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## News Roundup

## Corporate

- Dabur India is close to acquiring Fem Care Pharma for nearly Rs 300 crore. Both the parties are expected to sign an agreement to this effect next week. (ET)
- Fashion giant Esprit Holdings may assume direct charge of its Indian operations. The $\$ 5$-billion group may take $51 \%$ stake in a joint venture with Madura Garments, part of the AV Birla Group, which manages Esprit's retail stores through a licensing agreement in India. (ET)
- Private carrier Jet Airways is believed to have struck a deal last week with west Asian investment agency Mubadala Development Company for a funding of Rs1,000 crore. The instrument of funding, however, has yet to be formalised. Mubadala is wholly owned by the government of Emirates of Abu Dhabi. (BS)
- Steel Authority of India (SAIL), the country's second-biggest producer of steel, may cut output as demand for vehicles, homes slump and commodity prices tumble. Production of some of the products, including hot rolled (HR) coils and long products, at SAIL may be cut temporarily. (BS)
- The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) has imposed a 50 per cent export obligation condition on Supreme Tradelinks (STPL), a company whose 100 per cent equity is being acquired by Marks and Spencer Reliance (MSRPL). MSRPL is a joint venture between UK apparel and retail giant Marks and Spencer and Reliance Industries. (BS)


## Economic and political

- The FIPB has also clarified that foreign joint ventures in the construction and development business will not be allowed to sell undeveloped land they acquire for projects. The ambit of this clarification includes foreign joint ventures in housing, commercial premises, townships, resorts, educational institutions, and city and regional townships. (BS)

Source: $E T=$ Economic Times, BS $=$ Business Standard, $F E=$ Financial Express, $B L=$ Business Line

| India | Change, \% |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 11-Nov | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Sensex | 9,840 | (6.6) | (6.5) | (36.5) |
| Nifty | 2,939 | (6.7) | (10.4) | (36.4) |
| Global/Regional indices |  |  |  |  |
| Dow Jones | 8,694 | (2.0) | 2.9 | (26.2) |
| FTSE | 4,247 | (3.6) | 8.0 | (23.4) |
| Nikkie | 8,782 | (0.3) | 6.1 | (34.0) |
| Hang Seng | 14,217 | 1.3 | (3.9) | (34.3) |
| KOSPI | 1,134 | 0.4 | (8.7) | (28.1) |
| Value traded - India |  |  |  |  |
|  | Moving avg, Rs bn |  |  |  |
|  | 11-Nov |  | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Cash (NSE+BSE) | 124.5 |  | 142.7 | 156.1 |
| Derivatives (NSE) | 403.9 |  | 482.8 | 397 |
| Deri. open interest | 532.6 |  | 693 | 778 |

Forex/money market

|  | Change, basis points |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 11-Nov | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |
| Rs/US \$ | 48.1 | 0 | $(13)$ | 576 |
| 6mo fwd prem, $\%$ | 0.7 | $(25)$ | 71 | 24 |
| 10yr govt bond, $\%$ | 7.7 | $(3)$ | $(10)$ | $(123)$ |

Commodity market

|  | Change, \% |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 11-Nov | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |  |
| Gold (US $\$ / O Z)$ | 736.1 | 0.6 | $(13.4)$ | $(9.4)$ |  |
| Silver (US $\$ / O Z)$ | 9.8 | 0.7 | $(2.6)$ | $(32.3)$ |  |
| Crude (US $\$ / B B L)$ | 54.8 | 0.1 | $(28.1)$ | $(50.2)$ |  |

Net investment (US\$mn)

|  | 10-Nov | MTD | CYTD |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Flls | 34 | 162 | $(12,595)$ |
| MFs | 105 | $(176)$ | 3,375 |

Top movers -3mo basis

|  | Change, \% |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Best performers | 11-Nov | 1-day | 1-mo | 3-mo |  |
| Union Bank Of India | 157 | $(0.1)$ | 7.5 | 4.8 |  |
| Financial Techn (Ind | - | - | - | - |  |
| Bank Of Baroda | 284 | $(4.7)$ | 2.0 | $(0.1)$ |  |
| Bharat Petroleum C | 303 | $(5.2)$ | $(10.6)$ | $(7.1)$ |  |
| Punjab National Bar | 487 | $(3.0)$ | 5.8 | $(2.2)$ |  |
| Worst performers |  |  |  |  |  |
| Housing Developme | 113 | $(11.1)$ | 22.4 | $(70.2)$ |  |
| Suzlon Energy Limit | 59 | $(13.7)$ | $(36.3)$ | $(75.7)$ |  |
| Bajaj Finserv Ltd | 140 | 5.0 | $(28.3)$ | $(73.3)$ |  |
| Unitech Limited | 51 | $(9.5)$ | $(38.3)$ | $(71.8)$ |  |
| Tata Steel Limited | 191 | $(10.8)$ | $(33.5)$ | $(68.6)$ |  |

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## India Chemical Monthly, November 2008

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- Asia product prices decline sharply; ethylene prices plunge
- Plastics margins decline led by sharp decline in product prices
- Margins for PFY and PSF expand; weak demand to impact margins in near term
- Asia product prices decline sharply; ethylene prices plunge

Asia product prices plummeted in October, led by a sharp decline in naphtha prices $(-40.2 \% \mathrm{mom})$, which, in turn, were driven by a decline in crude prices mom. Ethylene prices nosedived $41.5 \%$ mom in October led by (1) steep decline in crude prices, (2) supply glut and (3) weak demand. We expect ethylene prices to remain weak upon weak demand resulting from reduced operating rates by downstream producers.

## Asia product prices decline sharply; ethylene prices plunge

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## Plastics margins decline led by sharp decline in product prices

Asia plastics margins declined in October led by lower product prices, which, in turn, were driven by (1) weak demand amid global economic slowdown and (2) high inventories. Margins declined for HDPE, LLDPE and LDPE in October by 15.1\%, 4.7\% and $1.5 \%$ mom, respectively. PP margins declined by $7.4 \%$ mom led by a sharp decline in PP prices ( $-26.8 \% \mathrm{mom}$ ). We highlight that margins had peaked in midOctober and have declined by $\sim$ US $\$ 300 /$ ton since then. We expect margins to decline in India in November with LLDPE and HDPE margins declining 23\% mom and PP margins 15.3\% mom.

## Margins for PFY and PSF expand; weak demand to impact near-term margins

Asia PFY and PSF margins expanded in October led by a moderate decline in product prices versus sharp decline in input (PTA and MEG) prices. We expect product prices/ margins to soften, led by weakening demand, which has resulted in (1) low operating rates and (2) inventory build-up. Current global PFY and PSF rates remain low at around $65-70 \%$. Operating rates have declined to historical lows in China and Taiwan with several producers shutting down operations or delaying the start of new plants. MEG margins over naphtha turned positive in October led by a sharper decline in naphtha prices ( $-40.2 \% \mathrm{mom}$ ) versus a decline in MEG prices ( $-11.2 \% \mathrm{mom}$ ). We expect margins for PSF and PFY to decline in India in November by 4\% and 1\% mom, respectively.

We have included key exhibits at the end of this comment, for further details, please refer to India Chemical Monthly, November 2008.

## Chemical prices have plummeted in the recent month

Asia chemical prices, calendar year-ending 2005-2008 (US $\$ /$ /ton)

