Say It Right Instrumental Download
Drema Elleman
Is it a Stereo track? Vocals on the left and music on the right? If so, Use the drop-down menu on the left > Split Stereo to Mono. That will give two mono tracks (no more Left and Right). Open the new tracks in Audacity. They should appear under the original tracks. Audacity will play everything at once unless you stop it with the MUTE and SOLO buttons.
One of the biggest mistakes I made when I got started as a music producer was setting the wrong price for my beats. I know that this is a common issue we as producers struggle with. Each instrumental track that you create is a work of art, so you must be careful not to just give it away.
A typical non-exclusive instrumental beat might go for $25-100, while an exclusive beat may go for $300 or more. Now, these are just examples. Your prices will also depend upon your level of experience. My example is for an average non-famous and non-established beat maker/music producer.
While appreciating their substantial contribution to our understanding of the global diffusion of human rights norms, we contend that these studies lack clarity when it comes to the causal mechanisms driving human rights alignment in IGOs. Two opposing mechanisms are potentially at play: states could alter their repressive outputs in order to conform to prevalent group norms and to derive benefits from membership (instrumental norm alignment).Footnote 2 Alternatively, states could internalize different norms as a consequence of their repeated interaction with other states resulting in genuine preference transformation (intrinsic norm alignment). At this stage, empirical scholarship is unable to answer the question of why states adapt their human rights records as members of IGOs.
Furthermore, we exploit information about the type of physical integrity rights violations committed by states to investigate the causal mechanisms underlying norm convergence.Footnote 3 Physical integrity rights violations differ in their level of intensity and, consequently, in the associated reputation costs (e.g., Greitens, 2016; Hafner-Burton, 2008). In response, states have strategically altered their repressive mix to avoid sanctions. Disappearances are more difficult to link to the government than other human rights violations since perpetrators tend to remain hidden. Kinzelbach and Spannagel (n.d.), highlight, for instance, how Argentina shifted in the 1970s from political imprisonments to disappearances in light of international pressure for the release of political prisoners. Against this backdrop, we assume that instrumental norm adaption in IGOs leads governments to shift to clandestine physical integrity rights violations that are less attributable to the state (Payne and Abouharb, 2016). In contrast, states that internalize human rights norms improve their records consistently across different types of physical integrity rights violations.
Our findings hold across a wide range of IGOs with different policy scopes and with varying degrees of authority. We demonstrate that the alignment effect is not driven by the subset of human rights IGOs but shaped by the average human rights norms of the respective member states in an IGO. We contribute to the norm diffusion literature by providing a new perspective on the mechanisms driving norm alignment (e.g., Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2019; Taninchev, 2015). Specifically, we contribute to the body of scholarship dedicated to the alignment of human rights norms in IGOs (Greenhill, 2010; Greenhill, 2016; Lindemann and Petiteville, 2019). We also contribute to the literature dedicated to the effectiveness of external means to promote human rights (e.g., Donno and Neureiter, 2018; Kelley and Simmons, 2015; Terman and Voeten, 2018). We show that co-membership in IGOs provides an important channel to affect human rights practices of other states and that new normative contents might be transmitted through repeated interactions.
This article proceeds as follows: first, we discuss previous research on human rights alignment in IGOs. Second, we present our theoretical framework explaining the logic underlying human rights alignment in IGOs. Third, we introduce our empirical strategy exploiting both the timing and duration of IGO membership and information about the type of physical integrity rights violation to disentangle instrumental and intrinsic motives for norm alignment in IGOs. Fourth, we introduce our empirical models accounting for the hierarchical data structure by controlling for state and IGO characteristics. Lastly, we discuss the empirical findings and elaborate on the limitations of our study.
