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austria remailer's keys compromised

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christian mock

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Apr 24, 2012, 1:53:18 PM4/24/12
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
threats.

Therefore, I had to destroy any existing keys and create new keys (see
below).

What does this mean?

- - The remailer's private keys are compromised, so any message that was
encrypted to those keys can be decrypted, *if* it was intercepted in
the form it reached the austria remailer.

- - If you've been following best practice and used a chain of
remailers, this chain has been weakened, but probably not broken.

- - Since I've destroyed all existing keys, messages "in flight"
encrypted to those keys will be discarded. I'm sorry about that.

- - You need to update your keyrings before you can include austria in
your chains again

- - Depending on how paranoid you are, you may assume the machine is
backdoored, since the authorities have had access. I will re-install
the machine from trustworthy media, but due to the logistics
involved this will take a few weeks.

The new keys:

austria mixm...@remailer.privacy.at 8ed603304ed22f688e8f8afe08a0e57b 2:3.0 C 2012-04-24 2013-05-19

- -----Begin Mix Key-----
8ed603304ed22f688e8f8afe08a0e57b
258
AATM4V5Fhkf9E5jzDrhDyUOZQO8Eu8X6Ba9Jccd9
o0BTp+AkejjTAIirKd55NKf+w67CtEDOA8WBK+5m
CX42MevVLN4P+SYeCRrkiZiDQKl7v3Fr6G17St+0
VwTNL9JUQLub/H/IQjIHu61P0M8n9e3kowpGGNhk
NdcaeJMLOAFVKwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB
- -----End Mix Key-----

Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 1024D/B052DF06 2012-04-24 "privacy.at Anonymous Remailer" <mixm...@remailer.privacy.at>
sub 1024g/B5DDE492 2012-04-24

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: Mixmaster 3.0 (OpenPGP module)
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=
=5GOB
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFPlubSfFYn/kwM9E8RAvJ+AKCRqWAuj3QopGPgq3qzPJz+tcNjaQCgiDcd
8CdX4q6G77zo6Ff3P+JdTUw=
=uhVK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

christian mock

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Apr 24, 2012, 1:48:35 PM4/24/12
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Message has been deleted

christian mock

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Apr 24, 2012, 3:24:06 PM4/24/12
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G Morgan <seal...@osama-is-dead.net> wrote:

>>What does this mean?
>
> The US authorities are going to grab an image of every remailer
> drive and break the chain?

That would only make sense if they seized all remailers at the same
time, or else they risk keys getting wiped in anticipation of their
next move.

> So, if they do this they actually have a chance of catching the
> message sender. Am I right?

They'd need to intercept pretty much all remailer SMTP traffic for the
time in question, or a subset thereof if they have reason to believe
the bad guy is using a certain chain.

I'm not saying this is impossible, but it would be a *very* big
effort.

> How many remailers (machines) are 'out of reach' from US
> authorities, any?

No idea.

cm.

--
** christian mock in vienna, austria -- http://www.tahina.priv.at/
Wahrscheinlich ist die Klage billiger als eine Inseratenkampagne: "Wir
haben das Internet nicht verstanden."
-- Martin Hlustik ueber Ferrero in Sachen kinder.at
Message has been deleted

christian mock

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Apr 24, 2012, 4:10:44 PM4/24/12
to
G Morgan <seal...@osama-is-dead.net> wrote:

>>No idea.
>
> I can't believe they got to you in Austria! I thought that was
> way out of their (US) sphere of influence.

There's international treaties about judicial assistance (or whatever
the correct english term is) -- the americans ask the austrians to
help them, via the correct channels and with the right paperwork, and
help will be granted (assuming it's allowed under austrian law).
Basically the same kind of stuff that gets criminals extradited.

So, to get back to your original question, one would have to look for
remailers located in countries where such treaties do not exist.

cm.

--
** christian mock in vienna, austria -- http://www.tahina.priv.at/
> 'schweinesystem, repressives'.
Könnt ihr nicht wenigstens aus diesem Thread OS/400 raushalten?
-- frank paulsen und fefe in dasr
Message has been deleted

Zax

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Apr 24, 2012, 4:29:05 PM4/24/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On Tue, 24 Apr 2012 14:07:07 -0500, G Morgan wrote in
Message-Id: <v7udp75h40p0ngde8...@Osama-is-dead.net>:

> The US authorities are going to grab an image of every remailer
> drive and break the chain?
I don't see how. Austria (and all other remailers) receive thousands of
identical Mixmaster messages. There is no way to correlate the message
that arrived at the destination with any specific message arriving at
Austria.

> So, if they do this they actually have a chance of catching the
> message sender. Am I right?
Impossible to say without knowing how the originator injected the
messages and the policies (in terms of logging) employed by the
remailers they injected to.

> How many remailers (machines) are 'out of reach' from US
> authorities, any?
I can't think of any remailers that reside in countries the US would
consider beyond reach. We're talking about bomb threats here so most
countries would be willing to assist.

There are too many losers in all this. The university that's been
targeted and its students, the remailer network and its operators, the
decent people who use the network for honest purposes. Nobody wins.

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Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux)

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=Yhno
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--
pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid Admin <admin.mixmin.net>
Message has been deleted

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 24, 2012, 5:42:49 PM4/24/12
to
glad you are ok and they didnt take your comp. thanks

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 24, 2012, 6:04:22 PM4/24/12
to
In article <slrnjpdp...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
> was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
> threats.
>
> Therefore, I had to destroy any existing keys and create new keys (see
> below).
>
> What does this mean?
>
> - - The remailer's private keys are compromised, so any message that was
> encrypted to those keys can be decrypted, *if* it was intercepted in
> the form it reached the austria remailer.
>
> - - If you've been following best practice and used a chain of
> remailers, this chain has been weakened, but probably not broken.
>
> - - Since I've destroyed all existing keys, messages "in flight"
> encrypted to those keys will be discarded. I'm sorry about that.
>
> - - You need to update your keyrings before you can include austria in
> your chains again
>
> - - Depending on how paranoid you are, you may assume the machine is
> backdoored, since the authorities have had access. I will re-install
> the machine from trustworthy media, but due to the logistics
> involved this will take a few weeks.
>
What was different about their siezing your computer from the seizure of
kulin? I ask because when his was seized, he said that they got nothing
due to his encrypted drives.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 24, 2012, 6:04:22 PM4/24/12
to
christian mock wrote:

>G Morgan <seal...@osama-is-dead.net> wrote:
>
>>>What does this mean?
>>
>> The US authorities are going to grab an image of every remailer
>> drive and break the chain?
>
>That would only make sense if they seized all remailers at the same
>time, or else they risk keys getting wiped in anticipation of their
>next move.

