## Sailing through the storm

## Earnings, POs cut sharply; Welspun cut to U/P; Buy BRFL

We cut operating earnings of our textile universe by avg. 15\% and EPS by avg. $49 \%$ for FY10E to reflect the economic downturn in key markets (US/EU). As a result of this and lower target multiples (to reflect moderated growth) our POs are down 40-70\%. We retain our Buy rating on Bombay Rayon (BRFL), seeing it as best positioned to weather the storm given its relatively de-risked biz model, on strong earnings growth outlook despite the cut and attractive valuations ( 5 x ' 10 E PE with $44 \%$ EPS CAGR and $22 \%$ RoE). Welspun, having highest exposure to US (>60\% of sales) in our universe, is cut to Underperform, on added concern on deteriorating balance sheet.

## Outlook deteriorates led by economic downturn...

The economic scenario has worsened sharply in the key markets of US and EU over last couple of months resulting in retailers beginning to cut their sales budgets. This puts at risk sales volume growth and realizations/margin assumptions for textile companies, in our view. However, large integrated players appear relatively better placed than smaller players, as buyers are forced to do cost cutting and undertake vendor consolidation.

## ...despite improving cost competitiveness

We see three key positives emerging for the sector -1) Sharp depreciation in Re, 2) Rise in Chinese costs (labor, power, currency, lower export subsidies) by nearly $20 \%$ yoy resulting in increasing competitiveness for India and 3 ) fall in input costs, especially cotton, which has come off its peak, but still remains significantly high on a yoy basis. We believe the companies might be forced to pass on these benefits to the buyers in a bid to keep their capacities running full.

## Earnings cut led by lower sales, higher funding costs

We have trimmed our sales forecast by 3-15\% for most companies over FY09-11. The companies should also get impacted by higher interest costs as debt levels go up (due to non-conversion of warrants). Balance sheet quality, too, is a cause of concern for us, particularly for Arvind and Welspun. Overall, we expect earnings to remain depressed for all companies in this space, with the exception of Bombay Rayon, where we still expect robust earnings growth of 44\%p.a., despite our estimates cut.

## What could turn the tide?

If the weakness in the Re sustains not only vs USD but also vs currencies of neighboring countries, it would improve India's competitiveness and lead to substantial flow of orders. Besides, there are certain non-fundamental company specific factors which could trigger a stock performance - any +ve newsflow on denim restructuring or Thane realty value unlocking in Raymond and potential reduction in liabilities on account of derivative exposure in Himatsingka.

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| Table 1: Ratings \& POs (Rs) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | New |  |  |  |  |
|  | Old | PO |  |  |  |
|  | Q-R-Q Price | PO | PO Change |  |  |
| Bombay Rayon | C-1-7 | 170 | 270 | 450 | $-40 \%$ |
| Raymond | C-3-7 | 81 | 75 | 200 | $-63 \%$ |
| Arvind | C-3-7 | 16 | 13 | 42 | $-69 \%$ |
| Gokaldas | C-3-7 | 107 | 116 | 200 | $-42 \%$ |
| Welspun India | C-3-9 | 21 | 21 | 71 | $-00 \%$ |
| Himatsingka | C-2-7 | 28 | 29 | 55 | $-47 \%$ |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 2: Estimates cut

| (FY10E) | Sales | EBIDTA | EPS |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Bombay Rayon | $-14 \%$ | $-13 \%$ | $-18 \%$ |
| Raymond | $-6 \%$ | $-6 \%$ | $-37 \%$ |
| Arvind | $-8 \%$ | $-2 \%$ | $-57 \%$ |
| Gokaldas | $-14 \%$ | $-20 \%$ | $-29 \%$ |
| Welspun India | $-7 \%$ | $-13 \%$ | $-92 \%$ |
| Himatsingka | $-28 \%$ | $-34 \%$ | $-61 \%$ |
| Source: Meriil Lynch |  |  |  |

Table 3: Valuation summary

CAGR
FY09E-

|  | $11 E$ | FY10E | FY10E | FY09E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Bombay Rayon | $44 \%$ | 5 | 6 | $22 \%$ |
| Raymond | $5 \%$ | 9 | 5 | $4 \%$ |
| Arvind | NM | 17 | 6 | $1 \%$ |
| Gokaldas | $-4 \%$ | 7 | 5 | $13 \%$ |
| Welspun India | $-10 \%$ | 23 | 7 | $2 \%$ |
| Himatsingka | $8 \%$ | 8 | 6 | $5 \%$ |
| Source: Meriil Lynch |  |  |  |  |

[^0]Refer to important disclosures on page 24 to 25. Analyst Certification on Page 22. Price Objective Basis/Risk on page 21.

Chart 1: Prop of export sales (mainly to US/EU)


Source: Meriill Lynch

Chart 2: Cotton* price trend


Source: MCX, Merrill Lynch *Medium staple

## Earnings, POs cut on worsening outlook

We are cutting operating earnings of our textile coverage universe by average $15 \%$ and EPS by average $49 \%$ for FY10E (see Table 2) to reflect the economic downturn in key markets (US/EU). As a result of this and lower target multiples (to reflect higher risk to growth) our POs are down 40-70\%. We maintain our Buy rating on Bombay Rayon (BRFL), which we see as best positioned to weather the storm, given its relatively de-risked business model, strong earnings growth outlook despite the earnings cut and attractive valuations (6x FY10E PE vs sector avg. at $12 x$ despite far stronger growth and higher RoE). Welspun, having highest exposure to US (>60\% of sales) in our universe, is cut to Underperform, on our added concern on deteriorating Balance sheet.

## Slowdown in key markets worsens sector outlook...

The economic scenario has worsened sharply in the key markets of US and EU over last couple of months resulting in retailers beginning to cut their sales budgets. This clearly puts at risk sales volume growth and realizations/ margin assumptions for textile companies, in our view. However, large integrated players should be relatively better placed than smaller players, as buyers would be forced to do cost cutting and undertake vendor consolidation.

## ...despite improving cost competitiveness

- Rise in Chinese costs (labor, power, currency, lower export subsidies) by nearly 20\% yoy resulting in increasing competitiveness for India
- Sharp depreciation in Re
- Fall in input costs, especially cotton, which has come off its peak, but still remains significantly high on a yoy basis.

We note that Arvind's earnings are most sensitive to changes in INR and cotton prices due to very high operating leverage. Earnings of Himatsingka, Gokaldas and Welspun (predominantly exporters) are also very sensitive to INR. Although Bombay Rayon's earnings are quite sensitive to INR we believe it is relatively insulated from cotton price fluctuation as it buys yarn, whose prices remain relatively more stable.

Table 4: Earnings sensitivity of a 1\% chg

|  | INR/US\$ | Cotton prices |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Bombay Rayon | $4 \%$ | NM |
| Raymond | $1 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| Arvind Mills | $8 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| Welspun India | $9 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| Himatsingka | $7 \%$ | NM |
| Gokaldas | $8 \%$ | NM |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |

We believe these companies might be forced to pass on these benefits to the buyers in a bid to keep their capacities running full.

## ...resulting in sharp earnings estimates cut

We have cut our earnings estimates sharply for most companies driven by lower sales forecast and higher estimates for funding costs.

Table 5: Snapshot of earnings cut

|  | Sales |  | EBIDTA |  | EPS |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | FY09E | FY10E | FY09E | FY10E | FY09E | FY10E |
| Bombay Rayon | -9\% | -14\% | -6\% | -13\% | -9\% | -18\% |
| Raymond | -2\% | -6\% | 7\% | -6\% | -6\% | -37\% |
| Arvind | -3\% | -8\% | -15\% | -2\% | NM | -57\% |
| Gokaldas | -5\% | -14\% | -8\% | -20\% | -11\% | -29\% |
| Welspun India | -5\% | -7\% | -21\% | -13\% | -88\% | -92\% |
| Himatsingka | -25\% | -28\% | -42\% | -34\% | -51\% | -61\% |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |  |  |  |  |

- We have trimmed our sales forecast by 3-15\% for most companies over FY09-11 to factor-in the impact of the downturn.
- We have assumed that the companies would pass on the benefits relating to lower costs and hence have not changed our margin assumptions significantly.
- The companies would also get impacted by higher interest costs as - 1) debt levels go up due to non-conversion of warrants, as in case of Raymond and Arvind and 2) overseas funding for working capital becomes scarce and gets converted to higher interest bearing Re loans, which probably might turn out to be cheaper vs foreign loan due to Re depreciation. But nonetheless the cost for working capital funding would go up.

Overall, we expect earnings to remain subdued for all companies in this space, with the exception of BRFL where we expect robust growth of 44\% CAGR over FY09-11.

## Valuations - BRFL most attractive in our view

Table 5 below shows the relative valuation of textile companies under our coverage. BRFL's valuations clearly look most attractive to us at $5 \times$ FY10E PE, lowest in the peer-group despite significantly higher RoE ( $22 \%$ for BRFL versus in single digit for most) and stronger earnings visibility (44\% EPS CAGR over FY09E-11E). On EV/E it is trading at 6.5x FY10E (with 43\% CAGR over FY0911E), which appears reasonable considering that full benefits of its new capacities should get reflected only in FY11, when its trading at only $5 x$. Most other companies look expensive considering the growth outlook and RoE.

