Re: WHY IS INDIA’S HIGHER DEFENCE SYSTEM NOT STABILISING? URGENT ATTENTION NEEDED by Veteran Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
Helping Hands For Veterans
1️⃣ Civilian Control is Non-Negotiable
India is a constitutional democracy, not a military state. The framers of the Constitution deliberately placed the armed forces under civilian control to prevent any possibility of military adventurism, as seen in several neighbouring countries. Integrating Service HQ into the MoD without robust checks and balances could compromise this principle and dangerously tilt the power equation.
2️⃣ Bureaucracy is Not the Enemy
The article paints the bureaucracy as obstructionist, but this oversimplifies a complex challenge. Yes, India’s defence decision-making needs reform — but blaming the bureaucracy alone ignores deeper issues such as political will, budgetary constraints, and competing national priorities. Civil servants provide continuity, institutional memory, and cross-ministry coordination — functions that a purely military-driven system cannot guarantee on its own.
3️⃣ NSC & NSA Have Strengthened Strategic Thinking
Criticism of the National Security Adviser’s role as “unconstitutional” is misplaced. The NSA reports directly to the Prime Minister and serves as the nodal point for inter-ministerial coordination, a role that the Services alone cannot perform. The creation of the NSC Secretariat has enabled India to develop coherent, long-term national security strategies that go beyond a narrow military framework, incorporating economic, diplomatic, technological, and intelligence dimensions.
4️⃣ The CDS & Theatre Commands Debate Needs Consensus
The article laments the slow pace of theatre command creation and suggests that the Air Force is being obstructionist. In reality, this pause reflects the need for doctrinal clarity, joint planning, and inter-service consensus before rushing into structural reforms that could compromise operational efficiency. Blindly replicating US or Chinese models is neither practical nor desirable given India’s unique threat matrix and limited resources.
5️⃣ True Reform Requires a Whole-of-Government Approach
The core challenge is not a lack of military authority but a lack of national security strategy, parliamentary oversight, and a culture of long-term planning. Reforms must focus on:
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Establishing a bipartisan National Security Strategy (NSS) that is reviewed periodically by Parliament.
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Strengthening the Defence Planning Committee to ensure 15–20-year capability planning.
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Creating permanent joint structures for intelligence-sharing, logistics, and procurement, not just operational command.
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Enhancing civilian expertise in defence and strategic studies — India needs more trained security professionals, not fewer civilians in decision-making.
6️⃣ Military Advice Must Be Direct — But Not Absolute
Political leaders should indeed have unfiltered access to military advice, but this must not come at the cost of weakening civilian oversight. The solution lies in institutionalising politico-military dialogue — through regular Defence Councils, structured CCS consultations, and a clearly defined charter for the CDS — not simply giving the military primacy over decision-making.
Conclusion
India’s higher defence system undeniably needs reform, but the way forward is integration with accountability, not militarisation without oversight. A system that fuses political direction, bureaucratic coordination, military expertise, and parliamentary scrutiny is the only sustainable model for a constitutional democracy aspiring to be a global power.
The risk lies not in slow change — but in unbalanced change that could undermine civilian supremacy and institutional checks, which are the bedrock of India’s stability.
