By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed “an Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors are discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo in name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a Northerner, spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern dress when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute power over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can arrange stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual and discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar” is none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book with the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s “explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly driven by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that matter. Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable departure from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain of events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central subject of Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of both general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic section of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the January 15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives” or “interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was it not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a “southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political and military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were, overwhelmingly, either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders. More pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were significant in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling class parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to the NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region, was spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter of fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of Prime Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were far more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern and conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was it, or was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in exploring - and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form the complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of ethnicity or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book. This may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against Igbos in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more than forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For this reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding that Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively to ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our two examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case: “By the time the government of the Western region also published a white paper outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions in the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and all over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is useful to carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here was that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact and fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes. Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and anti-socialist. A brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola tirelessly satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted, parodic visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared – wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these facts and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly, Akintola and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic tensions and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which they called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried, unsuccessfully, to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts and realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in which no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate” the singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs to this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the January 15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that assertion to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism is that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a work of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest to the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other modes, forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of art or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that typically and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how things actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only the most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging that gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial experience, he had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and individuality had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as No Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The Trouble with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A Country marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture in which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising defense of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in a fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In next week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if only speculatively with this choice, with particular reference to what I personally regard as one of the most controversial aspects of There Was A Country, this being the link that Achebe makes in the book between what he deems the endemic ethnic scapegoating of Igbos in our country and the utter collapse of meritocracy in post-civil war Nigeria.
Concluded.
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn�t: Reflections On Achebe�s New Book (2)By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed �an Igbo coup�. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors are discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo in name only�he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a Northerner, spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern dress when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute power over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can arrange stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
--If in There Was A Country �a Nigerian ruling class� only appears in the narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual and discursive architecture of the book. This �architecture�, this �grammar� is none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book with the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe�s �explanations�, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly driven by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that matter. Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that �explanations� and speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable departure from virtually all of Achebe�s writings prior to this recently published book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the �opening shot� in the chain of events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central subject of Achebe�s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of both general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And indeed, Achebe�s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic section of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the January 15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of �motives� or �interests� that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, �tribe�: Was it, or was it not, �an Igbo coup�.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a �southern coup�, this in light of the fact that most of the political and military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were, overwhelmingly, either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders. More pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were significant in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling class parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to the NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region, was spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter of fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the intension of making or �forcing� Chief Awolowo to assume the office of Prime Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were far more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern and conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe�s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was it, or was it not, �an Igbo coup�? That is all Achebe is interested in exploring - and disproving � in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form the complex fabric of that fateful coup d��tat, this single thread of ethnicity or �tribe� is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book. This may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against Igbos in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe�s book was written more than forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For this reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding that Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively to ethnicity or �tribalism� while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our two examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe�s own words, is the particular case: �By the time the government of the Western region also published a white paper outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions in the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and all over Nigeria in general had become untenable� (p. 77). This is indeed a fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is useful to carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here was that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact and fixes exclusively on this government�s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes. Secondly, Akintola�s government and party were not only virulently anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and anti-socialist. A brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola tirelessly satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted, parodic visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared � wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these facts and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly, Akintola and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic tensions and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which they called �Egbe Omo Olofin�. And for good measure, they tried, unsuccessfully, to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter Hubert Ogunde�s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts and realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in which no other aspects of social identification are allowed to �contaminate� the singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs to this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo �in name only�, the January 15 coup could not have been �an Igbo coup�.
In last week�s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that assertion to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism is that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a work of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest to the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman�s formulation of this �big grammar�, this means that above all other modes, forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of art or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that typically and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how things actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only the most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging that gap.
In all of Achebe�s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial experience, he had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and individuality had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as No Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The Trouble with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A Country marks a radical rupture in Achebe�s writings on our country, a rupture in which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising defense of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in a fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In next week�s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if only speculatively with this choice, with particular reference to what I personally regard as one of the most controversial aspects of There Was A Country, this being the link that Achebe makes in the book between what he deems the endemic ethnic scapegoating of Igbos in our country and the utter collapse of meritocracy in post-civil war Nigeria.
Concluded.
