Derek sent me a mail regarding what I wrote about Condorcet vs Vilfredo. I could have kept it private, but I think it is good for everybody if we slowly move our communications about Vilfredo from private mail to this list.
In my talk in Milan I claimed that if A dominates B according to Vilfredo than it also dominates it according to Condorcet. This is imprecise. Meaning that it is not always true (which should mean that it is false). But it is also not false.
If people only vote yes, no to each proposal. That is either vote in favour of various proposals or against, then we can still apply Condorcet. We treat all the proposals that have been voted the same as being... voted the same. Nothing in how we apply Condorcet voting systems requires that people strictly order the proposals. A partial ordering where proposals are either above or below is also acceptable. And if this is how people voted, then yes Vilfredo domination implies Condorcet domination. But.
But this is not how we usually vote when we are going to apply Condorcet. Usually people order all the proposals and the we calculate the graph of pairwise comparisons. But of course if people vote in this way, the a Vilfredo domination does NOT imply a Condorcet domination.
Let us look at an example.
Let us suppose we have 5 people that prefer A>C>B, Not only but all of them find C the least acceptable proposal, so if pressed to just say yes or no they will vote for A and C (and say no to B). Which would look like {A, C}>B
Then suppose we have other 3 people that prefer B>C>A. And again C is the least acceptable so they vote B and C. Which would look like {B, C}>A
The Vilfredo domination would say that C dominates A and B.
The Condorcet domination, on the other side would say that A dominates C (5 people prefer A to C and 3 prefer C to A).
So according to Condorcet using the full ordering:
A>C (5 to 3)
C>B (5 to 3)
A>B (5 to 3)
According to Condorcet using the partial ordering:
C>A (3 to 0)
C>B (5 to 0)
A>B (5 to 3)
and finally according to Vilfredo C dominates B and A:
C>A
C>B
and A, B are non comparable.
So Vilfredo implies Condorcet on the partial ordering, but it does NOT imply Vilfredo with the full ordering.
While this sounds like bad news it is not. Because if you are not satisfied by the Vilfredo Pareto Front, and look for the Condorcet winner for Partially Ordering you will get one of the elements in the Pareto Front (or a subset of those). But if you apply Condorcet on the full ordering to the full set of elements you might get a winner which is not even in the Pareto Front.
But what if you first apply the Pareto Front, and then apply the Condorcet on the full list among the proposals in the Pareto Front? This might be better.
I would say it requires more studies. And I would say we should implement the possibility for people to range vote the proposals as soon as possible. So we can then look in various experiments what comes out.
I want to thank and congratulate Derek for correcting me. I should now correct the slides.