Backward to the Future A speech by Mr. John Millis, the Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) bodes ill for the body politic. In his speech to the Central Intelligence Retirees' Association on 5 October 1998, he outlined Congressional plans for the future of the Intelligence Community (IC) -- especially the CIA. His report should frighten every informed American as it plunges the United States into a repeat world of "Newspeak," "New War," and a vastly expanded role for the ever-failing CIA. Terrifyingly the HPSCI plans the rebirth of the Mighty Wurlitzer AKA Wisner's Wurlitzer, along with increased covert action, and paramilitary attacks on other countries. It recreates the glory days of the CIA when it regularly overturned unpopular -- to the U.S. -- governments -- while creating false evidence, subverting America's academia and the press; and wholesale lying to everyone. The Vietnam and Laotian Wars being just one manifestation of the Intelligence Community's (IC) power to create and dictate public opinion. Selected cites from his speech with commentary follows. Following that is information from CIABASE. Ralph McGehee http://come.to/CIABASE ------------------------- Mr. Millis: Let me start with the first piece of truly good news. It's one word: George Tenet from my point of view is exactly what the doctor ordered for CIA. You all know one of the most important things, if not THE most important thing that a manager must do, is to pick good people to help implement his policies and to advise him, and I think George has done a very good job of that. RMC Comment: From the little I know about Tenet's appointments he does seem to have chosen some potentially good managers. But -- Tenet has overseen some glaring recent intelligence failures. COLLECTION AND DOWNSTREAM EXPLOITATION Mr. Millis: First of all, the imbalance between collection and downstream activities: The actual cost of all-source analysis is 1% of the intelligence budget.... RMC Comment: One percent of the budget for all-source analysis -- this after a claimed strong push on upgrading analysis as ordered by the HPSCI. No wonder U.S. Intelligence stinks. Here Mr. Millis talks about adding new analysts "Downstream." But once bad information gets "downstream" it pollutes and colors all subsequent analysis. There must be some mechanism to prevent this from happening. You can have 10, 100 or 1000 or more analysts and if they are analyzing garbage, then they will produce a "Garbage Report." Why do analysis only "downstream?" MORE OLD-FASHIONED ESPIONAGE Mr. Millis: This gets to the third point: the need for more espionage. There has been a sea change; I don't know how many of you have noticed it. Two or three years ago, everybody was constantly beating up on the Clandestine Service at the Agency. Now, I'm quite amazed at the change. We get lots of calls daily from journalists, and they hardly ever call up anymore wanting just to do a story that gratuitously beats up on the CIA's Directorate of Operations. They're out there trying to do stories about the value. The Ames case took a terrible toll for three or four years, poisoning the perception of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO). RMC Comment: The deterioration of the DO began before the Ames betrayal and continues to this day because of failed personnel and policies of the DO. It is convenient to blame everything on Ames to avoid commenting on, or dealing with, the real issues. For further information see Admiral Jeremiah's report of 1998. Mr. Millis: It seems we're getting beyond that. There seems to be close to a consensus of opinion that we need to rebuild these clandestine capabilities. The question is how do you go about doing it? Again, we're very pleased by what Jack Downing has done in the DO in trying to fix the problems and the damage which was done over the last several years. RMC Comment: The massive outpouring of negative information about the DO has spread far and wide -- if you want to rebuild the DO let people know what changes have been made. For example, are there still 400 employees under an investigative cloud because they protested to the Inspector General. Is it still standard practice of the IG to send details of protest back to the protesters' superiors, or, as one official called it "Shooting the Wounded." Is it standard practice to continue to use the lie detector as a weapon to further "Shoot the Wounded?" RMC further comment: Does the CIA still hire rigid-thinking team players as operations officers? CIA employed this personnel selection formula for close to 50 years with predictable results -- bad intelligence and failed operations. Does the CIA still use promotion procedures guaranteeing fraud? And, has the CIA cleaned out the "flawed" DO managers that caused so much of the malaise and the recent mass departures? REBUILDING COVERT-ACTION ASSETS Mr. Millis: "....rebuilding of covert-action capabilities. Again, without getting classified, there's not that much I can say; just a couple of observations. We believe that we have to keep a very strong paramilitary capability on the shelf for the Directorate of Operations. It's always hard to anticipate what the next crisis is going to be, but we can be sure that it will be there. And the paramilitary capability the DO has is uniquely well suited for many of the types of situations that we're seeing around the world." RMC Comment: Having a strong PM capability guarantees bad intelligence. PM officers in the CIA report "intelligence" that naturally supports the operations they are planning and conducting. Decades of such operations and reporting has led to disasters for the United States. The ability of PM officers when real intelligence is desired is a major problem. Lastly, why build a second or third or forth PM capability when there are the various military special forces? Mr. Millis: The media side was never popular among most case officers. "Where are the metrics? How do I know that what I'm doing is of any value?" Well, the fact is the Agency got out of the business totally. And believe it or not, there are some situations in the last year or two where it would not have hurt the US to try and swing world opinion our way. We see that we are losing world opinion against Saddam Hussein. There are countries that are being taken over by narco-traffickers. There are countries that are harboring terrorists. It would be nice if we could do something other than deliver a demarche or have USIS out there with the media guidance. That covert capability is totally gone. We believe again this is something that the CIA did very well, and has just as much application today as it did in the past. RMC Comment: The rebirth of the Mighty Wurlitzer and the loss of America's touch with reality. Please see my Web Site's "Chile, A Model CIA Operation," that describes in great and authentic detail the workings of the Mighty Wurlitzer in just one country -- other than the United States. For examples of the issues discussed see the below items from CIABASE. ------------------------------------ Mr. Millis's speech was published under -- Copyright notice: No part of the ZGram may be retransmitted in any format unless accompanied by the below signature line, in it's entirety. 