That's a minor risk. Let's see whether there are remops who renew
keys after those incidents. Keys are usually valid for one year.

I don't know whether two Mixmaster keys could be used at the same time
for message decryption. But if so, why not always have two keys
simultaneously in action with the older one being renewed every week?
No message is in transit for such a long time. Users just had to
update keys more often.

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 24, 2012, 7:28:52 PM4/24/12
to
Christian Mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:

>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
> was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
> threats.

Americans are such hysterical old women, that a few more pranks
like the Pittsburgh one will get them to shut down all remailers
in the US, and the ones in any countries that are afraid enough of
the US.

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 24, 2012, 7:39:55 PM4/24/12
to
In article <13e256703daf6211...@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> glad you are ok and they didnt take your comp. thanks

Sounds like they took the important parts of it.

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 24, 2012, 8:41:04 PM4/24/12
to
It is not Americans, its the socialist that have infiltrated the
government. As if any other country of the world has something to
say about Anerican intrusive government.


1103

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Apr 24, 2012, 10:50:32 PM4/24/12
to mail...@m2n.mixmin.net, mail...@tioat.net
In article <slrnjpe2...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> G Morgan <seal...@osama-is-dead.net> wrote:
>
> >>No idea.
> >
> > I can't believe they got to you in Austria! I thought that was
> > way out of their (US) sphere of influence.
>
> There's international treaties about judicial assistance (or whatever
> the correct english term is) -- the americans ask the austrians to
> help them, via the correct channels and with the right paperwork, and
> help will be granted (assuming it's allowed under austrian law).
> Basically the same kind of stuff that gets criminals extradited.
>
> So, to get back to your original question, one would have to look for
> remailers located in countries where such treaties do not exist.
>
> cm.

Is there any way the Feds could bring up one of those servers,
reconfigure it and rejoin the remailer network? They know they
can't get anything off the servers, perhaps they feel they can
disrupt things. Yes, I read about ECN's encrypted root.



Anonymous

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Apr 24, 2012, 10:57:14 PM4/24/12
to mail...@m2n.mixmin.net, mail...@tioat.net
In article <7fff0eadba92466c...@dizum.com>
They might have taken a few but they didn't shut any down
permanently, did they? Maybe they aren't as dumb as you think
they are.

christian mock

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Apr 25, 2012, 2:39:21 AM4/25/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:

> What was different about their siezing your computer from the seizure of
> kulin? I ask because when his was seized, he said that they got nothing
> due to his encrypted drives.

Well, as you guessed it, no encrypted drives. The machine is located
in a trustworthy, secure server room, so there's no need for encrypted
drives from that angle.

Also, even if it had encrypted drives, I'd probably had handed over
the passphrase to the cops -- I prefer to continue to be seen as a
law-abiding citizen by them; and my legal role in this is "witness",
so the right to refuse to give evidence doesn't apply to me, and I'm
certainly not gonna go to jail over this.

I'm not running a remailer to play the crypto hero, I'm running it to
provide part of a service to people who need it, and the concept of
chained remailers makes sure an adversary has to put a *lot* of effort
into breaking it.

You may have noticed that austria has been running for more than 10
years. Part of this long life, I think, stems from the fact that we
don't have cops kicking in our doors at dawn; in fact, this is the
first physical visit of police at the hosting site (and I've had them
visit me at home exactely once, in another case). Most of the police
contact is by mail or phone, where I politely explain to them what a
remailer is and what it is for and how it works and that therefore,
there's not any bit of evidence to be had, and they politely thank me.

cm.

- --
** christian mock in vienna, austria -- http://www.tahina.priv.at/
** http://www.vibe.at/ ** http://quintessenz.org/ ** s...@foo.woas.net
Besides, vi uses Nethack-style keybindings, and emacs doesn't.
-- Adam Thornton
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=kh7s
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christian mock

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Apr 25, 2012, 2:40:39 AM4/25/12
to
1103 <11...@none.com> wrote:

> Is there any way the Feds could bring up one of those servers,
> reconfigure it and rejoin the remailer network? They know they
> can't get anything off the servers, perhaps they feel they can
> disrupt things. Yes, I read about ECN's encrypted root.

You mean one of the seized servers? That would be quickly noticed by
the respective remops, because either the real one gets the messages
or the copy.

They could, of course, just set up their own remailer(s) and join them
to the network.

cm.

--
** christian mock in vienna, austria -- http://www.tahina.priv.at/
Wos hast "der ordner ist leer"? - Franz
Wahrscheinlich is nix drin - Tom
Vielleicht wär a Computerführerschein doch ka so schlechte Idee - Hubsi

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 25, 2012, 3:30:30 AM4/25/12
to
wrong the comp is the important part of it, its his property.
the data is encrypted and useless to anyone but the recpient that is what
mixmaster is all about
>

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 3:52:18 AM4/25/12
to
In article <slrnjpf7...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> > What was different about their siezing your computer from the seizure of
> > kulin? I ask because when his was seized, he said that they got nothing
> > due to his encrypted drives.
>
> Well, as you guessed it, no encrypted drives. The machine is located
> in a trustworthy, secure server room, so there's no need for encrypted
> drives from that angle.

