"Colvinism" and Arguments for Atheism (repost)
Matthew Alexander Colvin
net. I chose alt.atheism first, since I had posted several daring
(foolhardy?) things yesterday, and I wanted to see what had become of
them. I threaded the group, and, looking me in the face like a man with
his eyelids cut off, I saw:
Re: Atheism is a logical impossibility (Hans M Dykstra)
Re: Atheism is a logical impossibility (Niall McAuley)
Re: Atheism is a logical impossibility (Ray Ingles)
I'll admit it's quite daunting to see these three in tandem. Two
of them (Hans and Ray) have posted their explanations of reality. The
third has defended those explanations. I've floated a number of
assertions in my last couple posts, so I thought I would finally tie the
ends up and post some more comprehensive and simply-explained objections
to the naturalist worldview.
1) On the question of ethics:
By ethics I mean that code that we use to make choices. This code
is based on normative statements: "It is better to live than to die" or
"A stable society is better than an unstable one."
Now, it has been postulated (by some naturalists, perhaps not the
triumvirate of apologists whose posts I read this morning) that we make
decisions based on our natural (evolved) impulses. For example, we have a
herd instinct, we have an instinct for self-preservation, we have a sexual
instinct, we have an instinct to protect our offspring, etc.
The problem comes in when I observe that we have the ability to
choose among these instincts. That is, there are times when both our herd
instinct and our instinct for self-preservation are at work. Take this
situation:
A child (no relation to you) is drowning in white-water rapids.
You can:
1) Follow your herd instinct and rescue one of your own kind at
the very real risk of your own life.
2) Obey your self-preserving instinct and not go in the water.
Notice that to make either of these choices is to choose between
two instincts, to put one over the other. Given any two instincts, there
is usually a way that they can be put in conflict, and a choice is forced.
Now, the thing that allows us to choose between two instincts cannot
itself be one of the instincts. It must be something else.
This something else I term a sense of morality. Any intelligent
being that has the ability to make choices must exercise this sense of
morality -- he must have an ethical code. And this sense of morality
assigns value to instincts; for surely if we choose one instinct over
another we have judged it more valuable? The question now is John Kress'
"quid juris".
It has been suggested that teleology has nothing to do with
ethics; that there is no overarching purpose, only smaller purposes that
we derive from our self-interest. But it may be observed that we have the
ability to choose other than what is in accord with our self-interest; we
can rationally (not just mistakenly or ignorantly) put our own
self-interest second to some other purpose. The thing that assigns our
self-interest value cannot itself be our self-interest.
Couldn't our sense of this morality have evolved along with our
species? I think it may *be* evolving, for better or worse. But there
could never have been a time when our species did not have this sense of
morality. A middle ground such as would be necessitated by evolution is
inconceivable -- animals are either making decisions based only on
instinct and chance, or they are reasoning beings with the ability to
choose between these instincts. There is no middle ground, and none is
even imaginable. Morality doesn't seem to be derived from any other thing
-- certainly not from our instincts, to which it assigns value.
Another suggestion has been made that perhaps our morality is
really just a way to avoid pain (maximize pleasure). But this does not
answer my questions of teleology -- if the avoidance of pain is in itself
an end, why should we not commit suicide in some painless fashion? But we
decide that, according to our morality, to live is better most of the
time. Why do we live? It's a hard question to answer without the
universal teleology I've postulated.
The fact that I can't find any way to avoid this "teleological
bias" (as Will Jenkins termed it) leads me to look for a way to explain
where it comes from. Our ethics have to do with the way we think things
"ought" to be. Thus, they cannot ultimately be derived from the way
things are. "Ought" does not come from "is." Any normative statement
must ultimately have another normative statement behind it. To deny this
is to commit the so-called "naturalist fallacy."
So I am forced to rule out matter as a source of
Purpose-with-a-capital-P. I have thus locked myself into dualism and
cannot rule out God's existence on the basis of materialism.
2) On the senses:
The most recent debate I've been engaged in has to do with the
accuracy of the senses. Namely, what basis do we have for trusting them?
I find that I must trust them. And yet I see no reason to believe
that matter would give rise to accurate senses. To think so would be to
believe that matter has some vested interest in our perceptions. Such is
obviously not the case. Again, I find myself running into teleology when
I wonder why things are so.
