Wittgenstein on Consciousness
andy-k
consciousness in the Philosophical Investigations (sections 412 thru 426),
and their relation to what has become known as the "zombie problem".
Walter Imlenz wrote:
> Wittgenstein thinks, that the common use of the word "consciousness"
> is rather limited (it signalizes, that a person is awake again after
> he/she has fainted). By contrast, one use of the word in philosophy is
> associated with a certain picture (an enclosed realm of reality, which
> is accessible only for one person), which is suggested by common
> phrases like "the thoughts behind his forehead" (427) or "man has a
> soul" (422).
>
> The picture is OK in its everyday use, but it leads to absurd
> consequences, if you take it too serious: it now seems, that the only
> genuine way, to reach the thoughts or feelings of another person is
> some kind of direct access, and that our everyday means, to figure
> out, what people feel or mean are merely surrogate means (426 -
> "detours", because the "broad road" is always impassable). -
I don't see what is absurd about this -- it seems perfectly obvious
to me that people should be associated with private processes like
thoughts and pains that are inaccessible to other people.
> Furthermore, the picture implies, that behavior and feelings/thoughts
> are on principle unconnected, so that it's conceivable, that awake
> people ("conscious" in the common use) are nevertheless unconscious
> (in the philosophical sense). - The "grammatical error" arises, if you
> interpret the common use of words, which denote feelings etc. by means
> of the picture.
Yes, the contents of consciousness are in principle unconnected with
behavior, since behavior may be accounted for in purely mechanical
terms (e.g. information processing), and it is conceivable in principle that
the contents of consciousness may be arising quite separately from the
information processing that they accompany. I don't see anything about
this conceivable scenario that would warrant its summary dismissal.
>> [My definition of "Consciousness" is] /not/ distant from those
>> philosophers that first conjectured the zombie problem and
>> those that still consider the problem to highlight the use of the
>> word "consciousness" that is of particular interest to them.
>
> IMHO, those philosophers have no /special/ concept of "Consciousness".
> They rather interpret the common concept in a special way, and I deny
> the adequacy of the interpretation. (They /assume/, that they use the
> words in the common way.) - Their interpretation bases not on
> observations, how the words are really used, but on the picture,
> mentioned by Wittgenstein in 412-427 (a "soul" inside of man):
I propose that those philosophers do indeed have a /special/ concept of
"consciousness" that is not merely an inadequate interpretation of the
common concept, but something quite different. I propose that the already
extant word 'consciousness' has been /recruited/ for a variant use,
rather than merely re-interpreted. Such is the nature of language.
> 427: <quote> "'While I talked to him, I didn't know, what happend
> behind his forehead.' [...]"</quote> - The paragraph means the
> following: Somebody, who utters such a sentence, expresses simply the
> whish to know, what another person thinks, and there are very common
> ways, to figure it out (by observing his/her words and actions). But
> /literally/, the words refer to a hidden realm of consciousness, and
> this picture suggests - in marked contrast to the facts - the
> principled impossibility, to reach the thoughts of the other person.
> The zombie-problem arises merely, if you are blinded by this picture.
I still don't understand why this picture should be summarily dismissed.
Doesn't Wittgenstein also say "The picture is /there/; and I do not dispute
its /correctness/. But /what/ is its application?" -- i.e. he seems to be
saying /not/ that the picture is mistaken but rather that it has no place in
practical matters (and I would not dispute this claim).
>> [Moritz Schlick:] The strongest emphasis should be laid on the fact
>> that primitive experience is absolutely neutral or, as Wittgenstein has
>> occasionally put it, that immediate data "have no owner" [...] the
>> genuine positivist denies (with Mach etc.) that original experience "has
>> that quality or status, characteristic of all given experience, which is
>> indicated by the adjective 'first person'" [...]
>
> I presumably have not understood the connection between this
> positivistic position and the current discussion. Please add some
> explanation.
Schlick (like Wittgenstein) is pointing out that the data of consciousness
have no owner, and so it is invalid to qualify them as "first-person" data
in contrast to "some other kind of data" (since there is no other kind of
data with which to compare them). The subjective/objective distinction
arises as /part of/ the data of consciousness, and not as something that
transcends it (except in our philosophizing, which is also part of the data
of consciousness). This reflects the variant use to which the already extant
word 'consciousness' has been recruited.
>>> At second I want to repeat a theme of my last posting: If behavior
>>> and consciousness are totally independent on each other, you meet
>>> the problem, that a "consciousness" and the bearer / owner of this
>>> "consciousness" cannot be connected to each other any more.
>>
>> They cannot be connected by any known mechanism, but a connection is
>> assumed all the same. A variant of Dual Aspect Theory would seem to fit
>> the bill.
>
> I don't claim the lacking of a mechanism. I think the problem is
> rather located on a logical level: "This stone is conscious." -
> "But why this stone, and not some other stone?"
> Better: "But why /this/ stone, and not the stone two meters
> to the left of it?"
Why not both? (Note that I'm not supporting the notion that
stones are conscious, but rather investigating a logical argument).
> There is no /conceivable/ possibility, to establish a "relationship of
> possession" between a particular thing and a particular consciousness,
> if the thing doesn't "behave". And I think this fact is a strong hint,
> that consciousness is related to behavior in some "logical" way.
I make no claim for a "relationship of possession" between a physical
object and consciousness -- merely an assumed correlation. Like Schlick
and Wittgenstein, I think that the notion of /ownership/ of consciousness is
erroneous. The argument that "if consciousness and behavior aren't logically
related then we can't establish a relationship of possession" becomes
irrelevant.
> The assumption, that pains etc. are private, entails
> some implausible consequences, among others:
> a) That other people are conscious, is nothing more than a hypothesis.
> I'm the only being from which I really know, that it's conscious.
> b) To verify the consciousness (or the contents of the consciousness)
> of another being, it is required to invade his private world, which is
> impossible.
> c) Therefore it is conceivable, that other people - even if they
> behave like normal human beings - are totally unconscious (Zombie-
> Problem).
> d) To explain human behavior on a biological base, the private world
> of consciousness is entirely redundant. Environmental stimuli cause
> neuronal processes, which in turn cause behavior (muscle
> contractions). No "private" elements are part of this causal chain.
This is the essence of the zombie problem -- i.e. there is no necessity
that the contents of consciousness be correlated with the causal chain in
any manner at all, and so it is conceivable /in principle/ that an entity is
correlated with *no* contents of consciousness at all. Consciousness
is imputed to entities that are similar in appearance and behavior to
ourselves, on no firmer ground than the implicit conviction that
"I am conscious, therefore those like me are conscious too".
I don't see what is implausible about this.
> Those difficulties encouraged the failed attempt of the behaviourists,
> to deny the private stage of consciousness as a whole. - In a certain
> way, the view of the later Wittgenstein (which is indeed not a
> marginal area of his work - a large part of the PI deals more or less
> directly with consciousness, even if Wittgenstein disliked the term
> "consciousness") resumes the behaviouristic attempt, but avoids its
> central problem: it seems to be a consequence of the behaviouristic
> view, that (e.g.) a suffering human is not really in pain, because
> pain doesn't exist at all. - Obviously, such a consequence is inhuman
> and absurd.
Behaviorism may still adequately describe the situation if the behavior of
an entity and the contents of consciousness that are imputed to that entity
are related by a non-causal form of correlation, as postulated by dual
aspect theory. I know of no knock-down argument by which this possibility
may be eradicated.
tjack
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:QD2El.7136$GR6....@newsfe30.ams2...
confound yourself with your own desire to "figure it out". It is already
figured out. Maybe you haven't felt it happening.
When you ride the roller coaster of life, do you bend over to look at what
makes it stay on track? Knowledge is limitless, man is limited they say.
So why would you limit yourself to persuing the limitless. This can be
dangerous to your living.
But to prove that you can go deeper than any other investigator is only the
ultimate goal....witness the contriving of the "Great Philosophers" who's
work proved limited. They went mad, despotic, etc.
Great thinkers that wasted their lives trying to either placate or agitate
religious views.
Men climbing out of ignorance only to muddle themselves.
Patricia Aldoraz
> This post continues a discussion regarding Wittgenstein's
...and then you start quoting massive tracts from another post. Which
are hard to trace because you have lifted them out of context. Why the
hell not leave them there where they were and simply continue there.
And why are you quoting so much anyway? Quoting so much shows a muddle
of mind. Bad press for you.
Learn to quote better and stop worrying wtf Wittgentsein thought so
much. He is dead. Worry more what you think. You *are* alive are you
not? So behave like a live person and examine your own thoughts and
discuss them here.
Jeeeeeez!
Immortalist
wrote:
No. You should try and refrain from making up the rules a little. At
least he put some real philosophy in here in wankerhood.
John Jones
> This post continues a discussion regarding Wittgenstein's comments on
> consciousness in the Philosophical Investigations (sections 412 thru 426),
> and their relation to what has become known as the "zombie problem".
I'm not aware of W writing about the zombie problem. I think he tackles
ideas of experience at a greater level of insight than those tackled by
the zombie problem theoreticians.
> Walter Imlenz wrote:
>> Wittgenstein thinks, that the common use of the word "consciousness"
>> is rather limited (it signalizes, that a person is awake again after
>> he/she has fainted). By contrast, one use of the word in philosophy is
>> associated with a certain picture (an enclosed realm of reality, which
>> is accessible only for one person), which is suggested by common
>> phrases like "the thoughts behind his forehead" (427) or "man has a
>> soul" (422).
>>
>> The picture is OK in its everyday use, but it leads to absurd
>> consequences, if you take it too serious: it now seems, that the only
>> genuine way, to reach the thoughts or feelings of another person is
>> some kind of direct access, and that our everyday means, to figure
>> out, what people feel or mean are merely surrogate means (426 -
>> "detours", because the "broad road" is always impassable). -
>
> I don't see what is absurd about this -- it seems perfectly obvious
> to me that people should be associated with private processes like
> thoughts and pains that are inaccessible to other people.
W argues that the idea of an inaccessible private pain is a non-starter.
He argues, rightly, that we know other people's pains but not our own.
This is because knowledge is in the public domain and because we don't
have 'knowing' as a relationship with ourselves.
>> Furthermore, the picture implies, that behavior and feelings/thoughts
>> are on principle unconnected, so that it's conceivable, that awake
>> people ("conscious" in the common use) are nevertheless unconscious
>> (in the philosophical sense). - The "grammatical error" arises, if you
>> interpret the common use of words, which denote feelings etc. by means
>> of the picture.
>
> Yes, the contents of consciousness are in principle unconnected with
> behavior, since behavior may be accounted for in purely mechanical
> terms (e.g. information processing), and it is conceivable in principle that
> the contents of consciousness may be arising quite separately from the
> information processing that they accompany. I don't see anything about
> this conceivable scenario that would warrant its summary dismissal.
W would argue against that sort of dualism.
"There" doesn't point to in the head.
> Behaviorism may still adequately describe the situation if the behavior of
> an entity and the contents of consciousness that are imputed to that entity
> are related by a non-causal form of correlation, as postulated by dual
> aspect theory. I know of no knock-down argument by which this possibility
> may be eradicated.
But no possibility has been expressed, so it can't be knocked down: what
sort of possibility is a "Correlation"?
John Jones
> On Apr 12, 1:25 am, "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote:
>> This post continues a discussion regarding Wittgenstein's
>
> ...and then you start quoting massive tracts from another post. Which
> are hard to trace because you have lifted them out of context. Why the
> hell not leave them there where they were and simply continue there.
> And why are you quoting so much anyway? Quoting so much shows a muddle
> of mind. Bad press for you.
>
> Learn to quote better and stop worrying wtf Wittgentsein thought so
> much. He is dead.
No. I'm alive.
zeen...@gate.net
>
> - Show quoted text -
Given that induction is the foundation of all evidence, could someone
explain to this 'plain man' why the claim '"it is conceivable that
there is a non-causitive correlation of consciousness and behavior'"
amounts to more than the triviality that "induction is
inconclusive"!.
I may be swimming out of my depth here but that does not necessarily
invalidate my view from the shore! :-)
Zinnic
andy-k
> are hard to trace because you have lifted them out of context. Why the
> hell not leave them there where they were and simply continue there.
> And why are you quoting so much anyway? Quoting so much shows a muddle
> of mind. Bad press for you.
>
> Learn to quote better and stop worrying wtf Wittgentsein thought so
> much. He is dead. Worry more what you think. You *are* alive are you
> not? So behave like a live person and examine your own thoughts and
> discuss them here.
>
> Jeeeeeez!
You mean you're not enjoying your time here?
