Ecology Community And Lifestyle Outline Of An Ecosophy Pdf Download
Hercules Montero
DISCUSSIONS OF DEEP ECOLOGY, WHILE widespread throughout the environmental philosophy literature, are often suffused with misconceptions and misunderstandings. Some of these are relatively trivial, but others, unfortunately, are quite serious. These more serious errors in interpretation have often resulted in misrepresentation and distortion of the deep ecology approach (DEA). The purposes of this discussion are to outline several of the misconceptions, suggest some possible reasons for their prevalence, and offer an alternative, hopefully clarifying, interpretation of the DEA.
People seem either to feel at home with deep ecology (are sympathetic to the search for "root" causes, efforts to articulate one's total view, Naess and Session's "deep ecology platform," etc.) or they tend to feel antipathy towards it. A situation has emerged where supporters frequently neglect to give deep ecology a critical eye, while foes often fail to give it a receptive ear.
ecology community and lifestyle outline of an ecosophy pdf download
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While some may argue about whether Naess should be considered as the "father" of deep ecology, he is undeniably responsible for the interpretation of deep ecology that I consider here. A host of expositions and criticisms of deep ecology (or elements of it) have been put forth.1 Many of these contain careful and coherent analyses. Even some of these, however, are hindered by one or more forms of four weaknesses common to discussions of deep ecology.2 My purpose in raising these "weaknesses" is not to criticize particular authors, but rather to call attention to the dearth of accessible, thorough, and balanced treatments of Naess's DEA.
The first weakness consists of building expository discussions upon relatively unsophisticated reasoning. Examples range from seemingly rote acceptance or repetition of Naess's most popular writings to naive, sometimes misleading, portrayals of Naess's ideas. A common instance is the unfortunate use of the term "deep ecologists" for supporters or theoreticians of the deep ecology movement. While at first glance this seems like a relatively trivial use of shorthand, it has significant semantic implications, the most serious of which is that it implicitly suggests the existence of a counterpart to "deep ecologists," namely "shallow ecologists." This is an assertion Naess never intended to make and many times has counseled against. His use of the depth metaphor, following Kierkegaard, was directed at our level of problematizing.3 Its purpose is to draw attention to the need for publicly questioning all of the practices, policies, values, and assumptions that propel the ecological crisis.
A second, quite common shortcoming results from drawing inferences from a scanty, selective, or dated reading of the literature or unmindful subtextual analyses. The broad range, depth, volume, and evolutionary nature of Naess's philosophical writings demand a particularly labor intensive commitment to comprehensive analysis. Naess's many unpublished papers and tendency to revise, revise, and re-revise make this weakness difficult to avoid even with a commitment to thoroughpaced analysis. Examples of the selective reading weakness include assertions that deep ecology is inherently anti-humanist or anti-feminist because the deep ecology platform and the vast majority of deep ecology writings fail to make explicit reference to the oppression of women and the general domination of some humans by other humans. The deep ecology movement has as its primary focus the reversal of the ecological crisis; this focus in no way precludes or undermines the overlapping concerns of the peace and social justice movements. The deep ecology approach is consistent with many possible interpretations of and responses to the roots and origins of the ecological crisis.
The third, and perhaps most significant weakness, may result from a compounding of the two previous shortcomings, but is not necessarily derivative of them. It arises from incorporating critical misconceptions and methodological or logical fallacies. Five examples of misconceptions include: (1) equating ecocentrism with misanthropy, (2) identifying "Self-realization!," the fundamental norm of Naess's personal Ecosophy T, or "biospherical egalitarianism in principle" as singular fundamental norms of deep ecology, (3) isolating the deep ecology platform (DEP) as the "heart" of deep ecology or dismissing it as "non-distinctive" without considering the gestalt nature of the DEA and its emphasis upon total views, (4) pinpointing the genealogy of deep ecology in a stoic attempt to overcome the alienation resulting from the tragic loss of free nature as opposed to a Pyrrhonian sceptic's ataraxia,4 questioning of technological optimism, economic rationality, the costs associated with loss of biodiversity, etc., and concern with how to live "rightly," with virtue and simplicity, and (5) associating Naess's use of "depth" with the level of an individual's willingness to reject anthropocentrism as opposed to raising and taking seriously the search for fundamental causes and the consideration of radical responses.