There is no way to logically reject solipsism. But we invariably
do, based on nothing but faith. By "faith" I do not mean a relationship
with God in the sense of Christianity. I merely mean a belief unsupported
by evidence.
If we are thus able to make a choice that is not based on
empirical evidence, I therefore can't justify not believing in God for
lack of empirical evidence. Granted, the rejection of solipsism is not a
reason for belief in God. But it is disproof of another reason often
advanced for atheism: that there is no evidence (which is a contested
point anyway).
3) On the Argument from Poor Design:
I stated at one point that I trust my senses because I believe
that God wanted them to reflect objective reality. It was then pointed
out by Ray Ingles that our senses are no paragons of design perfection.
They work in roundabout ways, they make do with "imperfect" features such
as limited range and blind spots. Ray compared them to the machines in
Rube Goldberg's cartoons that accomplish simple tasks through convoluted
and unnecessary mechanisms.
The problem I have with this criticism of design is that it relies
on the critic's aesthetic judgement. Ray thinks that an ideal eye (such
as would be designed by an all-PKG creator) would not have a blind spot.
It's Gould's presumptuous "panda's thumb" argument all over again.
I pointed out that this assumes that God shares Ray's (or Gould's)
aesthetics; that he would design an eye in a perfectly simple and elegant
way. Gould argues that some features of animals hinder their survival.
But this assumes that God wanted those animals to survive more easily or
longer than they do. I think this is an unfounded assumption.
Ray also pointed out that limited senses are limited in their
potential for good as well as evil. But this statement presumes that the
senses were designed to cope with evil; Christian doctrine holds that they
were not.
I quote from my exchange with Mr. Ingles here:
> >> >It wouldn't be reasonable to expect our senses to be perfectly
> >> >designed for OUR purposes -- which include a good number of evil
> >> >intentions.
> >>
> >> But even if we concede that, which I don't, by deliberately breaking
the
> >> senses, it limits their capacity to be used for good as well...
> >
> > "Breaking" the senses? No, I think the Christian argument is
> >rather that the senses worked perfectly for what they were made for.
The
> >problem isn't with the senses, it's with the things that we now try to
do
> >with them. It's the world that's broken.
>
> How, exactly, does the blind spot prevent evil in such a way that it
> does not also prevent good? You're making this assertion, I would hope
> you could back it up...
My argument is not that the blind spot "prevents" evil. My
argument is that the eye was not designed to have to deal with evil at
all. If it falls short of what you'd like to do with it in a world that
is not perfect, that's not the fault of a designer who didn't intend it to
be used in this world. It's like complaining that, just because your
Formula One race car can't win the Baja 500 or Paris-Dakar Sahara Desert
"Raid," its tires were poorly designed.
4) On the argument from evil:
Another argument often used to reason God out of existence is the
argument from evil. I have maintained in the past that this argument is
circular, but I won't insult the regulars on this group my making up a
straw-man version of it to argue against. I did see it debunked quite
well by another theist on a different thread just a day or two ago.
If anyone cares to post a form of the argument from evil (with no
hidden propositions), I'll respond to it. If I don't, e-mail me and call
it to my attention. But don't call me a coward. If I didn't respond to
something, I didn't see it or I didn't disagree with it.
Matt Colvin
mikel evins
> Another argument often used to reason God out of existence is the
> argument from evil. I have maintained in the past that this argument is
> circular, but I won't insult the regulars on this group my making up a
> straw-man version of it to argue against. I did see it debunked quite
> well by another theist on a different thread just a day or two ago.
>
> If anyone cares to post a form of the argument from evil (with no
> hidden propositions), I'll respond to it. If I don't, e-mail me and
> call it to my attention. But don't call me a coward. If I didn't
> respond to something, I didn't see it or I didn't disagree with it.
The existence of evil persuades me that certain kinds of god do not exist.
Specifically, if there is a god who created the universe, who has absolute
discretion as to how the universe is to be disposed (that is, who is
'omnipotent' but subject to logic), who is absolutely good and who is
all-knowing, then there must be no evil, so long as our subjectivity is
not fraudulent.