I'm sorry to hear that.
walterimlenz
post here, because it's directly related to Wittgenstein. In my next
post I repeat the answer of dorayme:
On 10 Apr., 03:22, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> In article
> <3c44c033-a072-4b69-8649-127dd76e8...@v15g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>,
> True, it *could* have turned out that we had nothing but wires in our
> heads that lead elsewhere, maybe ultimately to wireless separated mental
> processing units far away. Or nothing at all inside our heads. But,
> unless you want to bow down to magical naivete, intelligent people would
> be meaning at least 'some unit or mechanism' somewhere or somehow that
> carries on the business of mental calculation, memory and so on.
I've never denied this.
> And mental sentences are sure not
> translatable into statements about behaviour either. Everyone - except
> some of Wittgenstein's disciples - knows that 'John looks like he is
> trying to remember a name' does not mean 'John is trying to remember a
> name'.
Nobody believes this, and surely not Wittgenstein. The sentence "John
is trying to remember a name" cannot be translated into a description
of his behavior, but the criteria for its truth are a matter of
behavior.
> Wittgenstein, believe it or not, is not everything and the world
> has moved on from his corrective insights.
So maybe I should feel like an old Kantian or Empirist in the age of
Hegel. (Sometimes they come back.) - But he's not really my guru. I
just think, that his approach of consciousness has the potential to
resolve problems like the Zombie-problem (problems, that have worried
me since my childhood). If something convinces me of the opposite, I
will abandon Wittgenstein's view with a shrug.
> When a human talks about
> people's mental life they are not talking about people's behaviour
> simply. Nor *necessarily* talking about their brains. But they *are*
> talking about hidden mechanisms that exhibit various things through
> their causal connections.
They are talking about hidden mechanisms, they don't know anything
about? Maybe they are talking about the results of hidden mechanisms.
> > But what's the function of sentences like "I've got a headache", if
> > they don't act as descriptions of facts?
> But they *can* and do often act as descriptions of facts, namely as
> saying that there is a mind in a certain headachy state.
If "headache" doesn't designate anything, the term "description" seems
inadequate. The sentence does not resemble a description, but rather
an outcry.
> When you say dorayme is in pain and I say I am, we
> are saying the same thing.
"saying the same thing" seems somehow empty, if the usages of both
sentences differ as remarkably as they actually do (the first person
sentence does not rely on criteria, the third person sentence does.
The third-person-sentence is a kind of description, the first-person-
sentence not.). - But the following is indeed a fact: If it's true,
that I've got a headache, than it's also true, that Walter Imlenz has
a headache and vice versa.
> Wittgenstein was not into clarity. He preferred that European Germanic
> pompous guru style enigmatic pronouncement. He was a sort of very
> competent and ingenious John Jones of his day. He left a trail of
> interpreters as befits an enigmatic guru.
I agree, that Wittgenstein's style has its difficulties, but he can't
be compared with obscurantists like Heidegger (and he isn't "pompous"
at all, in my eyes). Two points are important, if you want to
understand him: on the one hand, he often simply means, what he says
(while the reader is tempted to search for a hidden meaning). On the
other hand, if you think through the problem, which is raised in one
of the paragraphs (a one, you've understood), you will suddenly
recognize your own reasonings (and Wittgenstein's responses) in some
adjacent paragraphs, which have seemed cryptical before. - But after
this process another problem arises, namely how to relate
Wittgenstein's theses to the technical terms, which fill most of the
philosophical literature, because he ignores them with a kind of
arrogance. - And I think, largely his arguing against the private
world is clear enough (presumably my rendering is the unclear part).
> > the question about the
> > consciousness of robots can be answered as follows: because there is
> > no private inner world, which can be possessed by a robot or not
> > possessed, the only left criterion is behavior.
> Now this goes wrong. I do not judge my own mental states by my behaviour
> alone.
Yes, you don't use criteria at all. And therefore the own mental state
can't be the base to judge the mental states of robots.
> No, when I report on
> my mental states, including things like that I am conscious, I am saying
> something about my mind. I do in fact have knowledge about my mental
> states that is not so easily obtainable by others.
Another argument Wittgenstein's: if you've got /knowledge/ about your
mental states, than it must be conceivable, that you ain't got this
knowledge. ("Maybe I've got a strong toothache, but I don't know about
it.") There is no such thing as a mental state on the one side and
your knowledge of it on the other side. You don't perceive your
headache, you just "have" it.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
In article
<92eefc33-840d-4978-b43f-c382ea35e...@h28g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
- Zitierten Text ausblenden -
- Zitierten Text anzeigen -
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 10 Apr., 03:22, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > In article
> > <3c44c033-a072-4b69-8649-127dd76e8...@v15g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>,
...
> > And mental sentences are sure not
> > translatable into statements about behaviour either. Everyone...
> > knows that 'John looks like he is
> > trying to remember a name' does not mean 'John is trying to remember a
> > name'.
> Nobody believes this, and surely not Wittgenstein. The sentence "John
> is trying to remember a name" cannot be translated into a description
> of his behavior, but the criteria for its truth are a matter of
> behavior.
We need to be very careful about this phrase of yours "criteria for
truth". This can mean, on the one hand, "truth conditions/truth-maker"
and, on the other hand, "evidence". The distinction between (to use
some
big words) ontology and epistemology comes into this. Here is the
distinction in an example. A detective is hired to investigate a
woman's
husband.
1. The man that visited the blonde woman in the flat above was your
husband.
announces the detective to the wife.
The detective had his evidence based on his observations and
reasonings,
the wife on her own evidence (based on the detective's words and his
general reliability). These are criteria for rational judgement and
assessment. But these are *not identical* with what actually makes 1.
true. What makes 1. true is that there is just one man and both
phrases
"The man that visited the blonde woman in the flat above" and "your
husband" refer in fact to the same thing.
2. The man in the corner of the doctor's waiting room over there is in
pain
can be true or false no matter what evidence anyone actually has. His
grimacing is grounds to think he is in pain. But whether he is in pain
is not the truth maker or truth condition of his being in pain.
We can acknowledge that Wittgenstein was correct that pain behaviour
is
our way of identifying the mental state. This is how we learn the
word.
Being in pain is being in a state that often and regularly cause folk
to
show pain behaviour. But you cannot turn this around to say that the
criteria for truth is in the behaviour in the sense of what makes it
true. What makes 2. true, is the existence of the man suffering a
pain.
Our evidence for it is a distinct thing in spite of how we come to
identify it.
...
> > When a human talks about
> > people's mental life they are not talking about people's behaviour
> > simply. Nor *necessarily* talking about their brains. But they *are*
> > talking about hidden mechanisms that exhibit various things through
> > their causal connections.
> They are talking about hidden mechanisms, they don't know anything
> about? Maybe they are talking about the results of hidden mechanisms.
Yes, they are talking about hidden mechanisms about which they know
little. They know it is something that causes certain behaviour. And,
in
their own case, they know enough about what it feels like to be in
that
state to be able to say all sorts of things.
> > > But what's the function of sentences like "I've got a headache", if
> > > they don't act as descriptions of facts?
> > But they *can* and do often act as descriptions of facts, namely as
> > saying that there is a mind in a certain headachy state.
> If "headache" doesn't designate anything, the term "description" seems
> inadequate. The sentence does not resemble a description, but rather
> an outcry.
No, you are concentrating too narrowly on *parts of sentences*. "X has
a
headache" says something about the world. It does not truly say there
is
a thing that can be identified as a headache. Philosophers and
mentalists and chalmers might - but they are simply mistaken. You and
I
and Wittgenstein can see this. But it does describe the world truly in
that it is saying that X is in a particular mental state, the state
that
often causes headache behaviour.
> > When you say dorayme is in pain and I say I am, we
> > are saying the same thing.
> "saying the same thing" seems somehow empty, if the usages of both
> sentences differ as remarkably as they actually do (the first person
> sentence does not rely on criteria, the third person sentence does.
> The third-person-sentence is a kind of description, the first-person-
> sentence not.). - But the following is indeed a fact: If it's true,
> that I've got a headache, than it's also true, that Walter Imlenz has
> a headache and vice versa.
Perhaps you are being misled by your phrase "the usages of both
sentences differ ... remarkably". The ways we get evidence for
something
needs to be distinguished from the meaning of phrases and from the
things in the world that make sentences true. There is a lot of
gobbledegook talked about first and third person "usage". Be careful.
...
> > > the question about the
> > > consciousness of robots can be answered as follows: because there is
> > > no private inner world, which can be possessed by a robot or not
> > > possessed, the only left criterion is behavior.
> > Now this goes wrong. I do not judge my own mental states by my behaviour
> > alone.
> Yes, you don't use criteria at all. And therefore the own mental state
> can't be the base to judge the mental states of robots.
We would judge the mental state of a robot in similar ways to the ways
we judge our fellow humans.
> > No, when I report on
> > my mental states, including things like that I am conscious, I am saying
> > something about my mind. I do in fact have knowledge about my mental
> > states that is not so easily obtainable by others.
> Another argument Wittgenstein's: if you've got /knowledge/ about your
> mental states, than it must be conceivable, that you ain't got this
> knowledge. ("Maybe I've got a strong toothache, but I don't know about
> it.") There is no such thing as a mental state on the one side and
> your knowledge of it on the other side. You don't perceive your
> headache, you just "have" it.
The way we know about our own mental states is undoubtedly different
to
the way we know about the mental state of others. I see no argument
for
denying that there are some private mental states; after all, we know
that we all keep private about some things. And, indeed, there are
some
things very hard to tell others about (sometimes there are no words!).
But I would not go on to say there are things we cannot be wrong
about.
I agree we don't perceive our own mental states in the way we perceive
trees, but that does not mean that we cannot know we have mental
states
or know many things about them.
--
dorayme
> But whether he is in pain
> is not the truth maker or truth condition of his being in pain.
That should, of course, have read as:
But whether he is grimacing is not...
--
dorayme
Immortalist
Are you or are you not Wittgenstein?
----------------------------------------------
WAS JESUS A BLACK JEWISH ITALIAN WOMAN?
PROOF THAT JESUS WAS...
...Jewish:
1. He went into his father's business.
2. He lived at home until the age of 33.
3. He was sure his mother was a virgin, and his mother was sure he was
God.
...Irish:
1. He never got married.
2. He never held a steady job.
3. His last request was a drink.
...Puerto Rican:
1. His first name was Jesus.
2. He was always in trouble with the law.
3. His mother did not know who his father was.
...Italian:
1. He talked with his hands.
2. He had wine with every meal.
3. He used olive oil.
...Black:
1. He called everybody brother.
2. He liked Gospel.
3. He couldn't get a fair trial.
...Californian:
1. He never cut his hair.
2. He walked around barefoot all the time.
3. He started a new religion.
But the most compelling evidence of all - proof that Jesus was a
WOMAN:
1. He had to feed a crowd at a moment's notice when there was no food.
2 . He kept trying to get a message across to a bunch of men who just
didn't get it.
3. Even when he was dead, He had to get up because there was more work
for him to do.
Immortalist
To say that something is "conceivable" it is trivially inductive since
we cannot conceive of all things yet so it may be wrong. But we
definately would need an example of a "non-causitive correlation of
consciousness and behavior" does anyone have one.
Here is the first note I refer to one these matters.
...Causes and effects are discovered, not by reason but through
experience, when we find that particular objects are constantly
conjoined with one another. We tend to overlook this because most
ordinary causal judgments are so familiar; we've made them so many
times that our judgment seems immediate. But when we consider the
matter, we realize that “an (absolutely) unexperienced reasoner could
be no reasoner at all” (EHU, 45n). Even in applied mathematics, where
we use abstract reasoning and geometrical methods to apply principles
we regard as laws to particular cases in order to derive further
principles as consequences of these laws, the discovery of the
original law itself was due to experience and observation, not to a
priori reasoning.
Even after we have experience of causal connections, our conclusions
from those experiences aren't based on any reasoning or on any other
process of the understanding. They are based on our past experiences
of similar cases, without which we could draw no conclusions at all.
But this leaves us without any link between the past and the future.
How can we justify extending our conclusions from past observation and
experience to the future? The connection between a proposition that
summarizes past experience and one that predicts what will occur at
some future time is surely not an intuitive connection; it needs to be
established by reasoning or argument. The reasoning involved must
either be demonstrative, concerning relations of ideas, or probable,
concerning matters of fact and existence...
...all of us - ordinary people, infants, even animals - “improve by
experience,” forming causal expectations and refining them in the
light of experience...
...When we examine experience to see how expectations are actually
produced, we discover that they arise after we have experienced “the
constant conjunction of two objects;” only then do we “expect the one
from the appearance of the other.” But when “repetition of any
particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same
act or operation…we always say, that this propensity is the effect of
Custom”.
So the process that produces our causal expectations is itself causal.