Table 6: Relative valuation for India textile universe (Rs)

| Yr endin March | Rating | Stock price | PO | Upside I (downside) | EPS |  | $\frac{\text { EPS CAGR }}{\text { FY09-11E }}$ | PER ( x ) |  | EVIE (x) |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RoE } \\ & \text { FY09E } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { P/BV } \\ \text { FY09E } \end{array}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | FY09E | FY10E |  | FY09E | FY10E | FY09E | FY10E |  |  |
| Bombay Rayon | Buy | 170 | 270 | 59\% | 23.6 | 33.0 | 44\% | 7.2 | 5.2 | 9.8 | 6.5 | 22\% | 1.4 |
| Raymond | Underperform | 81 | 75 | -7\% | 8.9 | 9.3 | 5\% | 9.1 | 8.7 | 5.8 | 4.9 | 4\% | 0.4 |
| Arvind | Underperform | 16 | 13 | -19\% | (1.6) | 0.9 | NM | NM | 17.4 | 8.1 | 6.4 | 1\% | 0.3 |
| Gokaldas | Underperform | 107 | 116 | 8\% | 17.6 | 15.6 | -4\% | 6.1 | 6.9 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 13\% | 0.8 |
| Welspun India | Underperform | 21 | 21 | 0\% | 1.2 | 0.9 | -10\% | 17.9 | 22.6 | 9.2 | 6.7 | 2\% | 0.3 |
| Himatsingka | Neutral | 28 | 29 | 4\% | 3.1 | 3.4 | 8\% | 9.0 | 8.3 | 9.5 | 6.5 | 5\% | 0.4 |

Source: Merrill Lynch

Relative to trading history (unfortunately not very long as the company got listed in 2005 only), BRFL, not surprisingly, is trading at by far the lowest end of its 1-yr fwd rolling PE band. With a $45 \%$ stock price correction in the last 3 month (among the steepest across the textile universe) we believe the risks are more than captured in the price.

Chart 3: BRFL - 1-yr fwd rolling PE band


Source: Bloomberg, Meriill Lynch

## POs cut 40-70\%

The PO cut has been largely driven by the earnings cut. We have also lowered the target multiple in most cases (as tabulated below) to reflect the weaker growth outlook and higher risks. We continue to prefer valuing the textile business on EV/EBIDTA multiple as we believe this appropriately captures the true business valuation and not the PE which gets distorted by fluctuating other income.

- We have assigned a higher target EV/E for FY10 to BRFL due to 43\% CAGR in EBIDTA over FY09E-11E. At our PO, BRFL would trade at only $5.7 \times \mathrm{EV} / \mathrm{E}$ in FY11E, when full benefits of the new capacities should start to flow in.
- We have valued Raymond's textile business at a premium to others due to its strong domestic brand franchise.
- Rest all have been valued at $5.5 x$ EV/E (with the exception of Arvind whose denim business is in a structural downturn and hence should see a decline)
- Retail businesses have been valued on EV/sales at par with other retailers Himatsingka's retail business has been given a premium due to its higher profitability.

Table 7: Snapshot of PO cut (Rs)

|  | Old PO | Basis | New PO | Basis |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bombay Rayon | 450 | 8.5x FY10E EV/E | 270 | 7.5x FY10E EV/E |
| Raymond | 200 | SoTP - $7.5 \times$ EV/E for textiles, $1 \times \mathrm{EV} / \mathrm{sales}$ for retail | 75 | SoTP - 6 x EV/E for textiles, 0.8 x EV/sales for retail |
| Arvind | 42 | SoTP - $5.5 \times \mathrm{EV} / \mathrm{E}$ for textiles, $0.7 \times \mathrm{EV} /$ sales for retail | 13 | SoTP - $5 x$ EV/E for textiles, $0.7 x$ EV/sales for retail |
| Gokaldas | 200 | 6.5x FY10E EV/E | 116 | 5.5x FY10E EV/E |
| Welspun India | 71 | $5 \times \mathrm{FY} 10 \mathrm{E}$ EV/E | 21 | 5.5x FY10E EV/E |
| Himatsingka | 55 | $5.5 \times \mathrm{EV} / \mathrm{E}$ for textiles, 1.1x EV/sales for retail | 29 | 5.5x EV/E for textiles, 1.1x EV/sales for retail |

Chart 4: Capacity ramp-up in BRFL


Source: Merrill Lynch


Source: Merrill Lynch *FY09E

## BRFL stands out, top Buy

We have a Buy on Bombay Rayon as we believe it clearly stands out in terms of its performance so far as well as its ability to weather the storm due to the following: -

- Relatively de-risked business model with focus on both domestic and exports opportunities. Domestic fabric sales accounting for about $40 \%$ of sales currently. In exports, the company focuses on apparel (shirts) exports, where India has limited capacities.
- Cost competitiveness helped by loads of fiscal benefits for its new manufacturing facilities coming up in Maharashtra. This should help the company gain market share.
- Despite the earnings estimates being cut by 9-18\% to reflect the higher risk poised by the current environment, we still expect the company to deliver strong earnings growth of 44\% CAGR over FY09E-11E helped by new capacities coming on stream.
- Valuations appear to be attractive at $6 \times$ FY10E PER with $44 \%$ CAGR earnings growth and RoE of $22 \%$.


## Downgrade Welspun to Underperform

We downgrade Welspun to Underperform led by:

- Concerns on its high US exposure (>60\% of sales) and performance of its EU based brands \& distribution companies - Christy and Sorema. Welspun accounts for roughly $10 \%$ of total US import of towels and a slowdown there should impact Welspun negatively.
- Concerns about its deteriorating consolidated balance sheet with debt-equity at $>3 x$ currently versus $2.4 x$ earlier. In the current environment, refinancing could become an issue, given the very high leverage.
- Earnings estimates cut sharply - EBIDTA cut by 13-21\% led by lower sales and margin assumptions.

We have cut its PO to Rs21 from Rs71 to reflect lower earnings and worse than expected Balance Sheet. We believe there is a downside risk to our earnings given the deteriorating economic outlook in its key markets - US and EU.

We continue to maintain Underperform rating on Raymond, Arvind and Gokaldas led by subdued earnings outlook and rich valuations.


Source: Merrill Lynch

Chart 7: Bombay Rayon - sales growth trend


Fabric $\square$ Garment ex ports $\square$ Guru brand

Source: Merrill Lynch

## Bombay Rayon (Buy)

## PO cut to Rs270

We have cut BRFL's earnings by $9-18 \%$ over FY09E-11E to factor-in lower sales growth due slowdown in US / EU which account for more than $60 \%$ of its total business. We have reduced PO to Rs270 (from Rs450 earlier) to factor in market de-rating and lower earnings.

## $2 Q$ results in-line

BRFL reported 2Q PAT at Rs367mn, a growth of 20\% yoy, which was exactly in line with our estimates. Margins expanded 200bp which was a surprise to us. This was led by margin expansion on the back of increasing share of higher margin garments. However, interest cost was up $62 \%$ yoy. This was due to conversion of some of the foreign working capital loan into Re loan (higher interest cost), due to the non-availability of foreign loan. BRFL completed the acquisition of Guru (UK apparel brand \& retailer) during the quarter.

## Cut our sales forecast despite mgmt confidence

We have cut sales forecast by 9-14\% for FY09-11 to build in a more severe downturn than expected earlier. Particularly, we have trimmed our sales forecast for Guru. We note that our estimates are significantly below management guidance. As per the management, order book is full till March'09 and the flow of orders remains as strong as ever helped by rising Chinese costs and lack of garment capacities in India.

Table 8: What has changed?

|  | FY09E | FY10E | FY11E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | $-9 \%$ | $-14 \%$ | $-9 \%$ |
| EBIDTA | $-6 \%$ | $-13 \%$ | $-8 \%$ |
| PAT | $-9 \%$ | $-18 \%$ | $-11 \%$ |

Source: Merrill Lynch

## Conservative margin forecasts

We have build in margin dilution of 70bp each in FY10E and FY11E to factor-in potential pressures from overseas buyers. This is despite a weaker Re and fall in input costs. Further, the new Maharashtra facility has a lower cost structure given the fiscal incentives given by the State Govt like reimbursement of employers contribution to provident fund, exemption from various duties and interest subsidy of $4 \%$ over and above the $5 \%$ from Central Govt.

Table 9: Key assumptions

|  | FY07 | FY08 | FY09E | FY10E | FY11E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Fabrics |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volume Sold (mn meters) | 27 | 49 | 52 | 94 | 142 |
| Chg | $41 \%$ | $84 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $80 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| Sales value (Rsmn) | 2,942 | 5,320 | 5,719 | 10,294 | 15,441 |
| Chg | $91 \%$ | $81 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $80 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| Realization (Rs/mtr) | 111 | 109 | 109 | 109 | 109 |
| Chg |  | $-2 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Garments |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volume Sold (mn pieces) | 7.0 | 20.8 | 31.5 | 49.0 | 63.0 |
| Chg | $293 \%$ | $195 \%$ | $52 \%$ | $56 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| Sales value (Rsmn) | 1,954 | 5,648 | 8,940 | 13,274 | 17,202 |
| Chg | $307 \%$ | $189 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $30 \%$ |
| Realization (Rs/piece) | 278 | 272 | 284 | 271 | 273 |
| Chg |  | $-2 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $-5 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |  |  |  |

