Good times to continue

Sector Outlook Positive

Discretionary spend to be key growth driver in FY12

Indian IT services companies generate ~30% of revenues from discretionary spend. Discretionary spend environment is improving sharply as visible from both Oracle and SAP, recording yoy growth in new license sale greater than 25%. Management commentary of technology bellwethers suggests a more buoyant discretionary spend environment in North America and emerging economies than Europe. We believe increased spend on discretionary projects is critical because these have better pricing when compared to maintenance projects. Coupled with secular offshore shift to manage costs, the bounce back in discretionary spend augurs well for Indian IT services companies. We remain positive on the sector and expect returns to be driven by robust earnings growth.

HCL Technologies: All positive priced in

HCL Technologies (HCLT) has been able to catch-up and even outperform its larger peers in revenue growth by acquiring Axon and also by investing in Remote Infrastructure Management (RIM). However, the story is not same when it comes to other metrics such a margins, cash generation and return ratios. Though HCLT's revenue growth has been impressive and would continue to be inline with larger peers, led by its RIM practice, our concern is on HCLT's margin owing to: aggressive pricing especially in RIM, lower than peer fresher recruits, increased contribution from RIM business and relatively low SG&A spend. We do not share consensus optimism in HCLT improving operating margins by 100bps in FY12. We do not expect HCLT's P/E to bridge the gap with Tier-1 owing to relatively weak financial metrics. Initiate coverage on HCLT with Reduce/Underperform rating with a price target of Rs. 465.

Tech Mahindra – Mahindra Satyam: Marriage on the cards

Management of Tech Mahindra (TECHM) have indicated time and again that TECHM and Mahindra Satyam (MSAT) would be merged. With some of the obstacles out, we too believe a merger is realistic possibility in the next 12-18 months. In this context, TECHM and MSAT should not be looked at in isolation by investors in our opinion. On a combined basis, we expect the duo to have a sales of US\$ 2.5bn of revenues in FY12E making it the fifth largest India listed IT services company. Moreover, the business would exhibit a diversified revenue profile, a luxury TECHM hitherto did not enjoy.

We expect both companies to lag industry revenue growth - TECHM owing to a weak demand environment in the telecom vertical; MSAT due to their inability to participate in large deals in the past 24 months. On the margins front, TECHM would have a muted expansion, on the contrary we expect MSAT to expand operating margins by ~650bps over next 24 months. At current prices, the combined entity is trading at a P/E of 12.2x FY12E EPS and 9.0x FY13E, attractive in our view. Given the attractive valuation we believe investors should buy into both TECHM and MSAT in a manner that would result in them having the same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach as a protection against the as-yet-uncertain swap ratio that would be used for the merger. Our target multiple for the combined entity is 12x 1 year forward EPS based on a 20% discount to HCLT target multiple of 15x. We believe the discount in multiple is warranted given HCL Tech's higher earnings growth and more diversified business.

Date	Apr 05, 2011
Market data	

Market data								
BSE SENSEX	19686							
NIFTY	5910							
CNXIT	7314							



Performance (%)								
	1m	3m	12m					
Nifty	5	(5)	10					
CNXIT	4	(5)	19					

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HCL Tech vs. TechM and Mahindra Satyam – A quick Take

Sector Outlook

Positive

Factor of Comparison	HCL Technologies (HCLT)	Tech Mahindra (TECHM) – Mahindra Satyam (MSAT) (TECH+MSAT)	Remarks
Verticals	Financial Services – 24.6% Manufacturing – 27.1% Telecom – 10.8%	Financial Services – 13% Manufacturing – 21% Telecom – 48%	HCLT has a more balanced vertical exposure than TECHM+MSAT. Telecom would be an overhang for TECHM+MSAT combo, and make it more vulnerable to Telecom's cyclical nature.
Horizontals	Enterprise Application Services – 21% Engineering and R&D Services – 19% Custom Application – 32% Infrastructure Services – 23%	Enterprise Application Services – 22% Engineering and R&D Services – 7% Custom Application – 65% Infrastructure Services – 6%	Both entities have ~20% exposure to Enterprise application and lack meaningful presence in BPO. However, HCLT has a stronger presence in Infrastructure Service and Engineering Services, which is matched by TECHM+MSAT strength in applications.
Geographies	Americas – 57.1% Europe – 26.6% Rest of World – 16.3%	Americas – 44.3% Europe – 41.6% Rest of World – 14.1%	TECHM+MSAT have a more balanced geographic presence. Note that within Europe, both companies have high exposure to UK and TECHM+MSAT in particular.
Employees (FY12)	96,488	73,926	HCLT has a higher employee base, providing scope for better employee mix and higher utilisation.
Offshore: Onsite revenues	42:58	61:39	HCLT has a higher onsite owing to Axon, whereas TECHM+MSAT has a higher offshore due to high offshore in TECHM. However, BPO operations of both entities and HCLT's RIM practice is not included.
FY12 Revenues (Rs. mn)	198,536	110,987	TECHM+MSAT would become the fifth largest India listed IT services company after HCLT.
FY12 EBITDA (Rs. mn)	31,862	15,390	HCLT EBITDA margins would be 200bps higher than TECHM+MSAT. TECH+MSAT margins would be low due MSAT's low margins.
FY12 PAT (Rs. mn)	20,675	10,892	TECHM+MSAT would have a higher PAT margin owing to higher other income.
Current Market-Cap (Rs. mn)	320,027	132,782	TECHM+MSAT market cap is computed after adjusting for TECHM's stake in MSAT.
Revenue Growth (FY11-13E)	23%	13%	HCLT would outperform owing to TECHM+MSAT suffering from British Telecom overhang.
EBITDA Growth (FY11-13E)	19%	27%	HCLT margins would be flat, however we expect MSAT's robust margin expansion to drive TECHM+MSAT margins.
PAT Growth (FY11- 13E)	23%	28%	Operating margin improvement would flow through to PAT for TECHM+MSAT, whereas higher other income would improve PAT growth.
Net Cash (Rs. mn)	-2,345	8,345	TECHM+MSAT has strong cash balance even after adjusting for Unpaid and class action suit settlement.

Source: Spark Capital Research



Valuation

Sector Outlook Positive

		Sales			EBITDA		Net Income			EPS			
Company	Year End	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E
eClerx	Mar	3,391	4,420	5,755	1,444	1,619	1,902	1,273	1,459	1,548	42.5	48.5	51.5
Firstsource	Mar	20,533	23,913	-	2,880	3,575	-	896	1,257	-	1.9	2.7	-
HCL Tech	Jun	159,237	198,536	241,589	26,954	31,862	37,861	16,666	20,675	25,157	24.2	30.0	36.5
Hexaware	Dec	13,644	16,215	-	1,624	2,086	-	1,707	1,952	-	5.7	6.6	-
Infosys	Mar	277,916	344,210	403,856	92,477	113,302	131,532	69,632	86,778	102,707	121.5	151.4	179.2
Infotech	Mar	12,045	15,451	18,847	1,906	2,546	3,120	1,438	1,821	2,285	12.8	16.3	20.4
Mahindra Satyam	Mar	50,861	58,437	68,305	3,989	6,454	9,208	3,535	4,947	7,298	3.0	4.2	6.2
MindTree	Mar	15,215	18,239	21,800	1,947	2,851	3,310	1,033	1,805	2,306	25.3	44.2	56.5
MphasiS	Oct	53,434	64,942	-	10,418	13,145	-	9,104	10,334	-	43.1	49.0	-
Patni	Dec	37,046	40,813	-	6,911	7,716	-	4,897	6,115	-	36.4	45.5	-
Persistent	Mar	7,646	9,607	11,554	1,611	2,113	2,678	1,430	1,462	1,811	35.8	36.6	45.3
Polaris	Mar	15,729	19,032	21,233	2,183	2,678	3,186	1,970	2,211	2,718	19.7	22.1	27.2
TCS	Mar	374,723	467,246	551,779	112,331	137,159	159,547	87,468	102,308	119,897	44.7	52.3	61.3
Tech Mahindra	Mar	49,378	52,550	59,853	8,080	8,936	10,297	5,412	5,945	7,408	41.4	45.4	56.6
TECHM+ MSAT	Mar	100,240	110,987	128,158	12,068	15,390	19,505	8,947	10,892	14,706			
Wipro	Mar	311,777	376,403	446,131	66,889	81,302	78,109	53,038	61,322	67,545	21.7	25.1	27.6

