Excellent Intelligence      

   Items from a monitored Intel newsgroup referring to a speech
by DCI Tenet at Georgetown University 10/18/99.

>
> Ralph McGehee wrote:
> snip, snip...
>
> >  First, Tenet talked exclusively about intelligence while
> > deflecting any substantive discussion of covert operations --
> > when operations are the raison d'etre of the CIA. The CIA spends
> > one percent of its budget for all-source intelligence--indicating
> > the emphasis in reverse of this aspect.
>
> snip, snip....
>
> While intelligence spending is classified, there are numerous leaks and
> reports that indicate total spending is about $28 billion.  Of that, it is
> believed that some $3.1 billion goes to the CIA.  Further, it is thought
> that less than 5 percent of CIA spending (less than one percent of total
> intelligence spending) goes to covert action.  Some also goes to the FBI
> for counterintelligence, but most of the $28 billion goes for the
> collection, analysis and distribution of all-source intelligence.  And the
> bulk of that, of course, is spent by the NRO on its various spy satellite
> programs.  The biggest problem with priorities, most observers agree, is
> that too much is spent on technical collection (SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT)
> while too little is spent on exploitation and analysis.  As a result, much
> of the information collected gets little review (and in some cases is never
> even looked at) by analysts.
>
> Spending on overt action has varied greatly over time.  It was much if not
> most of the CIA budget in the late 40's and early 50's and during the
> Vietnam era, but is only a tiny part today.
>
> Also of note, more than half of all intelligence spending now goes for
> salaries to career government employees in the various agencies and in the
> military.
>
> SEE,
> Bruce Berkowitz & Allan Goodman, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, Princeton U Press,
> 1989, p144.
>
> SEE ALSO:
> http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/index.html
> http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/cia-invismain.html
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                  Outstanding Intelligence

   I appreciate the learned comments of the author (name
deleted by McGehee) whose background and current associations 
affords an excellent appreciation of the Intelligence Community. 
(But I question some of the budget figures estimated by the author).

   My criticisms are directed at improving the intelligence and
operations of the CIA -- in directions that seem imminently feasible
-- while taking into account domestic political realities.

   My observations admittedly come from very negative experiences
with the CIA and from research conducted since that time.

   (A quick word about experiences -- I, uniting analysis and operations,
in a matter of months was able to discover and report the procedures and
foundations of Vietnamese Communism -- that had and has escaped the
CIA to this day. These foundations were so strong and viable that
no amount of U.S. action would defeat them. Instead of reporting these
factors, the CIA suppressed all information challenging its policy of
victory there. I do no claim to be a super analyst, perhaps just super
naive -- believing the CIA, at that time, wanted intelligence not
policy support.)

   Recommendations:  First the priorities of counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, counter weapons of mass destruction and other
counters. These activities demand the highest level of analytical
processing conducted by outstanding analysts working in close
association with good case officers. These activities demand support
and non-interference by desk-based staffs, multi-layered supervisory
groups, etc., many of whom look more to political accommodations
and careers than results.

   One example -- a field intelligence report must undergo review
and editing by roughly three - to four levels before going to
Headquarters. There it must survive a number of reviews by the 
politicized Directorate of Operations (that was/is? in a state
of deep rot). From there it goes to the Directorate of Intelligence
where it must survive numerous other staff reviews. Nothing of
value can exit intact this politicized gamut -- particularly if it 
contains information challenging the political correctness of those 
review elements.

   Secondly: Hire case officers and analysts with demonstrated,
tested analytical capabilities. This seems so obvious that it
should not need be mentioned -- but the CIA from the beginning
sought/seeks other attributes than might be called counter
analysis/intelligence.

   After hiring good people, promote based on analytical and
operational results not on some artificial grading system that
counts the number of agent recruitment's.

   This  "How To Do" discussion can go on and on -- but to me
if you have a major problem say in counterterrorism --  put together
a good team of analysts and operators and assign them the problem, 
then move them from problem to problem if necessary while you assemble
other good teams.

   Appropriate supervisory input at the highest levels is essential and
can accomplish wonders, I hope it exists.

Ralph McGehee
http://come.to/CIABASE