STAR ESSAY: The Ogbomoso Rescue: Celebrate the Victory, Preserve the Lessons - by Sadeeq Garba Shehu

[Mobolaji Aluko]

 

*THE OGBOMOSO RESCUE :* *CELEBRATE THE VICTORY, PRESERVE THE LESSONS*

By *Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu Rtd*

July 11, 2026

*INTRODUCTION*

The safe recovery of the remaining pupils and teachers abducted from schools in Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State is profoundly welcome news. After 56 days of captivity, children and teachers have been/will be  reunited with their families, and a nation that followed their ordeal with anxiety can finally breathe a measure of relief. The officers and personnel of the Armed Forces, the Department of State Services (DSS) and the Nigeria Police Force who participated in the operation deserve national commendation. The Oyo State Government must equally be acknowledged for cooperating with the Federal Government throughout the crisis.

According to the Presidency, the victims were recovered through a sustained military, police and intelligence-driven operation. Eight suspected kidnappers were arrested and placed in DSS custody, while some members of the group were reportedly neutralised. The Presidency has also stated that there was no quid pro quo: the terrorist kingpin whose release the abductors demanded remains in custody and is being prosecuted. The security agencies are expected to provide a fuller operational account.

If these operational details are confirmed in the promised official briefing, this was not merely the release of hostages. It was the successful resolution of an extremely difficult hostage crisis through intelligence, patience, coordination and carefully controlled force.

As a security practitioner and trainer for me, that distinction is important.

Recall the kidnappers had reportedly threatened to kill the children if security forces advanced on their location. They were also said to be using the captives as leverage to secure the release of one of their detained commanders. The Government therefore faced one of the most difficult dilemmas in military operations: how to maintain pressure on the perpetrators without provoking them into murdering the very people the security forces were trying to save.

In such circumstances, restraint must never be mistaken for weakness.

*THE PROFESSIONAL DILEMMA OF HOSTAGE RESCUE*

Professional military force is not measured by how quickly troops open fire. It is measured by whether force is applied at the right time, against properly identified targets, under lawful command and with the minimum possible danger to hostages and other civilians.

Knowing where hostages are located is not the same as possessing a safe opportunity to rescue them. Before action can be taken, commanders must understand:

the disposition of the captors; the exact location and condition of the hostages; the terrain;

likely escape routes; possible reinforcement routes; the kidnappers' weapons and defensive preparations; and, above all, whether an assault is likely to trigger the execution of the hostages.

For that reason, hostage rescue operations frequently involve prolonged surveillance, human intelligence, communications interception, deception, negotiations designed to buy time, isolation of the kidnappers and meticulous preparation before force is finally employed. The objective is not merely to reach the kidnappers. The objective is to recover the hostages alive.

*WHY RESTRAINT IS SOMETIMES THE HIGHEST FORM OF PROFESSIONALISM*

Some observers often ask: "If the military knew where the kidnappers were, why did they not simply attack?"

That question is understandable, but it reflects the difference between public expectation and professional military/security  planning.  Every hostage rescue commander understands that an assault launched at the wrong moment can produce exactly the outcome everyone seeks to prevent. In hostage rescue operations, speed is desirable—but precision is indispensable.

The commander therefore constantly weighs two competing obligations: to act before the kidnappers disappear; and to avoid acting so early that the hostages are killed.

This explains why patience, surveillance and restraint are often signs of professionalism rather than indecision. Indeed, history shows that many of the world's most successful hostage rescue operations were preceded by days—or even weeks—of intelligence gathering, deception and careful preparation. The Ogbomoso operation, after 56 long days  if officially confirmed as described, appears to reinforce this enduring professional lesson.

*INTELLIGENCE: THE DECISIVE WEAPON*

Perhaps the most important feature of this operation is not the reported use of force.

It is the apparent success of intelligence. According to the Presidency, the rescue resulted from a sustained intelligence-driven operation involving the Armed Forces, the DSS and the Nigeria Police Force. This deserves careful attention. Popular imagination often credits hostage rescues to the soldiers seen during the final assault. Professional practitioners know differently. The visible rescue is merely the final phase. The decisive work usually begins much earlier.