		P/E			EV/EBITDA			EV/Sales		CMP	MCAP	TP	Rating	
Company	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E	(Rs.)	Rs. Mn	Rs.	Absolute	Relative
eClerx	15.2x	13.3x	12.5x	11.7x	10.5x	8.9x	5.0x	3.8x	2.9x	645	18,467	540	SELL	UPF
Firstsource	10.2x	7.3x	-	6.9x	5.5x	-	1.0x	0.8x	-	19	8,327	28	BUY	OPF
HCL Tech	19.7x	15.8x	13.0x	12.0x	10.1x	8.5x	2.0x	1.6x	1.3x	475	320,027	465	REDUCE	UPF
Hexaware	12.2x	10.6x	-	9.5x	7.4x	-	1.1x	1.0x	-	70	20,088	60	ADD	UPF
Infosys	27.0x	21.7x	18.3x	18.7x	15.3x	13.2x	6.2x	5.0x	4.3x	3,278	1,878,934	3,450	ADD	OPF
Infotech	12.4x	9.8x	7.8x	7.8x	5.9x	4.8x	1.2x	1.0x	0.8x	160	17,864	190	BUY	OPF
Mahindra Satyam	22.3x	16.0x	10.8x	14.6x	9.0x	6.3x	1.1x	1.0x	0.9x	67	78,926	77	BUY	OPF
MindTree	16.2x	9.3x	7.3x	7.7x	5.2x	4.5x	1.0x	0.8x	0.7x	410	16,327	478	BUY	OPF
MphasiS	9.9x	8.7x	-	7.4x	5.9x	-	1.4x	1.2x	-	427	89,826	480	ADD	UPF
Patni	13.0x	10.4x	-	5.8x	5.2x	-	1.1x	1.0x	-	475	62,016	478	ADD	UPF
Persistent	11.0x	10.7x	8.7x	7.8x	6.0x	4.7x	1.6x	1.3x	1.1x	392	15,680	500	BUY	OPF
Polaris	8.9x	7.9x	6.4x	5.6x	4.6x	3.9x	0.8x	0.6x	0.6x	175	17,311	230	BUY	OPF
TCS	27.1x	23.2x	19.8x	20.5x	16.8x	14.4x	6.1x	4.9x	4.2x	1,212	2,371,173	1,200	ADD	OPF
Tech Mahindra	16.9x	15.4x	12.4x	12.4x	11.2x	9.7x	2.0x	1.9x	1.7x	700	87,525	810	BUY	OPF
TECHM+ MSAT	14.8x	12.2x	9.0x	10.3x	8.1x	6.4x	1.2x	1.1x	1.0x	-	132,782	-	BUY	OPF
Wipro	22.2x	19.2x	17.4x	16.5x	13.5x	14.1x	3.5x	2.9x	2.5x	481	1,177,042	485	ADD	UPF


Source: Spark Capital, Bloomberg. Patni and Hexaware have Dec year-ends while MphasiS has an October year-end



Continued upswing in discretionary spend

Sector Outlook

Positive




Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

With this in mind, we analyze discretionary spend patterns as evidenced by the license revenues of enterprise software bellwethers SAP AG and Oracle. As Figures 1 and Figure 2 show, the 2007-09 recession had a significant negative impact on license sales, with SAP seeing ~35% yoy license revenue decline and Oracle witnessing ~20% yoy decline. Clearly, when customers cut back on packaged software, they cut back sharply. However, in the last four to five quarters, discretionary spend has bounced back sharply, as we see double-digit growth once again returning for the software bellwethers. SAP's software license figures generally lead IT services demand by three to four quarters. Also, Oracle management's comments during their most recent results call indicate solid company-specific momentum, and we feel it is reasonably safe to extrapolate this commentary to the broader IT demand environment.

Indian IT services companies generate ~30% of revenues from discretionary spend. Key service offerings include application development, Enterprise Application Services and Testing. Hence the need to understand trends in discretionary spending in the global IT services industry. In most software projects, the application sale leads the implementation by one to two quarters. A typical Software project goes through four stages 1. **Vendor Selection:** IT consultants from firms such as IBM or Accenture typically do the business analysis and select the suitable product. 2. **Application purchase:** Customer negotiates terms with the product provider and purchases a license. 3. **Implementation** consultants from firms such as SAP or Accenture plan the installation of the Software 4. **Systems Integrators** such as Capgemini, Infosys, and HCL typically handle the roll-out, maintenance, product enhancement and training. Due to the nature of the implementation cycle, Systems Integrators lag the Software application company by around two quarters.

Figure 2: Oracle licence revenue growth YoY cc






Bellwether numbers indicate strong momentum

Sector Outlook

Positive




Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

The results of IT services bellwethers IBM and Accenture are instructive. in our view. After a dip in consulting/short term bookings for a few quarters, the environment has become significantly better, and this is clearly reflected in the short term signings of IBM and Accenture. Accenture's commentary following the recent results is telling in this regard: "Systems integration bookings were strong again this guarter and the highest in 10 quarters. The primary driver is ERP, as clients are streamlining their operations and reducing their costs due to globalization, M&A, and regulation." They also indicated that this demand "reflects implementations on SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft platforms, as well as package enhancements and add-on industry-specific software, including analytics, that need to be integrated. " All of this points to significant discretionary spend momentum, in our view.

To take a step back and understand the relation between licences and IT services spend - into a downturn, the first leg of pull-back in tech spending results from the budget freeze, where discretionary spend sees a drastic cut. During this phase. Software application licenses see a sharp fall as IT discretionary Capex takes a severe hit. Typically, this gives way to a period of budget cuts, where the operating expense components of the budget are addressed. This results in falls in IT headcount (both inhouse and outsourced) leading to declines in IT Services revenues. During the recovery cycle, Software licenses pick up first, as products drive efficiency gains during recovery. As an analogy, we can look at the relation between Software and IT Services, levels as being similar to the link between GDP growth and unemployment. Unemployment usually picks up after the beginning of GDP decline while the peak unemployment rate is hit way after the recovery in the GDP growth rates.

Figure 4: YoY growth in Accenture's Consulting bookings 30% 20%





All positives priced in

CMPRs. 475AbsoluteReduceTargetRs. 465RelativeUnderperform

HCL Technologies (HCLT) has been able to catch-up and even outperform its larger peers in revenue growth by acquiring Axon and also by investing in Remote Infrastructure Management (RIM). However, the story is not the same when it comes to other metrics such as margins, cash generation and return ratios. Though HCLT's revenue growth has been impressive and would continue to be inline with larger peers, led by its RIM practice, our concern is on HCLT's margin owing to: aggressive pricing especially in RIM, lower than peer fresher recruits, increased contribution from RIM business and relatively low SG&A spend. We do not share consensus optimism in HCLT improving operating margins by 100bps in FY12. We do not expect HCLT's P/E to bridge the gap with Tier-1 owing to relatively poorer financial metrics. Initiate coverage on HCLT with Reduce and Underperform rating with a price target of Rs. 465.

