THE SURPRISE AT TET 1968 The below annotated citations are from my data base on the CIA. Ralph McGehee http://come.to/CIABASE The House of Rrepresentatives Pike committee investigation of CIA evaluated CIA intel on six major world events. All adjudged to be prolonged failures. Intelligence on the Tet offensive: on February 1, hours after the initial mass assaults, General Westmoreland [said] "I'm frank to admit I didn't know he (the enemy) would do it on the occasion of Tet itself. I thought he would do it before or after." The U.S. naval officer in command of river forces in the Mekong delta and his army counterpart were similarly caught off guard. Appalled by how poorly positioned they were to provide quick and efficient response, the naval officer, told the committee that he "well remember(s) the words...`it's Pearl Harbor all over again.'" The April, 1968 post-mortem done by intel officers discussed the general question of warning. It concluded that while units in one corps area were on alert, allied forces throughout the country were caught unprepared. Certain forces even while "on a higher than normal state of alert" were postured to meet "inevitable cease-fire violations rather than attacks on cities." In other areas "the nature and extent of the enemy's attacks were almost totally unexpected." One-half of the South Vietnamese army was on leave at the time of the attacks, observing a 36-hour standdown. Committee received testimony that problems with intel in Vietnam were not confined to Tet. Up to the last days of South Vietnamese existence, certain blinders prevented objective reporting from the field and an accurate assessment of the field situation. Tet raised the issue of whether American intel could effectively account for enemy strength. Facts on File 1977, the CIA and the Security Debate: 1975-1976 77-132 War of Numbers: an Intel Memoir, by San Adams, 1994. Adams became an analyst for CIA in 64...his analysis of the reasons the communists achieved Tet surprise, for example, is far better than that in the recent "the Tet offensive: Intel Failure in War", by J. Wirtz (ithaca: cornell university press, 1991). Article by Edwin Moise, pages 1312-3 11/94 issue Journal of Asian Studies 1994 The U.S. has been surprised by every major world event since 1960 - Tet offensive that proved to be turning point in Vietnam war... Codevilla, A. (1992). Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. CIA's inabilities are legend. my primary experience -- an indication of its overall problems -- was the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. To me this, in history of world, is its most egregious intel failure. CIA had a 600-person station with officers stationed throughout provinces. CIA via unilateral, military and liaison programs had literally tens of thousands of individuals gathering intel. U.S. programs surrounded, and were surrounded by, the enemy. Yet the VC were able to infiltrate soldiers, weapons, ammunition, demolitions, and supplies of all types throughout Vietnam and attacked every major city and town completely unanticipated by CIA. Even hours after start of offensive, CIA's watch office recorded no new developments. CIABASE 3/96 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concluded that CIA field reporting "did not...reflect the massive character [of the Tet offensive]. Ford, (1998). CIA and the Vietnam policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968. Vietnamese communist forces achieved tactical surprise at Tet offensive of 68 and easter offensive of 3/72. NVN achieved major tactical surprise in 3/75 attack on Ban Me Thuot. [U.S.] greatly underestimated VC and the NVA. Palmer. (1984). The 25-year War. Ten weeks before Tet attack, CIA analyst Joe Hovey predicted "all out offensive...January to March 68...urban centers". George Carver, a top official, shot it down. Adams, (1994). War of Numbers xiii George Allen, DDI analyst on Vietnam concerned about number of communist troops in northern South Vietnam. Adams read study from NSA called, "coordinated Vietnamese communist offensive evidenced in South Vietnam," circa January 68. On 29 january, Adams read Vietnam sitrep as of 1600 that said "military activity has slackened...there is nothing of significance to report." At about the same moment, Tet offensive was about four hours old. Adams (1994). War of Numbers. The attack on Khe Sanh convinced policymakers that it to become the biggest battle of the war. On 1/30/68, group received flash message that Saigon was being shelled. Neither Johnson nor advisors grasped that attack on Khe Sanh was a deception to divert attention away from the Tet offensive. On 1/31, over 80,000 attacked more than a hundred cities in an offensive than lasted until 2/24. Rusk admitted, "we didn't think the enemy would launch an offensive in the middle of the Tet holidays, any more than we would have expected Americans to launch an offensive on Christmas day." West Point textbook said, "this was an intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor." Andrew, C. (1995). for the