Nigeria Cannot Afford Strategic Drift In A Reordering World.
John Onyeukwu
Nigeria Cannot Afford Strategic Drift In A Reordering World.
The 2025 U.S. National Security
Strategy signals a new era of geoeconomics and power politics, and Nigeria must
reposition or be left behind.
By John Onyeukwu
Published in the Policy and Reform column of Business a.m. newspaper, on Monday December 15, 2025. Pull out attached
When the United States released its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), global commentary focused largely on the intensifying rivalry with China and the renewed assertion of American power. But for Nigeria, the strategy is more than an abstract geopolitical document. It is a clear statement of how the world’s most powerful state intends to reshape global industrial capacity, technology governance, supply chains, and diplomatic alignments. And at a time when Nigeria is still struggling to regain economic stability, fiscal credibility, and strategic direction, the NSS functions as a mirror: it reveals where the world is going , and exposes how unprepared we remain.
The 2025 NSS is the most assertive sovereignty-first American doctrine in decades. It discards the optimism of liberal multilateralism and embraces a harder-edged realism: defend borders, rebuild industry, reclaim technological dominance, discipline allies, deter rivals, and align development finance tightly with national interest.
For African states, especially those with strategic weight like Nigeria, the message is unmistakable. Washington no longer intends to spread influence primarily through aid or multilateral diplomacy. It now seeks partners able to guarantee regulatory predictability, secure territory, and support supply-chain diversification away from China. In effect, the U.S. is redefining its partnerships on the continent. Nigeria must read, and respond to, this moment accurately.
Africa does not sit at the apex of U.S. strategic priorities; the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere remain dominant theatres. Yet Africa is far from irrelevant. It is central to U.S. ambitions to secure critical minerals, expand supply-chain resilience, strengthen counterterrorism collaboration, and shape political environments away from rival influence. Within this configuration, Nigeria is significant but not indispensable. Countries like Kenya, , Morocco, Namibia, and Rwanda are already positioning themselves as predictable partners, offering clearer regulatory regimes and stronger investment pipelines. Nigeria risks being overshadowed not because of inadequate potential, but because of persistent governance inconsistencies and slow policy coordination. Washington’s signal is direct: the African states that organise their governance systems early will attract capital, security partnerships, and industrial collaboration. Those that hesitate will be sidelined.
Perhaps the most consequential theme in the NSS is its declaration that economic security is national security. The United States is preparing to re-industrialise at scale, protect its technological edge, and use trade measures, export controls, and investment restrictions to shape global economic behaviour. This shift carries two major implications for Nigeria.
First, there is opportunity. Nigeria holds valuable reserves of lithium, manganese, graphite, natural gas, and other minerals essential to the global energy transition and semiconductor supply chains. The NSS makes clear that institutions like the DFC, EXIM, and MCC will prioritise countries that can guarantee secure sourcing, enforce contracts, and maintain stable regulatory regimes. With thoughtful reforms, Nigeria could attract substantial U.S. strategic investment across energy infrastructure, mining, technology, and logistics.
Second, there is risk. A more protectionist, security-driven U.S. economy will expect partners to align with American positions on technology standards, supply chains, data governance, and critical minerals. Nigeria’s prolonged ambiguity, Chinese-built digital infrastructure anchored alongside Western finance and European consulting, will draw sharper scrutiny. The era of dual alignment is narrowing. Nigeria now needs a foreign economic strategy that is coherent, predictable, and anchored in national interest, not scattered across competing ministries and agencies.
The NSS also conveys a deep scepticism toward supranational mechanisms, emphasising bilateral, interest-driven relationships. For Nigeria, this carries practical consequences: Washington will demand stronger contract enforcement, predictable regulation, and transparent procurement processes. Anti-corruption expectations will be framed not as moral imperatives but as essential conditions for protecting strategic investments. Our digital governance architecture, especially cybersecurity and data rules, will face sharper examination. Nigeria’s enduring institutional weakness thus becomes central to its ability to secure meaningful partnerships. Business a.m. readers understand this instinctively: capital flows toward clarity. Under the new American doctrine, clarity is no longer merely an economic preference; it is a national-security requirement.