B'RIM'ing with growth: HCLT's revenue growth profile has been stellar even through the downturn, and with sustained aggression we expect this trend to continue into succeeding quarters as well. The growth pillars we expect are RIM and EAS, with the uptick in discretionary spend expected to help HCLT. We expect a **24% revenue CAGR** from FY10-13E. with RIM being the prime **mover with a 32% CAGR over this timeframe**. Also, with substantial uptick expected in discretionary spending (where we draw inferences from our analysis of global tech bellwethers SAP, Oracle, Accenture and IBM), HCL's EAS practice (~21% of revenues) should benefit.

Margins would settle at FY11E level: Margins are the area where we continue to be cautious on HCLT - our estimates bake in a 120bps decline from FY11E to 15.7% in FY13E, which compares to our FY12E margin estimate of 16%. As a result of RIM contribution increasing to ~24% of revenues (100bps increase from Dec-10 quarter), BPO overhang and limited lateral hiring, margins would be muted in our view. Overall, we think wage hikes + muted pricing uptick are likely to hold sway over profitability improvements in RIM and BPO, which explains our cautious margin forecasts.

Initiate with Reduce / UPF: HCLT has outperformed CNXIT predominantly by delivering revenue growth ahead of estimates. On the back of this, consensus expectation have rolled forward to FY12E and expects a 100bps margin expansion to top up a high revenue growth expectation. However, we do not share this optimism due to reasons outlined above. We expect HCLT to post FY11-13E EPS CAGR of 23%. An analysis of HCL Tech's trading history indicates that the stock has traded at 1 year forward P/E of 15x on 64% of its trading history over last five year. We value HCLT at 15x 12 months ended Sep-12 EPS of Rs. 31.5 to arrive at our price target of Rs. 465. Initiate with Reduce and UPF.

Financial summary										
Year	Revenues (Rs. mn)	EBITDA (Rs. mn)	PAT (Rs. mn)	EPS (Rs.)	P/E(x)	EV/EBITDA(x)				
FY10	159,237	26,954	16,666	24.2	19.7	12.0				
FY11E	198,536	31,862	20,675	30.0	15.9	10.1				
FY12E	241,589	37,861	25,157	36.5	13.0	8.5				

Initiating Coverage									
Date Apr 05, 2011									
Market Data									
SENSEX	19686								
Nifty	5910								
Bloomberg	HCLT IN								
Shares o/s	674 mn								
Market Cap	Rs 320bn								
52-wk High-Low	Rs 517-340								
3m Avg. Daily Vol	Rs 498mn								
Index member	Nifty								
Latest shareholdin	ıg (%)								
Promoters	65								
Institutions	27								
Public	8								
Oha ala ura urfa uura au	- (0/)								

Stock performance (%)								
1m 3m 12r								
HCLT	1	1	31					
Nifty	5	(5)	10					
CNXIT	4	(5)	19					

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Business overview

REDUCE CMP Rs. 470 **Absolute** Rs. 465 Relative **UPF Target**

HCLT derives ~60% of its revenues from the Americas region, which is

broadly similar to the large-cap IT players. However, it is on the service line front that HCL's distinguishing characteristics appear. Enterprise


Application Services accounts for ~21% of its revenues, which

means a significant chunk of its revenue base is exposed to discretionary spending. Secondly, Infrastructure services account for ~23% of revenues which gives the company an exposure to one of the most promising areas of IT services from a structural growth perspective. The company also has a solid Engineering/R&D services practice which,


under current demand trends, is likely to remain under duress in the near

term (this business is similar to Infotech's EMI practice). Finally, we point to HCLT's limited BPO practice, which accounts for only ~5-6% of revenues - this piece of the business has been struggling and we think it is better for HCLT to get its BPO strategy right before expanding this






Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 7: Revenue split by vertical

service line further.







HCL Technologies Business overview (Cont'd)








Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

In terms of verticals, HCL Tech gets ~25% of its revenues from Financial services, which is comparable to that of Wipro in the large-cap space but significantly lags TCS and Infy. Also, manufacturing accounts for 27% of revenues, the largest proportion among large-caps. Telecom and CPG account for ~10% of revenues apiece, rounding off a vertical exposure profile that is significantly different from a typical large-cap. ~55-60% of HCL Tech's revenues come from T&M contracts, but we think this will gradually shift more towards FP projects as more outcome-based billing models begin to hold sway. Finally, in terms of margin profile, Software services and RIM are doing well for HCL Tech with ~20% margin levels, but the key issue is with BPO, in our view. BPO margins have declined due to: a) Restructuring of business to shift from voice to non-voice based work. b) Investments in the modernization of Liberata's insurance platform. Company has noted that losses would continue in BPO till Dec'11.







EAS - Prime mover

CMP Rs. 470 Absolute REDUCE

Target Rs. 465 Relative UPF

HCLT has a strong EAS franchise bolstered significantly by its acquisition of UK-based consulting firm Axon. Following a "reverse integration" process wherein HCL Tech's EAS employees were subsumed into the Axon group, HCL has built a formidable EAS franchise — arguably the strongest among the Indian IT pack. Figure 12 show the steep increase in revenues from EAS (quarterly and yearly) which is primarily a result of the Axon acquisition in Dec-08 (i.e. FY09). This also resulted in EAS share of HCL's revenues increasing from 10-11% previously to ~20-21% currently (Figure 12).

On the back of solid momentum in enterprise software license sale and bookings by consulting companies, we are surprised by HCLT lagging TCS and Infosys in revenue growth from EAS over the three quarters. HCLT derives ~80% of its EAS revenues from consulting and implementation work, vs. ~50% for both Infosys and TCS. We find the trend of HCLT's EAS business growing slower than peers is worrying, as HCLT might be losing market share in a high growth market. Though we have not assumed a market share decline in our models, we would be tracking relative growth on year-on-year basis keenly.

We believe that as a result of discretionary spend uptick, the share of EAS in HCL Tech's revenues should be closer to 23-25% on a sustainable basis. We believe the acquisition overall has been a success despite starting off on the back foot initially due to macroeconomic turmoil during 2008/09.

Figure 11: Comparison of EAS revenue growth yoy

HCLT has lagged Infy
and TCS


Mar-10

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research






HCL Technologies RIM – Growth, but at a price

CMP Rs. 470 Absolute REDUCE

Target Rs. 465 Relative UPF

RIM is a key growth pillar for HCLT, and in our view RIM is the area where HCLT's aggressive go-to-market approach is most evident. Figure 15 shows the rapid up-scaling of growth in the RIM vertical quarter after quarter. HCLT's large deals e.g. the US\$ 350mn outsourcing deal with publishing group Readers Digest, tend to have RIM as a key component – indeed, winning such large deals in the past by itself bestows upon HCLT the crucial advantage of having an established track record in implementing large deals. HCLT's realisation per employee in RIM has seen a sharp increase over the last few quarters and we believe it is an outcome of rebadging onsite employees. The other side of this growth is that margins have got eroded to some extent (Figure 13) as a result of HCLT's push into RIM and emphasis on gaining market share. We believe that going forward, HCLT would not be able to increase margins meaningfully, as it continues to adopt aggressive pricing and also due to high component of onsite work.



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 13: RIM – Gross margin progression


SG&A expenses compressed by 360 bps over 6qtrs

10%

1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11

EBITDA margin — Gross margin

Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research





Growth measures up to peers, but margins need to catch up






Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 16 shows that HCLT's revenue growth profile measures up to that of large-cap peers, and sometimes even exceeds large-cap benchmarks. In terms of growth pillars, Figure 17 clearly shows that Infrastructure services is the prime mover whereas **BPO** is a laggard – in our view, the **BPO** situation should reverse as their investments in platform BPO take shape over the next four to five quarters.


Some of this growth, in our view comes at the expense of margins, where Figure 18 shows a divergence in margin trends for HCL vs TCS and Infosys. While TCS and Infy exhibited immaculate operational and margin control right through the downturn, HCL continued to focus on growth – which it did obtain, but at the expense of its margin profile. On the positive side, we think margins have stabilized more-orless at current levels, and we see more risks on the upside than downside currently on the margin front.





Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 18: EBITDA margins vs peers






CMP Rs. 470 Absolute REDUCE Target Rs. 465 Relative UPF

Financials – Expect continued growth momentum; margins key

HCLT's revenue growth profile has been stellar even through the downturn, and with sustained aggression we expect this trend to continue into future as well. The growth pillars would be RIM and EAS, with the uptick in discretionary spend expected to help HCL Tech. Accordingly, our expectation is for a 24% revenue CAGR from FY10-13E.

Margins are the area where we continue to be cautious on HCLT - our estimates bake in a 120bps decline from FY11E to 15.7% in FY13E, which compares to our FY12E margin estimate of 16%. As a result of RIM contribution increasing to ~24% of revenues (100bps increase from Dec-10 quarter), BPO overhang and limited lateral hiring, margins would be muted in our view. Upside risks to our margin estimate could, however, come from improved profitability in both BPO and RIM. Overall, we think wage hikes + muted pricing uptick are likely to hold sway over profitability improvements in RIM and BPO, which explains our cautious margin forecasts.




Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 19: HCLT – EBITDA margins

24%
22%
20%
18%
14%
12%
10%
FY09
FY10
FY11E
FY12E
FY13E

Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 21: HCLT – qoq growth in US\$ revenues




Financials - Impressive metrics, but risks exist

Rs. 470 **Absolute REDUCE CMP UPF** Rs. 465 Relative **Target**

HCL Tech's earnings trajectory is solid, and we expect revenue growth (rather than margins) to help drive this over coming years. EPS CAGR is at ~24% in line with revenue growth mainly because of the shift in Other income and Foreign exchange gains from negative to positive territory over this time frame.

HCL Tech enjoys reasonably good conversion of its EBITDA to operating cash flows, which is encouraging in our view. At ~60-70% levels (Figure 24). - in comparison, Infy is at ~75-80% on this metric. Free cash flow generation, which not necessarily impressive on an absolute basis, are showing an improving trend, which is again positive in our view.

On return ratios HCL scores poorly inspite of having debt to the extent of Rs. 25bn. We believe a sustained improvement in return rations and cash generation would prove to be crucial for HCLT to rerate and bridge the gap with Tier-1 companies.



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 24: Comparison of CFO/EBITDA

Figure 22: HCL – EPS progression 40 30 20 10 FY09 FY10 FY11E FY12E FY13E

90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% **HCLT TCS** Infosys Wipro **Polaris**

Valuation/Risk

CMP Rs. 475 Absolute Reduce

Target Rs. 465 Relative Underperform

All positives have been priced in - Initiate with Reduce

HCL Tech's stock has been one of the better performers over the last 12 months, with the stock returning 31% versus CNXIT's return of 18%. An analysis of HCL Tech's trading history indicates that the stock has traded at 1 year forward P/E of 15x on 64% of its trading history. Even though HCL Tech's EPS FY11-13E EPS CAGR of 23% is superior to Tier-1 companies, HCL Tech disappoints on other financial metrics such as RoE, CFO generation, predictable revenue and operating profit growth. Moreover, we do not share the consensus' optimism in HCL improving its operating margins by 100bps in FY12 due to HCL's aggressive pricing especially in RIM deals, lower than peer fresher recruits, increased contribution from RIM business and relatively low SG&A levels. HCL Tech would have to deliver superior revenue growth and more stable operating margin over a period of time to reduce the P/E gap it has with Tier-1 companies. We value HCL Tech by attaching a multiple of 15x on the 12 months ended Sep-12 EPS of Rs. 31.5 to arrive at our price target of Rs. 465. Initiate with Reduce and UPF.



Risks

Key risks for HCL Tech outside the industry wide risks such as Wage pressure, foreign exchange fluctuation and macroeconomic concerns are:

- Aggressive pricing: HCLT's recent deal wins especially in RIM have been on the back of aggressive pricing. RIM contracts owing to its nature in most cases are priced for a period of three to five years at flat prices or minimal pricing increase. Moreover, analysis of HCLT RIM business indicates a sharp increase in onsite related RIM business. We highlight that in case a client decides to offshore a portion of the work; HCLT would have to incur substantial costs in restructuring some of the deals. Another risk emanating from highly competitive pricing is the inability to pass on cost pressures, especially cost-pressures emanating from wage hikes.
- High exposure to discretionary spend: HCLT generates ~17% of its revenues from ERP consulting and implementation work. As noted earlier, ERP works are pulled down drastically in the event of an economic downturn. Accenture's consulting bookings declined 20% yoy at the depth of the recession. Owing to its higher onsite component, the impact on margins is more pronounced.



HCL Technologies Financial Summary

CMP Rs. 475 Absolute Reduce

Target Rs. 465 Relative Underperform

Abridged Financial Statements				
Rs. mn	FY10	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E
Profit & Loss				
Revenues	125,650	159,237	198,536	241,589
Direct Costs	81,957	108,595	137,769	169,325
Gross Profits	43,692	50,642	60,768	72,264
SG & A	17,964	23,688	28,905	34,403
EBITDA	25,728	26,954	31,862	37,861
Depreciation	3,895	4,512	5,128	5,519
Amortisation	1,115	697	661	651
EBIT	20,718	21,745	26,073	31,691
Foreign Exchange Gains / (loss)	(4,757)	(789)	-	-
Other Income, net	(532)	370	1,131	1,411
PBT	15,429	21,326	27,204	33,101
Provision for Tax	2,403	4,660	6,529	7,944
Share of Minority Interest	(2)	(2)	-	-
Net Income	13,027	16,666	20,675	25,157
EPS- Basic	19.3	24.7	30.7	37.3
EPS - Diluted	18.9	24.2	30.0	36.5
Balance sheet				
Total Current Liabilities	31,329	38,120	47,679	57,591
Borrow ings	26,632	26,007	26,007	26,007
Other Liabilities	7,386	6,391	6,391	6,391
Total Liabilities	65,347	70,518	80,077	89,989
Total Stockholders Equity	70,368	83,100	98,314	118,009
Total - Sources of funds	135,715	153,618	178,390	207,998
Cash & Cash Equivalents	4,686	8,720	19,653	35,335
Account Receivables, net	25,139	28,590	35,759	43,193
Fixed Deposits with Banks	10,913	14,429	14,429	14,429
Total - Application of funds	135,715	153,618	178,390	207,998

Key metrics				
	FY10	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E
Cashflow				
Net cash from operations	17,912	17,274	22,264	26,733
Net cash from investing	-10,141	370	1,131	1,411
Net cash from financing	-7,278	-2,731	-5,462	-5,462
Free cash flow	13,089	26,165	31,862	37,861
Cash at year-end	4,833	19,600	26,653	42,335
Growth				
Revenues	19%	27%	25%	22%
EBITDA	12%	5%	18%	19%
PAT	2%	28%	24%	22%
EPS	0%	28%	24%	22%
Margins				
EBITDA	20.5%	16.9%	16.0%	15.7%
PAT	10%	10%	10%	10%
Return				
ROE	20%	22%	23%	23%
ROCE	16%	15%	16%	16%
Valuation				
Fully diluted shares (mn)	674	674	674	674
Market cap (Rs. mn)	320,027	320,027	320,027	320,027
EV (Rs.mn)	322,372	322,372	322,372	322,372
EV/Sales (x)	2.6	2.0	1.6	1.3
EV/EBITDA (x)	12.5	12.0	10.1	8.5
P/E (x)	25.1	19.7	15.8	13.0
EPS(E) / Current market price	4%	5%	6%	8%
Revenue per employee (000's)	2,152	2,223	2,252	2,321
EBITDA per employee (000's)	441	376	361	364
PAT per employee (000's)	223	233	234	242



Tech Mahindra

One side of the coin

CMP Rs. 700 Absolute Buy

Target Rs. 810 Relative Outperform

Public

TECHM's focus on telecom vertical has been both its biggest boon and its biggest bane. A boon, because of the strong growth the company witnessed in FY07and FY08, and a bane because the next three years have been lacklustre. From the time TECHM won the bid to purchase fraud-hit Satyam, the management's intention has been to merge both the companies. With some of the litigations pertaining to Mahindra Satyam cleared, we expect the proceedings for the merger of TECHM and MSAT to kick start over the next 12 – 18 months. The combined entity would have annual revenues of US\$ 2.5bn (FY12) and a diversified revenues base in verticals, client concentration and service offering. Given the attractive valuation we believe investors should buy into both MSAT and TECHM in a manner that would result in the same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach in order to protect against the swap ratio that could be used for the merger. Initiate coverage with BUY/OPF and a price target of Rs. 810.