Five examples of methodological or logical flaws have included: (1) assuming that extension of care and concern to non-humans necessarily implies reducing care for humans, (2) presuming that discussions of population reduction imply draconian measures as opposed to long-term, slow reduction over centuries, (3) surmising that acceptance of `non-instrumental' or `objective' intrinsic value5 necessarily implies equal moral standing and treatment for such entities, (4) inferring that acceptance of intrinsic value necessitates acceptance of moral monism, and (5) positing that because the DEA identifies with nature as a gestalt with `objective' intrinsic value and because it sees humanity as a part of nature that whatever humans do necessarily furthers nature's interests.
The final form of weakness is represented by the few disingenuous attempts at critical analyses that seek to set-up deep ecology as a "straw man." These efforts, which often make use of the previously discussed examples, undertake to dismiss deep ecology and its contributions by demonstrating that it has fatal flaws. While some of the other weaknesses are more subtle, and thus insidious, these undertakings are usually "hatchet jobs" with transparent ulterior motives.
This brief review of weaknesses associated with the interpretation and exposition of deep ecology highlights the general absence of accessible, thorough, and balanced treatments of Naess's DEA.6 One possible explanation for this scarcity rests in the difficulty of tracing Naess's own meanings. Following the zetetic sceptic tradition he eschews dogma by asserting that his own work is searching, "on the way;" it is necessarily fragmentary and ever amenable to improvements, modifications, and elaborations.7 Naess's liberal revisions at times, however, make it truly difficult to pin down his interpretation of particular elements of the DEA.8
Additional difficulty in tracing Naess's meanings may result from his philosophical commitment to vagueness as a tool for encouraging widespread acceptance of the DEA.9 "Methodological vagueness" is a sophisticated semantic device for facilitating the acceptance and agreement of statements and notions by emphasizing the positive aspect of ambiguity that is sometimes associated with a high level of generalization. Naess maintains that this device, by leaving open issues of an inconsequential nature, acts to facilitate communication and agreement on the consequential ones. One can readily appreciate the pragmatic merits of eliminating irrelevant and contentious details. However, one cannot help but also wonder if in the process of practical decision-making relevant, but contentious details might be glossed over.
While Naess's sincerity, depth of intention, and intellectual integrity are beyond question, the propriety of emphasizing methodological vagueness raises some concern. Methodological vagueness has a antipodal side. As Naess himself has recognized, it can be employed to obfuscate conflicts as with discussions that fail to point out the oxymoronic nature of the term "sustainable development."10 As high level goals, sustainability and development (in the sense of access to health care, food, shelter, clean water, education, and free nature, etc.) are admirable and certainly worthy of advocating, but coupled they tend to belie links to neoclassical welfare economics and the underlying conflicts between ecological sustainability and perpetual economic growth. Because the border separating issues of a consequential and an inconsequential nature is amorphous and subjective, as well as quite wide, the use of methodological vagueness can introduce a tension between parallel efforts designed to isolate and clarify fundamental conflicts (deep questioning). There is a tradeoff between the benefits associated with positive expressions of ambiguity and the costs associated with its capacity for exploitation or potential for generating further confusion.
Failing to directly address "border" issues, like whether or not privileged ontological perceptions of nature exist, may only beg further speculation, confusion, and misconception. In order to fully reap the benefits of methodological vagueness, readers must be made aware that it has been employed both with deliberation and without attempt to obfuscate. The end result, otherwise, may be to turn away some possible supporters who eschew vagueness or, worse yet, wonder if the technique is being employed to avoid the asperities of deeper analyses.
Also central to the DEA, is Naess's emphasis and insistence on radical pluralism. Naess, convinced that a successful response to the ecological crisis demands a diversity of perspectives, approaches and lifestyles, imposes a minimum of external constraints while encouraging individuals to develop their own, critically thought-out total views. By offering little guidance as to whether acceptance or rejection of particular norms or hypotheses is mandatory, this approach, however, also tends to stimulate further confusion over, and criticism of, the DEA. This leads some to believe that Naess makes it unnecessarily difficult for his readers to piece together a coherent picture of the DEA. Questions arising from the use of methodological vagueness and the insistence upon radical pluralism are bound to generate frustration; they are an inevitable consequence of efforts to comprehend Naess's writings. Multiple readings of Naess's full range of work are necessary to absorb the depth and complexity of his contribution to environmental thought and policy. Readers will, however, be well rewarded for their journey.
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