|  | Annual average prices |  |  |  | Quarterly average |  |  |  |  | Monthly average |  |  |  | Recent |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1Q08 | 2Q08 | 3Q08 | 4Q08 | $\frac{\text { 4Q08 vs. 3Q08 }}{(\%)}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |  |  |  |  |  | July | Aug | Sep | Oct | Oct 17 | Oct 24 | Oct 31 | Nov 7 |
| Naphtha | 485 | 583 | 696 | 932 | 875 | 1,043 | 1,015 | 522 | (48.5) | 1,157 | 1,014 | 874 | 522 | 468 | 394 | 312 | 294 |
| Benzene | 824 | 861 | 1,021 | 1,110 | 1,050 | 1,136 | 1,198 | 677 | (43.5) | 1,312 | 1,178 | 1,103 | 677 | 751 | 525 | 357 | 375 |
| Ethylene chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ethylene | 874 | 1,132 | 1,137 | 1,311 | 1,334 | 1,301 | 1,374 | 651 | (52.6) | 1,638 | 1,373 | 1,113 | 651 | 695 | 505 | 355 | 335 |
| High-density PE | 1,033 | 1,237 | 1,325 | 1,577 | 1,562 | 1,583 | 1,647 | 1,033 | (37.3) | 1,797 | 1,670 | 1,475 | 1,033 | 1,115 | 955 | 805 | 675 |
| Linear low-density PE | 1,062 | 1,236 | 1,339 | 1,636 | 1,615 | 1,645 | 1,747 | 1,210 | (30.7) | 1,846 | 1,799 | 1,596 | 1,210 | 1,255 | 1,055 | 905 | 765 |
| Low-density PE | 1,129 | 1,243 | 1,445 | 1,749 | 1,718 | 1,762 | 1,859 | 1,356 | (27.0) | 1,941 | 1,915 | 1,721 | 1,356 | 1,395 | 1,205 | 1,055 | 955 |
| Propylene chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Propylene | 909 | 1,091 | 1,069 | 1,328 | 1,205 | 1,381 | 1,483 | 676 | (54.4) | 1,714 | 1,516 | 1,220 | 676 | 640 | 465 | 305 | 275 |
| Polypropylene | 1,072 | 1,228 | 1,324 | 1,598 | 1,483 | 1,648 | 1,763 | 1,086 | (38.4) | 2,022 | 1,783 | 1,483 | 1,086 | 1,180 | 920 | 790 | 650 |
| Styrene chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Styrene | 1,051 | 1,165 | 1,320 | 1,407 | 1,374 | 1,421 | 1,502 | 863 | (42.5) | 1,626 | 1,494 | 1,387 | 863 | 943 | 768 | 528 | 544 |
| Polystyrene | 1,155 | 1,232 | 1,426 | 1,527 | 1,436 | 1,566 | 1,645 | 1,223 | (25.7) | 1,757 | 1,644 | 1,533 | 1,223 | 1,305 | 1,195 | 995 | 895 |
| Vinyl chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PVC | 811 | 832 | 945 | 1,110 | 1,056 | 1,133 | 1,189 | 803 | (32.5) | 1,277 | 1,254 | 1,037 | 803 | 875 | 795 | 635 | 575 |
| EDC | 361 | 351 | 426 | 439 | 435 | 440 | 485 | 254 | (47.8) | 529 | 497 | 430 | 254 | 283 | 200 | 128 | 118 |
| Polyester chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PSF | 1,226 | 1,293 | 1,452 | 1,538 | 1,507 | 1,551 | 1,578 | 1,455 | (7.8) | 1,695 | 1,570 | 1,470 | 1,455 | - | 1,455 | - |  |
| PFY | 1,377 | 1,444 | 1,669 | 1,782 | 1,825 | 1,763 | 1,777 | 1,520 | (14.4) | 1,955 | 1,795 | 1,580 | 1,520 | - | 1,520 | - |  |
| Pure terephthalic acid | 804 | 898 | 881 | 974 | 908 | 1,002 | 1,031 | 735 | (28.7) | 1,152 | 1,056 | 886 | 735 | 723 | 670 | 593 | 563 |
| Monoethylene glycol | 869 | 853 | 1,115 | 1,023 | 1,184 | 954 | 931 | 580 | (37.7) | 1,063 | 917 | 814 | 580 | 510 | 478 | 405 | 428 |
| Paraxylene | 899 | 1,155 | 1,131 | 1,273 | 1,165 | 1,319 | 1,374 | 816 | (40.6) | 1,574 | 1,385 | 1,163 | 816 | 848 | 727 | 592 | 561 |

Source: Platts

## Chemical margins have declined in the recent week

Asia chemical margins, calendar year-ends (US\$/ton)


We expect margins to soften led by weakening demand arising from global economic slowdown
Asia chemical margins, calendar year-ends 1997-2009E (US $\$ /$ ton)

|  | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 YTD | 2008E | 2009E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ethylene chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ethylene - naphtha | 282 | 153 | 221 | 272 | 155 | 159 | 174 | 515 | 389 | 549 | 441 | 379 | 375 | 200 |
| HDPE - $1.015 \times$ ethylene | 263 | 223 | 181 | 109 | 166 | 138 | 158 | 28 | 147 | 88 | 171 | 247 | 250 | 180 |
| LLDPE - $1.015 \times$ ethylene | 262 | 250 | 196 | 126 | 174 | 142 | 168 | 53 | 175 | 87 | 185 | 306 | 300 | 195 |
| LDPE - $1.015 \times$ ethylene | 398 | 334 | 249 | 186 | 216 | 194 | 226 | 181 | 243 | 94 | 291 | 419 | 425 | 240 |
| HDPE - naphtha | 552 | 380 | 409 | 389 | 327 | 303 | 339 | 556 | 548 | 655 | 629 | 645 | 625 | 475 |
| LLDPE - naphtha | 551 | 407 | 424 | 406 | 335 | 307 | 350 | 582 | 577 | 654 | 643 | 704 | 670 | 525 |
| LDPE - naphtha | 687 | 491 | 476 | 466 | 377 | 359 | 408 | 710 | 644 | 660 | 749 | 817 | 775 | 625 |
| Propylene chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Propylene - naphtha | 242 | 103 | 152 | 174 | 131 | 208 | 262 | 414 | 424 | 509 | 373 | 396 | 400 | 350 |
| PP-1.01 x propylene | 245 | 213 | 195 | 163 | 146 | 129 | 154 | 142 | 154 | 125 | 244 | 257 | 220 | 160 |
| PP - naphtha | 492 | 319 | 350 | 341 | 281 | 341 | 421 | 564 | 587 | 645 | 628 | 666 | 625 | 500 |
| Styrene chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Benzene - naphtha | 81 | 60 | 56 | 113 | 30 | 110 | 164 | 435 | 339 | 278 | 325 | 178 | 160 | 200 |
| Styrene $-0.81 \times$ benzene | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 203 | 142 | 131 | 139 | 163 | 128 | 125 | 100 |
| -0.29 $\times$ ethylene |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Polystyrene -0.98 styrene | 658 | 495 | 589 | 864 | 569 | 319 | 116 | 124 | 125 | 90 | 132 | 149 | 200 | 125 |
| PS - naphtha | 444 | 347 | 404 | 594 | 332 | 449 | 517 | 786 | 670 | 649 | 730 | 595 | 600 | 500 |
| Vinyl chain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EDC - $0.3 \times$ ethylene) | NA | NA | NA | 190 | 61 | 202 | 171 | 186 | 99 | 11 | 85 | 46 | 40 | 40 |
| $\begin{array}{r} \text { PVC - } 1.025 \text { ( } 0.235 \times \text { ethylene } \\ +0.864 \times \text { EDC }) \end{array}$ | 623 | 410 | 295 | 251 | 234 | 177 | 251 | 258 | 281 | 249 | 294 | 406 | 410 | 275 |
| PVC - naphtha | 528 | 355 | 411 | 423 | 250 | 320 | 350 | 492 | 326 | 250 | 249 | 178 | 190 | 175 |
| Polyester/intermediates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PSF $-0.85 \times$ PTA $-0.34 \times$ MEG | 332 | 361 | 254 | 299 | 267 | 241 | 296 | 157 | 247 | 240 | 324 | 362 | 325 | 250 |
| PFY $-0.85 \times$ PTA $-0.34 \times$ MEG | 587 | 462 | 363 | 346 | 382 | 402 | 374 | 398 | 398 | 391 | 541 | 606 | 550 | 450 |
| PTA $-0.67 \times$ PX | 234 | 153 | 171 | 190 | 164 | 230 | 182 | 225 | 201 | 124 | 123 | 121 | 120 | 100 |
| PX-naphtha | 279 | 133 | 178 | 159 | 173 | 185 | 334 | 418 | 414 | 572 | 435 | 341 | 325 | 275 |
| MEG - naphtha | 402 | 251 | 287 | 260 | 201 | 200 | 386 | 564 | 384 | 270 | 419 | 91 | 200 | 100 |
| MEG - $0.6 \times$ ethylene | 319 | 219 | 228 | 205 | 203 | 199 | 395 | 410 | 345 | 174 | 433 | 236 | 230 | 200 |

Source: Platts, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

| Metals |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HALC.BO, Rs60 |  |  |  |
| Rating |  |  | SELL |
| Sector coverage vis |  |  | Cautious |
| Target Price (Rs) |  |  | 40 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) |  |  | 218-38 |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) |  |  | 105.4 |
| Financials |  |  |  |
| March y/e | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 600.1 | 745.0 | 732.2 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 24.2 | 16.7 | 12.7 |
| EPS (Rs) | 13.8 | 9.5 | 7.3 |
| EPS gth | (10.0) | (30.9) | (23.8) |
| P/E (x) | 4.4 | 6.3 | 8.3 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 5.9 | 5.2 | 5.7 |
| Div yield (\%) | - | - | - |

## Shareholding, September 2008

\% of Over/(under) Pattern Portfolio weight

| Promoters | 31.4 | - | - |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Flls | 23.7 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| MFs | 3.8 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| UTI | - | - | $(0.3)$ |
| LIC | 11.2 | 1.0 | 0.6 |

Hindalco : Novelis - Weak 2QFY2009 results; lowest EBITDA in the last several quarters

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- 2QFY09 net loss of US\$103 mn compared to net loss of US\$19 mn in 2QFY08
- Adj. EBITDA at US\$82 mn down 43\% yoy; lowest in past six quarters
- Maintain SELL rating with a price target of Rs40/share

Novelis reported 2QFY09 a net loss of US\$103 mn compared to a loss of US\$19 mn. EBITDA adjusted for the impact of metal ceiling contracts at US\$82 mn declined 43\% yoy and $57 \%$ qoq and were at their lowest levels in the last six quarters. Adj. EBITDA margins at $2.8 \%$ declined 800 bps yoy and 340 bps qoq. Volumes were marginally up by $2 \%$ to 808,000 tons during the quarter. Results for the quarter were impacted by higher energy, freight and alloy costs. North American segment witnessed a sharp decline in net income falling to US\$2 mn from US\$89 mn due to unfavourable impact of product mix, metal price lags, metal price ceilings, foreign exchange losses and higher operating costs. Results from other geographies i.e. Europe, South America and Asia were in-line with expectations. In October, the company witnessed weak demand in North America, Europe and Asia, especially in the construction and automotive markets. We expect the next two quarters to continue to remain sluggish on account of overall weak economic environment which would be offset by gains on account of lower metal ceiling costs. We maintain our SELL rating on Hindalco with a price target of Rs40/share.

