Book Review: A life in Diplomacy

[avinash shahi]

Author: By Maharajakrishna Rasgotra
Publisher: Penguin, Gurgaon, 2016
Pages: 437
Price: Rs.699
This book will be of interest not only to scholars of international
relations and diplomats but also to the general public in India, South
Asia and the wider world. By K.P. FABIAN
I READ this book almost non-stop. It reminded me of Henry Kissinger’s
White House Years and of Dean Acheson’s Present at the Creation. The
author is a true master of prose who effortlessly combines brevity,
wit and erudition. He is a gifted poet too and the evening he met his
future wife, Kadambiri, to whom the book is dedicated, the following
lines from Robert Burns “kept leaping up” in his head “word by word”
as he was driving back to his flat:
http://www.frontline.in/books/a-diplomats-insights/article8755772.ece
To see her is to love her

And love but her forever

For Nature made her

what she is

And never made sic

another.

The first chapter is “Foreign Policy in Independent India”. Jawaharlal
Nehru, in his speech on September 7, 1946, a few days after taking
over as vice chairman and member for external affairs of the Viceroy’s
Executive Council, said:

“We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics
of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to
two World Wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster
scale....”

The author draws attention to the implications of the phrase “as far
as possible” and draws the correct conclusion that Nehru’s policy did
not mean “an inflexible posture of equidistance between the two power
blocks”.

However, when Nehru spoke, he had neither a functioning Foreign Office
nor a Foreign Service cadre, and Maharajakrishna Rasgotra has given a
detailed account of how the two were created. The pre-incarnations of
the Indian Foreign Service go as far back as 1784 when Warren Hastings
was Governor General. Nehru asked Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai of the
Indian Civil Service (ICS), who was in Washington as Agent General
mainly to carry out propaganda to justify the United Kingdom’s
response to India’s demand for freedom, to come back and put together
a new diplomatic service and a Foreign Office.

Rasgotra, comfortably settled into the Punjab Education Service
teaching (Class 11) English language and literature, decided not to
appear for the second competitive examination held by the Union Public
Service Commission (UPSC) in 1948.

Fortunately, he was forced to write the next one by his mentor,
Principal H.C. Kathpalia of Government College, Ludhiana. At the
interview, candidate Rasgotra was asked whether he had come across a
person called Thailand. (Siam had just changed its name to Thailand.)
He answered, “A person called Thailand? No Sir. I have not heard of a
person by that name. But, Sir, there is a country of that name. But,
perhaps, Sir, there might be a person named Thailand also! It is a big
world, Sir.” As he came out of the interview, the candidate was a bit
nervous, not being sure that he was in. “I was lingering, wending my
way out in a long corridor, when I felt a friendly pat on my back and
a gentleman, who was part of the board, said: ‘Well done, Mr Rasgotra.
Well done. I am Ray.’” The reader will note what a born raconteur the
author is and how informal and cheerful the UPSC was then as compared
to its rather grim formality now.

Life in London

It was the practice then to send the newly recruited diplomats for
training to London. Life in London when Rasgotra joined Wadham College
at Oxford in 1950 “was austere”. Every day at breakfast he had a fish
called kipper, “more bones than fish”. While applying for membership
of the Oxford Labour Club, he wrote his name as Maharajakrishna
Rasgotra and a rumour went round that an Indian prince of the kingdom
of Rasgotra was studying at Oxford. High Commissioner V.K. Krishna
Menon took special interest in guiding Rasgotra. What is striking
about Rasgotra is that in the early stages of his career, he was lucky
to come across powerful seniors who spotted his competence and
brilliance and gladly “adopted” him.