 Intelligence officers identify patterns.  Communities provide information. Technical surveillance tracks movement. Communications are analysed. Sources are cultivated.

Safe houses are identified. Routes are mapped. Command structures are understood.

Only when all these elements come together does a tactical commander acquire an opportunity to intervene with an acceptable level of risk.

Firepower may conclude an operation. Intelligence makes it possible.

That is why modern counter-terrorism increasingly places intelligence—not superior weapons—at the centre of operational success.

*INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION: THE REAL FORCE MULTIPLIER*

The reported cooperation among the Armed Forces, the DSS and the Nigeria Police Force also deserves recognition. No single institution possesses every capability required to resolve a complex hostage crisis (especially  in Nigeria where we do not have a dedicated Hostage Recuse Unit HRU like the French GIGN).

The Armed Forces contribute operational reach, tactical capability and specialised combat assets. The Police contribute investigative powers, local policing structures and criminal justice responsibilities. The DSS contributes specialised intelligence capabilities. Each institution performs a distinct but complementary function.

When information flows freely and institutional rivalry gives way to national purpose, the combined effect becomes greater than the sum of its individual parts. That,  is the real lesson.

This operation should therefore not become a competition over institutional credit.

It should become a model for institutional cooperation. It demonstrates what Nigeria's security institutions are capable of achieving when intelligence is shared, responsibilities are coordinated and operational decisions remain guided by professionalism rather than bureaucracy.

*THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF "NO QUID PRO QUO"*

One aspect of the Presidency's statement deserves particular attention.

It has publicly stated that: no ransom was paid; no prisoner exchange took place;

the terrorist kingpin demanded by the abductors remains in custody; and he continues to face prosecution.

If subsequently confirmed by the security agencies, this is strategically important.

Criminal and terrorist organisations constantly seek leverage over governments.

Kidnapping children is among the most cynical forms of leverage imaginable.

If governments routinely exchange detained commanders or concede to such demands, hostage-taking becomes increasingly attractive as an operational method.

Professional crisis management sometimes requires communication, deception or controlled negotiation in order to buy time and protect lives.

However, there is an important distinction between managing a hostage crisis and rewarding hostage-taking.

A democratic State must preserve sufficient flexibility to save innocent lives while avoiding policies that encourage future kidnappings. The Presidency's statement, if fully borne out by the forthcoming operational briefing, suggests that this difficult balance may have been successfully maintained.

*JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISMANTLING THE NETWORK*

The reported arrest of eight suspects may ultimately prove to be as significant as the rescue itself. Recovering hostages saves lives. Arresting the perpetrators protects future lives.

A professional security response does not conclude when the hostages are brought home. In many respects, that is where the second phase of the operation begins.

Those arrested must now be investigated professionally and prosecuted in accordance with the law. Their communications, financial transactions, weapons supply chains, transportation arrangements, sources of funding, local collaborators and wider criminal networks should all become subjects of intensive investigation.

The objective should never be merely to punish the individuals physically present at the scene. The objective must be to dismantle the entire criminal enterprise that planned, financed, facilitated and sustained the abduction. Kidnapping on this scale rarely involves only the armed men seen carrying weapons. Behind them are financiers. Informants. 

Logistics providers. Suppliers of food and fuel. Transport facilitators. Communications enablers. Arms traffickers. Sympathisers. Occasionally, corrupt insiders.

Professional investigations seek to expose every layer of that network. Only then can the operation be regarded as strategically successful.

*THE HUMAN COST MUST NEVER BE FORGOTTEN*

As the nation celebrates the return of the surviving pupils and teachers, we must speak accurately about the human cost of this tragedy. Although the Presidency has stated that the rescue itself was completed without casualties among the remaining hostages, the overall incident was not casualty-free. From official snippets a couple of security personnel were lost. Lives were lost during the initial attack. Most painfully, Mr. Oyedokun, one of the abducted teachers, was murdered while in captivity. His death reminds us that this was never simply a kidnapping. It was a brutal act of terrorism against innocent civilians. 