India’s Higher Defence System Needs Reform — But With Accountability, Not Militarisation
लेख भारत की उच्च रक्षा प्रबंधन प्रणाली पर वास्तविक चिंताएँ उठाता है, लेकिन समाधान के रूप में वह केवल सैन्य दृष्टिकोण पर केंद्रित दिखता है — सशस्त्र बलों को अधिक शक्ति देने और सेवा मुख्यालय को रक्षा मंत्रालय में पूर्ण रूप से समाहित करने की वकालत करता है। यह दृष्टिकोण संवैधानिक, राजनीतिक और लोकतांत्रिक अनिवार्यताओं को नज़रअंदाज़ करता है और नागरिक-सैन्य संतुलन को अस्थिर कर सकता है, जो किसी भी लोकतंत्र में अत्यंत महत्वपूर्ण है।
1️⃣ नागरिक नियंत्रण अनिवार्य है
भारत सैन्य राज्य नहीं बल्कि संवैधानिक लोकतंत्र है। संविधान निर्माताओं ने जानबूझकर सशस्त्र बलों को नागरिक नियंत्रण में रखा ताकि किसी भी प्रकार की सैन्य हठधर्मिता या हस्तक्षेप से बचा जा सके, जैसा कि पड़ोसी देशों में देखने को मिला है। सेवा मुख्यालय को रक्षा मंत्रालय में बिना स्पष्ट चेक और बैलेंस के शामिल करना इस मूल सिद्धांत को खतरे में डाल सकता है और शक्ति संतुलन को बिगाड़ सकता है।
2️⃣ नौकरशाही दुश्मन नहीं है
लेख में नौकरशाही को बाधक के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया गया है, पर यह समस्या को बहुत सरल बना देता है। भारत की रक्षा निर्णय प्रणाली में सुधार की आवश्यकता है, लेकिन केवल नौकरशाही को दोष देने से राजनीतिक इच्छाशक्ति, बजटीय सीमाएँ और राष्ट्रीय प्राथमिकताओं जैसे गहरे मुद्दे छिप जाते हैं। सिविल सेवाएँ निरंतरता, संस्थागत स्मृति और मंत्रालयों के बीच समन्वय प्रदान करती हैं — जो केवल सैन्य दृष्टिकोण से संभव नहीं।
3️⃣ एनएससी और एनएसए ने रणनीतिक सोच को मज़बूती दी है
राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा सलाहकार (NSA) की भूमिका को “असंवैधानिक” बताना सही नहीं है। NSA सीधे प्रधानमंत्री को रिपोर्ट करता है और मंत्रालयों के बीच समन्वय का मुख्य केंद्र है। NSC सचिवालय के गठन से भारत को दीर्घकालिक, समन्वित राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा रणनीति बनाने की क्षमता मिली है, जो सैन्य के साथ-साथ आर्थिक, कूटनीतिक, तकनीकी और खुफिया पहलुओं को भी समाहित करती है।
4️⃣ सीडीएस और थिएटर कमांड पर सहमति ज़रूरी है
लेख में थिएटर कमांड के गठन में देरी पर असंतोष व्यक्त किया गया है। परंतु यह देरी वास्तव में आवश्यक है, ताकि सिद्धांतिक स्पष्टता (doctrinal clarity), संयुक्त योजना और तीनों सेनाओं के बीच सहमति सुनिश्चित की जा सके। जल्दबाज़ी में कोई संरचनात्मक बदलाव करना परिचालनिक दक्षता को प्रभावित कर सकता है। अमेरिका या चीन के मॉडल की अंधाधुंध नकल भारत के लिए न तो व्यावहारिक है और न ही रणनीतिक रूप से वांछनीय।
5️⃣ सुधार पूरे शासन तंत्र के सहयोग से ही संभव हैं
मुख्य समस्या सैन्य अधिकार की कमी नहीं बल्कि राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा रणनीति, संसदीय निगरानी और दीर्घकालिक योजना संस्कृति का अभाव है। सुधार के लिए आवश्यक कदम:
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संसद द्वारा समय-समय पर समीक्षा की जाने वाली राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा रणनीति (NSS) का निर्माण।
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डिफेंस प्लानिंग कमेटी को मज़बूत बनाना ताकि 15–20 साल की क्षमता योजना बनाई जा सके।
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खुफिया, लॉजिस्टिक्स और खरीद के लिए स्थायी संयुक्त ढाँचे का निर्माण।
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रक्षा और सामरिक अध्ययन में प्रशिक्षित नागरिक विशेषज्ञों की संख्या बढ़ाना।
6️⃣ सैन्य सलाह प्रत्यक्ष हो, पर सर्वोच्च नहीं
यह सही है कि राजनीतिक नेतृत्व को सैन्य सलाह बिना फ़िल्टर के मिलनी चाहिए, पर इसका अर्थ नागरिक ढाँचे को कमजोर करना नहीं है। समाधान है कि राजनीतिक-सैन्य संवाद को संस्थागत बनाया जाए — जैसे रक्षा परिषद की नियमित बैठकें, कैबिनेट कमेटी ऑन सिक्योरिटी (CCS) की सतत समीक्षा और सीडीएस को स्पष्ट अधिकार-क्षेत्र देना — पर सेना को सर्वोच्च निर्णयकारी अधिकार नहीं।
निष्कर्ष
भारत की उच्च रक्षा व्यवस्था में सुधार आवश्यक है, लेकिन रास्ता है जवाबदेही के साथ समेकन, न कि निगरानी के बिना सैन्यीकरण। एक ऐसी व्यवस्था चाहिए जिसमें राजनीतिक नेतृत्व, नौकरशाही, सैन्य विशेषज्ञता और संसदीय निगरानी चारों मिलकर निर्णय लें।