Revenue growth would lag industry growth

We expect TECHM revenue growth to lag the industry's growth rate owing to its focus on telecom vertical and also due to tight spending by its top client. With top client continuing at a similar rate (GBP 70-72mn per quarter) we expect non top client to drive revenue growth.

Some of the concerns would be addressed post merger

Investors have been concerned on high client concentration and TECHM being a single vertical company. Merger with MSAT would alleviate some concerns as top client concentration would **go down from 44% to ~21% and the** largest vertical albeit telecom would account for 48% of revenues. Moreover a merger would enable a more effective cross-sell of the strengths of both companies.

Initiate with BUY/OPF

TECHM and MSAT are companies that are bound to merge and we believe a merger would be consummated in the next 12 to 18 months. We recommend investors invest in both companies in a manner that would result in the same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach to hedge against the swap ratio that would be used for the merger. We value the combined company on P/E of 12x at a 20% discount to our target multiple for HCLT. We forecast the combined entity to post an earnings of Rs. 12.7bn for 12 months ending Sep-12 resulting in an upside of 16% Initiate coverage with a price target of Rs. 810.

Financial summary										
Year	Revenues (Rs. mn)	EBITDA (Rs. mn)	PAT (Rs. mn)	EPS (Rs.)	P/E(x)	EV/EBITDA(x)				
FY10	44,249	9,320	7,004	53.5	13.0	11.1				
FY11E	49,378	8,080	5,412	41.4	16.9	12.9				
FY12E	52,550	8,936	5,945	45.4	15.4	11.6				

Initiating Coverage				
Date Apr 05, 2011				
Market Data				
SENSEX	19686			
Nifty	5910			
Bloomberg	TECHM IN			
Shares o/s	125mn			
Market Cap	Rs bn			
52-wk High-Low	Rs 915-476			
3m Avg. Daily Vol	Rs. 196mn			
Index member	BSE200			
Latest shareholding (%)				
Promoters	73			
Institutions	17			

Stock performance				
	1m	3m	12m	
TechM	1	(7)	(19)	
Nifty	5	(5)	10	
CNXIT	4	(5)	19	

10

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


Tech Mahindra Business Overview

CMP Rs. 700 Absolute Buy

Target Rs. 810 Relative Outperform

Figure 26: TECHM – Revenue by Geography



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 27: TECHM – Client Concentration

1,000
800
80%
600
60%
40%
20%

Annual Revenues (US\$ Mn) — % of Revenues

Top 5 client

Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research


Top Client

TECHM had its beginning as a joint-venture between Mahindra and Mahindra and British Telecom. Over the course of time, TECHM started servicing external clients also. Owing to its legacy TECHM focuses and generates all its revenues from the Telecom vertical. In Apr-09 TECHM won the bid to acquire the erstwhile Satyam Computers and ended up acquiring 42.66% stake in Satyam Computers and later renamed it as Mahindra Satyam.

TECHM generates its revenues mainly from the telecom service providers. Its clients include the likes of British Telecom, AT&T, Airtel, Zain and Vodafone. TECHM has a high client concentration ratio as its top client British Telecom accounts for 44% of revenues (peak of 65%). Owing to the nature of the telecom vertical, a handful of clients account for most of the revenues, a trait seen even in larger competitors such as Infosys.

Europe accounts for 50% of TECHM's revenues due to its largest client being located in UK. BPO services have been TECHM's area of growth.

Figure 28: TECHM – Revenue by vertical



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

0%


Top 10 clients



0


Tech Mahindra Business Overview (Cont'd)





Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 30: TECHM – Higher offshore mix aids margins



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

British Telecom deal overview

During the course of FY07 and FY08, TECHM entered into an agreement with British Telecom (BT), wherein TECHM paid a consideration of Rs. 9.65bn for two transactions, for guaranteed cumulative business of US\$ 2bn over the next five to seven years. The consideration paid was treated as one-off expense and taken to P&L statement.

In Mar-09 BT restructured its deal with TECHM, as BT was not able to uphold it. As a part of restructured contract BT agreed to pay TECHM a sum of Rs. 9.68 bn as a one-off restructuring cost and paid all of it. However, TECHM decided to amortize the inflow over a 16 quarter period and recognize it as a part of revenues. We do not concur with this accounting treatment and hence have restated the financials to remove the impact of this transaction and the same has been noted as adjusted financials. However, we note that for Income Tax purpose both the initial outflow and the inflow are amortized by the company.

Figure 31: TECHM has lagged peers in gog US\$ Revenues growth






Tech Mahindra

Continues to be leader in telecom vertical





Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

TECHM has maintained market-share

Figure 32 indicates revenues from telecom vertical amongst TCS, Infosys, Wipro, HCL and TECHM. Inspite of a lot of changes, we note that, TECHM's market share has not declined and continues to be around 28%. This is inspite of TECHM's top client (accounts for ~45% of revenues) reducing business by over 15% in a weak environment for telecom deals. TECHM continues to be one of the largest offshore vendors in the telecom vertical and would capitalise on any avenues for growth. Moreover as indicated by figure 33, deal closures in Telecom and Media verticals have been very week over the last couple of years.

Recent conversations with TECHM and other offshore vendors indicate minimal revival in spending by telecom company's in developed nations. A surge in IT spend by telecom companies would enable TECHM to grow its revenues at a much healthier rate than now.

Figure 33: Deal flow in Telecom and Media vertical has been weak

18
16
14
12
8
10
8
6
4
Dec-07
Dec-08
Dec-09
Dec-10

Source: TPI, Spark Capital Research



Tech Mahindra Growth strategies

CMP Rs. 700 Absolute Buy

Target Rs. 810 Relative Outperform

Emerging markets continues to be a focus area

Emerging markets account for 14% of TECHM overall revenues now vis a vis 7% three years ago. Strong growth has been possible as Tech M has one many end-to-end systems integration deal, wherein they have helped operators to launch telecom operations in a circle or country from scratch. TECHM is a strong contender and has won a number of deals in the merging markets including India on the back of its strong telecom expertise. According to press reports systems integration deals with Etisalat and STel are cases in point. With the roll out of 3G/LTE and many emerging markets still having low penetration of telecom services, Tech M is well positioned to capture growth in our opinion.

Non top client growth continues to be impressive

Revenues from British Telecom has been muted post the restructuring. Most of TECHM's revenue growth has been driven by other clients in the emerging and developed markets. TECHM has been able to leverage its deep domain expertise in the area of telecom to add new clients and also mine many of its existing clients to improve its market share. Over the next 12 – 18 month revenue growth of TECHM would be driven by its non-top clients.