Nothing wrong with having encryption to keep snoops at bay, and physical
access is only one means of being compromised. You never know.

> Also, even if it had encrypted drives, I'd probably had handed over
> the passphrase to the cops -- I prefer to continue to be seen as a
> law-abiding citizen by them; and my legal role in this is "witness",
> so the right to refuse to give evidence doesn't apply to me, and I'm
> certainly not gonna go to jail over this.
>
> I'm not running a remailer to play the crypto hero, I'm running it to
> provide part of a service to people who need it, and the concept of
> chained remailers makes sure an adversary has to put a *lot* of effort
> into breaking it.

Nor should you be expected to play crypto hero. That's no problem. You did
the right thing, as far as I am concerned anyway. We do not want to depend
on heroes in that way. You are expecting, and rightl so, that users send
messages with chains and use the remailer system according to its design
in order to maintain security. Our expectations should be based on the
system design and not based on trust, or heroes or any such thing. Our
diligence in following best-practices in terms of using the system
correctly is what makes it work effectively.

This is another good example of why we need to ensure that trust is out of
the picture and system processes are used as the basis of security, and it
is plainly another indication of why relying on closed-source programs and
unrealistic models of trust is a bad platform to build security on.
Hopefully, those who expect us to "trust in their judgment" will catch the
hint.

> You may have noticed that austria has been running for more than 10
> years.

Thanks for that service, Christian Mock!

[snip]

Kulin

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 4:29:20 AM4/25/12
to
In article <slrnjpf7...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> 1103 <11...@none.com> wrote:
>
> > Is there any way the Feds could bring up one of those servers,
> > reconfigure it and rejoin the remailer network? They know they
> > can't get anything off the servers, perhaps they feel they can
> > disrupt things. Yes, I read about ECN's encrypted root.
>
> You mean one of the seized servers? That would be quickly noticed by
> the respective remops, because either the real one gets the messages
> or the copy.
>
> They could, of course, just set up their own remailer(s) and join them
> to the network.

Which is what it looked like shortly after 9/11. Our supply of
remailers doubled in a period of a few months. It was remarkable.
Most, if not all, made no contacts in a.p.a-s. They operated maybe a
1-2 years and gradually went away.

Personally, I think that was likely TLA and possibly it didn't gain
them enough to continue.


Anonymous

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 5:52:08 AM4/25/12
to mail...@m2n.mixmin.net, mail...@tioat.net
In article <slrnjpf7...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> 1103 <11...@none.com> wrote:
>
> > Is there any way the Feds could bring up one of those servers,
> > reconfigure it and rejoin the remailer network? They know they
> > can't get anything off the servers, perhaps they feel they can
> > disrupt things. Yes, I read about ECN's encrypted root.
>
> You mean one of the seized servers? That would be quickly noticed by
> the respective remops, because either the real one gets the messages
> or the copy.
>
> They could, of course, just set up their own remailer(s) and join them
> to the network.
>
> cm.

Wouldn't the latter make more sense than the former? Grabbing a
server like a remailer seems a waste of time and resources.
There's really nothing useful for them on it even if they should
manage to find and decrypt a few emails.

Amusement time. I worked at a facility where the FDIC and an
army of lawyers had great interest in some emails going back a
few years. There was one technically naive lawyer who insisted
that several servers be seized, never mind the fact that the
stuff they wanted was journaled off and archived on tape.
Anyway, they took them, we gave them the passwords, and a few
weeks later they were back demanding the archives, which we
handed over. To make a long story short, they had to move the
servers they took to a temp location where they had a rented
tape library that could read the tapes. In the process, they
dropped the rack of servers off a lift-gate and destroyed them.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 5:58:56 AM4/25/12
to
> So, to get back to your original question, one would have to look for
> remailers located in countries where such treaties do not exist.

Japan and North Korea are probably the only ones, sadly. USAberalles

Anonymous

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Apr 25, 2012, 9:22:04 AM4/25/12
to
I don't think Iran would be very cooperative.


Nathan

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Apr 25, 2012, 11:20:20 AM4/25/12
to
the problem here is that the US is *known* to be storing ALL email
traffic that routes through the united states. Sounds like a daunting
task, but there's a reason they have all these big high security data
centers all over the place and have "high security rooms" at all the
telcos and large ISPs. That traffic gets siphoned off to their data
centers for storage for later in case they need it. There's a simple
reason why those places have petabytes of storage.

So there is never a question of "but they'd have to have been watching
for that email last week/month/year and it's long since been sent and
removed from caches". No. They have it. They have them all, just in
case. Watch Enemy of the State. Watch how they pull up satellite
footage from hours and days ago. Same principle here, if you can
record everything, it works like a time machine. (for the past anyway)

So yes, busting down a door and taking the remailer keys gives them
100% access to 100% of the traffic that has been sent by that remailer
at ANY point in the past where it crossed through a US ISP.

The truly disgusting part of this is they got the KEYS. Technically
all they NEEDED was to hand over the encrypted message to the AU
authorities, they break down the door and use the key to decode the
message, and turn over the message, then wipe their copy of the key.
That would be the "proper" way to do it, not to abuse the system, but
instead they handed over the KEYS themselves, and now the US can
decrypt truckloads of hard drives of emails that they have NO business
having access to. That is the true crime here. It's like having a
legal reason to subpoena a safe deposit box at a bank, and the bank
hands them over a master key that opens every box in the vault and
lets them look through anything they want. That's just WRONG.

Every time someone sends a bomb threat they can pull this stunt, it's
like christmas over at the NSA, "we got another key! lets see what
goodies we can find!" Talk about an incentive for abuse... Normally
I don't go "tinfoil hat" on things, but THIS is actually an instance
where I could start to buy into someone suggesting the NSA/etc forging
a bomb threat just to get access to another random footlocker of
encrypted data they want a peek at.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 9:57:15 AM4/25/12
to
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
>create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
>was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
>threats.
>
>Therefore, I had to destroy any existing keys and create new keys (see
>below).
>
>What does this mean?

excuse please not good english.
what is level of logging was on server.
SMTP logs for how much time. /days/weeks/years/
old mixmaster messages for how much time.
old mixmaster messages mv to /dev/null or over writed.
cron job so to clean old logs and message is simpile rm or over writed.
please to give more informations.




