)$ | 74.0 |
| Depreciation | (92) | (91) | (91) | 0.0 | (1.1) | (90) |  | (350) | (360) | 2.9 |
| PBT | 820 | 169 | 25 | (85.2) | (97.0) | 280 |  | 2,709 | 1,455 | -46.3 |
| Taxes | (118) | (94) | 2 | (102.1) | (101.7) | (98) |  | (426) | (358) | -16.0 |
| PAT | 702 | 75 | 27 | (64.0) | (96.2) | 182 | (85.2) | 2,283 | 1,097 | (51.9) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Key ratios |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBITDA margin (\%) | 22.8 | 26.3 | 14.4 |  |  | 29.5 |  | 24.9 | 27.2 |  |
| PAT margin (\%) | 14.8 | 4.2 | 1.9 |  |  | 8.3 |  | 16.0 | 11.3 |  |
| Effective tax rate (\%) | 14.4 | 55.6 | (8.0) |  |  | 35.0 |  | 15.7 | 24.6 |  |

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

EBITDA margins have been volatile


[^1]
## We estimate March 2010 based NAV at Rs200/share

|  | March '09 based NAV Growth rate in selling prices |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0\% | 3\% | 5\% | 10\% |
| Valuation of land reserves | 20 | 29 | 34 | 55 |
| Residential projects | 24.1 | 28.3 | 31.4 | 39.6 |
| Commercial projects | (3.4) | 0.0 | 2.5 | 9.6 |
| Retail projects | (1.4) | 0.1 | 1.2 | 4.3 |
| Less: Land cost to be paid | (7) | (7) | (7) | (7) |
| Less: Net debt | (19) | (19) | (19) | (19) |
| Add: Contractual business | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Add: Balance 60 mn sq. ft (at avg. cost of Rs50/sq. ft) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| NAV | (1) | 8 | 13 | 34 |
| Total no. of shares (mn) |  |  |  | 73 |
| NAV/share |  |  |  | 185 |
| Target price @50\% discount to NAV |  |  |  | 90 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

India Daily Summary - May 19, 2009

Profit model of Sobha Developers, March fiscal year-ends, 2005-2011E (Rs mn)

|  | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total revenues | 4,629 | 6,277 | 11,865 | 14,311 | 9,679 | 11,139 | 15,104 |
| Land costs | $(1,054)$ | (781) | $(1,832)$ | $(4,333)$ | $(2,453)$ | $(1,010)$ | $(1,432)$ |
| Construction costs | $(2,344)$ | $(2,975)$ | $(5,222)$ | $(3,310)$ | $(2,051)$ | $(5,211)$ | $(7,564)$ |
| Employee costs | (221) | (286) | (707) | $(1,025)$ | $(1,009)$ | (980) | $(1,321)$ |
| SG\&A costs | (376) | (829) | $(1,542)$ | $(1,941)$ | $(1,537)$ | $(1,392)$ | $(1,737)$ |
| EBITDA | 634 | 1,407 | 2,563 | 3,703 | 2,629 | 2,545 | 3,050 |
| Other income | 23 | 8 | 29 | 53 | 225 | 126 | 171 |
| Interest | (109) | (219) | (481) | (615) | $(1,039)$ | $(1,258)$ | $(1,388)$ |
| Depreciation | (74) | (112) | (244) | (350) | (360) | (427) | (511) |
| Pretax profits | 473 | 1,083 | 1,866 | 2,791 | 1,455 | 987 | 1,322 |
| Extraordinary items | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Current tax | (123) | (188) | (251) | (510) | (358) | (149) | (293) |
| Deferred tax | (11) | (0) |  | 33 | - | 32 | 45 |
| Net income | 339 | 892 | 1,615 | 2,315 | 1,097 | 870 | 1,074 |
| Adjusted net income | 339 | 892 | 1,615 | 2,315 | 1,097 | 870 | 1,074 |


| EPS (Rs) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Primary | 5.3 | 14.0 | 24.5 | 31.7 | 15 | 12 | 15 |
| Fully diluted | 5.3 | 14.0 | 24.5 | 31.7 | 15 | 12 | 15 |

Shares outstanding (mn)

| Year end | 63 | 63 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Primary | 63 | 63 | 66 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| Fully diluted | 63 | 63 | 66 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |

## Cash flow per share (Rs)

| Primary |  |  |  |  |  |  | $(28$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Fully diluted | 7 | 15 | 28 | 6 |  | $(2)$ | $(0)$ |

## Growth (\%)

| Net income (adjusted) | 281 | 163 | 82 | 43 | $(53)$ | $(21)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EPS (adjusted) | 281 | 161 | 76 | 29 | $(53)$ | $(21)$ |
| DCF/share | 277 | 114 | 90 | $(1)$ | $(77)$ | $(126)$ |


| Cash tax rate (\%) | 26 | 17 | 13 | 18 | 25 | 15 | 2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Effective tax rate (\%) | 28 | 17 | 13 | 17 | 25 | 12 | 19 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

| Energy |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| BPCL.BO, Rs426 |  |
| Rating | SELL |
| Sector coverage view | Neutral |
| Target Price (Rs) | 425 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) | $444-206$ |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) | 140 |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1 E}$ |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 1,462 | 909 | 931 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 0.0 | 15.2 | 18.6 |
| EPS (Rs) | 0.0 | 42.0 | 51.5 |
| EPS gth | $(99.9)$ | $\# \# \# \# \#$ | 22.8 |
| P/E (x) | \#\#\#\#\# | 10.2 | 8.3 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 8.2 | 4.8 | 4.3 |
| Div yield (\%) | - | 4.4 | 5.4 |


| Energy |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| HPCL.BO, Rs306 |  |
| Rating | SELL |
| Sector coverage view | Neutral |
| Target Price (Rs) | 300 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) | $311-163$ |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) | 103.7 |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | 2009E | 2010E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 1,410 | 893.2 | 923.7 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | $(3.6)$ | 10.3 | 14.2 |
| EPS (Rs) | $(10.5)$ | 30.2 | 41.8 |
| EPS gth | $(131.5)$ | - | 38.3 |
| P/E (x) | $(29.0)$ | 10.1 | 7.3 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 7.4 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| Div yield (\%) | - | 3.9 | 5.4 |


| Energy |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| IOC.BO, Rs501 |  |
| Rating | REDUCE |
| Sector coverage view | Neutral |
| Target Price (Rs) | 525 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) | $514-299$ |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) | 591.1 |


| Financials |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| March y/e | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | 2009E | 2010E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 3,653 | 2,291 | 2,343 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 29.0 | 55.8 | 59.1 |
| EPS (Rs) | 24.3 | 46.8 | 49.6 |
| EPS gth | $(60.3)$ | 92.1 | 6.1 |
| P/E (x) | 20.6 | 10.7 | 10.1 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 9.0 | 5.1 | 4.6 |
| Div yield (\%) | - | 3.6 | 3.9 |

BPCL, HPCL, IOCL: Sell at 5-10\% higher levels with or without deregulation

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- No significant upside to fair valuation even under full de-regulation
- Historical experience relating to pricing freedom has not been encouraging
- Poor refining margins and new competition (RIL) to keep earnings under pressure

We do not see meaningful upside to stock prices of BPCL, HPCL and IOCL irrespective of full deregulation. Our fair valuations, even in a free-market scenario, come to Rs360 for BPCL, Rs330 for HPCL and Rs520 for IOCL. We expect deregulation (if any) to improve marketing margins but see high risks to all revenue and profit drivers of downstream oil companies-(1) refining margins due to large global oversupply, (2) uncertainty on marketing margins of auto fuels due to government control on pricing and re-entry of Reliance Industries into auto fuel retailing, (3) continued losses on LPG and kerosene and (4) likely sharp decline in FO/naphtha volumes and margins due to displacement by natural gas. We maintain our view on BPCL (SELL), HPCL (SELL) and IOCL (REDUCE) with key upside risk being higher-than-expected refining margins.

Low upside to earnings even in case of full deregulation. Our hypothetical earnings exercise for BPCL, HPCL and IOCL suggests limited earnings upside even in case of full deregulation (see Exhibit 1). We assume marketing margin of Rs1,500/ton (Rs1.25/liter) and Rs1,900/ton (Rs1.4/liter) for diesel and gasoline; we see these prices as achievable in a fully deregulated market. Exhibit 2 shows our computation of required marketing margin on diesel and gasoline in a free-market scenario. We also assume compensation of the full amount of under-recoveries on kerosene and LPG from the government (two-thirds) and upstream companies (one-upstream) in this hypothetical exercise. Our assumptions may be generous in case the government gives only one-third of the gross under-recovery on kerosene and LPG against our assumed two-third amount.

Historical evidence of pricing deregulation is not a good indicator. We would like to see the establishment of a market system before unnecessarily creating expectations about the same. We note that the pricing of petroleum products has been already deregulated from April 1, 2002 as per a government notification in 2001. However, governments have generally maintained control over the pricing of petroleum products due to social and political compulsions.

## Significant risks to all revenue and profit drivers of downstream oil companies.

We see risks to all revenue and profit drivers of downstream oil companies-(1) refining margins due to large global oversupply, (2) uncertainty on marketing margins of auto fuels due to government control on pricing and re-entry of Reliance Industries into auto fuel retailing, (3) continued losses on LPG and kerosene and (4) likely sharp decline in FO/ naphtha volumes and margins due to displacement by natural gas. We discuss the same in detail below.

- Weakness in refining margins to persist. We expect refining margins to remain under severe pressure led by start of several new refineries in Asia and weak demand. Refining margins have plummeted into negative territory in the recent week led by the implosion in product cracks. Exhibits 3 and 4 show that the increase in global refining capacity ( $3.5 \mathrm{mn} \mathrm{b} / \mathrm{d}$ ) and NGLs ( $1 \mathrm{mn} \mathrm{b} / \mathrm{d}$ ) in CY2009-10E will exacerbate oversupply due to a decline in demand of $1.9 \mathrm{mn} \mathrm{b} / \mathrm{d}$ over the same period. The IEA now projects global oil demand to decline $2.6 \mathrm{mn} \mathrm{b} / \mathrm{d}$ yoy in CY2009E. We note that the earnings of downstream oil companies are very sensitive to refining margin assumptions. Exhibit 5 shows the impact on EBITDA of US\$1/bbl change in refining margin and compares the same with the companies' EBITDA in FY2008.
- Re-entry of RIL can pose stiff challenges. We highlight that RIL will be selling a significant quantity of auto fuels in the domestic market given that it has surrendered its EOU status for its extant refinery. We believe RIL can take market share from extant players and cap marketing margins in a deregulated market. We note that RIL had been able to take significant market share away from oil PSUs in 2006 when it could compete with the PSUs on an equal footing (see Exhibit 6). It had subsequently shut down its $\sim 1,440$ outlets given high losses and inability to compete with subsidized fuels sold by the Indian PSU companies, once global oil prices increased substantially and the government did not allow PSU companies to increase prices commensurately.
- Continued losses on LPG and kerosene. We do not expect the government to deregulate prices of LPG and kerosene in the near term. Losses on LPG and kerosene continue to be high at Rs120/cylinder for LPG and Rs12.5/liter for kerosene (see Exhibit 7).
- Likely severe compression in margins of deregulated products. We see big challenges for PSU companies selling FO/LSHS and naphtha in the domestic market once RIL ramps up gas supply from its KG-D 6 gas block. We expect natural gas to displace naphtha in the fertilizer sector immediately and FO/LSHS over the next 1-2 years. We see pressure on both margins and volumes; in fact, the disposal of surplus FO/LSHS can be a big challenge as refineries may not be in a position to cut back production of these products immediately and exports may not be an option. We have seen similar developments in developed countries in 1970s when the advent of natural gas forced down production of FO to very low levels.


## Limited upside to fair valuations in a free-market scenario

Comparison of earnings and normalized marketing margins with FY2010E estimates (Rs/ton)

|  | BPCL |  | HPCL |  | IOCL |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010E | Normalized | 2010E | Normalized | 2010E | Normalized |
| LPG | $(7,289)$ | 1,500 | $(7,289)$ | 1,500 | $(7,289)$ | 1,500 |
| Naphtha | 1,000 | 400 | 1,000 | 400 | 1,200 | 900 |
| Gasoline | 1,688 | 1,900 | 1,688 | 1,900 | 1,900 | 2,100 |
| Jet fuel | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,700 | 1,700 |
| Kerosene | $(19,501)$ | 600 | $(19,501)$ | 600 | $(19,501)$ | 600 |
| Diesel | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,700 | 1,700 |
| Light diesel oil | 1,200 | 500 | 1,200 | 500 | 1,450 | 700 |
| Low sulphur heavy stock | 700 | 500 | 700 | 500 | 1,000 | 700 |
| Fuel oil | 700 | 500 | 700 | 500 | 1,000 | 700 |
| Bitumen | 2,000 | 1,000 | 2,000 | 1,000 | 2,000 | 1,200 |
| EPS (Rs) | 42.0 | 37.6 | 30.2 | 36.3 | 48.2 | 54.6 |
| EBITDA (Rs bn) | 39.4 | 37.0 | 38.0 | 41.1 | 119.0 | 130.5 |
| EV (5X normalized EBITDA) | Rs bn) | 185 |  | 206 |  | 652 |
| Value of investments (Rs bn) |  | 45 |  | 31 |  | 179 |
| Net debt (Rs bn) |  | 99 |  | 124 |  | 212 |
| Equity value (Rs/share) |  | 360 |  | 333 |  | 520 |
| Current target price |  | 425 |  | 300 |  | 500 |

## Note:

(a) Our normalized earnings estimates are based on normalized marketing margins and actual refining margin estimates for FY2010E.
(b) The higher marketing margins for IOCL reflects its high market share in land-locked North India.