Service Expansion - A key growth driver

TECHM has been expanding its service portfolio to include BPO and is also trying to leverage MS's expertise in the EAS domain. The recent deal win with Airtel, ie – to provide BPO services to a part of African business is a significant win for TECHM's BPO practise. We are positive on the deal, because with deal TECHM would enter the African market and also gain scale in its BPO business. Over the course and FY12, we expect the business to ramp up and result in ~35% revenue growth for the BPO business in FY12.

Figure 34: TECHM – Emerging markets have grown sharply



Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 35: TECHM – Robust growth in non top-client revenues





Tech Mahindra Muted growth across all fronts

СМР	Rs. 700	Absolute	Buy
Target	Rs. 810	Relative	Outperform

FY11-FY13 Revenue CAGR of 14%

We expect TECHM's revenue growth to be lower than industry owing to its Telecom focus. However initial discussions indicate a mild pickup in spend environment of Telecom verticals. We have not factored in material improvement in business momentum from its top client and expect the growth to be driven by its non-top client. However, any improvement in spend from its top-client would improve revenue growth trajectory substantially.

Minimal expansion to margins 3QFY11 base

TECHM's operating margins have declined by ~1000 bps from Mar-09 to Dec-10. Decline is margins can be predominantly attributed to depreciation of GBP by ~18% and pricing cuts from its top-client. In the near term, TECHM has few margin levers to manage and improve its margins namely – pricing, employee pyramid and utilisation.

TECHM's employee mix in the 0-3 years buckets is well below industry average and the company is targeting to improve it by hiring increased number of freshers and has made offers to 3,500 campus recruits for FY12.

EPS CAGR of 17% over FY11-13E

We forecast EPS CAGR of 17% over FY11-13E, driven by operating income and improved other income. We expect cash generation to improve as DSO would decline, as TECHM would receive substantial portions of payments pertaining to a large systems integration deal undertaken in 2QFY11.

We note that all our forecast are after adjusting for the amortisation resulting from the BT restructuring deal. However, the companies actual reporting would be higher than our forecast.





Figure 37: TECHM – Margins would continue to be subdued

30%
26%
22%
18%
14%
10%
Mar-09
Mar-10
Mar-11
Mar-12
Mar-13

Reported Operating margin





Tech Mahindra Valuation/Risk


СМР	Rs. 700	Absolute	Buy
Target	Rs. 810	Relative	Outperform


Prefer a proportionate stake in TECHM and MSAT – Initiate with a BUY

TECHM and MSAT are companies that are bound to merge and we believe a merger would be consummated in the next 12 to 18 months. We recommend investors invest in both companies in a manner that would result in same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach to hedge against the swap ratio that would be used for the merger.

We prefer to value both the companies together by attaching a P/E of 12x on the combined profit for 12 months ending Sep-12. Our target multiple of 12x is at a 20% discount to our target multiple for HCLT. We believe the combined entity would trade at a discount owing to slower revenue growth.

Combined entity is trading at P/E of 12.2x FY12E and 9.0x FY13E, attractive for an entity with revenues of US\$ 2.2bn. We initiate coverage with Buy with a price target of Rs. 810, indicating an upside of 16%. Our target price is arrived at by applying the potential upside from a merged entity scenario to CMP.





Risks

Key risks for TECHM outside the industry wide risks such as Wage Pressure, Foreign exchange fluctuation and Macroeconomic concerns are:

- British Telecom is TECHM's largest client contributing 44% of revenues and also holds ~29% stake in the company. With Mahindra & Mahindra waiving their first right of refusal, any stake sale by BT would be construed as precursor to decline in business. We believe TECHM is one of the largest and longstanding vendor for British Telecom and would not correlate stake sale to reduction in business. We note that Polaris, in which Citi (a investor and top client) has reduced its stake in the company from 40% to 20%. However Citi has not only continued its relationship, but in fact it is a growing account for Polaris.
- One of TECHM's India customers stands the risk of having its 2G licenses cancelled. TECHM has undertaken a large systems integration deal with this company and as a part of the deal, payment for TECHM services would be paid over next 12 quarters. Though there exists risk of bad debt, we note that TECHM has mitigated the risk by taking a bank guarantee from the client for the entire value of the contracts, which TECHM could invoke in the case of default
- MSAT accounts for ~42% of TECHM's market cap, and any material decline in MSAT's market cap value would impact TECHM's stock price. In page 29 we have discusses in detail risk's to MS
- MSAT's merger with Tech M is very likely in our view though the form, shape and timeline of merger is still uncertain. Integration of both the companies would be crucial for the fortunes of both companies. Moreover this would be the largest integration for both of companies respectfully. However, we derive some solace, from the fact that MSAT has been in the stewardship of TECHM and also the fact that members of the senior management of MSAT are from TECHM.



Tech Mahindra Financial Summary

CMP Rs. 700 Absolute Buy

Target Rs. 810 Relative Outperform

Profit & Loss Revenue from services 46,254 51,383 54,554 61,858 Adj Revenues 44,249 49,378 52,550 59,853 Cost of Services* 28,711 34,239 36,072 41,391 Gross Profit 17,543 17,144 18,483 20,467 Adj Gross Profit 15,538 15,139 16,478 18,462 SGA 6,218 7,060 7,542 8,165 Operating Profit 11,325 10,084 10,941 12,302 Adjusted Operating profit 9,320 8,080 8,936 10,297 Other Income 754 950 825 1,378 Interest Expense 2,184 1,038 1,008 1,008 Depreciation 1,339 1,399 1,414 1,408 Profit before Tax 6,551 6,593 7,339 9,260 Provision for taxes 1,440 1,334 1,394 1,852 Profit after tax before exceptional 7,117 5,259 <td< th=""></td<>
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PAT As per company reporting 9,009 7,417 7,950 9,413
EPS - Basic 56.0 43.3 47.5 59.2
EPS- Diluted 53.5 41.4 45.4 56.6
Balance sheet
Total Shareholders Equity 28,865 36,282 44,231 53,644
Long Term Debt 7,500 7,500 7,500 7,500
Unsecured Loan 6,172 6,172 6,172
Total - Sources of funds 50,353 55,760 61,705 69,113
Total Fixed Assets & Materials 11,312 12,312 13,312 14,312
Cash and Equivalents 2,187 7,076 13,545 20,911
Total - Application of funds 50,353 55,760 61,705 69,113

Key metrics				
	FY10	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E
Cashflow				
Net cash from operations	14,503	5,977	7,653	7,995
Net cash from investing	-29,925	-50	-175	378
Net cash from financing	12,216	-1,038	-1,008	-1,008
Free cash flow	10,395	4,977	6,653	6,995
Cash at year-end	2,213	7,076	13,545	20,911
Grow th				
Revenues	3.6%	11.1%	6.2%	13.4%
Adj Op profit	-27.3%	-13.3%	10.6%	15.2%
PAT	-31.0%	-22.7%	9.8%	24.6%
EPS	-32.1%	-22.7%	9.8%	24.6%
Margins				
Adj op margin	21.1%	16.4%	17.0%	17.2%
PAT	15.1%	10.5%	10.9%	12.0%
Return				
ROE	29.0%	16.6%	14.8%	15.1%
ROCE	26.7%	15.2%	15.2%	15.7%
Valuation				
Fully diluted shares (mn)	131	131	131	131
Market cap (Rs. mn)	91,345	91,345	91,345	91,345
EV (Rs.mn)	103,842	103,842	103,842	103,842
EV/Sales (x)	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.7
EV/Adj ΕΒΠ (x)	11.1	12.9	11.6	10.1
P/E (x)	13.0	16.9	15.4	12.3
EPS(E) / Current market price	7.7%	5.9%	6.5%	8.1%
Revenue per employee (000's)	1,534	1,461	1,380	1,381
Adj ⊞∏ per employee (000's)	309	230	226	230
PAT per employee (000's)	232	154	150	165



The other side of the same coin

CMP Rs. 67 Absolute Buy

Target Rs. 77 Relative Outperform

Institutions

Public

MSAT is staging a strong comeback on the strength of improved client addition, business flow and employee addition. 2 years after Tech Mahindra won the bid to become the majority shareholder in the fraud-hit Satyam, Mahindra Satyam has stemmed both revenue decline and client attrition. Today the management of MSAT is focused on adding new clients, improving employee retention and expanding margins. Management of Tech Mahindra has indicated that an eventual merger of both the entities would happen, though the form of timeline is still not known. The Merged entity would be the fifth largest IT services company in the listed space, with revenues of US\$ 2.5bn (FY12). We expect the merged entity to be a fairly diversified revenue base. Investors should buy into both MSAT and Tech M in a manner that would result in the same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach in order to hedge against the swap ratio that would be used for the merger. Initiate coverage with BUY/OPF and a price target of Rs. 77.