## iQprofile ${ }^{\text {su }}$ Bombay Rayon Fashions Ltd

| Key Income Statement Data (Mar) | 2007A | 2008A | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Rs Millions) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 4,894 | 10,891 | 17,092 | 26,784 | 36,020 |
| Gross Profit | 1,885 | 4,838 | 8,883 | 13,586 | 17,740 |
| Sell General \& Admin Expense | (965) | $(2,521)$ | $(5,350)$ | $(8,105)$ | $(10,472)$ |
| Operating Profit | 815 | 1,964 | 3,050 | 4,408 | 6,122 |
| Net Interest \& Other Income | (59) | (177) | (617) | $(1,007)$ | $(1,047)$ |
| Associates | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Pretax Income | 756 | 1,787 | 2,433 | 3,401 | 5,075 |
| Tax (expense) / Benefit | (212) | (551) | (803) | $(1,122)$ | $(1,675)$ |
| Net Income (Adjusted) | 544 | 1,227 | 1,630 | 2,279 | 3,400 |
| Average Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding | 63 | 63 | 69 | 69 | 69 |
| Key Cash Flow Statement Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Income (Reported) | 544 | 1,227 | 1,630 | 2,279 | 3,400 |
| Depreciation \& Amortization | 104 | 352 | 483 | 1,073 | 1,146 |
| Change in Working Capital | $(1,676)$ | $(3,696)$ | $(3,611)$ | $(4,089)$ | $(4,181)$ |
| Deferred Taxation Charge | 124 | 112 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Adjustments, Net | (124) | (112) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cash Flow from Operations | $(1,028)$ | $(2,118)$ | $(1,498)$ | (737) | 366 |
| Capital Expenditure | $(2,438)$ | $(5,136)$ | $(13,878)$ | (100) | (150) |
| (Acquisition) / Disposal of Investments | $(1,258)$ | 1,177 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Cash Inflow / (Outflow) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Cash Flow from Investing | $(3,695)$ | $(3,959)$ | $(13,878)$ | (100) | (150) |
| Shares Issue / (Repurchase) | 2,844 | 126 | 1,136 | 0 | 0 |
| Cost of Dividends Paid | (92) | (109) | (159) | (179) | (199) |
| Cash Flow from Financing | 5,137 | 5,882 | 15,378 | 836 | (214) |
| Free Cash Flow | $(3,466)$ | $(7,254)$ | $(15,376)$ | (837) | 216 |
| Net Debt | 2,562 | 8,606 | 23,007 | 24,022 | 24,007 |
| Change in Net Debt | 1,971 | 6,059 | 14,399 | 1,016 | (17) |
| Key Balance Sheet Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property, Plant \& Equipment | 3,540 | 8,327 | 21,722 | 20,749 | 19,752 |
| Other Non-Current Assets | 1,358 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 |
| Trade Receivables | 1,020 | 2,342 | 3,994 | 5,734 | 8,360 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 773 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| Other Current Assets | 2,486 | 5,324 | 7,698 | 11,063 | 13,669 |
| Total Assets | 9,176 | 16,767 | 34,188 | 38,319 | 42,555 |
| Long-Term Debt | 3,335 | 9,199 | 23,600 | 24,615 | 24,600 |
| Other Non-Current Liabilities | 134 | 246 | 246 | 246 | 246 |
| Short-Term Debt | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Other Current Liabilities | 751 | 1,216 | 1,630 | 2,646 | 3,697 |
| Total Liabilities | 4,220 | 10,661 | 25,476 | 27,506 | 28,543 |
| Total Equity | 4,956 | 6,106 | 8,714 | 10,814 | 14,016 |
| Total Equity \& Liabilities | 9,176 | 16,767 | 34,190 | 38,320 | 42,558 |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Bus Performance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return On Capital Employed | 10.7\% | 11.3\% | 8.5\% | 8.7\% | 11.0\% |
| Return On Equity | 16.8\% | 22.2\% | 22.0\% | 23.3\% | 27.4\% |
| Operating Margin | 16.7\% | 18.0\% | 17.8\% | 16.5\% | 17.0\% |
| EBITDA Margin | 18.8\% | 21.3\% | 20.7\% | 20.5\% | 20.2\% |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Quality of Earnings* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash Realization Ratio | -1.9x | -1.7x | -0.9x | -0.3x | 0.1 x |
| Asset Replacement Ratio | 23.3x | 14.6x | 28.7x | 0.1x | 0.1x |
| Tax Rate (Reported) | 28.0\% | 30.8\% | 33.0\% | 33.0\% | 33.0\% |
| Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 51.7\% | 140.9\% | 264.0\% | 222.1\% | 171.3\% |
| Interest Cover | 6.3 x | 5.2 x | $3.7 x$ | 3.7x | 4.9x |
| Key Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |

* For full definitions of iQmethod ${ }^{S M}$ measures, see page X .


## Company Description

After a modest beginning as a small fabric supplier, Bombay Rayon has grown multi-folds to emerge as India's leading integrated textiles company in a very short span of time. The recent acquisition of Guru, marks its foray into international branding and retailing. In FY08, garments contributed about half of sales - all exports, the rest being accounted for by fabric, sold mainly in the domestic market.

## Investment Thesis

Our Buy rating on Bombay Rayon is premised on strong earnings growth of 44\% pa over FY09-11E and inexpensive valuations. We expect strong volume growth in both fabric and garments driven by new capacities coming on stream. Global economic downturn is a concern but is priced in, in our view. Management has ambitious plans for Guru rollout across the globe, which should be an additional growth driver.

Stock Data
Price to Book Value

Chart 8: Raymond - sales mix


Source: Merrill Lynch

Table 10: What has changed?

|  | FY09E | FY10E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Net sales | $-2 \%$ | $-6 \%$ |
| EBIDTA | $7 \%$ | $-6 \%$ |
| EPS | $-6 \%$ | $-37 \%$ |

Source: Merrill Lynch

Table 12: SoTP valuation (Rs mn)

|  | Basis | Target (x) | EV |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Textiles | EV/E | 6.0 | 11,540 |
| Engineering | EV/E | 4.0 | 1,483 |
| Retail | EV/sales | 0.8 | 5,848 |
| Total EV |  |  | 18,870 |
| less: net debt |  |  | 14,253 |
| Equity value |  |  | 4,618 |
| \# of shares |  |  | 61 |
| Fair value per |  |  |  |
| share |  |  |  |
| Source: Merrill Lynch |  |  |  |

## Raymond (Underperform)

## Core worsted fabric performance revives...

Worsted fabric performance was back on track in 2 Q with sales growth of $22 \%$ yoy on a low base (ERP implementation problems last yr). This was led by 8\% realization growth on better mix and 13\% volume growth. EBIT margins expanded to $22 \%$ from $18 \%$ last yr led by higher realizations and lower input costs. We expect the performance of this business to remain strong over the next few quarters helped by softer wool prices and an elongated marriage season.

## ...but denim continues to be a drag

Denim JV reported loss of Rs400mn at PBT level for 2Q (Raymond's share is $50 \%)$. Management, in the earnings conference call, has indicated that they plan to close down the US and the Belgium operations by January'09. This should bring down the losses incurred by the JV and will be a positive, when it happens.

## EPS est. lowered on lower sales, higher interest; PO cut

 We have cut EPS 6-37\% over FY09-10E mainly due to higher interest costs - we have assumed higher debt due to non-conversion of promoter warrants at Rs340/share (given current stock price is significantly lower). Further, we have also assumed slower sales growth given economic downturn. We have cut our SoTP based PO to Rs75 to factor-in lower earnings and market de-rating. This does not include the potential value unlocking from Thane real estate from where they currently operate part of their worsted facility.Table 11: Key assumptions

| (Rs mn) | FY07 | FY08 | FY09E | FY10E | FY11E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Worsted Fabric |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volumes (mn meters) | 29.5 | 32.8 | 37.2 | 40.9 | 44.5 |
| change | 12\% | 11\% | 14\% | 10\% | 9\% |
| Realisations (Rs/meter) | 326 | 325 | 338 | 338 | 338 |
| change | 5\% | 0\% | 4\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Sales value | 9,627 | 10,644 | 12,580 | 13,810 | 15,028 |
| change | 17\% | 11\% | 18\% | 10\% | 9\% |
| Denim |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales value | 3,670 | 3,871 | 3,703 | 3,418 | 3,304 |
| change |  | 5\% | -4\% | -8\% | -3\% |
| Garment exports |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales value | 779 | 971 | 1,214 | 1,335 | 1,469 |
| change |  | 25\% | 25\% | 10\% | 10\% |
| Retailing |  |  |  |  |  |
| Raymond Apparel | 2,376 | 3,507 | 4,454 | 5,344 | 5,879 |
| ColorPlus | 1,231 | 1,489 | 1,787 | 1,965 | 2,113 |
| Total | 3,607 | 4,996 | 6,240 | 7,310 | 7,991 |
| change | 24\% | 39\% | 25\% | 17\% | 9\% |
| Light Engineering |  |  |  |  |  |
| Files \& tools | 1,606 | 1,622 | 1,714 | 1,756 | 1,786 |
| Ring Plus Acqua | 721 | 781 | 967 | 996 | 1,016 |
| Total | 2,327 | 2,403 | 2,680 | 2,752 | 2,802 |
| change | 1\% | 3\% | 12\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| JVs (Zambaiti \& Fedora) | 273 | 680 | 834 | 964 | 1,050 |
| change | 345\% | 149\% | 23\% | 16\% | 9\% |
| Consolidated Sales | 20,407 | 23,962 | 26,751 | 28,724 | 30,518 |
| change | 19\% | 17\% | 12\% | 7\% | 6\% |

