Response to the Cultural Polluter

[Pyro 1488]

Jumangi,

First of all, let me tell you that you have disqualified yourself of being able
to participate in any serious discussion or debate on cultural issues. It is
very obvious that you are a cultural polluter. By naming mental dwarfs such as
Johnnie Cochran (the charlatan) and Winton Marsallis (a former clown of Jay
Leno) as the new Socrates and Mozart, you exposed yourself as academically
naked. What you said is beyond the need of a cultural bath; it is (excuse me)
totally idiotic. "Ignorance is bold." Who are you, mental insect, to
determine who is more successful, Johnnie, you, me, or the other? What is your
concept of success, anyway? Don't you know that success is a "relative" term?
_Fortunately_, we do not think the same way, and what success is for you may
not be for me, or vice versa.

You are persistent in knowing in what point you are wrong in your argument
regarding "beauty and truth" in Plato's philosophy. Alright then, YOU ARE
WRONG ON EVERYTHING. First of all, the quote, "beauty is truth, truth beauty"
"all ye know on earth and all ye need to know" is from John Keats (not J.S.
Mill). Don't forget that the restful experience of enjoyable BEAUTY is not
limited to the contemplation of sensible objects. We can experience it as well
in the contemplation of TRUTHS we understand. "Mathematics rightly viewed
possesses not only _TRUTH_, but supreme BEAUTY," wrote Bertrand Russell. You,
eunuch, have put yourself on a pedestal as a new "oracle of Delphi." And so,
you have made a good contribution to the pursuit of TRUTH, except that to find
truth we have to look at the opposite of what you say.

Again, IGNORAMUS, Plato was not right on everything he wrote. The beautiful
prose he left constitutes a philosophical legacy by which we also learn about
Socrates. Needless to say, it should be preserved in golden letters. He was
the father of idealism. As Ivan Turgueniev wrote to Liev Tolstoy, "The truth
is like a lizard: you open your hand when you think you have got it to
contemplate it, and the only thing you see is the tail between your fingers.
It has escaped knowing it will grow a new tail." And Nietzsche wrote, "Let's
define our task: once and for all we have to question the value of TRUTH." I
have serious doubts that you are familiar with what a library is; I think your
cultural nourishment comes from a TV set. Nevertheless, I recommend you some
authors on truth: Herodotus, Hesiodo, Heraclito, Jenofonte, Thomas Aquinas,
Fichte, and Kant.

Regards,
Pyro

[jum...@my-deja.com]

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>

> First of all, let me tell you that you have disqualified yourself
> of being able to participate in any serious discussion or debate on
> cultural issues. It is very obvious that you are a cultural
> polluter. By naming mental dwarfs such as Johnnie Cochran (the
> charlatan) and Winton Marsallis (a former clown of Jay Leno) as the
> new Socrates and Mozart, you exposed yourself as academically
> naked. What you said is beyond the need of a cultural bath; it is
> (excuse me) totally idiotic. "Ignorance is bold." Who are you,
> mental insect, to determine who is more successful, Johnnie, you,
> me, or the other? What is your concept of success, anyway? Don't
> you know that success is a "relative" term? _Fortunately_, we do
> not think the same way, and what success is for you may not be for
> me, or vice versa.

Here's a "success" definition: persistence, duration, endurance,
stamina. OED "successful" -- attains to wealth or position or
an object according to one's desire, (prominence in) subsequent
history, prosperous achievement of something attempted.

YOU DON'T HAVE ANY SUCCESS, "relative" or otherwise, compared to
Cochran, Marsallis, and I will add Kenny Drew, Jr., George Russell,
Duke Ellington, John Hicks, and Amad Jamal. ALL OF THEM ARE BLACK
PEOPLE MORE SUCCESSFULL, MORE ARTISTIC, GREATER CULTURAL TREASURES,
RESPECTED INDIVIDUALS, LEADERS OF CIVILIZATION, CONTRIBUTORS TO THE
POSITIVE GOOD. *-UNLIKE-* *-YOU-* !!!! YOU ARE A *-LOSER-* !!!
HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

> You are persistent in knowing in what point you are wrong in your
> argument regarding "beauty and truth" in Plato's philosophy.
> Alright then, YOU ARE WRONG ON EVERYTHING. First of all, the
> quote, "beauty is truth, truth beauty" "all ye know on earth and
> all ye need to know" is from John Keats (not J.S. Mill). Don't
> forget that the restful experience of enjoyable BEAUTY is not
> limited to the contemplation of sensible objects. We can
> experience it as well in the contemplation of TRUTHS we understand.
> "Mathematics rightly viewed possesses not only _TRUTH_, but supreme
> BEAUTY," wrote Bertrand Russell. You, eunuch, have put yourself on
> a pedestal as a new "oracle of Delphi." And so, you have made a
> good contribution to the pursuit of TRUTH, except that to find
> truth we have to look at the opposite of what you say.

Keats: 1795-1821
Mill: 1806-1873

So J.S.Mill, who was -heavily- influenced by Coleridge and the
romantic movement, inclusive of his "deep impressions" with poetry
SUCH AS KEATS AND WORDSWORTH, obtained a -recasting- of "philosophy"
AWAY FROM CLASSICAL DIALECTICS and instead BECAME YET ANOTHER OF
THE WORTHLESS ROMANTIC RHETORICIANS, particularly by "elevating"
the role of "opinion" and entertaining, as you appear to do, the
notion of -validity- to a pluralizing of "truths" which in the
case of Plato's philosophy were invariably mentioned only in context
to myth, to the enemy's activity, or to STATE PROPAGANDA. Your
"analysis" of Russell's "cite" is OUTRAGEOUSLY LAUGHABLE. Here's
what seems to be *-YOUR-* logic: ( ha ha ha ha ha ha ha )

"A has B."
"A has C."
"Therefore B has some kinship to C."

Let's try it! Pyro has a son. Pyro has a daughter. Therefore
Pyro's son and daughter COPULATE ?? Aha! NOW I UNDERSTAND ALL !!!
YOU'RE RIGHT! Mill didn't say it and Keats did! AND IT TOOK YOU
MORE THEN TWO MONTHS TO DISCOVER THAT ! CONGRATULATIONS !!!!!!
But Mill said pretty much the same, which we BOTH AGREE ON !!!!
NOT *-OPPOSITE-* AS YOU CLAIM, BUT SIMILAR. PYRO IS A LIAR !!!

> Again, IGNORAMUS, Plato was not right on everything he wrote. The
> beautiful prose he left constitutes a philosophical legacy by which
> we also learn about Socrates. Needless to say, it should be
> preserved in golden letters. He was the father of idealism. As
> Ivan Turgueniev wrote to Liev Tolstoy, "The truth is like a lizard:
> you open your hand when you think you have got it to contemplate
> it, and the only thing you see is the tail between your fingers. It
> has escaped knowing it will grow a new tail." And Nietzsche wrote,
> "Let's define our task: once and for all we have to question the
> value of TRUTH." I have serious doubts that you are familiar with
> what a library is; I think your cultural nourishment comes from a
> TV set. Nevertheless, I recommend you some authors on truth:
> Herodotus, Hesiodo, Heraclito, Jenofonte, Thomas Aquinas, Fichte,
> and Kant.

WHAT DOES NIETZSCHE OFFER THAT IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN TRUTH ???
HOW DOES THE "TAIL" BETWEEN YOUR FINGERS *-FEEL-* TO PYRO ???
HOW DO "GOLDEN LETTERS" IMPROVE UPON THE SUBSTANCE OF PLATO ???

HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA !!!
( you masturbating cocksucker )
"white race" -- squirt squirt

- regards
- jb

------------------

Autobiography 1: Mill's notion of truth derived from what he -felt-
his "father" say... (NOT from DIALECTICS !!!)

"I felt no disposition to glorify myself upon the circumstance
that there were other persons who did not know what I knew; nor
had I ever flattered myself that my acquirements, whatever they
might be, were any merit of mine: but, now when my attention was
called to the subject, I felt that what my father had said,
respecting my peculiar advantages was exactly the truth and
common sense of the matter, and it fixed my opinion and feeling
from that time forward."

Autobiography 2: Placing "the good of human kind" ABOVE truth...
(but we need first to know truth in order
to determine "the good of human kind")

"As it was, his aversion to religion, in the sense usually
attached to the term, was of the same kind with that of
Lucretius: he regarded it with the feelings due not to a mere
mental delusion, but to a great moral evil. He looked upon it as
the greatest enemy of morality: first, by setting up factitious
excellencies, -- belief in creeds, devotional feelings, and
ceremonies, not connected with the good of human kind, -- and
causing these to be accepted as substitutes for genuine virtues:
but above all, by radically vitiating the standard of morals;
making it consist in doing the will of a being, on whom it
lavishes indeed all the phrases of adulation, but whom in sober
truth it depicts as eminently hateful."

Autobiography 2: Abandonment of Christianity...
Incapacity to resolve apparent contradictions...
(however application of DIALECTICS can resolve
ALL apparent contradictions)
Jesus said "Let us reason -together-"
(this was His application of DIALECTICS)
Jesus built His church upon the stone that was
-rejected- (thus was NOT a "creed")
Conclusion: the Mill family did NOT read scripture
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

"The time, I believe, is drawing near when this dreadful
conception of an object of worship will be no longer identified
with Christianity; and when all persons, with any sense of moral
good and evil, will look upon it with the same indignation with
which my father regarded it. My father was as well aware as
anyone that Christians do not, in general, undergo the
demoralizing consequences which seem inherent in such a creed, in
the manner or to the extent which might have been expected from
it. The same slovenliness of thought, and subjection of the
reason to fears, wishes, and affections, which enable them to
accept a theory involving a contradiction in terms, prevents them
from perceiving the logical consequences of the theory. Such is
the facility with which mankind believe at one and the same time
things inconsistent with one another, and so few are those who
draw from what they receive as truths, any consequences but those
recommended to them by their feelings, that multitudes have held
the undoubting belief in an Omnipotent Author of Hell, and have
nevertheless identified that being with the best conception they
were able to form of perfect goodness. Their worship was not paid
to the demon which such a being as they imagined would really be,
but to their own idea of excellence. The evil is, that such a
belief keeps the ideal wretchedly low; and opposes the most
obstinate resistance to all thought which has a tendency to raise
it higher. Believers shrink from every train of ideas which would
lead the mind to a clear conception and an elevated standard of
excellence, because they feel (even when they do not distinctly
see) that such a standard would conflict with many of the
dispensations of nature, and with much of what they are
accustomed to consider as the Christian creed. And thus morality
continues a matter of blind tradition, with no consistent
principle, nor even any consistent feeling, to guide it."

Autobiography 3: Mill -pluralized- truth (as "truths") in order to
claim that (rhetorical) opinions could be true.
( but doctrines are NOT truths. METHOD is truth.)

"This preparation of abstracts, subject to my father's censorship,
was of great service to me, by competing precision in conceiving
and expressing psychological doctrines, whether accepted as
truths or only regarded as the opinion of others."

Autobiography 3: Mill will later take his cues for truth from a work
which he says was NOT an examination of the truth,
so Mill's "truth" will consist of "the usefulness of
religious belief" (rhetorical propaganda)
and NOT DIALECTICS !!!!

"Among the works read in the course of this year, which
contributed materially to my development, I ought to mention a
book (written on the foundation of some of Bentham's manuscripts
and published under the pseudonyme of Philip Beauchamp) entitled
"Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal
Happiness of Mankind." This was an examination not of the truth,
but of the usefulness of religious belief, in the most general
sense, apart from the peculiarities of any special Revelation;
which, of all the parts of the discussion concerning religion, is
the most important in this age, in which real belief in any
religious doctrine is feeble and precarious, but the opinion of
its necessity for moral and social purposes almost universal; and
when those who reject revelation, very generally take refuge in
an optimistic Deism, a worship of the order of Nature, and the
supposed course of Providence, at least as full of
contradictions, and perverting to the moral sentiments, as any of
the forms of Christianity, if only it is as completely realized.
Yet, very little, with any claim to a philosophical character,
has been written by sceptics against the usefulness of this form
of belief."

Autobiography 4: People do NOT "reason" independently but as a group
so Bingham's remarks are NOT about actual "reason."
Mill details his involvement with -poetry- at this
point which will influence him toward romanticism
(which was going strong at that time in England),
and here he was very likely familiar with Keats
who was summarizing the same spirit of that age.
HOWEVER, PLATO'S SOCRATES *-EXCORIATED-* POETS
AS NOT CONTRIBUTING TO *-DIALECTICAL-* PHILOSOPHY.
So with romanticism, Mill went off the rails.

"An article of Bingham's in the first number of the Westminster
Review, in which he offered as an explanation of something which
he disliked in Moore, that "Mr Moore is a poet, and therefore is
not a reasoner," did a good deal to attach the notion of hating
poetry to the writers in the Review. But the truth was that many
of us were great readers of poetry; Bingham himself had been a
writer of it, while as regards me (and the same thing might be
said of my father), the correct statement would be, not that I
disliked poetry, but that I was theoretically indifferent to it.
I disliked any sentiments in poetry which I should have disliked
in prose; and that included a great deal. And I was wholly blind
to its place in human culture, as a means of educating the
feelings. But I was always personally very susceptible to some
kinds of it. In the most sectarian period of my Benthamism, I
happened to look into Pope's Essay on Man, and though every
opinion in it was contrary to mine, I well remember how
powerfully it acted on my imagination. Perhaps at that time
poetical composition of any higher type than eloquent discussion
in verse, might not have produced a similar effect on me: at all
events I seldom gave it an opportunity. This, however, was a mere
passive state. Long before I had enlarged in any considerable
degree, the basis of my intellectual creed, I had obtained in the
natural course of my mental progress, poetic culture of the most
valuable kind, by means of reverential admiration for the lives
and characters of heroic persons; especially the heroes of
philosophy."

( here Mill fails to understand that Socrates was NOT about
rhetorical inspiration but about dialectical method ) ...

"The same inspiring effect which so many of the
benefactors of mankind have left on record that they had
experienced from Plutarch's Lives, was produced on me by Plato's
pictures of Socrates, and by some modern biographies, above all
by Condorcet's Life of Turgot; a book well calculated to rouse
the best sort of enthusiasm, since it contains one of the wisest
and noblest of lives, delineated by one of the wisest and noblest
of men."

( Plato's philosophers regarded Homeric myth and the myths of
Greek Gods in LOW esteem. That's one of the charges brought
against Socrates at the Athenian trial. Mill got it WRONG. )

"The heroic virtue of these glorious representatives of
the opinions with which I sympathized, deeply affected me, and I
perpetually recurred to them as others do to a favourite poet,
when needing to be carried up into the more elevated regions of
feeling and thought. I may observe by the way that this book
cured me of my sectarian follies. The two or three pages
beginning "Il regardait toute secte comme nuisible," and
explaining why Turgot always kept himself perfectly distinct from
the Encyclopedists, sank deeply into my mind. I left off
designating myself and others as Utilitarians, and by the pronoun
"we" or any other collective designation, I ceased to affiche,
sectarianism. My real inward sectarianism I did not get rid of
till later, and much more gradually."

( yadda yadda yadda -- Mill's prolixity .... )

Autobiography 4: Mill characterizes truth as something which might
be "exceeded" when truth is an absolute limit.

"These writings were no longer mere reproductions and applications
of the doctrines I had been taught; they were original thinking,
as far as that name can be applied to old ideas in new forms and
connexions: and I do not exceed the truth in saying that there
was a maturity, and a well-digested character about them, which
there had not been in any of my previous performances."

Autobiography 5: Mill regards analysis as a "habit" (sic!) rather
than a critically essential METHOD IN DIALECTICS.
Mill expounds on (subjective) -feelings- which have
NO RELEVANCY TO DIALECTICAL INQUIRY. (Game Theory)

"Analytic habits may thus even strengthen the associations between
causes and effects, means and ends, but tend altogether to weaken
those which are, to speak familiarly, a mere matter of feeling.
They are therefore (I thought) favourable to prudence and
clearsightedness, but a perpetual worm at the root both of the
passions and of the virtues; and, above all, fearfully undermine
all desires, and all pleasures, which are the effects of
association, that is, according to the theory I held, all except
the purely physical and organic; of the entire insufficiency of
which to make life desirable, no one had a stronger conviction
than I had. These were the laws of human nature, by which, as it
seemed to me, I had been brought to my present state. All those
to whom I looked up, were of opinion that the pleasure of
sympathy with human beings, and the feelings which made the good
of others, and especially of mankind on a large scale, the object
of existence, were the greatest and surest sources of happiness.
Of the truth of this I was convinced, but to know that a feeling
would make me happy if I had it, did not give me the feeling. My
education, I thought, had failed to create these feelings in
sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of
analysis, while the whole course of my intellectual cultivation
had made precocious and premature analysis the inveterate habit
of my mind. I was thus, as I said to myself, left stranded at the
commencement of my voyage, with a well-equipped ship and a
rudder, but no sail; without any real desire for the ends which I
had been so carefully fitted out to work for: no delight in
virtue, or the general good, but also just as little in anything
else."

Autobiography 5: Mill uses the phrase "part of the truth" as if one
can -fragment- truth, but truth must be WHOLE.
So Mill FAILS to comprehend the NATURE of truth.
He says "the cultivation of the feelings became
one of the cardinal points in ...[his] ethical
and philosophical creed." So his technique is
based NOT ON DIALECTICS but on HIS FEELINGS, and
he CLAIMS to derive an ETHICAL/PHILOSOPHICAL CREED
from that, which is -precisely- what his father
critiqued about Christianity. A contradiction !

"I had now learnt by experience that the passive susceptibilities
needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and
required to be nourished and enriched as well as guided. I did
not, for an instant, lose sight of, or undervalue, that part of
the truth which I had seen before; I never turned recreant to
intellectual culture, or ceased to consider the power and
practice of analysis as an essential condition both of individual
and of social improvement. But I thought that it had consequences
which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of
cultivation with it. The maintenance of a due balance among the
faculties, now seemed to me of primary importance. The
cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in
my ethical and philosophical creed. And my thoughts and
inclinations turned in an increasing degree towards whatever
seemed capable of being instrumental to that object."

Autobiography 5: Unfortunately, truth is not obtained by variance
to "received opinion" but by the Socratic method
of DIALECTICAL INQUIRY, WHICH MILL FAILS TO APPLY!
Mill is just another RHETORICIAN !!! HA HA HA !!

"Great powers of generalization, rare ingenuity and subtlety, and
a wide perception of important and unobvious truths, served him
not for putting something better into the place of the worthless
heap of received opinions on the great subjects of thought, but
for proving to his own mind that the Church of England had known
everything from the first, and that all the truths on the ground
of which the Church and orthodoxy have been attacked (many of
which he saw as clearly as any one) are not only consistent with
the Thirty-nine articles, but are better understood and expressed
in those articles than by any one who rejects them. I have never
been able to find any other explanation of this, than by
attributing it to that timidity of conscience, combined with
original sensitiveness of temperament, which has so often driven
highly gifted men into Romanism from the need of a firmer support
than they can find in the independent conclusions of their own
judgment. Any more vulgar kind of timidity no one who knew
Maurice would ever think of imputing to him, even if he had not
given public proof of his freedom from it, by his ultimate
collision with some of the opinions commonly regarded as
orthodox, and by his noble origination of the Christian Socialist
movement. The nearest parallel to him, in a moral point of view,
is Coleridge, to whom, in merely intellectual power, apart from
poetical genius, I think him decidedly superior. At this time,
however, he might be described as a disciple of Coleridge, and
Sterling as a disciple of Coleridge and of him. The modifications
which were taking place in my old opinions gave me some points of
contact with them; and both Maurice and Sterling were of
considerable use to my development. With Sterling I soon became
very intimate, and was more attached to him than I have ever been
to any other man. He was indeed one of the most lovable of men.
His frank, cordial, affectionate, and expansive character; a love
of truth alike conspicuous in the highest things and the
humblest; a generous and ardent nature which threw itself with
impetuosity into the opinions it adopted, but was as eager to do
justice to the doctrines and the men it was opposed to, as to
make war on what it thought their errors; and an equal devotion
to the two cardinal points of Liberty and Duty, formed a
combination of qualities as attractive to me, as to all others
who knew him as well as I did. With his open mind and heart, he
found no difficulty in joining hands with me across the gulf
which as yet divided our opinions. He told me how he and others
had looked upon me (from hearsay information), as a "made" or
manufactured man, having had a certain impress of opinion stamped
on me which I could only reproduce; and what a change took place
in his feelings when he found, in the discussion on Wordsworth
and Byron, that Wordsworth, and all which that names implies,
"belonged" to me as much as to him and his friends."

Autobiography 5: Plato's "instructed Greeks" did NOT believe in
polytheism, but were DIALECTICAL INQUIRERS !!!

"During the organic periods (they said) mankind accept with firm
conviction some positive creed, claiming jurisdiction over all
their actions, and containing more or less of truth and
adaptation to the needs of humanity. Under its influence they
make all the progress compatible with the creed, and finally
outgrow it; when a period follows of criticism and negation, in
which mankind lose their old convictions without acquiring any
new ones, of a general or authoritative character, except the
conviction that the old are false. The period of Greek and Roman
polytheism, so long as really believed in by instructed Greeks
and Romans, was an organic period, succeeded by the critical or
sceptical period of the Greek philosophers. Another organic
period came in with Christianity. The corresponding critical
period began with the Reformation, has lasted ever since, still
lasts, and cannot altogether cease until a new organic period has
been inaugurated by the triumph of a yet more advanced creed.
These ideas, I knew, were not peculiar to the St. Simonians; on
the contrary, they were the general property of Europe, or at
least of Germany and France, but they had never, to my knowledge,
been so completely systematized as by these writers, nor the
distinguishing characteristics of a critical period so powerfully
set forth; for I was not then acquainted with Fichte's Lectures
on "the Characteristics of the Present Age." "

Autobiography 5: Truth is not obtained from a SOURCE, but obtained
by the METHOD OF DIALECTICAL INQUIRY !!!!
Mill wastes time with his "incubus" ....
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

"But the rediscovery was to me a discovery, giving me plenary
possession of the truths, not as traditional platitudes, but
fresh from their source; and it seldom failed to place them in
some new light, by which they were reconciled with, and seemed to
confirm while they modified, the truths less generally known
which lay in my early opinions, and in no essential part of which
I at any time wavered. All my new thinking only laid the
foundation of these more deeply and strongly while it often
removed misapprehension and confusion of ideas which had
perverted their effect. For example, during the later returns of
my dejection, the doctrine of what is called Philosophical
Necessity weighed on my existence like an incubus."

Autobiography 5: Mill wastes more time with animating poetry and
"deep impressions" attempting to find truth all
by himself WITHOUT THE METHOD OF DIALECTICS !!!

"Instead of my having been taught anything, in the first instance,
by Carlyle, it was only in proportion as I came to see the same
truths through media more suited to my mental constitution, that
I recognized them in his writings. Then, indeed, the wonderful
power with which he put them forth made a deep impression upon
me, and I was during a long period one of his most fervent
admirers; but the good his writings did me, was not as philosophy
to instruct, but as poetry to animate."

Autobiography 5: Socrates proves in the _Gorgias_ dialogue that the
rhetorical mode of reasoning (all by oneself) can
NOT discover truth (singular form). Mill FAILED
TO COMPREHEND THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES !!!!!
A "key to perplexity" is simply more perplexity.

"I also resumed my speculations on this last subject, and puzzled
myself, like others before me, with the great paradox of the
discovery of new truths by general reasoning. As to the fact,
there could be no doubt. As little could it be doubted, that all
reasoning is resolvable into syllogisms, and that in every
syllogism the conclusion is actually contained and implied in the
premises. How, being so contained and implied, it could be new
truth, and how the theorems of geometry, so different in
appearance from the definitions and axioms, could be all
contained in these, was a difficulty which no one, I thought, had
sufficiently felt, and which, at all events, no one had succeeded
in clearing up. The explanations offered by Whately and others,
though they might give a temporary satisfaction, always, in my
mind, left a mist still hanging over the subject. At last, when
reading a second or third time the chapters on Reasoning in the
second volume of Dugald Stewart, interrogating myself on every
point, and following out, as far as I knew how, every topic of
thought which the book suggested, I came upon an idea of his
respecting the use of axioms in ratiocination, which I did not
remember to have before noticed, but which now, in meditating on
it, seemed to me not only true of axioms, but of all general
propositions whatever, and to be the key of the whole perplexity."

Autobiography 6: (Musings on a text called "Liberty" -- a certainty
obtained from two extremes yields "wise skepticism"
though it's difficult to understand how skepticism
could be "wise" when -ANYBODY- can be skeptical
without much effort.) Mill says "to say truth"
in this passage because perhaps he was -NOT-
speaking "truth" elsewhere?) Disingenuous !!!

"To be admitted into any degree of mental intercourse with a being
of these qualities, could not but have a most beneficial
influence on my development; though the effect was only gradual,
and many years elapsed before her mental progress and mine went
forward in the complete companionship they at last attained. The
benefit I received was far greater than any which I could hope to
give; though to her, who had at first reached her opinions by the
moral intuition of a character of strong feeling, there was
doubtless help as well as encouragement to be derived from one
who had arrived at many of the same results by study and
reasoning: and in the rapidity of her intellectual growth, her
mental activity, which converted everything into knowledge,
doubtless drew from me, as it did from other sources, many of its
materials. What I owe, even intellectually, to her, is in its
detail, almost infinite; of its general character a few words
will give some, though a very imperfect, idea. With those who,
like all the best and wisest of mankind, are dissatisfied with
human life as it is, and whose feelings are wholly identified
with its radical amendment, there are two main regions of
thought. One is the region of ultimate aims; the constituent
elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life. The other
is that of the immediately useful and practically attainable. In
both these departments, I have acquired more from her teaching,
than from all other sources taken together. And, to say truth, it
is in these two extremes principally, that real certainty lies.
My own strength lay wholly in the uncertain and slippery
intermediate region, that of theory, or moral and political
science: respecting the conclusions of which, in any of the forms
in which I have received or originated them, whether as political
economy, analytic psychology, logic, philosophy of history, or
anything else, it is not the least of my intellectual obligations
to her that I have derived from her a wise scepticism, which,
while it has not hindered me from following out the honest
exercise of my thinking faculties to whatever conclusions might
result from it, has put me on my guard against holding or
announcing these conclusions with a degree of confidence which
the nature of such speculations does not warrant, and has kept my
mind not only open to admit, but prompt to welcome and eager to
seek, even on the questions on which I have most meditated, any
prospect of clearer perceptions and better evidence. I have often
received praise, which in my own right I only partially deserve,
for the greater practicality which is supposed to be found in my
writings, compared with those of most thinkers who have been
equally addicted to large generalizations. The writings in which
this quality has been observed, were not the work of one mind,
but of the fusion of two, one of them as pre-eminently practical
in its judgments and perceptions of things present, as it was
high and bold in its anticipations for a remote futurity."

Autobiography 6: Again, Mill's "truth" occurring in "portions" ...

"Instantly a number of other writers took up the tone: I believe
there was a portion of truth in what Lord Durham, soon after,
with polite exaggeration, said to me-that to this article might
be ascribed the almost triumphal reception which he met with on
his arrival in England."

Autobiography 7: Here Mill criticized the "obligation of justifying
itself by reason" for "intellectual support" IN
GENERAL, irrespective of whether it defends "false
doctrines and bad institutions." So he puts the
cart before the horse in -CLAIMING- doctrines as
false, or institutions as bad, WITHOUT APPLYING
THE TEST OF DIALECTICS as was Socratic method !!!

"The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by
intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and
experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great
intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By
the aid of this theory, every inveterate belief and every intense
feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to
dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, and
is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification."

Autobiography 7: Socratic philosophy does NOT "take sides" but is
a METHOD of investigating (rhetorical) arguments.
Philosophy IN GENERAL (other than dialectics) does
NOT necessary "combat" prejudice. Example: one
might regard their own philosophy of prejudice as
a philosophy. Mill's thinking is *-UNFOCUSED-* .

"In attempting to clear up the real nature of the evidence of
mathematical and physical truths, the "System of Logic" met the
intuitive philosophers on ground on which they had previously
been deemed unassailable; and gave its own explanation, from
experience and association, of that peculiar character of what
are called necessary truths, which is adduced as proof that their
evidence must come from a deeper source than experience. Whether
this has been done effectually, is still sub judice; and even
then, to deprive a mode of thought so strongly rooted in human
prejudices and partialities, of its mere speculative support,
goes but a very little way towards overcoming it; but though only
a step, it is a quite indispensable one; for since, after all,
prejudice can only be successfully combated by philosophy, no way
can really be made against it permanently until it has been shown
not to have philosophy on its side."