Because we observe evil, a god such as I describe must not exist. An
omnipotent god who is absolutely good and all-knowing will not create a
universe with evil in it because that god will do the very best thing that
it is logically possible to do. (You can, of course, refute this position
by showing that it is not logically possible to create a universe without
evil.)
A god can still exist of course, but that god will either not be
omnipotent, not be absolutely good, or not be all-knowing (evil could
exist because god doesn't mind; or it could exist because he doesn;t have
the power to create a universe without it, which could be either because
such a universe is logically impossible or because god's powers are
limited; or it could exist because god doesn;t know how to prevent it from
existing -- though one might say that this is a special case of a god with
limited powers).
Alternatively, it might be that our subjectivity is fraudulent. For
example, I might be god pretending very convincingly (to myself) that I'm
not really god; in which case any evil done to me by someone else (who is,
of course, really me pretending to be the someone else)isn;t really evil,
but only a pretense of evil.
Usually theists who wish to defend a particular popular conception of god
argue that god must permit evil to occur in order to enable free will, by
which they implicitly mean according free individuals the opportunity to
do evil. It has been my position that an all-knowing god could decide to
create those people who, given the opportunity to do evil, will not choose
to do so.
Matthew Alexander Colvin
writes:
There is, of course, the question of whether a universe with some
evil is better than a universe with none. That is, can some evil give
rise to greater good than would be possible with no evil?
The word you have overlooked in all of this is "love." If God is
all-good, then he wishes to love man. A man without the capability of
doing evil is inherently unlovable -- love is a transaction between
consenting consciousnesses.
It seems to me that your argument from evil relies on a
conveniently defined concept of good and evil. What good is, you don't
seem to have any definition. What evil is, you seem to say, is the
absence of good. I don't buy either of these non-definitions, and I don't
see how the argument from evil can work if you define good as God's will
and evil as deviation from that will. In other words, the argument from
evil is just as circular as the ontological argument -- it assumes that
there is some kind of "good" apart from God, and that he therefore does
not exist.
Remember, the argument from evil is only addressed against
specific gods and specific theisms. I don't think it works on the
Christian God and Christianity, since that religion's definitions of good
and evil are not separate from God. It does work on Zeus, for example:
Adultery is evil.
Zeus commits adultery (and commits it, and commits it, ...)
Therefore, Zeus is not all-Good.
I like Christopher Marlowe's (incidentally, an atheist) definition
of hell from Doctor Faustus: "All places shall be Hell that are not
Heaven." In other words, God's will is the only good, and all other wills
are only good insofar as they coincide with God's will.
Matt Colvin
mikel evins
> In article <2l072c$h...@rosie.next.com> mev...@next.com (mikel evins)
> writes:
> > The existence of evil persuades me that certain kinds of god do not
> > exist. Specifically, if there is a god who created the universe, who
> > has absolute discretion as to how the universe is to be disposed (that
> > is, who is 'omnipotent' but subject to logic), who is absolutely good
> > and who is all-knowing, then there must be no evil, so long as our
> > subjectivity is not fraudulent.
> >
> > Because we observe evil, a god such as I describe must not exist.
> There is, of course, the question of whether a universe with some
> evil is better than a universe with none. That is, can some evil give
> rise to greater good than would be possible with no evil?
The answer appears to me on the face it to be 'no'. Can you make a case
for a different answer?
> > A god can still exist of course, but that god will either not be
> > omnipotent, not be absolutely good, or not be all-knowing (evil could
> > exist because god doesn't mind; or it could exist because he doesn;t
> > have the power to create a universe without it, which could be either
> > because such a universe is logically impossible or because god's
> >powers are limited.
> The word you have overlooked in all of this is "love." If God is
> all-good, then he wishes to love man.
Can you support this assertion? (I think I can, but I'd like to see your
argument).
>A man without the capability of doing evil is inherently unlovable --
>love is a transaction between consenting consciousnesses.
I don't see that love is impossible between beings that are incapable of
choosing to do evil. Can you show me? In any case, I have not required
that human beings be incapable of choosing to do evil, only that they
never actually do so.