## Results lower-than-expected

Novelis reported 2QFY09 net sales at US\$2.96 bn—up 5\% yoy but declined 5\% qoq led primarily by higher LME aluminium prices. 2QFY09 EBITDA—adjusted for the impact of metal ceiling contracts-at US\$82 mn was down $43 \%$ yoy and $57 \%$ qoq. Novelis' 2QFY09 EBITDA was at its lowest levels in the last six quarters. Net loss for the quarter at US $\$ 103 \mathrm{mn}$ was impacted (a) negatively, by US $\$ 185 \mathrm{mn}$ on account of mark-to-market impact of LME forward purchase contracts used to hedge metal price risks and (b) positively, by a US $\$ 169 \mathrm{mn}$ benefit for taxes on pre-tax loss of US $\$ 274$ mn .

## Metal ceiling and lag impact

During the quarter, 8\% of total volumes were impacted by metal price ceiling contracts, resulting in a negative impact on profitability to the tune of US\$74 mn. The metal ceiling costs are the difference between the aluminium purchase prices and the metal ceiling prices under the respective contracts. Based on the closing aluminium price of US $\$ 2,395$ per ton as of September 30, 2008, approximately US $\$ 74-79 \mathrm{mn}$ of metal ceiling costs are remaining to be passed on for the second half of FY2009 and US\$112-US\$121 mn in the aggregate thereafter. At the time of acquisition of Novelis by Hindalco a reserve of US\$655 mn was created to record these contracts at fair value based on forecasted metal purchase costs in excess of metal ceilings. As of September 30, 2008, the balance of these reserves was about US $\$ 260 \mathrm{mn}$. As a result, currently there is an excess of US $\$ 74 \mathrm{mn}$ of reserves over and above the metal ceiling costs. Also, with aluminium falling further to US\$1,900 per ton the metal ceiling costs could get entirely eliminated.

## Valuation

We retain our SELL rating on the stock with a price target of Rs40/share. We value Hindalco's domestic and international businesses at 4X FY2010E EBITDA, which is in line with international peers. With Hindalco's earnings highly leveraged to aluminium prices which have fallen $28 \%$ over the last quarter's average, we expect earnings to fall sharply in the near term. Although volumes were not impacted during 2QFY09, we expect Novelis's volumes, especially in the North American and European markets, to be under pressure as reflected in the weak automotive and construction markets.

## Novelis, Interim results, March fiscal year-ends (US\$ mn)

|  | 2Q 2009 | 1Q 2009 | 2Q 2008 | \% change |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | qoq | yoy |
| Operating matrix |  |  |  |  |  |
| Shipments (kt) (including ingots) | 808 | 825 | 789 | (2.1) | 2.4 |
| Aluminium prices (US\$/ton) | 2,837 | 3,004 | 2,610 | (5.6) | 8.7 |
| Quarterly results |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue | 2,959 | 3,103 | 2,821 | (4.6) | 4.9 |
| Expenditure | $(2,890)$ | $(2,927)$ | $(2,653)$ |  |  |
| Cost of goods sold | $(2,791)$ | $(2,831)$ | $(2,555)$ |  |  |
| SG\&A | (89) | (84) | (88) |  |  |
| R\&D | (10) | (12) | (10) |  |  |
| EBITDA | 69 | 176 | 168 | (60.8) | (58.9) |
| Other income | - | - | - |  |  |
| Depreciation | (107) | (116) | (103) |  |  |
| EBIT | (38) | 60 | 65 |  |  |
| Interest | (41) | (40) | (56) |  |  |
| Pre-tax profits | (79) | 20 | 9 |  |  |
| Extra-ordinary items reported | (193) | 42 | (8) |  |  |
| Extra-ordinary items (adjusted) | - | - | - |  |  |
| Pre-tax profits - reported | (272) | 62 | 1 |  |  |
| Taxes | 169 | (35) | (20) |  |  |
| Minority interest | - | (2) | - |  |  |
| Net income | (103) | 25 | (19) |  |  |
| Adjusted net income for taxes | (30) | 7 | (171) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EBITDA analysis |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reported EBITDA | 69 | 176 | 168 |  |  |
| Add: Can sheet losses in N.A. | 74 | 78 | 61 |  |  |
| Less: Reversal of provision | (61) | (64) | 85 |  |  |
| Underlying EBITDA | 82 | 190 | 314 | (56.8) | (73.9) |
| Less: Metal price lag | (8) | 45 | (9) |  |  |
| EBITDA adjusted for metal price lag | 90 | 145 | 323 | (37.9) | (72.1) |
| Calculations |  |  |  |  |  |
| Realization (US\$/ton) | 3,587 | 3,684 | 3,468 | (2.6) | 3.4 |
| Underlying EBITDA (US\$/ton) | 101 | 230 | 398 | (55.9) | (74.5) |
| EBITDA margins (\%) | 2.8 | 6.3 | 10.8 |  |  |

Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities.

## Hindalco Ind. SOTP-based target-price, 2010E basis

|  | EBITDA | EV/EBITDA | EV | Stake | Attributable $\qquad$ <br> EV | Value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (Rs bn) | (X) | (Rs bn) | (\%) | (Rs bn) | (Rs/share) |
| Hindalco Ind. (India) | 30 | 4.5 | 136 | 100.0 | 136 | 80 |
| ABML (a) |  |  |  | 51.0 | 1 | 0.4 |
| Novelis Inc. | 20 | 4.5 | 89 | 100.0 | 89 | 52 |
| Total enterprise value |  |  |  |  | 89 | 133 |
| Less: Debt |  |  |  |  | 161 | 94 |
| Hindalco Ind. (India) |  |  |  |  | 10 | 6 |
| AV Minerals (SPV) |  |  |  |  | 44 | 26 |
| Novelis Inc. |  |  |  |  | 107 | 63 |
| Resultant market capitalization |  |  |  |  |  | 38 |
| Target price (Rs/share) |  |  |  |  |  | 40 |

Notes:
(a) Stake in ABML is valued based on market-capitalization of ABML

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Aluminum prices have corrected sharply from its highs


Source: LME, Kotak Institutional Equities.

Hindalco (consolidated), Profit model, balance sheet and cash flow model, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2011E (Rs mn)

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9 E}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 E}$ | 2011E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Profit model (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 193,161 | 600,128 | 744,960 | 732,189 | $\mathbf{7 3 6 , 8 6 4}$ |
| EBITDA | $\mathbf{4 4 , 3 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{6 6 , 3 5 1}$ | $\mathbf{6 3 , 7 9 2}$ | $\mathbf{5 5 , 3 7 1}$ | $\mathbf{5 2 , 9 2 5}$ |
| Other income | 4,091 | 6,560 | 5,387 | 5,451 | 5,714 |
| Interest | $(3,135)$ | $(18,491)$ | $(17,303)$ | $(14,748)$ | $(14,668)$ |
| Depreciaiton | $(8,646)$ | $(24,565)$ | $(24,468)$ | $(24,572)$ | $(25,486)$ |
| Profit before tax | $\mathbf{3 6 , 6 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 9 , 8 5 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 , 9 8 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 , 1 2 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 , 1 0 9}$ |
| Taxes | $(10,064)$ | $(4,355)$ | $(9,406)$ | $(7,523)$ | $(6,759)$ |
| Reported net income | $\mathbf{2 7 , 0 3 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 6 , 2 3 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 , 5 7 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 , 6 0 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 , 3 5 0}$ |
| Minority interest | $(161)$ | $(2,206)$ | $(134)$ | $(129)$ | $(129)$ |
| Share in profit/(loss) of associates | $(12)$ | $(159)$ | 1,157 | 1,118 | $\mathbf{1 , 1 1 8}$ |
| Adjusted net income | $\mathbf{2 6 , 8 5 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 3 , 8 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 , 6 0 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 , 5 9 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 , 3 3 9}$ |
| Fully diluted EPS (Rs) | $\mathbf{1 5 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 5}$ |