Growth is back: Following the fraud, MSAT lost more than half its clients and revenues. However over the last three quarters revenues have stabilised and in fact started to grow, as is evident from the 40+ client additions over the last 15 months and US\$ revenue growth of 4% posted in 3QFY11. MSAT along with its parent TECHM is focussed on driving growth by leveraging each others strength and by also being selective in the markets they would compete. The combined entity would focus on Manufacturing, Telecom, Enterprise Application services and vertical BPO. We are positive on this strategy, as competing on every vertical and horizontal would not be possible at this stage of the evolution.

FY11-13E EPS CAGR of 60%: Earnings growth would be driven by revenue growth of 16% and EBITDA Margin expansion of ~650bps. Our forecast for margin expansion would stem from volume growth, improved employee pyramid, pricing and operating leverage. Led by strong operating performance, we expect MSAT to post a EPS CAGR of 60% over FY11-13E.

Initiate with BUY/OPF

TECHM and MSAT are companies that are bound to merge and we believe a merger would be consummated in the next 12 to 18 months. We recommend investors invest in both companies in a manner that would result in the same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach to hedge against the swap ratio that would be used for the merger. We value the combined company on P/E of 12x at a 20% discount to our target multiple for HCLT. We forecast the combined entity to post an earnings of Rs. 12.7bn for 12 months ending Sep-12 resulting in an upside of 16%. Initiate coverage with a price target of Rs. 77.

Financia	Financial summary					
Year	Revenues (Rs. mn)	EBITDA (Rs. mn)	PAT (Rs. mn)	EPS (Rs.)	P/E(x)	EV/EBITDA(x)
FY10	54,810	5,556	2,923	2.5	27.2	10.5
FY11E	50,861	3,989	3,535	3.0	22.5	14.7
FY12E	58,437	6,454	4,947	4.2	16.1	9.1

Initiating Coverage				
Date Apr 05, 2011				
Market Data				
SENSEX	19686			
Nifty	5910			
Bloomberg	SCS IN			
Shares o/s	1,176 mn			
Market Cap	Rs 78bn			
52-wk High-Low	Rs 114-54			
3m Avg. Daily Vol	Rs. 545mn			
Index member	-			
Latest shareholding (%)				
Promoters	43			
3m Avg. Daily Vol Index member Latest shareholdin	Rs. 545mn - g (%)			

Stock performance				
	1m	3m	12m	
MSAT	4	(8)	(29)	
Nifty	5	(5)	10	
CNXIT	4	(5)	19	

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37

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Anand Bhaskaran <u>anand@sparkcapital.in</u> +91 44 4344 0040




Business Overview

CMP Rs. 67 Absolute Buy


Target Rs. 77 Relative Outperform






Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 40: MSAT – Revenue breakup by geography




Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 41: MSAT – Revenue and EBITDA Margins




Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 42: MSAT – Revenue breakup by horizontal






With revenues stabilising growth is back in agenda



Well laid out strategy to drive revenue growth

Revenue decline and client attrition were the key worries MSAT had to contend with, following the fraud by the erstwhile promoter. Number of active clients declined from ~500 in FY09 to 217 as of 3QFY11 However over the last three quarters, revenues have stabilised at with the last quarter even posting a sequential growth of 4%. Management highlighted growth is clearly the agenda and the following factors would drive revenue growth in our opinion.

- MSAT is approaching the customers, who had stopped working with MSAT post the fraud to get empanelled for new work. MSAT is experiencing initial success with some of the clients empanelling the company
- During the period of the fraud, MSAT financials were not known, thereby limiting its participation in many deals, especially deals over US\$ 50mn. With the financials being up-to-date now, MSAT is bidding for some of these deals and stands a better chance of winning some. We note that as in a survey conducted by a leading research house, financial stability was ranked No 2, parameter in deciding outsourcing partner
- In Nov'10, TECHM and MSAT held a joint industry analyst session to communicate its strengths, focus verticals and horizontals. The duo would focus on its existing strength in the verticals of Telecom and Manufacturing with BFSI and CPG being satellite verticals. In horizontals, Enterprise application services continues to be the thrust area. The duo decision to target a few verticals and pick their battle is a sensible decision, as, to compete head on across verticals without scale would be futile. The buoyant spend environment in the broad ERP market would dovetail with MS strength
- MSAT and TECHM are exploring cross selling of respective service offering to each other's clients. MS strength in ERP and BI would enable it to garner deals with TECHM's existing clientele. Similarly, MSAT is using TECHM's strength in areas of infrastructure management to offer it to its existing clients.




Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Key Contracts won by Mahindra Satyam over the recent past			
Jul-10	Selected as the key partner for UID project along with Morpho		
Oct-10	Signed deal with Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services		
Nov-10	Signed a SAP implementation contract with IRDA		
Jan-11	Chosen by a US logistics and tracking company to develop a comprehensive system to support its customers' operations		
Feb-11	Chosen by a top US based semiconductor manufacturers in the areas of SAP support, and Windows7 migration		
Mar-11	Won an end-to-end build and managed services engagement with Aspire Zone in Qatar		

Source: Company Data, Press Reports, Spark capital research



Mahindra Satyam Margins all set to expand








Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Bottomed out margins, to expand with revenue growth

MS's reported EBITDA margins of 6.4% in 3QFY11, well below peers. Though company aspires for industry level margins we believe it would not be a achievable target in the next 18 months. Key levers for margin improvement include:

- MS's employee pyramid is the inverse of industry and company is taking efforts to change by hiring more freshers. For FY12 company is hiring 3,500 campus hires
- MS had to give discounts during the troubled period to retain clients. With
 the spend environment improving, MS is trying to claw back atleast some
 part of these discounts. Moreover, company is seeing an uptick in pricing
 in new contracts and also in select pockets within existing customer
- Utilisation and Operating leverage are other levers MS has and we expect it to contribute ~300bps to margin expansion





Earnings to grow driven by margin expansion

СМР	Rs. 67	Absolute	Buy
Target	Rs. 77	Relative	Outperform

Revenue growth to be lower than industry

MSAT's revenue decline on a sequential basis has been arrested and we expect the recent growth momentum to continue. We forecast US\$ revenue CAGR of 16% over FY11-13E. Our confidence stems from client additions, MS's value proposition in the manufacturing and EAS segment and increased penetration in existing clients. We have also factored gradual pricing improvement over FY12 and FY13E.

Margin expansion would be steady and ongoing


Our thesis on margin expansion is hinged on MSAT delivering on volume growth assumptions and thereby using it to expand employee pyramid, improve pricing and drive operating efficiencies. We would be more focussed on year-on-year margin expansion than a sequential basis, as we believe there could exist aberration on a quarterly basis. Wage hikes would be the key headwind for margins. We have assumed industry levels salary hikes for MSAT too. In the event more than forecasted volume growth, margin expansion could surprise on the upside, as MSAT would be able to increase fresher mix and also drive operating efficiencies. Our EBITDA margin forecast of 13.4% for FY13E is ~150 bps below mid-cap IT companies under our coverage as we believe margin convergence would be a medium term target, than a short term.