On the security front, the NSS formalises a shift toward deterrence and burden-sharing. The U.S. intends to maintain global reach while relying on capable partners to manage frontline threats. Washington is not offering open-ended commitments; rather, it seeks partners who can stabilise their regions while the U.S. provides technology, intelligence, training, and targeted support.
This approach places Nigeria squarely within three major U.S. security interests: counterterrorism across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin; maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy, illegal bunkering, and coastal criminality remain persistent; and defence procurement partnerships at a time when the U.S. is expanding scalable, high-quality, lower-cost defence manufacturing for allies. These opportunities are real, but they require Nigeria to modernise its security coordination, professionalise command structures, and reform a procurement ecosystem long plagued by opacity and political interference. If Abuja can demonstrate operational reliability and reduce bureaucratic hesitation, it stands to benefit from deeper, more technologically sophisticated cooperation. If not, Washington’s focus will shift toward more organised and responsive African partners.
Development finance is undergoing its most profound transformation in decades. Under the new NSS, development tools are no longer goodwill instruments; they are strategic levers used to secure markets and counter rival influence. Aid has been dethroned. Investment, technology deployment, and commercial partnerships now define U.S. engagement.
For Nigeria, adaptation must be swift and decisive. We must reorganise our investment facilitation systems to match the speed and clarity expected by U.S. public and private capital. Longstanding regulatory gaps in mining, energy, and digital governance must be closed. And we must present credible, bankable projects that reflect national development priorities while aligning with American geoeconomic interests. Failure to do so will ensure that U.S. financing flows toward African countries with cleaner regulatory pathways and stronger investment readiness.
Nigeria cannot afford its current passive approach to global power shifts. The 2025 NSS marks the beginning of a new global order, one in which industrial strategy, data regulation, and technological ecosystems define national security. To navigate this new environment, Nigeria must move with coherence and conviction.
The starting point is a unified foreign economic policy that integrates foreign affairs with industrialisation, trade, mining, energy, and technology. Ministries cannot continue to negotiate in silos. Great powers reward clarity; they punish fragmentation.
Next, Nigeria needs a strategic geoeconomics and investment desk with real authority, one capable of coordinating economic diplomacy with institutions like the DFC, EXIM, Commerce, and State. Washington’s engagements are increasingly integrated; Nigeria must respond with equal sophistication.
Finally, Nigeria must embrace disciplined strategic hedging. We must deepen cooperation with the U.S. where interests align, minerals, maritime security, tech standards, energy, while maintaining the autonomy to preserve constructive relationships with other major actors. Hedging is not indecision; it is survival in a competitive world.
Nigeria is no longer operating in a benign international environment. If we fail to adapt with clarity and purpose, others will seize the opportunities of global reordering while we remain stuck in reactive diplomacy and fragmented planning.
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy is more than a foreign policy document. It is a blueprint for the next phase of global competition, one defined by strategic industries, technological dominance, secure supply chains, and the political will to defend national advantage. For Nigeria, this is not a distant geopolitical drama; it is a wake-up call of the highest order. We stand at a crossroads. We will either become an active participant in this emerging order, shaping outcomes and bargaining from a position of strength, or we will resign ourselves to the role of a peripheral state, shaped entirely by decisions taken in Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and the Gulf.
The world is reorganising around national interest, industrial capabilities, and tightly integrated technological ecosystems. Countries that understand this are already restructuring their governance, rewiring their economies, and sharpening their diplomatic tools. Clarity is now power. Strategy is now survival. Nigeria must decide whether it will act with intention and coherence, or drift, once again, into strategic irrelevance while others define the rules we will be forced to live by.
http://www.policy.hu/onyeukwu/
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