## Balance sheet (Rs mn)

| Equity | 133,653 | 172,819 | 240,895 | 254,487 | 265,826 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Deferred tax liability | 11,630 | 39,351 | 39,351 | 39,351 | 39,351 |
| Total Borrowings | 84,429 | 323,524 | 242,519 | 232,675 | 234,535 |
| Current liabilities | 38,459 | 172,180 | 156,151 | 152,442 | 152,918 |
| Minority interest | 8,503 | 16,154 | 16,287 | 16,416 | 16,545 |
| Total liabilities | $\mathbf{2 7 6 , 6 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{7 2 4 , 0 2 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 5 , 2 0 2}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 5 , 3 7 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 0 9 , 1 7 4}$ |
| Net fixed assets | 111,247 | 280,880 | 293,773 | 294,748 | 303,155 |
| Goodwill on consolidation | - | 88,329 | 88,329 | 88,329 | 88,329 |
| Investments | 78,741 | 140,076 | 76,842 | 73,388 | 69,020 |
| Cash | 10,345 | 17,169 | 2,572 | 7,591 | 16,042 |
| Other current assets | 76,340 | 197,573 | 233,686 | $\mathbf{2 3 1 , 3 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 3 2 , 6 2 7}$ |
| Total assets | $\mathbf{2 7 6 , 6 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{7 2 4 , 0 2 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 5 , 2 0 3}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 5 , 3 7 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 0 9 , 1 7 4}$ |


| Free cash flow (Rs mn) | $\mathbf{y y y y y y}$ |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Operating cash flow excl. working capital | $(5,347)$ | 46,417 | 52,961 | 46,472 | 44,791 |
| Working capital changes | $(21,905)$ | $(27,582$ | $(52,141)$ | $(1,337)$ | $(837)$ |
| Capital expenditure | $\mathbf{1 2 , 3 5 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 6 , 4 9 3}$ | $(12,893)$ | $(974)$ | $(8,408)$ |
| Free cash flow |  |  | $(\mathbf{1 2 , 0 7 3 )}$ | $\mathbf{4 4 , 1 6 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 5 , 5 4 6}$ |


| Ratios |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Debt/equity (incl. goodwill on consolidation) $(X)$ | 0.6 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Debt/equity (excl. goodwill on consolidation) $(X)$ | 0.6 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Net debt/equity $(X)$ | 0.5 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| RoAE (\%) | 18.5 | 17.7 | 11.1 | 6.8 | 5.4 |
| RoACE (\%) | $\mathbf{1 2 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 3}$ |

Source: Company, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

| Utilities |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CESC.BO, Rs220 |  |  |  |
| Rating |  |  | BUY |
| Sector coverage view |  |  | Attractive |
| Target Price (Rs) |  |  | 450 |
| 52W High -Low (Rs) |  |  | 15-165 |
| Market Cap (Rs bn) |  |  | 27.5 |
| Financials |  |  |  |
| March y/e | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E |
| Sales (Rs bn) | 27.7 | 29.5 | 32.3 |
| Net Profit (Rs bn) | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.6 |
| EPS (Rs) | 27.8 | 31.9 | 36.9 |
| EPS gth | (24.0) | 15.3 | 16.3 |
| P/E (x) | 7.9 | 6.9 | 5.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 4.1 | 3.8 | 5.0 |
| Div yield (\%) | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.4 |

## Shareholding, September 2008

\% of Over/(under)

|  | Pattern Portfolio |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| weight |  |  |  |
| Promoters | 52.5 | - | - |
| Flls | 23.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| MFs | 8.8 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| UTI | - | - | $(0.1)$ |
| LIC | 3.8 | 0.1 | $(0.0)$ |

## CESC : Strong growth in regulated book, curtailing losses in retail business

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- Regulated equity likely to grow at a CAGR of $15 \%$ FY2008-11E
- We estimate $\mathbf{> 2 0 \%}$ effective RoE on regulated equity due to better operating performance in generation and distribution
- Curtailing losses in retail-to be funded from cash surplus in power business
- Retain BUY rating with an SOTP-based target price of Rs450/share

We like CESC's regulated power business with its high degree of visibility in growth and retain our BUY rating with an SOTP-based target price of Rs450/share. CESC earns an effective RoE in excess of $20 \%$ as it gets to keep part of the savings from operating efficiencies and part-profits from export of surplus power. With large capex approved in T\&D by the regulator, we estimate the return-yielding equity to increase at a CAGR of 15\% during FY2008-11E. We have revised our EPS estimates to Rs31.9 for FY2009E (Rs28.2 previously) and Rs36.9 for FY2010E (Rs31.1 previously). While Spencer's Retail is trying to scale down capex and reduce losses, we factor in a cash support of Rs5.7 bn from power business over the next few years and have adjusted the same in our target price.

Regulated equity likely to grow at a CAGR of 15\% FY2008-11E. CESC's regulated power business offers high growth visibility-reinvestments in upgrading and strengthening the T\&D network and periodic generation capacity addition (Budge Budge 3 is under construction and will likely commission ahead of schedule). The regulator has approved a capital expenditure of Rs30 bn during FY2009-11E for distribution, increasing the book invested in distribution to Rs91/share from Rs58/share at the end of FY2008. The addition to equity for generation assets is estimated to increase to Rs91/share by FY2011 from the current Rs63/share. The addition of Haldia 1, which has most clearances in place, will further increase the regulated equity base.

CESC earning effective RoE in excess of $\mathbf{2 0 \%}$. As per the multi-year tariff order for FY2009-11E, CESC gets to keep part of the savings made by operating better than the stipulated benchmarks (of PLF, auxiliary consumption and station heat rate etc.). CESC also benefits from export sales by keeping $40 \%$ of profits made from exports sales. We estimate CESC to have made a profit (after sharing with consumers) of Rs571 mn from export sales in FY2008. CESC is entitled for $15 \%$ RoE on the invested equity in distribution (compared to $14 \%$ for generation) and gets to keep the savings from lower-than-targeted A,T\&C losses.

CESC has recently entered into an agreement with SP Global Solutions, a subsidiary of Singapore Power, for improving the standard of distribution in CESC's license area.

## Core regulated business is insulated from interest rate and forex rate

fluctuations. We value CESC's core power generation-distribution business in Kolkata using DCF-equity at Rs278/share—implied P/B of 2.1X on FY2009E invested book. We note CESC's regulated power business is insulated from uncertainties inherent in the IPP or the merchant power model-variations in interest rate and forex rates. However, the ability to sell surplus power from generation assets after meeting the requirements of the distribution business gives CESC the benefit from high merchant rates as well.

Spencer Retail—restricting investments, curtailing losses, improving product mix. Spencer Retail ( $95 \%$ subsidiary of CESC) has revised its growth plans in the retail business taking cognizance of the changing business environment and cash-flow constraints. Spencers will likely add 0.5 mn sq . ft to reach 1.7 mn sq . ft of retail space (against earlier plans of 2.5 mn sq . ft ). The retail strategy also focuses on large-format stores and the retail arm has already shut 0.15 mn sq. ft of retail space in the current fiscal-mainly small format stores, which were not economically viable.

We value the retail business at 1XFY2008 sales or Rs7.7 bn, implying Rs58/share for CESC's 95\% equity stake. Our financial projections for retail business factor in:
(1) closure of 0.15 mn sq. ft of retail space in small-format stores, ( 2 ) improving sales in existing stores, and (3) shift of product mix in favor of apparels (higher margin segment). We note that apparels currently contribute less than $5 \%$ of the total sales for Spencers (substantially lower than industrial peers such as Pantaloon and Vishal Retail). During FY2008, Spencer Retail incurred an EBITDA loss of Rs1.1 bn on store sales of Rs7.68 bn. We expect the retail business to continue to make EBITDA losses and have factored in the cash flows required to support it to come from the power business.

Reiterate BUY with SOTP-based target price of Rs450/share. Our SOTP-based target price of Rs $450 /$ share offers $105 \%$ upside from the current market price. We note that the stock is currently trading below its FY2009E book value of Rs232/share (net of revaluation reserves). Our value of the stable (and growing) core power business at Rs278/share (book invested Rs132/share) and estimated net cash of Rs23/share (Rs2.9 bn) implies the market is according a negative value for the expansion project at Haldia ( 600 MW )—equity available—and retail business. At the current market price of Rs220/share, the stock also offers $1.8 \%$ dividend yield.

- We value the core power generation, transmission and distribution business in Kolkata at Rs278/share using DCF-equity implying ~2.0X P/B FY2008. We use a cost of equity of $12 \%$ and terminal year growth of $2 \%$. We estimate a steady increase in regulated equity base in distribution that will drive steady earnings growth apart from step-improvement due to generation capacity addition.
- New generation projects to provide upside. We note good visibility in new generation project for CESC at Haldia ( 600 MW ). DCF-equity value for these projects contributes Rs72/share to our target price. We note Haldia phase 1 projects has been funded with the equity raised by the company. CESC has also been allocated a coal block in Jharkhand for setting up a 800-1,000 MW power project.
- Stake in Spencer Retail valued at Rs58/share. We value the retail business at 1 X Sales (FY2008) or Rs7.7 bn. For CESC's 95\% holding, this translates to Rs58/share. We note management has scaled down its growth capex and is currently focusing on limiting losses by closing down unviable outlets.
- We value the accretion (net of investments) from real estate projects at Rs1.6 bn (Rs13share). The company plans to develop a 0.5 mn sq . ft mall near Park Street, which will be given out on lease. CESC has additional real estate of $\sim 2.5 \mathrm{mn}$ sq. ft at Mulajore (site of its now defunct power plant). We note that CESC has to share $33 \%$ gains from real estate with the consumers as a reduction in its Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR).