Is god capable of choosing to do evil? If not, then by your argument above
god cannot love. If god is capable of doping evil, then does he sometimes
do so? If so, then he is not all-good. If not, then we know that a being
that can choose to do evil can be so constituted that he never actually
does so, which is all I require.
> It seems to me that your argument from evil relies on a
> conveniently defined concept of good and evil.
I don't think so. I think that the above holds for any definition of good
and evil such that the two are opposed.
> I don't buy either of these non-definitions, and I don't
> see how the argument from evil can work if you define good as God's will
> and evil as deviation from that will.
I disagree. I think that the above argument works perfectly well if good
is defined as god's will.
> Remember, the argument from evil is only addressed against
> specific gods and specific theisms. I don't think it works on the
> Christian God and Christianity, since that religion's definitions of
> good and evil are not separate from God. It does work on Zeus, for
> example:
I disagree again. The argument I presented is addressed against a general
category of theisms of which some varieties of Christianity are special
cases. Specifically, it is addressed against those theisms that posit an
omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient deity but that grant the reality of
evil.
Ray Ingles
In article <2l05bm$d...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> pto...@next19pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
[deletions]
>1) On the question of ethics:
> Now, it has been postulated (by some naturalists, perhaps not the
>triumvirate of apologists whose posts I read this morning) that we make
>decisions based on our natural (evolved) impulses. [...]
> The problem comes in when I observe that we have the ability to
>choose among these instincts. That is, there are times when both our herd
>instinct and our instinct for self-preservation are at work. [...]
>Given any two instincts, there
>is usually a way that they can be put in conflict, and a choice is forced.
>Now, the thing that allows us to choose between two instincts cannot
>itself be one of the instincts. It must be something else.
Matt, this looks suspiciously like something I read in C.S. Lewis' _Mere
Christianity_. Did you lift it?
Anyway, this is obviously silly. I mean, consider two deer having sex in
the woods. Suddenly a pack of wolves appears. The deer will break off their
romantic interlude and run away, no? They obviously 'decided' that their
instinct for self-preservation was more valuable than their instinct for
sex, right?
By this rule, either animals are (supernaturally) moral beings or it is
possible to prioritize instincts on the basis of something perfectly
natural. Guess which one I would pick. I would guess that you will retract
this line of argument.
[deletions]
>...it may be observed that we have the ability to choose other than what
>is in accord with our self-interest [...] The thing that assigns our
>self-interest value cannot itself be our self-interest.
I would argue that this is not in fact the case. I would probably risk my
life to save a baby from rapids. but that does not mean that I am acting
against my self-interest. I would feel guilty and ashamed for the rest of
my life if I did not try. And I would feel exceedingly proud if I succeeded.
> Couldn't our sense of this morality have evolved along with our
>species? I think it may *be* evolving, for better or worse. But there
>could never have been a time when our species did not have this sense of
>morality. A middle ground such as would be necessitated by evolution is
>inconceivable -- animals are either making decisions based only on
>instinct and chance, or they are reasoning beings with the ability to
>choose between these instincts.
I trut that my reductio ad absurdum above shows that this is based on
a false premise.
[deletions]
> Another suggestion has been made that perhaps our morality is
>really just a way to avoid pain (maximize pleasure). But this does not
>answer my questions of teleology -- if the avoidance of pain is in itself
>an end, why should we not commit suicide in some painless fashion?
Because avoiding pain is *not* the same as maximizing pleasure. Suicide
not only minimizes pain, it minimizes pleasure as well (in my worldview).
Hence it's only called for when the prospects of future pleasure are
exceedingly dim.
[deletions]
> The fact that I can't find any way to avoid this "teleological
>bias" (as Will Jenkins termed it) leads me to look for a way to explain
>where it comes from. Our ethics have to do with the way we think things
>"ought" to be. Thus, they cannot ultimately be derived from the way
>things are. "Ought" does not come from "is." Any normative statement
>must ultimately have another normative statement behind it. To deny this
>is to commit the so-called "naturalist fallacy."
You know, I *almost* agree with this. But remember the distinction between
'pragmatic ought' and 'normative ought'. (I can recap if you missed that
thread.) You refer to normative ought above, not pragmatic ought. Pragmatic
ought can be shown pretty easily; I'm not at all sure that normative oughts
actually exist. I certainly think the burden of proof is on you to show that
they exist; I don't think you have so far.