While IGO-driven convergence processes have been studied in several policy areas such as domestic economic policies (Cao, 2009), public-sector downsizing (Lee and Strang, 2006), or economic liberalism (Simmons et al., 2006), scholars have only recently turned to human rights norms. Greenhill pioneered this field of research with a foundational article in 2010 and a more extensive analysis of his theory in his 2016 monograph. His key findings are that IGO networks provide a conduit for the diffusion of human rights norms leading to convergence processes over time. The impact of IGOs goes beyond their formal mandates since diffusion processes are not sensitive to the mandate of IGOs. More specifically, Greenhill discovers that the convergence effect is not only restricted to those IGOs with a direct connection to human rights issues. He explains this finding with pressures for social conformity in IGOs leading states to strategically adapt their human rights records to group standards.
All things considered, we argue that it remains unclear why convergence processes of human rights norms take place in IGOs. In the following, we first present our theoretical framework depicting IGOs as social environments. Subsequently, we introduce our new empirical approaches to disentangle the mechanisms of instrumental and intrinsic norm alignment in IGOs.
Instrumental norm alignment describes the strategic adaption to prevalent group norms in response to social or material incentives. States could have incentives to align with prevalent human rights norms since co-members in IGOs might link cooperation on specific policy issues to improved human rights records. Issue-linkage has been demonstrated to be a powerful tool of inter-state influence (e.g., Haas, 1980; McGinnis, 1986). States might derive material benefits from standard-setting in IGOs that aligns with their favored policy positions. Hence, it might be strategically beneficial to adapt to prevalent human rights norms if compliance is linked to desired policy outputs.
Further, intrinsic norm alignment includes learning processes of effective means to promote certain norms. As members of IGOs, state representatives might learn about effective policies to promote human rights leading to a redefinition of their policy preferences. For instance, co-members in IGOs might share intelligence on effective security sector reforms that enhance human rights (e.g., Holm and Eide, 2000). If the acquired knowledge of such policies leads to redefined policy preferences, norm alignment is intrinsically motivated.
To summarize, instrumental norm alignment is strategic in nature being agnostic to the substantive contents of group norms. Actors seek to conform for the sake of deriving benefits from group membership and not because of their inherent appreciation of specific norms.Footnote 10 In contrast, intrinsic norm alignment captures the genuine endorsement of new normative contests leading to a redefinition of state preferences and identities.
How can we identify which of those two mechanisms - instrumental or intrinsic norm alignment is decisive for norm convergence in IGOs? In practice, the boundary lines are far from clear-cut. States might be motivated by an interplay of instrumental and intrinsic motives when adapting to prevalent standards in IGOs. Adding further complexity, it might be the case that states are originally motivated by instrumental motives but begin to internalize norms over time. Officially stated motives are likely to deviate from actual motivations. State representatives might publicly convey a rhetoric of norm endorsement while being motivated by instrumental motives. Being aware of these difficulties, we seek to disentangle the respective impact of those mechanisms by leveraging information about the timing of norm alignment and strategic shifts of the types of human rights violations.
First, we argue that motives for norm convergence can be identified by studying the timing of norm convergence. The underlying assumption is that instrumental and intrinsic mechanisms materialize at different points in time. The idea to leverage the timing of norm convergence has been applied in different contexts such as in research about the protection of labor rights (Kim, 2012) or the signing of international treaties (von Stein, 2005). Building on these studies, we distinguish between norm convergence (a) prior to IGO accession, norm convergence (b) during IGO membership, and the development of normative standards (c) after IGO exit to draw inferences about the impact of instrumental and intrinsic motives on norm alignment.
(a) Beginning with the time prior to IGO membership, we argue that systematic norm convergence shortly before membership is indicative of instrumental motives. States might instrumentally adapt their human rights records to enhance their chances to be admitted to an IGO. This process could occur voluntarily or due to formal conditionality requirements. For instance, states might strategically adapt their domestic policies in the realm of human rights to be admitted to IGOs. Membership in IGOs could be linked to diverse material benefits such as access to markets or influence on standard-setting. If the anticipated material benefits of cooperation are the underlying motivation for human rights improvement, norm alignment is driven by instrumental motives.
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