Profit model, balance sheet, cash model of India Cements, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-11E (Rs mn)

|  | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Profit model (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net sales | 25,159 | 24,843 | 27,750 | 29,487 | 32,316 | 34,134 |
| EBITDA | 7,157 | 6,364 | 6,045 | 7,216 | 8,295 | 9,635 |
| Other income | 736 | 927 | 1,285 | 1,326 | 1,340 | 1,398 |
| Interest | $(3,013)$ | $(2,305)$ | $(1,885)$ | $(2,186)$ | $(2,354)$ | $(2,867)$ |
| Depreciation | $(2,539)$ | $(1,579)$ | $(1,685)$ | $(1,730)$ | $(2,041)$ | $(2,426)$ |
| Pretax profits | 2,342 | 3,407 | 3,760 | 4,626 | 5,240 | 5,741 |
| Tax | (200) | (400) | (476) | (639) | (624) | (613) |
| Net profits | 2,142 | 3,007 | 3,285 | 3,986 | 4,616 | 5,127 |
| Extraordinary items | (299) | - | 269 | 115 | - | - |
| Earnings per share (Rs) | 27.3 | 36.2 | 27.8 | 31.9 | 36.9 | 41.0 |
| Balance sheet (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total equity | 16,549 | 20,939 | 31,701 | 36,471 | 41,400 | 46,650 |
| Total borrowings | 19,100 | 17,983 | 16,288 | 22,329 | 32,551 | 44,665 |
| Currrent liabilities | 13,113 | 16,350 | 19,559 | 20,131 | 21,209 | 21,793 |
| Total liabilities and equity | 48,761 | 55,271 | 67,548 | 78,931 | 95,160 | 113,108 |
| Cash | 3,959 | 7,314 | 9,864 | 13,200 | 8,749 | 7,547 |
| Current assets | 9,113 | 8,110 | 9,752 | 9,608 | 10,088 | 10,354 |
| Total fixed assets | 35,275 | 37,340 | 42,148 | 50,347 | 70,554 | 89,446 |
| Investments | 314 | 2,414 | 5,697 | 5,697 | 5,697 | 5,697 |
| Deferred Expenditure | 100 | 93 | 86 | 79 | 72 | 65 |
| Total assets | 48,761 | 55,271 | 67,548 | 78,931 | 95,160 | 113,108 |
| Free cash flow (Rs mn) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operating cash flow, excl. working capital | 7,622 | 6,697 | 6,081 | 7,180 | 8,185 | 9,397 |
| Working capital | 563 | 4,240 | 1,567 | 717 | 597 | 319 |
| Capital expenditure | $(3,077)$ | $(5,594)$ | $(8,353)$ | $(9,928)$ | $(22,249)$ | $(21,317)$ |
| Investments | 1 | $(2,100)$ | $(3,283)$ | - | - | - |
| Free cash flow | 5,109 | 3,244 | $(3,988)$ | $(2,032)$ | $(13,467)$ | $(11,602)$ |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

CESC Sum-of-the-parts valuation

|  | Methodology | Key assumptions |  |  |  | FY2009E Book value per share (Rs) | Per share value <br> (Rs) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kolkata generation, transmission \& distribution | DCF to equity Disc. rate: 12\% Terminal year growth: $2 \%$ | The business enjoys very high predictability of cash flows, regular reinvestments and high profitability (>20\% RoE) from operational efficiencies and incentives. |  |  |  | 132 | 27813 |
| Real-estate | DCF | Mall  <br> Area for lease (sq. ft) 400,000 <br> Rental (Rs/sq. ft) 100 <br> Inflation in rental (\%) 5 <br> CESC's retainable share of A (\%) 67 |  | 35 acre land at Mulajore |  |  |  |
|  | Disc. rate: 15\% <br> Terminal year growth: 5\% |  |  | Area for sale (sq. ft) <br> Rate (Rs/sq. ft) <br> CESC's retainable share of $\mathrm{A}(\%)$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2,500,000 \\ 600 \\ 67 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |  |
| Investments | Book value | $1 \%$ Cumulative optionally convertible preference shares of Integrated Coal Mining Ltd. (Rs mn) |  |  | $300$ | 2 | 2 |
| Cash and investible surplus on books | Market value | Marketable securities \& cash on books (Rs bn): Regulatory liability/unallocable debt (Rs bn) Cash required for Haldia 1 Cash infusion in retail |  |  | 19.9 <br> $(4.1)$ <br> $(7.2)$ <br> $(5.7)$ <br> $\mathbf{2 . 9}$ |  | 23 |
| Retail | EV/Sales (X) | 1 X on FY2008 sales, as the company is still in the rollout phase |  |  |  |  | 58 |
| Haldia - 1st phase 600 MW | $\begin{gathered} \text { DCF to equity } \\ \text { Disc. rate: } 12.5 \% \end{gathered}$ | Regulated returns-P/B of 1.33X based on our DCF-to-equity |  |  |  |  | 72 |
| SOTP value |  |  |  |  |  | 232 | 446 |

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

Regulated equity for CESC is growing at a CAGR of 14.5\%
CAGR (\%)


Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

CESC is well funded to meet its existing capex plans, including funding for retail business

|  | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E | 2012E |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
| Cash generation form power business | 6,938 | 7,608 | 8,617 | $\mathbf{7 , 4 9 1}$ |  |
| Capex for power business | $(7,528)$ | $(9,379)$ | $(4,535)$ | $(2,470)$ |  |
| Net debt taken (repayment) for power business | 4,361 | 647 | $(352)$ | $(972)$ |  |
| Net cash from regulated power business | $\mathbf{3 , 7 7 0}$ | $\mathbf{( 1 , 1 2 4 )}$ | $\mathbf{3 , 7 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 0 4 8}$ |  |
| Investments in Haldia | $(720)$ | $(2,160)$ | $(2,880)$ | $(938)$ |  |
| Net funding in retail business (capex + losses) | $(1,920)$ | $(1,439)$ | $(840)$ | $(508)$ |  |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 , 1 3 1}$ | $\mathbf{( 4 , 7 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{9}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 6 0 3}$ |  |
| Cash in hand | 11,253 | 12,383 | $\mathbf{7 , 6 6 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 6 7 0}$ | 10,272 |

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

CESC plans to slowdown capex in the retail business including shutting down non-viable retail formats Key assumptions of RPG Retail, March fiscal year-ends, 2007-2011E (Rs mn)

|  | 2007 | 2008 | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income statement |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenues | 5,154 | 8,061 | 11,367 | 14,070 | 15,135 |
| EBITDA | (364) | $(1,114)$ | (820) | (589) | (263) |
| PAT | (523) | (893) | $(1,637)$ | $(1,608)$ | $(1,385)$ |
| Balance sheet |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net worth | 837 | 2,429 | 792 | (816) | $(2,201)$ |
| Borrowings | 873 | 4,345 | 6,345 | 7,845 | 8,445 |
| Total liabilities | 1,710 | 6,775 | 7,137 | 7,029 | 6,245 |
| Net fixed assets | 1,239 | 4,023 | 3,869 | 3,534 | 2,934 |
| Investments | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Net working capital | 461 | 2,121 | 2,638 | 2,865 | 2,681 |
| Deferred tax asset | - | 620 | 620 | 620 | 620 |
| Total assets | 1,710 | 6,775 | 7,137 | 7,029 | 6,245 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Key assumptions |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total retail space (mn sq. ft ) | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Sales (Rs/ sq. ft pm) | 734 | 545 | 625 | 650 | 700 |
| Gross margin (\%) | 15 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| EBITDA margin (\%) | (7) | (14) | (7) | (4) | (2) |

Source: Company data, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates.

| Telecom |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Price, Rs |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |

## Scorching subscriber net adds pace continues as Vodafone and Idea expand their footprint

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- GSM net adds (ex-RCOM) at 7.7 mn ; total net adds will likely exceed 10 mn for the second consecutive month
- We remain wary of potential double counting of subs given rapid growth, high churn, and deactivation norms
- Idea and Vodafone net adds gain from new launches
- Another strong month for Aircel highlights the company's ability to compete aggressively with larger players

The scorching pace of network-expansion led GSM subscriber addition in the country continued in the month of October 2008 as the GSM players (ex-RCOM) added 7.7 mn subscribers, marginally ahead of our expectations. Total subscriber net adds (including CDMA and RCOM GSM) could exceed 10 mn for the second month in a row. The current net add run rate, if sustained, could push our end-FY2009E subscriber estimate of 358 mn ; however, we remain wary of the underlying subscriber double counting in this phase of high absolute net adds. Key highlights of Oct 2008 GSM net additions included-(1) marginal net add share loss for Bharti as new launches continued; Idea launched its services in Bihar, while Vodafone launched its in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar during the month, (2) further improvement in net adds market share for Aircel and strong performance from Idea and Vodafone (partly contributed by new launches), and (3) another strong month for BPL and another subdued one for MTNL and BSNL. We expect the strong net add pace to continue for another 12-15 months; however, the same would have limited impact on valuations of the sector or individual companies (unless there is a dramatic shift in market shares). We would rather focus on more pressing issues like the impending increase in competion, regulatory issues and declining quality of incremental subs. We maintain our Cautious stance on the sector but remain positive on Bharti (BUY) given the company's superior execution and undemanding valuations; maintain REDUCE on Idea and SELL on RCOM.