[deletions]
>2) On the senses:
> The most recent debate I've been engaged in has to do with the
>accuracy of the senses. Namely, what basis do we have for trusting them?
> I find that I must trust them.
(For prudential reasons that have nothing at all in common with Pascal's
Wager. :-> )
> And yet I see no reason to believe
>that matter would give rise to accurate senses. To think so would be to
>believe that matter has some vested interest in our perceptions.
Argument from incredulity. There are other possibilities. Have you seen
the paper I email around occasionally on 'Tierra", the evolution simulator?
[deletions]
> There is no way to logically reject solipsism. But we invariably
>do, based on nothing but faith. By "faith" I do not mean a relationship
>with God in the sense of Christianity. I merely mean a belief unsupported
>by evidence.
Well, I think it's necessity rather than faith, but I agree that I've
never heard of a true solipsist. (They might exist, but apparently not
long enough to make an impression... :-> ) Perhaps we should keep this
on the appropriate thread, though.
[deletions]
>3) On the Argument from Poor Design:
> I stated at one point that I trust my senses because I believe
>that God wanted them to reflect objective reality. It was then pointed
>out by Ray Ingles that our senses are no paragons of design perfection.
>They work in roundabout ways, they make do with "imperfect" features such
>as limited range and blind spots.
When obvious alternatives are not only possible but actually extant.
> Ray compared them to the machines in
>Rube Goldberg's cartoons that accomplish simple tasks through convoluted
>and unnecessary mechanisms.
> The problem I have with this criticism of design is that it relies
>on the critic's aesthetic judgement. Ray thinks that an ideal eye (such
>as would be designed by an all-PKG creator) would not have a blind spot.
No, I think that since there exist plenty of eyes that do *not* have
blind spots, and it's actually simpler to make an eye *without* a blind
spot, that a designer who made an eye with sa blind spot is inexcusably
sloppy. Humans are badly designed in a number of ways. Do you really
want me to tackle the reproductive systems next? (Note: evolution has
no trouble accounting for these things...)
If you postulate magic 'hidden purposes' to account for the lame design,
then it's up to you to suggest some. I haven't seen one yet.
>[...] Gould argues that some features of animals hinder their survival.
>But this assumes that God wanted those animals to survive more easily or
>longer than they do. I think this is an unfounded assumption.
What foundation do you have for the converse assumption?
[deletions]
>> How, exactly, does the blind spot prevent evil in such a way that it
>> does not also prevent good? You're making this assertion, I would hope
>> you could back it up...
>
> My argument is not that the blind spot "prevents" evil. My
>argument is that the eye was not designed to have to deal with evil at
>all. If it falls short of what you'd like to do with it in a world that
>is not perfect, that's not the fault of a designer who didn't intend it to
>be used in this world.
Hold it, bright boy. What world *would* a blind spot "work" in?
>4) On the argument from evil:
I think that Mikel is doing a good job with this one.
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"Icky icky icky icky fKANG zoop-boing n zowzyin..." -The Knights Who
So Recently Said "NI!"
jsc...@ux4.cso.uiuc.edu
>In article <2l05bm$d...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> pto...@next19pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
>>...it may be observed that we have the ability to choose other than what
>>is in accord with our self-interest [...] The thing that assigns our
>>self-interest value cannot itself be our self-interest.
> I would argue that this is not in fact the case. I would probably risk my
>life to save a baby from rapids. but that does not mean that I am acting
>against my self-interest. I would feel guilty and ashamed for the rest of
>my life if I did not try. And I would feel exceedingly proud if I succeeded.
How is 'not feeling guilty' and 'feeling proud' in your self-interest?
What possible evolutionary factors neccessitate or favor this type of
emotive/reactive structure in humans? Even when the 'saved' person isn't
from the same clan/culture?
>> The fact that I can't find any way to avoid this "teleological
>>bias" (as Will Jenkins termed it) leads me to look for a way to explain
>>where it comes from. Our ethics have to do with the way we think things
>>"ought" to be. Thus, they cannot ultimately be derived from the way
>>things are. "Ought" does not come from "is." Any normative statement
>>must ultimately have another normative statement behind it. To deny this
>>is to commit the so-called "naturalist fallacy."