�
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
this is probably not the place to argue this, but i feel my friend bj is not correct in his definition of realism. it is a genre, a construct, like all others; no closer to "real facts" than other genres, but ideologically presented to the reader as if it were an imitation of reality. in that regard, it is more immersed in ideology than other genres that make more obvious their constructions of "reality."
achebe's title as the greatest realist in the past 150 years is overblown, in my view, regardless of the definition of realism employed.
further, the issue of ethnicity here should take into account not simply the politics of the coup plotters or the leadership of the regions, but how the events were presented by the population to themselves: did people say, "those igbos in biafra want to secede"? did the biafrans, like achebe, say the same?
it isn't a question of whether this or that individual came from the north or spoke hausa or wore robes: it is how he represented himself, and how he was taken by others.
ken
On 12/29/12 9:43 PM, Chido Onumah wrote:
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s New Book (2)By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed “an Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors are discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo in name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a Northerner, spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern dress when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute power over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can arrange stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual and discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar” is none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book with the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s “explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly driven by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that matter. Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable departure from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain of events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central subject of Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of both general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic section of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the January 15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives” or “interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was it not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a “southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political and military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were, overwhelmingly, either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders. More pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were significant in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling class parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to the NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region, was spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter of fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of Prime Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were far more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern and conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was it, or was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in exploring - and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form the complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of ethnicity or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book. This may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against Igbos in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more than forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For this reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding that Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively to ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our two examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case: “By the time the government of the Western region also published a white paper outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions in the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and all over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is useful to carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here was that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact and fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes. Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and anti-socialist. A brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola tirelessly satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted, parodic visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared – wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these facts and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly, Akintola and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic tensions and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which they called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried, unsuccessfully, to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts and realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in which no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate” the singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs to this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the January 15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that assertion to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism is that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a work of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest to the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other modes, forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of art or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that typically and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how things actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only the most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging that gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial experience, he had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and individuality had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as No Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The Trouble with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A Country marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture in which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising defense of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in a fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In next week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if only speculatively with this choice, with particular reference to what I personally regard as one of the most controversial aspects of There Was A Country, this being the link that Achebe makes in the book between what he deems the endemic ethnic scapegoating of Igbos in our country and the utter collapse of meritocracy in post-civil war Nigeria.
Concluded.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
I think, though, that you overstretch the�possibilities�of that perspective �in�arguing�that�realism, with�particular�reference to the phrase I�highlight, �"�is a genre, a construct, like all others; no closer to "real facts" than other genres, but ideologically presented to the reader as if it were an imitation of reality. in that regard, it is more immersed in ideology than other genres that make more obvious their constructions of "reality."
Jeyifo is�describing�his�understanding�of a vision represented by realism as�fidelity�to reality. Some �writers� such as Emile Zola are�described�as�aspiring�towards�that goal.�
We may contextualise their�efforts�by describing�them�as representing another�ideological�position�but that will not detract �from the fact that a writer pursuing such an ideal is�operating��on�a different �point of the�continuum�dramatising�the relationship�between�art and lived�experience�than a magical realist/fantasy�writer, for example.
In the light of such an ideal as demonstrated �by the writer's work, one may�expect�certain�possibilities�from that writer as�different�from�other�possibilities�more in�keeping�with�other �kinds of�writing�that writer �is�not�known for. �
Perhaps Jeyifo ought to have qualified his�understanding�of�realism�in art�against�the background of the�understanding�of all constructed forms as�ideological�constructs mediating the�perspectives�of reality that they privilege as opposed to other�possibilities�they�downplay�or�exclude.�
Even then, Jeyifo could be understood as describing realism as an�artistic�ideal that tries, within the form of the�transformative��character� of art, to�demonstrate�historical �actuality.�
Ikhide,
Thank you setting a trap for yourself and falling into it.
I knew you were headed there and allowed you to do yourself in.
Well done.
How can you, in the name of Jesus Christ of Oyingbo, equate The Trouble with Nigeria, Anthills of the Savannah, Hopes and Impediments and even go further and equate them with There Was a Country :A Personal History of Biafra?
Haba!
I bin tink say you be literary critic.