Our celebration must therefore be accompanied by remembrance. Our relief must be accompanied by compassion. Our gratitude to the rescuers must be accompanied by a firm commitment that justice will be done for those who did not survive.

The nation owes that obligation not only to the rescued children and teachers, but also to the families of the security personnel and of Mr. Oyedokun, whose loss can never be reversed. Justice, in this context, means more than criminal prosecution. It also means ensuring that future teachers and pupils are never placed in similar danger.

*LET US CELEBRATE THE SUCCESS—BUT DO NOT ALLOW CELEBRATION TO BECOME AMNESIA*

There is every reason to commend what appears to have been a highly professional operation. Indeed, recognising operational success is important. Security personnel who perform difficult missions successfully deserve public appreciation. Doing so strengthens morale, reinforces professionalism and encourages excellence.

But responsible nations also understand another principle. Operational success should never erase institutional learning.

The successful rescue does not alter the fact that in Nigeria as a whole  armed men were able to attack several schools, kill innocent people and remove dozens of pupils and teachers into captivity. That reality should concern every Nigerian. If we celebrate the rescue without studying how the attack became possible, we risk congratulating ourselves while leaving the underlying vulnerabilities untouched.

The true measure of professional institutions is not whether mistakes never occur. It is whether every operation—successful or unsuccessful—is converted into institutional learning.

*PUBLIC SCEPTICISM AND PROFESSIONAL OBJECTIVITY*

It is also understandable that some Nigerians may approach official announcements of "rescue operations" with a degree of scepticism. Our country has experienced previous kidnapping cases in which public debate later emerged over whether ransom payments, negotiations or other undisclosed arrangements had taken place. Such experiences naturally influence public perceptions.

However, understandable scepticism should not become unquestioning cynicism. Equally, official statements should not be accepted uncritically merely because they originate from government.

Professional analysis requires discipline. As security professionals, our responsibility is to distinguish between confirmed facts and assumptions. In this case, the Presidency has publicly stated that: no ransom was paid; no prisoner exchange occurred; the terrorist kingpin demanded by the abductors remains in custody and under prosecution; the victims were recovered through a sustained intelligence-driven joint operation.

Until credible evidence demonstrates otherwise, these official statements deserve to be assessed on their merits rather than rejected simply because some previous cases generated controversy. 

At the same time, government transparency strengthens public confidence. The Presidency has indicated that the security agencies will provide a fuller operational account.

That briefing should answer the legitimate questions Nigerians may have while protecting intelligence sources, operational methods, surveillance capabilities and other information whose disclosure could compromise future hostage-rescue operations.

Professional analysis therefore requires two principles to coexist: We should neither practise unquestioning acceptance nor reflexive cynicism. We should commend what appears to have been a significant operational success while remaining prepared to examine objectively the fuller account when it is officially presented. In matters of national security, credibility is ultimately built not by speculation but by evidence.

*THE IMPORTANCE OF AN AFTER-ACTION REVIEW*

One of the hallmarks of professional military and security institutions is the willingness to conduct rigorous after-action reviews AAR. Every major operation—whether successful or unsuccessful—should become an opportunity for institutional learning. The purpose is not to allocate blame. Nor is it to diminish the achievements of those who carried out the rescue. The purpose is to understand what happened, why it happened, what worked well, what failed and what should change before the next crisis occurs.

The Ogbomoso incident should therefore be subjected to a comprehensive multidisciplinary review involving security agencies, education authorities, intelligence services and the Oyo State Government. Among the questions that deserve careful examination are:

What intelligence or warning indicators existed before the attack? Were there signs of unusual movement or suspicious activity that were missed? How did the perpetrators enter and leave the affected communities? How quickly did information reach the security agencies? Were emergency communication systems functioning effectively? Did the schools possess emergency response procedures? Were teachers trained in crisis management? Were there local collaborators? How could security architecture around vulnerable schools be strengthened? What lessons should be incorporated into future operational planning?

These questions are not criticisms. They are the foundation of professional improvement. 