Kulin

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 10:04:13 AM4/25/12
to
Unless the FBI is incompetent, they know that seizing a remailer
will not get them anywhere.

But some boss said 'you gotta make it look like you are trying.
Barack is breathing down my neck, the black bastard'.

So the hysterical old ladies seize here, seize there, and will find
nothing unless one of the 'Threateners' shoots his mouth off.

It is a good wake-up call for remailers, though. Is there a tutorial
on how to encrypt the keys by pressing a hotkey?


Anonymous

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 12:46:47 PM4/25/12
to
On 25 Apr 2012 14:04:13 -0000, Kulin <rema...@reece.net.au> wrote:

>Is there a tutorial on how to encrypt the keys by pressing a hotkey?

Run the whole thing from an encrypted volume. If you can be there to
press a hotkey, you can be there to power the machine down.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 1:26:05 PM4/25/12
to
> This is another good example of why we need to ensure that trust is out of
> the picture and system processes are used as the basis of security, and it
> is plainly another indication of why relying on closed-source programs

Nobody is using closed source programs except in your imagination faggot
boy! The only thing closed source is the GUI. DO YOU UNDERSTAND ME!!!!

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 4:09:49 PM4/25/12
to
Nathan <virtu...@gmail.com> wrote:

> instead they handed over the KEYS themselves, and now the US can
> decrypt truckloads of hard drives of emails that they have NO business
> having access to.

So in effect, Austria has been owned by the TLA since the keys
began to be used.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 2:48:58 PM4/25/12
to
In article <d2825467-22d3-4d1b...@x17g2000yqj.googlegroups.com>
Your full of shit and you haven't thought this threw past your loudly
quivering lips. Those one set of keys do not break the whole chain, and
let's hope you have used tor to hide your IP and put encryption on the
payload. If you were following best-practices, then you would have been
doing so; if you are not, then you need to start. You sound frantic and
desparate. Desparately emotional people are dangerous. Were you on LSD
when you watched the hollywood movie?





























Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 3:51:15 PM4/25/12
to
In article <slrnjpdp...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
> was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
> threats.

Apparently, their examination of cripto led them to you now because they
did not just come up with it out of the blue.

>
> Therefore, I had to destroy any existing keys and create new keys (see
> below).
>
> What does this mean?
>
> - - The remailer's private keys are compromised, so any message that was
> encrypted to those keys can be decrypted, *if* it was intercepted in
> the form it reached the austria remailer.

Well, then, if austria was an exit point, looks like a lot of people just
got hung out to dry.

> - - If you've been following best practice and used a chain of
> remailers, this chain has been weakened, but probably not broken.

If you had been following best practices, the disk would have been
encrypted and the keys short-lived. How much logging did you do, and how
often was it wiped?

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 4:37:57 PM4/25/12
to
In article <slrnjpdp...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
> was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
> threats.
>
> Therefore, I had to destroy any existing keys and create new keys (see
> below).
>

What exactly is the point of destroying old keys and creating new ones if
you are going to give them to the police next time they come and there is
no encryption? I am trying to understand that?

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 4:42:56 PM4/25/12
to
In article <slrnjpdp...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer.

Can you tell us more about the procedure followed for creating a forensic
disk image? How did the events play out exactly? Thanks.

Noone

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 6:19:01 PM4/25/12
to
G. Morgan <seal...@osama-is-dead.net> wrote:

> christian mock wrote:
>
>>> How many remailers (machines) are 'out of reach' from US
>>> authorities, any?
>>
>>No idea.
>
> I can't believe they got to you in Austria! I thought that was
> way out of their (US) sphere of influence.


This has been discussed for years in here. Overseas is no longer
automatically safer. Nor does it even necessarily add red tape, in
fact it may remove some. Many recent global happenings are now
solid proof of this.

Noone

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 6:30:35 PM4/25/12
to
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:

> Well, as you guessed it, no encrypted drives. The machine is
> located in a trustworthy, secure server room, so there's no need
> for encrypted drives from that angle.
>

Encrypted drives don't give much protection anyway in a server
situation. They are better for home computers/laptops/tablets, etc
where your compromise vector is likely to be against a non-running
machine.

Servers must have the encryption open to run. This leads to two
issues, they can image the drive while the machine is running and
the encryption is open when they have physical access. If they
want the key or passphrase they just have to reboot the remailer
(making it look like a routine hang or reboot) then wait for the
admin to log in and enter the passphrase to get it the rest of the
way up.

Kulin

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 7:05:02 PM4/25/12
to
"christian mock" <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote in message
news:slrnjpdp...@erl.tahina.priv.at...
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
> was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
> threats.
>

I called on you guys (i.e. all the remailer ops) in an earlier usenet
post in this NG to DESTROY ALL PRIVATE KEYS AND TO GENERATE NEW ONES.
This to prevent the Feds or anyone else from breaking the chain. I'm
pretty sure they (FBI) have a remailer message and they're trying to
peel away the encryption one layer at a time. There's a good chance the
bomber used a 3 remailer chain (the default in QuickSilver, I believe)
so it's VITAL that EVERY REMAILER DESTROYS ITS OLD KEYS AND GENERATE
NEW ONES A.S.A.P to prevent them retrieving the last remailer private
key.

Failure to do this and the resulting destruction of anonymity will
result in an enormous loss of face for the remailer community.



Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 6:02:42 PM4/25/12
to
Not only that, it also means they've been able to trace the message
from the exit remailer crypto back to the remailer Austria. If not,
then why austria ? Why not Eurovibes ? Why not Kroken ? Or Frell, or
any other ? No. They got to Austria remailer.