Aggregate net adds exceed expectations; current run rate could push our endFY2009E subscriber estimate. The aggregate GSM (ex-RCOM) net adds for the month of October 2008 ( 7.7 mn ) was higher than our expectations and an absolute increase of 0.4 mn over Sep net adds of 7.3 mn . Overall net adds for the months could exceed 10 mn for the second consecutive quarter, sustaining India's position as the fastest growing wireless market in the world. We highlight that the current subs add run rate ( $9 \mathrm{mn}+$ monthly average over April-Oct 2008) could push our end-FY2009E subs target of 358 mn ; YTD monthly run rate, if continued in 2HFY09, could take the end-FY2009E subscriber base to 362 mn .

We remain wary of potential double counting of subs given rapid growth, high churn, and deactivation norms. We remain wary of the likely subscriber double counting in this phase of rapid subscriber growth; the norms followed by industry players allow a non-paying subscriber to remain active (and counted in the subscriber base of that operator) for a period of 3-6 months. This, combined with the high churn rate ( $3-4 \%$ per month in the prepaid segment for various operators), could mean double counting of subscribers for a sustained period of time.

Expect strong net-adds pace to continue; has marginal impact on valuations, though. We expect the strong net adds trend to continue over the next 12-15 months driven by (1) rapid network expansion by the existing players; Idea launched services in Bihar and Vodafone in M.P. and Bihar during the month (2) entry of new players and pan-Indian expansion of some incumbents and (3) aggressive pricing tactics adopted by the operators. However, we do not see substantial value accretion for the industry from these incremental subscribers-a large portion (~35-40\%) of new subs comprises lowvalue lifetime subscribers.

Bharti's net adds market share declines; absolute net adds in line with estimates. Bharti maintained its net adds pace with 2.72 mn net additions for the month. However, we highlight that the GSM market net adds (assuming RCOM GSM maintains September 2008 net adds pace) increased by 0.4 mn to 8.1 mn from 7.7 mn in Sep 2008. Bharti's net adds market share dropped to $33.7 \%$, a drop of 140 bps over the previous month (though still higher than its GSM subs market share of $33.2 \%$ ). We attribute the drop in Bharti's net adds market share primarily to a slew of new launches over the past few months - Idea (Mumbai and Bihar), Aircel (Kolkata), and Vodafone (Orissa, Assam, North East, M.P. and Bihar). However, we believe that strong net adds in initial months (as seen in case of Aircel in Kolkata and Idea in Mumbai) could be driven by initial promotional offers, etc. and hence, we would watch for sustenance of net adds before calling it a worrisome trend for Bharti. In any case (1) Bharti's net adds per month are running in line with our estimates and (2) the street (and us, as well) is already factoring in a market share decline for Bharti over the next 12-24 months.

Vodafone and Idea gain from new launches. Vodafone and Idea (ex-Spice) improved on its previous month's performance, adding 2.08 mn ( 1.87 mn in Sep 2008) and $1.2 \mathrm{mn}(1.1 \mathrm{mn})$ subs respectively. However, Vodafone's and Idea's net adds were partially aided by their recent launches-Vodafone launched in M.P. and Bihar, while Idea launched its services in Bihar. We would continue to monitor the performance of new network launches over the coming months to understand the market share shifts and impact on incumbents.

Aircel continues to impress, no improvement for BSNL and MTNL. Aircel added 781,000 subs in October 2008, its highest ever monthly net adds; the company has gained $\sim 74$ bps of GSM market share over the past 12 months. We have been highlighting the price aggression and competitive intensity of Aircel, and net over the past three months have indicative of the company's ability to gain market share versus larger peers. We continue to see Aircel as a major competitive threat to the leading incumbents as it expands into a pan-India operator (currently present only in 10 circles and rolling out networks in other circles).

BSNL added 670,000 subs in October 2008, marginally lower than previous month's 677,000; the company has now been overtaken by every operator in monthly net adds (not counting MTNL, Spice, BPL, Shyam, and HFCL as they are present in only one or two circles). MTNL added 66,000 subs, an improvement over the 38,000 net adds reported in Sep 2008, but still lower than YTD average monthly net adds of 73,000.

Subscriber details for leading GSM cellular operators, ('000)

|  | Oct-07 | Nov-07 | Dec-07 | Jan-08 | Feb-08 | Mar-08 | Apr-08 | May-08 | Jun-08 | Jul-08 | Aug-08 | Sep-08 | Oct-08 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Subs ('000) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 50,909 | 52,961 | 55,163 | 57,418 | 59,670 | 61,985 | 64,370 | 66,826 | 69,384 | 72,078 | 74,778 | 77,479 | 80,200 |
| Hutchison | 37,187 | 38,563 | 39,865 | 41,145 | 42,557 | 44,126 | 45,780 | 47,467 | 49,195 | 50,950 | 52,759 | 54,625 | 56,704 |
| IDEA-Escotel | 19,422 | 20,222 | 21,054 | 21,955 | 22,874 | 24,002 | 25,040 | 26,141 | 27,194 | 28,248 | 29,278 | 30,380 | 31,583 |
| BPL | 1,201 | 1,221 | 1,239 | 1,257 | 1,276 | 1,295 | 1,314 | 1,331 | 1,378 | 1,440 | 1,517 | 1,664 | 1,808 |
| Modi group | 3,570 | 3,661 | 3,801 | 3,943 | 4,084 | 4,211 | 4,363 | 4,498 | 4,548 | 4,197 | 3,563 | 3,600 | 3,637 |
| Reliance | 5,342 | 5,669 | 6,002 | 6,338 | 6,676 | 7,016 | 7,359 | 7,711 | 8,080 | 8,455 | 8,831 | 9,206 | 9,206 |
| MTNL | 2,826 | 2,890 | 2,955 | 3,013 | 3,122 | 3,242 | 3,284 | 3,350 | 3,438 | 3,537 | 3,639 | 3,678 | 3,744 |
| BSNL | 31,033 | 31,945 | 32,712 | 33,749 | 34,573 | 36,210 | 36,683 | 36,997 | 37,363 | 37,916 | 38,490 | 39,167 | 39,836 |
| Aircel | 8,524 | 9,026 | 9,428 | 9,934 | 10,185 | 10,610 | 10,989 | 11,492 | 11,925 | 12,476 | 13,127 | 13,878 | 14,659 |
| Total market | 160,014 | 166,157 | 172,219 | 178,751 | 185,017 | 192,696 | 199,182 | 205,813 | 212,505 | 219,298 | 225,983 | 233,677 | 241,377 |
| Market share of subs (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 31.8 | 31.9 | 32.0 | 32.1 | 32.3 | 32.2 | 32.3 | 32.5 | 32.7 | 32.9 | 33.1 | 33.2 | 33.2 |
| Hutchison | 23.2 | 23.2 | 23.1 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 22.9 | 23.0 | 23.1 | 23.2 | 23.2 | 23.3 | 23.4 | 23.5 |
| IDEA-Escotel | 12.1 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 12.3 | 12.4 | 12.5 | 12.6 | 12.7 | 12.8 | 12.9 | 13.0 | 13.0 | 13.1 |
| BPL | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Modi group | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Reliance | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 |
| MTNL | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| BSNL | 19.4 | 19.2 | 19.0 | 18.9 | 18.7 | 18.8 | 18.4 | 18.0 | 17.6 | 17.3 | 17.0 | 16.8 | 16.5 |
| Aircel | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 |
| Growth (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| Hutchison | 4.3 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.8 |
| IDEA-Escotel | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| BPL | 4.2 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 9.7 | 8.7 |
| Modi group | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 1.1 | (7.7) | (15.1) | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Reliance | 6.1 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.3 | - |
| MTNL | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 1.8 |
| BSNL | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 4.7 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Aircel | 6.0 | 5.9 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 5.6 |
| Total market | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| Net monthly adds ('000) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 2,033 | 2,053 | 2,202 | 2,255 | 2,253 | 2,315 | 2,386 | 2,456 | 2,558 | 2,694 | 2,700 | 2,701 | 2,721 |
| Hutchison | 1,529 | 1,376 | 1,302 | 1,281 | 1,412 | 1,569 | 1,654 | 1,686 | 1,728 | 1,755 | 1,808 | 1,866 | 2,079 |
| IDEA-Escotel | 750 | 800 | 832 | 901 | 919 | 1,128 | 1,038 | 1,101 | 1,054 | 1,054 | 1,030 | 1,102 | 1,203 |
| BPL | 48 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 20 | $\bigcirc 19$ | $\bigcirc 19$ | -17 | - 47 | . 61 | $\bigcirc 77$ | 147 | 144 |
| Modi group | 89 | 91 | 139 | 142 | 141 | 126 | 152 | 135 | 50 | (351) | (634) | 37 | 37 |
| Reliance | 306 | 327 | 333 | 336 | 338 | 340 | 342 | 352 | 370 | 375 | 376 | 376 | - |
| MTNL | 54 | 64 | 65 | 58 | 109 | 120 | 42 | 67 | 87 | 100 | 102 | 38 | 66 |
| BSNL | 730 | 912 | 767 | 1,036 | 824 | 1,637 | 473 | 314 | 365 | 553 | 574 | 677 | 670 |
| Aircel | 485 | 502 | 402 | 506 | 251 | 425 | 379 | 503 | 433 | 551 | 651 | 752 | 781 |
| Total market | 6,022 | 6,144 | 6,062 | 6,531 | 6,266 | 7,680 | 6,486 | 6,630 | 6,693 | 6,793 | 6,685 | 7,694 | 7,700 |
| Market share of net adds (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bharti | 33.8 | 33.4 | 36.3 | 34.5 | 35.9 | 30.1 | 36.8 | 37.0 | 38.2 | 39.7 | 40.4 | 35.1 | 35.3 |
| Hutchison | 25.4 | 22.4 | 21.5 | 19.6 | 22.5 | 20.4 | 25.5 | 25.4 | 25.8 | 25.8 | 27.1 | 24.3 | 27.0 |
| IDEA-Escotel | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.7 | 13.8 | 14.7 | 14.7 | 16.0 | 16.6 | 15.7 | 15.5 | 15.4 | 14.3 | 15.6 |
| BPL | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Modi group | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 0.8 | (5.2) | (9.5) | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Reliance | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 4.9 | - |
| MTNL | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| BSNL | 12.1 | 14.8 | 12.7 | 15.9 | 13.2 | 21.3 | 7.3 | 4.7 | 5.5 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 8.7 |
| Aircel | 8.0 | 8.2 | 6.6 | 7.7 | 4.0 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 7.6 | 6.5 | 8.1 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 10.1 |