Security institutions that refuse to learn eventually repeat their mistakes. Those that institutionalise learning become progressively stronger. The greatest tribute we can pay to those who successfully rescued these children is not applause alone. It is ensuring that the knowledge gained from this operation makes future attacks less likely to succeed.

*SAFE SCHOOLS, PREVENTION, PSYCHOSOCIAL RECOVERY AND THE STRATEGIC LESSONS FOR NIGERIA*.

THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON: EVERY SUCCESSFUL RESCUE SHOULD PRODUCE A SAFER SCHOOL

Perhaps the single most important lesson from the Ogbomoso incident is this: The ultimate objective of security policy is not to rescue children after they have been abducted. It is to prevent schools from becoming targets in the first place. 

Viewed from that perspective, the 3 affected schools , Community Grammar School, Baptist Nursery and Primary School, and L.A. Primary School in Oriire Local Government Area (like most schools in Nigeria ) were, , in every practical sense,  UNSAFE SCHOOLs  right from the beginning .

The successful rescue should never obscure that uncomfortable reality.

If armed men can attack schools, kill innocent people, abduct dozens of pupils and teachers and hold them captive for almost two months, then the conversation cannot end with congratulations to the rescue team. It must also begin with an honest examination of how the attack became possible.

*THE SAFE SCHOOLS PROGRAMME MUST MOVE FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE*

Nigeria has invested considerable effort over the past decade in promoting the Safe Schools Declaration and implementing the National Safe Schools Programme. 

These initiatives were never intended to become policy documents that are discussed only after tragedies occur. They were designed to prevent tragedies. The philosophy behind Safe Schools is straightforward. A school should not depend upon a successful military rescue for the safety of its pupils. Its protection should begin long before criminals arrive.A truly safe school integrates: risk assessment; community engagement; intelligence and early warning;

physical protection; emergency communications; contingency planning; evacuation procedures; rapid response arrangements; psychosocial preparedness; and continuous cooperation between education authorities and security agencies.

In other words, rescue should always be the last line of defence, never the first.-

*FROM REACTIVE SECURITY TO PREVENTIVE SECURITY*

One weakness that often characterises discussions on insecurity in Nigeria is our tendency to celebrate successful responses while paying insufficient attention to prevention. Professional security thinking follows a different hierarchy. The highest level of success is prevention. If prevention fails, early detection, then disruption. If disruption fails, response (quick). If response fails, recovery. If recovery succeeds, institutional learning.

Every stage matters.

But prevention remains the highest form of success because it avoids human suffering altogether. From this perspective, no rescue—however professionally executed—can ever be considered preferable to preventing school  kidnapping in the first place. The children should never have entered captivity. That is the benchmark toward which policy should continually strive.

*WHAT MAKES A SCHOOL TRULY SAFE?*

The Ogbomoso incident should become a national case study for strengthening—not merely discussing—the Safe Schools Programme. A genuinely safe school is not simply one surrounded by fences or guarded by security personnel. It is a school protected by systems.

Teachers know exactly what to do during emergencies. Pupils understand evacuation procedures. Parents know emergency communication channels. Communities recognise suspicious activity and report it early. Traditional rulers, religious leaders and local vigilante structures cooperate with security agencies. Intelligence reaches decision-makers before criminals strike. Emergency communications function without delay. Rapid response mechanisms are rehearsed rather than improvised. Security agencies regularly review risk assessments. In short, safety becomes part of institutional culture rather than an emergency reaction.

*THE QUESTIONS NIGERIA SHOULD NOW ASK*

The rescue operation should now be followed by a comprehensive review of school security nationwide. Among the questions requiring professional attention are:

Were comprehensive school security risk assessments conducted before the attack?

Were there functioning early-warning mechanisms linking schools, surrounding communities and security agencies?

Did school administrators possess emergency response plans?

Were teachers trained to respond to armed attacks?

How quickly was the alarm raised?

How quickly did security agencies receive actionable intelligence?

Could stronger community intelligence have detected preparations for the attack?

Were there weaknesses in perimeter security?

Did communication failures contribute to the success of the kidnappers?

What lessons should immediately be incorporated into national Safe Schools implementation?

These questions are not criticisms. They are investments in prevention.