Compromized intentionally or unintentionally, "forgetting" to strip off
a message-id perhaps ? Or, "forgetting" to strip off all the technical
informations from an incoming message, or remailer software too buggy ?
Or something else, for the end user it doesn't make any difference.
Something has led them to the remailer austria.

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 7:31:18 PM4/25/12
to
On Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:02:42 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
<nob...@dizum.com> wrote:

>Not only that, it also means they've been able to trace the message
>from the exit remailer crypto back to the remailer Austria. If not,
>then why austria ? Why not Eurovibes ? Why not Kroken ? Or Frell, or
>any other ? No. They got to Austria remailer.

What is the basis of the conjecture that anything found at cripto
pointed back to austria? Did the FBI say that, did the cripto remop
say that, did the austria remop say that, did anyone say that?

It could easily be that austria was just another exit for one of the
threats.

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 8:24:12 PM4/25/12
to
Shut up, Rooster, you TLA lad. He's right. Keys have to be changed
and destroyed much more often to counter that strategy. Who would be
after a key, which is valid for no more than a few days?
Message has been deleted

Kulin

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 9:07:32 PM4/25/12
to
Suppose the keys had been encrypted. What should he have done when
the police looked over the image of the remailer that they created,
discovered that the keys were encrypted, and came back and demanded
that he give them the key to decrypt them?


Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 10:42:28 PM4/25/12
to
In article <slrnjpf7...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> > What was different about their siezing your computer from the seizure of
> > kulin? I ask because when his was seized, he said that they got nothing
> > due to his encrypted drives.
>
> Well, as you guessed it, no encrypted drives. The machine is located
> in a trustworthy, secure server room, so there's no need for encrypted
> drives from that angle.
>
> Also, even if it had encrypted drives, I'd probably had handed over
> the passphrase to the cops -- I prefer to continue to be seen as a
> law-abiding citizen by them; and my legal role in this is "witness",
> so the right to refuse to give evidence doesn't apply to me, and I'm
> certainly not gonna go to jail over this.


A secure remailer is one that is run in a virtual machine and in ram. Any
data that needs to be written to disk would be written to an encrypted
partition that is wiped routinely, rebooted every 24 hours. Having access
to the keys should yield less than one day's traffic, if that.











Anonymous

unread,
Apr 25, 2012, 10:54:51 PM4/25/12
to
On Thu, 26 Apr 2012 04:42:28 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
<nob...@dizum.com> wrote:

>Having access
>to the keys should yield less than one day's traffic, if that.

Having access to the keys yields all the traffic that was previously
collected via upstream SMTP capture before it even got to the
remailer.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 12:13:50 AM4/26/12
to
In article <e674d5002d08a0f4...@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
>
>
> > Christian Mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>
>
> > >
> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > > Hash: SHA1
> > >
> > > Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
> > > create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
> > > was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
> > > threats.
>
> > Americans are such hysterical old women, that a few more pranks
> > like the Pittsburgh one will get them to shut down all remailers
> > in the US, and the ones in any countries that are afraid enough of
> > the US.
>
> It is not Americans, its the socialist that have infiltrated the
> government. As if any other country of the world has something to
> say about Anerican intrusive government.

Is English not your native language? Your statement is generally
unintelligible. The first "sentence" is actually two, and the second one
is not even a complete sentence.
















Kulin

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 2:30:01 AM4/26/12
to
>Is English not your native language?

Does that matter?


christian mock

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 3:15:07 AM4/26/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:

> what is level of logging was on server.

mail logs from postfix and mixmaster logs. (plus system logs)

> SMTP logs for how much time. /days/weeks/years/

automatically deleted daily. deleted, not overwritten.

> old mixmaster messages for how much time.
> old mixmaster messages mv to /dev/null or over writed.

I don't think you can get mixmaster to keep old messages (if you don't
change the code).

cm.

- --
** christian mock in vienna, austria -- http://www.tahina.priv.at/
** http://www.vibe.at/ ** http://quintessenz.org/ ** s...@foo.woas.net
If you really want a tape-based backup solution, use lots of duct tape
to package up IDE hard-drives to keep them safe offsite. -- AdB
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFPmPX6fFYn/kwM9E8RAg0bAJ4tb1rnpvAoFx7P0Srj2INVDzHSHgCgp4E8
tMELURMHkqCXIDYUr9oOoy0=
=g4/o
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

christian mock

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 3:18:47 AM4/26/12
to
Anonymous <Anonymous> wrote:

>>Is there a tutorial on how to encrypt the keys by pressing a hotkey?
>
> Run the whole thing from an encrypted volume. If you can be there to
> press a hotkey, you can be there to power the machine down.

the problem with this is twofold:

a) it could well bring you trouble for obstruction of justice (or
whatever that's called)

b) if they politely knock on your door and show you a court order the
first time, and you pull such a stunt, the next time they'll kick
down your door and hold you at gunpoint to prevent you from
interfering.

cm.

--
** christian mock in vienna, austria -- http://www.tahina.priv.at/
...the [APL] Execution Environment (makes me think about sunny walls,
indifferent marksmen, and the offer of a blindfold and a cigarette)...
-- Mike Andrews

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 11:25:33 AM4/26/12
to
On Thu, 26 Apr 2012 07:18:47 +0000 (UTC), christian mock
<c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:

>Anonymous <Anonymous> wrote:
>
>>>Is there a tutorial on how to encrypt the keys by pressing a hotkey?
>>
>> Run the whole thing from an encrypted volume. If you can be there to
>> press a hotkey, you can be there to power the machine down.
>
>the problem with this is twofold:
>
>a) it could well bring you trouble for obstruction of justice (or
> whatever that's called)
>
>b) if they politely knock on your door and show you a court order the
> first time, and you pull such a stunt, the next time they'll kick
> down your door and hold you at gunpoint to prevent you from
> interfering.
>
>cm.