Custom or habit “determines the mind…to suppose the future conformable
to the past.” But if this background of experienced constant
conjunctions was all that was involved, then our “reasonings” would be
merely hypothetical. Expecting that fire will warm, however, isn't
just conceiving of its warming, it is believing that it will warm.
Belief requires that there also be some fact present to the senses or
memory, which gives “strength and solidity to the related idea.” In
these circumstances, belief is as unavoidable as is the feeling of a
passion; it is “a species of natural instinct,” “the necessary result
of placing the mind” in this situation.
walterimlenz
outline Wittgenstein's theory of consciousness as a whole, and I don't
want to say it again in this new "environment":
Of course, Wittgenstein has not denied cerebral processes. But at
first they are not relevant for the philosophical discussion of
consciousness: men have talked about their pains, feelings etc. long
before they got to know the function of the brain. Besides, there is
no obvious reason, why /each/ conscious being in the universe should
have a brain, that's similar to the human brain, and furthermore: the
possibility cannot be excluded, that our knowledge about the brain
will turn out to be wrong in large part. - If people talk about pains,
they don't talk about processes in the limbic system, even if those
processes (probably) act as causes. - Wittgenstein doesn't deny brain-
processes, he denies the "personally guarded private picture show".
This privacy leads to the well known philosophical problems concerning
consciousness. The assumption, that pains etc. are private, entails
some implausible consequences, among others:
a) That other people are conscious, is nothing more than a hypothesis.
I'm the only being from which I really know, that it's conscious.
b) To verify the consciousness (or the contents of the consciousness)
of another being, it is required to invade his private world, which is
impossible.
c) Therefore it is conceivable, that other people - even if they
behave like normal human beings - are totally unconscious (Zombie-
Problem).
d) To explain human behavior on a biological base, the private world
of consciousness is entirely redundant. Environmental stimuli cause
neuronal processes, which in turn cause behavior (muscle
contractions). No "private" elements are part of this causal chain.
Those difficulties encouraged the failed attempt of the behaviourists,
to deny the private stage of consciousness as a whole. - In a certain
way, the view of the later Wittgenstein (which is indeed not a
marginal area of his work - a large part of the PI deals more or less
directly with consciousness, even if Wittgenstein disliked the term
"consciousness") resumes the behaviouristic attempt, but avoids its
central problem: it seems to be a consequence of the behaviouristic
view, that (e.g.) a suffering human is not really in pain, because
pain doesn't exist at all. - Obviously, such a consequence is inhuman
and absurd.
The behaviourist can be compared with a philosopher, who refutes the
platonic theory, which states the objective existence of numbers, and
feels therefore compelled to deny the truth, that there is a certain
integer, which is bigger than three and smaller than five. - By
contrast, Wittgenstein can be compared with a philosopher, who refutes
merely the first and not the latter.
I'll try to outline the crucial point of his view (which is my view as
well): The sentence "I've got a headache" looks excactly like the
sentence "I've got a furuncle". The main difference seems to be, that
everybody can perceive my furuncle, but nobody except myself can
perceive my headache. The syntactic fact, that both words, "headache"
as well as "furuncle" are /nouns/, suggests the view, that both refer
to things - the word "furuncle" to a thing which is part of the public
world, and the word "headache" to a thing, which is part of my private
world. - This view corresponds with the picture of a "soul", which
dwells inside of me.
I'll confine myself to one argument Wittgenstein's, which seems very
crucial in my eyes. (Another one, the "Private Language Argument"
states the impossibility, to "translate" private experiences into the
intersubjective language.) It is known as the "Inverted Qualia
Argument" and the underlying thought-experiment is very old. It is
possible, but not verifiable, that one part of mankind has one
(private) perception-of-red ("Rotempfindung"), and another part of
mankind another one (227). - Because my perception-of-red is part of
my private world, and because I'm not capable, to perceive the private
worlds of other people, I cannot know, if the another human's
perception-of-red is equivalent to my perception-of-green and vice
versa - as long as both persons use the words "red" and "green" as
usual. It might be also possible, that the other one's perception-of-
red resembles my perception-of-sound or some other part of my private
world.
Wittgenstein concludes from this, that the word "perception-of-
red" (as well as the word "pains", etc.) cannot refer to a /thing/,
because the thing would be obviously totally irrelevant (293). - But
if the word "headache" doesn't refer to a thing, the existence of such
a thing must not be stated anymore: the whole concept of a "private
world of consciousness" breaks down.
But what's the function of sentences like "I've got a headache", if
they don't act as descriptions of facts? (Sentences in the third
person are not problematic, because they rely on behavioral
criteria.) Wittgenstein confines himself to allude, that those
sentences are "expressions": The one, who's uttering "I've got a
headache", expresses his pain in the same way as some other person,
who's merely sighing. This isn't meant to reintroduce the "private
thing" through the backdoor, but it means, that we are confronted with
a natural reaction (respectively, its linguistic replacement), which
is not disputable any more (and which indeed can be explained causally
by reference to cerebral processes).
If you accept Wittgenstein's view, the question about the
consciousness of robots can be answered as follows: because there is
no private inner world, which can be possessed by a robot or not
possessed, the only left criterion is behavior. A robot is conscious,
if he behaves, as if he's conscious (in the long term). And zombies
(in the sense of the Zombie-Problem) are simply not conceivable.
Walter Imlenz
Giga
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:QD2El.7136$GR6....@newsfe30.ams2...
> consciousness in the Philosophical Investigations (sections 412 thru 426),
> and their relation to what has become known as the "zombie problem".
>
> Walter Imlenz wrote:
>> Wittgenstein thinks, that the common use of the word "consciousness"
>> is rather limited (it signalizes, that a person is awake again after
>> he/she has fainted). By contrast, one use of the word in philosophy is
>> associated with a certain picture (an enclosed realm of reality, which
>> is accessible only for one person), which is suggested by common
>> phrases like "the thoughts behind his forehead" (427) or "man has a
>> soul" (422).
>>
>> The picture is OK in its everyday use, but it leads to absurd
>> consequences, if you take it too serious: it now seems, that the only
>> genuine way, to reach the thoughts or feelings of another person is
>> some kind of direct access, and that our everyday means, to figure
>> out, what people feel or mean are merely surrogate means (426 -
>> "detours", because the "broad road" is always impassable). -
>
> I don't see what is absurd about this -- it seems perfectly obvious
> to me that people should be associated with private processes like
> thoughts and pains that are inaccessible to other people.
>
I agree, we are often taken by others to have certain internal states that
we do not have, even those who know us well and are perceptive. In fact we
can even be mistaken or confused ourselves about our feelings.
>
>> Furthermore, the picture implies, that behavior and feelings/thoughts
>> are on principle unconnected, so that it's conceivable, that awake
>> people ("conscious" in the common use) are nevertheless unconscious
>> (in the philosophical sense). - The "grammatical error" arises, if you
>> interpret the common use of words, which denote feelings etc. by means
>> of the picture.
>
> Yes, the contents of consciousness are in principle unconnected with
> behavior, since behavior may be accounted for in purely mechanical
> terms (e.g. information processing), and it is conceivable in principle
> that
> the contents of consciousness may be arising quite separately from the
> information processing that they accompany. I don't see anything about
> this conceivable scenario that would warrant its summary dismissal.
Yes, look at some cases of sleep walking for instance. The person may appear
to be awake, conscious in W. language, but they may still be asleep,
uncoscious. So they have the behaviour of someone conscious, wlaking around,
eating, talking, and yet be unaware of events.
>
>
>>> [My definition of "Consciousness" is] /not/ distant from those
>>> philosophers that first conjectured the zombie problem and
>>> those that still consider the problem to highlight the use of the
>>> word "consciousness" that is of particular interest to them.
>>
>> IMHO, those philosophers have no /special/ concept of "Consciousness".
>> They rather interpret the common concept in a special way, and I deny
>> the adequacy of the interpretation. (They /assume/, that they use the
>> words in the common way.) - Their interpretation bases not on
>> observations, how the words are really used, but on the picture,
>> mentioned by Wittgenstein in 412-427 (a "soul" inside of man):
>
> I propose that those philosophers do indeed have a /special/ concept of
> "consciousness" that is not merely an inadequate interpretation of the
> common concept, but something quite different. I propose that the already
> extant word 'consciousness' has been /recruited/ for a variant use,
> rather than merely re-interpreted. Such is the nature of language.
>
True, it does not just mean 'the behaviour associated with being awake' it
means something awareness of the world and self.
>
>> 427: <quote> "'While I talked to him, I didn't know, what happend
>> behind his forehead.' [...]"</quote> - The paragraph means the
>> following: Somebody, who utters such a sentence, expresses simply the
>> whish to know, what another person thinks, and there are very common
>> ways, to figure it out (by observing his/her words and actions). But
>> /literally/, the words refer to a hidden realm of consciousness, and
>> this picture suggests - in marked contrast to the facts - the
>> principled impossibility, to reach the thoughts of the other person.
>> The zombie-problem arises merely, if you are blinded by this picture.
>
> I still don't understand why this picture should be summarily dismissed.
> Doesn't Wittgenstein also say "The picture is /there/; and I do not
> dispute
> its /correctness/. But /what/ is its application?" -- i.e. he seems to be
> saying /not/ that the picture is mistaken but rather that it has no place
> in
> practical matters (and I would not dispute this claim).
Also I could have a conscious experience of say eating an orange, or
smelling petrol, or seeing a sunset but I could hardly describe any of this
adequately in words and it would give you a very shallow impression of the
experience I actually had. Also just seeing me looking at the sky or eating
or smelling would not get you much farther.
>
>
>>> [Moritz Schlick:] The strongest emphasis should be laid on the fact
>>> that primitive experience is absolutely neutral or, as Wittgenstein has
>>> occasionally put it, that immediate data "have no owner" [...] the
>>> genuine positivist denies (with Mach etc.) that original experience "has
>>> that quality or status, characteristic of all given experience, which is
>>> indicated by the adjective 'first person'" [...]
>>
>> I presumably have not understood the connection between this
>> positivistic position and the current discussion. Please add some
>> explanation.
>
> Schlick (like Wittgenstein) is pointing out that the data of consciousness
> have no owner, and so it is invalid to qualify them as "first-person" data
> in contrast to "some other kind of data" (since there is no other kind of
> data with which to compare them). The subjective/objective distinction
> arises as /part of/ the data of consciousness, and not as something that
> transcends it (except in our philosophizing, which is also part of the
> data
> of consciousness). This reflects the variant use to which the already
> extant
> word 'consciousness' has been recruited.
>
Experience of any given part of reality by any given person is in some,
often slight degree, unique. As it is fed and processed through the brain of
that indivdual. We do not even know if they see the same colours as we do.
>
>>>> At second I want to repeat a theme of my last posting: If behavior
>>>> and consciousness are totally independent on each other, you meet
>>>> the problem, that a "consciousness" and the bearer / owner of this
>>>> "consciousness" cannot be connected to each other any more.
>>>
>>> They cannot be connected by any known mechanism, but a connection is
>>> assumed all the same. A variant of Dual Aspect Theory would seem to fit
>>> the bill.
>>
>> I don't claim the lacking of a mechanism. I think the problem is
>> rather located on a logical level: "This stone is conscious." -
>> "But why this stone, and not some other stone?"
>> Better: "But why /this/ stone, and not the stone two meters
>> to the left of it?"
>
> Why not both? (Note that I'm not supporting the notion that
> stones are conscious, but rather investigating a logical argument).
>
Also this is a straw man. Who is claiming that behaviour and consciousness
are completely disconnected?! W. is trying to say they are completely
connected, in a way, but they are not, nor are they completely disconnected.
>
>> There is no /conceivable/ possibility, to establish a "relationship of
>> possession" between a particular thing and a particular consciousness,
>> if the thing doesn't "behave". And I think this fact is a strong hint,
>> that consciousness is related to behavior in some "logical" way.
>
> I make no claim for a "relationship of possession" between a physical
> object and consciousness -- merely an assumed correlation. Like Schlick
> and Wittgenstein, I think that the notion of /ownership/ of consciousness
> is
> erroneous. The argument that "if consciousness and behavior aren't
> logically
> related then we can't establish a relationship of possession" becomes
> irrelevant.
>
W. positivist hangover, which he largely later rejected.
>
>> The assumption, that pains etc. are private, entails
>> some implausible consequences, among others:
>> a) That other people are conscious, is nothing more than a hypothesis.
>> I'm the only being from which I really know, that it's conscious.
This is actually true.
>> b) To verify the consciousness (or the contents of the consciousness)
>> of another being, it is required to invade his private world, which is
>> impossible.
This also is true.