In his first posting abroad to Washington, as third secretary/vice
consul, Rasgotra was given advance information on a confidential basis
about the United States’ decision to arm Pakistan by the desk officer
for India in the State Department; the third secretary recorded a
note. However, his seniors were not prepared to concede that such a
junior officer could have ever on his own picked up credible
information on such an important matter; it was decided to include a
few lines in the monthly political report rather than send a special
dispatch. A “bright Under Secretary”, the author does not name the
person, grasped the significance of the matter on reading the
political report and brought it to the notice of Joint Secretary T.N.
Kaul, who took it to Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon, who brought it to
Nehru’s notice and he took consequential action. “A lesson I learnt
from this episode was never to reject out-of-hand information brought
by a junior officer or spurn its source.” The author learnt about the
plans to arm Pakistan in June/July 1953 and the U.S.-Pakistan pact was
signed in February 1954.

If the U.S. had not armed Pakistan, Nehru and his Pakistani
counterpart, Mohammed Ali Dogra, would have agreed on a plebiscite in
Jammu and Kashmir and the course of history of the subcontinent might
have been different. The author points out that it was the U.S. arms
supply that caused the periodic military coups and the break-up of
Pakistan in 1971. It is such insights that make this book valuable for
the reader.


Rasgotra moved to Kathmandu from Washington in 1954. He travelled
widely and found out that Prime Minister M.P. Koirala’s party had been
spreading baseless rumours that Indian agents were working to
“alienate the Terai from Nepal”.

Rasgotra was transferred to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) as
Under Secretary (Foreign Service Personnel). At that time there were
no rules regulating the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officers’
entitlements. A typical case was that of an officer in a mission
abroad for whom unfurnished accommodation was found and the mission
asked for sanction to purchase furniture. The DFA (Deputy Financial
Adviser) refused saying that the officer abroad should have exactly
what an officer of the same level in India would have got. The DFA
made short shrift of Rasgotra’s argument that there was need for
proper furniture for diplomatic entertainment. The DFA’s position was
that the furniture would be sent from India. Rasgotra immediately
decided to outwit the DFA by getting an estimate from Cox & Kings for
the transportation of the furniture and its periodic replacement. That
estimate was obviously higher than the amount the mission had wanted
and the DFA had to yield.

At 32, the author had often “thought of remaining a bachelor while in
service and taking to a life of study, reflection and spiritual
pursuits thereafter”. All that changed one evening when he met
Kadambiri at a party and recalled Robert Burns’ lines as mentioned
above.

When King Mahendra of Nepal visited India in 1957, Nehru asked
Rasgotra to be the liaison officer. The visit lasted two weeks and the
royal couple went to many places. When the king invited the Rasgotras
to dine with them and Rasgotra asked Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt
for permission to accept the invitation, the latter was “dumbstruck
for a long minute or two”. Finally, Dutt asked Rasgotra to accept the
invitation and also mention it to Nehru, who approved it with alacrity
without seeking any explanation. Similarly, when Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan of the United Kingdom came in 1958, the liaison officer was
Rasgotra. On his return from Oxford, Rasgotra had spent a while at the
MEA doing protocol work and Nehru had spotted him then.

Insider stories

There are a number of insider stories. There was a ban on serving
alcohol at dinners and receptions. Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon
brought it up once by saying: “A little drink helps loosen the tongue
of the guest.” Nehru shot back: “Yes, indeed; and what about your own
tongues?” In 1958, as Ambassador to the USSR, K.P.S. Menon sought
permission to serve alcohol at three functions he was hosting. The
clinching argument was that the Soviet guests would be “unhappy”
without vodka. The decision was that sherry, light wine or vodka, but
no champagne, would be served at the small dinners; no alcohol at the
big reception; and no Indian should drink.


I remember that when Indira Gandhi came to Vienna in 1971 in the
context of the Bangladesh crisis, the initial instructions were not to
serve alcohol at the banquet she was to host. But from her first stop
in Brussels, we got instructions to serve alcohol, but no Indian was
to drink. As it happened, Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul was the first to
pick up a glass of white wine and the rest of the delegation followed
his good example with alacrity.