Encrypting the keys at the press of a hotkey has the same problems.

OBTW, thanks for your many years of service to the community.

us...@sabotage.org

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 12:15:30 PM4/26/12
to
Seems the US is going after all remailers.

Today the KLPD THTC tried to make a forensic copy of
outpost.zedz.net. The server was installed 3 years ago
and the remailer directory was encrypted.

The server has had no reboots in these 3 years.

Of the 6 disks, 3 are dead, I do not have the key
for the remailer directory (the reason for the no
reboots) and the machine seems dead.

I'll have to visit the DC (sometime after the 1st of May)
and check the machine. Untill I've verified the state
of the machine and replaced hardware, dizum is down.

No remailer keys should have been compromised, as the
keys were quite old, it might be a good reason to renew
those.


Alex.

Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
> In article <slrnjpdp...@erl.tahina.priv.at>
> christian mock <c...@tahina.priv.at> wrote:
>>
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> Hash: SHA1
>>
>> Today, the police arrived with a court order that allowed them to
>> create a forensic disk image of the austria remailer. This apparently
>> was on request of the US authorities, related to the Pittsburgh bomb
>> threats.
>>
>> Therefore, I had to destroy any existing keys and create new keys (see
>> below).
>>
>> What does this mean?
>>
>> - - The remailer's private keys are compromised, so any message that was
>> encrypted to those keys can be decrypted, *if* it was intercepted in
>> the form it reached the austria remailer.
>>
>> - - If you've been following best practice and used a chain of
>> remailers, this chain has been weakened, but probably not broken.
>>
>> - - Since I've destroyed all existing keys, messages "in flight"
>> encrypted to those keys will be discarded. I'm sorry about that.
>>
>> - - You need to update your keyrings before you can include austria in
>> your chains again
>>
>> - - Depending on how paranoid you are, you may assume the machine is
>> backdoored, since the authorities have had access. I will re-install
>> the machine from trustworthy media, but due to the logistics
>> involved this will take a few weeks.

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 12:33:10 PM4/26/12
to
Sorry to hear of this Alex. I hope you get things back together soon.
And thanks for your many, many, actually the most years of service to
the community.

Kulin

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 1:32:21 PM4/26/12
to

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 2:49:17 PM4/26/12
to
In article <19a60cdc4e55543c...@dizum.com>
And Windows Explorer is just a GUI too, nothing to worry about. Now you
want to sell us some real estate at bargain prices too?

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 3:40:14 PM4/26/12
to
In article <4f9974a2$0$6849$e4fe...@news2.news.xs4all.nl>
<us...@sabotage.org> wrote:
>
> Seems the US is going after all remailers.
>
> Today the KLPD THTC tried to make a forensic copy of
> outpost.zedz.net. The server was installed 3 years ago
> and the remailer directory was encrypted.

What is KLPD THTC? Why did you say "tried" as opposed to "did"?
>
> The server has had no reboots in these 3 years.
>
> Of the 6 disks, 3 are dead, I do not have the key
> for the remailer directory (the reason for the no
> reboots) and the machine seems dead.
>
> I'll have to visit the DC (sometime after the 1st of May)
> and check the machine. Untill I've verified the state
> of the machine and replaced hardware, dizum is down.
>
> No remailer keys should have been compromised, as the
> keys were quite old, it might be a good reason to renew
> those.
>
>
> Alex.

[snip]


In any case, this rash of seizures do indicate one good thing. The MIB had
not broken the codes previously and were not privy or "in the know". In
other words, our system works when used properly. That's a good thing.

us...@rehab.sabotage.org

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 3:50:14 PM4/26/12
to
Anonymous <christel-v...@eurovibes.org> wrote:
> In article <4f9974a2$0$6849$e4fe...@news2.news.xs4all.nl>
> <us...@sabotage.org> wrote:
>>
>> Seems the US is going after all remailers.
>>
>> Today the KLPD THTC tried to make a forensic copy of
>> outpost.zedz.net. The server was installed 3 years ago
>> and the remailer directory was encrypted.
>
> What is KLPD THTC? Why did you say "tried" as opposed to "did"?

KLPD = Dutch FBI; THTC = Team High-Tec Crime;

I know they succeded in imaging 3 of the 6 disks. (tried/did a Dutch way
of using English, sorry for the confusion)

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 3:53:44 PM4/26/12
to
On Thu, 26 Apr 2012 21:40:14 +0200, Anonymous
<christel-v...@eurovibes.org> wrote:

>What is KLPD THTC? Why did you say "tried" as opposed to "did"?

The National Police / High Tech Crime Team.

Only someone who was there could know whether they succeded in getting
a good image of the machine. If Alex was there he would have said so,
and have had a lot more to say beyond that his machine is hosed.

anon

unread,
Apr 26, 2012, 4:05:06 PM4/26/12
to mail...@m2n.mixmin.net, mail...@tioat.net
In article <4f9974a2$0$6849$e4fe...@news2.news.xs4all.nl>
<us...@sabotage.org> wrote:
>
> Seems the US is going after all remailers.
>
> Today the KLPD THTC tried to make a forensic copy of
> outpost.zedz.net. The server was installed 3 years ago
> and the remailer directory was encrypted.
>
> The server has had no reboots in these 3 years.
>
> Of the 6 disks, 3 are dead, I do not have the key
> for the remailer directory (the reason for the no
> reboots) and the machine seems dead.
>
> I'll have to visit the DC (sometime after the 1st of May)
> and check the machine. Untill I've verified the state
> of the machine and replaced hardware, dizum is down.
>
> No remailer keys should have been compromised, as the
> keys were quite old, it might be a good reason to renew
> those.
>
>
> Alex.

Need any disks?