[^2]
## A new retail outlet can be viable at around Rs1.1-1.3/liter

Economics of operating a retail outlet, non-metro location (Rs mn)

|  | Land purchased | Land leased |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Cost of asset | 5.5 | 5.0 |
| Cost of land (20,000 sq ft, 0.5 acre) | 0.5 | - |
| Cost of fixed assets | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Working capital | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Cost of capital (\%) | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| EBIT to break-even | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| Depreciation | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| EBITDA to break-even | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| Employee costs | - | 0.6 |
| Rent for land | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| SG\&A costs | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Terminal/storage costs | $\mathbf{2 . 4 3}$ | 0.2 |
| Total margin required to justify investment | $\mathbf{2 . 9 7}$ |  |
| Throughput per pump (Tonnes) | $\mathbf{1 , 3 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 8 5 3}$ |
| Gross margin per tonne of throughput (Rs/tonne) | $\mathbf{1 . 1 0 5}$ |  |
| Gross margin per liter of throughput (Rs/liter) | $\mathbf{1 . 3 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 3 4}$ |
| Gross margin per barrel of throughput (US $\$ / \mathrm{bbl})$ | 5.0 |  |

Source: Industry data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

Significant supply additions to global refining capacity
Global refinery capacity addition, calendar year ends, 2007-2012E ('000 b/d)


Source: IEA, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| We expect sharp deterioration in global-supply demand balance over the next few years Estimated global crude demand, supply and prices, Calendar year-ends |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011 E | 2012E | 2013 E |
| Demand (mb/d) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total demand | 84.1 | 85.2 | 86.0 | 85.8 | 83.2 | 83.9 | 84.8 | 85.9 | 87.1 |
| Yoy growth | 1.6 | 1.1 | 0.8 | (0.2) | (2.6) | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Supply (mb/d) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-OPEC | 49.8 | 50.4 | 50.8 | 50.6 | 50.3 | 50.6 | 50.8 | 51.0 | 51.2 |
| Yoy growth | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | (0.2) | (0.3) | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| OPEC |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Crude | 30.4 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 30.8 | 27.7 | 27.6 | 27.9 | 28.5 | 29.3 |
| NGLs | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.4 | 6.6 |
| Total OPEC | 34.7 | 34.9 | 35.0 | 35.5 | 32.7 | 33.3 | 34.0 | 34.9 | 35.9 |
| Total supply | 84.7 | 85.6 | 85.7 | 86.1 | 83.0 | 83.9 | 84.8 | 85.9 | 87.1 |
| Total stock change | 0.7 | 0.8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| OPEC crude capacity |  |  | 34.4 | 35.3 | 36.4 | 37.4 | 37.3 | 37.6 | 37.9 |
| Implied OPEC spare capacity |  |  | 3.9 | 4.5 | 8.7 | 9.8 | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.6 |
| Demand growth (yoy, \%) | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.9 | (0.2) | (3.0) | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| Supply growth (yoy, \%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-OPEC | 2.0 | 1.2 | 0.8 | (0.4) | (0.6) | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| OPEC | 3.0 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 1.3 | (7.9) | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.9 |
| Total | 1.6 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | (3.6) | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| Dated Brent (US\$/bbl) | 54.4 | 65.8 | 72.7 | 102.0 | 55.0 | 65.0 | 70.0 | 75.0 | 75.0 |

Source: IEA, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, and various government and industry sources

## Earnings of downstream companies are highly sensitive to change in refining margins

Earnings sensitivity of downstream companies to refining margins, March fiscal year-ends FY2010E (Rs mn)

| Refining margin assumption (US $\$ / \mathrm{bbl})$ | BPCL | HPCL | IOCL |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Current EBITDA estimate | 2.7 | 2.5 | 3.6 |
| EBITDA at US $\$ 1 / \mathrm{bbl}$ lower refining margins | 39,354 | 37,991 | 118,986 |
| Change in EBITDA $(\mathrm{B})-(\mathrm{A})$ | 31,885 | 31,696 | 101,545 |
| FY2008 EBITDA | 7,468 | 6,296 | 17,441 |
| Potential impact on EBITDA due to lower refining margins (\%) | $\mathbf{2 8 , 4 7 2}$ | 15,757 | 120,872 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

RIL had gained significant market share in the past in a short period of time Retail auto fuel sales, March fiscal year-ends, 2005-2009 ('000 tons)

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diesel |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reliance | 747 | 2,948 | 1,939 | 904 | 4 |  |  |
| Total sales | 31,085 | 31,109 | 33,527 | 37,470 | 41,001 |  |  |
| Reliance's market share (\%) | $\mathbf{2 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0}$ |  |  |
| Gasoline | 60 | 343 | 399 | 298 | 11 |  |  |
| Reliance | 8,159 | 8,534 | 9,177 | 10,206 | 11,137 |  |  |
| Total sales | $\mathbf{0 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 1}$ |  |  |
| Reliance's market share (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Auto fuels (diesel and gasoline) | 807 | 3,290 | 2,338 | 1,202 | 5 |  |  |
| Reliance | 39,244 | 39,643 | 42,704 | 47,676 | 41,920 |  |  |
| Total sales | $\mathbf{2 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0}$ |  |  |
| Reliance's market share (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: Industry, Kotak Instituional Equities

| Marketing margins have increased of late in India <br> Calculation of marketing margins/subsidy of key products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | May-08 | Jun-08 | Jul-08 | Aug-08 | Sep-08 | Oct-08 | Nov-08 | Dec-08 | Jan-09 | Feb-09 | Mar-09 | Apr-09 | May-09 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 10 YTD |
| International price (US\$/ton) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LPG | 804 | 871 | 880 | 907 | 780 | 782 | 565 | 357 | 348 | 461 | 430 | 365 | 382 | 496 | 667 | 666 | 373 |
| Gasoline | 975 | 1,086 | 1,160 | 1,127 | 952 | 873 | 640 | 384 | 311 | 396 | 452 | 431 | 475 | 625 | 730 | 772 | 453 |
| Kerosene | 1,070 | 1,236 | 1,277 | 1,282 | 1,049 | 926 | 680 | 564 | 450 | 473 | 404 | 406 | 459 | 617 | 716 | 865 | 432 |
| Diesel | 1,017 | 1,172 | 1,221 | 1,214 | 959 | 850 | 589 | 478 | 415 | 424 | 352 | 374 | 424 | 560 | 668 | 801 | 399 |
| India IPP price (incl. transport) (a) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LPG (Rs/cylinder) | 580 | 631 | 635 | 655 | 606 | 644 | 497 | 350 | 345 | 427 | 418 | 364 | 376 | 420 | 480 | 529 | 370 |
| Gasoline (Rs/liter) | 34.2 | 37.4 | 39.5 | 38.6 | 34.7 | 34.1 | 25.6 | 15.9 | 13.3 | 16.6 | 19.4 | 18.2 | 19.8 | 23.4 | 24.9 | 28.3 | 19.0 |
| Kerosene (Rs/liter) | 38.3 | 44.8 | 46.1 | 46.5 | 40.5 | 38.4 | 28.8 | 24.1 | 19.7 | 20.7 | 18.7 | 18.4 | 20.5 | 24.5 | 25.1 | 33.3 | 19.4 |
| Diesel (Rs/liter) | 39.5 | 44.6 | 46.1 | 46.1 | 38.7 | 36.8 | 26.2 | 21.4 | 18.9 | 19.4 | 17.0 | 17.6 | 19.7 | 24.2 | 25.3 | 32.4 | 18.6 |
| India retail price without taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LPG (Rs/cylinder) | 232 | 273 | 280 | 280 | 280 | 280 | 280 | 280 | 277 | 256 | 256 | 256 | 256 | 234 | 232 | 267 | 256 |
| Gasoline (Rs/liter) | 21.7 | 26.2 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 23.4 | 22.4 | 18.6 | 18.6 | 18.6 | 18.6 | 21.8 | 20.4 | 23.9 | 18.6 |
| Kerosene (Rs/liter) | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| Diesel (Rs/liter) | 22.5 | 25.7 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 24.7 | 24.2 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 22.2 | 21.7 | 24.6 | 22.6 |
| Marketing margin or (subsidy) (b) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LPG (Rs/cylinder) | (349) | (358) | (356) | (375) | (326) | (364) | (217) | (70) | (67) | (168) | (162) | (108) | (120) | (187) | (248) | (262) | (114) |
| Gasoline (Rs/liter) | (12.5) | (11.2) | (12.6) | (11.7) | (7.8) | (7.2) | 1.3 | 7.5 | 9.1 | 2.0 | (0.8) | 0.4 | (1.2) | (1.6) | (4.6) | (4.4) | (0.4) |
| Kerosene (Rs/liter) | (30.3) | (36.8) | (38.1) | (38.5) | (32.5) | (30.4) | (20.9) | (16.1) | (11.7) | (12.6) | (10.7) | (10.4) | (12.5) | (16.5) | (17.1) | (25.3) | (11.5) |
| Diesel (Rs/liter) | (17.0) | (19.0) | (19.9) | (19.9) | (12.6) | (10.7) | (0.0) | 3.2 | 5.3 | 3.2 | 5.6 | 5.0 | 2.9 | (2.0) | (3.6) | (7.8) | 4.0 |

Note
(a) Selling prices include transport costs estimated at Rs1.2/I for diesel and Rs1.3/I for gasoline.
(b) Portion of subsidy on kerosene and LPG reimbursed by the government.

Source: Industry data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

## Consolidated profit model, balance sheet, cash model of BPCL, March fiscal year-ends, 2004-2011E (Rs mn)

|  | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Profit model (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 479,840 | 578,774 | 755,333 | 965,569 | 1,102,081 | 1,461,995 | 908,989 | 931,368 |
| EBITDA | 38,686 | 26,231 | 9,407 | 35,362 | 28,472 | 15,484 | 39,354 | 43,991 |
| Other income | 4,348 | 4,015 | 4,653 | 7,332 | 13,954 | 14,785 | 10,155 | 8,086 |
| Interest | $(1,447)$ | $(1,748)$ | $(2,474)$ | $(4,774)$ | $(6,725)$ | $(18,106)$ | $(16,250)$ | $(11,821)$ |
| Depreciation | $(6,754)$ | $(7,130)$ | $(7,680)$ | $(9,041)$ | $(10,982)$ | $(10,743)$ | $(10,276)$ | $(12,023)$ |
| Pretax profits | 34,833 | 21,368 | 3,906 | 28,879 | 24,719 | 1,419 | 22,983 | 28,233 |
| Extraordinary items | (420) | 810 | 176 | (68) | - | - | - | - |
| Tax | $(12,026)$ | $(7,250)$ | (140) | $(9,286)$ | $(9,059)$ | (161) | $(5,473)$ | $(7,787)$ |
| Deferred taxation | (805) | $(1,230)$ | $(1,025)$ | (268) | $(1,108)$ | $(1,248)$ | $(2,339)$ | $(1,810)$ |
| Net profits | 21,582 | 13,698 | 2,916 | 18,055 | 15,806 | 11 | 15,171 | 18,637 |
| Net profits after minority interests | 19,086 | 11,334 | 2,916 | 18,055 | 15,806 | 11 | 15,171 | 18,637 |
| Earnings per share (Rs) | 64.6 | 37.2 | 7.6 | 50.1 | 43.7 | 0.0 | 42.0 | 51.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance sheet (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total equity | 69,960 | 82,887 | 91,394 | 102,735 | 116,768 | 116,779 | 124,759 | 134,562 |
| Deferred taxation liability | 11,304 | 12,533 | 13,558 | 13,826 | 14,814 | 16,061 | 18,400 | 20,210 |
| Total borrowings | 32,701 | 46,589 | 83,736 | 108,292 | 150,224 | 212,436 | 153,936 | 114,436 |
| Currrent liabilities | 95,495 | 104,462 | 94,070 | 112,767 | 145,803 | 122,007 | 96,502 | 100,571 |
| Total liabilities and equity | 209,459 | 246,472 | 282,758 | 337,620 | 427,608 | 467,283 | 393,597 | 369,779 |
| Cash | 9,319 | 6,644 | 4,921 | 8,640 | 9,616 | 4,831 | 4,531 | 4,724 |
| Current assets | 97,729 | 130,393 | 128,208 | 127,698 | 187,457 | 198,133 | 146,994 | 149,416 |
| Goodwill | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total fixed assets | 88,484 | 98,542 | 110,855 | 118,334 | 127,354 | 146,254 | 174,008 | 172,574 |
| Investments | 13,927 | 10,893 | 38,774 | 82,949 | 103,182 | 118,064 | 68,064 | 43,064 |
| Total assets | 209,459 | 246,472 | 282,758 | 337,621 | 427,608 | 467,283 | 393,597 | 369,779 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Free cash flow (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operating cash flow, excl. working capital | 30,727 | 21,118 | 9,275 | 29,920 | 22,988 | $(2,784)$ | 17,631 | 24,383 |
| Working capital | 1,025 | $(18,393)$ | 1,577 | 11,451 | $(25,161)$ | $(45,737)$ | 28,435 | 2,319 |
| Capital expenditure | $(17,001)$ | $(17,120)$ | $(19,945)$ | $(17,908)$ | $(20,665)$ | $(29,643)$ | $(38,030)$ | $(10,588)$ |
| Investments | 1,278 | 2,992 | $(28,146)$ | $(45,481)$ | $(21,684)$ | $(14,882)$ | 50,000 | 25,000 |
| Other income | 1,985 | 2,445 | 1,785 | 4,337 | 6,434 | 26,049 | 7,354 | 7,413 |
| Free cash flow | 18,015 | $(8,957)$ | $(35,455)$ | $(17,682)$ | $(38,088)$ | $(66,997)$ | 65,390 | 48,527 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Debt/equity | 40.2 | 48.8 | 91.6 | 105.4 | 128.7 | 181.9 | 123.4 | 85.0 |
| Net debt/equity | 28.8 | 41.9 | 86.2 | 97.0 | 120.4 | 177.8 | 119.8 | 81.5 |
| RoAE | 28.8 | 14.4 | 3.3 | 16.3 | 12.7 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 12.5 |
| RoACE | 21.2 | 12.0 | 4.1 | 11.0 | 7.9 | 5.5 | 9.3 | 10.2 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Key assumptions (standalone until FY2005) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Crude throughput (mn tons) | 8.8 | 9.1 | 17.2 | 19.8 | 20.9 | 20.6 | 21.5 | 23.0 |
| Effective tariff protection (\%) | 7.2 | 4.8 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Net refining margin (US\$/bbl) | 4.2 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 5.6 | 3.9 | 2.9 | 3.5 |
| Sales volume ( mn tons) | 20.9 | 21.5 | 23.3 | 24.5 | 26.7 | 28.7 | 29.8 | 31.0 |
| Marketing margin (Rs/ton) | 1,893 | 1,732 | (671) | $(1,140)$ | $(3,010)$ | $(6,075)$ | 1,438 | 1,395 |
| Subsidy under-recoveries (Rs mn) | $(13,518)$ | $(25,821)$ | $(31,847)$ | $(20,159)$ | $(26,680)$ | $(23,610)$ | $(4,015)$ | 175 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