The year 1958 saw Rasgotra as First Secretary at the United Nations.
He was given the 4th Committee dealing with decolonisation and the
work of the Trusteeship Council. He did an exceptionally brilliant job
in accelerating the pace of decolonisation.

We all have heard or read about Nikita Khrushchev’s shoe-thumping at
the U.N. General Assembly. Rasgotra gives the background. One
afternoon, he was taking Nehru around. The lights were on and some
sound was coming from the big hall though no plenary session was on.
Rasgotra got closer and saw a strange sight: Harold Macmillan was
rehearsing his speech, rather abusive of Khrushchev, to be delivered
the next day. When Rasgotra told Nehru of this, he did not believe it
in full. The following day, Macmillan was even more theatrical and
humiliated the Soviet leader, who thumped his shoes on the table.

Let us see how the members of the Indian delegation reacted to the
theatrical performance of the British Prime Minister. Nehru, V.K.
Krishna Menon, and Rasgotra did not like it. But, Foreign Secretary
Subimal Dutt, in his book With Nehru in the Foreign Office, says that
Macmillan was “in his best parliamentary form”.

While travelling with Nehru, Rasgotra asked whether there was a
solution to the Kashmir problem and, if so, what it might be. The
“brief and prophetic answer” was: “There are problems in human affairs
to which there are no solutions.” After a moment’s pause, Nehru added:
“Except Time.”

V.K. Krishna Menon was an outstanding orator. Sir Pearson Dixon of the
U.K. tried to pick holes in some of the words used by Menon, who shot
back: “Sir, I can understand your difficulty in understanding what I
have said; you picked up your English on the streets of London, I
devoted several years of my life to learn it with the care and respect
it deserves!” Derisive laughter silenced Dixon who did not open his
mouth for the rest of the session. When Zafarullah Khan of Pakistan
interrupted Menon by repeatedly shouting “Plebiscite”, Menon turned to
the Chair and said: “Plebiscite, Plebiscite, Plebiscite! Sir, ask this
gentleman whether his country has ever seen a ballot box!” Krishna
Menon had a reputation for being allergic to the U.S. In the mid
1950s, Menon had asked for F104 fighter jets against payment, but the
U.S. rejected the request on the grounds that it did not want to upset
the military balance in the subcontinent. Post-1962, when the request
was renewed, the answer was that India could not afford the cost.

Nuclear test


Nehru’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959 led to the
1962 war, which could have been prevented only by handing over the
Dalai Lama to China, a step Nehru refused even to consider. Before the
1962 war, President John F. Kennedy made a little-known offer to
Nehru. The U.S. knew that China was planning a nuclear test; Kennedy
wanted India to test ahead of China and was prepared to help
technically. Nehru was not disinclined to accept the offer. He
promptly instructed Homi Bhabha to “work out a plan of action on a
most urgent basis, should we finally accept Kennedy’s offer”. The only
other person Nehru consulted was G. Parthasarathy, who asked for a
couple of days to think it over. Parthasarathy talked to B.N. Mullick,
“India’s pretentious intelligence chief”, and to U.S. Ambassador J.K.
Galbraith, who had brought the offer. Both of them were for India
accepting the offer. However, Parthasarathy advised Nehru to reject
the offer.

The main arguments for rejecting the offer were as follows: First, the
seismic and other signatures of the test would have brought out the
U.S. connection and Moscow “would have isolated India totally”. This
argument does not hold water as the USSR-China break-up had started
and Moscow needed India’s support. The second argument was that any
testing would have dealt a mortal blow to India’s policy of
non-alignment. Kennedy had made it clear that there were no strings
attached. Unfortunately, the correct decision in India’s interest was
not taken, possibly also because Nehru’s faculties had started to
decline. Strangely enough, he chose not to consult Foreign Secretary
Subimal Dutt. Rasgotra correctly endorses the contra-factual argument
that had India tested, China would not have attacked her in 1962.