खतरा धीमे बदलाव में नहीं, बल्कि असंतुलित बदलाव में है जो नागरिक नियंत्रण और संस्थागत संतुलन को कमजोर कर सकता है — और यही संतुलन भारत की स्थिरता की रीढ़ है।
भारत की उच्च रक्षा व्यवस्था – सुधार चाहिए, पर जवाबदेही के साथ
Will the logical views of Brig Vidyasagar be read by any Neta or Babu of MOD. Even if so, they could not be bothered. MOD jaise chal raha hai, waise hi chalta rahega. The current PM interacting directly with the Service Chiefs has been seen by all on TV. A free hand was given to the Service Chiefs on how to teach Pakistan a lesson. The whole world saw the result. Not a whimper from any MOD Babu or Desk Officer. As far as NFU is concerned, the higher heirarchy of the Army is against giving it to their own Officers. Isme SC kya karega !!!On Wednesday, September 10, 2025 at 11:04:27 AM GMT+5:30, Vinod G <wing...@gmail.com> wrote:Whatever the General officers have stated is nothing new. Every thing is controlled by beaurocracy. Defence services are just tools. We should discuss only if we have some idea to overcome this hurdle. It is pointless writing Angrezi.On Wed, 10 Sep 2025 at 9:22 AM, BRIG SIVASANKAR VIDYASAGAR <brigvid...@gmail.com> wrote:Dear Brig Harwant Singh Sir,
The article by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi will not be read by either politicians or bureaucrats.1. The British inducted civilians into non combat activities like military estates, defence accounts, MES as they were cheaper compared to a soldier who is paid a higher salary. The British conquered India with less than 40,000 troops at any time. The Bureaucrats and defence accounts had no role whartsover in conquering India. Today with NFFU, the civilians cost more to the Govt of India. Their pension bill inflates the defence pension. While a soldier is thrown out at age of 35 to 37 years to keep the Army young, why do we have so many defence civilians in Min of Def? Just go to South Block and you see more civilians in Min of Def than the uniformed personnel. The Ex-Servicemen can perform these roles better with lesser cost to the Govt of India. There are 7 lakhs defence civilians drawing pension compared to 26 lakhs faujis and widows of faujis. For every 3.50 fauji we have one defence civilian. Do we need so many defence civilians? Go to a Sub Area and see how many defence civilians are there.2. A well reasoned proposal for modernisation or demands of weapons acquisition sent by Service Chief is turned down by a Desk Officer as un-viable. Our service chief is subordinate to a desk officer in Min of Def.3. Service Chiefs have no say in defence expenditure. It is all controlled by Def Accts bureaucrats who have no field experience. The Integrated Financial Advisors are only road blocks and not to expedite new projects.4. When we have a life cycle for small items like a by cycle or two wheeler or a four wheeler, there are no such concept for modern weapons. We are now saying good bye MIG -21s after using them for almost 50 years (inducted way back in 1963) with repeated mid life service overhauls and new improvement to old airframe of MiGs. No funds are catered for purchase of replacement of existing weapons and equipment in a time bound manner. Every corporate caters funds for purchase of new equipment for replacing the old equipment. They get depreciation to enable them to have funds for new purchases in a time bound manner.5. NSA decides how and what Armed Forces are to do. The NSA is totally dominated by IPS and other bureaucrats who know nothing of national security. For them it is turf expansion with few more vacancies of Secretaries, Addl Secretaries and Jt Secys.6. 100% IAS officers with just 16 years of ground service is a Jt Secy whereas not even 2% officers can hope to become Maj Gens and that too at service of 34 to 36 years of service. Where is stagnation?