Profit model, balance sheet, cash model of HPCL, March fiscal year-ends, 2004-2011E (Rs mn)

|  | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011 E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Profit model (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 512,001 | 597,020 | 708,609 | 889,959 | 1,043,130 | 1,409,713 | 893,219 | 923,682 |
| EBITDA | 31,858 | 20,511 | 8,056 | 24,036 | 15,757 | 25,731 | 37,991 | 43,943 |
| Other income | 3,794 | 3,295 | 3,285 | 6,845 | 11,980 | 7,480 | 7,596 | 5,005 |
| Interest | (557) | (816) | $(1,587)$ | $(4,230)$ | $(7,925)$ | $(23,441)$ | $(19,144)$ | $(15,681)$ |
| Depreciation | $(6,054)$ | $(6,584)$ | $(6,902)$ | $(7,040)$ | $(8,508)$ | $(9,932)$ | $(10,913)$ | $(11,787)$ |
| Pretax profits | 29,042 | 16,406 | 2,851 | 19,611 | 11,303 | (163) | 15,530 | 21,479 |
| Extraordinary items | - | 1,471 | 2,201 | 3,030 | - | - | - | - |
| Tax | $(10,225)$ | $(5,897)$ | (898) | $(6,625)$ | $(1,799)$ | 18 | $(3,226)$ | $(5,180)$ |
| Deferred taxation | (540) | 793 | (97) | (365) | $(2,025)$ | $(3,431)$ | $(2,052)$ | $(2,120)$ |
| Prior period adjustment | 762 | - | - | 61 | 3,870 | - | - |  |
| Net profits | 19,039 | 12,773 | 4,056 | 15,712 | 11,349 | $(3,575)$ | 10,252 | 14,178 |
| Earnings per share (Rs) | 56.2 | 34.8 | 6.6 | 40.0 | 33.5 | (11) | 30.2 | 41.8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance sheet (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total equity | 77,428 | 84,409 | 87,357 | 95,987 | 105,633 | 102,058 | 107,550 | 115,146 |
| Deferred tax liability | 14,541 | 13,748 | 13,844 | 14,209 | 15,960 | 19,391 | 21,443 | 23,563 |
| Total borrowings | 17,008 | 21,854 | 66,638 | 105,175 | 167,867 | 262,867 | 205,816 | 162,316 |
| Currrent liabilities | 76,551 | 69,887 | 79,549 | 101,195 | 124,337 | 91,094 | 92,648 | 96,232 |
| Total liabilities and equity | 185,528 | 189,896 | 247,389 | 316,566 | 413,797 | 475,409 | 427,457 | 397,257 |
| Cash | 1,971 | 2,016 | 426 | 868 | 2,940 | 1,536 | 1,741 | 1,991 |
| Current assets | 92,331 | 93,007 | 109,674 | 113,779 | 190,034 | 174,297 | 155,628 | 159,075 |
| Total fixed assets | 70,743 | 77,305 | 97,013 | 130,644 | 152,452 | 168,754 | 179,266 | 185,369 |
| Investments | 20,484 | 17,568 | 40,276 | 71,275 | 68,371 | 130,823 | 90,823 | 50,823 |
| Total assets | 185,528 | 189,896 | 247,389 | 316,566 | 413,796 | 475,410 | 427,458 | 397,258 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Free cash flow (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operating cash flow, excl. working capital | 29,062 | 15,977 | 10,126 | 23,966 | $(18,679)$ | 1,403 | 14,955 | 23,081 |
| Working capital changes | $(13,410)$ | $(3,614)$ | $(5,351)$ | 8,936 | $(6,504)$ | $(22,949)$ | 20,813 | 782 |
| Capital expenditure | $(8,895)$ | $(12,849)$ | $(25,298)$ | $(38,510)$ | $(31,638)$ | $(25,329)$ | $(20,759)$ | $(17,890)$ |
| Investments | (342) | 2,995 | $(22,884)$ | $(31,704)$ | $(1,851)$ | $(62,452)$ | 40,000 | 40,000 |
| Other income | 1,052 | 800 | 941 | 2,067 | 4,692 | 12,923 | 7,006 | 4,360 |
| Free cash flow | 7,466 | 3,310 | $(42,466)$ | $(35,246)$ | $(53,980)$ | $(96,404)$ | 62,015 | 50,333 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Debt/equity | 18.5 | 22.3 | 65.8 | 95.4 | 138.1 | 216.4 | 159.6 | 117.0 |
| Net debt/equity | 16.4 | 20.2 | 65.4 | 94.7 | 135.6 | 215.2 | 158.2 | 115.6 |
| RoAE | 22.0 | 13.4 | 4.1 | 14.9 | 9.8 | -2.9 | 8.2 | 10.6 |
| RoACE | 18.9 | 10.1 | 2.5 | 8.8 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 7.6 | 8.9 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Key assumptions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Crude throughput (mn tons) | 13.7 | 13.9 | 14.0 | 16.7 | 16.8 | 16.0 | 18.0 | 19.3 |
| Effective tariff protection (\%) | 7.4 | 5.6 | 3.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Net refining margin (US $\$ / \mathrm{bbl}$ ) | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 6.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| Sales volume (mn tons) | 20.1 | 20.6 | 20.1 | 23.4 | 26.2 | 28.1 | 29.5 | 31.2 |
| Marketing margin (Rs/ton) | 1,861 | 1,688 | (463) | (710) | $(2,345)$ | $(4,834)$ | 1,408 | 1,341 |
| Subsidy under-recoveries (Rs mn) | $(12,870)$ | $(26,708)$ | $(29,671)$ | $(18,899)$ | $(28,549)$ | $(28,211)$ | $(10,069)$ | $(5,624)$ |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

## Consolidated profit model, balance sheet, cash model of IOCL, March fiscal year-ends, 2004-2011E (Rs mn)

|  | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011 E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Profit model (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 1,173,450 | 1,379,018 | 1,729,474 | 2,149,428 | 2,444,378 | 3,652,917 | 2,291,295 | 2,342,711 |
| EBITDA | 114,303 | 86,765 | 82,044 | 110,451 | 120,872 | 83,635 | 118,986 | 123,793 |
| Other income | 17,565 | 16,138 | 21,310 | 27,451 | 43,748 | 33,596 | 31,615 | 19,300 |
| Interest | $(5,043)$ | $(7,433)$ | $(12,101)$ | $(17,058)$ | $(17,556)$ | $(38,560)$ | $(35,707)$ | $(15,244)$ |
| Depreciation | $(20,626)$ | $(23,140)$ | $(24,711)$ | $(28,686)$ | $(29,918)$ | $(31,479)$ | $(32,956)$ | $(37,677)$ |
| Pretax profits | 106,199 | 72,330 | 66,542 | 92,157 | 117,145 | 47,192 | 81,938 | 90,172 |
| Extraordinary items | 3,553 | 4,283 | 5,590 | 24,757 | 5,374 | 5,584 | 5,315 | 5,271 |
| Tax | $(25,966)$ | $(13,658)$ | $(19,975)$ | $(25,834)$ | $(38,293)$ | $(14,739)$ | $(27,031)$ | $(34,487)$ |
| Deferred taxation | $(5,157)$ | $(2,335)$ | $(1,282)$ | $(8,040)$ | (473) | (455) | 118 | 1,731 |
| Net profits | 79,052 | 59,475 | 51,125 | 82,729 | 83,430 | 37,582 | 60,340 | 62,687 |
| Net profits after minority interests | 73,298 | 52,666 | 45,362 | 62,469 | 74,573 | 30,766 | 57,517 | 61,161 |
| Earnings per share (Rs) | 62.8 | 45.1 | 38.8 | 52.4 | 62.5 | 25.8 | 48.2 | 51.3 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance sheet (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total equity | 233,386 | 271,302 | 317,977 | 378,117 | 450,449 | 486,030 | 521,682 | 558,007 |
| Deferred tax liability | 47,934 | 50,367 | 50,602 | 59,859 | 60,331 | 60,787 | 60,668 | 58,937 |
| Total borrowings | 146,147 | 197,809 | 292,395 | 290,215 | 382,818 | 654,549 | 370,971 | 261,007 |
| Currrent liabilities | 219,522 | 266,430 | 286,716 | 330,791 | 386,724 | 493,387 | 393,173 | 402,790 |
| Total liabilities and equity | 646,988 | 785,907 | 947,691 | 1,058,981 | 1,280,322 | 1,694,753 | 1,346,494 | 1,280,742 |
| Cash | 13,777 | 13,356 | 8,080 | 9,385 | 8,413 | 8,832 | 9,145 | 8,862 |
| Current assets | 278,550 | 368,158 | 413,904 | 437,178 | 599,256 | 869,723 | 630,206 | 634,666 |
| Total fixed assets | 320,647 | 370,003 | 383,717 | 415,014 | 460,307 | 484,654 | 525,599 | 530,671 |
| Investments | 34,013 | 34,391 | 141,990 | 197,403 | 212,345 | 331,543 | 181,543 | 106,543 |
| Total assets | 646,988 | 785,907 | 947,691 | 1,058,981 | 1,280,322 | 1,694,753 | 1,346,494 | 1,280,742 |


| Free cash flow (Rs mn) | 93,713 | 71,765 | $(10,334)$ | $(44,660)$ | $(107,263)$ | 26,875 | 64,583 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Operating cash flow, excl. working capital | 1,710 | $(33,421)$ | $(8,136)$ | 2,237 | $(1,414)$ | $(190,127)$ | 135,919 |
| Working capital changes | $(47,179)$ | $(73,626)$ | $(49,042)$ | $(50,969)$ | $(79,586)$ | $(49,357)$ | $(53,689)$ |
| Capital expenditure | $(509)$ | $(1,172)$ | $(17,778)$ | 99,768 | 92,665 | $(119,083)$ | 150,000 |
| Investments | 5,826 | 7,814 | 10,317 | 13,582 | 18,253 | 76,346 | 27,834 |
| Other Income | $\mathbf{5 3 , 5 6 0}$ | $\mathbf{( 2 8 , 6 4 1 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 7 4 , 9 7 3 )}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 , 9 5 8}$ | $\mathbf{( 7 7 , 3 4 6 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 2 5 5 , 3 4 7 )}$ | $\mathbf{3 2 4 , 6 4 6}$ |
| Free cash flow |  |  | 146,273 |  |  |  |  |



Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| Banking |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sector coverage view |  | Attractive |  |
| Company | Price, Rs |  |  |
|  | Rating | 18-May | Target |
| SBI | BUY | 1,577 | 1,600 |
| HDFC | SELL | 2,374 | 1,730 |
| HDFC Bank | BUY | 1,378 | 1,150 |
| ICICI Bank | ADD | 707 | 475 |
| Corp Bk | BUY | 280 | 310 |
| BoB | ADD | 397 | 370 |
| PNB | BUY | 658 | 650 |
| OBC | ADD | 161 | 150 |
| Canara Bk | REDUCE | 264 | 220 |
| LIC Housing | BUY | 406 | 390 |
| Axis Bank | BUY | 778 | 700 |
| IOB | BUY | 79 | 110 |
| Shriram Transk | ADD | 271 | 300 |
| SREI | ADD | 50 | 50 |
| MMFSL | ADD | 224 | 240 |
| Andhra | ADD | 76 | 75 |
| IDFC | ADD | 118 | 85 |
| PFC | ADD | 197 | 160 |
| Federal Bank | BUY | 222 | 280 |
| J\&K Bank | ADD | 400 | 480 |
| India Infoline | ADD | 117 | 90 |
| Indian Bank | BUY | 117 | 165 |
| Union Bank | BUY | 200 | 220 |
| Central Bank c | SELL | 62 | 55 |
| Future Capital | BUY | 172 | 440 |
| Bank of India | ADD | 290 | 310 |
| REC | BUY | 134 | 125 |

## Prudence called for during times of optimism; Be selective

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- Better perceptions on asset quality and increased risk appetite drive stock performance
- Valuations for most stocks appear to be getting expensive, advise caution
- Risk of interest rate hardening is largely being ignored by the market and could be a negative surprise for the stocks
- Prefer selective plays—Axis Bank and State Bank of India are our best picks

We expect perceptions regarding asset quality to improve further as a stable government at the centre is expected to introduce policies leading to faster economic recovery. However, the valuations in certain stocks are getting excessive and warrant prudence. We provide a sensitivity analysis of the impact on valuations due to lower NPLs and an increase in risk appetite (i.e. lower cost of equity). Based on this exercise, we believe that public banks like SBI, PNB, Union Bank and Axis Bank amongst private banks have some valuation upside. The market is, by and large, ignoring the risks that could arise if large foreign inflows within a short period of time are not accompanied by a substantial improvement in fiscal balances of the government-this could lead to a hardening of interest rates. This could be negative for stocks in the financial sector.

## Notions of low NPLs drive stock prices, impact on earnings/valuations not too significant

We expect slippages for the sector to increase to $3.5 \%$ in FY2010E and 2.7\% in FY2011 from about $2.2 \%$ as of March 2009 (not including restructured assets). This will likely lead to an increase in the gross NPL ratio to $4.2 \%$ as of March 2010 and $4.8 \%$ as of March 2011E. We believe that in the current environment, wherein restructured assets itself vary by 2-5\% of loans, the likely slippages in the current fiscal are likely to remain high. Thus, we do not change our view on NPLs as of now and would review these estimates only if economic indicators improve over the next few quarters. We run a sensitivity analysis, wherein, net NPLs as of March 2010 are (1) $25 \%$ lower than our expectations and (2) remain at the same levels as of March 2009; the upside to our target prices from the current prices could range between $3 \%$ and $15 \%$.

## Increased risk appetite also aiding stock price performance

Banking stocks have already seen a sharp rally from their lows and more on the brief trading sessions on Monday (May 18, 2009), partly driven by the increased risk appetite (i.e. lower cost of equity). We provide a sensitivity analysis of the impact on fair value due to lower cost of equity ( $1 \%$ lower than current estimates). Based on this exercise, upside to prices for new private banks is fairly limited-for some of the front tier public banks like SBI, PNB and Union Bank, the upside is 18-35\%.

## Policy measures would be positive but impact on valuations remain unclear to us

We expect some reforms in the financial sector by the new government, mainly: (1) FDI in the insurance sector could be enhanced from to 49\% from 26\%; (2) consolidation amongst public banks could gain momentum, but is likely to be challenging even for a strong government; (3) proportionate voting rights to be allowed in private banks and (4) reduction in minimum government holding in public banks from $51 \%$ to $33 \%$ to enable them to raise capital from the market-note that the option of reducing government stake in public banks below $51 \%$ has been strongly opposed by the incumbent political party during the term of the previous parliament. These policy measures would be positive for the sector but we believe that none of these could potentially change the core fundamentals significantly to warrant such a sharp movement in prices.

## High fiscal deficits and large capital flows imply hardening of interest rates

Large increase in foreign inflows given the fiscal balances of the government of India would lead to a hardening of interest rates. Our economist, Dr Mridul Saggar, expects interest rates to harden in 2HFY10E—the faster pace of flows could bring forward this development. Higher interest rates could be negative for the treasury gains of banks, lead to lower-than-expected repricing benefits on liabilities for wholesale borrowers and impact the economic recovery that might be underway. The market does appear to expect an abrupt spike in interest rates, which increases the probability of a negative shock for share prices, especially given the recent run-up in market prices of most stocks in the financial sector.

## Our assessment of hardening of interest rates is based on the following rationale:

1) RBI affects the money supply in the system by (a) altering its assets (i.e. net foreign assets and net domestic assets), (b) monetary liabilities (i.e. bonds issued under MSS) and/or (c) by changing the cash reserve ratio (CRR), which also has an impact on the money multiplier
2) Implication of increasing/decreasing the holdings of foreign assets and domestic assets (Gsecs) by monetary authority is the same for money supply considerations
3) Consequently, a sharp improvement in the balance of payments (BoP) situation, led by higher foreign flows within a short period, could lead to an increase in foreign asset holdings of RBI. This would reduce the leeway available for intervening in the Gsec markets without violating its money supply projections
4) RBI is unlikely to allow money supply to increase substantially over its projections as this could lead to inflationary pressures in the future and reduce its leeway to respond if there is an abrupt reversal of foreign flows at a future period of time. The prudent policy of raising CRR and increasing the issuance of securities under the market stabilization scheme (MSS) during periods of high foreign inflows allowed RBI to provide sufficient domestic liquidity when there was a reversal of flows during October 2008
5) Lower RBI purchase of Gsecs could lead to a hardening of yields in the Gsec markets given the borrowing program of government of India. We believe the probability of high borrowings by government remains high in the current fiscal. Consequently, Gsec yields can be expected to harden and push up interest rates in the economy

## Near-term performance of bank stocks may be strong

We highlight that the financial sector has been a favored sector in times of positive portfolio flows and vice-versa. Thus, if portfolio flows continue to remain strong, it is quite likely that the financial sector performance would remain strong. At its peak in Dec 2007, foreign holdings in Indian banks ranged within $20 \%$ and $70 \%$ (public banks had huge premiums as Flls could not buy directly) of their respective capital. As of March 2009, the ownership in Indian banks has declined to 12-63\%. This might have already risen till date and could increase more if portfolio flows continue.

## Fundamental and technical factors support select stocks

We prefer Axis Bank and State Bank of India offering the best mix of (1) valuations due to likely upside emanating from improving economic prospects and lower NPLs and (2) technical factors of low FIl holding compared to other financial sector stocks. Axis Bank trades at 2.4XFY2010E PBR and State Bank of India trades at 1.3XFY2010E PBR. We believe that risks of rising NPLs were fairly high for these banks as they had grown very fast in SMEs during the FY2005-09 period. We also highlight that Fll ownership is much lower in these stocks than their peak levels, probably for these reasons. ICICI Bank is also likely to be a big beneficiary of improving economic prospects but we do not find enough comfort in its valuations as its RoE is likely to remain subdued for some time. Amongst other public banks, we like PNB and Union Bank. In the NBFC space, we maintain our Sell rating on HDFC. We prefer LIC Housing Finance, REC and Shriram Transport as best plays to play the current cycle.

## Our base-case assumptions factor in a sharp rise in reported NPLs to account for likely deterioration of asset quality

Gross NPLs, Net NPLs of banks, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-2011E

|  | Gross NPLs (Rs bn) |  |  | Gross NPLs (\%) |  |  | Net NPLs (Rs bn) |  |  | Net NPLs (\%) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E |
| Public banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | 4 | 16 | 29 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 4.9 | 1 | 7 | 14 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 2.3 |
| Bank of Baroda | 18 | 50 | 73 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 5 | 22 | 30 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| Bank of India | 25 | 74 | 118 | 1.7 | 4.3 | 5.9 | 6 | 35 | 58 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| Canara Bank | 22 | 44 | 72 | 1.6 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 15 | 22 | 27 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| Corporation Bank | 6 | 24 | 33 | 1.1 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 1 | 13 | 17 | 0.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| Indian Bank | 5 | 18 | 33 | 0.9 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 1 | 9 | 15 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| IOB | 19 | 50 | 72 | 2.5 | 5.5 | 6.9 | 10 | 29 | 38 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 3.8 |
| OBC | 11 | 44 | 64 | 1.5 | 5.2 | 6.5 | 4 | 27 | 39 | 0.7 | 3.3 | 4.0 |
| PNB* | 33 | 72 | 108 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 6 | 18 | 32 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 |
| State Bank of India | 156 | 318 | 393 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 96 | 174 | 151 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 2.0 |
| Union Bank | 19 | 34 | 50 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 3 | 7 | 12 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| Overall public banks | 316 | 743 | 1,045 | 2.1 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 148 | 364 | 434 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.1 |


| Old private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Federal Bank* | 6 | 14 | 22 | 2.8 | 5.1 | 6.5 | 1 | 1 |
| J\&K Bank* | 5 | 12 | 18 | 2.6 | 4.6 | 5.7 | 3 | 6 |
| Overall old private banks | $\mathbf{1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 7}$ | $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ |


| New private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Axis Bank | 9 | 21 | 36 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| HDFC Bank | 20 | 33 | 51 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 6 | 11 | 14 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| ICICI Bank | 99 | 137 | 170 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 46 | 52 | 57 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| Overall new private banks | 128 | 191 | 256 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 56 | 69 | 80 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.9 |
| Total | 456 | 961 | 1,341 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 207 | 440 | 525 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 |

Note:

* Indicates NPL data as of December 2008 for fiscal year-end 2009.

Source: Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Valuation upside for front tier public banks are around 6-15\% from the current market prices
Sensitivity analysis for target prices assuming lower NPLs

|  |  | Target price | Current market price | Net NPLs as | s of March 20 | 010 (Rs bn) | Revised ta (March | rget price 2010) | Upside fro lev | m current els |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reco. | (Rs) | (Rs) | Base case | 25\% lower NPLs than base case | Same as <br> March 2009 | 25\% lower NPLs than base case | Same as March 2009 | 25\% lower NPLs than base case | Same as March 2009 |
| Public banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | ADD | 75 | 76 | 6.9 | 5.2 | 0.8 | 77 | 83 | 1.7 | 9.5 |
| BoB | ADD | 370 | 415 | 22.3 | 16.7 | 4.5 | 380 | 402 | (8.5) | (3.2) |
| Bol | ADD | 310 | 288 | 35.3 | 26.5 | 6.3 | 321 | 346 | 11.4 | 20.1 |
| Canara Bank | REDUCE | 220 | 260 | 21.6 | 16.2 | 15.1 | 229 | 230 | (12.1) | (11.4) |
| Corporation Bank | BUY | 310 | 280 | 13.2 | 9.9 | 2.9 | 325 | 357 | 16.1 | 27.5 |
| Indian Bank | BUY | 165 | 117 | 9.2 | 6.9 | 0.9 | 168 | 177 | 43.9 | 51.4 |
| IOB | BUY | 110 | 80 | 28.7 | 21.5 | 10.0 | 119 | 132 | 48.2 | 65.4 |
| OBC | ADD | 150 | 160 | 27.1 | 20.4 | 6.3 | 168 | 204 | 4.8 | 27.5 |
| PNB | BUY | 650 | 660 | 18.1 | 13.6 | 6.3 | 659 | 674 | (0.1) | 2.2 |
| SBI | BUY | 1,600 | 1,585 | 174.0 | 130.5 | 95.5 | 1,645 | 1,680 | 3.8 | 6.0 |
| SBI standalone | BUY | 1,186 | 1,168 | 174.0 | 130.5 | 95.5 | 1,231 | 1,267 | 5.4 | 8.4 |
| Union Bank | BUY | 220 | 195 | 7.2 | 5.4 | 3.3 | 222 | 225 | 14.1 | 15.5 |
| Old private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Bank | BUY | 280 | 221 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 281 | 282 | 27.2 | 27.6 |
| J\&K Bank | ADD | 480 | 400 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 500 | 524 | 25.0 | 31.0 |
| New private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Axis Bank | BUY | 700 | 800 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 703 | 705 | (12.2) | (11.9) |
| HDFC Bank | ADD | 1,150 | 1,380 | 11.1 | 8.3 | 6.0 | 1,154 | 1,158 | (16.4) | (16.1) |
| ICICI Bank | ADD | 475 | 720 | 52.0 | 39.0 | 43.0 | 533 | 530 | (26.0) | (26.3) |
| ICICI standalone | ADD | 308 | 505 | 52.0 | 39.0 | 43.0 | 316 | 314 | (37.4) | (37.8) |

## Note:

(1) Calculations for SBI and ICICI Bank are only for the standalone bank entity. Subsidiary valuations are retained at the same level as in the base case.
(2) We completely remove the discount to investments by ICICI Bank in its international subsidiaries in this analysis. This will imply a Rs50 upside from our base case.