FY11-13E EPS CAGR of 60%

Our EPS forecast is underpinned by EBIT CAGR of 80% over FY11-13E and effective tax rates of 24% and 22% for FY12E and FY13E. We have assumed cash out flow of US\$ 195 mn during 1QFY12, for the settlement of Upaid and Class Action suit litigation, hence as per our forecast other income would decline substantially from FY11E.


We note that MSAT has accumulated losses of ~Rs. 90bn and tax treatment for the same is not clear. In the event of Tax authorities allowing it as an allowable expense, we expect that losses to provide a tax shield of ~Rs. 20bn.





Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Figure 47: EPS set to record strong growth





Mahindra Satyam Valuation/Risk

СМР	Rs. 67	Absolute	Buy
Target	Rs. 77	Relative	Outperform

Risks from Litigation

MSAT faces a number of litigation, two of which have been settled. MSAT settled its case with Upaid for a sum of US\$ 70mn, however the cash is still reflected in the books of MSAT, because of a follow up litigation filed by Upaid regarding the tax liability on the settlement amount.

MS has entered into an agreement to settle the class action suit by paying a consideration of US\$ 125mn and also 25% of any net recovery MS may obtain in the future from PwC related entities. However, this settlement does not include the class action suit filed by Aberdeen along with its two trusts. Aberdeen has made a claim for US\$ 68mn. Also, the US SEC had served "Wells Notice" to MSAT, to initiate filing of fraud charges and to seek monetary relief in relation to the accounting prior to 2009 – this has now been settled for US\$ 10mn.

Income Tax department has made a claim for Rs. 6.16 bn for the company (under earlier management) having claimed Rs. 3.45bn of tax credit fraudulently. MS has taken the case with Andhra Pradesh high court. Though the correctness of these claims is unclear in our view, we note that settlement of these tax claims would be crucial to merger with TECHM.. Moreover the tax treatment of losses risen from the restatement of MS's financial is unclear. FY09 and FY10 losses amount to Rs. 90bn and in the event of Income Tax authorities allowing it as an allowable expense would result in a tax shield of at least Rs. 20bn in our view.

Entities relating to the former promoter has made a claim for Rs. 12.3bn, as these funds were lent to erstwhile Satyam Computers

Merger with TECHM


MSAT's merger with TECHM appears very likely in our view though the form, shape and timeline of merger is still uncertain. Integration of both the companies would be crucial for the fortunes of both companies. Moreover this would be the largest integration for both companiesy. However, we take solace from the fact that MSAT has been in the stewardship of TECHM and the senior management of MSAT are from TECHM.

Prefer a proportionate stake in Tech M and MS – Initiate with a BUY

TECHM and MSAT are companies that are bound to merge in our view and we believe this should be consummated in the next 12 to 18 months. We recommend investors invest in both companies in a manner that would result in same stake in both the companies. We prefer this approach to protect against the swap ratio that could be used for the merger.

We prefer to value both the companies together by attaching a P/E of 12x on the combined profit for 12 months ending Sep-12. Our target multiple of 12x is at a 20% discount to our target multiple for HCLT. We believe the combined entity would trade at a discount owing to slower revenue growth.

Combined entity is trading at P/E of 12x FY12E and 8.9x FY13E, attractive for an entity with revenues of US\$ 2.2bn. We initiate coverage with buy with a price target of Rs. 77. Our target price is arrived at by applying the potential upside from a merged entity scenario to CMP.



Source: Bloomberg, Spark Capital Research



Mahindra Satyam Financial Summary

CMP Rs. 67 Absolute Buy

Target Rs. 77 Relative Outperform

Abridged Financial Statements				
Rs. mn	FY10	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E
Revenues	54,810	50,861	58,437	68,305
Employee Cost	39,811	36,081	40,123	45,960
Operating and Administration Exper	9,443	10,792	11,861	13,138
EBITDA	5,556	3,989	6,454	9,208
Depreciation	2,144	1,804	1,920	2,089
EBIT	3,412	2,185	4,534	7,119
Other Income	69	2,468	1,976	2,238
Interest and Financing Charges	329	73	0	0
Exceptional Items	4,169	696	0	0
PBT	-1,017	3,884	6,509	9,356
Tax	222	1,022	1,562	2,058
PAT	-1,239	2,862	4,947	7,298
Minority Interest	7	23	0	0
PAT after Minorty and exceptio	2,923	3,535	4,947	7,298
EPS - Basic	2.5	3.0	4.2	6.2
EPS - Diluted	2.5	3.0	4.2	6.2
Balance sheet				
Cshare apital	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
Loan Funds	422	422	422	422
Deferred Tax Liability	39	39	39	39
Amounts Pending Investigation Sus	12,304	12,304	12,304	12,304
Total - Sources of funds	59,266	59,289	59,289	59,289
Fixed assets incl CWIP	9,865	10,561	11,441	11,752
Investments	6,268	6,268	6,268	6,268
Sundry Debtors	9,230	9,688	9,740	10,508
Cash and Bank Balances	21,768	22,655	28,845	37,895
Net current assets	15,577	17,743	21,810	28,796
Total - Application of funds	59,266	59,289	59,289	59,289

Key metrics				
	FY10	FY11E	FY12E	FY13E
Cashflow				
Net cash from operations	163	919	7,014	9,213
Net cash from investing	-22,204	-32	-824	-162
Net cash from financing	21,036	0	0	0
Free cash flow	-1,421	-1,581	4,214	6,813
Cash at year-end	3,378	22,655	28,845	37,895
Growth				
Revenues	-37.8%	-7.2%	14.9%	16.9%
EBITDA	84.2%	-28.2%	61.8%	42.7%
PAT	nm	nm	72.9%	47.5%
EPS	nm	nm	20.9%	40.0%
Margins				
EBITDA	3.4%	10.1%	7.8%	11.0%
PAT	nm	nm	5.6%	8.5%
Return				
ROE	nm	6.1%	10.7%	15.8%
ROCE	nm	4.7%	9.8%	15.4%
Valuation				
Fully diluted shares (mn)	1,178	1,178	1,178	1,178
Market cap (Rs. mn)	79,456	79,456	79,456	79,456
EV (Rs.mn)	58,614	58,614	58,614	58,614
EV/Sales (x)	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.9
EV/EBITDA (x)	10.5	14.7	9.1	6.4
P/E (x)	27.2	22.5	16.1	10.9
EPS(E) / Current market price	3.7%	4.4%	6.2%	9.2%
Revenue per employee (000's)		1,764	1,899	1,948
EBITDA per employee (000's)		138	210	263
PAT per employee (000's)		123	161	208



Absolute Rating Inte	Stock expected to provide positive returns of > 15% over a 1-year horizon Stock expected to provide positive returns of <=15% over a 1-year horizon		Recommendation I	
BUY	Stock expected to provide positive returns of > 15% over a 1-year horizon		Date	
ADD	Stock expected to provide positive returns of <=15% over a 1-year horizon			
REDUCE	Stock expected to fall <=15% over a 1-year horizon			
SELL	Stock expected to fall >15% over a 1-year horizon			
Relative Rating Inter	rpretation			
OUTPERFORM	Stock expected to outperform sector index /sector peers in our coverage			
UNDERPERFORM	Stock expected to underperform sector index/ sector peers in our coverage			

Recommendation History						
Date	СМР	Target price	Absolute Rating	Relative Rating		
Initiating Coverage						

Analyst Certification

The Research Analyst(s) who prepared the research report hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect the analyst(s) personal views about the subject companies and their securities. The Research Analyst(s) also certify that the Analyst(s) have not been, are not, and will not be receiving direct or indirect compensation for expressing the specific recommendation(s) or view(s) in this report.

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