1 March 1999 NMIA ZGram Thanks for logging on, Zhi Hamby Editor, The ZGram: http://www.zgram.net Managing Information for: CyberWynd Publications : http://www.cyberwynd.net National Military Intelligence Assn: http://www.nmia.org OPSEC Professionals Society: http://www.opsec.org Association of Former Intelligence Officers: http://www.his.com/afio 749th TBA WMD Laboratories ---------------------------------- Information from CIABASE about Tenet's plans and the past record of CIA in the fields of propaganda, book publishing, academia, and domestic and international media operations. Tenet Plans as Director: DCI Tenet, [is recruiting aggressively] two or three thousand in the next few years-or risk the slow death of american intel. Tenet hopes to make the clandestine service bigger than it was at the height of the cold war, to open more overseas stations and bases, to mount more complex and more expensive secret ops. and he wants the nation's sharpest talents -- analysts, info techs and experts on everything from afghanistan to zimbabwe. he aims to revitalize CIA mired in a slough of despond-terrible publicity, terrible morale, terrible credibility. Tenet's, hiring blitz is the most important internal affair on the agency's agenda. over the past six years, C.I.A. has lost about 4,000 of its people: about 20% of its spies, analysts, scientists and techs. CIA needs, hundreds of computer wizards. decline most significant at CIA's directorate of operations (do). at least 7 percent of the spy cadre left in each of past six years. about a thousand spies, and it leaves not many more than a thousand. departures of hundreds of officers in their 30's and 40's were troubling to CIA. no DCI served for more than two years in this decade. there were tremendous internal morale problems," says John Deutch, DCI in 1995 and 1996. CIA hired about 25 new ops officers in 1995, and lost six times as many to retirement. new york times 1/24/99 Academia: CIA, 50-75 CIA now using several hundred academicians who provide leads, making introductions, write books and other propaganda material, censored by CIA. located in 100 campuses. at majority of institutions no one other than individual is aware of link. several academicians serve abroad collecting intel. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) b 1 189-90 CIA, 50-75 has continuing operational relationships with many thousands of academicians at hundreds of U.S. academic institutions. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) b 1 189 domestic collection division maintained contacts with tens of thousands americans who volunteer info. CIA overtly in contact with many members american academic community. dcd operates from 38 offices around U.S. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) b 1 438 domestic, 50-75 CIA has long relationship with universities which range from making introductions for intel purposes, to intel collection abroad to academic research and writing where CIA sponsorship is hidden. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) b 1 181 domestic collection division, 47-50 DCD is the point of contact with large number academicians who travel abroad or who otherwise consulted for their expertise. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) b 1 189 domestic op, 50-75 university officials and professors provide leads and make introductions for intelligence purposes (this phrase substantially abridged at request of executive agencies); scholars and journalists collect intelligence; journalists devise and place propaganda; U.S. publications provide cover for CIA agents overseas. U.S. congress, church committee report. (1976) b 1 179 Media: domestic, 50-75 two proprietary news services in europe had U.S. subscribers. The larger had 30 subscribers. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) B1 199 CIA funded Vietnam institution that propagandized the American people and congress. U.S. Congress, Church Committee report. (1976) B1 200 No mechanism exists to protect public from black or any other CIA propaganda. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) B 1 201 CIA censored a portion of the U.S. congress, Church Committee report: CIA has used U.S. media for cover and to collect intel. American journalists were part of a network around world who provide intelligence and attempt to influence foreign opinion thru use of propaganda. Individuals provide CIA direct access to a large number of newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and TV stations and book publishers. U.S. congress Church Committee report (1976) B1 pages 192-195 (Note: as part of this activity members of the media stopped articles critical of U.S. and CIA policy, while planting false information). university officials and professors 47-75 provide leads and make introductions for intelligence purposes (this phrase substantially abridged at request of executive agencies); scholars and journalists collect intel; journalists devise and place propaganda; U.S. publications provide cover for CIA agents overseas. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) B1 179 Vietnam, CIA helped create and support various Vietnamese periodicals and publications. CIA-supported VN publications were used to propagandize American people and both houses of congress. U.S. congress, Church Committee report. (1976) b 1 454 Books Victor Navasky sued the CIA to get a list of the "well over 1000 books" that had been produced, subsidized or sponsored by the CIA before the end of 1967. The CIA advised request is staggering because files and materials relating to books subsidized or sponsored by the CIA vary in size from 2 to 200 linear feet (there about 2,000 pages in a linear ft). the chief of the CIA covert action staff wrote: "books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily because one single book can significantly change the reader's attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other single medium..." New York Times 10/26/82