Autobiography 7: Here Mill admits to devising a "system of thought"
which can only be that of non-dialectical rhetoric.
DIALECTICS IS NOT A "SYSTEM" BUT A METHOD !!!!
Again, dialectical philosophy is NOT CONCERNED with
"taking sides" but in applying a METHOD OF INQUIRY!
Dialectical philosophy is not concerned with being
or not being "intelligible" or "repulsive." It is
unconcerned with "attractiveness" because it aims
at DISCOVERY OF TRUTH, WHATEVER IT MAY BE.

"I had, in consequence, marked out this as a sphere of usefulness
in which I was under a special obligation to make myself active:
the more so, as the acquaintance I had formed with the ideas of
the Coleridgians, of the German thinkers, and of Carlyle, all of
them fiercely opposed to the mode of thought in which I had been
brought up, had convinced me that along with much error they
possessed much truth, which was veiled from minds otherwise
capable of receiving it by the transcendental and mystical
phraseology in which they were accustomed to shut it up, and from
which they neither cared, nor knew how, to disengage it; and I
did not despair of separating the truth from the error, and
expressing it in terms which would be intelligible and not
repulsive to those on my own side in philosophy. Thus prepared,
it will easily be believed that when I came into close
intellectual communion with a person of the most eminent
faculties, whose genius, as it grew and unfolded itself in
thought, continually struck out truths far in advance of me, but
in which I could not, as I had done in those others, detect any
mixture of error, the greatest part of my mental growth consisted
in the assimilation of those truths, and the most valuable part
of my intellectual work was in building the bridges and clearing
the paths which connected them with my general system of
thought."

Autobiography 7: Once again Mill falls into the error of conceiving
"truths" (sic!) as static rhetorical products of
his personal musing, rather than the "truth" which
is an -ONGOING- project of inquiry. Truth has NO
DEEP FOUNDATIONS. It is simply the result of the
PROCESS OF DIALECTICAL INQUIRY !!!!

"In both these points, as in many others, she benefited me as much
by keeping me right where I was right, as by leading me to new
truths, and ridding me of errors. My great readiness and
eagerness to learn from everybody, and to make room in my
opinions for every new acquisition by adjusting the old and the
new to one another, might, but for her steadying influence, have
seduced me into modifying my early opinions too much. She was in
nothing more valuable to my mental development than by her just
measure of the relative importance of different considerations,
which often protected me from allowing to truths I had only
recently learnt to see, a more important place in my thoughts
than was properly their due. The "Liberty" is likely to survive
longer than anything else that I have written (with the possible
exception of the "Logic"), because the conjunction of her mind
with mine has rendered it a kind of philosophic text-book of a
single truth, which the changes progressively taking place in
modern society tend to bring out into ever stronger relief: the
importance, to man and society of a large variety in types of
character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand
itself in innumerable and conflicting directions. Nothing can
better show how deep are the foundations of this truth, than the
great impression made by the exposition of it at a time which, to
superficial observation, did not seem to stand much in need of
such a lesson."

Autobiography 7: Philosophy is -NOT- divided into "two schools" or
any number of "schools" for that matter, but is
directed toward a DIALECTICAL ACTIVITY which must
produce a winner and loser in any gamed contest
over a "draughts" checkerboard (or Chess, Go, etc.)
THE OUTCOME IS UNAMBIGUOUS. Once again Mill is
"reasoning" based upon his -feelings- rather than
by social interaction via DIALECTICS.

"Now, the difference between these two schools of philosophy, that
of intuition, and that of Experience and Association, is not a
mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical
consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the greatest
differences of practical opinion in an age of progress. The
practical reformer has continually to demand that changes be made
in things which are supported by powerful and widely-spread
feelings, or to question the apparent necessity and
indefeasibleness of established facts; and it is often an
indispensable part of his argument to show, how those powerful
feelings had their origin, and how those facts came to seem
necessary and indefeasible. There is therefore a natural
hostility between him and a philosophy which discourages the
explanation of feelings and moral facts by circumstances and
association, and prefers to treat them as ultimate elements of
human nature; a philosophy which is addicted to holding up
favourite doctrines as intuitive truths, and deems intuition to
be the voice of Nature and of God, speaking with an authority
higher than that of our reason. In particular, I have long felt
that the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked
distinctions of human character as innate, and in the main
indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the
greater part of those differences, whether between individuals,
races, or sexes, are such as not only might but naturally would
be produced by differences in circumstances, is one of the chief
hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions,
and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement.
This tendency has its source in the intuitional metaphysics which
characterized the reaction of the nineteenth century against the
eighteenth, and it is a tendency so agreeable to human indolence,
as well as to conservative interests generally, that unless
attacked at the very root, it is sure to be carried to even a
greater length than is really justified by the more moderate
forms of the intuitional philosophy."

Conclusion: Mill's "philosophy" is a mishmash of continually
unresolved opinions where nothing is ever decided, and no decisive
resolutions are forthcoming. His unconscionable abandonment of
dialectics leads Mill (and those who follow him) instead toward
"anti-philosophy" and false multiplicity of truth(s), and failure
to find common-ground, and failure to adjudicate opinions. Plato's
philosophers regarded opinion as the -LOWEST- form of expression.
Mill tries to elevate the status of "opinions" by giving them the
credence they DO NOT DESERVE. Philosophy seeks rapid RESOLUTION
of ALL CONFLICTS, not the ceaseless quibble of OPINIONS !!!!!
I'd continue further but am quite certain Mill has nothing further
to offer, unless somebody can present an engaging counterargument.

======-- fin --

Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.

[jum...@my-deja.com]

Re: The Weapons Culture
Author: tjwilson <tjwi...@hb.quik.com
Date: 1999/09/18
Forum: alt.politics.usa.republican

"Be copy now to men of grosser blood and teach them how to war! The
game's afoot: follow your spirit." excerpted from "Henry V", by WS

enrique wrote:
>
> The Weapons Culture
>
> excerpted from the book
>
> Beyond Hypocrisy
>
> by Edward S. Herman
>
> published by South End Press, 1992
>
>
>
> Defense, Containment, Aggression, and National Security
>
> At the end of World War II, the United States enjoyed a
> historically unique position of global power. The war had revived
> its previously depressed economy, teaching a lesson in "Military
> Keynesianism" that was quickly incorporated into establishment
> practice, if not thought. The war had also seriously weakened U.S.
> rivals: enemies Germany and Japan were defeated and devastated
> physically, and allies like Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
> Union were also debilitated. The Soviet Union had been ravaged and
> suffered enormous casualties. Maintaining a large army, but
> exhausted and in no position to challenge the United States, the
> Soviet Union insisted only on preserving a security zone of
> dominated governments occupied at the end of the war and from which
> attacks had been launched against it.
>
> In the Third World, the United States was confronted with popular
> movements threatening to break out of centuries-long subservience,
> exploitation, and oligarchic-colonial rule. The United States was
> well positioned to fight against these popular upheavals and to
> enlarge its own spheres of influence, which it did on a global
> basis from 1945 onward. In the process, it often displaced its own
> allies as the dominant power in important colonial areas like Saudi
> Arabia, Iran, Indochina, Pakistan, Thailand, and Indonesia, among
> other places.
>
> U.S. leaders were, for the most part, well aware of their power and
> opportunity, and of Soviet weakness.' National Security Council
> Report 68, prepared just before the beginning of the Korean War in
> 1950, spelled out a "roll-back" strategy in which a rearmed United
> States would engage in systematic subversion of the Soviet
> satellite states, and even of the Soviet Union itself, by means
> that included the support of armed revolt. the United States was
> actively involved in roll-back operations in 1949 under a CIA
> program of organizing guerrilla bands of "former SS men" and
> ClA-trained Ukrainian operatives within the Soviet Union,
> parachuting in military supplies. These operations, along with the
> reconstruction of the Nazi intelligence apparatus of Reinhard
> Gehlen as the official espionage corps of the new West German
> state, also prior to the Korean war, were not featured in the U.S.
> media. The Korean war came along very opportunely to help justify
> the desired arms buildup.
>
> NSC 68 was similar to the Reagan era Pentagon "Defense Guidance,
> 1984 88" report, which also spelled out a program of active
> destabilization of the Soviet empire by the deliberately beggaring
> effects of an arms race as well as by aid to armed groups within
> the Soviet bloc. The significance of these documents is that they
> presume an offensive U.S. policy against an enemy perceived as
> vulnerable; they project U.S. plans to subvert and "bury" the
> Soviet Union. NSC-68 does speak of the Soviet design to conquer the
> world, but this was an ideological construct that provided the
> necessary dire threat to rationalize a forward strategy. NSC 68,
> like the Reagan era Defense Guidance statement, rests on the
> assumption of Soviet weakness and vulnerability, and does not use
> language suggesting fear of aggression and attack. This is why
> these documents have been essentially suppressed in mainstream
> media and discourse, which instead gave great play to the
> rhetorical boast of Khrushchev that "I am going to bury you."
>
> The national security elite also recognized in NSC 68 that taking
> advantage of the positive opportunities open to the United States
> required a large military force and mobilized population.
> Doublespeak embedded in a convenient matrix of anticommunist
> ideology was essential, as the U.S. establishment was obliged to
> pretend (or internalize the belief) that the huge global expansion
> of the U.S. political economy on which they had embarked was
> "defensive" and responsive to some external threat; that we were
> "containing" somebody else who was committing "aggression" and
> threatening our "national security."
>
> The words and phrases "defense," "containment," "aggression," and
> "national security" are core items in the doublespeak lexicon,
> essential ingredients of the ink squirted out by the imperial
> cuttlefsh. They deflected thought from the pro active and
> purposeful aspects of U.S. foreign policy, the locus of the
> determining initiatives in the arms race and conflict, the source
> of the bulk of the killing, and the extent to which the fight was
> against indigenous, popular, and democratic movements abroad.
> Epitomizing the new world of doublespeak was the change in name of
> the War Department to the Defense Department in 1947, just at the
> historic juncture when the United States was embarking on a global
> offensive to reshape the world in accord with its dominant
> corporate interests (not in "our image," as in the common
> apologetic formulation).
>
> In Greece, where the British, and then even more aggressively, the
> United States, reestablished an extreme rightwing regime of former
> collaborationist elements by ten or, fraudulent elections, and a
> vicious counterinsurgency war in the years 1944-1950, Stalin
> extended no aid to the communist and other left rebels under siege,
> and in fact strenuously opposed Yugoslavia's aid to the rebels.
> Nevertheless, Truman, aided by the "bipartisan" consensus and
> mainstream media, successfully made the crushing of the Greek Left
> and establishment of a right-wing police state by external (U.S.)
> force a "defensive" action to "contain" Soviet expansionism. This
> was a model of applied doublespeak that would be repeated often in
> the years to come.
>
> And from that time till the end of the Reagan era, whenever the
> United States wanted to intervene to crush some indigenous popular
> movement or government not to the taste of United Fruit Company or
> the national security establishment, the search would be on for
> Reds, the connection would be made to the Soviet Union (along with
> some lesser devils like Cuba or Libya), and the government would be
> declared Marxist-Leninist and a Soviet puppet. The real and massive
> intervention - by the United States - required an Evil Empire
> behind the indigenous and popular forces that were the real target.
> The United States would regularly impose boycotts and escalate
> threats against the tiny victim, forcing it to buy goods and arms
> from members of the Soviet bloc. This would then be used to show
> both the aggressive intent of the victim and its allegiance to the
> international communist conspiracy.
>
> The U.S. mass media has always swallowed this line of propaganda-
> even regarding Nicaragua in the 1 980s-never allowing that
> Nicaragua might be getting arms from the Soviet Union in response
> to a genuine threat or because of the U.S. and allied boycott, and
> never pointing out that the Sandinista military threat to its
> neighbors was implausible, unsupported by evidence, and rendered
> nonsensical by a watchful U.S. military presence. The press has
> never suggested that the linking of the victim under U.S. attack to
> the Soviet Union might be a red herring designed to obscure the
> real reason for opposition to the victim government The Democratic
> Loyal Opposition always jumps into line for fear of being tagged
> Red sympathizers, and intervention in violation of U.S. and
> international law proceeds unhampered.
>
> The case of Nicaragua in the 1980s showed that, given the patriotic
> premises of the mass media and the absence of a political
> opposition to contest them, lies can be institutionalized and the
> truth stood on its head. This was shown earlier during the U.S.
> attack on Guatemala in 1954, alleged to be a response to Soviet
> aggression, although there were no Soviet troops, advisers, or arms
> on the scene, and despite the fact that the government of Guatemala
> had carefully avoided any formal diplomatic relations with Soviet
> bloc countries out of respect for (and fear of) U.S. sensitivities.
> It is true that very late in the day, with a U.S.-organized attack
> in the offing and a U.S. arms boycott long in effect, the
> Guatemalan government did buy a boatload of arms from
> Czechoslovakia, the discovery of which created hysteria among U.S.
> officials and in the U.S. press. But this is the convenient
> pathology of imperialism-to bring to life a virus in the
> hemisphere, to decry its existence, and to mercilessly eradicate
> it. Soviet control, expansionism, and aggression in the Guatemala
> case was fiction, on an intellectual par with the claims of the
> Protocols of the Elders of Zion. But it was taken very seriously in
> the New York Times and media generally, and the uncontested view
> was that we were behaving defensively, containing the Soviet Union,
> not committing aggression to enforce our own positive standards of
> rule in Guatemala.
>
> Behind all these claims and counterclaims was the allegation of a
> threat to U.S. "national security," the longstanding "Linus
> blanket" in which the imperial faction and military establishment
> have regularly wrapped themselves. When tied to the threat of
> Communism and the Evil Empire, the cry of National Security stills
> criticism, rationality, and decency. And it is trotted out with
> abandon. National security is both vague and highly elastic, so
> that Grenada, Nicaragua, even the entry into the United States of
> Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Mrs. Salvador Allende, a contingent of
> mothers of the massacred in El Salvador, or printed matter from
> Cuba can seriously threaten it. It seems that the national security
> of the United States, the greatest military power in history, is in
> constant jeopardy as the country cowers before the threats of
> popular movements in Nicaragua or Guatemala.
>
> *****
>
> Weapons in Search of Missions
>
> During the period from 1945 to the present, a "weapons culture"
> developed in the United States to serve the interests dominating
> the U.S. power structure. These were mainly business interests that
> benefited from military power projected abroad-the weapons
> producers themselves; the oil companies that were helped to
> establish themselves in the Middle East and Venezuela, which
> benefited from the enforced opening of markets in Europe and
> elsewhere; other resource-exploiting firms (especially in mining,
> timber, and agribusiness); and other business and financial firms
> that were able to take advantage of newly penetrated markets.
> Wonderful contracts were written for U.S. iron, timber, and other
> mineral extraction and agribusiness companies following the
> U.S.-sponsored military coups in Brazil and Indonesia in 1964 and
> 1965. A large military establishment funded by the taxpayer served
> these global interests well.
>
> As the weapons culture grew, the industrial interests producing
> weapons and their Pentagon and congressional allies-a so called
> "iron triangle" or ''military-industrial complex" (MIC) of enormous
> and partially independent power, gradually emerged. The MlC's
> ability to command resources rested on its service to the
> transnational corporate system, as well as its own extraordinary
> institutional power. It had the further advantage of providing for
> our "national defense" and protecting our "national security," and
> what politician would stand against funding defense and national
> security, especially when the corporate establishment (including
> the national media) would denounce and defund him for selling his
> country short.
>
> *****
>
> Even when a truly lunatic boondoggle certain to intensify the
> nuclear arms race was put foreword, as in the case of the Strategic
> Defense Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars program, the power of the MIC
> was strong enough to preclude anything like adequate criticism. The
> SDI was supposed to provide a defensive shield in space that would
> intercept Soviet missiles and thus reduce the threat of war by
> providing a more-or-less foolproof defense. This extravaganza was
> based on fantastically complex technologies that did not exist. Its
> testing as well as deployment would have violated the
> Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972. It was foisted on
> Reagan by some of his really far out technical advisers like
> General Daniel Graham of the World Anticommunist League and the
> American Security Council, without prior study or approval even
> from the Pentagon's technical staff. The alternative ways of
> reducing the threat of nuclear war, like disarmament and a
> comprehensive test ban (that would have limited the development of
> new weapons and reduced the reliability of old ones) were ignored
> in favor of a technological fix pleasing only to the MIC and
> Armageddon far right, and beyond Rube Goldberg.
>
> There was some criticism of SDI's technical feasibility and
> probable limits as a defensive system, but it wasn't laughed off
> the stage as a completely irresponsible proposal, a gigantic waste
> of resources that would fuel the nuclear arms race, and a further
> demonstration of Reagan's incapacity for high office. One
> interesting suppression is worth noting: when the Soviets built a
> small ABM system for the "defense" of Moscow in the 1960s, a
> frenzied U S establishment declared it to have inherent and
> terrifying offensive implications. SDI, despite its vastly greater
> offensive implications, was not treated in that way; with trivial
> exceptions in the mainstream press, it was portrayed as a truly
> defensive system, a "noble dream", although of questionable
> workability. The power laws precluded an honest discussion of the
> prior allegations of the terrible threat stemming from "defensive"
> nuclear systems such as ABM.
>
> *****
>
===============================================================

http://www.atomicage.com/aalcs/5-97.html
----------------------------------------

African American Literature and Culture Society
AALCS Newsletter
ALA Conference Baltimore, Maryland
May 1997

Olaudah Equiano (Gustavus Vassa) ca. 1745-1797

Born around 1745 in what is now southeastern Nigeria, and kidnapped
into slavery around the age of eleven, Equiano was taken to the West
Indies for a few days before being brought to Virginia and sold to a
local planter. Michael Henry Pascal, an officer in the British Royal
Navy, soon bought him, renamed him Gustavus Vassa, and brought him to
London. Equiano served under Pascal in the Seven Years’ War
(1756-1763), but Pascal reneged on his promise of freedom, selling
Equiano into West Indian slavery at the end of 1762. Equiano purchased
his own freedom in 1766.

He remained in the employ of his former master, the Quaker Robert
King, for a year, making several trading trips to Georgia and
Pennsylvania. Between 1767 and 1773, Equiano, based in London, worked
on commercial vessels sailing to the Mediterranean and the West
Indies, and commented on all the versions of slavery, White and Black,
he observed. After joining an expedition to the Arctic seeking a
Northeast Passage in 1773, he returned to London, where he embraced
Methodism. Soon again growing restless, in 1775-1776 he helped his
friend and former employer, Dr. Charles Irving, in a short-lived
attempt to establish a plantation in Central America, with Equiano
acting as buyer and driver (overseer) of the Black slaves. After
returning to London in 1777, he published hostile newspaper reviews of
pro-slavery books and argued for racial intermarriage (Equiano married
an Englishwoman, Susanna Cullen, in 1792). He became increasingly
involved with Thomas Clarkson, Quiobna Ottobah Cugoana, James Ramsay,
and Granville Sharp and others in efforts to help his fellow Blacks,
with the project to resettle the Black poor in Sierra Leone, and with
the drive to abolish the African slave trade.

Equiano’s The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or
Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself (London, 1789) is a
spiritual autobiography, captivity narrative, travel book, adventure
tale, slave narrative, economic treatise, apologia, and argument
against the transatlantic slave trade. The author supervised the
publication and distribution of nine British editions between 1789 and
1794. And during his lifetime (1745-1797) unauthorized editions and
translations appeared in Holland (1790), New York (1791), Germany
(1792), and Russia (1794). Part of the book’s great popularity can be
attributed to the timing of its initial publication at the height of
the movement in Britain to abolish the slave trade. Equiano’s was the
only account by a former slave of slavery in Africa, on the Middle
Passage, as well as in the West Indies, North America, the
Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Britain. His first reviewers
quickly acknowledged the significance of the Narrative, which greatly
influenced the development of the 19th Century African-American slave
narrative.

Equiano died on 31 March 1797.

-- Vincent Carretta, University of Maryland at College Park

From the President: "A Dazzling Daybreak"

Two hundred years after the death of Olaudah Equiano, whose
Interesting Narrative of the Life (1789), along with the poetry of
Phillis Wheatley, helped to signal the genesis of an African American
(written) literary tradition, literary scholars stand at the threshold
of the twenty-first century, witnessing the successful expansion of
the American literary landscape to encompass this heretofore
marginalized body of material. For the many scholars who through out
the twentieth century labored to resurrect, validate, and celebrate
the monumental contributions of African American writers -- from
Equiano and Frederick Douglass to Alice Walker, Toni Morrison, Charles
Johnson, and John E. Wideman -- it is an exhilarating and rewarding
harvest.

Re-call that this century began with the prophetic voice of Dr. DuBois
who, in his now classic The Souls of Black Folk (1905), encouraged all
to "listen to the strivings in the souls of the black folk." He boldly
proposed that: "by fateful chance the Negro folk song-the rhythmic cry
of the slave stands today not simply as the sole American music, but
as the most beautiful expression of human experience born this side of
the sea." The folk/oral tradition which he reveres here is now
acknowledged as the wellspring of the African American (written)
literary tradition.

Re-call Dr. Locke’s demand that "the Negro of today be seen through
other than the dusty spectacles of past controversy," as he attempted
to lead a "New Negro" Renaissance. Most of all, re-call a young
Langston Hughes’ valiant declaration that the "younger Negro artists
who create now intend to express our individual dark-skinned selves
without fear or shame." Re-call as well the cacophonous resonances
heard during the turbulent sixties in the voices of Imamu Amiri
Baraka, Haki R. Madhubuti, Mari Evans, and Nikki Giovanni, prophets
who, in an effort to "speak the Truth to the people," led a Black Arts
Movement to "clean out the world for virtue and love."

At the dawning of the twenty first century we see that the response
has been not only the "discovery" of the African American literary
tradition (oral and written), but in fact the realization and
confirmation, as Morrison notes, that African Americans, "have always
imagined ourselves... We are the subjects of our own narrative,
witnesses to and participants in our own experience, and, in no way
coincidentally, in the experience of those with whom we have come in
contact. We are not, in fact, ‘other.’ We are choices ("Unspeakable
Things Unspoken...").

The chorus of antiphonal voices found in such recently published
anthologies as The Norton Anthology of African American Literature,
Cornerstones, An Anthology of African American Literature, Call and
Response: The Riverside Anthology of the African American Literary
Tradition, Unchained Voices: An Anthology of Black Authors in the
English Speaking World of the 18th Century, and Trouble the Water, 250
Years of African American Poetry among others are clear attestations
to Morrison’s declaration.

So, too, is the significant place and central role the African
American Literature and Culture Society (AALCS) and the several author
societies, such as the Toni Morrison Society, Richard Wright Society,
and Charles W. Chesnutt Society, have been given in the American
Literature Association (ALA) by its founder Dr. Alfred Bendixen and
program chairs Dr. Gloria Cronin and Dr. Susan Belasco Smith.

This support has resulted in an international membership, premiere
conference presentations--including the five dynamic ones scheduled
for this year’s conference--a poetry series: "In the Tradition:
Generations of African American Poetry," and noon hour forums on
various aspects on African American literature and theory, such as the
one scheduled this year to commemorate Olaudah Equiano. Finally, it is
also apparent in the selection of "African American Literature" as the
subject for this year’s autumn ALA Symposium to be held in Cabo San
Jose, Mexico, November 13-16, 1997.

For me, the visible change in our enterprise has not merely resulted
in yet another Renaissance, but instead in what must be seen as a true
Reformation through which those of us who are committed to the study
of African American literature and culture are ushering in the
twenty-first century acknowledging America’s multicultural treasures.
Although we must acknowledge the current efforts and significant roles
of such warrior critics as Henry L. Gates, Houston A. Baker, Jr.,
Deborah McDowell, Trudier Harris, Hortense Spillers, and bell hooks,
we must preserve and celebrate as well the foresight and contributions
of such pioneers as Dorothy Porter, Darwin T. Turner, Richard
Barksdale, Charles Nilon, Hoyt Fuller, and John Sekora, to name a few.

As I end my second term as President of the African American
Literature and Culture Society, I do so with tremendous pride in the
amount of work we were able to accomplish in a relatively short time
to contribute to the ongoing, more inclusive metamorphosis in the
study of American literature and culture. I remain ever grateful for
the support I received from the membership, but particularly the
founding members and officers, including Warren Carson, Virginia
Whatley Smith, Lee Greene, James Coleman, Marilyn Elkins, Aldon
Nielsen, and Anna Everett.

Perhaps Dr. DuBois was correct in asserting that in "good
time...infinite reason [would] turn the tangle[d] straight," making
not the end or lamentation but the beginning of the celebration of our
spiritual strivings.

-- Wilfred D. Samuels, President, AALCS

Remarks on John Sekora
Memorial Service
North Carolina Central University
February 10, 1997

I am grateful for this opportunity to pay tribute to the life and
intellectual work of John Sekora, my friend and my colleague in the
study of African American literature. John and I never taught at the
same university, but we had a commonality of intellectual interests
over the years, and we often consulted each other on our various
projects. Like many here today, I am a beneficiary of John’s
leadership and John’s example. To me he will always be a model of what
intellectual integrity and social commitment mean in humanistic
scholarship. John Sekora was a scholar of rare breadth of learning and
accomplishment. We know him best for his outstanding contributions to
African American literary scholarship. But it’s worthwhile to remember
that John’s first book is entitled Luxury: The Concept in Western
Thought from Eden to Smollett. This book was published in twenty years
ago by the Johns Hopkins University Press, one of the premier American
presses in the field of British literary scholarship. In 1977 one of
the most prominent scholars of British literature wrote of John’s
book: "This learned, illuminating, and well written book throws light
on one of the most important ideas in Western culture," namely, the
idea of luxury. Had John wanted to, he could have built upon his
auspicious first book to make a name for himself as a scholar of
British literature.

But for John the path of intellectual investigation and discovery led
in a different direction, one that must have seemed curious to many of
his Ivy League mentors twenty years ago. Within five years of
publishing his book on Luxury, he had team up with Darwin Turner, a
distinguished professor of African American literature, to co-edit a
book entitled The Art of Slave Narrative. This book did not have the
luxury of being published by a famous press like the Johns Hopkins
University Press. The Art of Slave Narrative was published by the
Western Illinois University Foundation, not by a university press at
all. It would have been difficult in 1981 to find a university press
willing to gamble on publishing a book of literary and theoretical
studies on so unlikely a topic (back then) as the slave narrative. Yet
John Sekora and Darwin Turner were committed to this undertaking, and
by hook or by crook John got the development officers of his home
university’s foundation to supply the funds necessary to publish The
Art of Slave Narrative. John’s persuasiveness in prying loose that
foundation money bore witness to his skills as a university
administrator, which culminated in his service as a Dean here at North
Carolina Central University. But most impressive of all to me, one of
the contributors to The Art of Slave Narrative, was that someone had
the prescience to create a book on early African American
autobiography as an art, not just a document of history but an art, an
achievement of letters meriting serious literary analysis and
appreciation. The editing of The Art of Slave Narrative represented a
major step in the development of African American Literary
scholarship. By virtue of its very title, this book emphasized that
artistry was not just a quality of the great African American
modernist writers -- the Toomers, the Hurstons, the Ellisons, and so
on. Artistry, the Sekora-Turner book announced, lies at the roots of
African American literature, in the slave narratives themselves. This
idea was quite radical, in both senses of the word, in 1982. It was
also inspiring to many of us who followed John into this field.

John Sekora wrote a number of early scholarly studies of the slave
narrative. These essays and articles are among the most widely cited
among scholars of African American autobiography. So highly respected
was this work on the slave narrative that John received an invitation
from G. K. Hall publishers in Boston to write a literary biography of
Frederick Douglass for the canon-defining Twayne United States Authors
Series. The fruit of many years of research and of great admiration
for Douglass as a thinker and a leader, John’s book, simply entitled
Frederick Douglass, will be must reading for all who are interested in
Douglass, his thought and expression, and his place in American as
well as African American history. Having been privileged to receive
from John a copy of the page proofs of his Douglas biography, which I
understand will appear in final book form in the near future, I can
say with confidence that this book will inform, teach, and stimulate
anyone who takes it up. It will be a widely praised book among
Douglass scholars as well.

This brief survey of just a few of John’s intellectual achievements
cannot do justice to the many ways he helped, encouraged, advised, and
pointed the way for those of us who were his co-workers. He was a
scholar of great erudition; he was also an intellectual activist in
the best sense of that word. He believed that the active pursuit of
ideas prepares us to become active agents for change in our society.
Beyond all the outstanding research, the scholarship, and the
teaching, this commitment to creating a more humane university and a
more just society is the legacy that John Sekora leaves us all,
teachers, scholars, and students alike.