Message has been deleted

biofilm

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 12:41:38 AM4/27/12
to

"Nomen Nescio" <nob...@dizum.com> wrote in message
news:0cb698d40ea5ad33...@dizum.com...
you stupid Engrlish teacher.


biofilm

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 12:47:48 AM4/27/12
to

"Kulin" <rema...@reece.net.au> wrote in message
news:VNSPCPOJ4102...@reece.net.au...
yes, thank you Alex !!


Anonymous Remailer (austria)

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 9:53:58 AM4/27/12
to
Typical liberal arguement. You can't stand up to the truth of
the statement, so you denigrate the writer.

us...@sabotage.org

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 3:58:57 PM4/27/12
to
Server is up again. 2 disks survived, 4 died. (one OS disk (of the raid) and
the website disk which holds hacktic.nl and dizum and other sites survived.)

The other OS disk (of the raid) died, as did the ftp disk (so no crypto
archive anymore) and two other disks.

I've verified the OS disk (which also host the home dir of the remailer)
and there was no data/key material available. (donno on the slack space
or the swap space though)

I'll see what I can do to update the remailer, late next week, although
I prefer to do a clean install on a new machine as the current config is
known.

Sorry for the incovenience.

Cheers,
Alex

Kulin

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 4:31:42 PM4/27/12
to
A point that many have overlooked is that mixmin/banana remailer are

linked .

What this means that the mixmin/banana remailer has its server server at

the same location as Mr Monk's





anon

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 4:56:57 PM4/27/12
to
In article <CXCCVIRV4102...@reece.net.au>
So what are you inferring? That some rabbits got slaughtered
while others did not?



straycat

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 5:43:03 PM4/27/12
to
On 27 Apr 2012 19:58:57 GMT, <us...@sabotage.org> wrote:

>The other OS disk (of the raid) died, as did the ftp disk (so no crypto
>archive anymore) and two other disks.

Alex,

Much of the crypto archive is mirrored in quite a few places. You
could probably get most, if not all of it back.

http://ftp.gwdg.de/linux/crypt/archive/utopia.hacktic.nl/

SC

Anonymous

unread,
Apr 27, 2012, 7:30:10 PM4/27/12
to
In article <365b74eca7d5d653...@remailer.privacy.at>
Au contraire, I suppose it never occurred to you that expressing oneself
coherently is a good indication of how well one thinks and generally a
requisite to having one's conclusions considered well-founded? In other
words one might say, "garbage in, garbage out." Or do you also listen to
advice from witch-doctors?

Zax

unread,
Apr 28, 2012, 7:43:56 AM4/28/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 27 Apr 2012 19:58:57 GMT, <us...@sabotage.org> wrote in
Message-Id: <4f9afa81$0$6858$e4fe...@news2.news.xs4all.nl>:

> I'll see what I can do to update the remailer, late next week, although
> I prefer to do a clean install on a new machine as the current config is
> known.

Hi Alex,

If you're upgrading, you might prefer to grab this tarball:-
https://github.com/downloads/crooks/mixmaster/mixmaster-3.1a2.tar.gz

No new features added but a few bugfixes since the 3.0 release.

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--
pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid Admin <admin.mixmin.net>

Zax

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Apr 28, 2012, 8:25:39 AM4/28/12
to
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Hash: SHA512

On 27 Apr 2012 20:31:42 -0000, Kulin wrote in
Message-Id: <CXCCVIRV4102...@reece.net.au>:

> A point that many have overlooked is that mixmin/banana remailer are
> linked .
There is no mixmin remailer. I operate banana, hsub and slow. They all
live on the same physical server. Both nymservers, nym.mixmin.net and
mixnym.net also reside on the same server, as does the mixmin.net
mail2news gateway. Much as I'd love to split these services on to
individual servers, the cost would be unacceptable.

> What this means that the mixmin/banana remailer has its server server at
> the same location as Mr Monk's
Not that I know of. My server is provided by Hetzner and lives in a DC
in Germany.

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Anonymous

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Apr 28, 2012, 10:32:03 AM4/28/12
to
Zax <ad...@mixmin.net> wrote:

> > I'll see what I can do to update the remailer, late next week, although
> > I prefer to do a clean install on a new machine as the current config is
> > known.
>
> Hi Alex,
>
> If you're upgrading, you might prefer to grab this tarball:-
> https://github.com/downloads/crooks/mixmaster/mixmaster-3.1a2.tar.gz
>
> No new features added but a few bugfixes since the 3.0 release.

the hsub support is not a new feature ?






Zax

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Apr 28, 2012, 10:59:08 AM4/28/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On Sat, 28 Apr 2012 14:32:03 +0000 (UTC), Anonymous wrote in
Message-Id: <e438323c448290fc...@remailer.paranoici.org>:
Not a new feature between what's in that repository and the official
Sourceforge repository. This one does merge support for hsub and esubbf
and reduces other depedencies on IDEA. I guess that could be deemed a
new feature. :)

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Kulin

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Apr 28, 2012, 4:27:44 PM4/28/12
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Zax <ad...@mixmin.net> wrote:

> I operate banana, hsub and slow. They all
> live on the same physical server.

I am not worried about that, but is that because I am too ignornant
to know better?



Nomen Nescio

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Apr 29, 2012, 10:28:56 AM4/29/12
to
No there is a difference. I have said this numerous times.

1 Create a new GPG key ring with keys for 10 different bogus remailers all
with no passphrase
2 Update the stats files for your GUI client to refer to your bogus remailers
3 Create a few messages with the GUI
4 Send them to yourself or capture the output
5 Use GPG to decrypt all these messages

You will find nothing surprising. All the messages decrypt. That proves
it was encrypted to your bogus remailers and you can see everything in every
message payload at each step. You can use PGPDUMP to verify it was encrypted
only to one key and no back doors. I have done all this myself. Trivial.

If you need more you can verify from your application firewall the GUI isn't
trying to connect anyplace you don't want it to. You do have an application
firewall don't you?

You have to know alot to defend against all the Windows holes in Explorer.
The simple thing is set your firewall to deny Explorer access to the
internet. Testing the closed-source GUI front end for Mixmaster is much
easier. Even idiots like the fucking whiner could probably do it from my
instructions but then maybe not since he needs a GUI for everything.