Source: Merrill Lynch

## iQprofile ${ }^{s u}$ Raymond Ltd.

| Key Income Statement Data (Mar) | 2007A | 2008A | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Rs Millions) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 20,407 | 23,962 | 26,751 | 28,724 | 30,518 |
| Gross Profit | 6,578 | 7,039 | 8,557 | 9,417 | 10,033 |
| Sell General \& Admin Expense | $(4,114)$ | $(5,511)$ | $(6,153)$ | $(6,607)$ | $(7,019)$ |
| Operating Profit | 1,207 | (161) | 662 | 929 | 1,007 |
| Net Interest \& Other Income | 343 | 480 | 100 | (133) | (133) |
| Associates | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Pretax Income | 1,549 | 318 | 762 | 796 | 874 |
| Tax (expense) / Benefit | (421) | (287) | (229) | (239) | (288) |
| Net Income (Adjusted) | 1,130 | 64 | 545 | 569 | 597 |
| Average Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| Key Cash Flow Statement Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Income (Reported) | 1,130 | 64 | 545 | 569 | 597 |
| Depreciation \& Amortization | 1,257 | 1,689 | 1,743 | 1,882 | 2,007 |
| Change in Working Capital | $(2,026)$ | $(2,149)$ | (938) | (500) | (321) |
| Deferred Taxation Charge | (96) | (65) | (52) | (54) | (66) |
| Other Adjustments, Net | (113) | 16 | (12) | (12) | (11) |
| Cash Flow from Operations | 153 | (446) | 1,286 | 1,884 | 2,205 |
| Capital Expenditure | $(4,777)$ | $(1,250)$ | $(2,750)$ | $(1,200)$ | $(1,200)$ |
| (Acquisition) / Disposal of Investments | 445 | (562) | 757 | 83 | 66 |
| Other Cash Inflow / (Outflow) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Cash Flow from Investing | $(4,332)$ | $(1,812)$ | $(1,993)$ | $(1,117)$ | $(1,134)$ |
| Shares Issue / (Repurchase) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cost of Dividends Paid | (359) | (359) | (431) | (503) | (503) |
| Cash Flow from Financing | 3,431 | 1,788 | 1,569 | (503) | (503) |
| Free Cash Flow | $(4,624)$ | $(1,696)$ | $(1,464)$ | 684 | 1,005 |
| Net Debt | 12,634 | 14,770 | 16,116 | 15,852 | 15,283 |
| Change in Net Debt | 4,538 | 2,617 | 1,138 | (264) | (569) |
| Key Balance Sheet Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property, Plant \& Equipment | 14,173 | 13,988 | 15,163 | 14,480 | 13,674 |
| Other Non-Current Assets | 4,047 | 3,434 | 3,594 | 3,594 | 3,594 |
| Trade Receivables | 4,125 | 4,641 | 5,130 | 5,509 | 5,853 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 568 | 579 | 1,233 | 1,497 | 2,066 |
| Other Current Assets | 10,910 | 13,652 | 13,342 | 13,808 | 14,241 |
| Total Assets | 33,822 | 36,294 | 38,462 | 38,889 | 39,427 |
| Long-Term Debt | 7,992 | 10,770 | 11,270 | 11,270 | 11,270 |
| Other Non-Current Liabilities | 667 | 644 | 592 | 537 | 472 |
| Short-Term Debt | 5,210 | 4,579 | 6,079 | 6,079 | 6,079 |
| Other Current Liabilities | 5,543 | 5,762 | 6,088 | 6,515 | 7,037 |
| Total Liabilities | 19,412 | 21,754 | 24,029 | 24,401 | 24,857 |
| Total Equity | 14,411 | 14,331 | 14,433 | 14,488 | 14,570 |
| Total Equity \& Liabilities | 33,822 | 36,085 | 38,462 | 38,889 | 39,428 |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Bus Performance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return On Capital Employed | 5.3\% | 0.9\% | 3.0\% | 3.3\% | 3.3\% |
| Return On Equity | 8.3\% | 0.4\% | 3.8\% | 3.9\% | 4.1\% |
| Operating Margin | 5.9\% | -0.7\% | 2.5\% | 3.2\% | 3.3\% |
| EBITDA Margin | 12.1\% | 6.4\% | 9.0\% | 9.8\% | 9.9\% |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Quality of Earnings* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash Realization Ratio | 0.1x | -7.0x | 2.4 x | 3.3 x | 3.7 x |
| Asset Replacement Ratio | 3.8x | 0.7x | 1.6x | 0.6x | 0.6x |
| Tax Rate (Reported) | 27.2\% | 90.3\% | 30.0\% | 30.0\% | 33.0\% |
| Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 87.7\% | 103.1\% | 111.7\% | 109.4\% | 104.9\% |
| Interest Cover | 1.7 x | -0.3x | 0.7x | 0.8x | 0.8x |
| Key Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |

* For full definitions of $\mathbf{i Q m e t h o d}{ }^{S M}$ measures, see page $X$.

Chart 9: Arvind - sales mix


Source: Meriill Lynch

Table 13: What has changed?

|  | FY09E | FY10E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | $-3 \%$ | $-8 \%$ |
| EBIDTA | $-15 \%$ | $-2 \%$ |
| EPS | From +Rs1.3 to |  |
|  | loss of Rs1.6 | $-57 \%$ |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |

Table 15: SoTP valuation (Rs mn)

|  | Basis | FY10E <br> target | Implied |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Textiles | EV/E | 5.0 | 16,346 |
| Retail | EV/Sal |  |  |
|  | es | 0.7 | 6,158 |
| Total EV |  |  | 22,504 |
| Less: Debt |  |  | 21,813 |
| Add: Realty value |  |  |  |
| unlocking |  | 2,744 |  |
| Equity value |  | 3,435 |  |
| \# of shares (mn) |  |  | 260 |
| Fair value per share |  |  | 13 |

## Arvind (Underperform)

## Earnings estimates, PO cut sharply

We have cut FY09E EPS from Rs1.3 to a loss of Rs1.6 to factor-in weaker than expected 2 Q results and high interest costs. We have also cut our export sales forecasts given the global slowdown. However, benefits of a likely lower cotton prices and a weaker Re should start flowing in from FY10 which should partially off set lower sales forecast. We have cut our SoTP based PO from Rs42 to Rs13 to build in market de-rating and significantly lower value for realty assets.

## 2QFY09: Margin pressure continues on high input costs

 Arvind reported a loss of Rs293mn for 2Q excluding the one-time profit on sale of fixed asset and investments. This was driven by muted sales growth of $6 \%$ yoy and a dip in EBIDTA margin by over 300bp yoy on a low base. Cotton cost for the company was higher by $35-40 \%$ yoy and power cost was up $57 \%$ yoy (due to non-availability of gas for captive power). Also, the company has hedged its dollar revenues at Rs40/\$ for the whole year and hence is unable to benefit from the Re depreciation.
## Sales slowdown; margin upside from cotton, Re

We expect sales growth to slowdown both for its domestic retailing and its export business. However, this is likely to be offset partially by benefits of lower cotton prices and weaker Re in FY10E. We continue to maintain Underperform rating on the stock given the continued weak outlook for core denim business.

Table 14: Key assumptions

|  | FY07 | FY08 | FY09E | FY10E | FY11E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Denim |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volumes (mn mtr) | 84 | 76 | 68 | 64 | 64 |
| Change | $-13 \%$ | $-10 \%$ | $-11 \%$ | $-6 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Realisations (Rs/mtr) | 94 | 102 | 102 | 101 | 101 |
| Change | $-5 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Sales value (Rs mn) | 7,829 | 7,670 | 6,853 | 6,467 | 6,467 |
| Change | $-18 \%$ | $-2 \%$ | $-11 \%$ | $-6 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Shirting |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volumes (mn mtr) | 22 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Change | $-7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Realisations (Rs/mtr) | 121 | 127 | 127 | 130 | 130 |
| Change | $-3 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Sales value (Rs mn) | 2,678 | 2,978 | 2,986 | 3,051 | 3,051 |
| Change | $-11 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Garments |  |  |  |  |  |
| Volumes (mn pcs) | 8.7 | 12.9 | 16.0 | 17.5 | 19.1 |
| Change | $26 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Realisations (Rs/pcs) | 290 | 280 | 282 | 295 | 278 |
| Change | $9 \%$ | $-3 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $-6 \%$ |
| Sales value (Rs mn) | 2,528 | 3,608 | 4,518 | 5,164 | 5,312 |
| Change | $37 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| Brands |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales value (Rs mn) | 3,471 | 4,834 | 6,767 | 8,798 | 10,997 |
| Change | $3 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $25 \%$ |
| Others | 5,316 | 7,460 | 7,848 | 7,787 | 6,500 |
| Total sales (Rs mn) | 21,822 | 26,550 | 28,972 | 31,267 | 32,328 |
| Chg | $2 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

[^1]
## iQprofile ${ }^{s i n}$ Arvind Ltd.

