General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng Dies at 80
Carl Robinson
From: Vietnam Weekly <vietna...@substack.com>
Date: Fri, 19 July 2024, 21:10
Subject: General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng Dies at 80
To: <robinso...@gmail.com>
This is a special edition of the Vietnam Weekly, written by Ho Chi Minh City-based reporter Mike Tatarski. General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng died overnight in Hanoi due to “old age and serious illness,” according to Nhân Dân. Trọng’s health was the subject of speculation for a while, from an apparent stroke a few years ago to an extended absence at the start of this year that included missing a January state visit by Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Rumors that Trọng had died ran rampant throughout one weekend in particular, though state media stayed quiet on the topic. The General Secretary eventually reappeared, only to vanish again through most of April and May. The high-profile absences started to add up, perhaps most notably on the 70th anniversary of Vietnam’s victory over the French at Điện Biên Phủ on May 7. Trọng was healthy enough to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in late June, but the General Secretary looked frail in his increasingly rare public appearances. In that context, Thursday’s Politburo “update” on Trọng’s health status wasn’t surprising - but at the same time, it was incredibly surprising. According to the 2018 Law on Protection of State Secrets, “Medical records, information, results of medical examinations, treatment, and health checks of members of the Politburo” are considered top-secret. The fact that anything regarding Trọng’s health was publicly announced, no matter how vague, indicated a serious problem. The awarding of the Gold Star Order, generally given posthumously, almost gave the game away, as did these identical Zing News and Lao Động photo essays of “the General Secretary's typical activities.” By Thursday evening, multiple reliable sources had told me that Trọng had passed, leaving all of us waiting for the inevitable official announcement. What next? Trọng’s legacy will be the subject of much discussion, though there’s little doubt he is one of the most impactful Vietnamese leaders in decades. He was also, by all accounts, genuinely incorruptible, an outlier amid the endless stream of corruption scandals that continues. Of course, he launched the ongoing ‘blazing furnace’ that will likely be the primary narrative of his biography, no matter where it goes from here. While the anti-corruption campaign has created problems of its own, it has had a positive impact, with data from the Provincial Competitiveness Index and other sources showing declines in ‘unofficial payments.’ While some cases pursued under the banner of the ‘blazing furnace’ have had a political tinge to them, others exposed and punished immoral, predatory official behavior that may have previously been tolerated. I asked Nguyen Khac Giang whether Trọng’s passing may impact this effort:
Giang, meanwhile, wrote a Fulcrum piece with his colleague Le Hong Hiep on Trọng’s legacy, which they consider ‘incomplete.’ Do read the full analysis, but this part jumped out:
His immediate “replacement,” as I noted in the Friday newsletter, is President Tô Lâm, who has been in that position for less than a month. I’ve seen some social media consternation over Lâm assuming these responsibilities, though it is protocol for these duties to pass to the president. Looking further ahead, Giang explained: “The Central Committee will likely convene a meeting to elect an interim General Secretary until 2026. This interim General Secretary will have the first-mover advantage for the leadership transition in 2026.” In theory, Lâm has the first-mover advantage for that first-mover advantage already, and his only real competition at this point is Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính - any General Secretary candidate is supposed to have served at least one full Politburo term, and everyone else meeting this requirement has been forced out of government over the last 18 months. There is some concern that this lack of options represents a ‘succession crisis,’ though given the structure of the Communist Party of Vietnam, any crisis will be relatively self-contained: foreign and economic policy, for example, are well-established no matter who is in control, though some institutional technocratic experience has been lost. Governance will lumber along and for most, day-to-day life will barely change. Many are hardly even aware of these events. Much bigger questions loom over the future approach to civil society, internet controls, public discourse, and cultural censorship. The ongoing bureaucratic malaise slowing public investment and other decision-making also has no clear endpoint even after such a momentous development. Nonetheless, stability will ultimately prevail - this may be uncharted territory, but the system is designed to stay the course, whatever that course may be. Invite your friends and earn rewardsIf you enjoy Vietnam Weekly, share it with your friends and earn rewards when they subscribe.
© 2024 Michael Tatarski
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