Source: Bloomberg, Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Higher risk appetite could provide further upsides to target prices
Sensitivity analysis for target prices assuming lower CoE


Note:
(1) Calculations for SBI and ICICI Bank are only for the standalone bank entity. Subsidiary valuations are retained at the same level as in the base case.
(2) We completely remove the discount to investments by ICICI Bank in its international subsidiaries in this analysis. This will imply a Rs50 upside from our base case.

Source: Bloomberg, Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Upside for the target prices on account of lower NPLs and cost of equity could be larger for certain banks
Sensitivity analysis for target prices assuming lower CoE and NPLs

|  | Current market price | Target price | Revised target price (Rs) |  | \% upside from current levels |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (Rs) | (Rs) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { 25\% lower } \\ \text { NPLs than } \\ \text { base case as } \\ \text { of March } \\ 2010 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Net NPLs as of March 2010 are same as of March 2009 | 25\% lower NPLs than base case as of March 2010 | Net NPLs as of March 2010 are same as of March 2009 |
| Public banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | 76 | 75 | 93 | 99 | 23.0 | 30.7 |
| BoB | 415 | 370 | 460 | 481 | 10.8 | 16.0 |
| Bol | 288 | 310 | 392 | 417 | 36.0 | 44.7 |
| Canara Bank | 260 | 220 | 282 | 283 | 8.3 | 9.0 |
| Corporation Bank | 280 | 310 | 386 | 418 | 37.9 | 49.3 |
| Indian Bank | 117 | 165 | 200 | 209 | 71.3 | 78.9 |
| IOB | 80 | 110 | 136 | 150 | 70.2 | 87.4 |
| OBC | 160 | 150 | 208 | 245 | 30.1 | 52.8 |
| PNB | 660 | 650 | 780 | 795 | 18.1 | 20.4 |
| SBI | 1,585 | 1,600 | 1,964 | 2,000 | 24.0 | 26.2 |
| SBI standalone | 1,168 | 1,186 | 1,551 | 1,586 | 32.7 | 35.8 |
| Union Bank | 195 | 220 | 266 | 269 | 36.7 | 38.1 |
| Old private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Bank | 221 | 280 | 336 | 337 | 52.2 | 52.7 |
| J\&K Bank | 400 | 480 | 572 | 596 | 42.9 | 49.0 |
| New private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Axis Bank | 800 | 700 | 867 | 869 | 8.4 | 8.6 |
| HDFC Bank | 1,380 | 1,150 | 1,460 | 1,463 | 5.8 | 6.0 |
| ICICI Bank | 720 | 475 | 601 | 599 | (16.5) | (16.8) |
| ICICI standalone | 505 | 308 | 385 | 382 | (23.8) | (24.2) |

(1) Calculations for SBI and ICICI Bank are only for the standalone bank entity. Subsidiary valuations are retained at the same level as in the base case.
(2) We remove all discounts to investments made by ICICI Bank in its subsidiaries in this analysis. This will imply a Rs50 upside from our base case.

Source: Bloomberg, Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

## Gsec yields are likely to spike sharply in the even assuming no fresh bond issuances are made under MSS

New government borrowings, MSS bond issuances and overall supply of SLR securities, March fiscal yearends, 2004-2010E


Source: RBI, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Bank stocks have generally performed well during periods of high foreign flows
Bankex performance and Fll flows (US\$ mn)


Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

## Foreign holding in Axis Bank, ICICI Bank and SBI has come off sharply since two years

Fll holding in select financial sector stocks

|  | Mar-07 | Jun-07 | Sep-07 | Dec-07 | Mar-08 | Jun-08 | Sep-08 | Dec-08 | Mar-09 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Axis Bank | 42 | 40 | 39 | 37 | 38 | 35 | 32 | 33 | 31 |
| HDFC | 69 | 68 | 64 | 62 | 61 | 59 | 60 | 59 | 60 |
| HDFC Bank | 51 | 44 | 48 | 49 | 48 | 47 | 46 | 45 | 45 |
| ICICI Bank | 72 | 71 | 70 | 70 | 69 | 68 | 65 | 64 | 63 |
| PNB | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 15 |
| SBI | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 15 | 12 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Valuation of bank stocks appear to be expensive
Valuations of key banks, March fiscal year-ends

|  | Reco. | Traget price (Rs) | Price$\begin{aligned} & \text { (Rs) } \\ & \hline \text { (Rs) } \end{aligned}$ | Market cap. US \$bn | EPS (Rs) |  |  | PER (X) |  |  | BVPS (Rs) |  |  | PBR (X) |  |  | RoE (\%) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010 E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E |
| Public banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | ADD | 75 | 76 | 0.8 | 11.9 | 13.5 | 11.1 | 6.4 | 5.6 | 6.8 | 67 | 75 | 83 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 18.0 | 19.0 | 14.0 |
| BoB | ADD | 370 | 415 | 3.2 | 39.3 | 60.9 | 54.9 | 10.6 | 6.8 | 7.6 | 259 | 309 | 354 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 14.6 | 18.7 | 14.9 |
| Bol | ADD | 310 | 288 | 3.2 | 40.6 | 57.2 | 46.3 | 7.1 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 168 | 224 | 263 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 27.6 | 29.2 | 19.0 |
| Canara Bank | REDUCE | 220 | 260 | 2.2 | 38.2 | 50.5 | 41.4 | 6.8 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 202 | 244 | 302 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 15.0 | 18.3 | 12.2 |
| Corporation Bank | BUY | 310 | 280 | 0.8 | 51.2 | 62.2 | 51.5 | 5.5 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 295 | 341 | 380 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 18.4 | 19.6 | 14.3 |
| Indian Bank | BUY | 165 | 117 | 1.0 | 22.5 | 28.1 | 26.6 | 5.2 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 107 | 130 | 152 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 24.8 | 23.7 | 18.9 |
| IOB | BUY | 110 | 80 | 0.9 | 22.1 | 24.3 | 16.6 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 4.8 | 89 | 108 | 121 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 27.2 | 24.7 | 14.5 |
| OBC | ADD | 150 | 160 | 0.8 | 23.9 | 36.1 | 27.3 | 6.7 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 231 | 258 | 279 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 6.2 | 14.8 | 10.2 |
| PNB | BUY | 650 | 660 | 4.3 | 65.0 | 90.7 | 90.7 | 10.2 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 342 | 411 | 481 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 18.0 | 21.5 | 18.6 |
| SBI | BUY | 1,600 | 1,585 | 21.0 | 106.6 | 143.6 | 121.1 | 14.9 | 11.0 | 13.1 | 772 | 913 | 999 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 16.8 | 17.1 | 12.7 |
| SBI incl. banking subs |  | 1,354 | 1,339 | 17.7 | 157.7 | 154.9 | 144.6 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 954 | 1,113 | 1,220 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 16.7 | 15.3 | 15.3 |
| SBI standalone |  | 1,186 | 1,168 | 15.5 | 122.1 | 138.1 | 114.8 | 9.6 | 8.5 | 10.2 | 703 | 843 | 929 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 19.6 | 17.9 | 13.0 |
| Union Bank | BUY | 250 | 195 | 2.1 | 27.5 | 34.2 | 29.6 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 6.6 | 111 | 140 | 164 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 26.8 | 27.2 | 19.5 |
| Old private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Bank | BUY | 280 | 221 | 0.8 | 34.4 | 32.0 | 34.0 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 6.5 | 229 | 254 | 281 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 13.6 | 13.2 | 12.7 |
| J\&K Bank | ADD | 480 | 400 | 0.4 | 74.2 | 82.8 | 72.2 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 470 | 533 | 588 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 16.8 | 16.5 | 12.9 |
| New private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Axis Bank | BUY | 700 | 800 | 6.0 | 32.2 | 50.6 | 55.8 | 24.8 | 15.8 | 14.3 | 245 | 284 | 328 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 17.6 | 19.2 | 18.2 |
| HDFC Bank | ADD | 1,150 | 1,380 | 12.2 | 46.0 | 55.4 | 64.1 | 30.0 | 24.9 | 21.5 | 324 | 354 | 403 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 17.7 | 16.9 | 16.7 |
| ICICI Bank | ADD | 475 | 720 | 16.7 | 39.9 | 33.8 | 32.3 | 18.0 | 21.3 | 22.3 | 418 | 445 | 467 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 11.7 | 7.8 | 7.1 |
| ICICI standalone |  | 308 | 555 | 12.9 | 28.9 | 31.1 | 28.9 | 19.2 | 17.9 | 19.2 | 341 | 336 | 345 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 10.2 | 9.2 | 8.5 |
| Non banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HDFC | SELL | 1,730 | 2,390 | 14.2 | 85.8 | 80.2 | 93.4 | 27.9 | 29.8 | 25.6 | 421 | 462 | 517 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 27.8 | 18.2 | 18.7 |
| IDFC | ADD | 85 | 117 | 3.1 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 7.0 | 20.6 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 43 | 48 | 53 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 17.6 | 12.9 | 14.1 |
| LIC Hsg Fin | BUY | 390 | 410 | 0.7 | 45.5 | 62.5 | 68.8 | 9.0 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 215 | 262 | 313 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 22.9 | 26.2 | 23.9 |
| Mahindra Finance | ADD | 250 | 221 | 0.4 | 20.8 | 22.4 | 27.5 | 10.6 | 9.9 | 8.0 | 138 | 154 | 173 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 16.9 | 15.4 | 16.9 |
| Power Finance Corporation | ADD | 160 | 197 | 4.7 | 11.4 | 13.0 | 16.5 | 17.3 | 15.2 | 12.0 | 92 | 102 | 113 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 12.8 | 13.4 | 15.3 |
| Shriram Transport | ADD | 300 | 271 | 1.0 | 19.2 | 30.1 | 32.5 | 14.1 | 9.0 | 8.4 | 89 | 114 | 131 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 26.9 | 29.6 | 27.0 |
| Srei Infrastructure finance | ADD | 50 | 53 | 0.1 | 11.4 | 7.7 | 6.9 | 4.6 | 6.9 | 7.7 | 59 | 97 | 101 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 23.1 | 14.0 | 11.5 |
| Rural Electrification Corp. | BUY | 125 | 135 | 2.4 | 10.9 | 15.2 | 17.7 | 12.4 | 8.9 | 7.6 | 72 | 83 | 95 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 17.1 | 19.6 | 19.9 |

Source: Bloomberg, Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Bank stocks have increased by around 30-50\% over the past one month
Stock price performance-absolute and relative (\%)

