Hi all,
Please join us for Lunch in Theory this Thursday, 02/12 at 12:00 PM in GCS 302c. This week we have Vasilis Varsamis presenting a talk on Computing Voting Rules with Improvement Feedback. Please find the title and abstract attached.
Reminder: Please bring your own lunch, as lunch will not be provided.
Title: Computing Voting Rules with Improvement Feedback
Abstract: Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the inquiry to improvement feedback, where voters express incremental adjustments rather than complete preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the positional scoring rules that can be computed given improvement feedback. Interestingly, while plurality is learnable under improvement feedback—unlike with pairwise feedback—strong impossi- bility results persist for many other positional scoring rules. Furthermore, we show that improvement feedback, unlike pairwise feedback, does not suffice for the computation of any Condorcet-consistent rule. We complement our theoretical findings with experimental results, providing further insights into the practical implications of improvement feedback for preference aggregation.