Auto-reminder: Upcoming CS Event(s): Weekly Digest

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May 14, 2010, 6:00:00 PM5/14/10
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/*Event*/
CS Colloq: Dr. Francesco Bullo

/*Time and Date*/
3:30:00 PM on 5/17/2010

/*Location*/
SSL 150

/*Details*/
Speaker: Francesco Bullo
Host: Gaurav Sukhatme

Title: Geometry, Optimization and Control in Robot Coordination

Abstract:

Motion coordination is an extraordinary phenomenon in biological systems and a powerful tool in man-made systems; although individual agents have no global system knowledge, complex behaviors emerge from local interactions. This talk focuses on robotic networks, that is, group of robots that communicate and coordinate their motions to perform useful tasks. Example t...read more at event URL-
http://www.cs.usc.edu/calendar/csevent.asp?date=5/17/2010&Event_ID=985
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May 21, 2010, 6:00:00 PM5/21/10
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/*Event*/
CS Colloq: Prof. Garud Iyengar

/*Time and Date*/
8:00:00 AM on 5/28/2010

/*Location*/
GER 309

/*Details*/
Talk Title: Inequality and network structure
Speaker: Prof. Garud Iyengar
Host: Prof: Milind Tambe

Time: TBA

Abstract:
In this talk we will explore the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the level of inequality that can be sustained in the network. We assume that any distribution of value across the network must be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, and that a set of players (nodes) form a deviating coalition only if the set is a clique in the n...read more at event URL-
http://www.cs.usc.edu/calendar/csevent.asp?date=5/28/2010&Event_ID=986
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