>> c) Therefore it is conceivable, that other people - even if they
>> behave like normal human beings - are totally unconscious (Zombie-
>> Problem).
Yes se sleep walkers and various american talk shows.
>> d) To explain human behavior on a biological base, the private world
>> of consciousness is entirely redundant. Environmental stimuli cause
>> neuronal processes, which in turn cause behavior (muscle
>> contractions). No "private" elements are part of this causal chain.
Here we see the real motivation behind all this argumentation, materialism,
and a solution to the mind/body problem (or attempt).
>
> This is the essence of the zombie problem -- i.e. there is no necessity
> that the contents of consciousness be correlated with the causal chain in
> any manner at all, and so it is conceivable /in principle/ that an entity
> is
> correlated with *no* contents of consciousness at all. Consciousness
> is imputed to entities that are similar in appearance and behavior to
> ourselves, on no firmer ground than the implicit conviction that
> "I am conscious, therefore those like me are conscious too".
> I don't see what is implausible about this.
>
Nothing. Also for all we know we may have some sense for something that in
conscious. Maybe something quantum or intuition. Or maybe all conscious
things are connected in some way, like the superconscious, and we feel this
connection. Or perhaps all things are conscious but not all are self-aware,
to the extent humans are, and why wouldn't a being with physical equipment
we have for self-awreness, that must be conscious because everything is, be
also self-aware to an extent.
>
>> Those difficulties encouraged the failed attempt of the behaviourists,
>> to deny the private stage of consciousness as a whole. - In a certain
>> way, the view of the later Wittgenstein (which is indeed not a
>> marginal area of his work - a large part of the PI deals more or less
>> directly with consciousness, even if Wittgenstein disliked the term
>> "consciousness") resumes the behaviouristic attempt, but avoids its
>> central problem: it seems to be a consequence of the behaviouristic
>> view, that (e.g.) a suffering human is not really in pain, because
>> pain doesn't exist at all. - Obviously, such a consequence is inhuman
>> and absurd.
>
> Behaviorism may still adequately describe the situation if the behavior of
> an entity and the contents of consciousness that are imputed to that
> entity
> are related by a non-causal form of correlation, as postulated by dual
> aspect theory. I know of no knock-down argument by which this possibility
> may be eradicated.
>
Where consciousness and behaviour just *happen* to correlate but are not
connected otherwise. In this case the most likely explanation is some third
force is causing both, A cause B & C but B & C are not connected except via
A. What is A, God perhaps. He sees what we want and makes our body obey. OK
but this opens a bigger can of worms surely?
Patricia Aldoraz
Real philosophy is not grubbing about trying to interpret others so
hard. That is wanking.
Patricia Aldoraz
> andy-k wrote:
> W argues that the idea of an inaccessible private pain is a non-starter.
> He argues, rightly, that we know other people's pains but not our own.
This cannot be right at all. Every other man and his dog can see that
we can well know we are in pain when others do not. Wittgenstein would
simply turn in his grave if he heard rubbish like this about him.
Patricia Aldoraz
> > Learn to quote better and stop worrying wtf Wittgentsein thought so
> > much. He is dead. Worry more what you think. You *are* alive are you
> > not? So behave like a live person and examine your own thoughts and
> > discuss them here.
>
> > Jeeeeeez!
>
> You mean you're not enjoying your time here?
> I'm sorry to hear that.
I mean learn to quote better. What is hard to understand about that?
Immortalist
> that the contents of consciousness be correlated with the causal chain in
> any manner at all, and so it is conceivable /in principle/ that an entity is
> correlated with *no* contents of consciousness at all. Consciousness
> is imputed to entities that are similar in appearance and behavior to
> ourselves, on no firmer ground than the implicit conviction that
> "I am conscious, therefore those like me are conscious too".
> I don't see what is implausible about this.
>
> > Those difficulties encouraged the failed attempt of the behaviourists,
> > to deny the private stage of consciousness as a whole. - In a certain
> > way, the view of the later Wittgenstein (which is indeed not a
> > marginal area of his work - a large part of the PI deals more or less
> > directly with consciousness, even if Wittgenstein disliked the term
> > "consciousness") resumes the behaviouristic attempt, but avoids its
> > central problem: it seems to be a consequence of the behaviouristic
> > view, that (e.g.) a suffering human is not really in pain, because
> > pain doesn't exist at all. - Obviously, such a consequence is inhuman
> > and absurd.
>
> Behaviorism may still adequately describe the situation if the behavior of
> an entity and the contents of consciousness that are imputed to that entity
> are related by a non-causal form of correlation, as postulated by dual
> aspect theory. I know of no knock-down argument by which this possibility
> may be eradicated.
This reminds me not of the Zombie problem but more like the old
religious debate about "prestablished harmony" theory where one clock
tick and another rings on the hour....
1) An Objection to Parallelism:
It Cannot Explain Observed Regularities
If parallelism is correct, and mental and material events proceed
completely independently of each other, then there is no reason for
the regular relationships between them. There is no reason why what
follows the breaking of an arm should not be pain one time and joy
another. We can understand why the breaking of an arm should be
followed by pain if bone breaks cause pain, but parallelists do not
allow causes of this sort. It seems unlikely that regularities of
parallel mental and bodily occurrences would happen merely by chance.
So it is fair to demand an explanation for such regularities, but how
can parallelists provide one? They cannot rely on a causal
explanation, and no other seems available. Thus, the objection is that
parallelism cannot explain what certainly needs to be explained,
namely, the regularities between occurrences of mental and material
events.
2) Two Replies: Occasionalism
and Preestablished Harmony
Occasionalism, propounded by the seventeenth-century French
philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), is the theory that, on
the occasion that certain bodily events occur, God causes certain
mental events; and, on the occasion that certain mental events occur,
God causes certain bodily events. So, although there is no causal
interaction between minds and bodies, we can still explain the
regularity among certain mental and material events by stating that
God, who has a most orderly and powerful mind, constantly causes the
same kind of mental event each time a certain kind of bodily event
occurs, and the same kind of bodily event each time a certain kind of
mental event occurs.
The preestablished harmony theory, proposed by the seventeenth-century
German philosopher Leibniz (1646-1716), claims that the procession of
bodily events and the procession of mental events both proceed
according to a preestablished plan of God's. Which material event
follows a certain material event is predetermined; and which mental
event follows a certain mental event is also predetermined. Also,
there is a predetermined harmony between these two independent series
of events. That is, the two series are so arranged that certain events
in the material series are always accompanied by certain events in the
mental series, and vice versa. Leibniz used the example of two clocks,
one of which has a face and hands but no bells to toll the hours,
while the other has bells but no face or hands. On noticing that each
time the hands on the first clock were in a certain position, the
second clock struck once, and when the hands were in a different
position on the first clock, the second struck twice, and so on, a
person might suppose that there is some causal relationship between
the two clocks. But a closer look would show no causal connection at
all. It is just that some being regulated each clock and then set them
running in such a way that whenever the one's hands were in a certain
position, the other struck its bells a certain number of times. The
two clocks run parallel to one another and exhibit a joint regularity
or harmony resulting from the causal effect of some being who set the
clocks to run in a certain manner. Now, says Leibniz,
put the soul and body in the place of these two timepieces. Then their
agreement or sympathy will also come about in one of these three ways.
The way of influence [interactionism] is that of the common
philosophy. But since it is impossible to conceive of material
particles or of species or immaterial qualities which can pass from
one of these substances into the other, this view must be rejected.
The way of assistance [occasionalism] is that of the system of
occasional causes. But I hold that God should help only in the way in
which he concurs in all other natural things. Thus there remains only
my hypothesis, that is, the way of preestablished harmony, according
to which God has made each of the two substances from the beginning in
such a way that, though each follows only its own laws which it has
received with its being, each agrees throughout with the other,
entirely as if they were mutually influenced or as if God were always
putting forth his hand, beyond his general concurrence.
Both Malebranche and Leibniz try to save parallelism from the
objection posed earlier by providing explanations of the regularities
between mental and material events. And both postulate an unobservable
being, which they call God, in order to explain the observed mind-body
regularities. (We say only that they call this being God, because, as
we shall see in the next chapter, God has many important
characteristics, and Malebranche and Leibniz do nothing to show that
their postulated being has those Godly characteristics.)
Leibniz tries not only to justify his own postulation but also to rule
out that of Malebranche. His idea is that interactionism cannot
explain the regularities that need explaining, and occasionalism is
not an economical or simple explanation. His point is that where
postulation is necessary for explanation, we should postulate no more
than is necessary to provide the needed explanation; i.e., we should
use the simplest explaining device available. Malebranche's
occasionalist theory requires God to be constantly intervening in the
natural world, whereas Leibniz's own account requires only that God
preprogrammed the universe so that mind-body regularities come about.
Hence, Leibniz holds that his theory is preferable, and parallelism is
vindicated.
3) A Problem for Parallelism:
No Evidence to Reject Interaction
Parallelists argue that if we accept dualism but reject
interactionism, we can escape the objections against the dualistic
interactionist by postulating God as the cause of mind-body
regularities. But why should we reject interactionism? We noted
earlier that massive amounts of evidence seem to favor the view that
mental and material (brain) events causally interact. We found no
strong supporting arguments for dualism, but interactionism we found
quite plausible, even truistic. Parallelists have given no evidence in
favor of overriding our inclination to accept interactionism.
Consequently, parallelists have gone too far in their reaction to the
problems facing dualistic interactionism. They have rejected that part
of dualistic interactionism which is most plausible and least open to
objection, and have done so for no good reason. We should rather
reject parallelism.
4) Another Objection to Parallelism:
It Uses an Ad Hoc Hypothesis
Parallelists point to certain regularities or patterns in occurrences
of mental events and bodily or brain events. A bodily injury is
followed by pain; a desire is followed by action; and so on.
Interactionists also hold that there are such regularities, and offer
a simple explanation of them: an injury is followed by pain because
the injury causes the pain; and a desire is followed by an action
because the desire causes the action. In short, interactionists
explain the regularities in terms of causal interaction. True, we have
found their account of the nature of such interaction unsatisfactory,
but this difficulty does not affect the point that causal interaction
explains the regularities. Consequently, these regularities do not
seem to be in need of explanation; they already have one.
Now consider the occasionalist or preestablished harmony hypotheses,
both of which involve God's actions as the causes of mind-body
regularities. Such hypotheses would have predictive power, and so be
capable of being tested by observation and experiment, only if we
could read God's mind and discover which of the kinds of mind-brain
regularities not yet observed he will bring about in the future. But
such mind reading is completely beyond our abilities. So, neither
hypothesis has predictive power, nor is either testable by observation
or experiment. This fact together with the point that neither
hypothesis seems to be needed to explain the regularities in question,
leads us to conclude that each hypothesis is ad hoc and that the
entity which each postulates (called God) is what Leibniz called a
deus ex machina, that is, a theoretical entity the sole use of which
is to enable its theory to explain what the theory otherwise could not
explain. Hypotheses that are ad hoc in this fashion have no command on
our attention.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
http://tinyurl.com/Philosophical-Problems-and-Ar
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Behaviorism may still adequately describe the situation if the
>> behavior of an entity and the contents of consciousness that are
>> imputed to that entity are related by a non-causal form of correlation,
>> as postulated by dual aspect theory. I know of no knock-down
>> argument by which this possibility may be eradicated.
>>
> Where consciousness and behaviour just *happen* to correlate but are
> not connected otherwise. In this case the most likely explanation is
> some third force is causing both, A cause B & C but B & C are not
> connected except via A. What is A, God perhaps. He sees what we want
> and makes our body obey. OK but this opens a bigger can of worms
> surely?
You are inferring that non-causal correlation is synonymous with
occasionalism (see Immortalist's excellent post on this), but I am proposing
nothing more than a variant of dual aspect theory -- i.e. that a particular
entity and its imputed consciousness are two different aspects of a unity
that transcends them both (just as with a red ball, 'red' and 'spherical'
are different aspects, but one does not 'cause' the other). Unless a causal
mechanism can be found that explains /how/ consciousness arises in a
physical entity (the Hard Problem), all we have is a correlation, and
since (in the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary) all logically
possible scenarios must remain on the table, my claim is that dual aspect
theory cannot justifiably be eliminated at this juncture.
walterimlenz
> We need to be very careful about this phrase of yours "criteria for
> truth". This can mean, on the one hand, "truth conditions/truth-maker"
> and, on the other hand, "evidence". The distinction between (to use some
> big words) ontology and epistemology comes into this.
The "truth-maker" of each simple assertion is obviously the fact,
which is stated by the assertion. "The dogs are barking" is true, if
the dogs are barking, "four is a prime number" is true, if four is a
prime number and "This man is in pain" is true, if this man's in pain.