-- William L. Andrews, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Memorial to John Sekora
from a former student

I knew John Sekora’s resume before I knew the man himself. My
dissertation chair and I were sitting around the office wondering out
loud who might be a possible outside reader for a study of racial
discourse in the work of white poets, when the department head piped
up suggesting that a friend of his from graduate school might be good.
I had my doubts, until I saw the resume. The name of John Sekora had
not come to my attention before, but when I saw his list of
publications and activities I knew that here was somebody to reckon
with. I met John for the first time at my dissertation defense, not
the best of circumstances for any first meeting. John, though,
immediately put me at ease and within minutes made me feel as though
we were old friends. It was with John’s encouragement that I sent my
unrevised manuscript off to a publisher, and thus my first book
appeared when it did largely because John Sekora helped me overcome my
own trepidations about the project.

John was always like that. My wife, Anna Everett, and I both owe much
to John’s inspiration. We looked forward to meeting him again each
year at the American Literature Association. His papers on the slave
narratives were an example to us of a thorough and dedicated
scholarship, and we always tried to tell John how much that work meant
to us. Those who knew John, though, knew how he always managed to turn
praise of his work into encouraging questions about your work. We
never left the ALA without extracting from John a promise to send us
copies of the essays he presented, bibliographies, illustrations, from
rare editions, and he never let us get away without making us feel
that our work was a part of his life too.

Anna and I learned that there were others like us around the nation,
people whose writing and research had been encouraged by the modest
instigations of John Sekora. His scholarship will continue to be a
model for many of us. He was simply and unselfconsciously one of the
most generous scholars of our time, and he gave himself to education
in a way that few of his contemporaries could. We had the good fortune
to have made John Sekora happy when we saw him; we had the better
fortune to have become better people because we knew him.

-- Aldon L. Nielsen

Poet, scholar, artist, activist and archivist, E. Ethelbert Miller
stands in a category all by himself, a lone voice crying in the urban
wilderness, unshielded and unabashed. His gentle,
laughter-filled-always conversational voice, testifies consistently to
the raw, unconditional love he has for his culture, family, and
humanity.

...I want to yell
join hands demonstrate
free my brothers around the world
free the world around my brothers...

This is more than avocation. Miller’s total commitment and sense of
mission is evidenced by the more than twenty years he has spent as the
archivist-director of the African American Resource Center at Howard
University, Washington, D.C.; as well as his work as founder-director
of the Ascension Poetry Reading Series, an important venue for new
poets in the D.C. area.

Miller’s collected work is a photoalbum filled with vignettes of the
collected history of his extended family/friends who occupy a global
village that stretches from the Bronx, where he grew up, to Panama,
the birthplace of his parents, to El Salvador and South Africa, where
he finds and champions the ongoing struggle against oppression and
injustice. Voices silently scream or laugh from his poetry, revealing
life’s tensions and ironies which are intricately intertwined
throughout his work.

if I had a pass
I could watch the
sunset in Johannesburg
instead I ride the crowded
train
the hot smell of my brothers
mixing with the dust
the coming blackness of the
night
moving ahead of me.

E. Ethelbert Miller will read his poetry Saturday evening, May 24,
1997, in the Baltimore Foyer of the Renaissance Hotel.

Bookshelf

Ansa, Tina McElroy. The Hand I Fan With. New York: Doubleday, 1996.
Bambara, Toni Cade. Deep Sightings and Rescue Missions.
New York: Pantheon Books, 1996.
Burton, LeVar. Aftermath. New York: Warner, 1997.Davis, Thulani.
The Maker of Saints. New York: Scribner, 1996.
Everett, Percival. Big Picture. Sant Paulk: Graywolf, Press, 1996.
Kamau, Kwadwo Agymah. Flickering Shadows. Minneapolis:
Coffee House Press, 1996.
Mosely, Walter. Gone Fishin’. Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1997.
Naylor, Gloria. Ed. Children of the Night. Boston:
Litt, Brown and Company, 1995.
Trice, Dawn Turner. Only Twice I’ve Wished for Heaven. New York:
Random House, 1996.
Ruff, Shawn Stewart. Go The Way Your Blood Beats: An Anthology of
Lesbian and Gay Fiction by African American Writers. New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1996.
Tyree, Omar R. Fly Girl. New York: Simon, 1996.
Wideman, John E. The Cattle Killing. New York: Heighten Mifflin, 1996.

Non Fiction
Abdul-Jabbar, Kareem and Alan Steinberg. Black Profiles in Courage.
A Legacy of African American Achievement. New York:
William Morrow, 1996.
Anderson, Jervis. Bayard Rustin: Troubles I’ve Seen. New York:
Basic Books, 1997.
Andrews, William. et.al. The Oxford Companion to African American
Literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Baker, Houston A., Jr., Manthia Diawara and Ruth H. Lindeborg, Eds.
Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Bogues, Anthony. Caliban’s Freedom: The Early Political Thought of
C.L.R. James. Chicago: Pluto, 1997.
Boyd, Julia. Embracing the Fire. New York: Dutton, 1997.
Carretta, Vincent. Ed. Unchained Voices: An Anthology of Black
Authors in the English Speaking World of the 18th Century.
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996.
Chamoiseau, Patrick. School Days. Translated Linda Coverdale.
University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
Dyson, Eric Michael. Between God and Gangsta Rap: Bearing Witness to
Black Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Demirturk, Lale. Modern Afro-American Novel. Ankara: Gundogarn
Publications, 1997.
Gates, Henry L., Jr. Thirteen Ways of Looking At a Black Man.
New York: Randorn, 1997.
Gates, Henry L., Jr., et.al., eds. The Norton Anthology of African
American Literature. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.
Greene, J. Lee. Blacks in Eden: The African-American Novel’s First
Century. University Press of Virginia, 1996. Winner CLA Award.
Gregoire, Henri. On the Cultural Achievements of Negroes (1808).
Translated Thomas Cassirer & Jean-Francois Briere. Boston:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1996.
Hamblin, Ken. Pick a Better Country. New York: Simon, 1996.
Hatch, James V. And Leo Hamalian, eds. Lost Plays of the Harlem
Renaissance, 1920-1940. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997
Hill, Patricia L., et.al., eds. Call and Response: The Riverside
Anthology of the African American Literary Tradition. Boston:
Heighten, 1997.
Hutchinson, Earl O. The Assassination of the Black Male Image.
New York: Simon, 1996.
Major, Clarence, ed. The Garden Thrives: Twentieth-century African
American Poetry. New York: Harper-Perennial, 1996.
McBride, James. The Color of Water: A Black Man’s Tribute to His White
Mother. New York: Riverhead, 1996.
McMorris, Mark. Black Reeds. University of Georgia Press, 1996.
Nielsen, Aldon L. Black Chant: Languages of African American
Postmodernism. Chambridge University Press, 1996.
Porter, Dorothy, ed. Early Negro Writing 1760-1837. Reprinted by Black
Classics Press.
Reid, Mark A. Post Negritude Visual and Literary Culture. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1997.
Smith, Jessie Carney. Powerful Black Women. Detroit: Visible Ink, 1996.
Smith, Valerie. Ed. New Essay on Song of Solomon. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
Tate, Sonsyrea. Little X: Growing Up In the Nation of Islam.
San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1997.
Walker, Alice. The Same River Twice: Honoring the Difficult.
New York: Scribner, 1996.
Ward Jerry W., Jr., ed. Trouble the Water: 250 Years of African
American Poetry. New York: Mentor, 1997.
West, Dorothy. The Richer, The Poorer: Stories, Sketches, and
Reminiscences. New York: Doubleday, 1996.
Wright, Roberta Hughes, and Wilburn B. Hughes, III. Lay Down Body:
Living History in African American Cemeteries. Detroit:
Visible Ink, 1996.

Poetry In Review

Trouble the Waters: 250 Years of
African-American Poetry
Ed. Jerry W. Ward, Jr.
New York: Mentor, 1997
ISBN 0-451-62864-0
566 pp. $6.99 (paper)

Spirit & Flame: An Anthology of Contemporary African American Poetry
E. Keith Gilyard
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997
ISBN 0-8156-2731-9
304 pp. $24.95 (paper)

In his introduction to Trouble the Waters, Jerry Ward makes the
simple, direct and commonsensical observation, one that has been
ignored by almost all American literature anthologies when they come
to representations of black verse, that "before one canonizes on the
literary/extraliterary axis, it seems desirable to represent the
variety and difference that actually does exist." The actually
existing variety with which Ward troubles the placid waters of today’s
multiclti anthology market encompasses such truly troubling poets as
Bob Kaufman, Lorenzo Thomas, Tom Dent, Julia Fields, Clarence Major,
David Henderson and Harryette Mullen. It seems that, despite what
we’ve been reading in some other collections, every good bye ain’t
gone, and it is wonderful to see again an editor willing to restore to
view the fullest spectrum of poetry by black American writers.

Unlike its editor, Trouble the Waters is thick and cheap. While any
individual reader might quibble about particular selections form a
favorite poet’s’s work, this is undoubtedly the most comprehensive
available anthology. All the expected poets are found here, but
readers will also encounter poetry by Daniel Payne, Camille Thierry,
Henrietta Cordelia Ray, James Edwin Campbell, May Miller, Marcus
Christian, Clarissa Delany and Sybil Kein. Raymond Patterson, who
found "Twenty-six Ways of Looking at a Blackman" long before Henry
Gates stopped at thirteen, is represented, as is Ahmos Zu Bolton. Ward
has done us all a favor by reprinting some of Harryette Mullen’s
earlier works, which many have wanted to read again now that she has
become better known to a larger audience. Any anthology that attempts
to be encyclopedic, as this one does, will leave its audience yearning
for more selections by each of the poets, but that is, after all, the
point of an introductory book or course, and after reading this volume
most will want to rush out in search of more poetry.

One place to look is in Keith Gilyard’s Spirit & Flame, a collection
that introduces even more new names to a wider readership. Along with
poets such as Baraka, Dove, Clinton, Madhabuti,, Troupe and Miller,
readers will find recent work by Niama Williams, Demetrice Worley,
Christopher Stanard and lamont b. steptoe. Because the ordering is
alphabetical, the new (Kevin Young) sometimes appears alongside the
more familiar (Al Young) to produce an intriguing lineage of book "to
indicate the considerable range of contemporaneity. Gilyard announces
his hope in this contemporary African American poetry, a project not
attempted in over twenty years." He almost succeeds. The introduction
refers to "logistical" problems that limited the space available to
him (and all of us who publish know just how limiting those logistics
are these days), but that does not quite explain one form of narrowing
of the range evident in the collection. Where Ward, despite trying to
indicate the range of poetry across 250 years, manages to display
aesthetics from the most conservative to the most avant garde,
Gilyard’s collection, in the guise of mappinga scene that is "vibrant
and diverse," cordons off one of the more interesting neighborhoods.
Harryette Mullen is missing in action, as is Mark McMorris, Nathaniel
Mackey, (and to get out of the M-base) Erica Hunt, Ed Roberson,
indeed, almost any poet who seems to have taken the poetic experiments
of the sixties (as opposed to thematics) beyond the point where the
Black Arts brought us.

Still, for a look at how the "mainstream" of contemporary
African-American poetry is flowing, it would be hard to match
Gilyard’s Spirit & Flame, and it makes a wonderful coda to Ward’s
Trouble the Waters. With this much activity on the anthology front,
perhaps we will once again see the excitement about poetry among
students and general readers that is pretended in films like Love
Jones.

-- Aldon L. Nielsen

New Books by AALCS Members

Demirturk, Lale. Modern Afro-American Novel. Ankara:
Gundogan Publications, 1997.
Greene, J. Lee. Blacks in Eden: The African American Novel’s First
Century. University Press of Virginia. Winner of the 1997 CLA Award.
Nielsen, Aldon L. Black Chant: Languages of African American
Postmodernism. Cambridge University Press.

[jum...@my-deja.com]

http://chss2.montclair.edu/history/217wilson.htm
------------------------------------------------

History of Black Americans - HIST 217/98 - Dr. Wilson
History 217
History of Black Americans
Professor Leslie Wilson
Wil...@Saturn.Montclair.edu
416 Dickson Hall
(973)-655-7827
office hours: mwth afternoons

Section -01
Texts
Roy Finkenbine, Sources of the African American Past

Introduction

Although they are one of the nation's oldest immigrant groups, black
Americans have not enjoyed all aspects of the "American Dream." Their
forced migration to these shores, their enslavement, and the
developing concept of race and racism, created distinctions between
themselves and others. They were the unwanted Americans, an experience
that left them isolated from other Americans in virtually every aspect
of life.

However, while the African American experience was different, it did
not mean that it was tragedy. Far too often, historians and other
social scientists focus on the negative victimization of blacks,
showing them as responders rather than leaders. To the contrary, I
would argue that African American s were leaders; making numerous
contributions to their own development, as well as helping to
transform America.

In this sense, the African American experience is enriched. It is not
just the inclusion of black faces in African American history, but a
view of two societies operating in the same time frame. Many issues
in the black community developed independently of problems faced in
"white society." And at times, a crisis facing both blacks and other
Americans will have different consequences. This course tries to
address previous deficiencies in trying to explain African American
history. It is a one semester survey of the traditional African
American history which begins the African past and continues to the
present time.

Course evaluation will consist of attendance, participation, three
examinations and two essays. Although the university does not have a
comprehensive attendance policy, it is expected that all students will
come to each session fully prepared to work. Because of the nature of
university study, it is extremely difficult to pass classes without
attending them. If you realize that you will miss more than one
session, please inform me or call the Dean of Students Office to
notify all of your professors. Examinations will be multi-formated
consisting of identifications, multiple choice questions and a mini
essay. The essays will be based on the series of assignments listed
at the bottom of this page.

Course Outline
Introduction
Sankofa: Remembering the African Past
Readings:
Finkenbine, 1-10
Seasoning in the Americas and the Caribbean
Readings:
Finkenbine, 11-20
The Colonial Experience
Readings:
Finkenbine, 21-28
First Examination
The New Republic
Readings:
Finkenbine, 29-40
Ante-bellum Era: Slavery
Readings:
Finkenbine, 41-70
Frederick Douglass, http://www.cotu.com/infopage/historic/dugl210.htm
Civil War
Readings:
Finkenbine, 71-82
Reconstructing America
Readings:
Finkenbine, 83-94
First Essay
Turn of the Century
Readings:
Marcus Garvey, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/mgpp/sample01.htm
Finkenbine 95-124
The Color Line
Readings:
Finkenbine, 125-170
Adjustments: Civil Rights And Black Power
Readings:
Homage to W.E.B. DuBois,
http://csf.colorado.edu/mail/psn/jun96/0046.html
Finkenbine, 171-200
Second Examination
The Modern Era
Readings:
Finkenbine, 201-212
Conclusion
Second Essay

Essay Questions

1. The Church played a role in the rise and fall of slavery. Yet most
people are unaware that American churches owned slaves. Look at the
dilemma faced by a particular church in Maryland and analyze what role
the church and the clergy played in the slave trade. Is there anything
in these pages that disturbs you or is of profound interest to you?
http://www.georgetown.edu/departments/amer_studies/coverjpp.html

2. Slave narratives can provide countless avenues to the exploration
of the peculiar institution. Consult several slave narratives and note
the differences based on age, location, gender, and type of
employment/labor. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/wpa/wpahome.html

3. Slavery and Native Americans can be viewed through examinations of
primary sources. However, is the reading of primary sources always
correct? Look at the following web site and compare the words of
Tocqueville and Beaumont and the analysis of the author. Do you think
that these interpretations are correct? If so, state why and if not
offer your own perspectives and interpretations of the highlighted
paragraphs. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/race/frames.html

4. Often people overlook the plight of women in the past and tend to
focus on the current controversies. At a time when it was common for
white men to give their opinions on conditions facing white women,
African American men were equally making gender related
pronouncements. Look at the writings of Rev. Alexander Crummell in his
"The Black Woman of the South." What are his views on blacks, black
women, and society at mid-century. What does he outline as problems
and are his proposed solutions viable for that time period?
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
murray:@field(FLD001+91898265+):@@@$REF$

5. Does history truly repeat itself or are the words of African
American preachers simply built on a broad, but solid, foundation? Are
the comments of Rev. W.D. Johnson in 1897 similar to the statements
made by African American leaders one hundred years later? Suggest a
current leader who might have used a similar approach in addressing
the issue of African Americans and society within the last decade.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
murray:@field(FLD001+90898324+):@@@$REF$

6. Historians have mixed reviews on the topic of Reconstruction. Look
at the views expressed in your texts and compare them with the
detailed opinion of John Mercer Langston, one of the longest serving
black representatives of this era. How does Langston place the defeat
of the South in relation to solving the issues of peaceful
co-existence of the races and the nation?
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
murray:@field(FLD001+18005993+):@@@$REF$

7. New words are being added to the dictionaries each day to explain
concepts and terms in the African American experience. Two words,
"Sankofa" and "Maafa" have particular importance in the emerging
African and African American culture. What does each mean and why do
you think that they are important to African Americans today? Use a
browser to look up the word "Sankofa" and see the following for the
latter. http://www.novanetwork.com/afrikan/about.html

8. Have American/U.S. doctors historically and consistently violated a
higher code of medical ethics in their denial of adequate health care
to economically disadvantaged and ethnic minorities? Consider for
example the Tuskegee experiment. See
http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~njoke/index.html

9. Kwanzza celebrates the cultural importance of African Americans.
What elements of the Black historical experience have shaped the
ideals of the Kwanzaa celebration? Based on these elements can Kwanzaa
be considered a universal experience in the diaspora and throughout
the world or simply an event that ties African Americans, in the
United States, together? http://www.melanet.com/kwanzaa/#background

10. Music is a major factor in African American life. We have
discussed rap and music videos and have suggested that they might
distort our images of reality and thus distort our images of modern
history. However, what about other forms of African American music?
What role does the changing structure of gospel, for example, play in
the analysis of African American music. Clearly, gospel has made great
strides to reach new and younger audiences. The Winans and Kirk
Franklin have been critized for pushing the boundaries of sacred music
into popular culture-have they gone to far? Read the following
commentary and then add your opinion to the ongoing debate.
http://www.everythingblack.com/Taylor3.html

11. The computer age has brought us the "virtual museum." One of the
more recent development is the Afrocentric "Museum of Slavery." Visit
the site and play close attention to the "Henrietta Marie" and
"Excerpts from Slave Narratives." What is the Henrietta Marie and why
is it so important in defining the Middle Passage and the Triangle
Trade? Additionally what can the various voices of slavery in Excerpts
from Slave Narratives tell us about the relationships between slaves,
slaves and masters, and the larger issues surrounding the Peculiar
Institution. Pay special attention to selections 1,2,5, 9, 18, 19 and
30. http://squash.la.psu.edu/~plarson/smuseum/homepage.html

12. The life and death of slavery in New Hampshire is an example of
the varying nature of slavery and it reveals the regional nature of
this institution. Visit the Seacoast New Hampshire website and examine
the plight of African Americans shortly after the American Revolution.
How did whites feel about African Americans and slavery? What factors
led to the decline and abolition of slavery? Was African American
emancipation a complete and final solution? Did it allow for blacks to
be fully integrated into the larger society or did it create a
marginal (quasi-free) existence for people of color that would remain
for decades? Compare the electronic information with that in the
Franklin and Moss text to gain a better understanding of changing
social and political conditions.
http://www.seacoastnh.com/blackhistory/blacks2.html

13. The is not one day when an African American issue or personality
is not covered by one of the thousands of radio or televison stations
or a major newspaper. Yet, what is the general perception of African
Americans by whites, blacks and others? How has the use of the
Internet affected this presentation? Web sites like Afrinet, NetNoir,
and Everythingblack pay parrticular attention to the portrayal of the
race in the media. They also provide links to countless black
newspapers and magazines, including Essence, Black Enterprise, and
Emerge. With over 3,000 members belonging to the National Association
of Black Journalists, do you think that the members do a good job of
presenting positive images of African Americans in the print and video
medias? Look at the NABJ web site, http://nabj.org as well as some of
the others listed above to shape the direction of your findings.

14. The movie "Amistad" has raised new questions about this lost piece
of African and African American history. Look at the Mystic Seaport's
web site for more information.
http://amistad.mysticseaport.org/main/wel

15. In "The Two Nations of Black America," Professor Henry L. Gates
explores the differences of class, race and gender with a
distinguished group of scholars. Look at aspects of this crisis from
the historic debate between WEB Du Bois and Booker T. Washington to
the current discussion on the black middle class and underclass. Based
on your analysis of the site, what can you suggest about the notions
of class in the African American community?
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/race

Section -02
Texts
Floyd Hayes, A Turbulent Voyage
John Hope Franklin & Alfred Moss, From Slavery To Freedom

Introduction
Although they are one of the nation's oldest immigrant groups, black
Americans
have not enjoyed all aspects of the "American Dream." Their forced
migration to
these shores and the developing concept of race and racism, created
distinctions
between themselves and others. They were the unwanted Americans, an
experience
that left them isolated from other Americans in virtually every aspect
of life.
However, while the African American experience was different, it did
not mean
that it was a tragedy. Far too often, historians and other social
scientists
focus on the negative victimization of blacks, showing them as
responders rather
than leaders. To the contrary, I would argue that African Americans were
leaders; making numerous contributions to their own development, as
well as
helping to transform America.
In this sense, the African American experience is enriched. It is not
just the
inclusion of black faces in American history, but a view of two
societies
operating in the same time frame. Many issues in the black community
developed
independently of problems faced in "white society." And at times, a
crisis
facing both blacks and other Americans will have different consequences.
This course struggles with the conflicts and duality of the African and
African
American experience from 1400 to the present. The class will consist of
lectures, readings, and discussions. To foster a greater understanding
of the
African American past, it is important to be exposed to as many
different views
as possible. There will be mandatory readings complimented by optional
activities. A schedule of weekly reading assignments is listed below.
Evaluation will be based on three examinations, two short written
assignments,
attendance, and class participation. All students are expected to
attend a
majority of the class sessions and to openly participate in class
discussions.
Tests will consist of short answer questions, multiple choice questions
and
identifications. Two will be given in class and the third/make-up test
will be
given during the final examination period. The essay assignments will
be in
response to topics listed on a following page will be discussed in
detail in
class. Papers should be at least four typed pages. Hand written
compositions
will not be accepted.

Course Outline and Reading Assignments

Introduction
The African Past
Film Sankofa
Franklin, 1-26 & Hayes, 1-84
Slavery And The Colonial Experience
Franklin, 27-63 & Hayes, 85-122
An African American Subculture
Franklin, 64-95
February 26th First Examination
The Formation of A Dual American Society
Franklin, 96-180 & Hayes, 123-191, 309-317, 333-363, & 405-417
First Essay
The Civil War and Reconstruction
Franklin, 181-223
Jim Crow to Booker T. Washington
Hayes, 192-308
Second Examination
Into The Twentieth Century
Franklin, 224-410 & Hayes 364-404
Second Essay
Post War Triumphs and Tragedies:The Modern Civil Rights Era
Hayes, 455-560
A Mid-Life Crisis: Observations of the Post Civil Rights Era
Franklin, 411-494 & Hayes, 561-612
Conclusion

Essay Topics
Select two of the following questions and respond to each one by the
specified
due dates for the reading assignments

1. Many people do not understand why African Americans seem to have a
general
distrust of conservative thought and the Republican party. Look at the
transformation of the Republicans to find some of the answers. Foremost
look at
Rayford Logan's concept of the "Nadir". Then explain how the "party of
Lincoln"
moved from abolition and equal rights to a position that stresses that
civil
rights policies are a form of favoritism. Finally, look at the writings
of some
black conservatives to see if they bring logic or further confusion to
the
subject.

2. Race pride, as promoted by blacks, has been contested for nearly
three
centuries. Likewise, Afrocentricism, as you should see, is not a modern
concept.
It emerges during the early 20th century and gains support through the
efforts
of DuBois and Garvey. Yet, the celebration of blackness met harsh
opposition,
then and now. If Americanisms often celebrate the achievements of white
Americans and Eurocentric doctrines tend to promote the values of
whites over
people of color, why is there such a furor over the attempts of blacks
to
promote their goals, aspirations and achievements in a public forum?
See reserve
article for additional assistance.

3. In From Slavery To Freedom, John Hope Franklin presents the image of
free
blacks living against the backdrop of slavery. Indirectly, he argues
that
freemen had to fight for the abolition of slavery in order to secure and
maintain their own freedoms. Given this notion, what role does the
black female
abolitionist play in the larger context of liberation struggles.

4. In light of my discussions of Hip-Hop culture and politics, read the
reserve
articles by Robin D. G. Kelley and Tricia Rose. How and why has rap
changed from
its political roots into a more social phenomena?

5. (Only for those in the teacher education program!!!) What is the
difference
between an Afrocentric approach and a multicultural approach to Black
History?
How are these related but different schools of thought expressed in the
writing
and teaching of history? How can you judge their effectiveness, if one
is
considered more controversial than the other? If you were teaching at
an inner
city school which methodology would you adopt? Try to interview various
faculty
members and use educational journals, including the Journal of Negro
Education,
to help shape your essay.

6. What is the real issue behind the fight for or against Affirmative
Action?
Who created this program, who benefits, and has it been successful?
Look at the
arguments of Jackson and Pendleton (reserve articles) for ideas.

7. Social scientists have suggested that blacks have made tremendous
strides
into the middle class. Yet, if you were to ask blacks and whites to
define the
"middle class" you would not get the same answers. Define the
term "black middle
class". Examine its numerical as well as historical growth and suggest
if it is
truly a sign of racial progress.

8. If racism is over, why is there still discrimination in America?
Better
still, in this context, how can we explain the existence of the urban
poor? Are
they not the products of racism? What about the views of Derrick Bell
and Dinesh
D&#8217;Souza on race and poverty? Examine their views and see if they
add to the
debate on the origins of the black underclass. What is the underclass,
why is it
a subject of debate and concern, and is it the fastest growing segment
of the
African American community?

9. In the course of the semester we will discuss many issues which will
tend to
suggest that African Americans have their own subculture and distinct
mental and
sociological orientation. Try to explain how this occurred if so much
of African
American culture is southern and American rather than African.

10. Black Power did not die in the 1960s, but continues, albeit in
different
settings. Look at the transformation of Black Power as captured in your
readings. Try to explain how this movement has emerged as part a
social-political consciousness that expresses itself in countless
settings. Do
you believe that this new Black Power is as threatening to whites as
the old
one?

11. Based on your readings offer your impressions of the role of African
American women in the continuing struggles for abolition and equality.
How have
the efforts of women varied from those of their male counterparts? Why
has the
struggle of black women never been seen on a comparable level with the
feminist
movement?
12. The movie "Amistad" has raised new questions about this lost piece
of
African and African American history. How did this incident and the
court case
affect northerners views on slavery and African Americans. Based on the
evidence, was the court's decision a fair one? Look at the Mystic
Seaport's web
site for more information. http://amistad.mysticseaport.org/main/wel
13. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has documents on
the South
during the nineteenth century. These documents have been compiled into
several
categories, including some surrounding slavery. Read several of the
documents
revealing the thoughts of slaves and planters and compare and contrast
their
comments with the ideas presented by your texts.
http://sunsite.unc.edu/docsouth/narratives.html
14. How can you measure progress if at this time African Americans are
experiencing their largest middle class and underclass? Join Dr. Henry
Gates and
others in the discussion. Use their ideas and your texts to present your
position on the subject.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/race

Resources for History of Black Americans
Additional Web Sites
WWW Virtual Library: history
http://history.cc.ukans.edu/history/WWW_history_main.html
Netnoir http://www.netnoir.com
Melanet http://www.melanet.com
Everythingblack http://www.everythingblack.com
Afrinet http://www.afrinet.net

Course Discussion Forum

RETURN TO DR. WILSON'S HOME PAGE
=============================================================

http://www.oxfordcoach.com/help/africana.html
---------------------------------------------

Africana : The Encyclopedia of the African and African-American
Experience by Anthony Appiah, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Henry Gates

Read Reviews and Reader Comments Here

Amazon.com

Legendary scholar-activist W.E.B. Du Bois labored to complete an
"Encyclopedia Africana" before his death in 1963. Just over 35 years
later, two Harvard educators, Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Ghanaian-born
Kwame Anthony Appiah, have brought Du Bois' intellectual dream to life
in Africana, the most complete and comprehensive record of the
Pan-African diaspora compiled into one volume. With over two million
words and 3,500 entries from more than 220 contributors, Appiah and
Gates sought, as they put it, to "give a sense of the wide diversity
of peoples, cultures, and traditions that we know about Africa in
historical times, a feel for the environment in which that history was
lived, and a broad outline of the contributions of people of African
descent, especially in the Americas, but, more generally, around the
world." To fulfill this aim, they consider biographical, political,
artistic, economic, historical, and geographical data; a brief
sampling of topics includes "Food in African-American Culture,"
"Creolized Musical Instruments of the Caribbean," and "Anthropology in
Africa." The section on Africa fills about two thirds of the book,
loaded with invaluable information--from the ethnic and colonial
factors that contributed to violence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Liberia, Eritrea, and Sierra Leone to the educational,
linguistic, and social advances in Tanzania, Gabon, and South Africa.
The legacies of the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Nubia, Ethiopia,
and Zimbabwe are also presented in great detail. The encyclopedia also
contains documented evidence of African-derived peoples in Asia,
including the exploits of Malik Ambar, who arrived in India from
Ethiopia as a result of the East Indian slave trade.