*SAFE SCHOOLS ARE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY*

One of the greatest misconceptions about school protection is that responsibility rests solely with the military or the police. It does not.

School safety is fundamentally a whole-of-society responsibility. It requires partnership among: Federal Government; State Governments; Local Governments; education authorities; security agencies; traditional institutions; parents; teachers; school management; religious leaders; civil society organisations; host communities; and development partners.

Security agencies cannot permanently guard every classroom. Communities, however, can become the first and most effective layer of early warning. Parents often notice unusual movements. Teachers recognise unfamiliar faces. Community members detect suspicious activities. Traditional institutions frequently possess invaluable local knowledge.

When these observations become connected to professional intelligence systems, prevention becomes significantly more effective. 

Safe Schools therefore begin not with armed guards. They begin with informed, organised and resilient communities.

*THE ROLE OF EARLY WARNING*

Throughout my professional work on child protection, Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), civilian protection and security sector reform, one lesson has remained constant: Early warning without early response saves no one. An effective Safe Schools Programme depends upon both.

Schools should never become isolated institutions operating independently of their surrounding security environment. Instead, they should be integrated into local early-warning systems capable of detecting threats before they mature into attacks.

This requires: continuous risk monitoring; intelligence sharing; community reporting mechanisms; emergency communication protocols; rapid verification procedures; 

and clearly designated response responsibilities.

Every hour gained through early warning can save lives.

*FINALLY THE CHILDREN ARE HOME—NOW THEY MUST HEAL*

The conclusion of the rescue operation does not conclude the Government's responsibilities. The rescued pupils and teachers are survivors of a traumatic experience. 

They now require protection of a different kind. Medical examinations. Psychological first aid. Trauma-informed counselling. Family reunification. Educational reintegration. 

Long-term psychosocial support. Privacy. Dignity.

Children emerging from prolonged captivity should never become media spectacles.They should not repeatedly relive traumatic experiences before television cameras. Nor should they be subjected to unnecessary public attention simply because their rescue generated national interest.

President Tinubu's directive that emergency response agencies work with the Oyo State Government to provide immediate medical attention, psychological care and other necessary assistance is therefore entirely appropriate. That support, however, should extend well beyond the immediate aftermath. Recovery from trauma is measured not in days but often in months or years.

*THE STRATEGIC LESSONS*

*Several important lessons emerge from the Ogbomoso rescue*.

*First*, disciplined restraint can sometimes be more professional than immediate action.

*Second*, intelligence often proves more decisive than superior firepower.

*Third*, effective inter-agency cooperation saves lives.

*Fourth*, hostage rescue should always be followed by professional investigation, prosecution and dismantling of the wider criminal network.

*Fifth*, transparency strengthens public confidence while operational secrecy protects future missions.

*Sixth*, the welfare of rescued victims remains a continuing national responsibility.

*Seventh*—and perhaps most importantly—prevention is always superior to rescue.

A nation that continually celebrates successful hostage rescues without making its schools safer has addressed the symptom while leaving the underlying vulnerability intact.

*CONCLUSION: THE ENDURING VICTORY*

If the Presidency's account is confirmed by the forthcoming operational briefing, Nigeria's security agencies deserve genuine commendation for resolving one of the country's most sensitive hostage crises without losing the remaining captives.

That is no small achievement. It reflects professionalism, discipline, patience, intelligence and cooperation. But the greatest honour we can pay those who carried out this operation is not applause alone. It is ensuring that fewer rescue operations will ever again be necessary. This operation should become more than a story of successful rescue.

It should become the catalyst for strengthening Nigeria's Safe Schools Programme, expanding early-warning systems, improving intelligence coordination, enhancing school protection planning and building stronger partnerships between communities and security institutions.

Recovering the remaining children and teachers was the immediate victory. Making every Nigerian school a genuinely safe school will be the enduring victory.

That,  is the lesson we must preserve.

*Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu* *Kashim Shettima* 

*Defence Headquarters Nigeria* 

*Nigeria Police Force* 

*DSS* 

*Arise News* 

*Channels Television*

 *Tvcnewsng*