> You know, I *almost* agree with this. But remember the distinction between
>'pragmatic ought' and 'normative ought'. (I can recap if you missed that
>thread.) You refer to normative ought above, not pragmatic ought. Pragmatic
>ought can be shown pretty easily; I'm not at all sure that normative oughts
>actually exist. I certainly think the burden of proof is on you to show that
>they exist; I don't think you have so far.
I think, to do anything remotely deserving of the name 'ethics', you have
to presuppose the relevance (at least) of the concept of the normative
ought. Anything else, is nihlism, plain and simple. If you want to be a
nihlist, don't be suprised when some people consider you about as loony as
a solipsist. Both run off of the same basic drive ("You can't prove it! You
can't prove it!").
--
"The seeker after truth must, once in the course of his life, doubt everything,
as far as is possible. What is doubtful should even be considered as false.
This doubt should not, meanwhile, be applied to ordinary life."
-- 1-3rd Principles of Human Knowledge (R. Descartes)
Brian E. Clark
> Couldn't our sense of this morality have evolved along with our
> species? I think it may *be* evolving, for better or worse. But there
> could never have been a time when our species did not have this sense of
> morality. A middle ground such as would be necessitated by evolution is
> inconceivable -- animals are either making decisions based only on
> instinct and chance, or they are reasoning beings with the ability to
> choose between these instincts. There is no middle ground, and none is
> even imaginable. Morality doesn't seem to be derived from any other thing
> -- certainly not from our instincts, to which it assigns value.
You are constructing not only a straw man, but an entire straw family.
Beyond that, you argument is so circular that it rolled right off my
screen! Your assertion that morality cannot have a naturalistic base is
founded on statements like "Morality doesn't seem to be derived from any
other thing -- certainly not from our instincts, to which it assigns
value." I pity you that you think "There is no middle ground, and none is
even imaginable." Perhaps your lack of imagination is the cause of your
consternation. :-)
> Another suggestion has been made that perhaps our morality is
> really just a way to avoid pain (maximize pleasure). But this does not
> answer my questions of teleology -- if the avoidance of pain is in itself
> an end, why should we not commit suicide in some painless fashion?
The avoidance of pain is not the ONLY goal in life.
> Why do we live? It's a hard question to answer without the
> universal teleology I've postulated.
Nonsense. Natural selection would hardly favor suicidal creatures.
> So I am forced to rule out matter as a source of
> Purpose-with-a-capital-P. I have thus locked myself into dualism and
> cannot rule out God's existence on the basis of materialism.
Even if one did accept your arguments, that is no reason to make the huge
jump to the idea that any god (let alone your God), is the source of that
purpose.
> [On senses] ...I find that I must trust them. And yet I see no reason to
> believe that matter would give rise to accurate senses.
Try harder. Research more. You started with and are apparently
perpetually locked into your belief that "it just couldn't happen."
> To think so would be to
> believe that matter has some vested interest in our perceptions.
Stop anthropomorphising.
> If we are thus able to make a choice that is not based on
> empirical evidence...
A premise I don't belive you're substantiated well at all
> ...I therefore can't
justify not believing in God for
> lack of empirical evidence.
Nor can you reject believing in Elves or the Fluffy Blue Oyster who
actually governs the cosmos.
> 3) On the Argument from Poor Design:
> I stated at one point that I trust my senses because I believe
> that God wanted them to reflect objective reality. It was then pointed
> out by Ray Ingles that our senses are no paragons of design perfection.
> They work in roundabout ways, they make do with "imperfect" features such
> as limited range and blind spots. Ray compared them to the machines in
> Rube Goldberg's cartoons that accomplish simple tasks through convoluted
> and unnecessary mechanisms.
> The problem I have with this criticism of design is that it relies
> on the critic's aesthetic judgement. Ray thinks that an ideal eye (such
> as would be designed by an all-PKG creator) would not have a blind spot.
> It's Gould's presumptuous "panda's thumb" argument all over again.
No, aesthetics is not the question; engineering is.