- But that doesn't mean, that in each of those cases the fact can
exist, if all evidence speaks against it, or that the non-existence of
the fact is logically possible, if a certain evidence is given. -
Concerning the case of the suffering man, I want to say, that 3.-
person-sentences about "private" matters are indeed necessarily true,
if a certain behavior is given.
> "X has a
> headache" says something about the world. It does not truly say there is
> a thing that can be identified as a headache. Philosophers and
> mentalists and chalmers might - but they are simply mistaken. You and I
> and Wittgenstein can see this. But it does describe the world truly in
> that it is saying that X is in a particular mental state, the state that
> often causes headache behaviour.
If "headache" doesn't refer to anything (as Witt's "inverted-qualia-
argument" suggests), than "a particular mental state" has no reference
as well. - But if "X has a headache" is not a description of a
"worldly" fact, it is nevertheless possible, to conclude statements
about worldly facts from it. (If "X has a headache" is true, you can
infer, that X will more likely show a certain kind of behavior.)
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> I propose that those philosophers do indeed have a /special/ concept of
> "consciousness" that is not merely an inadequate interpretation of the
> common concept, but something quite different. I propose that the already
> extant word 'consciousness' has been /recruited/ for a variant use,
> rather than merely re-interpreted. Such is the nature of language.
Maybe. - But they want to cope with problems like the "Zombie-
Problem" (which arise from the "normal" concept of "consciesness"), so
at least they think, that their theories are applicable to it.
> I still don't understand why this picture [the picture of a "soul inside of man"] should be summarily dismissed.
> Doesn't Wittgenstein also say "The picture is /there/; and I do not dispute
> its /correctness/. But /what/ is its application?" -- i.e. he seems to be
> saying /not/ that the picture is mistaken but rather that it has no place in
> practical matters (and I would not dispute this claim).
He compares it with another picture, the blindness as a "darkness in
the mind / head". - If you say "there's only darkness in his head" and
merely mean, that he's blind, the picture is OK. If you take it
literally, it leads into absurdities.
> Schlick (like Wittgenstein) is pointing out that the data of consciousness
> have no owner, and so it is invalid to qualify them as "first-person" data
> in contrast to "some other kind of data" (since there is no other kind of
> data with which to compare them). The subjective/objective distinction
> arises as /part of/ the data of consciousness, and not as something that
> transcends it (except in our philosophizing, which is also part of the data
> of consciousness). This reflects the variant use to which the already extant
> word 'consciousness' has been recruited.
The early Wittgenstein should not be confused with the late
Wittgenstein. You can regard them as two totally different
philosophers. (I'm sure you know this, but it might irritate other
readers.) - The late Wittgenstein would say: the owner of the
consciousness is the one, who shows the corresponding behavior (that's
the normal use of language) and he would deny the existence of
detached "data of consciousness".
> > I don't claim the lacking of a mechanism. I think the problem is
> > rather located on a logical level: "This stone is conscious." -
> > "But why this stone, and not some other stone?"
> > Better: "But why /this/ stone, and not the stone two meters
> > to the left of it?"
>
> Why not both? (Note that I'm not supporting the notion that
> stones are conscious, but rather investigating a logical argument).
The thought-experiment (try to imagine, that this stone is conscious)
leads to the result, that you can merely imagine a consciousness and a
stone and that the notion of a connection between both is somehow
empty - there is no conceivable reason, why the imagined consciousness
should be called the consciousness of this stone, as long as the stone
is a "non-behaving" thing. You could likewise try to imagine, that a
prime number is conscious.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
wrote:
> This cannot be right at all. Every other man and his dog can see that
> we can well know we are in pain when others do not. Wittgenstein would
> simply turn in his grave if he heard rubbish like this about him.
No, it's really his opinion. - To /know/ a fact means, that there is
some fact on the one side and the knowledge of this fact on the other
side. So it must be possible, that the fact exists, even if you don't
know, that it exists. And that's exactly not the case, if we talk
about our own pains. Otherwise the sentence "I might have a strong
toothache, but I don't know it." must make sense, what it obviously
doesn't. - Whereas it makes sense, to say "I know, that he's in pain."
Walter Imlenz
Patricia Aldoraz
> On 12 Apr., 03:51, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > we can well know we are in pain when others do not. Wittgenstein would
> > simply turn in his grave if he heard rubbish like this about him.
>
> No, it's really his opinion. - To /know/ a fact means, that there is
> some fact on the one side and the knowledge of this fact on the other
> side.
Is this what to know a fact is? I would say that 'to know a fact', if
it means anything, means believing that p and p being true at the very
least. There are probably other conditions too. Now, when I am in
pain, I can well believe truly that I am in pain.
> So it must be possible, that the fact exists, even if you don't
> know, that it exists.
Why *must*- this be the case? Why can there not be propositions, which
if true, we helplessly know they are true?
> And that's exactly not the case, if we talk
> about our own pains. Otherwise the sentence "I might have a strong
> toothache, but I don't know it." must make sense,
So you say! But what is the argument for this?
> ...what it obviously
> doesn't. - Whereas it makes sense, to say "I know, that he's in pain."
>
Methinks, Walter, you need to be more critical of this idol of yours!
<g>
The Evening Star
walterimlenz
wrote:
> On Apr 12, 7:35 pm, walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
>
>
> Is this what to know a fact is? I would say that 'to know a fact', if
> it means anything, means believing that p and p being true at the very
> least. There are probably other conditions too. Now, when I am in
> pain, I can well believe truly that I am in pain.
Can't you see, that you meet the same problem with "believe"? Can you
be in pain, and believe, that you're not in pain?
>
> > So it must be possible, that the fact exists, even if you don't
> > know, that it exists.
>
> Why *must*- this be the case? Why can there not be propositions, which
> if true, we helplessly know they are true?
It might be an empirical fact, that there are such propositions. But
it is still logically possible, that those propositions are true and
that we don't know about it. To "know" something, to "believe"
something - there's always a kind of distance, which is not given in
the case of "I'm in pain."
>
> > And that's exactly not the case, if we talk
> > about our own pains. Otherwise the sentence "I might have a strong
> > toothache, but I don't know it." must make sense,
>
> So you say! But what is the argument for this?
>
> > ...what it obviously
> > doesn't. - Whereas it makes sense, to say "I know, that he's in pain."
If "I know that I'm in pain" makes sense, "I don't know, if I'm in
pain" makes sense as well. - That it doesn't make sense amounts to the
following: if somebody uttered it, we would regard this as a sign,
that his language knowledge is insufficient.
>
> Methinks, Walter, you need to be more critical of this idol of yours!
Why always reduce my posts to idolatry? I simply try to argue, and if
my arguments are not new, that doesn't decrease their relevance. Just
forget that damned decayed Wittgenstein - try to believe that I
express my own opinion, if you feel better with it.
Happy Easter,
Walter Imlenz
Rec Room
>Unless a causal mechanism can be
> found that explains /how/ consciousness
> arises in a physical entity (the Hard
> Problem), all we have is a correlation,
> and since (in the absence of empirical
> evidence to the contrary) all logically
> possible scenarios must remain on the
> table, my claim is that dual aspect
> theory cannot justifiably be eliminated at
> this juncture.
Even though --in most physical overviews-- atoms would be taken to be
precursor components of the human body (and other macroscopic objects),
atoms aren't called "proto-humans" or "proto-biotic bodies", etc, or
categorized under items like "pan-humanism" or "pan-bioism". Thus, our
current tendency to label speculatively global primitive or elemental
stages of later brain-grounded consciousness with terms like
"panpsychism", "panexperientialism", and proto-versions of those
(including proto-consciousness) is probably inhibiting exploration
beyond neural activity because of the stigma of "kook territory" that
they engender.
For instance: Despite the promise of pointing-out the necessary
"receptivity" of microphysical entities to the existence or causal
effects of each other, Gregg Rosenberg unfortunately didn't try to shuck
the "panpsychism" appendage: "Gregg Rosenberg lays out a sophisticated
dual aspect panpsychist theory of consciousness and causation."
http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~anand/html/Rosenberg.html
posted by Ecce
Ed
>
> You are inferring that non-causal correlation is synonymous with
> occasionalism (see Immortalist's excellent post on this), but I am proposing
> nothing more than a variant of dual aspect theory -- i.e. that a particular
> entity and its imputed consciousness are two different aspects of a unity
> that transcends them both (just as with a red ball, 'red' and 'spherical'
> are different aspects, but one does not 'cause' the other). Unless a causal
> mechanism can be found that explains /how/ consciousness arises in a
> physical entity (the Hard Problem), all we have is a correlation, and
> since (in the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary) all logically
> possible scenarios must remain on the table, my claim is that dual aspect
> theory cannot justifiably be eliminated at this juncture.
Tom Arnold says: "According to the dual aspect theory, both matter and
mind are two different modalities or aspects of one underlying
reality. I call this fundamental reality: Universal Mind (hyponoesis).
There is no independent substance of matter or mind besides the
Universal Mind. Therefore, aspectuality just means a different
manifestation of the same reality."
This quote caught my attention because of its emphasis on one aspect
of the dual. My first thought was why "Universal Mind" rather than
"Universal Matter"? I notice that many who advocate dual aspect
theory (or something like it) focus on the mind aspect more than on
the physical aspect.
But, since they are both presumed to be aspects of one, underlying,
thing, it would seem that either one could be a viable window to
exposing the fundamental properties of that underlying "stuff". Which
one should be used for that purpose could depend on which one we have
the best investigative tool for; which one we can most easily measure
and for which we have the most developed theories. So, we should
focus on the physical aspects of those entities that seem to display
symptoms of the second aspect, as best we know. It would seem self
defeating to focus on the "mind" aspect of entities (like rocks) where
that aspect is extremely hard to detect.
ZerkonXXXX
> Yes, the contents of consciousness are in principle unconnected with
> behavior, since behavior may be accounted for in purely mechanical terms
> (e.g. information processing), and it is conceivable in principle that
> the contents of consciousness may be arising quite separately from the
> information processing that they accompany. I don't see anything about
> this conceivable scenario that would warrant its summary dismissal.
Mind if we go from here?
The persistent given of the word 'consciousness' is the yes/no possession
of an object. The conscious observer is taken for granted, the
confrontation with neutral or ownerless object or behavior occurs, the
determination of consciousness is made (or mused upon). The zombie
example sort of implodes this by the position "suppose everything is
there except consciousness". Sort of like considering a circle by
supposing there is a perfectly round square.
Before consciousness itself became a bit of cold ownerless data, it was
and still is seen in other things quite easily not by behavior of an
object but by behavior/feeling of the observer, usually based on need,
towards the object. Much like computers today which have replaced things
like the sun, corn, cats AND rocks.
Consciousness becoming 'data' as it does or can be made to seem in
"Philosophy of mind" or "Philosophy of consciousness" therefore having no
owner, it makes sense that zombie methods (ie neurotech) are needed to
define and study it to reach any satisfactory degree of certainty since
Zombies having an objective/subjective disconnect from all the mess.
A logical problem here would be that consciousness studied as data has
the same problem as all study of data, a want of finality that never
really comes. Maybe this is what 'we must pass over (through) in
silence'. The means (the study) becoming, as usual, the only real end
(the finality).
Rec Room
>The early Wittgenstein should not be
> confused with the late Wittgenstein. You
> can regard them as two totally different
> philosophers.
Yes, unless it's one of the few "heretics" like John Cook who contend
Wittgenstein could be categorized as a "neutral monist" throughout his
entire career. The review below is rather tame, as most of them (or at
least posts appended to the reviews by readers) give Cook a good
thrashing with a rod for advancing any notion that Wittgenstein didn't
change later.
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=3103
posted by Ecce
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> I propose that those philosophers do indeed have a /special/ concept
>> of "consciousness" that is not merely an inadequate interpretation
>> of the common concept, but something quite different. I propose that the
>> already extant word 'consciousness' has been /recruited/ for a variant
>> use, rather than merely re-interpreted. Such is the nature of language.
>
> Maybe. - But they want to cope with problems like the "Zombie-
> Problem" (which arise from the "normal" concept of "consciesness"),
> so at least they think, that their theories are applicable to it.
I also propose that the zombie problem is not concerned with the use of the
word 'consciousness' in common speech, but with this particular variant of
the word. I can't see how the zombie problem could be taken to apply to
the use of the word in common speech -- it would indeed be an absurdity.
>> I still don't understand why this picture [the picture of a "soul
>> inside of man"] should be summarily dismissed. Doesn't Wittgenstein
>> also say "The picture is /there/; and I do not dispute
>> its /correctness/. But /what/ is its application?" -- i.e. he seems
>> to be saying /not/ that the picture is mistaken but rather that it has no
>> place in practical matters (and I would not dispute this claim).