| Metros | 26,691 | 27,460 | 28,135 | 28,823 | 29,510 | 30,235 | 30,903 | 31,555 | 32,250 | 33,015 | 33,880 | 34,901 | 35,891 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Circle A | 57,719 | 60,089 | 62,479 | 65,033 | 67,081 | 70,045 | 72,090 | 74,344 | 76,837 | 79,216 | 81,369 | 83,822 | 86,692 |
| Circle B | 58,259 | 60,498 | 62,582 | 64,870 | 67,289 | 70,077 | 72,920 | 75,636 | 78,228 | 80,931 | 83,573 | 86,515 | 89,352 |
| Circle C | 17,345 | 18,111 | 19,024 | 20,024 | 21,137 | 22,339 | 23,269 | 24,277 | 25,190 | 26,136 | 27,161 | 28,439 | 29,442 |
| Total | 160,014 | 166,157 | 172,219 | 178,751 | 185,017 | 192,696 | 199,182 | 205,813 | 212,505 | 219,298 | 225,983 | 233,677 | 241,377 |
| Circlewise net adds ('000) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Metros | 807 | 770 | 675 | 689 | 687 | 725 | 667 | 652 | 696 | 764 | 865 | 1,021 | 991 |
| Circle A | 2,471 | 2,370 | 2,391 | 2,554 | 2,048 | 2,964 | 2,045 | 2,254 | 2,492 | 2,379 | 2,153 | 2,453 | 2,870 |
| Circle B | 2,170 | 2,239 | 2,083 | 2,289 | 2,418 | 2,788 | 2,843 | 2,716 | 2,592 | 2,703 | 2,642 | 2,942 | 2,837 |
| Circle C | 574 | 765 | 913 | 1,001 | 1,113 | 1,202 | 930 | 1,008 | 913 | 946 | 1,025 | 1,278 | 1,003 |
| Total | 6,022 | 6,144 | 6,062 | 6,531 | 6,266 | 7,680 | 6,486 | 6,630 | 6,693 | 6,793 | 6,685 | 7,694 | 7,700 |
| Circlewise subs (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Metros | 17 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Circle A | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| Circle B | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |
| Circle C | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Circlewise net adds (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Metros | 13 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Circle A | 41 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 33 | 39 | 32 | 34 | 37 | 35 | 32 | 32 | 37 |
| Circle B | 36 | 36 | 34 | 35 | 39 | 36 | 44 | 41 | 39 | 40 | 40 | 38 | 37 |
| Circle C | 10 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 13 |

Note
(1) Oct 2008 subscriber data excludes RCOM GSM net adds for the month

Source: Cellular Operator's Association of India, Compiled by Kotak Institutional Equities

## Life insurance update [September 2008]: Out of fuel

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- Private players appear to be slowing down
- Heightened risk perception and subdued equity markets will likely affect growth in the private sector and provide risk to our estimates
- LIC will likely benefit in the current environment

On the backdrop of a challenging macro environment, moderate expansion by large players and base effects, growth in adjusted premium collections for the private life insurance companies slipped to $17 \%$ during September 2008. Conversely, LIC reported $29 \%$ yoy growth (a reversal from the previous month when it reported $61 \%$ degrowth) largely on the low base of September 2007; its mom growth was just 4\%. YTD- LIC has lost significant market share-38\% v/s 50\% in FY2008 primarily to Birla Sun Life, HDFC Standard Life and Reliance Life. However, we believe that heightened risk perceptions of the private players in the financial sector now pose a significant risk. Hence, in the medium term, private players may have to take a backseat and LIC may be a beneficiary.

Divergent trends in the private sector. Growth in adjusted premium collections of the private players seem to moderating - 17\% growth in September 2008 versus $33 \%$ in August 2008 and over $50 \%$ in the previous months. While the base was high (150\% growth in September 2007), sluggish performance of large players pulled down overall growth for the private sector. ICICI Pru de-grew by $4 \%$ and a large base pulled down Bajaj Allianz adjusted premium collections by $46 \%$ yoy. Birla SL's growth has also been coming off (reported 18\% growth in September 2008 down from over 200\% in 1QFY09). However, most other players continued their growth traction - Reliance Life (169\% yoy) and Max NY (53\% yoy), SBI (59\% yoy) and HDFC (140\% yoy).

HDFC—high growth may be one-off. HDFC reported 140\% yoy growth in September 2008 as compared to $35-40 \%$ reported in the past. The management has highlighted that the growth was driven by one of its pension products that was to be withdrawn from October 2008. HDFC SL has commenced business with HDFC Bank (merged entity); erstwhile CBoP's branches are now also distributing HDFC SL's products. We are retaining our estimate of 40\% growth in FY2009E implying 35\% growth in 2HFY09E versus 56\% reported in 1HFY09.

India Daily Summary - November 12, 2008

Exhibit 1: Life insurance premium income collections adjusted for single premium (Rs mn)

|  | Sep-08 |  |  |  |  |  | YTD FY2009 |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | yoy growth |  |  | yoy growth | Totalyoy growth <br> (\%) |  | Individual yoy growth |  | yoy growth |  | yoy growth |  |
|  | Individual | (\%) | Group |  |  |  | Individual | (\%) | Group | (\%) | Total | (\%) |
| Bajaj Allianz | 3,907 | (47) | 14 | 281 | 3,921 | (46) | 18,092 | (11) | 58 | 240 | 18,150 | (11) |
| Bharti Axa | 253 | 326 | 1 | N/A | 254 | 327 | 1,115 | NA | 4 | NA | 1,119 | 512 |
| Birla Sunlife | 2,152 | 16 | 55 | 2,871 | 2,207 | 18 | 10,517 | 89 | 105 | 229 | 10,622 | 90 |
| HDFC Standard Life | 3,550 | 141 | 9 | 44 | 3,559 | 140 | 11,851 | 56 | 59 | (4) | 11,910 | 56 |
| ICICI Prudential | 4,954 | (6) | 135 | 220 | 5,090 | (4) | 26,502 | 22 | 700 | 140 | 27,202 | 23 |
| ING Vysya | 555 | 29 | 2 | 1,037 | 557 | 29 | 3,069 | 29 | 10 | 238 | 3,080 | 29 |
| Max NY | 1,400 | 54 | 2 | (72) | 1,402 | 53 | 8,033 | 65 | 20 | 2 | 8,054 | 65 |
| Reliance Life | 3,126 | 178 | 24 | (49) | 3,150 | 169 | 11,948 | 150 | 84 | (23) | 12,032 | 146 |
| SBI Life | 2,247 | 39 | 379 | 1,047 | 2,626 | 59 | 11,154 | 73 | 1,031 | 492 | 12,186 | 84 |
| Tata AIG | 634 | 10 | 13 | 19 | 647 | 10 | 4,133 | 44 | 59 | 10 | 4,192 | 44 |
| Private sector | 26,061 | 15 | 650 | 309 | 26,711 | 17 | 121,863 | 42 | 2,203 | 170 | 124,065 | 44 |
| LIC | 13,098 | 15 | 2,207 | 437 | 15,305 | 29 | 75,083 | (38) | 6,109 | 58 | 81,192 | (35) |
| Total | 39,158 | 15 | 2,858 | 401 | 42,016 | 21 | 196,946 | (5) | 8,312 | 77 | 205,258 | (3) |

Source: IRDA.