7. If you see the result of 1971 war and Op Pawan one thing is very clear. The COAS and other service chiefs in 1971 had regular interaction with the Hon'ble PM. The Hon'ble PM went by the sane advice of COAS and the operations were conducted not in April 1971 which the cabinet ministers wanted but on 03 Dec 1971. The result is a resounding victory and creation of Bangladesh. Contrast this with Op Pawna where the then COAS lamented that "PM mera bath nahi suntha". The COAS being a Tamilian should have known the relationship between Tamils in Sri Lanka and India. He capitulated to the trap set by Jayawardhane of Sri Lanka when India signed the Indo - Sri Lanka Treaty to disarm the LTTE. COAS should have opposed disarming LTTE whom India trained, funded and supported. Sri Lankan Army was happy as IPKF was doing their dirty job. Does not COAS possess that much intelligence to know if LTTE does not agree to be disarmed then what is our plan B? Will anyone in sane mind agree to drop their weapons when the enemy is ready to kill them. Did Indian Army top brass every analyse why the armed conflict between Srilankan Tamils who are Hindus and Sri Lankan Govt which is Buddhist? The Isrealis keep saying " If Arabs drop their weapons, there will be peace. If Jews drop weapons, then there will be no jews". Op Pawan is the most ill planned and poorly executed operation which resulted in death of 1250 innocent soldiers and Indian Army was thrown out of Sri Lanka as a defeated Army. The COAS in 1971 even offered to quit if his advice is not palatable.
8. Unless Hon'ble PM has a monthly meeting with the service chiefs nothing is going to improve. CDS is an appointment to stymie the role of service chiefs. India does not need theatre commands nor it can afford with defence budget not even reaching 2% of GDP when ther requirement is 3.2% of GDP. It is OK for USA who have the theatre commands because of their military might. Are you going to split depleting 29 IAF sqns against authorisaton of 42 sqns to various theatres when we know IAF is best used if employed in a concentrated manner?
9. Unless NSA has more defence components it is another bloated bureaucratic organisation.10. The bogey of military coup being propped by bureaucrats to have their control over Min of Def if not removed, India will suffer in the future wars. There is no role for IAS Officers in the Min of Def. The powers of Def Accts Dept should be curtailed. They cannot veto new projects in the name of financial stringency. The Armed Forces cost a bomb. If you cannot afford then do not have them.
These are my 5 paise contributions.On Sun, 7 Sept 2025 at 16:48, Brig.Harwant Singh <brig.har...@gmail.com> wrote:29 Aug 2025 9:16 AM
https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/why-is-indias-higher-defence-system-not-stabilising-1179372
WHY IS INDIA’S HIGHER DEFENCE SYSTEM NOT STABILISING? URGENT ATTENTION NEEDED
by
Veteran Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi
Email: geno...@gmail.com
Former Army Commander Western Command and later Vice Chief of Army Staff
The present Higher Defence Structure of India has a large number of weaknesses or in other words it has so many lacunae that it is nearly unworkable. The British legacy-based Higher Defence System, which was carved out on Independence in 1947 after de-colonisation of the country, as modified to what it exists today, inhibits planning and decision-making; long-term focus; intimate coordination; integration; cost-efficiency; and elimination of adhocism.
Past efforts to rectify these weaknesses have been stymied by inertia; resistance to change; turf considerations; all-round apathy; lack of knowledge of security strategies amongst the political leadership and the higher bureaucracy; and sadly a misplaced apprehension about the loyalty of the military, something invented by the bureaucracy in the early years of Independence and sustained by the expanding bureaucracy, while the armed forces ignored it on the grounds that it will be their work that will speak for them. The end result is that while the armed forces have endeared themselves to the citizens of the nation, the bureaucrats rule the roost, while the political leadership acts blind!
