Hall And Oates X Static Rar
Violetta Hooke
Mick Haggerty, a graphic designer of countless classic album covers, and C.D. Taylor, a special effects designer, teamed up to direct many popular videos of the time but the black cougar on the set of this video turned out to be one of the biggest challenges of their music video career.
IN EARLY JUNE 2000, I visited Art Basel for the first time. I was naive, which meant that I was subsequently shocked and dismayed. The convention hall was filled with stalls, many of which were displaying objects I knew and loved (works by Piero Manzoni, Marcel Broodthaers), pieces made by people I admired from afar (Jeff Wall, Rodney Graham) or by artists of great historical merit (Piet Mondrian, Ed Ruscha). Then there were pieces by artists I knew personally. All of this gave me a charge of recognition mixed with a creeping sense of sadness; by the time I reached my hotel, unironically called the Hotel du Commerce, I realized I was suffering from a kind of equally unironic, decidedly old-fashioned heartbreak. For, more than being an assortment of proper names, the objects themselves had, up until that point, represented constellations of ideas to me, their primary form of exchange taking place in books and in journals, in buzzed late-night conversations in bars, and, increasingly (in ways that were deeply exciting), in the space of exhibitions. To see all those ideas hung up on the trade-show walls ready for sale was just short of crushing. The next day, as I made my way back to the Messeplatz to take another stab at this new form of art viewing, I ran into an artist I knew. She was one of the very few artists there, and on hearing that she had just arrived, I cautioned her not to go in. This was no place for artists.Related JEAN GENET: THE COURTESY OF OBJECTS EPIC THEATER: THE WORK OF CHRISTOPH SCHLINGENSIEF
Kean, Crystal Olive (2005)Comparison of static and dynamic balance training on muscle activation, static balance, jumping and sprint performance. Masters thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
With the improvement of social environmental awareness, the dual-channel green product sales mode has been widely used by many manufacturing firms. In this paper, we consider a dual-channel green supply chain where one manufacturer produces a green product and sells it through one retail channel and its own direct channel. Consumers in the two channels have different perceptions of the product energy efficiency level due to different purchasing experiences. The product energy efficiency level evolves over time and is characterized as a dynamic variable. By developing and solving the Stackelberg differential game problems under the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies, respectively, we obtain the main results in this paper. First, the manufacturer has more incentives to invest in green innovation when more consumers buy the green product through the direct channel. Second, the manufacturer prefers to adopt the dynamic wholesale pricing strategy in most cases and prefers the static one only when the consumers in both channels have relatively high energy efficiency perceptions. By introducing the transfer payment contract, we show that the static wholesale pricing strategy may be the better choice, which leads to a win-win outcome for both members. Finally, sensitivity analysis further provides some managerial insights and verifies the robustness of the results.
To answer these questions, we consider a dual-channel green supply chain, where one manufacturer invests in green innovation and produces a green product and sells the product through a retail channel and its own direct channel. Considering that the energy efficiency standard changes with the development of technology, the energy efficiency level of the green product is described by a differential equation. Hence, the decision-making problem is modeled as a Stackelberg differential game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader and the retailer acts as the follower. With the dynamic or static wholesale pricing strategy, the dominant manufacturer firstly decides the dynamic or static wholesale price, the direct selling price, and the green innovation level, and then the retailer makes the retail price decision. According to the maximum principle, we obtain the equilibrium decisions and profits of the supply chain members under the two wholesale pricing strategies, respectively. Additionally, we conduct numerical studies to compare the outcomes under the two pricing strategies and provide sensitivity analysis with respect to key system parameters to obtain the main managerial implications.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, the energy efficiency level is modeled as a dynamic evolution process to reflect the reality in the green supply chain. Second, to examine the performance of the dual-channel green supply chain, this paper compares the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies for the first time. Third, the dominant parameter regions of the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies are described, respectively, which helps the supply chain members make the right decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A review of the extant literature is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish a Stackelberg differential game model. Section 4 and Section 5 examine the dynamic wholesale pricing strategy and the static wholesale pricing strategy, respectively. In Section 6, the effects of key system parameters are analysed, and the two pricing strategies are compared by numerical simulation. Section 7 concludes this paper.
Pricing is regarded as a tool for regulating operations and improving performance. The pricing mode generally includes static pricing and dynamic pricing based on whether prices change over time or not. Static pricing means that prices remain constant for a long period of time [27, 28]. Dynamic pricing means that prices change over time [29, 30]. Some studies focus on the comparison between the two pricing strategies. For example, Cachon and Feldman [31] showed that facing strategic consumers, firms prefer to adopt static pricing rather than dynamic pricing. Zhang et al. [32] examined the effects of static pricing and dynamic pricing on a supply chain and compared the results in different pricing modes. In our paper, we consider the dynamic energy efficiency level of a green product and focus on the comparison between dynamic wholesale pricing and static wholesale pricing in a dual-channel green supply chain.
Different from the above studies, our work extends the study of Shaorui et al. [33] to a dynamic scenario where the energy efficiency level is considered as a dynamic evolution process. This paper aims to investigate the wholesale pricing strategy in a dual-channel green supply chain. By formulating and solving the Stackelberg differential game problems, we obtain and compare the results of decisions and profits under the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies. We show the dominant parameter regions of the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies, respectively, which provides theoretical basis and management suggestions for the supply chain members to choose the optimal wholesale pricing strategy.
Considering that the energy efficiency level is a dynamic state, in the following sections, we explore two wholesale pricing strategies of the manufacturer: dynamic wholesale pricing strategy (D) and static wholesale pricing strategy (S). Specifically, we first derive the equilibrium decisions and profits of both members under the two pricing strategies and then compare these outcomes to obtain the main managerial implications by numerical simulation.
In this section, we consider the case where the manufacturer and the retailer trade through a static wholesale price. In this scenario, the manufacturer commits a reasonable wholesale price at the beginning of the selling season and keeps it for a long time.
Similar to the dynamic wholesale pricing problem, the static one is also a Stackelberg differential game, and the sequence of the game is as follows. The manufacturer first commits the static wholesale price w and then decides the green innovation level ut and the direct selling price pmt. Based on these decisions, the retailer determines the retail price prt.
We focus on the steady states of decision variables in this study. Tables 1 and 2 report the effects of the main parameters on the long-term decision-making behaviors and profits of the supply chain members under the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies, respectively. The results of sensitivity analysis are summarized as follows.
As mentioned above, when a large number of consumers prefer to buy goods from the direct channel, the dynamic wholesale pricing strategy makes the supply chain more efficient than the static one. However, when more and more consumers turn to the physical store, the static wholesale pricing strategy combined with the transfer payment contract will be the better one. Note that in practice, the manufacturer usually incurs the cost of adjusting the wholesale price if adopting dynamic pricing, which can be found in [46]. Moreover, there are some negative effects of adjusting the wholesale price frequently, such as damaging the commercial relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer and hurting the goodwill of the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer has to weigh the pros and cons of dynamically adjusting the wholesale price. From this point of view, the static pricing strategy may be the better choice for the manufacturer.
As presented in Figure 3, the differences of the wholesale price, sales price, and green innovation level between the two pricing strategies change from negative to positive with the sales price competition intensity b increasing. Specifically, when b0.8, the supply chain has a greater profitability with the dynamic wholesale pricing strategy, and otherwise the static wholesale pricing strategy combined with the transfer payment contract is the better choice.
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