|  | Price | Rating | Change in price (\%) |  |  |  |  | Relative performance to sensex (\%) |  |  |  |  | 52 week <br> high <br> (Rs) | $\frac{$52  week  <br>  low }{ (Rs) } |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18-May-09 |  | 1 month | 3 month | 6 month | 12 month | Ytd | 1 month | 3 month | 6 month | 12 month | Ytd |  |  |
| Public banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Andhra Bank | 76 | ADD | 30.5 | 46.6 | 54.3 | (5.8) | 37.8 | 0.8 | (7.4) | (3.4) | 10.4 | (6.9) | 85 | 35 |
| Bank of Baroda | 415 | ADD | 39.8 | 81.7 | 57.7 | 40.4 | 48.2 | 7.9 | 14.8 | (1.3) | 49.5 | 0.2 | 444 | 170 |
| Bank of India | 288 | ADD | 9.0 | 30.3 | 15.0 | (19.8) | 0.3 | (15.8) | (17.7) | (28.0) | (1.4) | (32.2) | 369 | 179 |
| Canara Bank | 260 | REDUCE | 28.7 | 45.2 | 50.7 | 10.0 | 38.2 | (0.6) | (8.3) | (5.6) | 23.8 | (6.6) | 272 | 135 |
| Corporation Bank | 280 | BUY | 31.3 | 68.2 | 43.2 | (17.8) | 47.9 | 1.4 | 6.2 | (10.3) | 0.3 | (0.0) | 360 | 155 |
| Indian Bank | 117 | BUY | 1.6 | 14.9 | (4.3) | (18.8) | (14.5) | (21.5) | (27.4) | (40.1) | (0.5) | (42.2) | 148 | 64 |
| IOB | 80 | BUY | 20.3 | 50.7 | 14.3 | (45.9) | 11.5 | (7.1) | (4.8) | (28.4) | (23.5) | (24.6) | 150 | 38 |
| OBC | 160 | ADD | 13.9 | 42.9 | 12.3 | (24.2) | 3.9 | (12.0) | (9.7) | (29.7) | (5.1) | (29.8) | 212 | 95 |
| PNB | 660 | BUY | 34.1 | 81.2 | 45.9 | 15.4 | 25.3 | 3.6 | 14.4 | (8.7) | 28.4 | (15.3) | 680 | 286 |
| SBI | 1,585 | BUY | 21.5 | 48.0 | 43.0 | (7.1) | 23.0 | (6.2) | (6.5) | (10.5) | 9.3 | (16.9) | 1,710 | 892 |
| Union Bank | 195 | BUY | 17.5 | 52.3 | 30.1 | 19.7 | 19.6 | (9.2) | (3.8) | (18.5) | 32.0 | (19.2) | 208 | 96 |
| Old private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Bank | 221 | BUY | 27.8 | 65.0 | 53.6 | (7.7) | 36.4 | (1.3) | 4.3 | (3.8) | 8.8 | (7.8) | 256 | 110 |
| J\&K Bank | 400 | ADD | 24.6 | 46.0 | 35.4 | (46.2) | 12.8 | (3.7) | (7.8) | (15.2) | (23.8) | (23.8) | 779 | 210 |
| New private banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Axis Bank | 800 | BUY | 59.0 | 102.9 | 82.8 | (11.1) | 58.5 | 22.8 | 28.2 | 14.4 | 5.9 | 7.1 | 908 | 278 |
| HDFC Bank | 1,380 | ADD | 28.7 | 57.5 | 50.8 | (8.0) | 38.2 | (0.6) | (0.5) | (5.6) | 8.6 | (6.6) | 1,562 | 774 |
| ICICI Bank | 720 | ADD | 63.3 | 94.8 | 99.8 | (23.7) | 60.6 | 26.1 | 23.0 | 25.1 | (4.7) | 8.6 | 971 | 252 |
| Non-banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HDFC | 2,390 | SELL | 32.8 | 75.4 | 68.3 | (13.5) | 60.8 | 2.6 | 10.8 | 5.4 | 4.0 | 8.7 | 2,800 | 1,116 |
| IDFC | 117 | ADD | 76.1 | 110.3 | 99.0 | (30.7) | 75.0 | 36.0 | 32.8 | 24.6 | (10.6) | 18.3 | 170 | 44 |
| LIC Housing Finance | 410 | BUY | 47.3 | 104.1 | 117.4 | 16.4 | 77.9 | 13.8 | 28.9 | 36.1 | 29.3 | 20.2 | 425 | 150 |
| MMFS | 221 | ADD | 4.6 | 15.1 | 16.3 | (25.1) | (12.8) | (19.2) | (27.3) | (27.2) | (5.9) | (41.1) | 300 | 162 |
| PFC | 197 | ADD | 27.7 | 42.5 | 91.3 | 27.5 | 48.0 | (1.4) | (10.0) | 19.8 | 38.6 | 0.0 | 200 | 85 |
| Shriram Transport | 271 | ADD | 25.7 | 47.5 | 35.4 | (15.3) | 39.1 | (2.9) | (6.9) | (15.2) | 2.4 | (6.0) | 360 | 150 |
| Srei Infrastructure finance | 53 | ADD | 38.7 | 42.3 | 23.3 | (66.8) | 36.2 | 7.2 | (10.1) | (22.8) | (41.2) | (7.9) | 160 | 22 |
| Rural Electrification Corp. | 135 | BUY | 23.6 | 67.8 | 125.9 | 15.4 | 85.2 | (4.5) | 6.0 | 41.5 | 28.4 | 25.2 | 138 | 53 |

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

| Telecom |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Price, Rs |  |  |  |
| Sector coverage view |  |  |  |

## Impact of election outcome-some technical positive triggers, nothing fundamental

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- Meaningful change in policy unlikely
- Play on technical factors may not be significant
- Maintain Cautious coverage view

We find the sharp run-up in Indian Telecom stock prices surprising given that formation of stable government is unlikely to (1) change policy matters on licensing, levies and competition, (2) impact estimates on value accretion from 3G auction, (3) impact estimates on subscribers additions, usage change and growth, and (4) lead to any direct benefit of potential fiscal stimulus. The run-up appears to be based on technical factors including (1) potential Rupee appreciation that can provide some near-term upside to earnings estimates though it is unlikely to change fundamental value and (2) expectations that the telecom sector may be able to capture primary and second fund-flows from formation of stable government. There could be some justification in technical factors; however, we would recommend investors not to overlook the fundamental concerns including increasing competitive intensity and consistent downgrades of EBITDA estimates over the last 12-months. Valuations of the wireless names at 9-11X FY2010E and 7-10X FY2011E EV/EBITDA are at a significant premium to fair value and regional comps (even after adjusting for growth). Retain Cautious coverage view with SELL rating on RCOM and REDUCE on Idea.

Meaningful change in policy unlikely. We do not expect meaningful deviations on the policy front from the government's earlier term. The government may however provide clarity/ take decisions on the following

1. 3G auctions. 3G auctions could not materialize during the planned Jan 2009 month due to delays in procedure clarifications. We believe that 3G auctions may materialize in CY2009, though this in unlikely to be a stock price trigger. We assume 3G to be NPV neutral (though global experiences suggest some value destruction).
2. Concessional license fees and increase in spectrum charges. DOT had issued notification for concessional license fees of $2 \%$ of AGR in non-Metro circles in case any operator reaches coverage of $95 \%$ of developmental blocks in a circle. The DOT had also proposed increased in spectrum charges of 1-3\% of AGR depending on the quantum of spectrum usage. Both these events were not notified by the Cabinet and did not materialize into law. If taken together, these would be neutral for the sector.
3. TDSAT's ruling on excess allocation of spectrum by DOT. The TDSAT had recently ruled that the GSM operators are not entitled to 2G spectrum grant beyond the 6.2MHz permitted in their UAS (Universal Service Access) license. The ruling does not suggest any actions on operators who have been granted excess spectrum (beyond 6.2 MHz ). Potential actions could be (1) a one-time spectrum charge levied on operators holding excess spectrum and/or (2) a recurring excess spectrum levy. We expect the government to step in and take remedial action.

Play on technical factors may not be significant. Positive rub-off effect from stable government may drive strong capital inflows and possibly drive rupee appreciation. We believe that strong capital inflows may lead to temporary increase in stock prices though fundamentals and earnings in our view would eventually prevail. We discuss the impact of stronger rupee on Bharti and RCOM

1. Bharti-temporary earnings boost from rupee appreciation though no change in value. Bharti's FY2009 EPS was impacted by Rs4.5 from mark-to-market forex losses (net of deferred tax asset) on overseas borrowings resulting from rupee depreciation. Bharti's FY2010E EPS may increase by Rs2-2.5 in case rupee appreciates to 45; insignificant in our view.
2. RCOM—Rs12 increase in target price in case rupee appreciates to 45. RCOM had forex loans of approximately US $\$ 3.6$ bn at end-December 2008. In addition, we estimate buyers credit and equipment payables of US\$1.4 bn. RCOM's forex liability (and effectively debt) can reduce by Rs25 bn ( $\sim$ Rs 12/share) in case rupee appreciates to 45; our target price can increase accordingly.

Indian telecom companies valuation analysis, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-2011E

|  | Price (Rs) | Target price | P/E (X) |  |  |  | EV/EBITDA (X) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18-May-09 | (Rs) | 2008 | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E | 2008 | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E |
| Bharti | 1,003 | 775 | 28.4 | 22.5 | 19.2 | 16.8 | 17.1 | 13.0 | 11.1 | 9.7 |
| Idea | 76 | 55 | 19.2 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 23.6 | 13.1 | 9.6 | 8.7 | 7.3 |
| MTNL | 89 | 50 | 12.4 | 22.3 | 21.8 | 19.5 | 3.0 | 10.7 | 8.9 | 6.6 |
| RCOM | 290 | 180 | 11.0 | 10.5 | 14.3 | 13.7 | 10.3 | 9.2 | 8.7 | 6.8 |
| TCOM | 601 | 400 | 54.9 | 44.2 | 42.9 | 39.6 | 28.2 | 21.4 | 19.3 | 17.7 |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { KS } \\ \text { rating } \end{gathered}$ | Market cap. (US\$ bn) | Revenues (Rs bn) |  |  |  | EBITDA (Rs bn) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 2008 | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E | 2008 | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E |
| Bharti | ADD | 38.1 | 270 | 370 | 433 | 501 | 113 | 152 | 175 | 196 |
| Idea | REDUCE | 4.7 | 67 | 101 | 136 | 176 | 23 | 28 | 36 | 44 |
| MTNL | SELL | 1.1 | 47 | 42 | 45 | 48 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| RCOM | SELL | 11.9 | 191 | 229 | 278 | 343 | 82 | 93 | 104 | 131 |
| TCOM | REDUCE | 3.4 | 33 | 38 | 42 | 46 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 10 |


|  | Net Income (Rs bn) |  |  |  | EPS (Rs) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2008 | 2009 | 2010E | 2011E | 2008 | 2009 | 2010E | 2011 E |
| Bharti | 66 | 84 | 97 | 111 | 35.3 | 44.6 | 52.2 | 59.8 |
| Idea | 10 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 3.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.2 |
| MTNL | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 7.1 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.6 |
| RCOM | 56 | 59 | 43 | 45 | 26.5 | 27.7 | 20.3 | 21.1 |
| TCOM | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 10.9 | 13.6 | 14.0 | 15.2 |

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| Technology |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sector coverage view |  |  | Neutral |
|  | Price, Rs |  |  |
| Company | Rating | 18-May | Target |
| TCS | REDUCE | 744 | 510 |
| Wipro | ADD | 417 | 325 |
| Infosys | BUY | 1,800 | 1,500 |
| HCL Tech | REDUCE | 166 | 110 |
| Patni | REDUCE | 214 | 150 |
| Hexaware | SELL | 38 | 25 |
| Polaris Softwal | SELL | 85 | 50 |
| Tech Mahindré | ADD | 392 | 360 |
| Mphasis BFL | REDUCE | 292 | 190 |
| MindTree | BUY | 407 | 400 |

## Election outcome euphoria detrimental for Indian IT stocks

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- Indian elections outcome do not matter for the Indian IT sector...
- ...however, the possibility of a stronger Re does
- Multiple re-rating needs to be viewed in conjunction with the likelihood of earnings downgrades on stronger Re expectations

We find the run-up in stock prices of Indian IT services post Indian elections outcome surprising and a bit worrying. We do not believe a stable Indian Government would have a positive influence on the operational metrics for the Indian IT companies. On the contrary, strong capital inflows and a stable government may lead to a stronger rupee, a considerable negative for the sector. Basket buying of India equity as an asset class may keep stock prices of Indian IT stocks firm in the near term; however, outperformance from these levels in the medium-to-long term would require substantial earnings upgrades, which we do not foresee in the near future. Our thesis on business recovery starting from 2HCY09 remains intact; however, stocks are running ahead of fundamentals. We would review our earnings estimates after our economist's currency forecast revision.

The outcome of Indian elections does not matter for India's IT sector... We attribute the participation of the Indian IT stocks in the post election results rally to a possible short squeeze in the broader market, or fresh money chasing Indian equity as an asset class without careful consideration of the actual sectoral impact of a stable government formation at the centre. We believe Central government stability has no positive influence on the operational metrics of the Indian IT sector, whose fortunes are tied more closely to a revival in the global economy. If anything, a stable government and higher capital inflows (to Indian equities) could lead to a stronger Rupee, impacting the earnings of the Indian IT sector negatively (we discuss this in detail in the next paragraph). Re-rating of the Indian IT stocks may sustain given the likelihood of the lower country and political risk premium attached to Indian equities in general; however, investors should consider that it is also likely that meaningful earnings upgrades in the sector could be smaller and fewer (a sharp appreciation in the Re/US\$ rate could lead to downgrades as well). Our thesis of business recovery starting from 2 HCY 09 remains intact; however, stocks are running ahead of fundamentals. We would review our earnings estimates post our economist's currency forecast revision.
... however, the possibility of a stronger Re does. As highlighted above, an increase in capital inflows could lead to a sustained appreciation in the Re versus the US\$, negatively impacting FY2010E/11E earnings estimates for the Indian IT companies. Our current EPS estimates are based on an average Re/US\$ rate of 50.75 and 50.5 for FY2010E and FY2011E, respectively. Exhibit 1 depicts the EPS sensitivity of Indian IT companies to various Re/US\$ scenarios. We are maintaining our earnings estimates but would review the same post our economist's currency forecast revision.