The current dispensation needs to change, not only because it is intensely flawed, but in the views of our Hukmaran, it is not important! However, considering the current turmoil in the world, it is in urgent need of change. This is especially so today, as our nation looks to move up from a regional power configuration to a great power status; desires to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council; and has its aims set to become a power of reckoning in the world.
Strategic challenges that lie ahead to our sovereignty and security demand urgent changes in our decision-making structure, so that it is efficient, fast and works like clockwork. In brief, most problems are due to four reasons, viz. political, bureaucratic, not taking advice of the military hierarchy and incorrect reading of the strategic situation. A modified System must shun these.
For a change, let me take a deep dive and commence with the Kitchener-Curzon controversy (1904-05), although it has no relevance to the current Higher Defence Structure, as it had evolved after Independence and how it has deteriorated over the years. It may persuade writers not to quote it while discussing this particular subject. The dispute was in colonial times when all policy decisions were taken by the India Office in London.
The Viceroy was akin to the senior most Bureaucrat as he implemented the policy laid down by the Crown, through the India Office, although he had a fair degree of autonomy, within the policy parameters received from London. The Viceroy was not an elected person but one appointed. Hence, to call it a dispute between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ is not only patently wrong, but gives the incorrect impression of a civil-military dispute. The dispute did not involve any change or suggestion of ‘the order of precedence’. In the hierarchy in India of that time, the Viceroy was at number one position and the C-in-C was at number two. Their scope of work and authority were well defined. At no stage did either of the incumbents wanted or sought a change. The objection of Kitchener was to the creation of one more military power centre in the Viceroy’s office, who would scrutinise and sit over the judgement of the C-in-C. It was obviously an attempt by the Viceroy to usurp the powers of the C-in-C and hence was correctly opposed by Kitchener and was rightly upheld by the India Office and the Crown. Let me point out that later events, viz. the sterling role played by the Indian Army in both the World Wars, as well as operations against the various tribes in the erstwhile NWFP is testimony that the army flourished under this dispensation.
After Independence in 1947, it was Lord Ismay (a senior staff officer to the Viceroy) who had evolved our Higher Defence System, which consists of interlocking committees, which were meant to give ‘full political control and yet ensure functional integration between the three services, without ‘bureaucratic control’.
The structure that was evolved and which still continues with some changes was based on a three–tiered system. At the apex of this structure was the Cabinet Committee of Political Affairs or CCPA, which was later renamed as the Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS). It consisted of the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and selected Ministers, with Service Chiefs and Defence Secretary in attendance at all meetings. The highlighted portion is hardly ever observed.
The second level was the Defence Minister's Committee (DMC), chaired by the Defence Minister, with Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary and Financial Adviser (Defence Services) [better known as FA (DS)], as members. It served as the top policy formulation organ in the MoD. However, it rarely met for decades. It was later converted as the Morning Meeting of the Defence Minister, thus further reducing its efficacy.
The third level is the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is a forum for the three Service Chiefs (and now including the CDS) to discuss matters having a bearing on the activities of the Services and also to advise the Minister of Defence. In theory, the COSC is the highest authority on military matters in the country. However, a major shortcoming of this body is that it exercises no real power.
Over the years, the committees either ceased functioning or their character was altered drastically. This eroded the role of Service Chiefs as professional military advisors to the government and at the same time precluded professional interaction between Services HQ and agencies outside MoD.
With the appointment of National Security Adviser (NSA) and its Secretariat, which started with one person, it has burgeoned into a huge cabal of bureaucrats with one or more Deputies, advisers and officials from many departments and agencies. Horrors of horrors, the Chiefs of the Armed Forces were also placed under the NSA, an appointment with neither Parliamentary nor Constitutional approval.