| Key Income Statement Data (Mar) | 2007A | 2008A | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Rs Millions) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 21,822 | 26,550 | 28,972 | 31,267 | 32,328 |
| Gross Profit | 10,239 | 11,106 | 11,709 | 13,076 | 14,165 |
| Sell General \& Admin Expense | $(6,584)$ | $(7,667)$ | $(8,675)$ | $(9,413)$ | $(10,483)$ |
| Operating Profit | 1,863 | 1,620 | 1,181 | 1,740 | 1,672 |
| Net Interest \& Other Income | $(1,526)$ | $(1,359)$ | $(1,596)$ | $(1,460)$ | $(1,398)$ |
| Associates | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Pretax Income | 337 | 261 | (416) | 280 | 274 |
| Tax (expense) / Benefit | (33) | (74) | 50 | (34) | (33) |
| Net Income (Adjusted) | 205 | 126 | (383) | 238 | 233 |
| Average Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding | 209 | 219 | 238 | 260 | 260 |
| Key Cash Flow Statement Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Income (Reported) | 270 | 155 | (374) | 238 | 233 |
| Depreciation \& Amortization | 1,791 | 1,819 | 1,853 | 1,924 | 2,009 |
| Change in Working Capital | 585 | (725) | (393) | (291) | 410 |
| Deferred Taxation Charge | (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Adjustments, Net | 33 | 31 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| Cash Flow from Operations | 2,680 | 1,281 | 1,094 | 1,879 | 2,661 |
| Capital Expenditure | $(1,950)$ | $(2,086)$ | (750) | (750) | $(1,000)$ |
| (Acquisition) / Disposal of Investments | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Other Cash Inflow / (Outflow) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cash Flow from Investing | $(1,950)$ | $(2,086)$ | (750) | (750) | $(1,000)$ |
| Shares Issue / (Repurchase) | 0 | 1,079 | 1,253 | 220 | 0 |
| Cost of Dividends Paid | (66) | (29) | (10) | 0 | 0 |
| Cash Flow from Financing | (804) | 1,865 | 43 | (780) | $(1,800)$ |
| Free Cash Flow | 730 | (805) | 344 | 1,129 | 1,661 |
| Net Debt | 20,716 | 21,579 | 20,259 | 19,091 | 17,429 |
| Change in Net Debt | (665) | (245) | $(1,587)$ | $(1,349)$ | $(1,661)$ |
| Key Balance Sheet Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property, Plant \& Equipment | 24,746 | 25,057 | 23,954 | 22,780 | 21,771 |
| Other Non-Current Assets | 184 | 169 | 169 | 169 | 169 |
| Trade Receivables | 2,065 | 2,839 | 2,381 | 2,570 | 2,657 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 282 | 234 | 354 | 522 | 384 |
| Other Current Assets | 12,212 | 12,314 | 13,669 | 14,100 | 13,747 |
| Total Assets | 39,489 | 40,613 | 40,527 | 40,141 | 38,727 |
| Long-Term Debt | 20,998 | 21,813 | 20,613 | 19,613 | 17,813 |
| Other Non-Current Liabilities | 253 | 255 | 255 | 255 | 255 |
| Short-Term Debt | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Other Current Liabilities | 4,405 | 4,557 | 5,061 | 5,389 | 5,533 |
| Total Liabilities | 25,656 | 26,625 | 25,929 | 25,257 | 23,601 |
| Total Equity | 13,833 | 13,988 | 14,598 | 14,884 | 15,126 |
| Total Equity \& Liabilities | 39,489 | 40,613 | 40,527 | 40,141 | 38,727 |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Bus Performance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return On Capital Employed | 4.6\% | 3.3\% | 2.9\% | 4.4\% | 4.3\% |
| Return On Equity | 1.5\% | 1.0\% | -2.8\% | 1.7\% | 1.6\% |
| Operating Margin | 8.5\% | 6.1\% | 4.1\% | 5.6\% | 5.2\% |
| EBITDA Margin | 16.7\% | 13.0\% | 10.5\% | 11.7\% | 11.4\% |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Quality of Earnings* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash Realization Ratio | 13.1x | 10.1x | NM | 7.9x | 11.4 x |
| Asset Replacement Ratio | 1.1x | 1.1x | 0.4x | $0.4 x$ | 0.5x |
| Tax Rate (Reported) | 9.8\% | 28.5\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% |
| Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 149.8\% | 154.3\% | 138.8\% | 128.3\% | 115.2\% |
| Interest Cover | 1.1x | 1.0x | $0.7 x$ | 1.1x | 1.1 x |
| Key Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |

* For full definitions of $i Q m e t h o d^{S M}$ measures, see page $X$.


## Company Description

Arvind Mills Ltd., the flagship company of the Lalbhai Group, is one of India's leading textile companies and one of the world's largest producers of denim. The company is also into shirting fabric and garments, and has a presence across the value chain from yarn to garments and retailing.

## Investment Thesis

Arvind Mills' stock performance is likely to remain subdued amid the continuing downturn in the core denim business. Global economic slowdown is an added concern which could offset benefit from softer input costs and weaker Re. We like management's intention to focus on domestic branded retailing but remain concerned about the high cost of retail in India and competition from larger players. Sale of non-core realty assets should help reduce the leverage on a stretched balance sheet.

Stock Data
Price to Book Value

Chart 10: Welspun - sales mix


Source: Merrill Lynch

Table 16: What has changed?

|  | FY09E | FY10E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | $-5.2 \%$ | $-7.1 \%$ |
| EBIDTA | $-21.1 \%$ | $-13.2 \%$ |
| EPS | $-87.6 \%$ | $-92.2 \%$ |

Source: Merrill Lynch

# Welspun India (Underperform) 

## Downgrade to Underperform, PO cut

We downgrade Welspun to Underperform and cut its PO to Rs21 (Rs71 earlier) to reflect earnings cut on economic slowdown and worse than expected consolidated balance sheet (with debt-equity ratio $>3 x$ ). In the current credit environment, refinancing / obtaining credit lines for working capital, especially for its overseas subs can become an issue. We note that Welspun has the highest exposure to US (nearly $60 \%$ of sales) within our coverage universe companies. The company is among the top 3 towel manufacturers globally and accounts for nearly $10 \%$ of total US imports. With the US retailers cutting their sales budgets, Welspun is likely to get significantly impacted.

## Sharp cut in earnings estimates

We have cut our EBIDTA forecast by $21 \%$ for FY09 to reflect the disappointing 1H'09 performance. We have cut our sales forecast 5-7\% largely driven by lower sales volume and realizations. We have build in a 5\% drop in USD realization in FY10E and another 2\% in FY11E. We believe the benefits of a weaker Re will be more than offset by negative impact of the slowdown and hence we have cut our EBIDTA for FY10E by $13 \%$. EPS cut is sharper due to higher interest costs on higher debt levels and lower other income.

## Bed linen performance likely to remain below par

We believe Welspun's bed linen business continues to operate at sub-optimal capacity utilization and hence lower margins. The company may find it difficult to ramp up this business in the current macro environment. Further, the company is likely to face competition from Himatsingka which is fast ramping up its bed linen production and is catering to similar geographies.

## Overseas subs performance at risk

The performance of Christy and Sorema (nearly 20\% of FY09E sales) could be at risk given the slowdown in the European markets. The company does not report interim results for these subsidiaries. We are also concerned about the performance of the domestic retail venture - Spaces, operated under an associate company. The gestation period is likely to get elongated for the business given slowdown in the Indian economy.

Table 17: Key assumptions

|  | FY2007 | FY2008 | FY2009E | FY2010E | FY2011E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Terry Towels |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales (TPA) | 25,437 | 29,098 | 36,900 | 37,925 | 38,950 |
| change | $27.3 \%$ | $14.4 \%$ | $29.3 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ |
| Sales (Rs mn) | 6,601 | 7,049 | 9,117 | 9,553 | 9,615 |
| change | $27.9 \%$ | $6.8 \%$ | $29.3 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $0.6 \%$ |
| Sales (Rs per ton) | 259,499 | 242,238 | 247,083 | 251,904 | 246,866 |
| change in USD terms | $0.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $-5.0 \%$ | $-2.0 \%$ |
| Bed Linen |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales (mn meters) | 16.6 | 27 | 32 | 36 | 41 |
| change | $337.4 \%$ | $62.4 \%$ | $16.7 \%$ | $14.3 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ |
| Sales (Rs mn) | 2,672 | 4,091 | 4,773 | 5,854 | 6,586 |
| change | $427.2 \%$ | $53.1 \%$ | $16.7 \%$ | $22.6 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ |
| Sales (Rs per mtr) | 161 | 152 | 152 | 163 | 163 |
| change in USD terms | $20.0 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |  |  |  |

Textiles \& Apparel

## iQprofile ${ }^{\text {sm }}$ Welspun India Ltd.

| Key Income Statement Data (Mar) | 2007A | 2008A | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Rs Millions) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 12,409 | 16,464 | 18,042 | 19,889 | 21,011 |
| Gross Profit | 5,228 | 6,852 | 9,828 | 11,241 | 11,895 |
| Sell General \& Admin Expense | $(3,490)$ | $(5,199)$ | $(7,766)$ | $(8,586)$ | $(9,210)$ |
| Operating Profit | 1,006 | 702 | 931 | 1,407 | 1,428 |
| Net Interest \& Other Income | (137) | (404) | (819) | $(1,315)$ | $(1,334)$ |
| Associates | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Pretax Income | 869 | 297 | 112 | 92 | 94 |
| Tax (expense) / Benefit | (54) | (192) | (17) | (14) | (14) |
| Net Income (Adjusted) | 791 | 95 | 86 | 68 | 70 |
| Average Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| Key Cash Flow Statement Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Income (Reported) | 815 | 105 | 96 | 78 | 80 |
| Depreciation \& Amortization | 732 | 952 | 1,130 | 1,248 | 1,258 |
| Change in Working Capital | $(2,009)$ | (995) | $(1,197)$ | 247 | (246) |
| Deferred Taxation Charge | 286 | 128 | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Adjustments, Net | (277) | (151) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cash Flow from Operations | (454) | 40 | 40 | 1,573 | 1,091 |
| Capital Expenditure | $(4,605)$ | $(4,490)$ | (200) | (200) | (200) |
| (Acquisition) / Disposal of Investments | (168) | 952 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Cash Inflow / (Outflow) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Cash Flow from Investing | $(4,773)$ | $(3,538)$ | (200) | (200) | (200) |
| Shares Issue / (Repurchase) | (417) | (72) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cost of Dividends Paid | (23) | (10) | (10) | (10) | (10) |
| Cash Flow from Financing | 5,825 | 2,609 | (510) | (510) | $(1,510)$ |
| Free Cash Flow | $(5,059)$ | $(4,450)$ | (160) | 1,373 | 891 |
| Net Debt | 12,775 | 16,053 | 16,224 | 14,861 | 13,979 |
| Change in Net Debt | 5,899 | 3,610 | 170 | $(1,363)$ | (881) |
| Key Balance Sheet Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property, Plant \& Equipment | 13,617 | 16,894 | 15,964 | 14,916 | 13,859 |
| Other Non-Current Assets | 258 | 258 | 258 | 258 | 258 |
| Trade Receivables | 1,176 | 1,384 | 1,924 | 2,078 | 2,241 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 1,886 | 1,299 | 628 | 1,491 | 872 |
| Other Current Assets | 5,809 | 6,267 | 8,013 | 7,870 | 8,177 |
| Total Assets | 22,747 | 26,102 | 26,788 | 26,613 | 25,407 |
| Long-Term Debt | 12,101 | 14,198 | 14,198 | 13,698 | 12,198 |
| Other Non-Current Liabilities | 957 | 1,086 | 1,097 | 1,097 | 1,097 |
| Short-Term Debt | 2,559 | 3,154 | 2,654 | 2,654 | 2,654 |
| Other Current Liabilities | 1,567 | 2,189 | 3,279 | 3,536 | 3,760 |
| Total Liabilities | 17,185 | 20,627 | 21,228 | 20,985 | 19,709 |
| Total Equity | 5,404 | 5,281 | 5,367 | 5,435 | 5,504 |
| Total Equity \& Liabilities | 22,588 | 25,908 | 26,594 | 26,419 | 25,213 |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {sh }}$ - Bus Performance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return On Capital Employed | 5.1\% | 1.6\% | 3.3\% | 5.1\% | 5.4\% |
| Return On Equity | 15.0\% | 1.8\% | 1.6\% | 1.3\% | 1.3\% |
| Operating Margin | 8.1\% | 4.3\% | 5.2\% | 7.1\% | 6.8\% |
| EBITDA Margin | 14.0\% | 10.0\% | 11.4\% | 13.3\% | 12.8\% |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {sm }}$ - Quality of Earnings* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash Realization Ratio | -0.6x | $0.4 x$ | 0.5x | 23.2x | 15.6x |
| Asset Replacement Ratio | 6.3 x | 4.7x | 0.2x | 0.2x | 0.2x |
| Tax Rate (Reported) | 6.2\% | 64.6\% | 15.0\% | 15.0\% | 15.0\% |
| Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 236.4\% | 304.0\% | 302.3\% | 273.5\% | 254.0\% |
| Interest Cover | 1.9x | 0.9x | 0.8x | 1.0x | 1.0x |
| Key Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |

* For full definitions of $i$ Qmethod ${ }^{S M}$ measures, see page X .