EPS sensitivity of Indian IT companies to Re/US\$ rate assumptions

| FY2010E earnings sensitivity |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Re/USS rate | $\mathbf{4 6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 7 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 9 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 . 8}$ |
| Infosys | 91.4 | 94.1 | 96.8 | 99.4 | 102.1 | 104.1 |
| TCS | 43.7 | 45.3 | 46.9 | 48.5 | 50.1 | 51.3 |
| Wipro | 23.7 | 24.4 | 25.1 | 25.8 | 26.4 | 27.0 |
| HCLT | 10.2 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 12.1 | 12.5 |
| Tech Mahindra | 30.9 | 32.4 | 33.9 | 35.4 | 36.9 | 38.0 |
| Patni | 18.5 | 19.6 | 20.6 | 21.7 | 22.7 | 23.5 |
| MindTree | 35.0 | 36.9 | 38.8 | 40.7 | 42.6 | 44.0 |
| Hexaware | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 |
| Polaris | 10.6 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 12.3 | 12.9 | 13.3 |
| Mphasis | 25.9 | 27.3 | 28.7 | 30.1 | 31.5 | 32.6 |


| FY2011E earnings sensitivity | $\mathbf{4 6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 7 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 9 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 . 5}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Re/USS rate | 102.6 | 105.6 | 108.6 | 111.6 | 114.6 | 116.1 |
| Infosys | 48.1 | 49.9 | 51.6 | 53.3 | 55.0 | 55.9 |
| TCS | 26.1 | 26.9 | 27.6 | 28.3 | 29.1 | 29.4 |
| Wipro | 14.0 | 14.6 | 15.2 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 16.7 |
| HCLT | 31.2 | 32.6 | 33.9 | 35.2 | 36.5 | 37.2 |
| Tech Mahindra | 21.4 | 22.5 | 23.5 | 24.5 | 25.6 | 26.1 |
| Patni | 40.8 | 43.0 | 45.2 | 47.4 | 49.6 | 50.7 |
| MindTree | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 |
| Hexaware | 9.8 | 10.3 | 10.8 | 11.3 | 11.9 | 12.1 |
| Polaris | 22.4 | 23.6 | 24.9 | 26.1 | 27.3 | 27.9 |
| Mphasis |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

Currency hedges of the top Indian IT companies over the past few quarters (US\$ mn)

|  | Jun-07 | Sep-07 | Dec-07 | Mar-08 | Jun-08 | Sep-08 | Dec-08 | Mar-09 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| TCS | 2,500 | 2,800 | 3,100 | 2,900 | 2,300 | 1,800 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| HCL Tech | 1,160 | 1,860 | 2,300 | 2,700 | 2,000 | 1,900 | 1,580 | 1,300 |
| Wipro (a) | 708 | 1,100 | 2,450 | 3,500 | 3,000 | 2,600 | 2,100 | 1,900 |
| Infosys | 939 | 1,401 | 1,150 | 759 | 811 | 932 | 576 | 506 |

Note:
(a) Gross outstanding hedges. Net hedges (after assigining to assets on the balance sheet) at endMar 2009 were US $\$ 1,300 \mathrm{mn}$.

Source: Companies, Kotak Institutional Equities

## Implied FCF growth to perpetuity for tier-I Indian IT stocks has shot up post the recent rally

|  | CMP | Enterprise value | FY2010E FCF (a) | FY2010E FCF yield | Assumed WACC | Implied FCF growth to perpetuity (b) | Risk to FCF estimates |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (Rs) | (Rs mn) | (Rs mn) | (\%) | (\%) | (\%) |  |
| Infosys | 1,800 | 882,743 | 46,025 | 5.2 | 12.5 | 7.3 | Low |
| TCS | 744 | 679,582 | 39,304 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 6.7 | Medium |
| Wipro | 417 | 576,184 | 29,382 | 5.1 | 12.5 | 7.4 | Medium |

Note:
(a) Defined as operating cash flow post working capital changes less capex (normalized for tax rate increase starting FY2011E)
(b) Assuming FY2010E as the terminal year

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates


Price, Rs

| Company | Rating | 18-May | Target |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| BHEL | REDUCE | 2,015 | 1,475 |
| BGR | REDUCE | 238 | 165 |
| Crompton Gre | ADD | 205 | 210 |
| L\&T | ADD | 1,232 | 1,000 |
| BEL | REDUCE | 1,098 | 1,025 |
| ABB | REDUCE | 560 | 500 |
| Suzlon | ADD | 93 | 90 |
| Siemens | REDUCE | 426 | 360 |

Government can make difference in key sectors; however there was no constraint in previous term also

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- Centre has influence on $\mathbf{6 0 \%}$ of infra. spending; reported progress on $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$, mainly power
- Roads, ports and railways need focus; nothing prevented progress in previous term also
- Limited role in power distribution, state roads, irrigation and telecom adding to about $40 \%$ of infra. spending

We identify sectors based on ability of central government to make a difference to spending trajectory: (a) Sectors with strong progress already and thus limited incremental role ( $25 \%$ ) ' power generation, transmission and airports, (b) government has to drive (37\%) ' roads, railways, ports and water supply and sanitation (c) sectors that are dependant on state and private sector (38\%) ' power distribution, state level roads, irrigation and telecommunication. In key sectors such as power, government has to ensure execution of projects on time as well as catalyze state level reforms to reduce losses. In the derailed roads sector emphasis is to get the award process going again while in railways emphasis is on capacity enhancement particularly with large projects such as Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC). We highlight that there was no constraint in previous term also in pushing the infrastructure agenda and sectors like roads and ports got derailed because of the lack of coordination among various arms of government on crucial policy matters.

## Central government has direct influence on $\mathbf{6 0 \%}$ of infrastructure spending and has made decent progress on $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ already

We identify sectors in three categories based on ability of central government to make a meaningful difference to spending trajectory in those sectors:
a) Sectors with strong progress already and thus government incremental role is limited (25\%) - Power generation, transmission and airports
b) Where government can drive a significant difference (37\%) - roads (National Highway Development Program), Railways and ports.
c) Sectors that are not dependant on central government but on state and private sector (38\%) - Power distribution, state level roads, irrigation, water supply and sanitation, and telecommunication (Exhibit 1).

## Power - Push execution, catalyze state level reforms to reduce AT\&C losses and carry out bulk tendering

We highlight that power sector has seen strong ordering activity with completion of 80 GW of ordering activity for the XIth plan. About 25 GW of XIIth plan thermal capacity has also been already ordered which may be more than $40 \%$ of total envisaged thermal capacity in the XIth plan. We believe portion of XIIth plan capacity that has been ordered already may be even higher if we include nuclear and hydro power also as these are longer lead and are likely to be ordered out earlier. So power sector requires an execution push so that plants can be commissioned without much delays (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4).

Other initiatives that have the potential to change the sector dynamics and improve sector health are:
a) Bulk tendering - bulk tendering activity that may catalyze competition in the power equipment manufacturing and
b) Reduce AT\&C losses at state level - incentivizing reduction in AT\&C losses (schemes such as APDRP) so that unit revenues and sector health could improve.

## Roads—Clarify bidding norms and reduce project costs to enhance viability

We highlight that road sector could be the biggest beneficiary of a government that intends to create a meaningful difference in the infrastructure development. We believe that long-term program has already been structured and there are enough instances of successful road projects in both the public as well as private domain. However the momentum has recently flagged with (a) long debate around the model concession agreement, (b) imposition of clause to let only top six qualified bidders place bids in the current batch of projects and (c) subsequently forcing some top qualified bidders to withdraw based on maximum number of projects that can be won by a particular consortium. Apart from clarity on bidding norms, projects may also need to be restructured to reduce the scope such as (service lanes etc.) so as to reduce costs and make them more attractive for private bidders (Exhibits 5 and 6).

## Railways—Dedicated freight corridor and capacity enhancements; good enough investable cash generation

We highlight that key investments in the railways sector that the government can push are
(a) capacity enhancements post several years of volume led utilization strategy and
(b) dedicated freight corridor on which work has already started. Railway is generating investable cash surplus of the order of US\$4-5 bn p.a. and that can be put to use in the executing the investment program (Exhibits 7 and 8).

## Ports-Several identified capacity enhancement projects at major ports are facing delays in tendering activity

We highlight that several capacity enhancement projects at major ports such as JNPT $4^{\text {th }}$ terminal are facing long delays and can be tendered out to construction contractors/ developers. Private sector has come forth and invested in port capacity with several new ports such as Mundra, Pipavav, Krishnapatnam, Dhamra, Gangavaram coming up. This sector was also affected by delays related to debate on the model concession agreement similar to road pojects.

## Irrigation-Central government has limited role however state budgets suggest spending may be in line with target

We highlight that irrigation sector is completely dominated by state sector spending and thus central government ha a limited role to play in the sector. Andhra Pradesh leads the way in irrigation spending and reelection of same state government as before in AP bodes well for visibility on this sector. We highlight that recent budget allocations suggest that spending in the sector may be broadly in line with set targets (Exhibits 9 and 10).

## Water supply and sanitation-catalyst role for state government investments

Central government can play role of a catalyzing agency in the water supply and sanitation area as this sector is lead by state government investments. Schemes such as Jawahar Lal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNURM) is aimed at urban level reforms and partially financing investments in urban infrastructure particularly related to water supply and sanitation.

We highlight that there was no constraint in previous term also in pushing the infrastructure agenda
We highlight that there was no constraint on pushing the infrastructure agenda in the previous terms also, Derailment of investment program in sectors such as roads and ports was essentially the result of lack of coordination among various arms of government in setting clear policy objectives and process to drive investments.

Exhibit 1. Government has a role to play in about $60 \%$ of the total infrastructure spending, rest is autonomous or in hands of state governments Infrastructure spending during the Xith plan as per the planning commission document

| Sectors | $\frac{\text { Xth Plan }}{\text { US\$ bn }}$ | XIth Plan US\$ bn | Centre | State | Private | Key remarks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Power | 71 | 150 | 53 | 57 | 40 | Visible progress but execution is the key |
| Generation | 35 | 85 | 30 | 23 | 30 | Capacity already ordered |
| Transmission | 15 | 32 \|| | 13 | 12 | 7 | Should align with generation progress |
| Distribution | 20 | 36 | 10 | 23 | 2 | Depend on state finances |
| Roads \& bridges | 32 | 76 | 28 | 21 | 27 | Confusion on award process |
| Central - NHDP |  | 48 | 28 | - | 20 | Slow ordering activity by NHAI |
| State - Non-NHDP |  | 281 | - | 21 | 7 | Select states such as Gujarat, MP have made progress |
| Railways | 20 | 62 \| | 52 | - | 11 | Cash generation of US $\$ 4-5$ bn p.a. could help finance investments |
| Irrigation | 32 | 53 | 5 | 48 | - | Disaggregated state level spending |
| Water supply \& sanitation | 16 | 49 | 28 | 20 | 1 | Driven by state, however, JNURM etc drive investments |
| Ports | 1 | 18 \| | 4 \| | 1 | 13 | Private sector has made investments, however public projects have languished |
| Airports | 2 | 8 | 2 \\| | - | 6 | Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad have already made progress |
| Telecommunication | 22 | 65 | 22 |  | 431 | Mostly private sector led investment |
| Total | 271 | 492 | 198 | 149 | 145 |  |

Note: (a) These are planning commission estimates 2006-2007 prices and have been converted using exchange rate of Rs41/\$
Legend:
Strong progress already visible, unlikely to get better
Progress largely depends on state government/private sector Government can make significant difference

Source: Planning commission, Kotak Institutional equities research

Exhibit 2. Total of $\mathbf{8 0} \mathbf{G W}$ of orders under construction/ commissioned in the XIth Plan
Projects in the XIth plan - Under construction/ commissioned (MW)

|  | Coal |  |  | Gas | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | 3,300 | 16,420 | 19,720 | 726 | 9,955 | 3,380 | 33,781 |
| NTPC | 3,300 | 10,220 | 13,520 | - | 1,920 | - | 15,440 |
| NHPC | - | - | - | - | 5,103 | - | 5,103 |
| DVC | - | 5,450 | 5,450 | - | - | - | 5,450 |
| Others | - | 750 | 750 | 726 | 2,932 | 3,380 | 7,788 |
| State | - | 20,828 | 20,828 | 2,223 | 2,637 | - | 25,688 |
| Private | 5,560 | 10,009 | 15,569 | 2,057 | 3,263 | - | 20,889 |
| Total | 8,860 | 47,257 | 56,117 | 5,006 | 15,855 | 3,380 | 80,358 |

## Projects in the XIth plan-Commissioned so far

|  | Coal |  |  | Gas | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | - | 2,740 | 2,740 | - | 1,030 | 220 | 3,990 |
| NTPC | - | 2,490 | 2,490 | - | - | - | 2,490 |
| NHPC | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| DVC | - | 250 | 250 | - | - | - | 250 |
| Others | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| State | - | 4,420 | 4,420 | 280 | 2,362 | - | 7,062 |
| Private | - | 1,000 | 1,000 | 383 | - | - | 1,383 |
| Total | - | 8,160 | 8,160 | 662 | 3,392 | 220 | 12,434 |

Source: CEA, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 3. BHEL captures 62\% of coal-based thermal power projects under XIth Plan

| Projects in the XIth plan - BHEL having the order, (MW) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Thermal |  |  |  | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
|  | Coal |  |  | Gas |  |  |  |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | - | 15,530 | 15,530 | 726 | 4,270 | - | 20,526 |
| NTPC |  | 9,480 | 9,480 |  | 1,400 |  | 10,880 |
| NHPC |  |  |  |  | 1,870 |  | 1,870 |
| DVC |  | 5,300 | 5,300 |  |  |  | 5,300 |
| Others |  | 750 | 750 | 726 | 1,000 |  | 2,476 |
| State | - | 16,778 | 16,778 | 1,757 | 473 | - | 19,008 |
| Private | - | 2,390 | 2,390 | - | 1,022 | - | 3,412 |
| Total | - | 34,698 | 34,698 | 2,483 | 5,765 | - | 42,946 |