In the USA, from where we picked up the idea, the NSA is an appointment for advising the President on security issues, not the government. I recall that when I was attending the US Army War College Course in 1988-89, in his talk to the students, the then NSA of USA, Maj Gen Colin L. Powell (later Chief), implicitly stated that he was the NSA to the President and not to the US Government.
The result of such activities was that the Armed Forces in our Country became isolated from such important subjects as formulation of Nuclear Policy; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); military use of Space; disarmament initiatives; chemical weapons policies/treaties; and missile technologies. The armed forces were thus totally removed from the decision-making processes.
Even within the Armed Forces, on account of gross interference of bureaucrats, the introduction of the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), instead of streamlining the Higher Defence System of the nation, has resulted in worsening it. It will not be incorrect to state that strategic issues have deliberately been pushed to the boon docks. This is so when politically and economically the entire world and particularly our region are in a flux, as anything can happen at short or no notice.
Despite decades since the Kargil Review Committee had directed the formation of a CDS as the single point adviser on Defence issues and an amalgamated and truly joint MoD, we are still searching for assigning duties for the incumbent. Consequently, the whole structure of ‘theatre commands’ hangs in balance and is virtually in cold storage. Only a few days back, the Chief of Air Force has publicly stated that theatre commands are not needed. He also implied or reinforced that the air force can win wars without the other two services; a thought debunked since the issue was first raised even before World War II. It appears that the three Defence Services are not entirely on the same page as regards formation of the CDS system in its full play and our Hukmaran continue to let the status quo prevail!
In the CDS system the overall operational command must rest with the CDS and individual Service Chiefs handle only staff functions related to their respective service. The phrase ‘Higher Defence Management’ or System usually conjures up images of only the military, but this is not at all correct, as ‘Defence Management’ encompasses much more. No doubt the Indian Military is a significant player in this endeavour, but unless we bring all instruments of the nation together, ‘Higher Defence’ will remain incomplete.
National Security Strategies should aim at the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries. It is the fountainhead from which Defence Policies; military strategy; and ultimately the tools to implement Defence policies are evolved.
Defence strategy and higher direction of Defence must constantly evolve through objective analyses of present and future needs. All agencies and departments of the government, as well as many others have to be involved in some manner in ensuring that the national aims, as related to Defence, are achieved.
Waging war and meeting warlike challenges today is a complex phenomenon and such complexities are likely to increase in future. The reasons include high technology; the nature of modern war; new and ever-changing threats and challenges; the sharp rise in the use of non-state actors by some nations; and the reality of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of our potential adversaries. Consequently, integrated and holistic structures are not just desirable but an imperative.
Most nations have such structures, but we seem to be out of sync in this respect. The creation and sustenance of an environment that nurtures these aspirations necessitates development of what is now known as Comprehensive National Power (CNP). There are many ingredients that make up CNP, but perhaps the most important is a structure for Higher Defence that is able to take smart, well-reasoned and quick decisions, especially when the country is in a crisis mode. This cannot be done if each instrument of the state works independently and vertically, as is the case at present.
The major infirmity of our current higher Defence structure is keeping the military outside the government, resulting in the political leadership receiving second-hand advice. Professional advice by the hierarchy of military leadership needs to be available to the political executive without it being filtered or altered to suit the perspectives of the bureaucrats. This is a fundamental issue, which needs to be changed immediately. This would improve politico-military responses to challenges and threats; enhance cost-effectiveness; and assist in the best employment of the Armed Forces.
Complete integration of the MoD and the Service Headquarters needs to be carried out immediately, as a prelude to major structural changes. In addition, there is a need to also integrate those ministries and agencies which deal with similar subjects. Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Finance and Home must be manned by integrated staff from each other. This must not be token representation, as has been the norm in the past, but substantial numbers must be posted across these ministries. The same is applicable to representation by the Services. Management of Higher Defence needs to be proactive, efficient and long-term oriented, amalgamating foreign and internal security policies and incorporating all relevant instruments of the nation.
THE END
Helping Hands For Veterans
In continuation of the earlier email........