## Company Description

Welspun India Ltd is Asia's largest and one of the world's top 5 manufacturers of terry towels. It has expanded into bed linen over last 2 yrs, which has still not started operating at optimal levels. Exports make up more than $90 \%$ of its revenues. The company also operates retail stores under the names Spaces and WelHome, through an associate co.

## Investment Thesis

Our Underperform rating on Welspun is driven by economic downturn in key markets, concerns on its bed linen business which continues to operate at sub-optimal levels and likely worse than expected performance by its overseas subs - Christy and Sorema. High Balance sheet leverage is an added concern.

## Stock Data

Table 18: What has changed?

|  | FY09E | FY10E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | $-25 \%$ | $-28 \%$ |
| EBIDTA | $-42 \%$ | $-34 \%$ |
| EPS | $-51 \%$ | $-61 \%$ |

Source: Merrill Lynch

## Himatsingka (Neutral)

## Overseas subsidiaries performance a concern; Earnings estimates, PO cut sharply

We are concerned about the performance of Divatex and DWI (US based) and Bellora (EU based), all of whom had significantly below par performance in 1 H FY09. These subs are likely to see a decline in sales over the next few quarters. As a result we have cut our consolidated sales forecast 25-28\% over FY09-10. We have also cut our margin forecast for bed linen business to 11\% now. As a result our earnings are now lower by 51\% for FY09E and 61\% for FY10E. PO has been reduced to Rs29 (vs Rs55 earlier) to reflect this. Maintain Neutral.

## Improved operating results, bed linen achieves breakeven

2 Q results (ex overseas subs) were better than expected led by bed linen which finally achieved break-even. The plant is operating currently at $60 \%$ utilization levels and mgmt aims to take this up to $70 \%$ by end of 4Q'09. Bed linen made an EBIDTA margin of $9 \%$ in 2 Q; we expect this to improve to $14 \%$ in FY10, as efficiencies improve. Silk business remains stable with more or less flat sales and margins maintained in the $30-33 \%$ range.

## Flat sales, higher margins forecast for FY10

We have assumed a 1-2\% decline in consolidated sales over FY10-11, given the economic slowdown and lack of any drivers for sales growth. EBIDTA margins, however, are likely to improve from 10\% in FY09E to 14\% in FY10E as bed linen plant achieves optimal efficiency levels. We have assumed that the silk business continues to make over 30\% EBIDTA margin.

## Derivative losses an overhang

The company had reported large MTM losses on exotic derivative contracts in last couple of quarters (close to Rs2bn). While some of these contracts are under sub-judice, the issue has remained an overhang on the stock performance. The company has announced recently that the MTM losses on few of these contracts have reduced substantially. Any positive news on this front could have an impact on the stock performance.

Chart 11: Sales mix


Chart 12: EBIDTA margin forecast


Source: Merrill Lynch

## iQprofile ${ }^{s n}$ Himatsingka Seide Ltd.

| Key Income Statement Data (Mar) | 2007A | 2008A | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Rs Millions) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 2,091 | 8,862 | 9,402 | 9,319 | 9,126 |
| Gross Profit | 843 | 1,702 | 6,284 | 5,435 | 4,896 |
| Sell General \& Admin Expense | (331) | $(1,223)$ | $(5,352)$ | $(4,125)$ | $(3,535)$ |
| Operating Profit | 355 | 114 | 463 | 790 | 842 |
| Net Interest \& Other Income | 345 | (74) | (60) | (285) | (300) |
| Associates | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Pretax Income | 700 | 40 | 403 | 505 | 542 |
| Tax (expense) / Benefit | (69) | (54) | (97) | (167) | (179) |
| Net Income (Adjusted) | 614 | 17 | 321 | 348 | 374 |
| Average Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding | 97 | 98 | 103 | 103 | 103 |
| Key Cash Flow Statement Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Income (Reported) | 614 | 17 | 321 | 348 | 374 |
| Depreciation \& Amortization | 157 | 364 | 470 | 520 | 520 |
| Change in Working Capital | (195) | $(1,275)$ | (882) | (206) | (48) |
| Deferred Taxation Charge | 11 | 34 | 62 | 106 | 114 |
| Other Adjustments, Net | (8) | (195) | 45 | (14) | (10) |
| Cash Flow from Operations | 579 | $(1,055)$ | 15 | 754 | 950 |
| Capital Expenditure | $(3,660)$ | $(2,064)$ | (750) | (250) | (250) |
| (Acquisition) / Disposal of Investments | 642 | 299 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Cash Inflow / (Outflow) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Cash Flow from Investing | $(3,018)$ | $(1,764)$ | (750) | (250) | (250) |
| Shares Issue / (Repurchase) | (60) | 223 | 531 | 0 | 0 |
| Cost of Dividends Paid | (278) | (95) | (156) | (156) | (156) |
| Cash Flow from Financing | 2,454 | 2,903 | 875 | (156) | (156) |
| Free Cash Flow | $(3,081)$ | $(3,118)$ | (735) | 504 | 700 |
| Net Debt | 785 | 5,810 | 6,170 | 5,822 | 5,278 |
| Change in Net Debt | 2,803 | 2,537 | 360 | (348) | (544) |
| Key Balance Sheet Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property, Plant \& Equipment | 4,235 | 5,827 | 6,108 | 5,838 | 5,568 |
| Other Non-Current Assets | 1,024 | 3,577 | 3,577 | 3,577 | 3,577 |
| Trade Receivables | 802 | 1,156 | 1,227 | 1,216 | 1,191 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 2,404 | 153 | 294 | 642 | 1,186 |
| Other Current Assets | 2,358 | 4,562 | 2,596 | 2,906 | 3,019 |
| Total Assets | 10,822 | 15,276 | 13,801 | 14,178 | 14,541 |
| Long-Term Debt | 2,791 | 3,581 | 4,081 | 4,081 | 4,081 |
| Other Non-Current Liabilities | 23 | 14 | 76 | 182 | 296 |
| Short-Term Debt | 398 | 2,382 | 2,382 | 2,382 | 2,382 |
| Other Current Liabilities | 1,677 | 3,260 | 483 | 576 | 615 |
| Total Liabilities | 4,888 | 9,238 | 7,023 | 7,222 | 7,375 |
| Total Equity | 5,934 | 6,038 | 6,779 | 6,957 | 7,165 |
| Total Equity \& Liabilities | 10,822 | 15,276 | 13,801 | 14,178 | 14,541 |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Bus Performance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return On Capital Employed | 5.2\% | 0.8\% | 3.1\% | 4.0\% | 4.1\% |
| Return On Equity | 10.6\% | 0.3\% | 5.1\% | 5.1\% | 5.4\% |
| Operating Margin | 17.0\% | 1.3\% | 4.9\% | 8.5\% | 9.2\% |
| EBITDA Margin | 24.5\% | 5.4\% | 9.9\% | 14.1\% | 14.9\% |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Quality of Earnings* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash Realization Ratio | 0.9x | NM | 0x | 2.2x | $2.5 x$ |
| Asset Replacement Ratio | 23.3x | 5.7 x | 1.6 x | 0.5x | 0.5x |
| Tax Rate (Reported) | 9.8\% | 134.5\% | 24.0\% | 33.0\% | 33.0\% |
| Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 13.2\% | 96.2\% | 91.0\% | 83.7\% | 73.7\% |
| Interest Cover | 36.8x | 0.4 x | $1.5 x$ | 2.6 x | 2.7 x |
| Key Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |

* For full definitions of $i$ Qmethod ${ }^{S M}$ measures, see page X .

Table 19: What has changed?

|  | FY09E | FY10E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | $-5.2 \%$ | $-13.8 \%$ |
| EBIDTA | $-7.6 \%$ | $-20.4 \%$ |
| EPS | $-11.0 \%$ | $-28.9 \%$ |

Source: Merrill Lynch

## Gokaldas (Underperform)

## Earnings estimates, PO cut

We have cut FY09E earnings by $11 \%$ and FY10E earnings by $29 \%$ to factor in a disappointing 2 Q performance and impact of global economic slowdown. We have cut our sales forecast by $5-14 \%$ over FY09-10 and EBIDTA by $7-20 \%$. PO is reduced to Rs116 (Rs200 earlier) as a result of the earnings cut and lower target multiple (5.5x FY10E EV/E versus 6.5x earlier).

Muted sales growth, slightly lower margins forecast We forecast sales growth of $5 \%$ p.a. over FY10-11. We have built in a 50 bp margin dilution in FY10E on the back of lower realizations as the company might be forced to pass on the benefit of weaker Re to the buyer, given the slowdown. As a result, we expect avg. $4 \%$ decline in earnings over next 2 yrs.

