TTP’s new strategy against Pakistan
Faheem Uddin
There has been a series of cross-border attacks since April 2011 by
Taliban militants operating out of Kunar province of Afghanistan, and
attacking security installations and civilian settlements in Upper and
Lower Dir districts of Malakand Division, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies
of FATA. The attacks seem to multiply Pakistan’s woes regarding
stabilising these conflict-hit areas. While the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the cross-border raids,
local tribesmen also claimed the participation of foreign militants as
well as Afghan Taliban in these brazen attacks. Reports indicate that
the TTP and allied militant outfits have successfully established semi-
sanctuaries in the neighbouring Kunar and Nuristan provinces of
Afghanistan, after they were driven out from the above-mentioned areas
during multiple and simultaneously military operations which were
initiated since August 2008. There are number of issues which need
attention.
Firstly, terrorist sanctuaries, which until 2008 mainly existed on the
Pakistani side of the border could now be found on the Afghan side of
the border as well. This is mainly due to the current US’ counter-
insurgency (COIN) strategy that was put in place during late 2009-
early 2010 by the incumbent US Administration. The existing strategy
is based on protecting the urban population centres in Afghanistan,
under which the US and ISAF-NATO withdrew from most of the forward
operating bases (FoB) located on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and
the rural area. This provided an opportunity for the Taliban and
associated militant groups to exploit the security void created as a
result of withdrawal of troops from Kunar and Nuristan, and establish
terrorist bases paraphernalia on the Afghan side of the border.
Particularly important are the Pech and Korengal Valleys in Kunar,
from wich NATO withdrew its presence completely. It is precisely from
these two valleys in Kunar province, that the TTP along with Afghan
Taliban and al-Qaeda are launching attacks into Pakistan. The growing
strength of insurgents in Kunar and Nuristan could be gauged from the
fact that since April 2011, the Kunar-Nuristan Highway connecting the
two provinces has been closed by them in order to apply economic
pressure on local residents of Nuristan to submit to the Taliban rule.
Secondly, Kunar and Nusristan provinces are host to many militant
groups, foremost being Jamaat al-Dawa al-Sunnat (JDS), a militant
outfit comprising of Salafi-Wahabi Afghan fighters. This militant
outfit does not belong to the mainstream Afghan Taliban school of
thought, but owed allegiance to Mullah Omar, supreme leader of the
Afghan Taliban, somewhere in early 2010, in order to put joint
resistance to foreign coalition troops. While the JDS seems to be
spiritually tied to Mullah Omar, they retain their operational
independence. The most important commander of the JDS is Qari Ziaur
Rehman, who belongs to Kunar province. Ziaur Rehman maintains close
links with the TTP-Bajaur, especially Maulana Faqir Muhammad, and is
known to be active in Bajaur Agency. The mainstream Afghan Taliban
also denied involvement in cross-border attacks into Pakistan. This
could explain the operational independence which the JDS exercises
from mainstream Mullah-Omar led Taliban, when it comes to militant
activity in the region.
The JDS also maintains very close ties with al-Qaeda, which has been
able to recently establish a strong presence in Kunar and Nuristan
provinces. In fact, Qari Ziaur Rehman is sometimes referred to as the
joint leader of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Kunar and Nuristan. In recent
months, many senior leaders of al-Qaeda were killed or captured in
NATO raids in Kunar province. They include Abu Hafs al-Najdi alias
Abdul Ghani, who was reported to the highest ranking Qaeda leader in
Afghanistan, and who was killed in April 2011. Najdi’s predecessor,
Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, was earlier arrested in a NATO raid in December
2010. Similarly, Qari Masiullah, Qaeda’s former chief of security for
Kunar province was also killed in a NATO raid somewhere in December
2009.