>
> He compares it with another picture, the blindness as a "darkness in
> the mind / head". - If you say "there's only darkness in his head" and
> merely mean, that he's blind, the picture is OK. If you take it
> literally, it leads into absurdities.
I don't agree with your insertion into my comment above, namely the line
"the picture of a soul inside of a man" -- for my own part I would speak of
no such thing as a "soul", nor would I place consciousness "inside" of a man
as though it were an organ or a function thereof. The quote from your post
to which I replied with the comment above did not mention "soul" at all.
My comment pertained to consciousness (of a person) as an aspect that
is not available to another person's senses, and I still don't understand
/why *this* picture should be summarily dismissed/.
>> Schlick (like Wittgenstein) is pointing out that the data of
>> consciousness have no owner, and so it is invalid to qualify them as
>> "first-person" data in contrast to "some other kind of data" (since
>> there is no other kind of data with which to compare them).
>> The subjective/objective distinction arises as /part of/ the data of
>> consciousness, and not as something that transcends it (except in our
>> philosophizing, which is also part of the data of consciousness).
>> This reflects the variant use to which the already extant word
>> 'consciousness' has been recruited.
>
> The early Wittgenstein should not be confused with the late
> Wittgenstein. You can regard them as two totally different
> philosophers. (I'm sure you know this, but it might irritate other
> readers.) - The late Wittgenstein would say: the owner of the
> consciousness is the one, who shows the corresponding behavior
> (that's the normal use of language) and he would deny the existence
> of detached "data of consciousness".
If we take the word 'consciousness' as it is used in common speech (e.g.
"the patient has regained consciousness") then the whole issue is reduced to
a triviality, but in doing so the use to which the word has been recruited
gets overlooked. One will no doubt find this a tolerable situation if this
latter use has not been recognized, and indeed one will no doubt be
perplexed at the claims made by the likes of Chalmers, but once it has been
recognized, the previously tolerable situation is can no longer be
sustained.
>>> I don't claim the lacking of a mechanism. I think the problem is
>>> rather located on a logical level: "This stone is conscious." -
>>> "But why this stone, and not some other stone?"
>>> Better: "But why /this/ stone, and not the stone two meters
>>> to the left of it?"
>>
>> Why not both? (Note that I'm not supporting the notion that
>> stones are conscious, but rather investigating a logical argument).
>
> The thought-experiment (try to imagine, that this stone is conscious)
> leads to the result, that you can merely imagine a consciousness and a
> stone and that the notion of a connection between both is somehow
> empty - there is no conceivable reason, why the imagined consciousness
> should be called the consciousness of this stone, as long as the stone
> is a "non-behaving" thing. You could likewise try to imagine, that a
> prime number is conscious.
Stones and prime numbers are very different things -- the analogy does not
hold. But I can imagine a stone to have a "what it's like to be a stone" in
the sense that, even in the absence of behavior, a stone might /experience/
its interactions with other entities in the world (though I don't believe
this to be the case).
andy-k
> Tom Arnold says: "According to the dual aspect theory, both matter and
> mind are two different modalities or aspects of one underlying
> reality. I call this fundamental reality: Universal Mind (hyponoesis).
> There is no independent substance of matter or mind besides the
> Universal Mind. Therefore, aspectuality just means a different
> manifestation of the same reality."
>
> This quote caught my attention because of its emphasis on one aspect
> of the dual. My first thought was why "Universal Mind" rather than
> "Universal Matter"? I notice that many who advocate dual aspect
> theory (or something like it) focus on the mind aspect more than on
> the physical aspect.
I agree -- calling it "Universal Mind" would seem to favor the mind
aspect over the matter aspect. Strawson goes the other way,
calling it "Real Materialism".
andy-k
> If "I know that I'm in pain" makes sense, "I don't know, if I'm in
> pain" makes sense as well. - That it doesn't make sense amounts to the
> following: if somebody uttered it, we would regard this as a sign,
> that his language knowledge is insufficient.
And yet we do make such claims, as though there is a "knower" that is
separate and distinct from the pain that is "known". Recognizing this error,
it makes more sense to say, not that "I am in pain", but just "pain". And
this is the point being made when it is claimed that the data of
consciousness /have no owner/. This is pertinent to the use of the word
"consciousness" to which I keep referring -- this use of the word alludes to
the case where the very "existence" of the data of consciousness is
acknowledged -- acknowledged, that is, as an aspect of that very data of
consciousness (i.e. it "enters into itself" as part of its own "content" as
it were). I find language very clumsy for conveying this idea, but language
is the only tool in the toolbox so I must use it as best I can. This leads
me to /want/ to say things like "it's the first-person subjective
perspective upon a world", but Morritz Schlick puts it perfectly when he
says that this idea of subjectivity of the data of consciousness is a very
grave error. And here is the rub... this notion of consciousness, having
arisen as part of the data of consciousness, is implicitly associated with
the concept of self. Thus the primary "stuff" if you will, being the data of
consciousness, is associated with a physical organism in its habitat, and
other physical organisms in that habitat that are similar in appearance and
behavior are associated with their own data of consciousness -- data that is
not evident from their appearance or behavior. This situation is merely
/highlighted/ by the zombie problem -- i.e. I'm sure that nobody really
transcends such a strong instinct to impute consciousness to other people
(and nor should they).
So Walter... do you recognize this notion of consciousness?
John Jones
I am though.
John Jones
> On Apr 12, 4:36 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>> andy-k wrote:
>
>> W argues that the idea of an inaccessible private pain is a non-starter.
>> He argues, rightly, that we know other people's pains but not our own.
>
> This cannot be right at all. Every other man and his dog can see that
> we can well know we are in pain when others do not.
We don't know when we are in pain. We don't have that sort of
relationship with ourselves. We are in pain, period. Knowledge is in the
public domain. There's no private knowledge.
> Wittgenstein would
> simply turn in his grave if he heard rubbish like this about him.
>
It's bog standard W.
John Jones
> On Apr 12, 7:35 pm, walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
>> On 12 Apr., 03:51, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> ...Every other man and his dog can see that
>>> we can well know we are in pain when others do not. Wittgenstein would
>>> simply turn in his grave if he heard rubbish like this about him.
>> No, it's really his opinion. - To /know/ a fact means, that there is
>> some fact on the one side and the knowledge of this fact on the other
>> side.
>
> Is this what to know a fact is? I would say that 'to know a fact', if
> it means anything, means believing that p and p being true at the very
> least.
Yes, and that shows what's wrong with saying we know our own pain. For
what would not knowing it be like?
> There are probably other conditions too. Now, when I am in
> pain, I can well believe truly that I am in pain.
>
>> So it must be possible, that the fact exists, even if you don't
>> know, that it exists.
>
> Why *must*- this be the case? Why can there not be propositions, which
> if true, we helplessly know they are true?
Yes but helplessly knowing is not knowing, its direct experience.
>> And that's exactly not the case, if we talk
>> about our own pains. Otherwise the sentence "I might have a strong
>> toothache, but I don't know it." must make sense,
>
> So you say! But what is the argument for this?
If I am in pain I may wish to tell people that I am in pain, so that
they know I am in pain. But how and why could I give myself this
information?
Patricia Aldoraz
> ...I simply try to argue, and if
> my arguments are not new, that doesn't decrease their relevance. Just
> forget that damned decayed Wittgenstein - try to believe that I
> express my own opinion, if you feel better with it.
>
> Happy Easter,
> Walter Imlenz
Happy Easter to you too. If you are arguing on behalf of yourself why
have you gone moved the discussion about robot consciousness to a
thread that is specifically about the great Wittgenstein? I am sure
dorayme does not give a fig how you get your opinions as long as they
are yours and you are interested in exploring your own ideas and not
those of some dead man from a long time ago.
If I tell you, "I am in pain", this can be perfectly true. It can
also be false. If I say "I am in pain now" does this mean that I am in
pain? What if I say it in my sleep. Or I lie? Or there is a part of my
mind that goes wrong and I find myself saying this out aloud.
Ah, you want to say, we are talking about sincere beliefs. A sincere
belief that i am in pain cannot be a wrong belief. Great! You cook the
books here because when I press you for details and make objections
you will make damned sure that if there is a gap between the belief
and the fact, it is not a "sincere" belief.
Patricia Aldoraz
> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
...
> >... I would say that 'to know a fact', if
> > it means anything, means believing that p and p being true at the very
> > least.
>
> Yes, and that shows what's wrong with saying we know our own pain. For
> what would not knowing it be like?
>
And how exactly does it show what is wrong? Are you suggesting we
could never have a mental state of which we were not aware of having
or knowing all about ? Why *must* there be a possibility of me being
wrong for me to be excluded from the honour of knowing something?
> > There are probably other conditions too. Now, when I am in
> > pain, I can well believe truly that I am in pain.
>
> >> So it must be possible, that the fact exists, even if you don't
> >> know, that it exists.
>
> > Why *must*- this be the case? Why can there not be propositions, which
> > if true, we helplessly know they are true?
>
> Yes but helplessly knowing is not knowing, its direct experience.
>
And how do you work this one out? Why is helplessly knowing p suddenly
to be excluded from knowledge?
Patricia Aldoraz
> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
> > On Apr 12, 4:36 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
> >> andy-k wrote:
>
> >> W argues that the idea of an inaccessible private pain is a non-starter.
> >> He argues, rightly, that we know other people's pains but not our own.
>
> > This cannot be right at all. Every other man and his dog can see that
> > we can well know we are in pain when others do not.
>
> We don't know when we are in pain. We don't have that sort of
> relationship with ourselves. We are in pain, period. Knowledge is in the
> public domain. There's no private knowledge.
>
Me knowing when I am in pain does not exclude others knowing it. You
are confusing things.
> > Wittgenstein would
> > simply turn in his grave if he heard rubbish like this about him.
>
> It's bog standard W.
It's bog standard usenet W. The poor guy would turn in his grave to
hear you lot!
zeen...@gate.net
> On Apr 11, 11:41 am, zeenr...@gate.net wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 11, 12:41 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Apr 11, 10:26 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
>
> > > > On Apr 12, 1:25 am, "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote:
>
> > > > > This post continues a discussion regarding Wittgenstein's
>
> > > > ...and then you start quoting massive tracts from another post. Which
> > > > are hard to trace because you have lifted them out of context. Why the
> > > > hell not leave them there where they were and simply continue there.
> > > > And why are you quoting so much anyway? Quoting so much shows a muddle
> > > > of mind. Bad press for you.
>
> > > > Learn to quote better and stop worrying wtf Wittgentsein thought so
> > > > not? So behave like a live person and examine your own thoughts and
> > > > discuss them here.
>
> > > > Jeeeeeez!
>
>
> > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > Given that induction is the foundation of all evidence, could someone
> > explain to this 'plain man' why the claim '"it is conceivable that
> > there is a non-causitive correlation of consciousness and behavior'"
> > amounts to more than the triviality that "induction is
> > inconclusive"!.
> > I may be swimming out of my depth here but that does not necessarily
> > invalidate my view from the shore! :-)
> > Zinnic
>
> To say that something is "conceivable" it is trivially inductive since
> we cannot conceive of all things yet so it may be wrong. But we
> definately would need an example of a "non-causitive correlation of
> consciousness and behavior" does anyone have one.
>
> Here is the first note I refer to one these matters.
>
> ...Causes and effects are discovered, not by reason but through
> experience, when we find that particular objects are constantly
> conjoined with one another. We tend to overlook this because most
> ordinary causal judgments are so familiar; we've made them so many
> times that our judgment seems immediate. But when we consider the
> matter, we realize that “an (absolutely) unexperienced reasoner could
> be no reasoner at all” (EHU, 45n). Even in applied mathematics, where
> we use abstract reasoning and geometrical methods to apply principles
> we regard as laws to particular cases in order to derive further
> principles as consequences of these laws, the discovery of the
> original law itself was due to experience and observation, not to a
> priori reasoning.
>
> Even after we have experience of causal connections, our conclusions
> from those experiences aren't based on any reasoning or on any other
> process of the understanding. They are based on our past experiences
> of similar cases, without which we could draw no conclusions at all.
>
> But this leaves us without any link between the past and the future.
> How can we justify extending our conclusions from past observation and
> experience to the future? The connection between a proposition that
> summarizes past experience and one that predicts what will occur at
> some future time is surely not an intuitive connection; it needs to be
> established by reasoning or argument. The reasoning involved must
> either be demonstrative, concerning relations of ideas, or probable,
> concerning matters of fact and existence...
>
> ...all of us - ordinary people, infants, even animals - “improve by
> experience,” forming causal expectations and refining them in the
> light of experience...