> ...My argument is not that the blind spot "prevents" evil. My
> argument is that the eye was not designed to have to deal with evil at
> all. If it falls short of what you'd like to do with it in a world that
> is not perfect, that's not the fault of a designer who didn't intend it to
> be used in this world.
This is becomming patently ridiculous. Tell me, please, what are the
physical effects of 'good' or 'evil' on the photorecptors in the human
eye? Were all photons 'good' in the Garden of Eden?
> 4) On the argument from evil:
> Another argument often used to reason God out of existence is the
> argument from evil. I have maintained in the past that this argument is
> circular, but I won't insult the regulars on this group my making up a
> straw-man version of it to argue against.
I agree this is not the thread for that. However, I should point out that
many philosphers and theologians have wrestled with theodicy. None that I
recall ever claimed that argument from evil was circular. Mayhaps you
should start a new thread explaining why you believe it is.
-Brian
Mike McAngus
[trim]
> Couldn't our sense of this morality have evolved along with our
>species? I think it may *be* evolving, for better or worse. But there
>could never have been a time when our species did not have this sense of
>morality.
Please substantiate this assertion.
> A middle ground such as would be necessitated by evolution is
>inconceivable -- animals are either making decisions based only on
>instinct and chance, or they are reasoning beings with the ability to
>choose between these instincts. There is no middle ground, and none is
>even imaginable. Morality doesn't seem to be derived from any other thing
>-- certainly not from our instincts, to which it assigns value.
You mischaratarize my stuff as circular, oh self-styled falacy
policeman, and you then post this obvious argument from
ignorance. Tsk, tsk.
> Another suggestion has been made that perhaps our morality is
>really just a way to avoid pain (maximize pleasure). But this does not
>answer my questions of teleology -- if the avoidance of pain is in itself
>an end, why should we not commit suicide in some painless fashion? But we
>decide that, according to our morality, to live is better most of the
>time. Why do we live? It's a hard question to answer without the
>universal teleology I've postulated.
Why do I continue to live (as opposed to committing suicide)?
Because I don't find the alternative (suicide) appealing. Nope,
not hard at all.
[a little off the side]
> So I am forced to rule out matter as a source of
>Purpose-with-a-capital-P. I have thus locked myself into dualism and
>cannot rule out God's existence on the basis of materialism.
Why must there be "Purpose-with-a-capital-P"?
>
>2) On the senses:
> The most recent debate I've been engaged in has to do with the
>accuracy of the senses. Namely, what basis do we have for trusting them?
> I find that I must trust them. And yet I see no reason to believe
>that matter would give rise to accurate senses. To think so would be to
>believe that matter has some vested interest in our perceptions. Such is
>obviously not the case. Again, I find myself running into teleology when
>I wonder why things are so.
You just ignore what is inconvenient, don't you?
> There is no way to logically reject solipsism. But we invariably
>do, based on nothing but faith. By "faith" I do not mean a relationship
>with God in the sense of Christianity. I merely mean a belief unsupported
>by evidence.
> If we are thus able to make a choice that is not based on
>empirical evidence, I therefore can't justify not believing in God for
>lack of empirical evidence. Granted, the rejection of solipsism is not a
>reason for belief in God. But it is disproof of another reason often
>advanced for atheism: that there is no evidence (which is a contested
>point anyway).
I reject solipsism because I find no evidence for it, and lots of
evidence against it. One of the main pieces of evidence against
solipsism is that I'm not imaginative enough to come up with the
stuff that happens in the world. I could never dream up Dan
Johnson and Stacy Prowell.
>3) On the Argument from Poor Design:
> I stated at one point that I trust my senses because I believe
>that God wanted them to reflect objective reality. It was then pointed
>out by Ray Ingles that our senses are no paragons of design perfection.
>They work in roundabout ways, they make do with "imperfect" features such
>as limited range and blind spots. Ray compared them to the machines in
>Rube Goldberg's cartoons that accomplish simple tasks through convoluted
>and unnecessary mechanisms.
> The problem I have with this criticism of design is that it relies
>on the critic's aesthetic judgement.
You just ignore what is inconvenient, don't you?
[rest shaved]
--
Cheers,
Mike McAngus
m...@mouse.infinet.com <- new address.
How come you never see a headline like 'Psychic Wins Lottery'?