Novo estudo sobre segurança de eleições eletrônicas

[Amilcar Brunazo Filho]

https://www.ifes.org/publications/cybersecurity-elections

[augusto....@gmail.com]

"There is no end to the ways in which an EMB can be exposed politically, sometimesby their own action or inaction, especially in developing democracies where checks and balances may not be in place."

A concentração de poderes da Justiça Eleitoral no Brasil é um exemplo disso: quando a mesma entidade executa, fiscaliza e julga as operações das eleições, rejeita-se o princípio democrático da separação de poderes.

"Specific tools that provide independent ways to test the system, such as voter verified paper audit trails (VVPATs)and post-election auditsof technology systems, are alsoagood meansto gain public trust and secure against fraud.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ European Commission, Methodological Guide on Electoral Assistance, 63"

Não conhecia essa referência. E olha que o documento é de 2006. Na argumentação a favor do voto impresso é importante incluir essa recomendação da Comissão Europeia. Está no link abaixo, página 65.

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/methodological-guide-electoral-assistance_en

"The key challenge remains the verification of results in a transparent manner and the possibility to audit all the stages of an automated voting process. It is now considered necessary, in the interests of transparency and security, to insert in all electronic voting processes an audit paper trail. The most effective and transparent forms of audit in this respect are the so-called ‘voter verified audit trails’ (VVATs), also known as ‘voter verified paper ballots’.

These entail the production of paper records of the vote, to be verified by the voter after casting the vote, which can be used for eventual recounts in case of challenges. It is, in simple words, the link between the casting of the ballots and the compilation of the results. A slightly different version of this mechanism is when the vote may be verified by the voter but it is not mandatory (voter verifiable audit trail). Both versions can only be used in controlled environments as the voter has to be physically present to verify the vote. The presence of these features must be considered as a necessary precondition every time consideration is given to providing assistance to the installation of an automated voting process in a partner country."

Abaixo desse parágrafo vem uma foto da urna eletrônica usada no Brasil - provavelmente intencionalmente como um exemplo onde a trilha de auditoria verificável pelo eleitor não é utilizada.

Em domingo, 6 de janeiro de 2019 17:59:16 UTC-2, Amilcar Brunazo Filho escreveu:

https://www.ifes.org/publications/cybersecurity-elections