President's Eyes Only 342-4 The Tet offensive. CIA sit rep sent to press at six o'clock on night January 29, 1968 when the Tet offensive had been under way for four hours. But the CIA sit rep claimed military activity had declined in the Central Highlands and there was nothing of significance to report. Powers, T. (1979). The Man who Kept the Secrets. Three intel components alerted re the Tet offensive -- army communications intel group supporting the 3rd corps, national security headquarters, and CIA's Saigon Station. (see San Adams' article in the may 1975 issue of harpers: "Vietnam cover-up: playing war with numbers: a CIA conspiracy against its own intelligence." in this article he outlines his singular effort to revise estimates of the VC upward. He notes that a few hours after the VC began the 1968 Tet offensive, CIA's watch office reported there was nothing new happening.) MACV -- and virtually everyone else -- greatly underestimated the scope and intensity of the coming offensive "even though north Vietnamese newspapers were speaking freely of a coming campaign of `historic dimension.'" General Weyland, III corps commander, in the case of the Tet offensive felt that macv and CIA did not provide any warning "worth a damn." Former CORDS ambassador Komer said: "neither CIA nor MACV provided any warning at all of the magnitude or the target of the enemy's Tet offensive; we were all completely surprised." Ford, H. (1998). CIA and the Vietnam policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968. CIA study blasts own Vietnam-era performance. Top CIA officers committed the sin of slanting their views to suit policymakers a study released tuesday by CIA's own think tank said. ``CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers,'' drew on previously secret documents to illustrate how working-level CIA officers were overridden by bosses driven largely by political considerations. The survey was written by Harold Ford, a retired CIA officer who drafted many estimates re Vietnam. DCI John McCone, ``brought heavy pressure'' on the CIA and its companion spy agencies in 1962 and 1963 to produce a more optimistic national intel estimate. on whether to ``go big,'' The study found that McCone gave Johnson's foreign policy advisers his ``personal assessments which at times did not agree with those of his analysts and officers.'' CIA working-level officers, unlike McCone, argued in 1963-65 against committing U.S. combat forces and bombing North Vietnam. Lower-level CIA officers held that the war was a political-military struggle that had to be won mainly by the South Vietnamese. Later a few CIA officers championed accurate findings that enemy strength in the south was as much as twice as large as the U.S. military was willing to acknowledge, ``But the (CIA's) most senior Vietnam officers gave in to (the military's) stonewall defense of its (enemy strength) estimates, enshrined that position in a definitive (national intelligence estimate), downplayed (CIA) Saigon station officers' warnings, and so left administration officials unprepared for the shattering of their illusions in Vietnam'' after the communists' 1968 Tet offensive. Reuters 98 The position of Special Assistant for Vietnam Activities (SAVA) was created in 64-65 to focus U.S. efforts in support of policy. Helms the next DCI, gave the White House and the pentagon vigorous CIA support re Vietnam. In 1962-1963 policy intruded on intelligence. Policymakers believed [the situation in Vietnam and Laos] was improving and proposed withdrawing 10,000 advisory military personnel. In the 67-68 period political pressures forced low estimates of the enemy. George Carver head of SAVA enjoyed extraordinary cabinet-level entree, did not restrict himself to intelligence, and, until shortly after the Tet offensive, voiced a more optimistic view than his CIA colleagues. Ford H. (1998). CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968. General Westmoreland dropped about 300,000 local militia (Vietcong) from order of battle prior to Tet attack to prove U.S. winning war. Adams, S. (1994). War of Numbers. San Adams, who resigned from the CIA in disgust the day before the Tet offensive began, blamed DCI Helms for signing a doctored report on VC numbers. jeffreys-jones, r. (1989). the CIA & american democracy 171 CIA intel missed the seven-million-person-strong liberation association members of the south Vietnamese communist movement. If the VC were a popular movement, then we lost all justification for being in Vietnam. McGehee, CIABASE Unpopular pessimism why CIA analysts were so doubtful about Vietnam, Harold P. ford. "Yet analysts have to keep in mind that hubris is not a monopoly of policymakers. Vietnam analysts sometimes got locked into mindsets. this contributed to their being wrong on occasion. sometimes very wrong--especially in not sounding clear alerts that the enemy was about to launch an unprecedented Tet offensive in early 1968... An extensive and footnoted article. a Study of the Center for the Study of Intelligence semiannual edition #1 1997.