Thirdly, intensification in cross-border attacks by Taliban from Kunar
province into the Dir districts, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies came in
the wake of killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) on 2 May 2011 in a US
raid in Abbottabad. A large number of people in Pakistan refuse to
accept that the US conducted the entire operation on its own, and
believe that there could be a covert Pakistani support behind the
raid. It is because of this perception that soon after the death of
OBL the TTP’s spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, vowed to take revenge from
the Pakistani government, stating, “Now Pakistani rulers, President
Zardari and the [Pakistan] Army will be our first targets. America
will be our second target.” Similarly, Qaeda also suspects Pakistan’s
involvement in the US raid, and fears that Pakistan may assist future
operations against Qaeda as well. In the words of US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, “There is some indication that al-Qaeda is worried that
- because of the way we went after Bin Laden, their suspicion is that
the Pakistanis may have been involved in it.” The Al Qaeda militants
were “worried that the Pakistanis may betray them as well,” he added.
Post-OBL killing, there is an increasing pressure on Pakistan,
especially from the US, to launch a massive military operation in
North Waziristan Agency (NWA) to disrupt and dismantle semi-
sanctuaries of local Taliban and foreign militants. Particularly
worried are al-Qaeda and the TTP, which took refuge in Mirali area of
NWA, after fleeing the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) during military
operation “Rah-e-Nijat” (Urdu for The Path to Salvation) in October
2009, who believe that any such future operation would directly affect
them.
Therefore, in order to forestall any future military operation by the
Pakistan Army, the TTP and al-Qaeda in cohorts with JDS are
intensifying cross-border raids from Kunar into Malakand, Bajaur and
Mohmand, so that Pakistan may remain bogged down in the abovementioned
areas, and may not be able to redeploy its troops in NWA. One of the
objectives of the TTP is to establish a foothold in the area by
staging a comeback into Swat and other districts of Malakand Division
by targeting security forces and weakening the writ of the government.
Since Malakand Division, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies share border with
Kunar province, re-establishment of Taliban rule in the above-
mentioned Pakistani territory may provide strategic depth to the
Taliban on both sides of the border, and could act as vibrant
sanctuaries through which Taliban could ferry logistics and recruits
while targeting Kabul and Islamabad simultaneously.
Fourthly, cross-border raids by the TTP highlights the long-term
threat this group poses to Pakistan. The TTP was established in
December 2007 on the principle of primarily fighting against the US
and NATO troops “occupying” Afghanistan, while simultaneously waging a
“defensive” jihad against Pakistan, if they are obstructed by the
latter from conducting cross-border raids into Afghanistan. However,
it seems that this “defensive” strategy has now been changed into
“offensive” strategy by the TTP, particularly at a time when they are
already based in Afghanistan and does not face obstruction by
Pakistani security forces. The TTP’s elevation of Pakistan as the
“first target” and the US as the “second target” in the post-OBL
killing, explains the transformation of this group and the threat it
poses to Pakistan.
Pakistan’s predicament has multiplied since the establishment of cross-
border terrorist sanctuaries and subsequent border raids by the
Taliban could reverse the fragile security gains Pakistan has made
against the militants in Malakand Division, Bajaur and Mohmand
agencies. Inaction by NATO and Afghan government to wipe out the
terrorist sanctuaries has made Pakistan question the sincerity of the
international coalition, particularly when they are insisting on
Pakistan to open new military front against the Taliban insurgents in
North Waziristan. Such cross-border incidents could complicate
improvement of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and US-NATO
countries, while also worsening the cross-border relations between the
Pushtun tribes. The situation could take a dangerous turn if cross-
border attacks are not stopped, since it may engage the Afghan and
Pakistani security forces, as well as tribes on both the sides into
hostile action against each other.
There is a need for both Afghanistan and Pakistan to enhance bilateral
cooperation on security matters, which affect both of them. Both the
countries need to take steps to deny safe havens, recruitment and
training of militants, and curb cross-border infiltration of militants
on both sides. Similarly, intelligence sharing needs to be enhanced.
There is a need to institutionalise flag meetings between border
forces on both sides to coordinate their actions and avoid
misunderstanding that could cause human and material damage. Since the
border is very porous and rough, there could be selective fencing or
mining of the border area, from where infiltration could not be
stopped easily. However, the fencing could be undertaken in a way that
Pushtun tribesmen living on both sides still can easily cross the
border after clearing a few security checks. Similarly, joint
patrolling by security forces of both countries could also be
considered for eliminating cross-border infiltration.
Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari is Associate Research Fellow at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang
Technological University (NTU) in Singapore.