Let me take your hand and lead you though this since you are not getting it.
Are those books identical in form and content?
Are you arguing with a straight face, that a work largely fictional, Anthills of the Savannah, is identical with a collection of expository essays on a broad range of topics, Hopes and Impediments and that these two are identical with a book that, unlike Anthills, focuses on one subject from a non-fictive perspective,The Trouble with Nigeria, and does not involve movement into abstract metaphysics as Achebe does superbly in the essay "The Igbo World View and its Art" in Hopes and Impediments?
Are you standing straight and arguing that this diverse body of books is identical with an effort to present a realist narrative of a historical period from a personal perspective in There Was a Country:A Personal History of Biafra?
Is this the kind of mish mash conflation you are demonstrating in gleefully declaring : "It is stunning to me that a scholar of Jeyifo's calibre could not see that Achebe's new book TWAC is pretty much a compilation of all he has been saying all these years."
Is Achebe simply rehashing the content of those books?
At this point, one has to ask-have you read these books? If so,what went wrong?
You might do well to enrol in my adult education class.
I will craft a special curriculum for you.
It will begin with a foundation in theory of genres and proceed to discussing creative transposition from life to art.
You need it, brother.
Based on the differences between these books and the fact that even if they were similar in all aspects, unless you are arguing that There Was a Country is a direct repetition of one of those books,you need to address the new imaginative and narrative nexus constituted by the new work, as Jeyifo is rightly doing, seeing it as a new development, not identical with the old productions, as your one eyed criticism is too short sighted to understand
Pull your ears tight and assimilate that first.
What is this thing you are trying to say about musings after a driver stole Achebe's car?
If you are drinking or sleepy, please go and wash your face and sit up.
Jeyifo states categorically that Achebe takes to task issues of class in Nigeria but does not do that in Biafra.
At that point,we move beyond incidental musing resulting from the theft of a car.
Let me leave you there for now.
toyin
Oluwatoyin,You are trying to immerse yourself in depths beyond your intellectual competence and the more you open your mouth I am convinced you are a waste of my time. I am tired of giving you lectures for free and you are ungrateful to boot. I paid dearly for my education but I spent my money wisely - on the right tyoe of education. Have you read Professor Chinua Achebe's book? Where is your own "critical analysis"? No amount of pompous pretensions to scholarship will hide your ignorance of literature and Nigerian history..Go get your bifocals and read what I said about Professor Biodun Jeyifo's "critical analysis." Here, let me help you unpack my one-line.1. Three quarters of Achebe's book, There Was a Country is from his previous books, The Trouble with Nigeria, Anthills of the Savannah, Hopes and Impediments, etc. as Achebe carefully footnotes ad nauseam in his book. So how can Jeyifo say that "ethnicity, class and individuality had been superbly interwoven and productively explored" in those books, when much of the same thoughts are basically the new book that is pretty much 3/4s of the book Jeyifo cites? Does that make sense to you?2. It is stunning to me that a scholar of Jeyifo's calibre could not see that Achebe's new book TWAC is pretty much a compilation of all he has been saying all these years. He obviously did not see that. That alone makes his "critical analysis" worthless scholarship. How can you ask me to take seriously such critique.3. Has Jeyifo read Adichie's Half of a Yellow Sun? That book is the most updated and elegant discussion of class not only in Biafra but in Nigeria. Have you read Half of a Yellow Sun? Have you, Toyin? What, for heaven's sakes, have you read?4. How can Jeyifo in all seriousness say that Achebe did not discuss class in TWAC? He must be reading a pirated copy of the book with the substantive pages ripped off. Achebe makes clear that he was part of the intellectual elite, he was traveling the West, doing propaganda on behalf of Biafra. He had a "driver" who made off with his car and belongings one day. The resulting musing is as lucid a discussion of class as you'll ever get. It is the job of the astute reader to deduce these things. I honestly have no idea what Jeyifo is talking about. He needs to read the text more closely before any more "critical analysis" or whatevr pablum passes for scholarship around here.Look, Toyin, if you are going to engage me civilly, I am happy to reciprocate, but trust me I am good at throwing punches and they land where I want them to land. Don't get me started on you, because I have all day and all night. Go and read TWAC. Go and read Adichie's HOAYS and then come back and talk to me. Until then sit down before me. And learn something.Happy New Year.