Anonymous

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Apr 29, 2012, 5:52:24 PM4/29/12
to
In article <c3958a0b7171642b...@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> Anonymous <christel-v...@eurovibes.org> wrote:
>
> > In article <19a60cdc4e55543c...@dizum.com>
> > Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > This is another good example of why we need to ensure that trust is out of
> > > > the picture and system processes are used as the basis of security, and it
> > > > is plainly another indication of why relying on closed-source programs
> > >
> > > Nobody is using closed source programs except in your imagination faggot
> > > boy! The only thing closed source is the GUI. DO YOU UNDERSTAND ME!!!!
> >
> > And Windows Explorer is just a GUI too, nothing to worry about. Now you
> > want to sell us some real estate at bargain prices too?
>
> No there is a difference. I have said this numerous times.
>
> 1 Create a new GPG key ring with keys for 10 different bogus remailers all
> with no passphrase

This would need to be done in a secure environment, not in the same one
being tested, etc.

> 2 Update the stats files for your GUI client to refer to your bogus remailers
> 3 Create a few messages with the GUI
> 4 Send them to yourself or capture the output

Clarify "how" to send them to yourself, as you have bogus remailers
configured?

> 5 Use GPG to decrypt all these messages

Have you examined the gpg packets to see whether there are hidden
recipients, etc.? Again, have you done this in a protected environment,
not the one being tested?

> You will find nothing surprising. All the messages decrypt. That proves

At this point, let's just say it was a good step in the right direction.
You can see how the closed-source aspect of it definitely complicates
life, I trust?

> it was encrypted to your bogus remailers and you can see everything in every
> message payload at each step. You can use PGPDUMP to verify it was encrypted
> only to one key and no back doors. I have done all this myself. Trivial.

So you say.

> If you need more you can verify from your application firewall the GUI isn't
> trying to connect anyplace you don't want it to. You do have an application
> firewall don't you?

Absolutamente

> You have to know alot to defend against all the Windows holes in Explorer.
> The simple thing is set your firewall to deny Explorer access to the
> internet. Testing the closed-source GUI front end for Mixmaster is much
> easier. Even idiots like the fucking whiner could probably do it from my
> instructions but then maybe not since he needs a GUI for everything.

This sounds like you are now getting the test parameters correctly
identified.

Fritz Wuehler

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May 8, 2012, 3:31:57 PM5/8/12
to
Anonymous <christel-v...@eurovibes.org> wrote:

> In article <c3958a0b7171642b...@dizum.com>
> Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
> >
> > Anonymous <christel-v...@eurovibes.org> wrote:
> >
> > > In article <19a60cdc4e55543c...@dizum.com>
> > > Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > This is another good example of why we need to ensure that trust is out of
> > > > > the picture and system processes are used as the basis of security, and it
> > > > > is plainly another indication of why relying on closed-source programs
> > > >
> > > > Nobody is using closed source programs except in your imagination faggot
> > > > boy! The only thing closed source is the GUI. DO YOU UNDERSTAND ME!!!!
> > >
> > > And Windows Explorer is just a GUI too, nothing to worry about. Now you
> > > want to sell us some real estate at bargain prices too?
> >
> > No there is a difference. I have said this numerous times.
> >
> > 1 Create a new GPG key ring with keys for 10 different bogus remailers all
> > with no passphrase
>
> This would need to be done in a secure environment, not in the same one
> being tested, etc.

Right. This is easily done with Virtualbox Vmware etc.

>
> > 2 Update the stats files for your GUI client to refer to your bogus remailers
> > 3 Create a few messages with the GUI
> > 4 Send them to yourself or capture the output
>
> Clarify "how" to send them to yourself, as you have bogus remailers
> configured?

Yes you update the stats files by deleting all the real remailers and
replacing them with your remailers. Here's an example rlist

change

$remailer{"3nails"} = "<3na...@peculiar.user32.com> cpunk mix hybrid middle pgp pgponly latent ek ekx esub cut hash repgp remix reord ext max test inflt75 rhop5 klen1000";

to

$remailer{"3nails"} = "<y...@your.email.addy> cpunk mix hybrid middle pgp pgponly latent ek ekx esub cut hash repgp remix reord ext max test inflt75 rhop5 klen1000";

Broken type-I remailer chains:

Broken type-II remailer chains:

Not sure if you have to change the addy here its been awhile since I tested
the GUI

Last update: Mon 30 Apr 2012 07:30:02 GMT
remailer email address history latency uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
3nails y...@your.email.addy ++ ---+ 5:34:30 64.92%


using Mixmaster its simple to test as you remove the SMTP option and use OUTFILE
to capture the output of mixmaster to files in your chosen directory. Then
you don't have to send them to yourself well you do but they don't actually
get sent the messages appear in your directory and you can check them
directly without the bother of mailing yourself but its all the same

>
> > 5 Use GPG to decrypt all these messages
>
> Have you examined the gpg packets to see whether there are hidden
> recipients, etc.? Again, have you done this in a protected environment,
> not the one being tested?

Yes. I suggest PGPDUMP as the tool to dump the packets but you can also do
the same thing with something like gpg --examine-packets or --dump-packets
check the gpg help page. I use PGPDUMP so I don't remember the gpg options
but it has a similar feature

>
> > You will find nothing surprising. All the messages decrypt. That proves
>
> At this point, let's just say it was a good step in the right direction.
> You can see how the closed-source aspect of it definitely complicates
> life, I trust?

Not really because open source is a false security blanket. Everyone thinks
everyone else is checking it. Check everything yourself then you know who
checked it and as I show its simple to do. If youre afraid to rely on a
closed source GUI then why aren't you afraid to rely on anything you
havent tested. You can remove all the variables by testing. But then this is
my job as I test computer programmes so Im not afraid to do abit of work.
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