Re: [Sadhu Sanga] Message for List Members People Serge Patlavskiy Today at 3:03 PM To Online_Sadhu_Sanga@googlegroups.com CC Yahoogroups Message body - Priyedarshi Jetli on April 20, 2017 wrote: > However, if you take consciousness studies to be a science of >the study of the subject matter of consciousness, then there must >be some consensus on what consciousness is or even before that > whether there is anything which is normally understood by >consciousness. [S.P.] Thanks for your very important question. Why Physics is a science? It is because the problem of intersubjectivity is basically solved. I mean that when one physicist talks about, say, the effect of piezoelectricity, all other physicists in the world understand him very well. The physicists apply the third-person approach (to wit, the researcher is here, while the object of study is there), and the experimental results may be replicated in different laboratories under strict agreed-upon conditions. Let me introduce one concept here. So, I call "cognitive environment" a sufficiently big group of like-educated, like-doing, and like-thinking people within which the problem of intersubjectivity is basically solved. So, the cognitive environment for Physics is formed, and this makes Physics a science. Now, as to the Science of Consciousness. Indeed, the problem of intersubjectivity is not solved here, which means that what I mean by "consciousness" may not be the same as the other persons may mean by this same term. Moreover, when applying the first-person approach, every researcher gets a unique set of subjective research data, and this data cannot be easily (or at all) replicated by others. Therefore, the question is a valid one: how to solve the problem of intersubjectivity when playing on a purely subjective field? I suggest the following answer. Let us accept that every researcher constructs his/her own personalized or subjective version of the theory of consciousness being based on his/her unique data received due to studying own exemplar of consciousness, and he borrows no ideas from others. Now, suppose, we have got many such personal versions of the theory of consciousness constructed by different researchers. Then, if all such theories will obey the same criteria of formal correctness (formulated in my reply to Vinod Sehgal on April 20; see also Appendix below), then, as I predict, these theories will turn to be compatible with each other (despite of the different conceptual basis used by different authors), and we would be able to come to comprehensive version of the theory of consciousness. So, in trying to erect a Science of Consciousness we should not start from looking for common definitions (as we wont to do in Physics and other third-person-based disciplines) -- we should start from looking for the researchers who have got their personal finished versions of the theory of consciousness. So, in principle, my prediction is falsifiable, and the all I need is to find another researcher(s) who would have his own version of the theory of consciousness. To be honest, for the last 25 years of active search I have found nobody yet, even with a help of a candle. :-) [Priyedarshi Jetli] wrote: > I am afraid this is not the case with consciousness. Basically >you are begging the question as in the proofs for the existence >of God. [S.P.] No begging the question on my part. To understand my approach you have first to understand a difference between a meta-theory and an applied theory. The former is a collection of postulates and general assertions about Reality, and it serves as an epistemological framework for applied theories (just like a computer operation system serves as a platform for running applications). As to applied theories, they are being constructed within the limits of such or other meta-theory, and they must possess such or other explanatory and predictive power. For example, Physics (being a discipline -- a collection of applied theories) is constructed within the limits of a meta-theory called the Modern Materialistic Picture of the World. In so doing, the very meta-theory requires NO proofs by definition. So, when constructing my own special meta-theory I postulate Noumenal Reality as existing objectively and independently of the activity of consciousness, and I call "Phenomenal Reality" the "model of Noumenal Reality" that every living organism possesses due to activity of own consciousness. Since it is a postulate, I have no need to prove the existence of consciousness, nor the existence of (consciousness-independent) outer world, nor the existence of living organisms. However, I use one objective criterion to assess the given meta-theory. So, I call a meta-theory "good" if the applied theories, constructed within its limits (or on its epistemological basis), possess sufficient explanatory and predictive power, and it is the more good the more there are such applied theories. With respect, Serge Patlavskiy ----------------- Appendix (the criteria of formal correctness) Whatever meta-theory, applied theory, a hypothesis, or a simple description my (or anybody's) consciousness constructs, they all (1) should not contain tautologies; (2) should not contain notion-metaphor transmutations (e.g., "power" – it is a concept in Physics, but being used in Psychology, say, as "power of imagination", it becomes a metaphor); (3) should not contain hypostatization (which occurs when something abstract is treated or represented as a concrete reality); (4) should not contain incorrect definitions (when the unknown is defined through another unknown); (5) should not contain multiplication of hypotheses (which occurs when the new hypothesis is being based upon the previous one, instead of being the result of generalization and systematization of research data); (6) should not breach Okham's principle (the most evident and simplest explanation has to be preferred); (7) should possess inner consistency (or, be formally non-self-contradictory); (8) should be rational (when the aim and criteria of approach correspond to each other). ------------------- From: priyedarshi jetli To: Serge Patlavskiy Sent: Thursday, April 20, 2017 9:01 AM Subject: Re: [Sadhu Sanga] Message for List Members Serge, Thanks for you detailed comments. I am in agreement with most of them. But at the ground level when you say that each science has its subject matter that is obvious as the subject matter of physics is different from that of biology and from that of chemistry, and so on. However, if you take consciousness studies to be a science of the study of the subject matter of consciousness, then there must be some consensus on what consciousness is or even before that whether there is anything which is normally understood by consciousness. I take the word "consciousness" to mean what is meant in medical science. When the body is