Exhibit 2: Growth for private player was low
Individual business premium income growth (\%), March fiscal year-ends, 2005-2007,2008 YTD

|  | 2005 | 2006 | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | FY2008 | Apr-08 | May-08 | Jun-08 | Jul-08 | Aug-08 | Sep-08 | YTD |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Bajaj Allianz | 182 | 199 | 136 | 79 | 53 | 2 | 7 | 14 | $(4)$ | $(47)$ | $(11)$ |
| Birla Sun Life | 90 | 11 | 24 | 143 | 255 | 254 | 213 | 107 | 23 | 16 | 89 |
| HDFC Standard Life | 164 | 118 | 57 | 80 | $\mathbf{7 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 6}$ | $\mathbf{5 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 6}$ | $\mathbf{4 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 1}$ | $\mathbf{5 6}$ |
| ICICI Prudential | 114 | 57 | 87 | 68 | 44 | 60 | 33 | 25 | 11 | $(6)$ | 22 |
| Max NY | 72 | 103 | 75 | 70 | 66 | 130 | 43 | 58 | 60 | 54 | 65 |
| Reliance Life | 21 | 160 | 813 | 168 | $\mathbf{2 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 0}$ |
| SBI Life | 87 | 206 | 290 | 111 | 110 | 85 | 95 | 114 | 46 | 39 | 73 |
| Private sector | $\mathbf{1 2 2}$ | $\mathbf{8 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{8 6}$ | $\mathbf{8 4}$ | $\mathbf{6 4}$ | $\mathbf{5 3}$ | $\mathbf{5 1}$ | $\mathbf{3 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 5}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ |
| LIC | 3 | 18 | 88 | 0 | $(41)$ | $(22)$ | $(29)$ | $(38)$ | $(63)$ | 15 | $(38)$ |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 9}$ | $\mathbf{3 4}$ | $\mathbf{9 2}$ | $\mathbf{3 1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1 4}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{( 5 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 3 4 )}$ | $\mathbf{1 5}$ | $\mathbf{( 5 )}$ |

Source: IRDA

Exhibit 3: Companies like HDFC SL, Max, SBI Life and Reliance Life are doing better than our estimates. ICICI Prudential and Bajaj behind our estimate Proportion of full year's business contracted during the period mentioned (\%)

|  | YTD |  |  |  |  |  |  | YTD |  | YTD |  |  |  | YTD |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1QFYO6 | Sep-05 | 2QFY06 | FY2006 | 1QFY2007 | Sep-06 | 2QFY2007 | FY2007 | 1QFY08 | Sep-07 | 2QFY08 | FY2008 | 1QFY09 | Sep-08 | 2QFY09 | FY2009E |
| Bajaj Allianz | 7.7 | 7.1 | 19.6 | 20.1 | 11.1 | 6.0 | 14.9 | 26.0 | 11.6 | 13.0 | 24.5 | 36.1 | 11.0 | 5.8 | 15.7 | 26.7 |
| SBI Life | 7.1 | 3.6 | 9.0 | 12.6 | 10.7 | 4.8 | 17.2 | 27.9 | 9.2 | 6.1 | 15.1 | 24.3 | 11.4 | 5.4 | 15.5 | 27.0 |
| HDFC Standard Life | 13.0 | 8.0 | 20.7 | 25.7 | 15.9 | 7.6 | 19.5 | 35.4 | 13.6 | 6.7 | 20.7 | 34.3 | 13.7 | 11.3 | 23.9 | 37.6 |
| ICICI Prudential | 12.7 | 8.3 | 20.6 | 24.9 | 17.4 | 6.5 | 17.4 | 34.8 | 12.1 | 7.9 | 20.4 | 32.5 | 13.3 | 5.6 | 16.7 | 29.9 |
| Birla Sun Life | 13.2 | 8.4 | 20.6 | 25.4 | 16.2 | 6.8 | 20.9 | 37.1 | 8.4 | 10.9 | 24.0 | 32.4 | 15.4 | 6.9 | 18.3 | 33.8 |
| Max NY | 14.4 | 8.0 | 19.6 | 26.0 | 19.8 | 7.7 | 20.3 | 40.1 | 18.7 | 7.0 | 18.4 | 37.2 | 22.4 | 7.4 | 19.9 | 42.2 |
| Reliance Life | 9.5 | 4.9 | 13.9 | 18.5 | 12.5 | 3.9 | 13.4 | 25.9 | 8.1 | 6.0 | 17.4 | 25.5 | 10.8 | 8.2 | 20.4 | 31.2 |
| Private sector | 11.7 | 7.5 | 19.1 | 23.3 | 15.1 | 6.3 | 17.4 | 32.5 | 11.9 | 8.5 | 20.3 | 32.2 | 13.5 | 6.8 | 18.5 | 32.0 |
| LIC | 13.1 | 5.6 | 18.6 | 26.1 | 13.6 | 10.2 | 26.6 | 40.2 | 9.1 | 2.2 | 13.8 | 22.9 | 11.7 | 4.6 | 14.5 | 26.2 |

[^0]Exhibit 4: LIC's market share has fallen sharply, select private players are gaining
Trend in market share for key players in adjusted individual premium, (\%), March fiscal year-ends, 2005-2007, 2008 YTD
YTD
private

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | Apr-08 | May-08 Jun-08 | Jul-08 | Aug-08 | Sep-08 | YTD | players |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bajaj Allianz | 1.2 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 7.8 | 10.7 | 9.0 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 9.6 | 10.0 | 9.2 | $\mathbf{1 4 . 8}$ |
| Birla Sun Life | 2.0 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 3.3 | $\mathbf{4 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 6}$ |
| HDFC Standard Life | 1.0 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 4.2 | $\mathbf{5 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 7}$ |
| ICICI Prudential | 4.8 | 8.7 | 10.1 | 9.9 | 12.7 | $\mathbf{1 2 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 . 7}$ |
| Max NY | 1.0 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 6.6 |
| Reliance Life | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 3.6 | $\mathbf{5 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 8}$ |
| SBI Life | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 9.2 |
| Private sector | $\mathbf{1 3 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 4 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{3 5 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{6 0 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{6 0 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{6 0 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{5 9 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 2 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{6 6 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{6 1 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |
| LIC | 86.4 | $\mathbf{7 4 . 7}$ | 65.8 | 64.5 | $\mathbf{4 9 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{3 9 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{3 9 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{3 9 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 0 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 8 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 3 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{3 8 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{-}$ |

Source: IRDA.

Exhibit 5: Group business has increased considerably for SBI and LIC
Proportion of single premium in individual business and proportion of individual premium to total premium (\%)

| Rs mn | Ind. single prem/Total ind. prem |  | premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | YTD FY2008 | YTD FY2009 | YTD FY2008 | YTD FY2009 |
| Bajaj Allianz | 11 | 8 | 99 | 97 |
| Birla Sun Life | 2 | 2 | 95 | 91 |
| HDFC Standard Life | 7 | 5 | 93 | 95 |
| ICICI Prudential | 7 | 5 | 89 | 80 |
| Max NY | 17 | 14 | 97 | 98 |
| Reliance Life | 13 | 16 | 83 | 94 |
| SBI Life | 38 | 21 | 85 | 57 |
| Private players | 12 | 9 | 92 | 86 |
| LIC | 40 | 47 | 83 | 68 |
| Total Premium | 31 | 28 | 86 | 76 |

Source: IRDA.


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Kotak Institutional Equities：Valuation Summary of Key Indian Companies
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| Price (RS |

## $\begin{array}{r}\text { EPS growth（o）} \\ 2008 \\ 2009 E \\ \hline\end{array}$

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Biocon
Cipla
Dishman Pharma \＆chemic
Divi＇s Laboratories
Dr Reddy＇s Laboratories
 Lupin Piramal Healthcare
Ranbaxy Laboratories
Sun Pharmaceuticals


[^1]
 VR Prime Urban Developers
Mahindra Life Space Developer
Phoenix Mills
Puravankara Projects
Kotak Institutional Equities: Valuation Summary of Key Indian Companies


[^2]659
Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
"Each of the analysts named below hereby certifies that, with respect to each subject company and its securities for which the analyst is responsible in this report, (1) all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about the subject companies and securities, and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related
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Kotak Institutional Equities Research coverage universe
Distribution of ratings/investment banking relationships


Percentage of companies covered by Kotak Institutional Equities, within the specified category.

Percentage of companies within each category for which Kotak Institutional Equities and or its affiliates has provided investment banking services within the previous 12 months.

* The above categories are defined as follows: Buy = OP; Hold $=\mathrm{IL}$; Sell $=\mathrm{U}$. Buy, Hold and Sell are not defined Kotak Institutional Equities ratings and should not be constructed as investment opinions. Rather, these ratings are used illustratively to comply with applicable regulations. As of 30/09/2008 Kotak Institutional Equities Investment Research had investment ratings on 143 equity securities.

Source: Kotak Institutional Equities

## Ratings and other definitions/identifiers

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Definitions of ratings
BUY. We expect this stock to outperform the BSE Sensex by $10 \%$ over the next 12 months.
ADD. We expect this stock to outperform the BSE Sensex by $0-10 \%$ over the next 12 months.
REDUCE: We expect this stock to underperform the BSE Sensex by $0-10 \%$ over the next 12 months.
SELL: We expect this stock to underperform the BSE Sensexby more than $10 \%$ over the next 12 months.

Our target price are also on 12-month horizon basis.
Other definitions
Coverage view. The coverage view represents each analyst's overall fundamental outlook on the Sector. The coverage view will consist of one of the following designations: Attractive (A), Neutral (N), Cautious (C).

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[^0]:    Source: IRDA, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates

[^1]:[^2]:    

