Hugo - Old Tyme Religion (2011) __FULL__
Valente Heavener
Associate Justice Hugo Black is often considered one of the giants of twentieth-century American religion clause jurisprudence. Especially regarding the Establishment Clause, Black sought to leave his mark on precedent. Previous biographers and legal scholars have noted the influence of his own religious convictions on his legal reasoning. I extend this line of inquiry but argue that Black's decisions enshrine a more concrete, substantive view of religion and political life than has previously been acknowledged. By drawing primarily on archival research regarding Justice Black's reading, correspondence, and religious membership, I argue that we can best understand his religious thought as a species of political theology, one I term syncretic civic moralism. In brief, Justice Black viewed the ideal religion as one free of doctrinal claims and primarily supporting prosocial behavior and civic loyalty. After outlining the impact of his theology on his landmark opinions, I conclude by suggesting some of the consequences of Black's theo-political jurisprudence for contemporary American establishment debates.
In his conclusion to this book Daniel Brown notes that the legacy of Hugh de Lacy has suffered in comparison with that of predecessor as lord of Ulster, John de Courcy, his own father and brothers. TheAnnals of Clonmacnoise recording the death of Hugh's brother, William Gorm, say he had "the hardest and strongest hand of any Englishman from the Nicene seas to this place." The same annal notes his brother Walter at his death as "the bountifullest Englishman for horses, cloaths, mony and goold that ever came before his tyme." The annalist did not see fit to mention the death of Hugh. It is recorded in another set of annals, those of Loch Cé, with the simple "Hugo de Laci, earl of Uladh, mortuus est." Even then the annalist feels the need to point out "He was not the first Hugo, whome Gilla-gan inathair killed at Durmhagh-Choluim-Chille, but the last Hugo." Making the distinction, presumably, between the career of Hugh, Earl of Ulster, and his more famous father and namesake. Considering the achievements of Hugh, Earl of Ulster outlined in this volume, the manner in which he is recalled by contemporary sources is all the more remarkable. This book, however, more than addresses that oversight and puts Hugh de Lacy, Earl of Ulster, firmly in the forefront, not only of the Angevin world, but in the wider context of International politics, both religious and secular.
Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the themesand concepts involved in religious traditions as well as the broaderphilosophical task of reflecting on matters of religious significanceincluding the nature of religion itself, alternative concepts of Godor ultimate reality, and the religious significance of generalfeatures of the cosmos (e.g., the laws of nature, the emergence ofconsciousness) and of historical events (e.g., the 1755 LisbonEarthquake, the Holocaust). Philosophy of religion also includes theinvestigation and assessment of worldviews (such as secularnaturalism) that are alternatives to religious worldviews. Philosophyof religion involves all the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics,epistemology, value theory (including moral theory and appliedethics), philosophy of language, science, history, politics, art, andso on. Section 1 offers an overview of the field and its significance,with subsequent sections covering developments in the field since themid-twentieth century. These sections address philosophy of religionas practiced primarily (but not exclusively) in departments ofphilosophy and religious studies that are in the broadly analytictradition. The entry concludes with highlighting the increasingbreadth of the field, as more traditions outside the Abrahamic faiths(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) have become the focus of importantphilosophical work.
Ideally, a guide to the nature and history of philosophy of religionwould begin with an analysis or definition of religion. Unfortunately,there is no current consensus on a precise identification of thenecessary and sufficient conditions of what counts as a religion. Wetherefore currently lack a decisive criterion that would enable clearrulings whether some movements should count as religions (e.g.,Scientology or Cargo cults of the Pacific islands). But whileconsensus in precise details is elusive, the following generaldepiction of what counts as a religion may be helpful:
Today, philosophy of religion is one of the most vibrant areas ofphilosophy. Articles in philosophy of religion appear in virtually allthe main philosophical journals, while some journals (such as theInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion,Religious Studies, Sophia, Faith andPhilosophy, and others) are dedicated especially to philosophy ofreligion. Philosophy of religion is in evidence at institutionalmeetings of philosophers (such as the meetings of the AmericanPhilosophical Association and of the Royal Society of Philosophy).There are societies dedicated to the field such as the Society forPhilosophy of Religion (USA) and the British Society for Philosophy ofReligion and the field is supported by multiple centers such as theCenter for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, theRutgers Center for Philosophy of Religion, the Centre for thePhilosophy of Religion at Glasgow University, The John Hick Centre forPhilosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham, and othersites (such as the University of Roehampton and NottinghamUniversity). Oxford University Press published in 2009 The Historyof Western Philosophy of Religion in five volumes involving over100 contributors (Oppy & Trakakis 2009), and the WileyBlackwell Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion in five volumes,with over 350 contributors from around the world, is scheduled forpublication by 2021. What accounts for this vibrancy? Consider fourpossible reasons.