Projects in the XIth plan - BHEL's market share (\%)

|  | Thermal |  |  |  | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coal |  |  | Gas |  |  |  |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | - | 94.6 | 78.8 | 100.0 | 42.9 | - | 60.8 |
| NTPC |  | 92.8 | 70.1 |  |  |  | 70.5 |
| NHPC |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DVC |  | 97.2 | 97.2 |  |  |  | 97.2 |
| Others |  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |  | 31.8 |
| State |  | 80.6 | 80.6 | 79.0 | 17.9 |  | 74.0 |
| Private |  | 23.9 | 15.4 |  | 31.3 |  | 16.3 |
| Total | - | 73.4 | 61.8 | 49.6 | 36.4 | - | 53.4 |

Source: CEA, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 4. One-fourth of XIIth plan ordering activity may have already been completed
Total projects in the XIIth Plan - Likely to be taken up for commissioning (MW)

|  | Coal |  |  | Gas | Hydro | Nuclear | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | Total |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | 7,344 | 5,937 | 13,281 | 4,550 | 13,986 | 7,200 | 39,017 |
| NTPC | 7,344 | 675 | 8,019 | 4,550 | 4,546 | 1,800 | 18,915 |
| NHPC | - | - | - | - | 5,950 | - | 5,950 |
| DVC | - | 1,638 | 1,638 | - | - | - | 1,638 |
| Others | - | 3,624 | 3,624 | - | 3,491 | 5,400 | 12,515 |
| State | 800 | 19,944 | 20,744 | 1,185 | 4,174 | - | 26,103 |
| Private | 3,260 | 4,203 | 7,463 | 2,932 | 4,189 | - | 14,584 |
| UMPP | 15,885 | - | 15,885 | - | - | - | 15,885 |
| Total | 27,289 | 30,084 | 57,373 | 8,667 | 22,349 | 7,200 | 95,589 |

Total projects in the XIIth Plan - Already awarded (MW)

|  | Coal |  |  |  |  |  |  | Total | Gas | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Supercritical | Subcritical | 5,500 | 7,480 | $\mathbf{7 , 4 8 0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Centre | 1,980 | 4,250 | 6,230 | $\mathbf{6 , 2 3 0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NTPC | 1,980 |  | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NHPC |  |  | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DVC |  | 1,250 | 1,250 | $\mathbf{1 , 2 5 0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Others |  | 3,400 | 6,320 | $\mathbf{6 , 3 4 3}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| State | 2,920 | 8,100 | 12,060 | 23 | $\mathbf{1 2 , 0 6 0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Private | 3,960 | $\mathbf{1 7 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 , 8 6 0}$ | - | $\mathbf{2 3}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | $\mathbf{8 , 8 6 0}$ |  |  | $\mathbf{2 5 , 8 8 3}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: CEA, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 5. Overall activity has been excruciatingly slow while clearly cash projects are on the way out
Cash and BOT/SPV/Annuity funded NHDP projects 1999-2009 as on December 31, 2008 (km)


Source: NHAI, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 6. Progress has been slow post completion of Golden Quadilateral, i.e. Phase I of NHDP
Phase-wise status of NHDP Phases III to VII (as of March 31, 2009)


Source: National Highway Authority of India, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 7. Railway envisages strong investments in capacity enhancement
Capital expenditure plan of Indian Railways over the XIth plan

|  | Investments  <br>  (Rs bn) <br> Rolling stock 545 <br> Capacity augmentation \& development 725 <br> Safety \& other works 1,119 <br> Investment in PSUs 110 <br> Dedicated Freight Corrdior 300 <br> Metro rail projects 200 <br> Total $\mathbf{3 , 0 0 0}$ $\mathbf{l}$ |
| :--- | ---: |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates, planning commission documents

Exhibit 8. Railways generate about US\$4-5 bn of investable surplus each year Investable cash surplus of Indian railways, March fiscal year-ends 2007-2009E (Rs bn)


Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates, Indian Railways budget documents

Exhibit 9. Contribution to total irrigation spending led by Andhra Pradesh follwed by Maharashtra and Gujarat
State-wise share of total planned spending on Major and Medium Irrigation and Flood Control, March fiscal year-end, 2008


Source: Reserve Bank of India

Exhibit 10. Envisaged spending in irrigataion sector during 11th plan likely to pan out Planned versus actual investments in Irrigation sector (Rs bn)

| Envisaged investment in irrigation in 11th five year plan (2006-07 prices) | 2,231 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Actual spending in Irrigation in 2007-08 (Budget estimate) | 339 |
| Actual spending in Irrigation in 2007-08 (at 2006-07 prices) | 323 |
| Total potential spending in XI |  |
| Likely central government spending (10\% of total) | 1,819 |
| Total potential spending | 202 |


| Likely achievement versus envisaged (\%) | 90.6 |
| :--- | :--- |

Note:
(1) Used inflation estimate of 5\% for deflating 2007-08 nominal data to 2006-07 prices.

Source: Government of India, RBI, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| Cement |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sector coverage view |  | Cautious |  |
|  | Price, Rs |  |  |
| Company | Rating | 18-May | Target |
| Gujarat Ambuj | REDUCE | 87 | 70 |
| ACC | REDUCE | 721 | 625 |
| Grasim | REDUCE | 2,192 | 1,500 |
| India Cements | ADD | 128 | 130 |
| UltraTech Cert | ADD | 651 | 625 |
| Shree Cement | BUY | 919 | 950 |

Healthy volume growth sustains, prices inch upwards
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- Despatch growth at 13.1\% yoy in April 2009, despite unfavorable base
- Cement prices increase by Rs2/bag, led by North and East
- Cement stocks lag market performance, recommend reducing exposure to ACC and Ambuja

Despatch growth of 13.1\% yoy in April 2009—sustainability of double-digit growth remains suspect. Cement despatch growth improved in April 2009 to 13.1\% yoy (compared to 10.3\% yoy growth in March 2009 and $9.1 \%$ in January 2009). We note the improvement in cement despatches was aided by pre-election spending and have concerns on the sustainability of the current despatch growth rate. In our view, cement despatches will likely clock growth of 7\% yoy in FY2010E.

Shree Cement and Jaiprakash reported strong despatch growth (despite unfavorable base), benefiting from (1) ramp-up of production from new capacities, and (2) healthy demand environment in key markets of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Madhya Pradesh (MP). We note that India Cement (+1.4\% yoy) and ACC (+3.6\% yoy) continue to report despatch growth in low single-digits.

Cement prices increase to Rs245/bag—North and East contribute to price rise. All India average cement prices during April 2009 increased to Rs245/bag (Rs243/bag in March 2009). We note that most of the price increase was contributed by North (+Rs5/ bag) and East (Rs4/bag), while price action in other regions remained largely muted. Cement prices in South have remained around Rs260/bag for the last six months, as demand growth in the region has slowed down during this period.

In our view, the near-term firmness in the price trend will likely reverse itself as the recently commissioned capacities likely ramp-up production and new capacities continue to come on stream. We currently assume a 3-5\% decline in prices during FY2010E in our financial projections.

Valuation multiple for large-cap stocks expanded after yesterdays rally, upside still exist in smaller cement companies. Cement stocks have lagged the markets over the last three months, despite strong quarterly results and absolute performance (+18\% mom). In our view, earnings multiples of large-cap cement companies (now around 6.5X EV/EBITDA on FY2010E) appear fairly valued, though room for further re-rating exists in the case of Shree Cement (3.9X on FY2010E), India Cements (4.3X on FY2010E) and Ultratech (5X on FY2010E).

Cement stocks have typically traded below replacement cost (currently at ~US\$100/ton) during periods of declining margins (and prices). We recommend reducing exposure to cement players near or above replacement costs. ACC and Ambuja remain our top sell ideas in the sector.

Exhibit 1: Despatch growth in strong double-digits
Cement despatch growth rate for major companies

|  | Apr-09 |  |  | Growth (\%) |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | (mn tons) |  | y-0-y | YTD |  |
| ACC | 1.77 |  | 3.6 | 3.6 |  |
| Ambuja Cements | 1.64 |  | 10.8 | 10.8 |  |
| Ultratech Cement | 1.58 |  | 13.7 | 13.7 |  |
| Grasim Industries | 1.59 |  | 30.7 | 30.7 |  |
| Shree Cement | 0.79 |  | 28.4 | 28.4 |  |
| India Cements | 0.78 |  | 1.4 | 1.4 |  |
| Madras Cements | 0.61 |  | 19.6 | 19.6 |  |
| Jaiprakash | 0.79 |  | $\mathbf{2 8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 8 . 0}$ |  |
| Industry | $\mathbf{1 6 . 6}$ |  | $\mathbf{1 3 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 1}$ |  |

Source: CMA, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 2: All India average cement prices at Rs245/bag
Regional cement prices (Rs per 50 kg bag)


Source: CMA, Kotak Institutional Equities

Exhibit 3: Price action in South and Central remained muted in April
Regional cement prices (Rs per 50 kg bag)


Source: CMA, Kotak Institutional Equities

## Exhibit 4: Cement comparative valuation

| Company | Market cap. (US\$ mn) | $\begin{gathered} \text { CMP (Rs) } \\ \text { 18-May } \end{gathered}$ | Target price (Rs) | Rating | EPS (Rs) |  |  |  | P/E (X) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| ACC | 2,859 | 730 | 625 | REDUCE | 64.1 | 56.3 | 55.2 | 42.2 | 11.4 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 17.3 |
| Ambuja Cements | 2,697 | 85 | 70 | REDUCE | 7.6 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 5.4 | 11.2 | 11.8 | 12.4 | 15.6 |
| Grasim Industries | 4,108 | 2,150 | 1,500 | REDUCE | 284.6 | 225.7 | 188.5 | 192.6 | 7.6 | 9.5 | 11.4 | 11.2 |
| India Cements | 770 | 131 | 130 | ADD | 24.5 | 18.8 | 19.8 | 17.5 | 5.4 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 7.5 |
| Jaiprakash Associates | 4,972 | 170 | 140 | ADD | 4.9 | 6.6 | 7.9 | 11.8 | 34.7 | 25.9 | 21.6 | 14.4 |
| Shree Cement | 687 | 946 | 950 | BUY | 90.2 | 174.7 | 91.6 | 86.2 | 10.5 | 5.4 | 10.3 | 11.0 |
| UltraTech Cement | 1,645 | 630 | 625 | ADD | 81.4 | 78.0 | 70.5 | 49.3 | 7.7 | 8.1 | 8.9 | 12.8 |


|  | EV/EBITDA (X) |  |  |  | EV/ton of production (US\$) |  |  |  | EV/ton of capacity (US\$) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Company | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| ACC | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.6 | 131 | 125 | 123 | 116 | 122.1 | 122.1 | 118.9 | 103.1 |
| Ambuja Cements | 5.3 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 7.9 | 146 | 144 | 139 | 134 | 132.6 | 130.3 | 128.6 | 124.5 |
| Grasim Industries | 4.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 5.9 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| India Cements | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 115 | 115 | 96 | 87 | 118.7 | 108.0 | 81.7 | 80.9 |
| Jaiprakash Associates | 16.2 | 13.9 | 11.9 | 11.2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Shree Cement | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 112 | 90 | 87 | 74 | 104.7 | 82.7 | 74.2 | 66.7 |
| UltraTech Cement | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 116 | 114 | 93 | 79 | 116.8 | 104.7 | 79.2 | 74.9 |

Source: Company reports, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

Exhibit 5: Cement companies lag the market despite strong absolute performance
Absolute and relative performance of cement companies under coverage (\%)

|  | Change (\%) |  |  |  |  | Relative change (\%) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1-mo | 3-mo | 6-mo | 1-year | CYTD | 1-mo | 3-mo | 6-mo | 1-year |
| Ambuja Cements | 9.1 | 25.9 | 58.0 | (21.1) | 24.6 | (15.8) | (20.6) | (1.1) | (2.6) |
| ACC | 18.4 | 31.7 | 80.1 | 5.8 | 50.1 | (8.7) | (16.9) | 12.7 | 20.2 |
| Grasim Industries | 34.1 | 59.4 | 136.6 | (4.3) | 79.7 | 3.5 | 0.6 | 48.0 | 11.6 |
| UltraTech Cement | 14.9 | 55.2 | 109.7 | 8.2 | 68.8 | (11.3) | (2.0) | 31.2 | 22.2 |
| India Cements | 5.7 | 24.1 | 47.4 | (23.9) | 31.3 | (18.4) | (21.7) | (7.8) | (4.9) |
| Shree Cement | 13.3 | 67.5 | 128.0 | 3.9 | 99.7 | (12.6) | 5.7 | 42.7 | 18.6 |
| Cement | 19.2 | 42.2 | 92.4 | (8.1) | 54.5 | (8.0) | (10.2) | 20.4 | 8.4 |

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities





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Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
Kotak Institutional Equities: Valuation Summary of Key Indian Companies


[^3]Kotak Institutional Equities: Valuation Summary of Key Indian Companies


[^4]Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
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Source: Kotak Institutional Equities
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[^0]:    Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities

[^1]:    Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities.

[^2]:    Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

[^3]:    Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

[^4]:    (1) For banks we have used adjusted book values.
    (2) 2008 means calendar year 2007 , similiarly $\mathbf{2}$. 2009 and 2010 for these particular companies.
    (3)