Chart 13: Sales \& EBIDTA forecasts


Source: Meriill Lynch

Table 20: Key assumptions

|  | FY07 | FY08 | FY09E | FY10E | FY11E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sales (mn pieces) | 24.2 | 27.4 | 30.1 | 30.9 | 33.0 |
| \% growth | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Realization (Rs/psc) | 425 | 400 | 406 | 410 | 410 |
| \% change | $4 \%$ | $-6 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Source: Merill Lynch |  |  |  |  |  |

## iQprofile ${ }^{\text {sh }}$ Gokaldas Exports Ltd.

| Key Income Statement Data (Mar) | 2007A | 2008A | 2009E | 2010E | 2011E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Rs Millions) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 10,306 | 10,752 | 12,239 | 12,655 | 13,541 |
| Gross Profit | 1,803 | 1,804 | 1,958 | 1,962 | 2,099 |
| Sell General \& Admin Expense | (649) | (751) | (796) | (823) | (880) |
| Operating Profit | 866 | 686 | 719 | 660 | 710 |
| Net Interest \& Other Income | (77) | (82) | (25) | (29) | (54) |
| Associates | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Pretax Income | 788 | 605 | 694 | 631 | 656 |
| Tax (expense) / Benefit | (84) | (43) | (90) | (95) | (98) |
| Net Income (Adjusted) | 705 | 561 | 604 | 537 | 558 |
| Average Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 |
| Key Cash Flow Statement Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Income (Reported) | 705 | 561 | 604 | 537 | 558 |
| Depreciation \& Amortization | 288 | 366 | 443 | 478 | 508 |
| Change in Working Capital | (806) | (234) | (471) | (126) | (282) |
| Deferred Taxation Charge | 48 | (27) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Adjustments, Net | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cash Flow from Operations | 235 | 666 | 576 | 889 | 784 |
| Capital Expenditure | $(1,148)$ | (600) | (400) | (300) | (300) |
| (Acquisition) / Disposal of Investments | 220 | 180 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Cash Inflow / (Outflow) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Cash Flow from Investing | (928) | (420) | (400) | (300) | (300) |
| Shares Issue / (Repurchase) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cost of Dividends Paid | (80) | (80) | (80) | (80) | (80) |
| Cash Flow from Financing | 720 | (180) | 20 | (80) | (80) |
| Free Cash Flow | (913) | 66 | 176 | 589 | 484 |
| Net Debt | 2,900 | 2,817 | 2,722 | 2,213 | 1,810 |
| Change in Net Debt | 774 | (166) | (96) | (509) | (403) |
| Key Balance Sheet Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property, Plant \& Equipment | 2,743 | 2,977 | 2,934 | 2,756 | 2,547 |
| Other Non-Current Assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trade Receivables | 798 | 854 | 972 | 1,005 | 1,076 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 127 | 110 | 305 | 814 | 1,217 |
| Other Current Assets | 4,563 | 4,622 | 5,128 | 5,270 | 5,572 |
| Total Assets | 8,231 | 8,563 | 9,340 | 9,845 | 10,412 |
| Long-Term Debt | 646 | 646 | 646 | 646 | 646 |
| Other Non-Current Liabilities | 100 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| Short-Term Debt | 2,381 | 2,281 | 2,381 | 2,381 | 2,381 |
| Other Current Liabilities | 1,021 | 1,082 | 1,235 | 1,285 | 1,374 |
| Total Liabilities | 4,148 | 4,082 | 4,335 | 4,385 | 4,474 |
| Total Equity | 4,083 | 4,481 | 5,005 | 5,461 | 5,938 |
| Total Equity \& Liabilities | 8,231 | 8,563 | 9,340 | 9,845 | 10,412 |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Bus Performance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return On Capital Employed | 12.0\% | 8.4\% | 8.0\% | 6.7\% | 6.9\% |
| Return On Equity | 18.7\% | 13.1\% | 12.7\% | 10.3\% | 9.8\% |
| Operating Margin | 8.4\% | 6.4\% | 5.9\% | 5.2\% | 5.2\% |
| EBITDA Margin | 11.2\% | 9.8\% | 9.5\% | 9.0\% | 9.0\% |
| iQmethod ${ }^{\text {SM }}$ - Quality of Earnings* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash Realization Ratio | 0.3x | 1.2 x | 1.0x | $1.7 x$ | 1.4 x |
| Asset Replacement Ratio | 4.0x | 1.6x | 0.9x | 0.6x | 0.6x |
| Tax Rate (Reported) | 10.6\% | 7.2\% | 13.0\% | 15.0\% | 15.0\% |
| Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 71.0\% | 62.9\% | 54.4\% | 40.5\% | 30.5\% |
| Interest Cover | 3.9x | 2.2 x | 2.9x | 2.6 x | $2.8 x$ |
| Key Metrics |  |  |  |  |  |

* For full definitions of $i$ Qmethod ${ }^{S M}$ measures, see page X .


## Appendix - I: 2Q results review

## No major surprises, BRFL stands out

BRFL reported 2Q PAT at Rs367mn, a growth of $20 \%$ yoy, which was in line with MLe. This was led by 200bp margin expansion on weaker Re and higher share of garments. Profit growth could have been higher but for higher interest cost. Raymond showed a sharp improvement in its core worsted fabric business but consolidated earnings remained depressed as losses for the denim JV widened. Himatsingka's bed linen business finally achieved break-even but performance of its overseas subsidiaries deteriorated. Arvind's earnings remained depressed by high input costs and continued downturn in denim market.

Table 21: 2Q'09 results snapshot (Rs mn)

|  | Sales | yoy <br> chg EBIDTA |  | yoy <br> chg | PAT | chg | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bombay Rayon | 2,870 | 28\% | 687 | 39\% | 367 | 20\% | Strongest results in textile universe, PAT in line with MLe, 200bp margin expansion a +ve surprise driven by higher share of garments and weaker Re. |
| Raymond | 7,540 | 27\% | 852 | 38\% | NA | NM | Strong performance by worsted fabric, denim continues to be a drag (Rs400mn loss - 50\% Raymond share), Overall results ahead of expectations, consolidated PAT not reported by company, forex translation losses impact results. |
| Arvind | 5,989 | 6\% | 645 | -18\% | (293) | NM | Muted sales growth, Margins impacted by high input costs, results clearly below expectations. |
| Gokaldas | 3,226 | 29\% | 211 | -6\% | 31 | -73\% | Strong sales growth, EBIDTA disappoints, Results impacted by forex hedging losses. |
| Welspun India | 3,786 | 29\% | 494 | 6\% | 5 | -97\% | Disappointing results, Strong sales growth but sharp margin decline, PAT impacted by forex translation loss, standalone results - consolidated (not reported by the company) could be worse. |
| Himatsingka | 2,549 | 1\% | 204 | 24\% | (206) | NM | Bed linen achieves break-even (9\% EBIDTA margin), operational results better than expected, PAT impacted by forex translation loss. |

Source: Merrill Lynch

US imports of textiles \& apparel has declined 4\%yoy for the J an-August'08 period

## Appendix - II: Industry update Exports scenario

Chart 14: US imports of textiles \& apparel - yoy growth trend


[^2]China's exports of textiles \& apparel to US has declined $2 \%$ yoy for the J anJuly'08 period

Chart 15: Chinese exports of textiles \& apparel to US - yoy growth trend


Source: OTEXA, Merrill Lynch

Chart 16: India's exports of textiles \& apparel to US - yoy growth trend


Source: OTEXA, Meriil Lynch

India's exports of textiles \& apparel to US has declined $2 \%$ as well for the JanJuly'08 period

Table 22: Country wise textile \& apparel exports to US and market shares

| (US\$mn) | Jan-August'07 | Jan-August'08 | YoY chg | CY06 | CY07 | YoY chg |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total US imports | 64,052 | 61,696 | -4\% | 93,279 | 96,410 | 3\% |
| China | 20,984 | 20,624 | -2\% | 27,068 | 32,323 | 19\% |
| India | 3,598 | 3,542 | -2\% | 5,031 | 5,104 | 1\% |
| Vietnam | 2,900 | 3,536 | 22\% | 3,396 | 4,558 | 34\% |
| Mexico | 3,820 | 3,381 | -12\% | 6,376 | 5,625 | -12\% |
| Indonesia | 2,893 | 2,887 | 0\% | 3,902 | 4,206 | 8\% |
| Bangladesh | 2,191 | 2,326 | 6\% | 2,998 | 3,191 | 6\% |
| Pakistan | 2,125 | 2,026 | -5\% | 3,250 | 3,170 | -2\% |
| Market shares |  |  | Chg (bp) |  |  | Chg (bp) |
| China | 32.8\% | 33.4\% | 67 | 29.0\% | 33.5\% | 451 |
| India | 5.6\% | 5.7\% | 12 | 5.4\% | 5.3\% | (10) |
| Vietnam | 4.5\% | 5.7\% | 120 | 3.6\% | 4.7\% | 109 |
| Mexico | 6.0\% | 5.5\% | (48) | 6.8\% | 5.8\% | (100) |
| Indonesia | 4.5\% | 4.7\% | 16 | 4.2\% | 4.4\% | 18 |
| Bangladesh | 3.4\% | 3.8\% | 35 | 3.2\% | 3.3\% | 10 |
| Pakistan | 3.3\% | 3.3\% | (3) | 3.5\% | 3.3\% | (20) |
| Source: OTEXA, Merrill L |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Cotton prices have come off their peak, but still remain high on a yoy basis. In 3 Q (Oct-Nov' 09) they are up 37\%yoy.