functioning in a minimal state it is conscious. When someone is knocked out and becomes faint or dies we say that the person is now unconscious. So "conscious" means the non functioning of the body. What people usually mean by "consciousness" in consciousness studies has to me the same status as soul or God or mind; something intangible and most probably non existent, so one can say anything about it. This is not science I am afraid. Water is a hard tangible thing that everyone can agree upon and then chemistry can have water as part of its subject matter and analyze it. I am afraid this is not the case with consciousness. Basically you are begging the question as in the proofs for the existence of God. Priyedarshi On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Serge Patlavskiy wrote: - Priyedarshi Jetli on April 19, 2017 wrote: >Consciousness studies is not a field of study for physics perhaps >for a good reason. Because it deals with a lot of pseudo problems. [S.P.] My explanation is that to study any object scientifically, the methods (and models) we use must correspond to the nature of the object of study. The methods/models used by Physics are not good for studying consciousness-related phenomenal. These methods/models do not take into consideration the activity of informational factor, and cannot deal with a whole complex system reducing its overall entropic state. A living organism is an example of such a complex system. [Priyedarshi Jetli] wrote: >After reading what you have written I remain precarious about >the hard problem. It accepts a division of subjective experience >from objective experience I presuppose. Or 'subjective' is >redundant here as experience is just experience of a subject. [S.P.] Yes, any experience is subjective and the word "subjective" is redundant. As to "objective experience", it is not possible in principle, because every person gets a model of the outer world (or the model of Noumenal Reality) due to activity of own personal consciousness. We -- the group of people -- may only talk about "comprehensive experience" we may receive after solving the problem of intersubjectivity. [Priyedarshi Jetli] wrote: >Why not partition experiences of vision from hearing and so on? [S.P.] It is ill advised to part the physical (sensory) signals receiving from different sense organs because consciousness always deals with cumulative sensory input. In so doing, in case one sense organ deteriorates, the other sense organ(s) exacerbates. The rest of lacking sensory data our consciousness compensates itself by processing the formerly memorized elements of experience (or the elements of knowledge). So, we may be looking at the bare foots behind the curtain in the bathroom, and "seeing" a girl having a shower. However, it may, in fact, be a barefooted plumber repairing a water tap. :-) [Priyedarshi Jetli] wrote: >These would also not make sense because experiences are >multi-modal sensory inputs leading to certain outputs. [S.P.] No, the very presence of sensory input does not lead to the new elements of experience. The new element of experience (or new knowledge, etc.) is a result of the activity of consciousness. Sometimes, we may be looking at something but seeing nothing. I mean that the physical (sensory) signals sent by sense organs to the brain are available, but our consciousness refuses to process them and transform them into new elements of experience. However, sometimes, when there are no physical (sensory) signals sent to the brain (to wit, our sense organs do not function), our consciousness may process the formerly memorized elements of experience and create new element of experience, and we call it "illusion", or "imagination", etc. [Priyedarshi Jetli] wrote: >I just don't understand what are the elements of experience. [S.P.] Experience/knowledge is not continuous -- it is always in a form of some whole distinct pattern. Therefore, when I say "the element of experience" or "the element of knowledge", I mean one fully accomplished act of creation of a new experience/knowledge. Using English, we cannot say "two knowledges", but we may say "two elements of knowledge". Thanks for your reply, Serge Patlavskiy From: priyedarshi jetli To: Serge Patlavskiy Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2017 10:00 AM Subject: Re: [Sadhu Sanga] Message for List Members Serge, Consciousness studies is not a field of study for physics perhaps for a good reason. Because it deals with a lot of pseudo problems. After reading what you have written I remain precarious about the hard problem. It accepts a division of subjective experience from objective experience I presuppose. Or 'subjective' is redundant here as experience is just experience of a subject. Partitioning experiences into subjective and non subjective seems arbitrary. Why not partition experiences of vision from hearing and so on? These would also not make sense because experiences are multi-modal sesory inputs leading to certain outputs. I just don't understand what are the elements of experience. Priyedarshi On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:23 PM, Serge Patlavskiy wrote: Dear Priyedarshi, have you seen my own reply to this same post on April 16? If not, I attach it below. By the way, consciousness studies is not a research field for physicists. SP ------------------------------ Re: [Sadhu Sanga] Message for List Members People Serge Patlavskiy April 16 at 3:32 PM To Online_Sadhu_Sanga@ googlegroups.com Message body - Chungmin Lee on April 16, 2017 wrote: > What would be the solution of the "hard problem" by David Chalmers, >to whom the target is "the first person data." [S.P.] The key point here is not the name of David Chalmers. :-) For example, I formulate the problem more generally, namely, what are the mechanisms of transformation of the physical (sensory) signals into the elements of subjective experience. Or, yet simpler: how my consciousness creates a model of Noumenal Reality? So, I have my own solution (albeit not an easy one, because I start from constructing a special meta-theory), and for the last 20+ years I am looking for other thinker(s) who would also have his/her own original solution (who would be experienced in constructing meta-theories and applied theories) to compare our results. From: priyedarshi jetli To: Online_Sadhu_Sanga@ googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 2:06 AM Subject: Re: [Sadhu Sanga] Message for List Members The solution is that there is no "hard problem" and the statement of it in Chalmers and others makes it a pseudo problem as it is only the decree of it as a "hard problem" that makes it a hard problem. I doubt that physicists pay much attention to it as they are dealing with numerous problems every day in their work, all of which are difficult to solve but they work their hardest at solving them.