YACL Talk | Adam O'Neill (UMass Amherst) - Schnorr Signatures are Tightly Secure in the ROM under a Non-Interactive Assumption
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Join us for our next YACL talk!
When: Friday (Feb 7), 11:00-noon
Where: AKW200, Arthur K. Watson Hall, 51 Prospect St, New Haven, CT 06511, US
Speaker:Adam O'Neill (UMass Amherst) Title: Schnorr Signatures are Tightly Secure in the ROM under a Non-Interactive Assumption Abstract: We
show that the widely-used Schnorr signature scheme meets existential
unforgeability under chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) in the random
oracle model (ROM) if the circular discrete-logarithm (CDL) assumption, a
new, non-interactive, and falsifiable variant of DL we introduce, holds
in the underlying group. Notably, our reduction is *tight*, meaning the
constructed adversary against CDL has essentially the same running time
and success probability as the assumed forger. Tightness is essential
for justifying the key length used in practice. To our knowledge, we are
the first to exhibit such a reduction to even a non-interactive
assumption. We justify CDL by showing it is as hard as DL in two
carefully chosen idealized models, which idealize different aspects of
the assumption.
Bio: Adam
O’Neill is an Assistant Professor in the Manning College of Information
and Computer Sciences at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Previously, he was an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at
Georgetown University. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science at the
Georgia Institute of Technology and held postdoctoral appointments at
the University of Texas at Austin and Boston University. His doctoral
work was recognized with the CRYPTO 2022 Test-of-Time Award.