One other aspect of religious populations that may motivate philosophyof religion is that philosophy is a tool that may be used when personscompare different religious traditions. Philosophy of religion canplay an important role in helping persons understand and evaluatedifferent religious traditions and their alternatives.
Second: Philosophy of religion as a field may be popular because ofthe overlapping interests found in both religious and philosophicaltraditions. Both religious and philosophical thinking raise many ofthe same, fascinating questions and possibilities about the nature ofreality, the limits of reason, the meaning of life, and so on. Arethere good reasons for believing in God? What is good and evil? Whatis the nature and scope of human knowledge? In Hinduism; AContemporary Philosophical Investigation (2018), ShyamRanganathan argues that in Asian thought philosophy and religion arealmost inseparable such that interest in the one supports an interestin the other.
Fourth, a comprehensive study of theology or religious studies alsoprovides good reasons to have expertise in philosophy of religion. Asjust observed, Asian philosophy and religious thought are intertwinedand so the questions engaged in philosophy of religion seem relevant:what is space and time? Are there many things or one reality? Mightour empirically observable world be an illusion? Could the world begoverned by Karma? Is reincarnation possible? In terms of the West,there is reason to think that even the sacred texts of the Abrahamicfaith involve strong philosophical elements: In Judaism, Job isperhaps the most explicitly philosophical text in the Hebrew Bible.The wisdom tradition of each Abrahamic faith may reflect broaderphilosophical ways of thinking; the Christian New Testament seems toinclude or address Platonic themes (the Logos, the soul and bodyrelationship). Much of Islamic thought includes critical reflection onPlato, Aristotle, Plotinus, as well as independent philosophicalwork.
At least two reasons bolstered this philosophy of religion inspired byWittgenstein. First, it seemed as though this methodology was morefaithful to the practice of philosophy of religion being trulyabout the actual practice of religious persons themselves.Second, while there has been a revival of philosophical arguments forand against theism and alternative concepts of God (as will be notedin section 5), significant numbers of philosophers from the mid-twentieth centuryonward have concluded that all the traditional arguments andcounter-arguments about the metaphysical claims of religion areindecisive. If that is the case, the Wittgenstein-inspired newphilosophy of religion had the advantage of shifting ground to whatmight be a more promising area of agreement.
While this non-realist approach to religion has its defenders today,especially in work by Howard Wettstein, many philosophers havecontended that traditional and contemporary religious life rests onmaking claims about what is truly the case in a realist context. It ishard to imagine why persons would pray to God if they, literally,thought there is no God (of any kind).
Interestingly, perhaps inheriting the Wittgenstein stress on practice,some philosophers working on religion today place greater stress onthe meaning of religion in life, rather than seeing religious beliefas primarily a matter of assessing an hypothesis (see Cottingham2014).
Evidentialism has been challenged on many grounds. Some argue that itis too stringent; we have many evident beliefs that we would be at aloss to successfully justify. Instead of evidentialism, somephilosophers adopt a form of reliabilism, according to which a personmay be justified in a belief so long as the belief is produced by areliable means, whether or not the person is aware of evidence thatjustifies the belief. Two movements in philosophy of religion developpositions that are not in line with the traditional evidentialtradition: reformed epistemology and volitional epistemology.
Assessing the significance of disagreement over religious belief isvery different from assessing the significance of disagreement indomains where there are clearer, shared understandings of methodologyand evidence. For example, if two equally proficient detectivesexamine the same evidence that Smith murdered Jones, theirdisagreement should (other things being equal) lead us to modifyconfidence that Smith is guilty, for the detectives may be presumed touse the same evidence and methods of investigation. But in assessingthe disagreements among philosophers over (for example) the coherenceand plausibility of theism, philosophers today often rely on differentmethodologies (phenomenology, empiricism, conceptual or linguisticanalysis, structural theory, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, andso on). But what if a person accepts a given religion as reasonableand yet acknowledges that equally reasonable, mature, responsibleinquirers adopt a different religion incompatible with her own andthey all share a similar philosophical methodology? Thissituation is not an abstract thought experiment. In Christian-Muslimdialogue, philosophers often share a common philosophical inheritancefrom Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and a broad range of shared viewsabout the perfection of God/Allah.
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