Turning to the Western Hemisphere, Africana skillfully and succinctly
synopsizes the lives and achievements of a multitude of African
Americans, from 18th-century inventor-astronomer Benjamin Banneker to
late-20th-century heroes like Colin Powell, Tiger Woods, and astronaut
Mae Jemison. You'll learn about the little-considered black presence
in Canada; Africana also uncovers hidden pockets of black culture in
surprising places like Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina (where the Negro
population, we discover, was reduced by a process of miscegenation
known as blanqueamiento, or whitening). The upper-crust veneer of the
Argentine tango is peeled away, revealing the dance's roots in the
rhythmic innovations of 19th-century Afro-Argentines. With all of the
aforementioned headings and topics, however, it's the special essays
that best detail the treasure chest of scholarship of Africana. Robin
Kelley examines the volatile clash between "Malcolm X and the Black
Bourgeoisie"; Thomas Skidmore deconstructs "Race and Class in Brazil"
and the myth of "racial democracy"; Mahmood Mamdani, in "Ethnicity in
Rwanda," brilliantly decodes the complex and maddening colonial
manipulations that erupted in genocide and made the Hutu and Tutsi
ethnic groups "more political than cultural identities ... one is
power and the other is subject."

A splendidly packaged reference work that will adorn libraries and
homes for years to come, Africana defines the black experience in the
same sweeping way that the Encyclopedia Britannica defined
Euro-American civilization. More importantly for young readers, the
magnificent collection shows that Africans and the continent's
descendants are a truly global people who have made tremendous
contributions to human civilization.

==========================================================

http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lecturers/gates/biblio.html
---------------------------------------------------------

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND CRITICAL TEXTS

Books by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (On Reserve)
Books Edited or Co-edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
Selected Articles by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
Selected Articles about Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

Books by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

On Reserve in Meyer Library
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man. New
York: Random House, 1997.
Meyer Reserves E185.86 .G374
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., and Cornel West. The Future of the Race.
New York: Knopf, 1996.
Meyer Reserves E185.86 .G377 1996
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., et al. Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex:
Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. New York: New York
University Press, 1994.
Meyer Reserves KF9345 .A75S67
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. Colored People: A Memoir. New York: Knopf,
1994.
Meyer Reserves PS29 .G28A3
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Meyer Reserves PS153 .N5G275
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of
Afro-American Literary Criticism. New York: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Meyer Reserves PS153 .N5G28
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the
"Racial" Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Meyer Reserves PS153 .N5G27

Books Edited or Co-edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., and Kwame A. Appiah, eds. The Dictionary of
Global Culture. New York: Knopf, 1997.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., and Nellie Y. McKay, eds. The Norton
Anthology of African American Literature. New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1997.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., and Kwame A. Appiah, eds. Identities.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. Bearing Witness: Selections from
African-American Autobiography in the Twentieth Century. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1991.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. "Race," Writing, and Difference.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., Randall K. Burkett, and Nancy Hall Burkett,
eds. Black Biography, 1790-1950: A Cumulative Index. 3 vols.
Alexandria: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991.
Hughes, Langston. Mule Bone: A Comedy of Negro Life. Edited with
introductions by George Houston Bass and Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
with the complete story of the Mule Bone controversy. New York:
HarperPerennial, 1991.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. Reading Black, Reading Feminist: A
Critical Anthology. New York: Meridian Books, 1990.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. Black Literature and Literary Theory.
New York: Routledge, 1990.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. The Classic Slave Narratives. New York:
New American Library, 1987.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., James Gibbs, and Ketu H. Katrak, eds. Wole
Soyinka: A Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., and Charles T. Davis, eds. The Slave's
Narrative. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. Black Literature and Literary Theory.
New York: Methuen, 1984.
Davis, Charles T. Black is the Color of the Cosmos: Essays on
Afro-American Literature and Culture, 1942-1981. Edited by Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. New York: Garland Pub., 1982.

Selected Articles by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

[magazines]
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Net Worth: How the Greatest Player in the
History of Basketball Became the Greatest Brand in the History of
Sports. Michael Jordan and Advertising." New Yorker v74, n14 (1 June
1998): 48.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The White Negro: in 'Bulworth,' Warren
Beatty Puts His Career on the Color Line." New Yorker v74, n11 (11
May 1998): 62.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Two Nations of Black America: the Best
of Times, the Worst of Times." Brookings Review v16, n2 (Spring
1998): 4.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "All the Way to Timbuktu: a Journey into
Africa's Intellectual History." New Republic v218, n16 (20 April
1998): 17.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The End of Loyalty: Why Has Betraying
Clinton - and Everyone Else - Become a National Pastime?" New Yorker
v74, n3 (9 March 1998): 34.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Dole 2000: the G.O.P.'s Best Hope for the
White House is an Un-Republican Named Elizabeth Dole." New Yorker
v73, n32 (20 October 1997): 228.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Naked Republic: Shifting Perceptions of
Sexual Mores." New Yorker v73, n25 (25 August 1997): 114.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Going Back: an African American Returns to
Africa." New Republic v216, n24 (16 June 1997): 19.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Belafonte's Balancing Act. Singer and
Activist Harry Belafonte." New Yorker v72, n25 (26 August 1996):
132.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "White Like Me. African American Author
Anatole Broyard." New Yorker v72, n16 (17 June 1996): 66.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The African-American Century: a Reality
That Is More Complicated, and More Heroic, Than the Myth." New
Yorker v72, n10 (29 April 1996): 9.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Charmer. Louis Farrakhan." New Yorker
v72, n10 (29 April 1996): 116.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "King of Cats. Cultural Critic,
African-American Albert Murray." New Yorker v72, n7 (8 April 1996):
70.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Hating Hillary. First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton." New Yorker v72, n2 (26 Feb. 1996): 116.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man.
African American Leaders React to the O.J. Simpson Trial and the
Million Man March." New Yorker v71, n33 (23 October 1995): 56.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Powell and the Black Elite. General Colin
Powell." New Yorker v71, n29 (25 September 1995): 64.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "On Honoring Blackness." American Enterprise
v6, n5 (September-October 1995): 49.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Wole Soyinka: Mythopoesis and the Agon of
Democracy." Georgia Review v49, n1 (Spring 1995): 187.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Multiculturalism and Its Discontents."
Black Scholar v24, n1 (Winter 1994): 16.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Body Politic. Choreographer Bill T.
Jones." New Yorker v70, n39 (28 November 1994): 112.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Black Leadership Myth." New Yorker v70,
n34 (24 October 1994): 7.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Black Creativity: on the Cutting Edge."
Time v144, n15 (10 October 1994): 74.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory,
Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment." New Republic v209,
n12-13 (20 September 1993): 37.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Blood and Irony. Race and Religion."
Economist v328, n7828 (11 September 1993): F33.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Blacklash? African Americans Object to Gay
Rights-Civil Rights Analogy." New Yorker v69, n13 (17 May 1993): 42.

Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Culture of Complaint." New Yorker v69, n9
(19 April 1993): 113.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "A Pretty Good Society. The Inherent
Strength and Determination of American Society." Time v140, n20 (16
November 1992): 84.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Two nations... Both Black. Social and
Economic Division in Black Community." Forbes v150, n6 (14 September
1992): 132.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "African American Studies in the 21st
Century." Black Scholar v22, n3 (Summer 1992): 3.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Fire Last Time: What James Baldwin Can
and Can't Teach America." New Republic v206, n22 (1 June 1992): 37.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Beware of the New Pharaohs. Afrocentrism
and Education." Newsweek v118, n13 (23 September 1991): 47.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Delusions of Grandeur; Young Blacks Must Be
Taught That Sports Are Not the Only Avenues of Opportunity." Sports
Illustrated v75, n8 (19 August 1991): 78.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Alchemy of Race and Rights." Nation
v252, n22 (10 June 1991): 766.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "The Master's Pieces: On Canon Formation and
the African-American Tradition." South Atlantic Quarterly v89, n1
(Winter 1990): 89.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., and Murray Hausknecht. "Taking the Rap.
Black Intellectuals and the 2 Live Crew Obscenity Case." New
Republic v203, n23 (3 December 1990): 4.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Censorship and Justice: On Rushdie and
Soyinka." Research in African Literatures v21, n1 (Spring 1990):
137.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Introduction: 'Tell Me, Sir, ... What Is
"Black" Literature?'" PMLA v105, n1 (January 1990): 11.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "'What's in a Name?' Some Meanings of
Blackness." Dissent v36, n4 (Fall 1989): 487.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. "Academe Must Give Black-Studies Programs
Their Due." Chronicle of Higher Education v36, n3 (20 September
1989): A56.
[newspapers]
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "A Call to Protect Academic Integrity from
Politics. A Debate on Activism in Black Studies," New York Times
v147, 4 April 1998, A13(N), B11(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "American Letters, African Voices. History
of African American Authors," New York Times Book Review, 1 December
1996, 39.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "A Dangerous Literacy: The Legacy of
Frederick Douglas.," New York Times Book Review, 28 May 1995, 3.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "The Glance That Betrays Uncomfortable
Solidarity. Silent Acknowledgments between Blacks in Public," Los
Angeles Times v113, 8 May 1994, M3.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Black Intellectuals, Jewish Tensions; a
Weaving of Identities," New York Times v142, 13 April 1993, A17(N),
A21(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Black Demagogues and Pseudo-Scholars.
Relations between Black and Jewish Americans," New York Times v141,
20 July 1992, A13(N), A15(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Just Whose 'Malcolm' Is It, Anyway? Spike
Lee's New Film Biography of Malcolm X," New York Times v141, sec2,
31 May 1992, H13(N), H13(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Must Buppiehood Cost Homeboy His Soul? In
Today's Movies, Guilt and Loss of Cultural Roots Seem to Plague
Blacks Who Rise to the Middle Class," New York Times v141, sec2, 1
March 1992, H11(N), H11(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Whose Culture Is It, Anyway? It's Not Just
Anglo-Saxon. Trend in Schools to Emphasize Western Cultural Values
in Their Curricula," New York Times v140, 4 May 1991, 15(N), 23(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "2 Live Crew, Decoded. Rap Music Group's
Use of Street Language in Context of Afro-American Cultural Heritage
Analyzed," New York Times v139, 19 June 1990, A15(N), A23(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "TV's Black World Turns - But Stays
Unreal," New York Times v139, sec2, 12 November 1989, H1(N), H1(L).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Whose Canon Is It, Anyway? Literary Canons
and Politics of Culture," New York Times Book Review, 26 February
1989, 1.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl,"
New York Times Book Review, 22 November 1987, 12.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Mating Birds," New York Times Book Review,
18 May 1986, 3.
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Dust Tracks on a Road: An Autobiography,"
New York Times Book Review v90, 21 April 1985, 1(3).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "The Autobiography of Leroi Jones," New
York Times Book Review v89, 11 March 1984, 11(2).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "Dictionary of American Negro Biography,"
New York Times Book Review v88, 1 May 1983, 13(2).
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., "A Poet in Peril. Dennis Brutus of Southern
Africa," New York Times v131, 7 September 1982, 27(N), A23(L).

Selected Articles about Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

[magazines]
Malveaux, Julianne. "Bostonians Squabble over Headline." Black
Issues in Higher Education v15, n7 (28 May 1998): 28.
Slaughter, Jane. "Henry Louis Gates Jr." Progressive v62, n1
(January, 1998): 30.
Shumway, David R. "The Star System in Literary Studies." PMLA v112,
n1 (January, 1997): 85.
Taylor, Ronald A. "Academic Theater: An the Road with Cornel West,
Henry Gates and SRO Crowds." Black Issues in Higher Education v13,
n5 (2 May 1996): 12.
Gergen, David R. "Harvard's 'Talented Tenth': Harvard's Dream Team
of African-American Scholars Could Deepen Understanding of Racial
Issues in Our Nations." U.S. News & World Report v120, n11 (18 March
1996): 116.
White, Jack E. "The Black Brain Trust." Time v147, n9 (26 February
1996): 58.
Kalb, Claudia and Starr, Mark. "Education: Up from Mediocrity - Now
Black Studies at Harvard Is Famous for Its Stars." Newsweek v127, n8
(19 Febraury 1996): 64.
Newman, Richard. "Henry Louis Gates Jr." Publishers Weekly v241, n25
(20 June 1994): 80.
Teachout, Terry. "Dead Center: The Myth of the Middle." National
Review v44, n21 (2 Nov 1992): 53.
Magner, Denise K. "Nomadic Scholar of Black Studies Puts Harvard in
the Spotlight." Chronicle of Higher Education v38, n45 (15 July
1992): A13.
Ward, Jerry W., Jr. "Interview with Henry Louis Gates, Jr." New
Literary History v22, n4 (Autumn, 1991): 927.
"An American culture." National Review v43, n9 (27 May 1991): 18.
Clarke, Breena; Tifft, Susan. "A "Race Man" Argues for a Broader
Curriculum: Henry Louis Gates Jr. Wants W.E.B. Dubois, Wole Soyinka
and Phyllis Wheatley on the Nation's Reading Lists, As Well As
Western Classics like Milton and Shakespeare." Time v137, n16 (22
April 1991): 16.
Lubiano, Wahneema. "Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and African-American
Literary Discourse." New England Quarterly v62, n4 (December, 1989):
561.
[newspapers]
Goodman, Walter. "Frontline: The Two Nations of Black America." New
York Times v147, 10 February 1998, B3(N), E8(L).
Rimer, Sara. "On Front Lines of Battle of Tradition and Change." New
York Times v145, 20 March 1996, A10(N), A14(L).
Trescott, Jacqueline. "Harvard's Dream Team: Many of the Nation's
Top Black Intellectuals Have Heeded the Call of Scholar Skip Gates.
Now the Real Test Begins." Washington Post v119, 26 February 1996,
B1.
Hentoff, Nat. "Campus Quicksand: Finally, an Attack on Black
Antisemitism by a Nationally Prestigious Black." Washington Post
v115, 11 August 1992, A17.
Butterfield, Fox. "Afro-American Studies Get New Life at Harvard."
New York Times v141, 3 June 1992, B9(N), B7(L).
Holmstrom, David. "A Vision of a New Racial Tapestry: Harvard
Scholar Gates Talks about Racism and Multiculturalism in US."
Christian Science Monitor v84, n95, 10 April 1992, 11.
Gardner, Marilyn. "The Classroom Versus the Field of Dreams."
Christian Science Monitor v83, n186, 20 August 1991, 14.
Bernstein, Richard. "African Oriented: Reviving a Magazine of Change
and Ideas." New York Times v140, 14 May 1991, B1(N), C13(L).
"Harvard Hires a Specialist in African-American Studies." New York
Times v140, 1 February 1991, A14(L).
Clary, Mike. "Professor Calls 2 Live Crew 'Refreshing.'" Los Angeles
Times v109, 20 October 1990, A20.
Parker, Laura. "Rap Lyrics Likened to Literature: Witness in 2 Live
Crew Trial Cites Art, Parody, Precedents." Washington Post v113, 20
October 1990, D1.
May, Lee. "Turning a New Page in History." Los Angeles Times v109,
14 May 1990, A1.
Begley, Adam. "Black Studies' New Star." New York Times Magazine
v139, 1 April 1990, 24.
"On U.S. Cultural Literacy: the Stakes and Strategy." New York Times
v139, 6 December 1989, B8(N), B14(L).
"'Do the Right Thing': Issues and Images." New York Times v138,
sec2, 9 July 1989, H1(N), H1(L).
Alexander, Elizabeth. "Pursuing the Pages of History: Yale's Henry
Louis Gates and the Roots of Black Literature." Washington Post
v106, 10 August 1983, B1.

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Last modified: September 07, 1999

=============================================================

New Beast Control Technology
Author: kcaj <kc...@bellsouth.net>
Date: 1999/10/18
Forum: alt.conspiracy

An "exciting" and "refreshing" new way to carry around your soon to
come globally-mandated United Nations beast control identification
number.

BELIEVE IT! YOUR FACIAL IMAGE IN A BAR CODE.

I.D. Magazine, October 1999

An exciting new combination of identification technologies has emerged
recently, resulting in a cost-conscious solution for security
applications. The encoding of facial images within PDF417 symbology
means that businesses requiring verification capabilies can now operate
within a printed medium. One example of this potential market is the
airline industry; the PDF417 ID would let personnel link passenger
identification with personel boarding passes and luggage tags,
enhancing the security of worldwide travel. In the corporate
environment, visitor badges can now provide a higher level of security.
Developed by Visionics Corp., this technology is packaged in a software
toolkit containing the latest programming modules for the company's
biometric identification package, Faceit. Designed for software
developers, the toolkit enables efficient encoding of a facial template
of images in 84 bytes of data, allowing for very small 2-D symbols and
leaving ample room on printed materials for additional information.
"This new development has very significant implications for 2-D bar
code applications," explained Dr. Joseph Atick, president of Visionics.
"It enables developers to deploy facial recognition on an expensive
paper medium without compromising accuracy or speed."

========================================================

CLEANSING THE PLANET
Author: kcaj <kc...@bellsouth.net>
Date: 1999/10/18
Forum: alt.conspiracy

http://www.mcsi.net/alahoy/26000.htm

A Good Book about people "cleansing" the planet of "undesirables" in
the new-age new world order. The cover of the book depicts a future
newage ritualistic "cleanser" washing a sword after he has killed an
undesirable.

http://www.texemarrs.com/mysmark1.htm

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/5234/end.htm

http://www.digiserve.com/gaia/articles/earthchange.html

http://www.noahproject.com

http://www.eagleswings.com.au/pan2.htm

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/future/build.txt

[kc...@bellsouth.net]

i don't know how my two posts at the very bottom got tied into this
but I ain't no fan of Ted K (What's his name) or I don't particularly
care about reading this post. Take it any way you want. I don't care,.

In article <7veku1$dbu$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,

[jum...@my-deja.com]

> "Mike" wrote:
>> It seems to me you have brought such attacks upon yourself. What
>> is the point of bringing up such a debate? Find a 'holocaust
>> quantification questioning' newsgroup and post there. Otherwise
>> expect to bring on others' wrath.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> Are you the same fucker who keeps on coming in with different
> screennames and yammers? We are here to discuss "the" Holocaust,
> so if you have a problem with that by all means go to a
> politically correct newsgroup, or maybe alt.support.impotence
> might be of help to you.

Mike is wrong to imagine "wrath" as the consequence of posting
"info" to a newsgroup, albeit it may be boorish and repetitive.
Pyro is wrong to criticize Mike for being a "fucker" because
"fucking" is a basic human right intrinsic to sexual reproduction.
When Nazis make babies they also engage in "fucking" just like
ordinary human beings. Pyro is also wrong to imagine that "we
are here to discuss 'the' Holocaust" because no `discussion' is
taking place here, and TK wasn't interested in the "Holocaust"
because he hadn't written anything about it. Mike is correct
that this newsgroup is not an appropriate location for "discussion
about the Holocaust." If an interesting, engaging, and focused
"Holocaust discussion" should take place then alt.revisionism
is more approriate, not alt.fan.unabomber. To sharpen this
issue: one may conduct a newsgroup-wide DejaNews search and
bring up readable "Holocaust discussion" threads where they are
`appropriately' posted. I agree that an "open society" is
facilitated by review of literature from D.Irving or D.Duke, etc.,
and I have no disagreement to disagreeable literature being made
available to the USENET by that means. However, the "case" is
being overstated when it wanders into an "irrelevancy objection"
on newsgroups where it does not belong. More is less. Hitler
might have been "successful" at exterminating Jews from Germany
if he had not also decided to make war upon Europe and threaten
to conquer the world. Similarly the anti-semites look foolish
when they display insensitivity toward "relevancy" questions,
it seems that they incline toward "ANTI-anti-semitism" when I see
how the case for "anti-semitism" is being misrepresented. That's
why I suspect these "anti-semites" are actually Jews in disguise
who by overstating that case are instead whipping up "WRATH" Mike
speaks of, against anti-semites, producing ANTI-anti-semitism.

Also, it is not a given that alt.fan.unabomber is a newsgroup
devoted to "politically incorrect" topics. Many are of the mind
that TK's philosophy is "politically correct," not "incorrect."
TK's luddism and anti-technological suspicion have a long history
given significant coverage in mainstream humanistic literature.
Of course, even if there is a "politically incorrect" component
to some of TK's writings it does not follow that some "doorway"
was forced open to allow -all- "politically incorrect" topics
as relevant. Oranges are not apples simply because they're fruit.
So there's a rather serious "logical error" being displayed by
those who portend to be champions of anti-semitism here, and as
long as that "logical error" is perpetrated then reviewers would
naturally conclude that ANTI-anti-semitism is THE BOTTOM LINE.

> "Mike" wrote:
>> The point of discussing freedom is not to content let
>> slight differences of opinion spring into large ones while
>> the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> What the heck are you prattling about?

I had no difficulty decrypting Mike's remark. It's embarassing
that Mike should have an "oxford" email address while butchering
the English language, but actually that's the perogative of the
Brits who conceive of English as a fluid ever-changing medium.
Here's what he wanted to say, after running it through the filter:

" The point of discussing freedom is not to contend, lest
slight differences of opinion spring into large ones
while the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. "

And Mike's point is that discussions can be diverted away from
the REAL issues by individuals who grab the floor without any
demonstration of meritorious standing (relevancy) to the topics.
There's no connection between anti-semitism and environmentalism
because Nazis could just as well trample this planet to death,
all by themselves, all the more likely in light of the observation
of Nazi insensitivity, lack of empathy and/or humanitarian concern.
And Pyro, since you show considerable dyslexia, feel free to ask
me about your "decryption problems" any time you can't read Mike's
simple English.

> "Mike" wrote:
>> An appropriate Nazi topic might be to discuss US business
>> involvement or how the CIA was partly created out of the old
>> Nazi spy business.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> Or, let's talk about mental deficiency and how we can alter the
> language so the "special" such as yourself don't get their
> feelings hurt.

Alteration of language is not the chief signal of "mental
deficiency." The chief signal is FAILURE TO AVOID LOGICAL FALLACY.

> "Mike" wrote:
>> But to start something like this seems pointless at best and
>> only draws out such fierce debate. Perhaps in an ideal world we
>> would have time for such haggling of points but considering the
>> continued division of wealth and power pointing us to an ecological
>> disaster it would seem far better to keep to some standard of
>> meaningful points rather than rubbing historical sores and
>> then acting righteous because logically you might be in some way
>> correct.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> What does the gap between rich and poor have to do with ecology?
> If not for the scintilla of coherence in your writing I would
> think you are trying to filibuster!

Pyro, Pyro, Pyro ... you're just displaying your woeful lack of
familiarity with the paramaters of this environmental debate.
For example, an impoverished Haiti rendered their little island
an environmental waste. It would have been a simple solution to
upgrade Haiti, provide free medical care (including sterilization),
and their little island wouldn't need to have become a wasteland.

> "Mike" wrote:
>> Your comment about Karl Marx being a criminal shows to me that
>> everything you say can be thrown out as so much loudmouth rhetoric,
>> born from anti-communist propaganda.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> Hardly victims of anti-communist propaganda. I for one was
> raised with socialist ideals, and was even once a liberal. I
> developed my viewpoint from my own experiences and capacity.
> While it is true the U.S. government and media have taken part in
> much brainwashing of Americans with anti-communist drivel, the
> same can be said about them brainwashing against politically
> incorrect ideas.

Ahem! Since it's getting "stuffy" in here I've decided to open
a window. Pyro is not entirely wrong in utilizing a literary form
of criticism which ascribes blame for "Marxist" travesties to Marx,
whereas Mike is correct in pointing out that Marx really had very
little, or nothing, to do with what "Marxists" later did, or were
alleged to have done. The basic point is that Marx was not himself
a Marxist. I recognize it's a complex point which might exceed the
parameters of Pyro's microcephallus. It's not a point I originate
but one given adequate coverage and analysis in existing literature.
Mike is wrong again in presuming that "everything" Pyro says can be
thrown out simply because Pyro has illustrated yet again a tendency
to overstep the boundaries of valid argument. Sometimes Pyro makes
a correct argument, which makes all of this an exceedingly difficult
task to adjudicate. Now the phrase "politically incorrect" is not
a well-formed semantic, and is not an analytical tool for political
science. To claim that "brainwashing" is taking place against an
ill-defined term requires one's imagination stretched beyond repair.
Pyro's argument on that issue IS "brainwashing" and about as much
`convincing' as pissing up a rope. Point awarded to Mike.

> "Mike" wrote:
>> Marx's followers may have made some mistakes and that is worth
>> debating so such mistakes can be avoided in the future.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> I wouldn't refer to the killers of tens of millions as persons
> who merely made "mistakes".

Yes, mass murders are not simply making mistakes. Hint. Hint.

> "Mike" wrote:
>> But Marx himself was a man the likes of which we chance upon all to
>> rarely - someone who devoted his entire life and work to the cause
>> of better the conditions of living for the masses of downtrodden.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> His goal of a classless society was screwed from the beginning.
> Mikhail Bakunin saw his flaws from the getgo and wrote plenty of
> prescient ideas about Marx and his ilk.

I'm inclined to agree that the "classless society" is neither
feasible, nor even aesthetic in terms of ongoing development for
civilization. I think Marx was merely inarticulate on that point.
He could have stated that the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and
the proletariat -all- needed to make a showing of "defensible
positions" in life. Inherited wealth causes a problem when the
inheritors lose touch with patterns of wealth creation that must
rely upon everyone's contribution in the world at large. Classes
occur by wealth stratification and also by lack of socialization
among classes. Wealth stratification does not itself contribute
to diminished future wealth creation, but a lack of socialization
very likely -does- contribute to diminished future wealth creation.
We have already the model available from religious literature, but
it is a "technology" not being applied, having been submerged under
the rubric of the "industrial revolution technology" concomitant
with invention of -dictionaries- which reduced the people's general
dependence upon their Biblical literature as the semantic source.
People began running to dictionaries for an "efficient" definition
rather than to the Bibles, so its detailed doctrines of inestimable
value were being lost and not transmitted in social discourse, and
also not from one generation to another. The cause of malaise in
a lack of wealth creation is -ignorance- but it is an -ignorance-
taking many forms, each of which require considerable attention at
an etiology and treatment of diseases. Mental diseases are rather
pernicious since patients with "mental illness" are notoriously
resistant to change, and they do not typically recognize the need
for change, much less making motions toward improved mental health.

As I mentioned previously, six of Plato's dialogues invoke the
reference to "draughts" (checkers, or more generally any cognitive
skill boardgame such as Chess, Go, Shogi ...) as a characterization
for what is -meant- by the term _dialectics_, a most essential form
of argument in the Socratic exchange. Plato's _Gorgias_ dialogue
is central to an overall "ordering" consisting of that discussion
which examines the relationship between "dialectics" and "rhetoric."
Robert Pirsig's character gave this some treatment in his 1975 book
_Zen_and_the_Art_of_Motorcycle_Maintenance_, though Pirsig drifted
off point when he began focusing upon "quality" rather than "nature."
The "Socratic solution" for people quibbling over rhetorical issues
was to have them all sit down together and play checkers. Then they
would re-argue their points in light of the fact that each of them
had just previously demonstrated superior and inferior capacity at
cognitive skill activity. This, too, was the method applied within
mathematical studies. I don't believe you can find today a single
mathematician who will not report the positive utility of employing
cognitive skill boardgames as an educational technology toward the
end of improving intelligence, logical reasoning ability, cognition,
and socialization. So if anything is primitively "relevant" to this
newsgroup it should proceed from acknowledgment of the Plato method,
Aristotle's development, the fundmental nature of mathematics study,
the issues of environmentalism which concerned TK. If anti-semites
want to present a "case" here, they're going to become self-defeating
if they cannot follow the basic rules of logical reasoning, if they
cannot READ (as has been amply demonstrated already), if they think
that name-calling or _ad_hominem_ offers one iota of force toward a
point (which it does not but in fact works towards its opposite), if
they think that mere repitition of points previously presented has
any effect toward "persuasion" in the minds of readers (which it
does not), if they think that some "news" is being offered which has
not previously been offered on other (relevant) newsgroups (nothing
is "original" about anything Pyro and Agent99 have been presenting),
they are sadly mistaken. The anti-semites here have merely been
breathing their own exhaust. Richard Wagner earned the -right- to
be an anti-semite because he was an ARTIST, but Pyro and Agent99
have shown no indication that they have the slightest appreciation
either for the arts, or for skill at logical discourse, as they
could have easily shown had they any capacity for Plato's "draughts."

