SQUARING THE CYCLE

   Intelligence publications for eons have talked about "The
Intelligence Cycle," starting with:  1. Planning and Direction; 
2. Collection; 3 Processing; 4. All Source Analysis and Production;
and, 5. Dissemination. 

   This theoretical cycle has very little application in reality. To 
briefly document my argument -- the House of Representatives Pike 
Committee retroactively evaluated CIA intelligence on six major world 
developments and found that in all six cases CIA's information was 
either wrong or non-existent.  In more recent times we note the complete 
failure of intelligence during the 25 years of the Vietnam War; plus, 
the CIA was virtually the last organization to accept the collapse of 
the USSR.  We now ask that this agency -- that failed to predict India's
explosion of nuclear devices -- to serve as the bulwark against 
international terrorism.

   Correcting "the intelligence cycle" is simple in practice; but, 
politically  (virtually) impossible.  The problem begins with the 
Director of Operations -- it recruits case officers who are deficient 
in analytical ability. This is not an accident -- it is done deliberately. 
My arguments re this are oft-repeated, but for the skeptical I recommend 
the book by former CIA top official, Duane Clarridge, "A Spy for All 
Seasons." In it he documents this phenomenon. 

   CIA's enemies, Cuba's DGI, the USSR's KGB and East Germany's Stasi 
(and probably also Vietnam's Cuc Ngien Cuu) all ran double operations 
at the CIA with the greatest of ease. 

   Assets of all of these organizations fed false data to CIA case 
officers who then forwarded that information to CIA Headquarters --
forever polluting the system.  This information was analyzed, evaluated 
and formed the basis for comparing all other reporting.

   The problem starts with the agent/case officer.  Once this data
is recorded as the official position -- nothing can change it --
not even an unwinnable, 25-year-long war -- and analysis, open source 
information, and other data are a lost cause.

   The October 1998 Signal's Magazine article "Intelligence Agency 
Adjusts as Mission Possible Unfolds," outlines the advances in
the Intelligence side of the Agency in using analytical tools to
better cope with all of today's data.

   The ideas and information presented in that article seem
generally plausible. But -- a big but -- analysis must start at
the level of agent contact. If you allow bad data from double or
incompetent, or corrupt agents to enter and pollute the atmosphere,
you never recover.

   With analysis measuring an agent's reliability, his/her access,
and all other facts from and about the agent -- you can stop the
pollution before it begins.

   One suggestion is to recruit case officers possessing analytical
ability.  Clarridge suggests that such ability unduly constrains
an officer's actions. Then the alternative is to place analysts directly
in the operational process. From spotting, assessing, handling to
evaluating. Had such been the case in the USSR, East Germany, Cuba 
and Vietnam, none of the enemy double agents would have survived 
this analysis. The CIA relies instead on the lie detector -- that 
is a joke to foreign services -- the lie detector does not work.  
On the spot analysis is the only plausible alternative. 

   The CIA also relies on the reporting of case officers about his/her 
agents and bases its promotions of case officers on the number of agent 
recruitment's. This problem has been around forever. It has been noted, 
criticized and continued.

   Other suggestions include the use of open source information --
included in the discussion of the Intelligence Cycle but generally
ignored in practice. My experience reading the works of Asian
revolutionaries gave me a view of the Vietnam War totally at
odds with CIA reporting. Others have recorded the deficiency in
using open source information but the CIA regards open sources as 
a challenge to its officers, procedures and politicized intelligence.

   I suppose the solution can be simple, de-politicize the Intelligence 
Cycle, recruit and use good analysts at the operational "front,"
and, demand integrity and analysis in agent evaluating, recruiting 
and handling.

   There seems some recognition of the above by the current leadership 
of the CIA, but can it overturn the generations of personnel, procedures 
and positions taken by the operating divisions?

Ralph McGehee
http://come.to/CIABASE