Those of us who deal with systems like ECHS (Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme) and Record Offices know very well what happens when a service is placed entirely under the command of serving military officials without any independent oversight. Veterans often face harassment, arbitrary decisions, and a complete lack of grievance redressal — simply because there is no independent accountability mechanism.
What makes this even more painful is that it is often done by officials who are fully aware that one day they too will stand in the same line as retired soldiers. Despite this, many veterans are subjected to harassment and, in some cases, are denied their rightful entitlements — a betrayal that hurts even more coming from within the fraternity.
Similarly, in the Record Offices, delays in pension correction, documentation, and entitlement resolution are routine, leaving affected veterans helpless. These are not theoretical problems — they are the daily lived experiences of thousands of ex-servicemen. As the saying goes, “Those whose feet have never been cut by thorns can never truly understand the pain of others” — those who have not personally experienced these hardships often fail to grasp their depth and severity.
If such unchecked control were expanded to the highest levels of national defence policy, it would risk institutionalising opacity and power imbalance. That is why any reform must go hand-in-hand with strong accountability and independent grievance redressal mechanisms, so that veterans receive justice and dignity.
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पिछले ईमेल के क्रम में...........
जो हम जैसे पूर्व सैनिक ईसीएचएस (Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme) और रेकॉर्ड ऑफिस जैसी व्यवस्थाओं से गुजरते हैं, वे भली-भांति जानते हैं कि जब कोई सेवा पूरी तरह से सेवारत सैन्य अधिकारियों के नियंत्रण में होती है और उस पर कोई स्वतंत्र निगरानी नहीं होती, तो क्या हालात पैदा होते हैं। पूर्व सैनिकों को अक्सर उत्पीड़न, मनमाने निर्णय और पूरी तरह से शिकायत निवारण तंत्र के अभाव का सामना करना पड़ता है — केवल इसलिए क्योंकि कोई स्वतंत्र जवाबदेही व्यवस्था मौजूद नहीं होती।
यह और भी पीड़ादायक तब हो जाता है जब यह सब उन्हीं अधिकारियों द्वारा किया जाता है जो अच्छी तरह से जानते हैं कि एक दिन उन्हें भी भूतपूर्व सैनिकों की कतार में खड़ा होना है। इसके बावजूद, कई बार अपने ही सेवानिवृत्त सैनिकों को न केवल उत्पीड़ित किया जाता है बल्कि उन्हें उनके वैध हक और हकदारी से भी वंचित कर दिया जाता है।
इसी तरह रेकॉर्ड ऑफिसों में पेंशन सुधार, दस्तावेज़ीकरण और हकदारी के समाधान में देरी आम बात है, जिससे प्रभावित पूर्व सैनिक बेबस रह जाते हैं। यह कोई सैद्धांतिक समस्या नहीं है — यह हज़ारों पूर्व सैनिकों के रोज़मर्रा के अनुभव हैं। जैसा कि कहा गया है, "जाके पाँव न फटी बेवाई, वो क्या जाने पीर पराई" — जिन्होंने स्वयं यह पीड़ा नहीं झेली, वे इसकी गंभीरता और गहराई को समझ ही नहीं सकते।
अगर ऐसा अनियंत्रित नियंत्रण उच्च रक्षा नीति-निर्माण के स्तर तक बढ़ा दिया गया, तो यह पारदर्शिता की कमी और शक्ति असंतुलन को संस्थागत रूप दे देगा। इसलिए आवश्यक है कि किसी भी सुधार के साथ मजबूत जवाबदेही और स्वतंत्र शिकायत निवारण तंत्र जोड़े जाएं, ताकि पूर्व सैनिकों को न्याय और सम्मान मिल सके।
SANTOSH KUMAR MISHRA
India urgently needs higher defence reform — but reform must enhance political leadership, embed institutional safeguards, and ensure balanced civil-military partnership.
The militarisation of higher defence management without parliamentary oversight may offer short-term efficiency, but poses long-term risks to democratic stability.
India needs a strategically literate political executive, a professionally empowered military leadership, and a transparent, accountable decision-making ecosystem — not a concentration of unchecked authority.