> "Mike" wrote:
>> To speak against him so is to affirm the oppressors of the world.
>> Apparently you don't care about the fate of the billions oppressed
>> by economic systems only the minutia of accounting for how some are
>> oppressed.
>> And to blame a hundred million deaths on Marx - well then how many
>> millions of deaths to you account to the US founding fathers,
>> considering the Indian genocide?
>> One last point - you might want to consider what it implies about
>> you - putting 'fuckwit' in the subject line.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> What about the 25 million killed by Mao from 1958-61, when
> collectivization did not go as he had planned due to crop
> failures? What about the tens of millions slaughtered -- not to
> mentioned deliberately starved -- by Stalin and his henchmen
> (whom were largely Jewish)? What about the 1.5 million
> slaughtered by Pol Pot in Cambodia (or 25% of the population)?
> These numbers DWARF those killed by even the most depraved of
> capitalists.
>
> This is not propaganda; it's what you'll find if you commit
> yourself to a tiny bit of reading.

The upshot of these historical slaughters, from both the "left"
and "right," should illustrate that these basic problems all stem
from OVERPOPULATION and IGNORANCE. If human beings are going to
survive on this planet, now under the threat of high-technology
Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) weaponry, they will need to:

(a) STOP INCREASING POPULATION NUMBERS
(b) TAKE PRO-ACTIVE MEANS TO REDUCE IGNORANCE

Point-(a) is rather trivial, but point-(b) is a much more difficult
problem, since if we don't have point-(b) in place then point-(a)
will be forgotten. On point-(b) there needs to be preliminary
agreement, essentially being that point-(b) requires our attention.
Believe it or not there are a number of people "running about" who
don't think point-(b) requires very much attention, perhaps because
THEY are the candidates who have been ignoring point-(b). Once we
all agree that point-(b) requires more attention then there needs
to be put into place some agreement as to how point-(b) will receive
that attention. We have already the literature of Plato/Aristotle,
which had served as traditional "core curriculum" in a university
education, but has (unfathomably) been neglected in USENET discourse
due to large numbers from point-(a) continuing to ignore point-(b).
I'm rather astonished that "anti-semites" continue to misread Plato
because when *-I-* made a study of "anti-semitism" many years ago
I ran across the reference to dyslexia and illiteracy rampant among
many followers who subscribe to "anti-semitism" and I'm finding the
same phenomena of dyslexia and illiteracy illustrated "right here in
River City" by Pyro and Agent99. These individuals have -FAILED- to
pay attention to Plato's reference to "draughts" and its critically
essential task in discerning the primitive _dialectics_, and have
-FAILED- to recognize _dialectics_ takes precedence over _rhetoric_
in Plato, as was UNAMBIGUOUSLY SHOWN by the _Gorgias_ dialogue.

It was *-Hitler-* who made use of "rhetoric" as a substitute for
Plato's "dialectics" because *-Hitler-* and followers were NOT
INTERESTED IN RIGOROUS INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE because they DID NOT
STUDY THE LOGICAL FOUNDATION INHERENT TO COGNITIVE SKILL BOARDGAMES,
and that's why they lost their "big war" in Europe. Reminds me of
the "mirage" shape in J.H.Conway's "Life" game, which rabbits around
a little bit and then dissipates into nothing. EVEN AFTER KILLING
OFF ALL JEWS, THE "ANTI-SEMITES" WILL *-INVENT-* "NEW TARGETS" AND
CALL THEM JEWS, BECAUSE "ANTI-SEMITES" ARE NOT HAPPY UNLESS THEY'RE
KILLING SOMEBODY. IT DOES NOT FOLLOW, HOWEVER, THAT ALL KILLERS ARE
"ANTI-SEMITES," BECAUSE NAZIS ALSO DIED IN WORLD WAR II !!!!!!!!!!!!
It does not follow that "ANTI-anti-semites" are not "anti-semites."
ONCE DEFINING ONESELF IN TERMS OF "HATE" THEN THE *-OBJECT-* OF THAT
"HATE" IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT. "HATE" IS ALL THAT MATTERS FOR THE
"ANTI-SEMITE" AND THE "ANTI-ANTI-SEMITE" ALIKE.

From: Pyro 1488 <pyro...@aol.com>
> "The Jew has never had an art of his own, hence never a life of
> art-enabling import... So long as the separate art of music had a
> real organic life-need in it, down to the epochs of Mozart and
> Beethoven, there was nowhere to be found a Jew composer: it was
> utterly impossible for an element quiet foreign to that living
> organism to take a part in the formative stages of that life.
> Only when a body's inner death is manifest, do outside elements
> win the power of judgment in it - yet merely to destroy it."
> -- Richard Wagner

Hitler -ADMIRED- Mendelssohn's music, but was -EMBARASSED- to learn
that Mendelssohn was Jewish. Skewered his entire thesis. Darn!
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

-------------

From: <age...@post.cz>
> Once again, as if we needed another demonstration,
> you've shown your complete lack of understanding.
> The Greek conception of race that Plato is here
> discussing as myth is in no way the same as the
> modern, biological conception of race as a taxonomic
> category. How could it be, so many centuries before
> Linnaeus, before Mendel, before Watson and Crick?

That's correct. So don't be running back to Plato in the
miscegenated effort to justify some ancient "race" theory. At
least you have the _cojones_ to recognize that Plato's discussion
of "race" was MYTH. WHAT ARE THE SUPPORTIVE "CITATIONS" YOU
INVOKE W/R/T "RACE THEORY" FROM LINNAEUS, MENDEL, WATSON, CRICK ??
NONE ?? I THOUGHT SO. -- more mythology from YOU --
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

From: <age...@post.cz>
> What Plato means here is the creation of a myth of
> lineage, of descent from a single, noble progenitor.
> Examples might be the legend of Theseus, who was said
> to have founded the Athenian state, or Priam, the sire
> of the Trojans, and through Anaeas, the Romans -- a
> unifying myth, created as a political necessity.

WRONG! Anaeus is NOT MENTIONED in Plato !!! Your "legend" of
Theseus was that of a RAPIST, and Priam who "rolled in the dust."

(Reference to Theseus): In this passage Plato's philosophers are
discussing the State's use of RHETORICAL MYTHOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA in
the "management" of its citizens, in particular the manner in which
the stories of its HEROES and GODS are "told" or "not told." Plato
relates that THESEUS WAS REPORTED TO BE A RAPIST, but the context
here describes HOW THAT ACCOUNT MIGHT NEEED TO BE SUPPRESSED by being
recharacterized as "FALSE," as with other less flattering stories of
other HEROES and GODS. In other words, HOW TO CONTROL THE PUBLIC
MIND, REDIRECT THE HEART, SHAPE THE WILL, THROUGH PROPAGANDA OF THE
STATE AS PRODUCED BY ITS "POETS" (whom Socrates -detests-) !!!!!!
These were the sorts of clever insights which the Athenian Council
DID NOT LIKE, accusing Socrates of SLANDERING THE GODS !!!!!!!!!!
Plato's philosophers were NOT CENSORS.

They were POKING FUN at those WHO WOULD TRY TO BE CENSORS !!!!!!!!
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

REPUBLIC:
---------

Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable
of deities.

Verily I would he even with thee, if I had only the
power, or his insubordination to the river-god, on
whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his
offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair,
which had been previously dedicated to the other
river-god Spercheius, and that he actually
performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round
the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives
at the pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he
was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens
to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the
son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest
of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so
disordered in his wits as to be at one time the
slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions,
meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with
overweening contempt of gods and men.

You are quite right, he replied.

And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to
be repeated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon,
or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they
did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other
hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and
dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in
our day: and let us further compel the poets to
declare either that these acts were not done by
them, or that they were not the sons of gods;
--both in the same breath they shall not be
permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying
to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors
of evil, and that heroes are no better than
men-sentiments which, as we were saying, are
neither pious nor true, for we have already proved
that evil cannot come from the gods.

Assuredly not.

And further they are likely to have a bad effect on
those who hear them; for everybody will begin to
excuse his own vices when he is convinced that
similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated
by --

The kindred of the gods, the
relatives of Zeus, whose
ancestral altar, the attar of
Zeus, is aloft in air on the
peak of Ida, and who have the
blood of deities yet flowing in
their veins.

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest
they engender laxity of morals among the young.

By all means, he replied.

=================================================

This *-SATIRE-* of STATE PROPAGANDA is taken from a LONG PASSAGE in
the REPUBLIC which discusses how the POETS might be "utilized" (or
"misutilized") to CLOUD THE MINDS OF ITS CITIZENS, but are clearly
transparent to Plato's DIALECTIC PHILOSOPHERS. They say of Priam
that he was:

Rolling in the dirt, calling each
man loudly by his name.

HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA !!!!!

In these passages the "most certainly" and "assuredly" responses
are DISINGENUOUS. THEY ARE *-LAUGHING-* AT STATIST PROPAGANDA !!
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

REPUBLIC:
--------

Again: --

The soul flying from the limbs had
gone to Hades, lamentng her fate,
leaving manhood and youth.

Again: --

And the soul, with shrilling cry,
passed like smoke beneath the
earth.

And, --

As bats in hollow of mystic
cavern, whenever any of the has
dropped out of the string and
falls from the rock, fly shrilling
and cling to one another, so did
they with shrilling cry hold
together as they moved.

And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be
angry if we strike out these and similar passages,
not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to
the popular ear, but because the greater the
poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for
the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free,
and who should fear slavery more than death.

Undoubtedly.

Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and
appalling names describe the world below -- Cocytus
and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless
shades, and any similar words of which the very
mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost
soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these
horrible stories may not have a use of some kind;
but there is a danger that the nerves of our
guardians may be rendered too excitable and
effeminate by them.

There is a real danger, he said.

Then we must have no more of them.

True.

Another and a nobler strain must be composed and
sung by us.

Clearly.

And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and
wailings of famous men?

They will go with the rest.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them?
Reflect: our principle is that the good man will
not consider death terrible to any other good man
who is his comrade.

Yes; that is our principle.

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed
friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

He will not.

Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient
for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is
least in need of other men.

True, he said.

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother,
or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men
least terrible.

Assuredly.

And therefore he will be least likely to lament,
and will bear with the greatest equanimity any
misfortune of this sort which may befall him.

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than
another.

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the
lamentations of famous men, and making them over to
women (and not even to women who are good for
anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those
who are being educated by us to be the defenders of
their country may scorn to do the like.

That will be very right.

Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other
poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a
goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back,
and then on his face; then starting up and sailing
in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now
taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and
pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing
in the various modes which Homer has delineated.
Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the
gods as praying and beseeching,

Rolling in the dirt, calling each
man loudly by his name.

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all
events not to introduce the gods lamenting and
saying,

Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore
the harvest to my sorrow.

But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let
him not dare so completely to misrepresent the
greatest of the gods, as to make him say --

O heavens! with my eyes verily I
behold a dear friend of mine
chased round and round the city,
and my heart is sorrowful.

Or again: --

Woe is me that I am fated to have
Sarpedon, dearest of men to me,
subdued at the hands of Patroclus
the son of Menoetius.

For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously
listen to such unworthy representations of the
gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought,
hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being
but a man, can be dishonoured by similar actions;
neither will he rebuke any inclination which may
arise in his mind to say and do the like. And
instead of having any shame or self-control, he
will be always whining and lamenting on slight
occasions.

Yes, he said, that is most true.

Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not
to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and
by that proof we must abide until it is disproved
by a better.

It ought not to be.

Neither ought our guardians to be given to
laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been
indulged to excess almost always produces a violent
reaction.

So I believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men,
must not be represented as overcome by laughter,
and still less must such a representation of the
gods be allowed.

Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be
used about the gods as that of Homer when he
describes how

Inextinguishable laughter arose
among the blessed gods, when they
saw Hephaestus bustling about the
mansion.

On your views, we must not admit them.

On my views, if you like to father them on me; that
we must not admit them is certain.

Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we
were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and
useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of
such medicines should be restricted to physicians;
private individuals have no business with them.

Clearly not, he said.

Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of
lying, the rulers of the State should be the
persons; and they, in their dealings either with
enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed
to lie for the public good. But nobody else should
meddle with anything of the kind; and although the
rulers have this privilege, for a private man to
lie to them in return is to be deemed a more
heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of
a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own
bodily illnesses to the physician or to the
trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain
what is happening about the ship and the rest of
the crew, and how things are going with himself or
his fellow sailors.

Most true, he said.

If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself
lying in the State,

Any of the craftsmen, whether he
priest or physician or carpenter.

he will punish him for introducing a practice which
is equally subversive and destructive of ship or
State.

Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State
is ever carried out.

In the next place our youth must be temperate?

Certainly.

Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking
generally, obedience to commanders and self-control
in sensual pleasures?

True.

Then we shall approve such language as that of
Diomede in Homer,

Friend, sit still and obey my
word,

and the verses which follow,

The Greeks marched breathing prowess,
...in silent awe of their leaders,

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We shall.

What of this line,

O heavy with wine, who hast the
eyes of a dog and the heart of a
stag,

and of the words which follow? Would you say that
these, or any similar impertinences which private
individuals are supposed to address to their
rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill
spoken?

They are ill spoken.

They may very possibly afford some amusement, but
they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore
they are likely to do harm to our young men --you
would agree with me there?

Yes.

And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that
nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

When the tables are full of bread
and meat, and the cup-bearer
carries round wine which he draws
from the bowl and pours into the
cups,

is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young
man to hear such words? Or the verse

The saddest of fates is to die and
meet destiny from hunger?

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who,
while other gods and men were asleep and he the
only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot
them all in a moment through his lust, and was so
completely overcome at the sight of Here that he
would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie
with her on the ground, declaring that he had never
been in such a state of rapture before, even when
they first met one another

Without the knowledge of their parents;

or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of
similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and
Aphrodite?

Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they
ought not to hear that sort of thing.

But any deeds of endurance which are done or told
by famous men, these they ought to see and hear;
as, for example, what is said in the verses,

He smote his breast, and thus
reproached his heart, Endure, my
heart; far worse hast thou
endured!

Certainly, he said.

In the next place, we must not let them be
receivers of gifts or lovers of money.

Certainly not.

Neither must we sing to them of

Gifts persuading gods, and
persuading reverend kings.

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be
approved or deemed to have given his pupil good
counsel when he told him that he should take the
gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that
without a gift he should not lay aside his anger.
Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles
himself to have been such a lover of money that he
took Agamemnon's or that when he had received
payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but
that without payment he was unwilling to do so.

Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments
which can be approved.

Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in
attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in
believing that they are truly to him, he is guilty
of downright impiety. As little can I believe the
narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he
says,

Thou hast wronged me, O
far-darter, most abominable of
deities. Verily I would he even
with thee, if I had only the
power,

or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose
divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his offering
to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had
been previously dedicated to the other river-god
Spercheius, and that he actually performed this
vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of
Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the
pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he was
guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to
believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son
of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of
men and third in descent from Zeus, was so
disordered in his wits as to be at one time the
slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions,
meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with
overweening contempt of gods and men.

You are quite right, he replied.

----------------------------------------------------

From: <age...@post.cz>
> Your conflation of the classical notion of race as lineage
> with the modern idea of race as a taxonomic category
> is plainly nonsense, either arising from your own
> profound ignorance of classical philosophy (most
> likely), or an ignoble attempt to deceive.

'scuse me? *-I-* DO NOT CONFLATE. Those were Plato's words
in a time previous to modern taxonomic notions. YOUR INABILITY
TO DISTINGUISH "CITES" FROM "MAIN TEXT" ILLUSTRATES *-YOUR-*
IGNORANCE OF *-DIALECTICAL-* *-METHOD-* !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
I provided cites from Plato to illustrate that NO RACE THEORY
EMANATES FROM PLATO. Plato's philosophers were *-LAUGHING-* AT
THE RACE THEORIES. Plato's philosophers DID NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE
COMMON PROGENITOR THEORY. If anything they referred ONLY TO THE
NOTION OF "GOLDEN RACE" PRECEDENT TO THE "IRON RACE," BUT THEY
REGARDED *-THEMSELVES-* (in that -mythological- context which
they did not belive) AS BELONGING TO THE (lesser) "IRON RACE"
(if there were any validity -- which there is not -- to such
mythological notions of "race").

YOU ARE A BLITHERING IDIOT, 99 . HA HA HA HA HA HA !!!!!!!!
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

- regards
- jb

.

(Once more for the road) ------------------------- **

> From: jum...@my-deja.com
>> I couldn't find the word "civilization" anywhere in Plato, and
>> Plato's discussions about "race" are invariably in the context of
>> myth, which Socrates regards with amusement and does not accept as
>> valid nor binding. Remember the basic argument that "dialectics"
>> has precedent over "rhetoric," which means one finds the reference
>> to "draughts" in six dialogues: Charmides, Gorgias, Laws, Phaedrus,
>> Politics, and Republic. From "draughts" are drawn the -structural-
>> frame example of gamed logical inference, and so Socrates defeats
>> the rhetorician Gorgias. For Plato, then, "race" is a notion that
>> stems from sophistry. Timaeus is almost entirely a presentation of
>> mythology, and the Republic "cite" to which I think you may refer
>> proceeds from their inquiry into the discourse of LIES:
>>
>> Republic:
>> ---------
>>
>> [ ... ]
>>
>> How then may we devise one of those needful
>> falsehoods of which we lately spoke --just one royal
>> lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be
>> possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?
>>
>> What sort of lie? he said.
>>
>> Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale
>> of what has often occurred before now in other
>> places, (as the poets say, and have made the world
>> believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know
>> whether such an event could ever happen again, or
>> could now even be made probable, if it did.
>>
>> How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!
>>
>> You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when
>> you have heard.
>>
>> Speak, he said, and fear not.
>>
>> Well then, I will speak, although I really know not
>> how to look you in the face, or in what words to
>> utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to
>> communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to
>> the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to
>> be told that their youth was a dream, and the
>> education and training which they received from us,
>> an appearance only; in reality during all that time
>> they were being formed and fed in the womb of the
>> earth, where they themselves and their arms and
>> appurtenances were manufactured; when they were
>> completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and
>> so, their country being their mother and also their
>> nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to
>> defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are
>> to regard as children of the earth and their own
>> brothers.
>>
>> You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the
>> lie which you were going to tell.
>>
>> True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have
>> only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in
>> our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you
>> differently. Some of you have the power of command,
>> and in the composition of these he has mingled gold,
>> wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others
>> he has made of silver, to be auxillaries; others
>> again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has
>> composed of brass and iron; and the species will
>> generally be preserved in the children. But as all
>> are of the same original stock, a golden parent will
>> sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a
>> golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to
>> the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing
>> which should so anxiously guard, or of which they are
>> to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the
>> race. They should observe what elements mingle in
>> their off spring; for if the son of a golden or
>> silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron,
>> then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the
>> eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the
>> child because he has to descend in the scale and
>> become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be
>> sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or
>> silver in them are raised to honour, and become
>> guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that
>> when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will
>> be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any
>> possibility of making our citizens believe in it?
>>
>> Not in the present generation, he replied; there is
>> no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be
>> made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons,
>> and posterity after them.
>>
>> I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of
>> such a belief will make them care more for the city
>> and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction,
>> which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour,
>> while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them
>> forth under the command of their rulers. Let them
>> look round and select a spot whence they can best
>> suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory
>> within, and also defend themselves against enemies,
>> who like wolves may come down on the fold from
>> without; there let them encamp, and when they have
>> encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and
>> prepare their dwellings.
>>
>> Just so, he said.
>>
>> [ ... ]
>>
>> ---------------------------------
>>
>>
>> That section from The Republic examined the role of -propaganda- in
>> administration of a State: there's "no possibility" of convincing
>> anybody in -this- generation (BECAUSE IT'S LYING SOPHISTRY) however
>> the -next- generation might buy into that LIE of a "race theory"
>> just to satisfy their false sense of PRIDE in themselves. So,
>> according to Plato, the origin of "race theory" is NOT -fact- but
>> -pride- which stemmed from mythological propaganda. It's "the
>> fiction, which may now fly abroad on the wings of rumor" leading
>> them into yet another senseless war, or whatever manipulative
>> schemes their rulers devise. An "audacious fiction" premised upon
>> the objective of organizing vast armies, or busying the populace
>> with diversionary pursuits. Plato's Socrates was a "cool dude"
>> extremely untrusting of lying rhetoricians, such as you, I might
>> add, who simply want to UNLOAD HISTORY without any specific
>> argument of relevance to contemporary circumstances. All "races"
>> can form a cohesive society through the common-ground framework of
>> dialectics (investigation/theory of cognitive games). Only their
>> -rhetorical- differences (culture, language ...) separate various
>> peoples into "races" as long as they do NOT interact in the
>> cooperative fashion of shared pursuit of common goals. If peoples
>> build a society together then they are of one "race" in Plato's view.
>> From the citation (above) the "race" notion is, however, a
>> delusion: their common pursuits also engage in chasing delusional
>> red herrings. If there's a common theme running throughout Plato's
>> dialogues it is that discussions in philosophy become much more
>> complex than could have been imagined from the outset. The
>> characters of the dialogues are usually expressive of novel
>> -amazement- at lessons they learn. Socrates is NOT interested in
>> subscribing to "race" mythologies. Read Plato again, and argue your
>> issues FROM SPECIFIC CITATIONS.
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ <<<--- YOU FAILED TO DO THIS !!!

** ------------- GOTCHA !!!

From: "Health Risk" <p...@netxpress.com>
If you are concerned about macular degeneration or sunglasses that
really do protect your vision, check out this site that reviews
Melanin - the body's own sunlight protections system - in sun lenses.

http://www.netxpress.com/~ppt/macular.htm

If you wish to be removed from our list or if you have received this
message by mistake, please reply and type: "unsubscribe" as the
subject.

[jum...@my-deja.com]

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2278/neo-tech.html
-------------------------------------------------------

Neo-Tech FAQ alt.neo-tech Frequently Asked Questions

Alpha release .06.6

Copyright (c) 1996 by King of all Heretics

All Rights Reserved

May be reproduced freely so long as the full text is included.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

PREFACE:

0.1. Introduction.
0.2. Who am I?
0.3. Why do I use an anonymous remailer?
0.4. Why are you so cheesed off at NT/ZP?
0.5. How can corrections/changes/suggestions be submitted for the FAQ?
0.6. Note about numbering of the questions between FAQ versions.

THE FAQ:

1. What is Neo-Tech/ZonPower (NT/ZP)?
2. Who is Dr. Frank R. Wallace?
3. Is he really a Dr.?
4. Why does he use a pen name?
5. Who are the real people behind Neo-Tech?
6. What is I & O Publishing Company?
7. What are the Neo-Tech publications?
8. How much does this stuff cost?
9. Did Wallace Ward (Frank R. Wallace) really spend time in jail?
10. What was he doing time for?
11. Is Wallace Ward crazy?
12. Is Neo-Tech/ZonPower a cult?
13. Did Frank R. Wallace really renege on a promised $10,000 bonus to
BMXerToo?
14. Did Frank R. Wallace really advocate immoral tactics in
'The Advanced Concepts of Poker'?
15. Did Frank R. Wallace really write a book on how to cheat at cards?
16. Does Neo-Tech really claim that faster than light communication is
possible?
17. Does Neo-Tech really claim that the 'ether' exists?
18. Does Neo-Tech really promise unlimited power?
19. Does Neo-Tech really claim that consciousness controls existence?
20. Does Neo-Tech really claim that space aliens exist?
21. Does Neo-Tech really claim that the dead can be resurrected?
22. Was KOAH really 'created' or 'propagated' by 'Drew Ellis'?
23. Is KOAH really Kaiser Soze, an unemployed postal worker collecting
government checks?
24. Who are the defenders of Neo-Tech on usenet?
25. Will Neo-Tech Publishing ever file the IRS class action lawsuit?
26. Does Neo-Tech consider homosexuality wrong?

PREFACE:

0.1. Introduction:

This FAQ makes no pretense of 'objectivity.' This is the case against
Neo-Tech/Zonpower. The case for NT/ZP (such as it is) can be read on
their own web site at:

http://www.neo-tech.com/

0.2. Who am I?

I'm King of all Heretics.

0.3. Why do I use an anonymous remailer?

I want my words to stand or fall on their merits, and I don't want my
ISP to get in trouble. :)

0.4. Why are you so cheesed off at NT/ZP?

They are spamming net pests who have shown not the slightest concern
for other net users. They crosspost what amount to commercial
advertisements for their pathetic self-help scam incessantly. They
also seem to have virtually no opposition, enabling them to rope in
new dupes with not a word of criticism. Until now.

0.5. How can corrections/changes/suggestions be submitted for the FAQ?

Post your hate mail, comments and/or ringing endorsements to
alt.neo-tech with the words 'ATTN: KOAH' in the subject line and I
will see them and respond, and if warranted, incorporate changes in
later versions of the FAQ.

0.6. Note about numbering of the questions between FAQ versions:

I am going to renumber the questions as I insert new ones based on
organizing the FAQ into a coherent whole, rather than adopting
contrived schemes of numbering items '5.4' or '9.05' in order to cram
them in while preserving the existing numbering.

So question 11 in version .02 may not be the same as it is in
version .04.

Note:
Quotations from usenet messages have been edited for length and
relevence. Complete original messages can be reposted on request.
Let the FAQ begin.

THE FAQ:

1. What is Neo-Tech/ZonPower (NT/ZP)?

If you ask a Neo-Tech follower they will tell you Neo-Tech is 'fully
integrated honesty.' But in reality, 'Neo-Tech' is the name given to
an entire body of self help literature created by or under the
direction of Dr. Frank R. Wallace.

Neo-Tech is a blend of New Age pollyanna promises, psuedo-science, and
Objectivism (!).

Throughout the FAQ I will use the term 'Neo-Tech' to generically refer
to the views promulgated by Neo-Tech Publishing, 'Frank R. Wallace' and
his various pen names and ghost writers.

2. Who is Dr. Frank R. Wallace?

Frank R. Wallace, founder of the Neo-Tech cult, is actually one Wallace
Ward. He also writes as Dr. Higgs Field and John Flint (JF).

3. Is he really a Dr.?

Yes. But despite what you might think by his choice of topics, he is
not a physicist or a medical doctor. He was once an inorganic chemist
at Dupont before he went into the far more lucrative field of gambling
manuals.

4. Why does he use a pen name?

Two explanations have been offered by those inside the organization:

"They hid behind pen names mostly to make the company appear larger
than it really is. The company is really really small. But man do
they have egos! Plus when you come right down to, they lied."

- From: bmxe...@aol.com (BMXerToo)
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: Re: Ex-Neo-Techer Speaks
Date: 22 Aug 1995 22:26:10 -0400

"RE: "Why do they hide behind pseudonyms, anyway?"

"I'm pretty sure it's so they can replace people without exposing the
turn-over. So, while there have been a multitude of customer service
mangers, there is only one Barbie Diamond, who the innocent customer
might think is an I&O lifer. And of course, the names contain memes;
like there are really beatuifull blondes covered in diamonds working
at I&O!!!!!!!!!"

- From: mat...@pop01.ny.us.ibm.net
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: Re: Ex-Neo-Techer Speaks
Date: 23 Aug 1995 20:13:28 GMT

5. Who are the real people behind Neo-Tech?

Wallace Ward and his relatives.

Here's some information on them partially based on a message by
mat...@pop01.ny.us.ibm.net:

The Ward Family

* Wallace Ward - creator of Neo-Tech. Writes under the name of
Frank R. Wallace, Dr. Higgs Field, John Flint, and others.
Estimated age: early 60s. Posts to the net as thin...@netcom.com.

* Rosa Maria Meono - Wallace Ward's wife. She claimed to be a witch.
Estimated age: 60.
May be posting to the net as jung...@aol.com and ros...@aol.com,
though her messages bear a striking resemblence to those written by
her husband.