>
> ...When we examine experience to see how expectations are actually
> produced, we discover that they arise after we have experienced “the
> constant conjunction of two objects;” only then do we “expect the one
> from the appearance of the other.” But when “repetition of any
> particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same
> act or operation…we always say, that this propensity is the effect of
> Custom”.
>
> So the process that produces our causal expectations is itself causal.
> Custom or habit “determines the mind…to suppose the future conformable
> to the past.” But if this background of experienced constant
> conjunctions was all that was involved, then our “reasonings” would be
> merely hypothetical. Expecting that fire will warm, however, isn't
> just conceiving of its warming, it is believing that it will warm.
>
> Belief requires that there also be some fact present to the senses or
> memory, which gives “strength and solidity to the related idea.” In
> these circumstances, belief is as unavoidable as is the feeling of a
> passion; it is “a species of natural instinct,” “the necessary result
> of placing the mind” in this situation.
>
Er! I believe that the implication of my post approximates what
you expound in your post.
If a tossed penny comes up heads 10^6 times in sequence, my induction
will be that it has heads on both sides. If that induction is correct
then the result under all circumstanes will be heads.
However, it is possible that my 'induction' is incorrect and that the
penny has a tail side but has aerodynamic peculiarities that results
in its always landing as heads. Provided the circumstances are
unchanged, I still win a bet with a heads call, despite the fact
that my induction is incorrect.
However, if (unbeknownst to me) a change in circumstances affects the
aerodynamic behavior of the coin I may lose on the 10^6 +1 toss.
Accepting this possibility, confidence in a heads outcome remains
rational because it will be based on the additional induction that
the successful manufacture of a seemingly identical coin with such
peculiar aerodynamic properties is highly improbable.
Deduction is the plaything of its premisses. Induction is founded on
the reality/unreality of experience. If experience is 'unreal', then
the only alternative is to 'solipsize' !
Zinnic
Giga
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
name (it sounds a lot like epiphenomenalism). However if we take your
example of the red ball, the redness and the shape are connected as they are
aspects of the surface of the object. The same section of the ball is both
red and the appropriate section of a shere surely.
Giga
"Ed" <edg...@att.net> wrote in message
news:1ae25226-b1e7-4c3a...@j12g2000vbl.googlegroups.com...
= Or even better we could just give up both these possibly misleading
dualities. Maybe just call them both energy.
Giga
imagine any difficulty for two different substances to interact or effect
each other? Have we observed such a problem many times and conclude that
such a problem exists? No because we only know of one substance, energy.
This is sometimes matter and sometimes radiation, kinetic etc. This is the
only substance we have ever clearly observed. If matter is energy in a
strange form then perhaps mind is also. In which case they are actually the
same substance. If they are of completely different natures why shold they
not be able to interact?????
"Immortalist" <reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:03108961-f1d1-452f...@b7g2000pre.googlegroups.com...
andy-k
> I have to admit I have never heard of dual-aspect theory, at least by
> that name (it sounds a lot like epiphenomenalism).
Dual aspect theory is very different to epiphenomenalism. The latter says
that consciousness is an impotent "side effect" that arises causally in a
primarily material world.
> However if we take your example of the red ball, the redness and the shape
> are connected as they are aspects of the surface of the object. The same
> section of the ball is both red and the appropriate section of a shere
> surely.
Yes -- they are /connected/ since they are different aspects of the same
object, but one is not the /cause/ of the other. Similarly, dual aspect
theory says that the physical object and the consciousness imputed to it are
/connected/ since they are both manifestations of some unity that transcends
them both, but one is not the /cause/ of the other.
Patricia Aldoraz
What an incredible load of codwallop! What have you ended up saying?
dorayme
<54f33d21-3352-40e6...@d19g2000prh.googlegroups.com>,
Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
....
>
> What an incredible load of codwallop! What have you ended up saying?
Patricia, please attend to your quotation:
<http://www.netmeister.org/news/learn2quote.html>
--
dorayme
Giga
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
OK. So B & C are caused by A (of some kind, like being partof a ball).
Rec Room
>OK. So B & C are caused by A
Or if put that way, you can go the route of another scheme: "A" then is
or borders on being categorized as "neutral" between B & C, if the
"caused by" refers to its composite relations creating B and C.
neutral monism: "A position according to which the difference between
minds and bodies derives from different arrangements of the same neutral
entities. The entities are neutral because they themselves are neither
mental nor physical. This position proposed a solution to the mind-body
problem, but there are difficulties with the neutral status of that
which constitutes minds and bodies and with how arrangements of what is
neutral can issue in minds and bodies. If experiences are proposed as
the neutral entities, it is not clear whether neutral monism clarifies
or obscures the nature of experience."
http://www.filosofia.net/materiales/rec/glosaen.htm
If the choice is "experiences" (qualia, qualitative events, etc), what
often gets lost is that those phenomenal properties have been stripped
of their "mental-hood" (and thus that type of neutral monism is not
really idealism, which is grounded in "minds" being basic). It's similar
to how, in common materialism, pattern recognitions were stripped of
their original subjective grounding (perception / conception) and those
final discriminations of "shapes and things" resultingly made
independent of the mental / brain process (objective).
But neutral monism goes one step beyond that and makes the selection of
"whatever" (experiences, mathematics, etc) more fundamental than both
the mental and physical categories or the subjective / objective
distinction. In the case of a phenomenal properties choice
(phenomenalism), those primal qualitative events can compose both
physical objects and what is inferred as the "mind" (owner). The roots
of this empiricist version go back to Hume's bundle theory, then Ernst
Mach adopting a form of it.
posted by Ecce
John Jones
> On Apr 13, 7:13 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
>>> On Apr 12, 4:36 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>>>> andy-k wrote:
>>>> W argues that the idea of an inaccessible private pain is a non-starter.
>>>> He argues, rightly, that we know other people's pains but not our own.
>>> This cannot be right at all. Every other man and his dog can see that
>>> we can well know we are in pain when others do not.
>> We don't know when we are in pain. We don't have that sort of
>> relationship with ourselves. We are in pain, period. Knowledge is in the
>> public domain. There's no private knowledge.
>>
> It is you who is talking private knowledge, not me.
>
> Me knowing when I am in pain does not exclude others knowing it. You
> are confusing things.
How would you know that you are in pain? By being in pain. So why would
you have to know it?
Patricia Aldoraz
>
> How would you know that you are in pain? By being in pain. So why would
> you have to know it?
>
hat to wear on Sundays? You cannot help but know some things. That
does not equate to not knowing these things (which is what you and
other usenet guys with your usenet Wittgentein seem to think)
John Jones
What could you know or not know about whether you are in pain?
What you mean is "is 'pain' the right word to use for what I am feeling?"
Patricia Aldoraz
I mean we all have pains and we all generally know when we are in
pain, so this business of we cannot know we are in pain because what
is the difference between knowing and falsely believing does not make
sense has never been made out on usenet yet.
John Jones
> On Apr 14, 9:05 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>> What you mean is "is 'pain' the right word to use for what I am feeling?"
>
> I mean we all have pains and we all generally know when we are in
> pain,
How could we know whether we are in pain or not?
> so this business of we cannot know we are in pain because what
> is the difference between knowing and falsely believing does not make
> sense has never been made out on usenet yet.
Knowledge is information. But I don't need to inform myself that I am in
pain.
walterimlenz
> walterimlenz wrote:
>
> I also propose that the zombie problem is not concerned with the use of the
> word 'consciousness' in common speech, but with this particular variant of
> the word. I can't see how the zombie problem could be taken to apply to
> the use of the word in common speech -- it would indeed be an absurdity.
>
>
> "the patient has regained consciousness") then the whole issue is reduced to
> a triviality, but in doing so the use to which the word has been recruited
> gets overlooked. One will no doubt find this a tolerable situation if this
> latter use has not been recognized, and indeed one will no doubt be
> perplexed at the claims made by the likes of Chalmers, but once it has been
> recognized, the previously tolerable situation is can no longer be
> sustained.
>
sense, as it is presupposed by Wittgenstein. I meant it in the normal
sense of the present day: it has become standard, to understand the
question "Is this mosquito conscious?" not as "Is it sleeping?" but as
"Can it have pains, feelings, perceptions etc.?".
>
> Stones and prime numbers are very different things -- the analogy does not
> hold. But I can imagine a stone to have a "what it's like to be a stone" in
> the sense that, even in the absence of behavior, a stone might /experience/
> its interactions with other entities in the world (though I don't believe
> this to be the case).
You mean it like this: you can imagine, that the stone feels pain, if
it e.g. collides with another stone. But the problem, that I've tried
to pose, remains. It is imaginable as well, that a consciousness,
which is /not/ the consciousness of the stone, feels pain in the
moment of the collision. So how to distinguish this case from the
case, in which the stone itself is the pain-feeling entity? - The pain-
feeling entity is the one, that expresses the pain and if this kind of
behavior is excluded from the first, the imagined pain has no owner,
or at least its owner is not the stone.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> And
> this is the point being made when it is claimed that the data of
> consciousness /have no owner/. This is pertinent to the use of the word
> "consciousness" to which I keep referring -- this use of the word alludes to
> the case where the very "existence" of the data of consciousness is
> acknowledged [...]
I assume, that the "red point in my scope of vision" can serve as an
example for the "immediate data of consciousness", which have no owner
(and of course there is no "scope of vision" on this level, there is
just the simple perception of red). The way, to win an assertion like
"there are simple perceptions, which have no owner" is surely a kind
of introspection. At the end of such an experiment the philosopher
says e.g. "There is a simple perception of red." (He has to say
something if he wants to join a philosophical debate). And since he
utters it, /he/ is the owner of the perception.
>
> So Walter... do you recognize this notion of consciousness?
No.
dorayme
<c31726a4-0b1e-46d5...@y9g2000yqg.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> you can imagine, that the stone feels pain, if
> it e.g. collides with another stone.
Can your really? I can't. I cannot distinguish the case of the stone
from feeling pain from the case of the stone not feeling pain. We know
how a stone is made, there is nothing that gives it any such capacity.
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> In article
> <c31726a4-0b1e-46d5-8a0e-d9466476e...@y9g2000yqg.googlegroups.com>,
If you try to imagine, that the stone is in pain, when it has been
damaged, the only thing that you can really imagine is a damaged stone
and a pain. But not because of our knowledge about the composition of
a stone, but because of our knowledge about its behavior.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<76a6872b-7cba-475f...@3g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 12 Apr., 21:26, "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote:
>
...
> > So Walter... do you recognize this notion of consciousness?
>
> No.
No, Walter does not recognize such a thing any more than a sensible
philosopher like Wittgenstein would have recognised such a thing.
It is a complete fabrication that there is "a use of the word" that
"alludes to the case where the very "existence" of the data of
consciousness is acknowledged" What a mealy mouthed begging of the
question this is. It is an artless invented use of words to give them a
sort of status and make them worthy of debate.
If philosophers stopped cementing sense data and private objects into
their thoughts in this way, they would not become so helplessly trapped.
--
dorayme
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> And this is the point being made when it is claimed that the data of
>> consciousness /have no owner/. This is pertinent to the use of the
>> word "consciousness" to which I keep referring -- this use of the
>> word alludes to the case where the very "existence" of the data of
>> consciousness is acknowledged [...]
>
> I assume, that the "red point in my scope of vision" can serve as an
> example for the "immediate data of consciousness", which have no owner
> (and of course there is no "scope of vision" on this level, there is
> just the simple perception of red).
The idea of a "simple perception" (along with the idea of a "perceiver")
is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
> The way, to win an assertion like "there are simple perceptions, which
> have no owner" is surely a kind of introspection.
The idea of introspection (along with the idea of an "introspector")
is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
> At the end of such an experiment the philosopher says e.g. "There is a
> simple perception of red." (He has to say something if he wants to join a
> philosophical debate). And since he utters it, /he/ is the owner of the
> perception.
The utterance (along with the idea of a self that makes this utterance)
is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Stones and prime numbers are very different things -- the analogy
>> does not hold. But I can imagine a stone to have a "what it's like
>> to be a stone" in the sense that, even in the absence of behavior, a
>> stone might /experience/ its interactions with other entities in the
>> world (though I don't believe this to be the case).
>
> You mean it like this: you can imagine, that the stone feels pain, if
> it e.g. collides with another stone.
That's not quite the way I would put it -- rather, what it means to say that
"consciousness has been imputed to an object" is that the object is taken to
experience its environment (whether or not those experiences are expressed
in behavior).
> But the problem, that I've tried to pose, remains. It is imaginable as
> well, that a consciousness, which is /not/ the consciousness of the stone,
> feels pain in the moment of the collision.
If experiences have been imputed to an object, then how can the
consciousness imputed to a /different/ object have the experiences
of the first object? This would indeed be an absurdity.