## Input cost trend

Chart 17: Cotton price trend (medium staple)


Source: MCX, Merrill Lynch

## Price objective basis \& risk <br> Arvind Ltd (ARVZF)

Our PO of Rs13 is based on a SOTP-based valuation. (1) We have valued the textile business ( 74 pct of EV ) at $5 \times$ FY10E EV/EBITDA, at par with other textile companies and at the lower end of Arvind's historical one-year forward EV/EBITDA band. (2) The retail business (26pct EV) has been valued at 0.7 x FY10E EV/sales at a discount to other Indian retailers as the format is still evolving and the profitability is lower. Upside risks: Lower cotton prices, improvement in denim volumes and higher-than-expected value unlocking from real estate. Downside risks: Lower-than-expected growth in its brands and retail business, stronger rupee and higher input costs.

## Bombay Rayon Fashions Ltd (BORYF)

Our PO of Rs270 is based on $7.5 \times$ FY10E EV/EBIDTA, which we believe is reasonable considering EBIDTA growth of 43\% CAGR over FY09E-11E. Also, this is at the mid-end of the stock's historical 1-year forward rolling EV/EBIDTA band. We have chosen to value Bombay Rayon and other textile companies on EV/EBIDTA as we believe this appropriately captures their core business value. At our PO the stock will trade at P/Es of 11x FY09E and 8x FY10E. We believe this is reasonable considering the strong earnings growth of 44\% CAGR over FY09E-11E and a high ROE of $22 \%$ in FY09E. Risks are slowdown in key markets including the US, slower demand in the domestic market, exchange fluctuation, rise in input costs and execution risks.

## Gokaldas Exports (GKLDF)

Our PO of Rs116 is based on $5.5 \times$ FY10E EV/EBIDTA. This is at a slight premium to other textile companies given higher RoE but at the lower end of its historical EV/EBIDTA band, given the moderation in growth prospects and margins on the back of global slowdown. At our PO, the stock would trade at 7.5 x FY10E P/E which is at the lower end of its historical P.E band. This, in our view, is appropriate given slowing earnings growth trajectory. Upside risks: Weaker rupee and faster growth in domestic OEM business. Downside risks: Competition from neighboring countries and higher costs.

## Himatsingka Seid (HMKFF)

Our PO of Rs29 is based on a SOTP valuation. (1) The silk fabric business has been valued at $5.5 \times$ FY10E EV/EBITDA at slight premium to other textile companies given higher margins and pricing power. But this is a significant discount to its historical multiples, given the moderation in growth prospects and margin erosion in the silk business. (2) The bed linen business is valued at $5.5 x$ EV/EBIDTA which is at par with Welspun, the leading company in this space. (3) The retail business, Atmosphere, has been valued at $1.1 \mathrm{x} \mathrm{EV} /$ sales, which is a premium to other retail companies, given its higher profitability. Upside risks: Fast ramp-up in the bed linen business and lower input costs. Downside risks: Longer gestation for the bed linen business and stronger rupee.

## Raymond Ltd (XRAMF)

Our PO of Rs75 is based on a SOTP-based valuation. We have valued Raymond's textile business (63pct of EV) at 6x FY10E EV/EBITDA, which is a 20pct premium to other textile companies. We believe this premium is justified, given Raymond's strong brand franchise. We value the retail business (30pct of EV) at $0.8 x$ FY10E EV/sales similar to other retail companies in India. The engineering and auto ancillary business ( 7 pct of EV ) has been valued at 4 x EV/EBITDA similar to other auto ancillary companies. Upside risks: News flow on

Thane land sale, restructuring of denim business, lower input costs and weaker rupee. Downside risks: Lower-than-expected growth in worsted business, slower retail ramp-up and higher costs of retailing.

## Welspun India (WPNIF)

Our PO of Rs21 is based on $5.5 \times$ FY10E EV/EBITDA, which is at the lower end of its historical one-year forward EV/EBITDA band. We believe this is justified, given the moderation in growth prospects on slowdown in key markets. We prefer to value Welspun on EV/EBIDTA as this multiple appropriately captures the core business valuation in our view and ignores the fluctuations in earnings due to changes in non-operating income. At our PO the stock trades at 18x FY09E PE, which we believe may not be the appropriate measure. On P/BV it trades at only $0.3 x$ FY09E and has a RoE of 2\%. Risks: INR/USD fluctuation, weaker input prices and weakening competitive environment.

## Analyst Certification

I, Manish Sarawagi, hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject securities and issuers. I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or view expressed in this research report.

## Special Disclosures

In accordance with the SEBI (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations and with guidelines issued by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), foreign investors (individuals as well as institutional) that wish to transact the common stock of Indian companies must have applied to, and have been approved by SEBI and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Each investor who transacts common stock of Indian companies will be required to certify approval as a foreign institutional investor or as a sub-account of a foreign institutional investor by SEBI and RBI. Certain other entities are also entitled to transact common stock of Indian companies under the Indian laws relating to investment by foreigners. Merrill Lynch reserves the right to refuse copy of research on common stock of Indian companies to a person not resident in India. American Depositary Receipts (ADR) representing such common stock are not subject to these Indian law restrictions and may be transacted by investors in accordance with the applicable laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Global Depository Receipts (GDR) and the Global Depository Shares of Indian companies, Indian limited liability corporations, have not been registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and may only be transacted by persons in the United States who are Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs) within the meaning of Rule 144A under the Securities Act. Accordingly, no copy of any research report on Indian companies' GDRs will be made available to persons who are not QIBs.

India - Consumer Coverage Cluster

| Investment rating | Company | ML ticker | Bloomberg symbol | Analyst |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BUY |  |  |  |  |
|  | Bombay Rayon Fashions Ltd | BORYF | BRFL IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Hindustan Unilever | HINLF | HUVR IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | ITC Limited | ITCTF | ITC IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Mcleod Russel India Ltd. | XCVFF | MCLR IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Nestle India | XNTEF | NEST IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Titan Inds Ltd | TTNIF | TTAN IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | United Spirits | UDSRF | UNSP IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Welspun India | WPNIF | WLSI IN | Manish Sarawagi |
| NEUTRAL |  |  |  |  |
|  | Asian Paints | XAPNF | APNT IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Colgate India | CPIYF | CLGT IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Dabur India | DBUIF | DABUR IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Himatsingka Seid | HMKFF | HSS IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Pantaloon | PFIAF | PF IN | Vandana Luthra |
| UNDERPERFORM |  |  |  |  |
|  | Arvind Ltd | ARVZF | ARVND IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Gokaldas Exports | GKLDF | GEXP IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Radico Khaitan | RKHAF | RDCK IN | Vandana Luthra |
|  | Raymond Ltd | XRAMF | RW IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Shoppers' Stop | SHPSF | SHOP IN | Manish Sarawagi |
|  | Vishal Retail Ltd | XVHLF | VISH IN | Manish Sarawagi |

## Important Disclosures

Investment Rating Distribution: Textiles/Apparel Group (as of 01 Oct 2008)

| Coverage Universe | Count | Percent | Inv. Banking Relationships* | Count | Percent |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Buy | 8 | $33.33 \%$ | Buy | 4 | $42.86 \%$ |
| Neutral | 5 | $20.83 \%$ | Neutral | 2 | $40.00 \%$ |
| Sell | 11 | $45.83 \%$ | Sell | 1 |  |
| Investment Rating Distribution: Global Group (as of 01 Oct 2008) | Count | Percent | Inv. Banking Relationships* |  |  |
| Coverage Universe | 1647 | $45.31 \%$ | Buy | Count | Percent |
| Buy | 858 | $23.60 \%$ | Neutral | 429 |  |
| Neutral | 1130 | $31.09 \%$ | Sell | $28.83 \%$ |  |
| Sell |  |  |  | 240 |  |

* Companies in respect of which MLPF\&S or an affiliate has received compensation for investment banking services within the past 12 months. For purposes of this distribution, a stock rated Underperform is included as a Sell.

FUNDAMENTAL EQUITY OPINION KEY: Opinions include a Volatility Risk Rating, an Investment Rating and an Income Rating. VOLATILITY RISK RATINGS, indicators of potential price fluctuation, are: A - Low, B - Medium and C - High. INVESTMENT RATINGS reflect the analyst's assessment of a stock's: (i) absolute total return potential and (ii) attractiveness for investment relative to other stocks within its Coverage Cluster (defined below). There are three investment ratings: 1-Buy stocks are expected to have a total return of at least 10\% and are the most attractive stocks in the coverage cluster; 2 - Neutral stocks are expected to remain flat or increase in value and are less attractive than Buy rated stocks and 3-Underperform stocks are the least attractive stocks in a coverage cluster. Analysts assign investment ratings considering, among other things, the 0-12 month total return expectation for a stock and the firm's guidelines for ratings dispersions (shown in the table below). The current price objective for a stock should be referenced to better understand the total return expectation at any given time. The price objective reflects the analyst's view of the potential price appreciation (depreciation).

| Investment rating | Total return expectation (within 12-month period of date of initial rating) | Ratings dispersion guidelines for coverage cluster* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Buy | $\geq 10 \%$ | $\leq 70 \%$ |
| Neutral | $\geq 0 \%$ | $\leq 30 \%$ |
| Underperform | N/A | $\geq 20 \%$ |

* Ratings dispersions may vary from time to time where Merrill Lynch Research believes it better reflects the investment prospects of stocks in a Coverage Cluster.

INCOME RATINGS, indicators of potential cash dividends, are: 7 - same/higher (dividend considered to be secure), 8 - samellower (dividend not considered to be secure) and 9 - pays no cash dividend. Coverage cluster is comprised of stocks covered by a single analyst or two or more analysts sharing a common industry, sector, region or other classification(s). A stock's coverage cluster is included in the most recent Merrill Lynch Comment referencing the stock.

Price charts for the securities referenced in this research report are available at http://www.ml.com/research/pricecharts.asp, or call 1-888-ML-CHART to have them mailed.

[^3]Textiles \& Apparel

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[^2]:    Source: OTEXA, Merrill Lynch

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