* Ruth Ward - daughter of Wallace Ward by Helen Savage.
Estimated age: 40.

* Wallace H. Ward - son of Wallace Ward by Helen Savage. a.k.a. Mark
Hamilton. Formerly married to T.J. (Terry), who left him.
Estimated Age: 35.
In a recent press release, he states that he is the actual owner of
Neo-Tech Publishing:

"My name is Wallace H. Ward, and I own Neo-Tech Publishing
Company. My father, Wallace Ward (a.k.a. Dr. Frank R. Wallace)
wrote the Neo-Tech Discovery and founded I & O Publishing
Company in 1968."

- From: nov...@neo-tech.com
Subject: Mark Hamilton endorses Harry Browne
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 1996 20:27:47 -0700
Message-ID: <317465...@neo-tech.com>

Posts to the net as nov...@neo-tech.com.

* Frank S. Ward - son of Wallace Ward by Helen Savage. a.k.a. Eric
Savage. Posts to the net as mar...@chinadirect.com AKA 'J. Hampton'
Estimated age: 31.

* Steve Rapella - adopted son of Wallace Ward. Romantic Love Partner
of Ruth Ward (last I heard). a.k.a. John Alberts. Estimated Age: 40.

* Gary Twichell - Wallace Ward's right hand man. Smithers to Ward's
Mr. Burns. Not related to the Ward family, Gary was recruited through
the NT literature. Claims to have created KOAH. (see questions 22 & 23)
AKA Drew Ellis AKA Kenneth Clark.

6. What is I & O Publishing Company?

Wallace Ward's original publishing business. I & O stands for
'Individualism and Objectivism.' Originally set up to sell Ward's
first book 'Poker, A Guaranteed Income for Life by Using the Advanced
Concepts of Poker', it was shut down in 1991 when Neo-Tech Publishing
was formed to continue the work of selling Neo-Tech to the world.

7. What are the Neo-Tech publications?

The following books are listed in the 'official' bibliography on the
web site. Other than the mysterious 'Poker Odds' book by Frank
Wallace it was complete when it was created, at least so far as I've
been able to determine.

They put it up as a GIF of a chart which is poorly scanned and laid
out. I have added a few items that weren't on the chart which have
been announced since I transcribed it.

Note that there have been many editions of some of the books listed
incorporating many revisions, some quite substantive, so your copy of
'The Neo-Tech Discovery' may not be the same as someone else's brand
new copy. I have tried to preserve the order of the chart, as well as
including the full names and psuedonyms of the authors:

* The Advanced concepts of Poker
Frank R. Wallace - 1968 - (now online http://www.neo-tech.com/poker)
* Man's Choice/Eric Flame
Frank R. Wallace - 1970/1972
* Neo-Tech Reference Encyclopedia
Frank R. Wallace - 1976
* Neocheating
Frank R. Wallace, Mark Hamilton and W. Swann - 1979
* The Neo-Tech Discovery
Frank R. Wallace - 1981/1986/1994
* The Neo-Tech Protection Kit
Frank R. Wallace et al - 1988/1994
* Zonpower Discovery
Higgs Field, Editor - 1992 (out of print)
* Neo-Tech Cosmic Business Control
Mark Hamilton - 1989
* Cassandra's Secret
Higgs Field, Editor - 1993
(as Neo-Tech proudly proclaims 'Written in Prison')
* Neo-Tech Global Business Control
Eric Savage - 1992
* Zon 2000
The Golden Helmet
Higgs Field, Editor - 1995 - on web site
* Will America Go Neo-Tech
Mark Hamilton - 11/3/95
* ZonPower
Higgs Field, Editor - 1995 - on web site
('The Full Matrix' says the chart - whatever that means)
* Get Rich by 2001
Mark Hamilton - 1996 - on web site
Forthcoming:
* The Zon Protocols - 1996
(will be published in 'Cyberspace' - that is, to the Neo-Tech web page)
* Flame-War Justice - 1997

I have also seen a book entitled "Poker Odds" by Frank Wallace
mentioned in rec.gambling.poker:

"Does anyone know of a reference that contains the probabilities for a
wide variety of situations for draw, stud, and holdem? So far the best
I have been able to find is "Poker Odds" by Frank Wallace."

- Subject: Probabilities in draw, stud, and holdem
From: hein hundal
Newsgroups: rec.gambling.poker
Date: 1995/08/29
MessageID: 42096e$11...@hearst.cac.psu.edu

8. How much does this stuff cost?

Here the one price list I have. More information on other products
is always welcome.

_NeoTech_Product_ _code_ _US$Price_

Cosmic Power (Pincer One) P1M US$65.00
Cosmic Business Control X0M US$99.95
(Pincer Two)
A Future of Wealth Belongs 43M US$29.95
to You!
Neo-Tech Job Power 60M US$99.95
Rapid Power and Wealth B0M US$39.95
Kick-Start Report 44M US$29.95
The Ultimate Battle Tapes Q0M US$99.95
Consultation Packages G1M US$99.95
How to Start a Global 46M US$29.95
Business
Hot Tips 42M US$49.95
Anatomy of Love CD 5CM US$19.95
Anatomy of Love Cassette 5TM US$19.95
Happiness Forever 90M US$24.95
Neo-Tech Reference D0M US$59.95
Encyclopedia
Neo-Tech Treatment 70M US$30.00
for Alcoholism
Neo-Tech Pleasures Y0M US$17.50
The Complete Neo-Tech 07M US$95.00
Library

Recently Tony Guzman provided this update to the above list:

>_NeoTech_Product_ _code_ _US$Price_
>
>Cosmic Power (Pincer One) P1M US$65.00
**most recent price I've received:.......US$89.95
(out of print)

(snip)
>A Future of Wealth Belongs 43M US$29.95
> to You!
**most recent price I've received:.......US$20.00
(out of print)

>Neo-Tech Job Power 60M US$99.95
**(out of print)

>Rapid Power and Wealth B0M US$39.95
**(out of print)

>Kick-Start Report 44M US$29.95
**most recent price I've received:.......US$20.00
(out of print)

>The Ultimate Battle Tapes Q0M US$99.95
**(out of print)

(snip)
>Hot Tips 42M US$49.95
**(out of print)

(snip)
>Neo-Tech Treatment 70M US$30.00
> for Alcoholism
**most recent price I've received:.......US$19.95

>Neo-Tech Pleasures Y0M US$17.50
**most recent price I've received:.......US$19.95

(snip)
These prices are supposedly for NT Discovery
owners. Non-NT owners are charged a higher
price. (snip)

- From: guz...@ix.netcom.com(TonyGuzman)
Newsgroups: alt.support.ex-cult,alt.neo-tech
Subject: Re: Where's the products!!
Date: 28 Jun 1996 14:56:18 GMT
Message-ID: <4r0rqi$j...@dfw-ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>

9. Did Wallace Ward (Frank R. Wallace) really spend time in jail?

Yes.

10. What was he doing time for?

The story began in 1986. According to an ex-employee of I&O
publishing:

"I took me a while after going to work for I&O before I got to
the REAL explanation of the 1986 raid on I&O.

"Wallace Ward/Zon's girlfriend got mad at him and ratted him out. She
called up the IRS and and told them that Zon wasn't paying his taxes,
and had a bunch of cash and gold stashed away in his home. The IRS
showed up in their usual friendly style, and scarfed up the assets.
And I believe that the girlfriend got a cut, since the IRS rewards
informers. Since then, the incident has become 'fully integrated.'

"Years later, Ward put up a series of billboards (typeset by BMXerToo)
across the street from the Federal Building in Las Vegas. The IRS got
pissed off, and hauled him in. Needless to say, the IRS would respond
in exactly the same way for anyone who pulled such stunts."

- From: mat...@pop01.ny.us.ibm.net
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: 1986 Raid on I&O Publishing Co.
Date: 23 Aug 1995 00:50:49 GMT
Organization: Internet Providers of Florida

11. Is Wallace Ward crazy?

Never met him myself. But here's something to ponder:

In article <3nn44d$2...@mirage.skypoint.com>,
Earl Baker wrote:

"I know one of Wallace's nieces; she said he lives in Las Vegas. They
refer to him as "Wally" and she said he believes in 'romantic love'.
Also he worked as a chemist at Dupont for many years. The
family considers him crazy but generally harmless; and so do I."

12. Is Neo-Tech/ZonPower a cult?

Here are some testimonials by those who used to work for the Neo-Tech
organization, I&O publishing:

"But, upon gaining employment with these folks, I came to realize that
nepotism rules. If you are not a family member your chances of making
the big bucks they claim to offer is remote if not impossible. Long
hours and meager salaries are the norm for non-family members. Working
for these people was interesting and even fun for a while. The whole
idea of "saving the world" is an appealing one. And to think that
_you_ are a part of it is even more seductive. But unfortunately after
a while the constant brow-beatings, the promises made but never kept,
and the rampant nepotism begins to make the whole experience akin to a
strained bowel movement. The whole organization would better serve the
public at large if they weren't so blatantly condescending. They strut
around acting as if they have been given secret information from
advanced alien beings. It really is a bore."

- From: bmxe...@aol.com
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: Ex-Neo-Techer Speaks
Date: 17 Aug 1995 19:33:58 -0400

"The event that finally revealed to me the actual nature of these
people was when they didn't keep their word. A $10,000 bonus was
offered to all "core member" if certain business goals were met. When
the principal of the company declared the goal achieved the bonuses
were disbursed to all "core members" excluding myself. It was deemed I
was too immature. That pretty much told me exactly what these folks
think about their employees. They even had the nerve to ask one
employee to return his bonus after they had given it him!

"Unless you have been employed by these happy people, you can never
fully understand the outrageous hipocrisy that pervades everything
they do. Mistakes made by the principals of the company were simply
laughed off. Mistakes made by employees were dealt with in the most
severe manner. Many times I was fined a significant amount of money
for misspellingg a word."

- From: bmxe...@aol.com
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: Re: Ex-Neo-Techer Speaks
Date: 17 Aug 1995 23:00:29 -0400

"I began questioning my involvement in the company directly following
the infamous monthly meeting where a bust of Christ was smashed to
pieces with a sledge hammer by JF. The statue rested on the table
surrounded by live microphones. I was recording the meeting and wore
headphones, not knowing what was about to occur. Hours later, after
regaining my hearing I was accused of doing speedballs and other
drugs. I was temporarily fired and then re-hired a week later. (Matt
referred earlier to this incident as the Great I&O Purge of 1988.)
After this incident, the common question running throughout the
company (outside the family) was "Is this a cult?""

-'Rocket Rod', posted to the net by
From: bmxe...@aol.com
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: Re: Ex-Neo-Techer Speaks
Date: 25 Aug 1995 20:45:35 -0400

13. Did Frank R. Wallace really renege on a promised $10,000 bonus to
'BMXerToo'?

Here's BMXerToo's side of the story in his own words:

"Let's look at the facts:

1) Zon sets a goal
2) Zon attaches to that goal a $10,000 bonus
3) Zon declares the goal has been achieved
4) Zon welches on the bonus

"Now if we examine item 3. Even if the goal was not met, Zon must
declare it so because otherwise Zon would be seen an less than the
god-like business titan he claims to be. To boost his ego and his
image as an authority figure in the cult, Zon must declare that the
goal has been achieved.

"Now, because he is basically a cheating liar, he must figure out a
way to keep from giving that bonus to his followers. Since there is no
logical grounds on which Zon can rest, he whips up the foolish
rationalization that I am immature. As if my level of maturity was
suddenly a part of the agreement. I cannot recall at any time Zon
placing the stipulation that only mature cult members will receive the
bonus.

"Now let's look at the Zon-based facts:

1) Zon sets a goal
2) Zon attaches to that goal a $10,000 bonus
{Shhh. Those who are not mature will not receive the bonus}
3) Zon declares the goal has been achieved
4) Zon weleches on the bonus
5) Zon gets to keep the cult member money!

"Now, to be fair, I think Zon said that when the cult member displayed
a marked improvement in his level of maturity the bonus would be
released. This still does not negate the fact that Zon reneged on the
original agreement and then modified that agreement after the goal had
been achieved.

"You be the judge. Is Zon a liar and a welch?"

- From: bmxe...@aol.com
Newsgroups: alt.neo-tech
Subject: Re: Ex-Neo-Techer Speaks
Date: 23 Aug 1995 02:36:30 -0400

14. Did Frank R. Wallace advocate immoral tactics in 'The Advanced
Concepts of Poker'?

Yes. Among the tactics he recommends are covert hypnosis, decieving
the wives of players, and limitless dishonesty while playing, though
actual cheating is not recommended. The entire book is a primer on
how 'John Finn' the 'good player' pretends to be friends with the
'fish' (losing players) while taking them for everything they've got
by decieving, manipulating and abusing them. The climactic scene has
one of the losers blowing the entire second mortgage on his business
during a marathon overnight game. Even after his life is ruined he
thinks that 'John Finn' was really his friend.

For example:

"3. Practicing Deceit (43)
"Only in a poker game can a man lie and practice any form of deceit,
except cheating, and still remain a gentleman. The good palyer makes
extensive use of his right to deceive. He conceals facts and lies
about anything that offers him an advantage."
- 'The Advanced Concepts of Poker' page 72

Would you buy a used philosophy from that man?
You can read the whole book at http://www.neo-tech.com/poker

15. Did Frank R. Wallace really write a book on how to cheat at cards?

I haven't seen it, but one poker player had this to say about
Wallace's early book 'Neocheating':

Ed Oliveri wrote:
>Yes, I remember this book well. It opened my eyes twenty years ago
>when it showed me that not all of the players in the local "friendly
>poker game" were so friendly after all.
>
>The author's pseudonym was Frank Wallace--I never found out who the
>author really was, or if they wrote anything else on poker.
>Anybody know?
>

An interesting book: His playing techniques were somewhere between
aggressive and sociopathic. He wrote at least one other book, called
_Neocheating_, about card-mechanic tricks he claimed were undetectable.

Phil

- From: ph...@panix.com (Phil Gustafson)
Subject: Re: "Poker--A Guaranteed Income for Life"
Date: 1995/06/20
MessageID: 3s7r5r$q...@panix2.panix.com
Newsgroups: rec.gambling.poker

I have seen reports that 'Neocheating' contained illustrated
step-by-step instructions on how to perform card manipulations useful
in cheating. Anyone who has this book and would be willing to scan in
the relevent pages (for fair use purposes of course) please let me
know.

16. Does Neo-Tech really claim that faster than light communication is
possible?

Yep. They will squirm and waffle, but it's right there in black and
white in their online book, chapter one:

"Conscious beings harnessing the Super-Inflation nature of Gravity
Units (SIGUs) can produce near instant, gravity-pulse
communication not only across an entire universe but possibly
between universes -- all without violating physical laws,
including the speed of light. How? By gravity pulses transmitted
through big-bang-type inflations radiating from exploded Gravity
Units."

Hoofah!

17. Does Neo-Tech really claim that the 'ether' exists?

Yep. The Luminiferous ether is back and ZonPower's got it!
From chapter four of their online book:

"Existence cannot not exist. Moreover, no vacuum void of existence is
possible. "Vacuums" of the matter field can exist as in outer space, in
vacuumed-pumped containers, and in areas between electrons. But, all
those volumes are filled with the unmovable, frictionless ether or
existence field -- a uniform, continuous field of existence."

Welcome to the 19th century!

18. Does Neo-Tech really promise unlimited power?

Yep.

One of the cover pages promises the following:

Zonpower
lets you become
GOD
even without a computer

Don't believe it really says this? Check it out:
http://www.neo-tech.com/zonpower/book/cover3.html

And then there's this gem:

Z O N P O W E R
from
Cyberspace
Higgs Field, Ph.D.
Editor
guarantees
Riches
Romantic Love
and a god-like
Mind and Body

In fact ZonPower is chock full of such promises. Just check out their
online book for endless examples of such idiocy:
http://www.neo-tech.com/zonpower/

19. Does Neo-Tech really claim that consciousness controls existence?

Yep. From Chapter four of the online book:

"Conscious Control of Existence

"The above example of an energy-releasing star can be
"deterministically" calculated from the "immutable" cause-and-effect
of existence without conscious influences. But, the above example of
an energy-releasing television transmitter is the volitional dynamics
of existence being integrated, controlled, and forever altered by
freewill human consciousness. Thus, as revealed by Neo-Tech physics,
all existence is ultimately controlled and evolved through volitional
human consciousness.

"Unknown to the busily self-serving Establishment, the nature of
existence and its dynamics of matter and energy are today being
increasingly understood and methodically verified. That verification
process will lead to the corollary verification that human
consciousness is the eternal integrator and controller of existence.
...Human
consciousness ultimately controls the relationships and geometries of
the other existence modes -- matter and energy along with space and
time. The human-consciousness mode is the purposeful, unmoved mover of
existence."

20. Does Neo-Tech really claim that space aliens exist?

Yep.

Chapter 5: Part 1, paragraph 3

"Probability statistics overwhelmingly reveal that our universe
contains at least a hundred million, and probably billions of
Earth-like planets populated with conscious beings like you and
me."

Chapter 5: Part 4, paragraph 5

"Given the endless number of water/oxygen abundant, Earth-like
planets forever spinning in endlessly evolving existence, one
realizes life and consciousness have forever co-existed in
limitless abundance."

(Thanks to raba...@isdn33.eng.uc.edu for pointing out these passages)

21. Does Neo-Tech really claim that the dead can be resurrected?

Yep.
As is the case in many religious cults, there's salvation awaiting
the just and oblivion for the sinners.
From Chapter 31 of the online book:

"Ultimate Justice

"Justice is an immutable law of nature. As demonstrated by Cassandra's
Secret, justice is always fulfilled throughout existence. As a result,
the eventual destination or just reward for every actual and potential
value producer -- of every honest conscious being -- is eternal
prosperity and happiness in the Civilization of the Universe. That
just destination is the inevitable consequence of nature. From that
nature comes (1) immutable justice that characterizes the Civilization
of the Universe, (2) the supremely leveraged, limitless value of each
conscious being when placed in a rational civilization, (3) the
dynamics of eternally expanding prosperity, which demand the full use
of every available conscious being, and, as explained later in this
chapter, (4) the technology needed to transceive[ 72 ] every
volitionally developed human consciousness through the omnipresent
existence field and into the Civilization of the Universe. "Humanoid
criminals or parasitical neocheaters who have lived by harming others
or society through force, fraud, and illusions also meet ultimate
justice: They become humanoids because they destroy the human nature
of their own consciousnesses. Therefore, they destroy the conscious
structure needed to transceive through the Gravity-Unit existence
field and into the Civilization of the Universe. Moreover, having
lived as enormous net negatives to society, humanoids such as
politicians with their armed bureaucratic agents of force and
ego-"justice" systems are in reality nothing -- they are worthless to
the Civilization of the Universe. Thus, they simply vanish from
existence, forever forgotten."

The following note from the same chapter elaborates on the above:

"[ 72 ]Transceived not in the mystical Plato sense of a detached soul.
For, the soul and physical body are one in the same and function as a
unit. But, transceived (within a profit-mode, business dynamic) in the
Gravity-Unit form that captures conscious "I"ness immortality as
described in The Neo-Tech Discovery, all in accord with the laws of
physics."

Ye must be born again!

UPDATE:

In the wake of my constant posting of this section of their book,
which drew considerable skepticism from many usenet denizens, the web
book has been updated.

Neo-Tech Publishing has revised their online book to add the following
disclaimer:

"Footnotes for Chapter 31

"[ 70a ] Profit-driven immortality is a highly speculative hypothesis
arising from a priori logic. Logically, no contradictions exist in
that hypothesis. But, today, the value of such a hypothesis is
metaphorical -- an illustration of justice that reality ultimately
asserts."

Sorry Zonnies, but as of 5/23/96 you're not gonna live forever after
all - it's just another one of those 'highly speculative hypotheses'
that Wallace Ward loves to cook up. Which doctrine will be revised
next? Only Wally knows for sure.

22. Was KOAH really 'created' or 'propagated' by 'Drew Ellis'?

In May of 1996 Neo-Tech publishing, after weeks of huffing and
puffing, finally 'revealed the identity' of 'King of all Heretics',
claiming that KOAH was really just a gigantic troll, a persona created
to bait various NT enemies into demonstrating their committment to the
eeeevil anticivilization:

"KOAH was created and propagated by Neo-Tech contributor and Usenet
editor, Drew "Kaiser" Ellis! ...No one at NTP suspected such a brazen
double bluff. Great poker play -- a stunning metaphor. He'll rake in
a huge pot from his resulting "Flame War" book due in 1997.
Congratulations."

- From: nt...@aol.com
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: KOAH Identified -- The Final Ploy
Date: Tue, 14 May 1996 01:31:06
Message-ID: <4n9gca$l...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>

This is rather amusing since NT had been claiming for months that KOAH
must be a criminal psychotic. Not the sort of person a NTP employee
ought to be associating with. After all, any decent NTer would just
vanish such a value destroyer with a pip template! The Neo-Tech spin
doctors are working overtime and we can expect plenty of revisions to
the FAQ as they get their stories straight regarding the 'KOAH is a
Neo-Tech puppet' charade. (see the next answer for the latest) But the
short answer to the question 'Was I created or propagated by Drew
Ellis?' is no. Incidentally, Drew Ellis is really Gary Twitchell, also
known as Kenneth Clark, Wallace Ward's right hand man.

23. Is KOAH really Kaiser Soze, an unemployed postal worker collecting
government checks?

No.
However I did send this email to thin...@netcom.com (Wallace Ward):

To: thin...@netcom.com
From: rema...@utopia.hacktic.nl
Subject: Your good buddy

The person posting to the net as King of all Heretics is Kaiser Soze.
He is a 38 year old retired postal worker living on a disability check
in Woodbury New York.

Subsequently Neo-Tech employee 'J. Hampton' (mar...@chinadirect.com
who is probably one of Wally's kids) posted dozens of messages
denouncing me for my loathsome evil since I was an 'unemployed postal
worker living on government checks.'
It appears that no one at NTP had been out to see 'The Usual Suspects'
so they failed to make the connection between my 'identity' and that
of Keyser Soze, the notorious, fearsome super criminal from that film.
NTP, YHBT.
Hook, line and sinker.

24. Who are the defenders of Neo-Tech on usenet?

matt...@netcom.com (Matt Keys) - The King of all Neo-Posters has to
be Matt Keys. Matty not only posts neo-templates and the '114
Objectivist/Neo-Tech Advantages', he also sends every post to the
neo-talk mailing list to alt.neo-tech, and until he was flamed
thoroughly, he used to post the same crap to
alt.philosophy.objectivism.
He once had a giant crosspost of the 'IRS Class Action' template
cancelled. On any given day he can be found posting NT/ZP templates in
any newsgroup he can devise a pretext to post into.
In return for his devotion to NTP he gets free copies of all Neo-Tech
publications.
UPDATE: Matt Keys recently admitted that he has been employed by NTP
doing work on their web site for the past year.

nr...@ssn.com (Nicholas Rich) - The most articulate of the Neo-Tech
defenders, Nick has, in the past, devoted countless hours defending NT
on the net, moderating mailing lists, registering domain names, and
flaming the pips and neocheaters who dare attack NT as it works to
'take over cyberspace.' He denies any financial connection to Neo-Tech
Publishing, but he has met Wallace Ward, and he has an arrangement
where he can have free copies of any NTP publication sent to anyone he
wishes.

Barring any revelations of a financial link to NTP, Wallace Ward, or
any of Wally's relatives, he seems to be a true zealot driven by pure
devotion to the 'truth' of NT/ZP. He has stated that his primary
motive was to be part of the forthcoming 'Flame War Justice' book,
presumably because he would take pride in being part of an actual NT
publication.

But recently Nick's devotion has become somewhat antennuated. His
life story contains not one mention of Neo-Tech or ZonPower, and he
removed NT urls from his sigfile. Even more embarrassing for NTP,
Nick compared discussing NT to discussing how many times he
masturbates.

So apart from NTP employees, Matt Keys is likely to remain NT's #1 net
lackey for some time to come.

25. Will Neo-Tech Publishing ever file the IRS class action lawsuit?

Joseph Adams cast doubt on the validity of NTP's excuses for not
filing immediatly as follows:

Matt Keys wrote:
>Joseph G. Adams (jga...@leland.Stanford.EDU) wrote:
>
>: Especially because it is likely that there will be no such class
>: action lawsuit.
>
>: Matt Keys and the Neo-tech crowd consistently refuse to give any
>: information about the lawsuit or a credible reason why they haven't
>: already filed it.
>
> you'd think people who go to stanford could read... the following
> IRS class-action lawsuit update was posted in early september:
>
> In the past few months, we have gathered well over a hundred valid
> plaintiffs that legally meet the requirements for a class-action suit
> against the IRS on the basis of the Eighth Amendment to the United
> States Constitution, which forbids the government from inflicting
> cruel-and-unusual punishment on its citizens. We are adding an
> average of 1-2 valid plaintiffs daily from web site
> http://www.neo-tech.com/irs.class-action/. We would like to have
> about 500 bona fide plaintiffs when we file the lawsuit in Federal
> District Court. Potential plaintiffs should visit the IRS
> Class-Action home page for information about this lawsuit and how to
> become a plaintiff. ...No fees or charges of any kind are being asked
> or will be asked from any plaintiff or potential plaintiff.

This isn't a credible reason. Your legal position and your chances of
success don't improve if you have 500 plaintiffs instead of 100
plaintiffs. The point of a class action lawsuit is that it's
impractical to identify every plaintiff.

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Class actions are designed to get around the problem you claim is
delaying you: the need to find more plaintiffs. You have enough
plaintiffs to sue if you really want to.

So, once more: when and where are you going to file your class action
lawsuit against the IRS?

We're still waiting for a real answer.

- From: jga...@leland.Stanford.EDU (Joseph G. Adams)
Subject: Re: IRS Abuse Reports #52-#54
Date: 9 Oct 1996 15:34:12 -0700
Message-ID: <53h994$4...@elaine21.Stanford.EDU>

26. Does Neo-Tech consider homosexuality wrong?

Matt Keys, Neo-Tech Publishing's paid consultant, recently added this
'question' to his 'FAQ':

q-1) why does KOAH always talk about f***ing everyone up the *ss? is
h**e a h***omo?

Neo-Tech employee J. Hampton (who is probably Frank Ward, son of NT
founder Wallace Ward) then asked 'Have you ever sought counseling?' It
appear that NTP's representatives believe homosexuality is an illness
requiring counseling.

Then 'A Completely Separate Entity' posted this excerpt:

Well there is this from Neo-Tech Concept 88:
"Intense orgasm by nature requires a heterosexual man-woman
interaction."

and

"For humans, homosexuality is generally a form of life-diminishing
neurosis in which neither the physical nor psychological experiences
can satisfactorily simulate the heterosexual experience."

This material has probably been purged from recent editions of the
Neo-Tech Discovery as Wally has switched into 'nice-clown' mode.
-snip-
-A Completely Separate Entity (ACSE 10/27/96)

- From: nob...@cypherpunks.ca (John Anonymous MacDonald)
Subject:
Re: Why does KOAH/ACSE always want to f*** everyone up the *ss ??
Date: 28 Oct 1996 03:24:07 -0500
Message-ID: <1996102721...@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>

So NTP's official stand is that homosexuality is a 'life-diminishing
neurosis'

- King of all Heretics

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[jum...@my-deja.com]

380 BC
GORGIAS
by Plato
translated by Benjamin Jowett
GORGIAS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: CALLICLES; SOCRATES; CHAEREPHON; GORGIAS;
POLUS
Scene: The house of Callicles.

Callicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray,
but not for a feast.
Socrates. And are we late for a feast?
Cal. Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been
exhibiting to us many fine things.
Soc. It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to
blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
Chaerephon. Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have
been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine,
and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you
prefer, at some other time.
Cal. What is the matter, Chaerephon-does Socrates want to hear
Gorgias?
Chaer. Yes, that was our intention in coming.
Cal. Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and
he shall exhibit to you.
Soc. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I
want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is
which he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest,
defer the exhibition to some other time.
Cal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to
answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only
just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him,
and that he would answer.
Soc. How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon-?
Chaer. What shall I ask him?
Soc. Ask him who he is.
Chaer. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been
a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
Chaer. I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our
friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any
questions which you are asked?
Gorgias. Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just
now; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has
asked me a new one.
Chaer. Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
Gor. Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
Polus. Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make
trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long
time, is tired.
Chaer. And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than
Gorgias?
Pol. What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
Chaer. Not at all:-and you shall answer if you like.
Pol. Ask:-
Chaer. My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his
brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the
name which is given to his brother?
Pol. Certainly.
Chaer. Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
Pol. Yes.
Chaer. And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon,
or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
Pol. Clearly, a painter.
Chaer. But now what shall we call him-what is the art in which he is
skilled.
Pol. O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are
experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience
makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience
according to chance, and different persons in different ways are
proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts.
And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he
is a proficient is the noblest.
Soc. Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias;
but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
Gor. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he
was asked.
Gor. Then why not ask him yourself?
Soc. But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer:
for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has
attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
Pol. What makes you say so, Socrates?
Soc. Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art
which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some
one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
Pol. Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
Soc. Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody
asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and
by what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you
briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at
first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias:
Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question what
are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?
Gor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
Soc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that
which, in Homeric language, "I boast myself to be."
Soc. I should wish to do so.
Gor. Then pray do.
Soc. And are we to say that you are able to make other men
rhetoricians?
Gor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at
Athens, but in all places.
Soc. And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias,
as we are at present doing and reserve for another occasion the longer
mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise,
and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
Gor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will
do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my
profession is that I can be as short as any one.
Soc. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method
now, and the longer one at some other time.
Gor. Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never
heard a man use fewer words.
Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker
of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I
might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would
you not?), with the making of garments?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
Gor. It is.
Soc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your
answers.
Gor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about
rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
Gor. With discourse.
Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?-such discourse as would
teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?
Gor. No.
Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And to understand that about which they speak?
Gor. Of course.
Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now
mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?
Gor. Just so.
Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the
good or evil condition of the body?
Gor. Very true.
Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:-all of them
treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally
have to do.
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of
discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not
call them arts of rhetoric?
Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only
to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there
is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect
only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified
in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.
Soc. I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say
I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:-you would
allow that there are arts?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part
concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in
painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in
silence; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not
come within the province of rhetoric.
Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
Soc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium
of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for
example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of
playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly
co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is
greater-they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power:
and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter
sort?
Gor. Exactly.
Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of
these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used
was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through
the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious
might say, "And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric." But I do
not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than
geometry would be so called by you.
Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my
meaning.
Soc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:-seeing
that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of
words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what
is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:-Suppose
that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning
just now; he might say, "Socrates, what is arithmetic?" and I should
reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those
arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to
ask: "Words about what?" and I should reply, Words about and even
numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again:
"What is the art of calculation?" I should say, That also is one of
the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said,
"Concerned with what?" I should say, like the clerks in the
assembly, "as aforesaid" of arithmetic, but with a difference, the
difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the
quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations
to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say
that astronomy is only word-he would ask, "Words about what,
Socrates?" and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the
motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.
Gor. You would be quite right, Socrates.
Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about
rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those
arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium
of words?
Gor. True.
Soc. Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do
the words which rhetoric uses relate?
Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
Soc. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for
which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you
have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the
singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next,
thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty obtained.
Gor. Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the
author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the
trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the
physician will say: "O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my
art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his." And
when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, "I am a physician." What do
you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest
good? "Certainly," he will answer, "for is not health the greatest
good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?" And after him the
trainer will come and say, "I too, Socrates, shall be greatly
surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show
of mine." To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and
what is your business? "I am a trainer," he will reply, "and my
business is to make men beautiful and strong in body." When I have
done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I
expect, utterly despise them all. "Consider Socrates," he will say,
"whether Gorgias or any one-else can produce any greater good than
wealth." Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of
wealth? "Yes," he replies. And who are you? "A money-maker." And do
you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? "Of course,"
will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias
contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then
he will be sure to go on and ask, "What good? Let Gorgias answer." Now
I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you
by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest
good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.
Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that
which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals
the power of ruling over others in their several states.
Soc. And what would you consider this to be?
Gor. What is there greater than the word which persuades the
judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the
citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?-if you
have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your
slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you
talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you
who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.
Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained
what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I
am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion,
having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.
Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of
producing persuasion?
Gor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for
persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever
was a man who-entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love
of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of
you.
Gor. What is coming, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you: I am very well aware that do not know what,
according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of
that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric;
although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am
going to ask-what is this power of persuasion which is given by
rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask
instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the
argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth
the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking
this further question: If I asked, "What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?"
and you said, "The painter of figures," should I not be right in
asking, What kind of figures, and where do you find them?"
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And the reason for asking this second question would be, that
there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
Gor. True.
Soc. But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them,
then you would have answered very well?
Gor. Quite so.
Soc. Now I was it to know about rhetoric in the same way;-is
rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have
the same effect? I mean to say-Does he who teaches anything persuade
men of that which he teaches or not?
Gor. He persuades, Socrates,-there can be no mistake about that.
Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now
speaking:-do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the
properties of number?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And therefore persuade us of them?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of
persuasion?
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about
what,-we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd
and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of
which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of
what sort, and about what.
Gor. Very true.
Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
Gor. True.
Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but
that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question
has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric
the artificer, and about what?-is not that a fair way of putting the
question?
Gor. I think so.
Soc. Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?
Gor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in
courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and
about the just and unjust.
Soc. And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion;
yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a
seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but
as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and
that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the
meaning of one another's words; I would have you develop your own
views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.
Gor. I think that you are quite right, Socrates.
Soc. Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as
"having learned"?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And there is also "having believed"?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And is the "having learned" the same "having believed," and are
learning and belief the same things?
Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.
Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this
way:-If a person were to say to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false
belief as well as a true?" -you would reply, if I am not mistaken,
that there is.
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?
Gor. No.
Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief
differ.
Gor. Very true.
Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have
believed are persuaded?
Gor. Just so.
Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,-one which is
the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?
Gor. By all means.
Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts
of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of
persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives
knowledge?
Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.
Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a
persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives
no instruction about them?
Gor. True.
Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or
other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief
about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast
multitude about such high matters in a short time?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about
rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the
assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other
craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For
at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and,
again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be
constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise;
or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or
a proposition taken, then the military will advise and not the
rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a
rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn
the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I
have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some
one or other of the young men present might desire to become your
pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this
wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when
you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are
interrogated by them. "What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias? they
will say about what will you teach us to advise the state?-about the
just and unjust only, or about those other things also which
Socrates has just mentioned? How will you answer them?
Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will
endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have
heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and
the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the
counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at
the suggestion of the builders.
Soc. Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I
myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the
middle wall.
Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to
be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are
the men who win their point.
Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is
the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the
matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.
Gor. A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric
comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me
offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been
with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his
patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or
apply a knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for
me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric.
And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any
city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly
as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician
would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he
wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the
rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting
himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude
than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power
of the art of rhetoric And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like
any other competitive art, not against everybody-the rhetorician ought
not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or
other master of fence; because he has powers which are more than a
match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike,
stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the
palestra and to be a skilful boxer-he in the fulness of his strength
goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or
friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters
should be held in detestation or banished from the city-surely not.
For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against
enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and
others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use
their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers
bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather
say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the
same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak
against all men and upon any subject-in short, he can persuade the
multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases,
but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other
artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought
to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers.
And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his
strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to
be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher
to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And
therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation,
banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.
Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of
disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not
always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either
party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are
apt to arise-somebody says that another has not spoken truly or
clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both
parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal
feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in
the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one
another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for
ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I
cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite
consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about
rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should
think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not
for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now
if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but
if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am
one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything
which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says
what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute-I
for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the
gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing
another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so
great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are
speaking and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the
discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter-let us
make an end of it.
Gor. I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you
indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before
you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the
argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we
should consider whether we, may not be detaining some part of the
company when they are wanting to do something else.
Chaer. You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which
shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid
that I should have any business on hand which would take me Away
from a discussion so interesting and so ably maintained.
Cal. By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many
discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before,
and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better
pleased.
Soc. I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.
Gor. After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused,
especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with
the wishes of the company, them, do you begin. and ask of me any
question which you like.
Soc. Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words;
though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have understood
your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of
you, a rhetorician?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the
multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by
persuasion?
Gor. Quite so.
Soc. You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have,
greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of
health?
Gor. Yes, with the multitude-that is.
Soc. You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know
he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.
Gor. Very true.
Soc. But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the
physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. Although he is not a physician:-is he?
Gor. No.
Soc. And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of
what the physician knows.
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the
physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he
who has knowledge?-is not that the inference?
Gor. In the case supposed:-Yes.
Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other
arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has
only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has
more knowledge than those who know?
Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?-not to have
learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in
no way inferior to the professors of them?
Soc. Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a
question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to
be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether
he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good
and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does
he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or
honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the
ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to
know more about these things than some. one else who knows? Or must
the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can
acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the
teacher of rhetoric will not teach him-it is not your business; but
you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not
know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be
unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of
these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens,
Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric,
as you were saying that you would.
Gor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not
to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.
Soc. Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a
rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust
already, or he must be taught by you.
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And he who has learned music a musician?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner?
He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes
him.
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?
Gor. To be sure.
Soc. And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?
Gor. That is clearly the inference.
Soc. Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just
man?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?
Gor. Clearly not.
Soc. But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not
to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his
pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and
unjust use of rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his
teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who
made a bad use of his rhetoric-he is to be banished-was not that said?
Gor. Yes, it was.
Soc. But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will
never have done injustice at all?
Gor. True.
Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric
treated of discourse, not [like arithmetic] about odd and even, but
about just and unjust? Was not this said?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that
rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not
possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards,
that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with
surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that
if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted,
there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not,
I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you
will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be
incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do
injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of
discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.
Polus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now
saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny
that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good,
and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could
teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a
contradiction-the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he,
but you, brought the argument by your captious questions-[do you
seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any
one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the
nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners
in bringing the argument to such a pass.
Soc. Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with
friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger
generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and
in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are
you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any
error into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition:
Pol. What condition?
Soc. That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which
you indulged at first.
Pol. What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?
Soc. Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to
Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you
got there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of
speech-that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case:-shall not
I be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and
refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and
listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real
interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any
desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you
please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and
Gorgias-refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to
know what Gorgias knows-would you not?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything
which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?
Pol. To be sure.
Soc. And now, which will you do, ask or answer?
Pol. I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question
which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?
Soc. Do you mean what sort of an art?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my
opinion.
Pol. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?
Soc. A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours,
you say that you have made an art.
Pol. What thing?
Soc. I should say a sort of experience.
Pol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?
Soc. That is my view, but you may be of another mind.
Pol. An experience in what?
Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.
Pol. And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine
thing?
Soc. What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether
rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you
what rhetoric is?
Pol. Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?
Soc. Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a
slight gratification to me?
Pol. I will.
Soc. Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?
Pol. What sort of an art is cookery?
Soc. Not an art at all, Polus.
Pol. What then?
Soc. I should say an experience.
Pol. In what? I wish that you would explain to me.
Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification,
Polus.
Pol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?
Soc. No, they are only different parts of the same profession.
Pol. Of what profession?
Soc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I
hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun
of his own profession. For whether or no this is that art of
rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:-from what he
was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art,
but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable
whole.
Gor. A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.
Soc. In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a
part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit,
which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the
word "flattery"; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of
which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain,
is only an experience or routine and not an art:-another part is
rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus
there are four branches, and four different things answering to
them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been
informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had
not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question:
Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him
whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first
answered, "What is rhetoric?" For that would not be right, Polus;
but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of
flattery is rhetoric?
Pol. I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is
rhetoric?
Soc. Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my
view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.
Pol. And noble or ignoble?
Soc. Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I
call what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I
was saying before.
Gor. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.
Soc. I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained
myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is
apt to run away.
Gor. Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying
that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.
Soc. I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am
mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence
of bodies and of souls?
Gor. Of course.
Soc. You would further admit that there is a good condition of
either of them?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Which condition may not be really good, but good only in
appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to
be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern
at first sight not to be in good health.
Gor. True.
Soc. And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in
either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and
not the reality?
Gor. Yes, certainly.
Soc. And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what
I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to
them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and
another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but
which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic,
and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part,
which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two
parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject
as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but
with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two
attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good;
flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed
herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the
likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which
she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is
ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into
the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates
the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best
for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a
competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no
more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the
goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to
death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for
to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without
any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an
experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the
nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing
an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence
of them.
Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of
medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the
form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal,
working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels,
and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect
of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.
I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say,
after the manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time
you will be able to follow)

astiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine;
or rather,
astiring : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation;
and
as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and
the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to
be jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of
themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the
body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the
soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery
and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of
judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word
of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well
acquainted, would prevail far and wide: "Chaos" would come again,
and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate
mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in
relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been
inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to
discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you
did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke
shortly, and therefore I had to enter into explanation. And if I
show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will
speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have
the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do
what you please with my answer.
Pol. What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?
Soc. Nay, I said a part of flattery-if at your age, Polus, you
cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?
Pol. And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states,
under the idea that they are flatterers?
Soc. Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?
Pol. I am asking a question.
Soc. Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.
Pol. How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?
Soc. Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.
Pol. And that is what I do mean to say.
Soc. Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all
the citizens.
Pol. What! Are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and
exile any one whom they please.
Soc. By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of
yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a
question of me.
Pol. I am asking a question of you.
Soc. Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.
Pol. How two questions?
Soc. Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like
tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they
please?
Pol. I did.
Soc. Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and
I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians
and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now
saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what
they think best.
Pol. And is not that a great power?
Soc. Polus has already said the reverse.
Soc. No, by the great-what do you call him?-not you, for you say
that power is a good to him who has the power.
Pol. I do.
Soc. And would you maintain that if a fool does what he think
best, this is a good, and would you call this great power?
Pol. I should not.
Soc. Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and
that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery-and so you will have
refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who
do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have
nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be
indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without
sense is an evil.
Pol. Yes; I admit that.
Soc. How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power
in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that
they do as they will?
Pol. This fellow-
Soc. I say that they do not do as they will-now refute me.
Pol. Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?
Soc. And I say so still.
Pol. Then surely they do as they will?
Soc. I deny it.
Pol. But they do what they think best?
Soc. Aye.
Pol. That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.
Soc. Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar
style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I
am in error or give the answer yourself.
Pol. Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you
mean.
Soc. Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will
that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take
medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the
drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the
sake of which they drink?
Pol. Clearly, the health.
Soc. And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do
not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire
to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?-But they
will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And is not this universally true? If a man does something for
the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but
that for the sake of which he does it.
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and
indifferent?
Pol. To be sure, Socrates.
Soc. Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods,
and their opposites evils?
Pol. I should.
Soc. And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which
partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or
of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again,
wood, stones, and the like:-these are the things which you call
neither good nor evil?
Pol. Exactly so.

[jum...@my-deja.com]

Soc. Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good,
or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
Pol. Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.
Soc. When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the
idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for
the sake of the good?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil
him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the
good?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of
something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that
other thing for the sake of which we do them?
Pol. Most true.
Soc. Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or
to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces
to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not
will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that
which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why
are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?
Pol. You are right.
Soc. Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant
or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of
his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests
when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems
best to him?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do
you not answer?
Pol. Well, I suppose not.
Soc. Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one
have great power in a state?
Pol. He will not.
Soc. Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to
him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
Pol. As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of
doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would
not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or
imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!
Soc. Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
Pol. In either case is he not equally to be envied?
Soc. Forbear, Polus!
Pol. Why "forbear"?
Soc. Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be
envied, but only to pity them.
Pol. And are those of whom spoke wretches?
Soc. Yes, certainly they are.
Pol. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and
justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
Soc. No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is
to be envied.
Pol. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
Soc. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he
is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him
justly.
Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death
is wretched, and to be pitied?
Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as
he who is justly killed.
Pol. How can that be, Socrates?
Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the
greatest of evils.
Pol. But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater
evil?
Soc. Certainly not.
Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them,
I would rather suffer than do.
Pol. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
Soc. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
Pol. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems
good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you
like.
Soc. Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do
you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a
dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare
power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men
whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to
kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or
tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn
in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do
not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply:
Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power-he may burn
any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the
Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or
private-but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best
is great power?
Pol. Certainly not such doing as this.
Soc. But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
Pol. I can.
Soc. Why then?
Pol. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be
punished.
Soc. And punishment is an evil?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is
a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and
that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is
an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another
way do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking,
the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property
are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that
they are evil-what principle do you lay down?
Pol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask
that question.
Soc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me,
I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are
unjust.
Pol. You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child
refute that statement?
Soc. Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally
grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my
foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of
doing good to a friend.
Pol. Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity;
events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you,
and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.
Soc. What events?
Pol. You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is
now the ruler of Macedonia?
Soc. At any rate I hear that he is.
Pol. And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
Soc. I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with
him.
Pol. And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance
with him, whether a man is happy?
Soc. Most certainly not.
Pol. Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even
know whether the great king was a happy man?
Soc. And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands
in the matter of education and justice.
Pol. What! and does all happiness consist in this?
Soc. Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women
who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the
unjust and evil are miserable.
Pol. Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is
miserable?
Soc. Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.
Pol. That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all
to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a
woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he
himself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if
he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then,
according to your doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is
unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest
crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas,
to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the
throne which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his
son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with
him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried
them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way;
and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he
was the most miserable of all men, was very far from repenting:
shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger
brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of
Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus,
however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the
kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; but not long
afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to
his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a
goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal
of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable
and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many
Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather be
any other Macedonian than Archelaus!
Soc. I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather
than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument
with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I
stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my
good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which
you have been saying.
Pol. That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I
do.
Soc. Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me
after the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For
there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring
forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their
allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all.
But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man
may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a
great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one,
Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should
bring witnesses in disproof of my statement-you may, if you will,
summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the
row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with
him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the
giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will,
the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom
you choose-they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and
cannot agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many
false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my
inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth
speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one
witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of
yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways
of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general;
but mine is of another sort-let us compare them, and see in what
they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to
know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know
happiness and misery-that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can
be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore
I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who
is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think
Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. But I say that this is an impossibility-here is one point about
which we are at issue:-very good. And do you mean to say also that
if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?
Pol. Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.
Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then,
according to you, he will be happy?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust
actions is miserable in any case,-more miserable, however, if he be
not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if
he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and
men.
Pol. You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.
Soc. I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a
friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us-are
they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
Pol. Exactly so.
Soc. And you said the opposite?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?
Pol. By Zeus, I did.
Soc. In your own opinion, Polus.
Pol. Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.
Soc. You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be
unpunished?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who
are punished are less miserable-are you going to refute this
proposition also?
Pol. A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other,
Socrates.
Soc. Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?
Pol. What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt
to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated,
has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great
injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children
suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will
he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue
all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of
government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is
that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?
Soc. There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of
refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But
please to refresh my memory a little; did you say-"in an unjust
attempt to make himself a tyrant"?
Pol. Yes, I did.
Soc. Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the
other-neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers
in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but
that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of
the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of
refutation-when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to
laugh at him.
Pol. But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently
refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the
company.
Soc. O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my
tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their
president to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was
unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to
count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you
have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you
make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for
I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is
the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take;
but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself
to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have
your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you
and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than
to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.
Pol. And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself,
for example, suffer rather than do injustice?
Soc. Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.
Pol. Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.
Soc. But will you answer?
Pol. To be sure, I will-for I am curious to hear what you can have
to say.
Soc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I
am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your
opinion, is the worst?-to do injustice or to suffer?
Pol. I should say that suffering was worst.
Soc. And which is the greater disgrace?-Answer.
Pol. To do.
Soc. And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?
Pol. Certainly not.
Soc. I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the
honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the
evil?
Pol. Certainly not.
Soc. Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful
things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you
not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for
example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the
sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other
account of personal beauty?
Pol. I cannot.
Soc. And you would say of figures or colours generally that they
were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or
of their use, or both?
Pol. Yes, I should.
Soc. And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same
reason?
Pol. I should.
Soc. Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in
so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?
Pol. I think not.
Soc. And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?
Pol. To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring
beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.
Soc. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the
opposite standard of pain and evil?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the
measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that
is to say, in pleasure or utility or both?
Pol. Very true.
Soc. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity
or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil-must it not be so?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But then again, what was the observation which you just now
made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering
wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
Pol. I did.
Soc. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the
more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in
evil or both: does not that also follow?
Pol. Of course.
Soc. First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice
exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer
more than the injured?
Pol. No, Socrates; certainly not.
Soc. Then they do not exceed in pain?
Pol. No.
Soc. But if not in pain, then not in both?
Pol. Certainly not.
Soc. Then they can only exceed in the other?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. That is to say, in evil?
Pol. True.
Soc. Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will
therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. But have not you and the world already agreed that to do
injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And that is now discovered to be more evil?
Pol. True.
Soc. And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a
less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if
you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as
to a physician without shrinking, and either say "Yes" or "No" to me.
Pol. I should say "No."
Soc. Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
Pol. No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.
Soc. Then I said truly, Polus that neither you, nor I, nor any
man, would rather, do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is
the greater evil of the two.
Pol. That is the conclusion.
Soc. You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of
refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of
myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and
witness are enough for me-I have no need of any other, I take your
suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let
us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of
evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or
whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed.
Consider:-You would say that to suffer punishment is another name
for being justly corrected when you do wrong?
Pol. I should.
Soc. And would you not allow that all just things are honourable
in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and, tell me your
opinion.
Pol. Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.
Soc. Consider again:-Where there is an agent, must there not also be
a patient?
Pol. I should say so.
Soc. And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does,
and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for
example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is
stricken?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which
is struck will he struck violently or quickly?
Pol. True.
Soc. And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same
nature as the act of him who strikes?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing
burned will be burned in the same way?
Pol. Truly.
Soc. And if he cuts, the same argument holds-there will be something
cut?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain,
the cut will be of the same nature?
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition
which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient
answers to the affection of the agent?
Pol. I agree.
Soc. Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is
suffering or acting?
Pol. Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.
Soc. And suffering implies an agent?
Pol. Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.
Soc. And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And therefore he acts justly?
Pol. Justly.
Soc. Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers
justly?
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished
suffers what is honourable?
Pol. True.
Soc. And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the
honourable is either pleasant or useful?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
Pol. That is true.
Soc. Then he is benefited?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term
"benefited"? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is
improved.
Pol. Surely.
Soc. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at
the matter in this way:-In respect of a man's estate, do you see any
greater evil than poverty?
Pol. There is no greater evil.
Soc. Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil
is weakness and disease and deformity?
Pol. I should.
Soc. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil
of her own?
Pol. Of course.
Soc. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and
cowardice, and the like?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have
pointed out three corresponding evils-injustice, disease, poverty?
Pol. True.
Soc. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?-Is not the most
disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
Pol. By far the most.
Soc. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
Pol. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already
admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by
to be most disgraceful?
Pol. It has been admitted.
Soc. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing
excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and
ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
Pol. Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to
follow from your premises.
Soc. Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the
soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of
disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or
extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest
of evils?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity
of the soul, are the greatest of evils!
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not
the art of making money?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of
medicine?
Pol. Very true.
Soc. And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer
at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take
them.
Pol. To the physicians, Socrates.
Soc. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
Pol. To the judges, you mean.
Soc. -Who are to punish them?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in
accordance with a certain rule of justice?
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine
from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. Which, then, is the best of these three?
Pol. Will you enumerate them?
Soc. Money-making, medicine, and justice.
Pol. Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.
Soc. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or
advantage or both?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are
being healed pleased?
Pol. I think not.
Soc. A useful thing, then?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and
this is the advantage of enduring the pain-that you get well?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is
healed, or who never was out of health?
Pol. Clearly he who was never out of health.
Soc. Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered
from evils, but in never having had them.
Pol. True.
Soc. And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their
bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and
another is not healed, but retains the evil-which of them is the
most miserable?
Pol. Clearly he who is not healed.
Soc. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from
the greatest of evils, which is vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the
medicine of our vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has
never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest
of evils.
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and
punishment?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no
deliverance from injustice?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and
who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or
correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been
accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and
potentates?
Pol. True.
Soc. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to
the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases
and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins
against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a
child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:-Is not that
a parallel case?
Pol. Yes, truly.
Soc. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and
bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous
conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice,
which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which
ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a
diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt
and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to
avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of
evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate
to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right,
do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in
form?
Pol. If you please.
Soc. Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is
the greatest of evils?
Pol. That is quite clear.
Soc. And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be
released from this evil?
Pol. True.
Soc. And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to
do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
Pol. That is true.
Soc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You
deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and
unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other
who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought
to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice
is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment,
more miserable than he who suffers.-Was not that what I said?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And it has been proved to be true?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of
rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought
in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby
suffer great evil?
Pol. True.
Soc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought
of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will
run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the
disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the
incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence,
Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:-is any other inference
consistent with them?
Pol. To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.
Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to
excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or
children or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that
instead of excusing he ought to accuse-himself above all, and in the
next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong;
he should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so
the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should even
force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like
brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not
regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the
honourable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow
himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to
be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself
being the first to accuse himself and his relations, and using
rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made
manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice,
which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be
useful. Do you say "Yes" or "No" to that?
Pol. To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange,
though probably in agreement with your premises.
Soc. Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?
Pol. Yes; it certainly is.
Soc. And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty
to harm another, whether an enemy or not-I except the case of
self-defence-then I have to be upon my guard-but if my enemy injures a
third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I
should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the
judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and
not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep
what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion
and justice; and if he has done things worthy of death, let him not
die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not
possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can.
For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if
of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at
least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous
discussion.
Cal. Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?
Chaer. I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest;
but you may well ask him
Cal. By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest,
or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is
true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we
not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we
ought to be doing?
Soc. O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among
mankind, however varying in different persons-I mean to say, if
every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by
the rest of his species-I do not see how we could ever communicate our
impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that
you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of
us have two loves apiece:-I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of
Cleinias-I and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of
Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your
cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or
opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and
forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are
saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the
same with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not
the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and is a person
were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you say from
time to time when under their influence, you would probably reply to
him, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves
say unless they are prevented; and that you can only be silent when
they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and
therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me,
silence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me
what I am telling you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my
other love, for the son of Cleinias says one thing to-day and
another thing to-morrow, but philosophy is always true. She is the
teacher at whose words you are. now wondering, and you have heard
her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying,
that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of
all evils; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god
of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at
one with himself, but that his whole life, will be a discord. And yet,
my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and
that there should be no music in the chorus which I provided; aye,
or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me,
rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and
contradict myself.
Cal. O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running
riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because
Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused
Gorgias:-for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if
some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know
justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied
that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be
displeased if he answered "No"; and then in consequence of this
admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being
just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed
at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into
the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded
to you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice,
for this was the admission which led to his being entangled by you;
and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth
stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be
engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular
and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only
conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one
another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks,
he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your ingenuity
perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is
arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the
rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip
away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion
about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the
conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of
view of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is
the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally,
to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice
is hot the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die
than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to
help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I
conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak;
and they, make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to
themselves and to their own interests; and they: terrify the
stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them
in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say,
that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word
injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for
knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of
equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is
conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called
injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the
better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker;
and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and
indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the
superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what
principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the
Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these
are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according
to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial
law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take
the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like
young lions, -charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to
them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is
the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had
sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape
from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells
and charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave would
rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural
justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of
Pindar, when he says in his poem, that

Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;

this, as he says,

Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I
infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them-

-I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without
buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off
the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that
the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly
belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may
ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things:
for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper
age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin
of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries
philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those
things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is
inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which
ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or
public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind
and of human character in general. And people of this sort, when
they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I
imagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in
the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,

Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest
portion of the day to that in which he most excels,

but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and
praises the opposite partiality to himself, and because he from that
he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them.
Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there
is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study;
but when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous,
and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and
imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an
age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of
grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish
years. But when I hear some small creature carefully articulating
its words, I am offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my
ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him
playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and
unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about
students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged-the study
appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal
education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior
man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see
him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I
should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one,
even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies
from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says,
men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of
his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring you,
but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I,
Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be
compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of
Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say to
you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are
careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that
you

Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;
Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any
reason or proof, offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.