> So how to distinguish this case from the case, in which the stone itself
> is the pain-feeling entity? - The pain- feeling entity is the one, that
> expresses the pain
The object to which consciousness has been imputed *is*, by definition,
the experiencing object (whether or not those experiences are expressed
in behavior).
> and if this kind of behavior is excluded from the first, the imagined pain
> has no owner, or at least its owner is not the stone.
The imagined experiences are imputed to the object -- i.e. object and
consciousness are imagined to be associated. It seems perfectly reasonable
to call the object the "owner" of the imputed experiences for the purposes
of common speech, and I have no problem with this. The problem lies
with the asymmetry of the third-person case mentioned above and the
so-called "first-person" case. It is in the latter case that experiences
have no owner, except in that they are imputed to a /conceptual/ owner
-- the 'self' -- that is itself also an aspect of the immediate data of
consciousness.
John Jones
> On Apr 13, 7:37 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
> ...
>>> ... I would say that 'to know a fact', if
>>> it means anything, means believing that p and p being true at the very
>>> least.
>> Yes, and that shows what's wrong with saying we know our own pain. For
>> what would not knowing it be like?
>>
>
> And how exactly does it show what is wrong? Are you suggesting we
> could never have a mental state of which we were not aware of having
> or knowing all about ? Why *must* there be a possibility of me being
> wrong for me to be excluded from the honour of knowing something?
If we can know something we can also not know it. Now what could we mean
by the claim 'I do not know that I am in pain'?
>>> There are probably other conditions too. Now, when I am in
>>> pain, I can well believe truly that I am in pain.
>>>> So it must be possible, that the fact exists, even if you don't
>>>> know, that it exists.
>>> Why *must*- this be the case? Why can there not be propositions, which
>>> if true, we helplessly know they are true?
>> Yes but helplessly knowing is not knowing, its direct experience.
>>
>
> And how do you work this one out? Why is helplessly knowing p suddenly
> to be excluded from knowledge?
If you have direct experience of something then it comes to you
unnanounced (helplessly) and not as knowledge but as direct experience.
You don't have direct experience by knowing 'about it'
dorayme
<741f3bd6-c736-4110...@o30g2000vbc.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 14 Apr., 22:31, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > In article
> > <c31726a4-0b1e-46d5-8a0e-d9466476e...@y9g2000yqg.googlegroups.com>,
> >
> > walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> > > you can imagine, that the stone feels pain, if
> > > it e.g. collides with another stone.
> >
> > Can you really? I can't. I cannot distinguish the case of the stone
> > from feeling pain from the case of the stone not feeling pain. We know
> > how a stone is made, there is nothing that gives it any such capacity.
> >
> > --
> > dorayme
>
> If you try to imagine, that the stone is in pain, when it has been
> damaged, the only thing that you can really imagine is a damaged stone
> and a pain. But not because of our knowledge about the composition of
> a stone, but because of our knowledge about its behavior.
>
What behaviour to the stone could show anything appropriate? Perhaps one
can imagine it a bit like a wounded animal in *some* respect or other
(you pick what respect, perhaps it rolls out of sight as if to hide).
But I am not sure what imagining the pain would be (you said this). One
can willy nilly juxtaposed anything with anything in mere idle words or
concepts. But to be really sensible, I say, no amount of behaviour will
do. One must imagine some sort of mental mechanism, something with
capacities. A thing, an engine. We know, of course, that in animals and
humans it is the brain.
--
dorayme
Giga
"walterimlenz" <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote in message
news:741f3bd6-c736-4110...@o30g2000vbc.googlegroups.com...
Walter Imlenz
= In the case of a stone does it not have behaviour? Is not just occupying
space, holding itself together, vibrating microscopicaly, leaching certain
minerals around inside it etc etc behaviour? Maybe it does not seem very
dynamic from the point of view of an animal such as ourselves, or even a
plant, but it still does something even if just be a stone. Perhpas the
consciousness of a stone would be a very low level compared to a human or
even an ant. If I make a fist of my hand I am conscious of it. If I
concentrate on that consciousness of my fist maybe this is something like
the consciousness of a stone.
Patricia Aldoraz
You don't need to inform me when you are in pain. i can see that you
are a troubled man! Who could not be in this day and age... <g>
Patricia Aldoraz
> The idea of a "simple perception" (along with the idea of a "perceiver")
> is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
>
What confused useless words these are! The immediate data of
consciousness indeed! You have absolutely no idea what you are talking
about. You just have swallowed something that Berkeley and Locke made
famous. At least they, especially the former, can be seen to argue for
it and argue wrongly. Your excuse is nil.
>
> The idea of introspection (along with the idea of an "introspector")
> is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
More useless (and I mean this in a straight out technical sense)
verbiage.
> The utterance (along with the idea of a self that makes this utterance)
> is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
Poor old deaf men, consigned to the dark nothingness of the likes of
Arial Sharon (is he still in a coma?) by one andy-k! I wonder, after
this sort of rubbish whether you should be more careful who you call
an idiot.
Spend less time in the library and reading odd ball continental
philosophers and other spooky texts and more time thinking and taking
more careful note of what dorayme and I say. We can help you if you
show the right sort of willingness to learn and ditch preconceived
ideas.
andy-k
> We can help you if you show the right sort of willingness to learn and
> ditch preconceived ideas.
"Let me help you across this busy road" says the blind man.
lol! Priceless.
walterimlenz
This seems to me like the immured arguing of a solipsist. - The
question is, how have you achieved the notion of "immediate data of
consciousness"? Yes, when you are eventually convinced, that the
"immediate data of consciousness" are the building material of
everything, than "the idea of introspection" and "the utterance" are
just aspects of it in your eyes. But there has been a starting point
before you've adopted this view, and at this point you (or Schlick)
have used some kind of introspection (presumably). And I want to deny
that introspection can lead to "ownerless data of consciousness".
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> One must imagine some sort of mental mechanism, something with
> capacities. A thing, an engine. We know, of course, that in animals and
> humans it is the brain.
IMHO you concentrate too much on the mechanism, because at the present
time we (seemingly) know something about it, and we are proud of it. I
think it's healthy to leave this knowledge aside. - One must not
imagine "some sort of mental mechanism" to imagine a conscious being,
it is sufficient to imagine a certain kind of behavior.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<8fad4e43-3d72-4027...@y9g2000yqg.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
No, this is a misunderstanding I am afraid. There is no concentration on
the details of the mechanism at all.
It is just that there needs to be some mechanism or other factored into
our understanding otherwise you are left with either magical thinking
(indulged in by the likes of andy-k) or behaviourism (indulged in by
Witgenstein's disciples).
I have no idea really where you stand except I get the impression that
you are vaguely not wanting to be a crude behaviourist but unwilling to
come clean and bite the bullet to get out of it. Your vague talk about
criteria will not do. Wittgentein's talk will not do.
The way out is to posit and understand that there is a mechanism. It is
typical post-Wittgentian linguistic tactics to say what you have just
said because you somehow think that you can get out of philosophical
puzzles by describing language games.
First you can't get out of all puzzles classed as philosophical this
way. And second, it is in fact necessary to bring in the idea of
mechanism to more accurately describe the language games and its
presuppositions. There is a reason for language and the way it is all
played out. You cannot ignore these presuppositions. And mechanism is
part of the causal thinking that makes our approach to everything
sensible.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<8fad4e43-3d72-4027...@y9g2000yqg.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> ...One must not
> imagine "some sort of mental mechanism" to imagine a conscious being,
> it is sufficient to imagine a certain kind of behavior.
>
What is it sufficient for? Why is it sufficient to imagine a certain
kind of behaviour? How about spelling out how you identify mental
happenings with behavioural happenings. In your own words please.
We do have mental events. We do dream and we do have pains and we do
have hallucinations and illusions and we do think. I have no particular
conceptual difficulty with this, because I attribute these things to an
object capable of having mental events. They are states of such an
object and we will know much more about these states in the coming
decades and centuries.
But you will just have good old behaviour and behaviourism has been
pretty well criticized for its inadequacies for the last 50 years. Are
you aware of these criticisms and have you any sort of answer to them.
Do you want me to outline some of them to you? I desist so far because I
leave open the possibility that you have a sophisticated behavioruism
that I have not heard about.
(btw, re your remark about the impressive gains in understanding the
brain in recent times... I would think the very opposite actually, that
they amount to jack little. All the understanding about these mechanisms
are very much in the future.
--
dorayme
andy-k
> This seems to me like the immured arguing of a solipsist.
Not a metaphysical solipsist but an epistemological solipsist,
and therefore not immured.
> The question is, how have you achieved the notion of
> "immediate data of consciousness"?
The immediate data of consciousness are always already the case.
The recognition of the fact of their existence is not an "achievement"
(since there is no-one to take the credit) but rather an /event/.
> Yes, when you are eventually convinced, that the
> "immediate data of consciousness" are the building material of
> everything, than "the idea of introspection" and "the utterance" are
> just aspects of it in your eyes. But there has been a starting point
> before you've adopted this view, and at this point you (or Schlick)
> have used some kind of introspection (presumably). And I want to deny
> that introspection can lead to "ownerless data of consciousness".
The starting point is absence of the notion of the immediate data of
consciousness. Perhaps some kind of analysis is necessary to precipitate
the transition in some individuals, and perhaps it is spontaneous in others
-- the point is not relevant. What is relevant is the recognition itself.
It might be that you already recognize this but decline to recruit the
word 'consciousness' for this purpose. Then again it might not, in which
case you and I can do no other than debate at cross-purposes.
polymer
<snippage>
> But you will just have good old behaviour and behaviourism has been
> pretty well criticized for its inadequacies for the last 50 years. Are
> you aware of these criticisms and have you any sort of answer to them.
<snippage>
I don't think that his saying that behavior is enough to know
consciousness commits him to behaviorism. Cognitive scientists
would also use 'consciousness' that way, but they have a much richer
theory of how the behavior happens than the old pavlovians
and skinnerettes.
You might enjoy watching...
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8576072297424860224
...and readings here
http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/
...and reading the book referred to in this article...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained
--
polymer
Rec Room
>Knowledge is information. But I don't
> need to inform myself that I am in pain.
Don't need to, but a linguistic thought about pain usually happens,
anyway. Part of the internal monologue habit acquired from having to
engage in interpersonal information transactions (the communal knowledge
network) on a regular basis. Since Wittgenstein believed language was
not private but of public status and origin, I suppose a Witt acolyte
can contend that this resultingly makes even those personal cognitions
mediated by language as actually belonging to that "public epistemic
system". That is, Jane Smith's thought that "My left leg hurts" was not
meant to inform "herself" but is a reflexive preparation for informing
another person (this internal monologue or descriptive habit having
become so deeply ingrained that it can't be broken even when "others"
are not around).
posted by Ecce
dorayme
polymer <pol...@operamail.com> wrote:
> dorayme wrote:
>
> <snippage>
> > But you will just have good old behaviour and behaviourism has been
> > pretty well criticized for its inadequacies for the last 50 years. Are
> > you aware of these criticisms and have you any sort of answer to them.
> <snippage>
>
>
> I don't think that his saying that behavior is enough to know
> consciousness commits him to behaviorism.
Read him more and you will see he does not like the mention of
mechanism, the engine of the mind. He has no place for it and just keep
talking about behaviour. It has to be brought in to the conceptual game
here.
--
dorayme
Patricia Aldoraz
I see you are as easily amused as confused.
> The utterance (along with the idea of a self that makes this utterance)
> is also an aspect of the immediate data of consciousness.
How can something be an aspect of something that does not exist? And,
to take the crazy counterfactual anyway, how can a mysterious thing
like this *utterance* of yours be an aspect of your even more
mysterious *immediate data of consciousness*?
Don't you know the fundamentals? If A is an aspect of B, then A must
be at least as mysterious as B. But it is not in this case, B is more
mysterious.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
>>> We can help you if you show the right sort of willingness to learn
>>> and ditch preconceived ideas.
>>
>> "Let me help you across this busy road" says the blind man.
>> lol! Priceless.
>
... said the blind man ...
turtoni
> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
> > "andy-k" wrote:
> >> Patricia Aldoraz wrote:
> >>> We can help you if you show the right sort of willingness to learn
> >>> and ditch preconceived ideas.
That is kinda scary. I think Pat is a guy.. Let us help you with your
eggs.. Heh.
> >> "Let me help you across this busy road" says the blind man.
> >> lol! Priceless.
>
> > I see [...]
>
> ... said the blind man ...
We're only making plans for Nigel.
Humor is when God allows us to have some time off for good behaviour.
andy-k
> We're only making plans for Nigel.
"We only want what's best for him."