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh sent Rasgotra as Deputy High
Commissioner to London in 1972, charged with the task of reducing the
strength of staff to 400 from the then level of 1,200-plus. Rasgotra
accomplished the task brilliantly and painlessly. He moved to
Kathmandu from London as Ambassador. There he handled with singular
courage and diplomatic skills the protests in Nepal over the
integration of Sikkim, which is in sad contrast to what is happening
now.

From Nepal, Rasgotra went to Holland and then to France from where he
returned to India as Foreign Secretary in November 1981. Indira Gandhi
had received an invitation from United States President Ronald Reagan.
External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, G. Parthasarathy and
Principal Secretary P.C. Alexander advised her against accepting it.
Indira Gandhi was inclined to accept it. Rasgotra first talked to
those who opposed the visit, but failed to make them change their
mind. He prepared a long note arguing the case for the visit and sent
it to Indira Gandhi, who approved it. The visit was a great success.
The reader will note that when the Foreign Secretary has direct access
to the Prime Minister, no PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) can stand in
the way.


In the summer of 1995, A.B. Vajpayee, Leader of the Opposition, wanted
to meet Rasgotra who had retired by then. The conversation turned to
nuclear matters and Vajpayee asked whether it was time for another
nuclear test. Rasgotra replied that one test was not enough, a series
of tests was required. Vajpayee put into the manifesto of his party
that there would be nuclear tests. Asked about the reference to
nuclear tests in the manifesto, Rasgotra told foreign ambassadors that
it was meant seriously. None of them took him seriously and they were
all unprepared for the tests in May 1998.

The last chapter is “Foreign Policy: Past and Present”. The author
makes a number of useful points. We shall mention only a few. First,
non-alignment was not a mere idealistic concept. “It was a policy in
which pragmatism, idealism, and realism went hand in hand, and Nehru
used one or more of these traits in his conduct of relations, at
different times, with a neighbour or a great power or in the United
Nations Security Council on issues which included Kashmir, the Suez
Canal crisis, Goa’s liberation or Soviet Russia’s military
intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”

Second, there is need for a firm, stable, and unwavering neighbourhood
policy. Rasgotra quotes Machiavelli to the effect that it is better to
be feared than loved.

Third, the author has drawn a 21st century “mandala” on page 395 with
China at the centre. India needs a closer political understanding and
cooperation with the U.S. “to deter or deal with any misadventure
threatening peace and security in the region”. The reader will note
that this is the direction in which the present government is moving.
The author advises Prime Minister Narendra Modi not to have any
doctrine attached to his name as “a combination of principles and
pragmatism makes for a successful foreign policy”.

Rasgotra admires Machiavelli and Kautilya. But to that worldly wisdom
is combined deep spirituality. The author became an atheist with the
death of his elder son in an accident in 1967. Five years later,
before going to London as Deputy High Commissioner, he met Sathya Sai
Baba and became his devotee. Rasgotra says he had a vision of
transcendental luminescence once when he, 85, was waiting for Sai Baba
who was coming towards him.

The book is elegantly brought out with carefully chosen
black-and-white photographs that recall the past. The editing is more
or less diligent. On page 18, there is a reference to K.M. Kannam
Pillay. The correct name is Kannampilly. In chapter 6, dealing with
Rasgotra’s first posting in Washington, there is no mention of the
Ambassador’s name. The reader has to do some research and find out
from an earlier chapter that it is G.L. Mehta.

This book will be of interest not only to scholars of international
relations and diplomats but also to the general public in India, South
Asia and the wider world. Anyone who wants to get a feeling of “being
present at the creation” should read it. We are all deeply beholden to
the doyen of India’s diplomatic corps for this magisterial work, which
he, at 90, completed in 10 months. Younger people would have taken
longer to write a book of this length. Obviously, Rasgotra is a fast
“dictator”.



--
Avinash Shahi
Doctoral student at Centre for Law and Governance JNU