And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking
out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed
of being thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of
you only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too
far. For suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your
sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had
done no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to
do:-there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to
say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a
poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed
to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of

An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,

who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others,
when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by
his enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of
his rights of citizenship?-he being a man who, if I may use the
expression, may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good
friend, take my advice, and refute no more:

Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation
of wisdom.
But leave to others these niceties,

whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:

For they will only
Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and
emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.
Soc. If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not
rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and
the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if
the stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should
know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was
needed by me.
Cal. What is your meaning, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired
touchstone.
Cal. Why?
Soc. Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the
opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed.
For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good
or evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities-knowledge,
good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom
I meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as
you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because
they have not the same interest in me which you have; and these two
strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very
good friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too
modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to
contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the
face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you
have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having
received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify.
And are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you,
Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of
Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied
together: there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with
one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should
be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the
study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning
one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom
might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I
hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most
intimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real goodwill
to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty
I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your
last speech. Well then, the inference in the present case clearly
is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that
point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not require
to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed
with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty,
nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you
tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the
result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler
enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for making,-What
ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far
is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For be assured that
if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from
ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have
begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to
practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to
your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call
me "dolt," and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once
more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do
you not mean that the superior should take the property of the
inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble
have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?
Cal. Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.

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Soc. And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I
could not make out what you were saying at the time-whether you
meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey
the stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities
attack small ones in accordance with-natural right, because they are
superior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and
better were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior
and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be
defined in the same way as superior: this is the point which I want to
have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same
or different?
Cal. I say unequivocally that they are the same.
Soc. Then the many are by nature to the one, against whom, as you
were saying, they make the laws?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?
Cal. Very true.
Soc. Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class
are far better, as you were saying?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them
are by nature good?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying,
that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to
suffer injustice?-is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no
modesty be: found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they
not think thus?-I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you
agree with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an
authority.
Cal. Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.
Soc. Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more
disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so
that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when
accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I,
knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to
custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the
argument is about custom?
Cal. This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age,
Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling
over some verbal slip? do you not see-have I not told you already,
that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a
rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps
for their physical strength, get together their ipsissima verba are
laws?
Soc. Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have
been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question-What is the
superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do
not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are
better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again,
and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I
will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions,
or I shall have to run away from you.
Cal. You are ironical.
Soc. No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just
now saying many ironical things against me, I am not:-tell me, then,
whom you mean, by the better?
Cal. I mean the more excellent.
Soc. Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have
no meaning and that you are explaining nothing?-will you tell me
whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not,
whom?
Cal. Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.
Soc. Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to
ten thousand fools, and he ought them, and they ought to be his
subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I
believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am
word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten
thousand?
Cal. Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be
natural justice-that the better and wiser should rule have more than
the inferior.
Soc. Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case:
Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are
several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks,
and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various
degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being physician, is
wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably
stronger than some and not so strong as others of us-will he not,
being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this
matter of food?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and
drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of
all of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make
use of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he
will be punished-his share will exceed that of some, and be less
than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the
best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles:-am I not
right, my friend?
Cal. You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other
nonsense; I am not speaking of them.
Soc. Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer
"Yes" or "No."
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And ought not the better to have a larger share?
Cal. Not of meats and drinks.
Soc. I understand: then, perhaps, of coats -the skilfullest weaver
ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and
go about clothed in the best and finest of them?
Cal. Fudge about coats!
Soc. Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the
advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the
largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?
Cal. Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?
Soc. Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the
wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger
share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?
Cal. How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!
Soc. Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.
Cal. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of
cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do
with our argument.
Soc. But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and
wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a
suggestion, nor offer one?
Cal. I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by
superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand
the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also
valiant and able to carry. out their designs, and not the men to faint
from want of soul.
Soc. See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge
against you is from that which you bring against me, for you
reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never
saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were
defining the better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as
the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and
the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I
wish, my good friend, that you would tell me once for all, whom you
affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?
Cal. I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and
courageous in the administration of a state-they ought to be the
rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than
their subjects.
Soc. But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not
have more than themselves, my friend?
Cal. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think
that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only
required to rule others?
Cal. What do you mean by his "ruling over himself"?
Soc. A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man
should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own
pleasures and passions.
Cal. What innocence! you mean those fools-the temperate?
Soc. Certainly:-any one may know that to be my meaning.
Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a
man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I
plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his
desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when
they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and
intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings.
And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this
however the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man
because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to
conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have
remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to
satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of
their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a
king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or
sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance--to
a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and
has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason
and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?-must not he be in a
miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders
from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be
a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary
of the truth, and the truth is this:-that luxury and intemperance
and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue and
happiness-all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to
nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth.
Soc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching
the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think,
but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the
true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me, then:-you say,
do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not
to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and
somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?
Cal. Yes; I do.
Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?
Cal. No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest
of all.
Soc. But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and
indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,

Who knows if life be not death and death life;

and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say
that at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma)
is our tomb (sema), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of
the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and
down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian,
playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the
soul-because of its believing and make-believe nature-a vessel, and
the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in
the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being
the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full
of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way
of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in
Hades, meaning the invisible world these uninitiated or leaky
persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel
which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly
perforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul,
and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the
ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore
incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions
are strange enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I
would fain prove to you; that you should change your mind, and,
instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which is
orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I
make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion
that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to
persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you
continue of the same opinion still?
Cal. The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.
Soc. Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the
same school:-Let me request you to consider how far you would accept
this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate
in a figure:-There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks;
the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of
honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other
liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he
can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but
when his casks are once filled he has need to feed them anymore, and
has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in
like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but
his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled
to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony
of pain. Such are their respective lives:-And now would you say that
the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate?
Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?
Cal. You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled
himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now
saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he
is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of
the influx.
Soc. But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the
holes must be large for the liquid to escape.
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man,
or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering
and eating?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And he is to be thirsting and drinking?
Cal. Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about
him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.
Soc. Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame;
I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell
me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have
enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of
happiness?
Cal. What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator.
Soc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias,
until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will
not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And
now, answer my question.
Cal. I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.
Soc. And if pleasantly, then also happily?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I
pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider
how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially
if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is
not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that
they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?
Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics
into the argument?
Soc. Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these
topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel
pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no
distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask,
whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether
there is some pleasure which is not a good?
Cal. Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they
are the same.
Soc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no
longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you
say what is contrary to your real opinion.
Cal. Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.
Soc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would
ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is
the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences
which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.
Cal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.
Soc. And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?
Cal. Indeed I do.
Soc. Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the
argument?
Cal. By all means.
Soc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question
for me:-There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

Cal. There is.
Soc. And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied
knowledge?
Cal. I was.
Soc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things
different from one another?
Cal. Certainly I was.
Soc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same,
or not the same?
Cal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.
Soc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says
that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage
are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.
Cal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say -does he
assent to this, or not?
Soc. He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees
himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune
are opposed to each other?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and
disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or
be without them both, at the same time?
Cal. What do you mean?
Soc. Take the case of any bodily affection:-a man may have the
complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the
same time?
Cal. Certainly not.
Soc. And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of
the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of
them both together?
Cal. Certainly not.
Soc. That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
Cal. Very.
Soc. I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them
in turns?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Or swiftness and slowness?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their
opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?
Cal. Certainly he has.
Soc. If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the
same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil-do we agree? Please
not to answer without consideration.
Cal. I entirely agree.
Soc. Go back now to our former admissions.-Did you say that to
hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
Cal. I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is
pleasant.
Soc. I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And thirst, too, is painful?
Cal. Yes, very.
Soc. Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all
wants or desires are painful?
Cal. I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.
Soc. Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are
thirsty, is pleasant?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word
"thirsty" implies pain?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the word "drinking" is expressive of pleasure, and of the
satisfaction of the want?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. There is pleasure in drinking?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. When you are thirsty?
Soc. And in pain?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Do you see the inference:-that pleasure and pain are
simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they
not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same
part, whether of the soul or the body?-which of them is affected
cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
Cal. It is.
Soc. You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune
at the same time?
Cal. Yes, I did.
Soc. But, you admitted that when in pain a man might also have
pleasure?
Cal. Clearly.
Soc. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same
as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the
pleasant?
Cal. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
Soc. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
Cal. Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a
wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
Soc. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in
drinking at the same time?
Cal. I do not understand what you are saying.
Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;-we should like
to hear the argument out.
Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of
Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
Gor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let
Socrates argue in his own fashion.
Cal. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling
questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great
mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that
this was not allowable, But to return to our argument:-Does not a
man cease from thirsting and from pleasure of drinking at the same
moment?
Cal. True.
Soc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease
from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
Cal. Very true.
Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as
you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
Cal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the
same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is
a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good
and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as
good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in
another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by
you identified them: Are not the good they have good present with
them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were
saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good would
you not say so?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
Cal. Yes, I have.
Soc. And a foolish man too?
Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
Soc. Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
Cal. Yes, I have.
Soc. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Which rejoice and sorrow most-the wise or the foolish?
Cal. They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
Soc. Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the
coward or the brave?
Cal. I should say "most" of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced
about equally.
Soc. No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
Cal. Greatly.
Soc. And the foolish; so it would seem?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their
enemies, or are the brave also pained?
Cal. Both are pained.
Soc. And are they equally pained?
Cal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
Soc. And are they better pleased at the enemy's departure?
Cal. I dare say.
Soc. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave
all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree;
but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and
the cowardly are the bad?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly
equal degree?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal
degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e.
in having more pleasure and more pain.]
Cal I really do not know what you mean.
Soc. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because
good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that
pleasures were goods and pains evils?
Cal. Yes, I remember.
Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who
rejoice-if they do rejoice?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with
them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with
them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the
presence of evil?
Cal. I should.
Soc. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain
evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of
pleasure and of pain?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy
and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has
more?
Cal. I should say that he has.
Soc. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from
our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice
and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we
allow to be good?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And he who has joy is good?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And he who is in pain is evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the
evil has more of them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad
as the good, or, perhaps, even better?-is not this a further inference
which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the
good and the pleasant are the same:-can this be denied, Callicles?
Cal. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates;
and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a
child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you
really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some
pleasures are good and others bad?
Soc. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me
as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as
if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you
were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have
helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must
make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what
I can get out of you.-Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may
assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the
hurtful are those which do some evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking,
which were just now mentioning-you mean to say that those which
promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their
opposites evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil
pains?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and
pains?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. But not the evil?
Cal. Clearly.
Soc. Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all
our actions are to be done for the sake of the good-and will you agree
with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and
that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and
not the good, for of them?-will you add a third vote to our two?
Cal. I will.
Soc. Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the
sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of
pleasure?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are
evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
Cal. He must have art.
Soc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and
Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were
some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a
better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and
evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but
only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with
pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is
concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg
you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you;
do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion-for you will
observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a
man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than
this?-whether he should follow after that way of life to which you
exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the
assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs,
according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should
pursue the life of philosophy-and in what the latter way differs
from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish
them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they
are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from
one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you
do not even now understand what I mean?
Cal. No, I do not.
Soc. Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and
I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is
such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good,
and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is
pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition
of the other, which is good-I wish that you would tell me whether
you agree with me thus far or not-do you agree?
Cal. I do.
Soc. Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me,
and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to
Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience,
and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and
attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has
principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending
upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that
pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end,
nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and
routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually
done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider
whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are
not other similar processes which have to do with the soul-some of
them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest
interest-others despising the interest, and, as in the previous
case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be
acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and
having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or
bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is
the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the
body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and
without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you
would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you
differ.
Cal. I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I
shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend
Gorgias.
Soc. And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
Cal. Equally true of two or more.
Soc. Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard
for their true interests?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind-or rather,
if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them
belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first
place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an
art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
Cal. I assent.
Soc. And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for
example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic
poetry?-are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that
Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral
improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the
multitude?
Cal. There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.
Soc. And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did
he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be
said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an
infliction to his audience. And of harp playing and dithyrambic poetry
in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for
the sake of pleasure?
Cal. That is my notion of them.
Soc. And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august
personage-what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only
to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and
refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in
word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?-which in your judgment
is her character?
Cal. There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face
turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.
Soc. And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were
just now describing as flattery?
Cal. Quite true.
Soc. Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm
and metre, there will remain speech?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then, poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
Cal. True.
Soc. And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be
rhetoricians?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is
addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and
slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as
having the nature of flattery.
Cal. Quite true.
Soc. Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which
addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other
states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is
best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or
are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them
pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own
interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to
amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for
this?
Cal. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of
the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.
Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two
sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the
other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of
the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether
welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such
a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is
of this stamp, who is he?
Cal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such
among the orators who are at present living.
Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who
may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and
made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for,
indeed, I do not know of such a man.
Cal. What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man,
and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and
whom you heard yourself?
Soc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first,
true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and
those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled
to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better,
and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the
other, and there is an art in distinguishing them-can you tell me of
any of these statesmen who did distinguish them?
Cal. No, indeed, I cannot.
Soc. Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one.
Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such
as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he
says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some
standard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the
painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them to
their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply,
but strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all
things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with
the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic
whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the
trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and
regularity to the body: do you deny this?
Cal. No; I am ready to admit it.
Soc. Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good,
that in which there is disorder, evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the same is true of a ship?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the same may be said of the human body?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be
that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony
and order?
Cal. The latter follows from our previous admissions.
Soc. What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and
order in the body?
Cal. I suppose that you mean health and strength?
Soc. Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the
effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for
this as well as for the other.
Cal. Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?
Soc. Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall
say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer
me. "Healthy," as I conceive, is the name which is given to the
regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other
bodily excellence: is that true or not?
Cal. True.
Soc. And "lawful" and "law" are the names which are given to the
regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and
orderly:-and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?
Cal. Granted.
Soc. And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands
his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he
addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he
gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant
justice in the souls of his citizens mind take away injustice, to
implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue
and take away every vice? Do you not agree?
Cal. I agree.
Soc. For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a
sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most
delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be
really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if
rightly estimated. Is not that true?
Cal. I will not say No to it.
Soc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his
body is in an evil plight-in that case his life also is evil: am I not
right?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him
to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to
satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly
suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir?
While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and
unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought
to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own
improvement.
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than
intemperance or the-absence of control, which you were just now
preferring?
Cal. I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would
ask some one who does.
Soc. Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or: to
subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument
speaks!
Cal. I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only
answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.
Soc. What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?
Cal. You shall judge for yourself.
Soc. Well, but people say that "a tale should have a head and not
break off in the middle," and I should not like to have the argument
going about without a head; please then to go on a little longer,
and put the head on.
Cal. How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your
argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with
you.
Soc. But who else is willing?-I want to finish the argument.
Cal. Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight: on,
or questioning and answering yourself?
Soc. Must I then say with Epicharmus, "Two men spoke before, but now
one shall be enough"? I suppose that there is absolutely no help.
And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all
remark that not only, but all of us should have an ambition to know
what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of
the truth is common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to
my own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions
which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not
speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like
yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of
force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the
supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you
think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.
Gor. I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you
have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish
of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear
what more you have to say.
Soc. I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with
Callicles, and then I might have given him an "Amphion" in return
for his "Zethus"; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue,
I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be
in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you
are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors
on the tablets of my soul.
Cal. My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.
Soc. Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:-Is the
pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are
agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of
the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to
be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the
presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence
of which we are good? To be sure. And we-good, and all good things
whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That,
Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether
body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best
way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and
truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain
that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or
arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the
proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the
soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no
order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of
course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the
temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear;
have you any?
Cal. Go on, my good fellow.
Soc. Then I shall proceed to add, that if the, temperate soul is the
good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the
foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.
And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation
to the gods and to men; -for he would not be temperate if he did
not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men
he will do what is just; See and in his relation to the gods he will
do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just
and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of
a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but
what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and
patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the
temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous
and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the
good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he
who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man
who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were
applauding-the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate.
Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they
are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must
pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as
fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as
not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends,
whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then
justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be
happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and
towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself
and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice
present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be
unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a
robber's life. Such; one is the friend neither of God nor man, for
he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion
is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us,
Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and
temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and
men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not
disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you
seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty,
both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate
inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.-Well, then,
either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession
of justice and temperance, and the miserable the possession of vice,
must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the
consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and
about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a
man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did
anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric-all
those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was
led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, if
more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the
other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of
modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and
have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true.

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And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the
next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth
that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to
save them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of
another like an outlaw to whom anyone may do what he likes-he may
box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my
goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition
which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is
one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated
once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears
wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have
my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine
wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to
despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me
and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong
than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been
already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would
seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an
expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of
iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising
hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I
say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how
these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say
otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is
my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is
the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if
possible a greater than this greatest of evils, in an unjust man not
suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will
make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will
avert the greatest of human evils? And will not worst of all
defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his
family or his friends?-and next will come that which is unable to
avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert
the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of
evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several
degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not
right Callicles?
Cal. Yes, quite right.
Soc. Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice
and the suffering injustice-and we affirm that to do injustice is a
greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil-by what devices can a
man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing
and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the power, or
only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will
escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have
provided himself with the power?
Cal. He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.
Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only
sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he
have provided himself with power and art; and if he has not studied
and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say,
Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in
admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but
that all do wrong against their will?
Cal. Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.
Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in
order that we may do no injustice?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not
wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree
with me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is
either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of
the ruling power.
Cal. Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to
praise you when you talk sense.
Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view
of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is
most like to him-like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not
agree to this?
Cal. I should.
Soc. But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be
expected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never
be able to be perfectly friendly with him.
Cal. That is true.
Soc. Neither will he be the friend of any one who greatly his
inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously
regard him as a friend.
Cal. That again is true.
Soc. Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can
have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes
and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and
subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state,
and no one will injure him with impunity:-is not that so?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and
formidable, this would seem to be the way-he will accustom himself,
from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on, the same occasions
as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your
friends would. say, the end of becoming a great man and not
suffering injury?
Cal. Very true.
Soc. But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very
opposite be true,-if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and
to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as
much wrong as possible, and not be punished?
Cal. True.
Soc. And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he
thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not
this be the greatest evil to him?
Cal. You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert
everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if
he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his
goods?
Soc. Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a
great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man
in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he
will kill him if he has a mind-the bad man will kill the good and
true.
Cal. And is not that just the provoking thing?
Soc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think
that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the
uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from
danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts
of law, and which you advise me to cultivate?
Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too.
Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that
an art of any great pretensions?
Cal. No, indeed.
Soc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, there are
occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the
swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the
pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies
and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet
his art is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of
doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation
which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us
from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or
Egypt, at the utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just
now saying, the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and
safely disembarked them at the Piraeus -this is the payment which he
asks in return for so great a boon; and he who is the master of the
art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the
sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to
reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his
fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured
in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the
same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a
whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers
that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily
diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way
benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he
who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the
soul, which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth
having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered
from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer-and so he
reflects that such a one had better not live, for he cannot live well.
And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is
not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all
behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his
saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any
comparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk,
Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain
of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be
engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about;
he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art,
and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your
daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And
yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your
refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the
others whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, "I am
better, better born." But if the better is not what I say, and
virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may
be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the
physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my
friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly
be something different from saving and being saved:-May not he who
is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time?-he knows, as
women say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond
of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can
best spend his appointed term-whether by assimilating himself to the
constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to
consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian
people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in
the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the
interest of either of us-I would not have us risk that which is
dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian
enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at
the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man
will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not
conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or
worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callides; for he who
would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus,
aye, or of Pyrilampes' darling who is called after them, must be by
nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make
you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and
orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own
language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet
Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?
Cal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to
be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite
convinced by them.
Soc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides
in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to
these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be
convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two
processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one,
as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other
with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist
them: was not that the distinction which we drew?
Cal. Very true.
Soc. And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar
flattery:-was not that another of our conclusions?
Cal. Be it so, if you will have it.
Soc. And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that
which was ministered to, whether body or soul?
Cal. Quite true.
Soc. And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of
our city and citizens? Must we not try and make-them as good as
possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in
imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are
to have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of
power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?
Cal. Yes, certainly, if you like.
Soc. Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set
about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake
buildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size,
ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or
do not know the art of building, and who taught us?-would not that
be necessary, Callicles?
Cal. True.
Soc. In the second place, we should have to consider whether we
had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our
friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and
if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent
masters, and had been successful in constructing many fine
buildings, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our
own unaided skill-in that case prudence would not dissuade us from
proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no
master to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at
all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public
works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I
were physicians, and were advising one another that we were
competent to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you,
and would you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates
himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be
cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same
enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no
one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any
the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven,
Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being
should be so silly as to set up as state-physicians and advise
others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised
in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of
the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when
you are learning the potter's art; which is a foolish thing?
Cal. True.
Soc. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public
character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one,
suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then,
Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever
a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and
became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such
a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me,
Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what
would you answer? Whom would you say that-you had improved by your
conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were
done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public.
Why will you not answer?
Cal. You are contentious, Socrates.
Soc. Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I
really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be
administered among us-whether, when you come to the administration
of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens?
Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty
of a public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not
answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the
good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to
recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning,
Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask
whether you still think that they were good citizens.
Cal. I do.
Soc. But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made
the citizens better instead of worse?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the
assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?
Cal. Very likely.
Soc. Nay, my friend, "likely" is not the word; for if he was a
good citizen, the inference is certain.
Cal. And what difference does that make?
Soc. None; only I should like further to know whether the
Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on
the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was
the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly,
and encouraged them in the love of talk and money.
Cal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise
their ears.
Soc. But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but
well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious
and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians-this was
during the time when they were not so good-yet afterwards, when they
had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they
convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the
notion that he was a malefactor.
Cal. Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?
Soc. Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or
horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor
butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks?
Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle,
and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do
you say?
Cal. I will do you the favour of saying "yes."
Soc. And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is
an animal?
Cal. Certainly he is.
Soc. And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the
animals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to
have become more just, and not more unjust?
Cal. Quite true.
Soc. And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?-or are you of
another mind?
Cal. I agree.
Soc. And yet he really did make them more savage than he received
them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must
have been very far from desiring.
Cal. Do you want me to agree with you?
Soc. Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.
Cal. Granted then.
Soc. And if they were more savage, must they not have been more
unjust and inferior?
Cal. Granted again.
Soc. Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?
Cal. That is, upon your view.
Soc. Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take
the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was
serving ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for
ten years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the
penalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon,
should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the
Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these
things would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are
not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have
broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers,
are thrown out-that is not the way either in charioteering or in any
profession-What do you think?
Cal. I should think not.
Soc. Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in
the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good
statesman-you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen,
but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet
they have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and
therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of
rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.
Cal. But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of
them in his performances.
Soc. O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the
serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more
serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to
gratify the wishes of the State; but as to transforming those
desires and not allowing them to have their way, and using the
powers which they had, whether of persuasion or of force, in the
improvement of their fellow citizens, which is the prime object of the
truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a
whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that
they were more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and
all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time
that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same
point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not
mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that
there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body,
and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial,
and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are
thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with
garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same
images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me
the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either
wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,-the baker,
or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in
so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and
every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is
another art-an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true
minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest,
and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has
and they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks
on the body. All other arts which have to do with the body are servile
and menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they
ought to be, their mistresses.
Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you
seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and
then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State
had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you
reply, seemingly quite in earnest as if I had asked, Who are or have
been good trainers?-and you had replied, Thearion, the baker,
Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner:
these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the
first makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the
third capital wine-to me these appear to be the exact parallel of
the statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether
pleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics;
those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and
purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art,
and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and
gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their
original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were
before; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their
diseases and loss of flesh to their entertainers; but when in after
years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease,
he who happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, is
accused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some
harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have been the real
authors of the mischief.
And that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise
the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and
people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the
swollen And ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to
these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of
harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have
left no room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the
disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and
applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real
authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may
assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only
their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not
that you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although
you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece of work is
always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; about our
statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe
that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong
which is done to them; "after all their many services to the State,
that they should unjustly perish"-so the tale runs. But the cry is all
a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the
city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman
is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the
sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a
strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will
often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them
of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what
can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and
whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had
justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by
reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more
irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a
mob-orator, because you will not answer.
Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some
one to answer?
Soc. I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which
I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I
adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether
there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying
that you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?
Cal. Yes, it appears so to me.
Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in
this inconsistent manner?
Cal. Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?
Soc. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers,
and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city,
and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of
the city:-do you think that there is any difference between one and
the other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was
saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you
ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, sophistry a thing
to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much
superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or
gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to
think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief
ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in
the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those
whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact?
Cal. Certainly it is.
Soc. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then
they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration
to those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been
benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run
by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer
left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he
should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for
not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by
reason of injustice.
Cal. Very true.
Soc. And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being
treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his
pupils, if he be really able to make them good-am I not right?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a
man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any
other art?
Cal. Yes, we have found the reason.
Soc. But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and
best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no
advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?
Cal. True.
Soc. And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to
requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been
conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is

this true?
Cal. It is.

Soc. Then to which service of the State do you invite me?
determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will
strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I
to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good
friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again,
and tell me your entire mind.
Cal. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.
Soc. The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.
Cal. The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse,
the consequences will be-
Soc. Do not repeat the old story-that he who likes will kill me
and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that
he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will
be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he
wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.
Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to
harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and
can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may
be brought by some miserable and mean person.
Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know
that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am
brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will
be a villain who brings me to trial-of that I am very sure, for no
good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am
put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?
Cal. By all means.
Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living
who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my
time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with
any view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to
what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces
which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court.
And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus: -I shall
be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little
boys at the indictment of the cook. What Would he reply under such
circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, "O my boys,
many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you,
especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and
starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he
gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst.
How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!"
What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when
he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he
could only say, "All these evil things, my boys, I did for your
health," and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury
like that? How they would cry out!
Cal. I dare say.
Soc. Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?
Cal. He certainly would.
Soc. And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know,
if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to
rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them,
and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers
or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages.
And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds,
or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them,
whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I
truly might:-"All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view
to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else." And therefore there
is no saying what may happen to me.
Cal. And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus
defenceless is in a good position?
Soc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have
often acknowledged he should have-if he be his own defence, and have
never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men;
and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of
defence. And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend
myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether
I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone;
and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed
grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or
rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death.
For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death
itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world
below having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all
evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I
should like to tell you a story.
Cal. Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.
Soc. Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale,
which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only,
but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the
truth. Homer tells us, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the
empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of
Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has
always been, and still continues to be in Heaven-that he who has lived
all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the
Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of
the reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously
shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called
Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the
reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men
were to die; the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the
consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and
the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said
that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: "I
shall put a stop to this; the judgments are not well given, because
the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for they are
alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in
fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of
judgment arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their
behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by
them, and they themselves too have their clothes on when judging;
their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a well
before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them; there are the
clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged-What is to be
done? I will tell you:-In the first place, I will deprive men of the
foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present: this power
which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take from
them: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they
are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge
too shall be naked, that is to say, dead-he with his naked soul
shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly
and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire
strewn upon the earth-conducted in this manner, the judgment will be
just. I knew all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I
have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and
one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give
judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two
roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to
Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and
Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the
primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the
two others are in any doubt:-then the judgment respecting the last
journey of men will be as just as possible."
From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw
the following inferences:-Death, if I am right, is in the first
place the separation from one another of two things, soul and body;
nothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several
natures, as in life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of
treatment or accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he
who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he was
alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will
remain fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to
have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with
the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when
he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his
limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same
appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was
the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after
death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time.
And I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles;
when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired
affections of the soul are laid open to view. And when they come to
the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places them
near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the
soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of
some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his
soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of
perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is
all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness,
because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full
of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and
luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him
ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment
which he deserves.
Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly
punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought
to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he
suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when
they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable;
and they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain
and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be
delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the
worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made
examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which
they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but
others get good when they behold them enduring for ever the most
terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their
sins-there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of
the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men
who come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be
found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant
who is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are
taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public
men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes,
because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this;
for they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as
suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were
Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites,
or any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting
punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am
inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those
who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men come from the class
of those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise
good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is
great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing,
and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this.
Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again,
at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust
righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas,
Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also
bad, my friend.
As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad
kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his
parents are; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and
seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away
to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or,
again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has
lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not;
and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a
philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with
the doings of other in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the
Islands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have
sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is
seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:

Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.

Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I
consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the
judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I
desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when
I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I
exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your
exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat,
which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly
conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not
be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of
which I was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge,
the son of Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is
carrying you off, you will gape and your head will swim round, just as
mine would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one
will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort of
insult.
Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale,
which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning
such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or
truer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the
three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we
ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as
well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains
unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided
than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the
appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in
public as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in
anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man
being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and
punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as
of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art
should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with
a view to justice.
Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in
life and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some
one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him
strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind
the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the
practise of virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we
have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics,
if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may
seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our
present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the
most important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly
stupid are we! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has
revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice and
every virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort
all men to follow, not in the way to which you trust and in which
you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing
worth.

-THE END-