- IkhideStalk my blog at http://www.xokigbo.com/Follow me on Twitter: @ikhideJoin me on Facebook: www.facebook.com/ikhide
From: OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU <tva...@gmail.com>
To: usaafric...@googlegroups.com; xok...@yahoo.com
Sent: Monday, December 31, 2012 8:58 PM
Subject: Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s New Book (2)
Ikhide,Please, come off it.You wont escape through that door.If you really think you are in a position to criticise Jeyifo, do us a favour and do a critical analysis of the Jeyifo essay with close reference to the Achebe text you are both referring to.All you have provided so far is a one line dismissal, an effort I can easily show as of little illumination if I were bothered to do so.You might not like my thinking, but you will observe my consistent painstaking efforts to present my case, often using a range of scholarly references.Are you giving us a serious analysis or not?If you persist in presenting uncritical denunciation, I will persist in calling out your actions for what they are.
toyin
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
Sent from my BlackBerry wireless device from MTN
-----Original Message-----
From: kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu>
Sender: usaafric...@googlegroups.com
Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2012 11:36:04
To: <usaafric...@googlegroups.com>
Reply-To: usaafric...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s New Book (2)
>>>> First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s
>>>> New
>>>> Book (2)
>>>>
>>>> By Biodun Jeyifo
>>>>
>>>> Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
>>>> “an
>>>> Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
>>>> are
>>>> discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
>>>> in
>>>> name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
>>>> Northerner,
>>>> spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
>>>> dress
>>>> when not in uniform.
>>>>
>>>> Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
>>>>
>>>> In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
>>>> power
>>>> over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
>>>> arrange
>>>> stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
>>>>
>>>> Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
>>>>
>>>> If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the
>>>> narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
>>>> book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
>>>> and
>>>> discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar”
>>>> is
>>>> none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
>>>> with
>>>> the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s
>>>> “explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
>>>> driven
>>>> by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
>>>> matter.
>>>> Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and
>>>> speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
>>>> inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
>>>> excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
>>>> departure
>>>> from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published
>>>> book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
>>>> subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
>>>> particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
>>>> book.
>>>>
>>>> The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
>>>> January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain
>>>> of
>>>> events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
>>>> subject of
>>>> Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
>>>> both
>>>> general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
>>>> indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
>>>> section
>>>> of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
>>>> January
>>>> 15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives”
>>>> or
>>>> “interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
>>>> that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was
>>>> it
>>>> not, “an Igbo coup”.
>>>>
>>>> There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
>>>> “southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political
>>>> and
>>>> military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
>>>> overwhelmingly,
>>>> either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
>>>> More
>>>> pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
>>>> plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
>>>> significant
>>>> in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
>>>> Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
>>>> class
>>>> parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
>>>> the
>>>> United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
>>>> Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
>>>> the
>>>> NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
>>>> chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
>>>> assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
>>>> was
>>>> spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
>>>> of
>>>> fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
>>>> intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
>>>> Prime
>>>> Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
>>>> far
>>>> more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
>>>> and
>>>> conservative allies of the NNA.
>>>>
>>>> Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
>>>> factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
>>>> it, or
>>>> was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in
>>>> exploring -
>>>> and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
>>>> the
>>>> complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of
>>>> ethnicity
>>>> or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
>>>> This
>>>> may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
>>>> Igbos
>>>> in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
>>>> completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
>>>> incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more
>>>> than
>>>> forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
>>>> hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
>>>> this
>>>> reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
>>>> that
>>>> Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
>>>> to
>>>> ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
>>>> other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
>>>>
>>>> At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
>>>> two
>>>> examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
>>>> between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
>>>> Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case:
>>>> “By
>>>> the time the government of the Western region also published a white
>>>> paper
>>>> outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
>>>> in
>>>> the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
>>>> situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
>>>> all
>>>> over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a
>>>> fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
>>>> realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
>>>> useful to
>>>> carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
>>>>
>>>> First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
>>>> was
>>>> that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
>>>> Democratic
>>>> Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
>>>> government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
>>>> post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
>>>> and
>>>> fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
>>>> Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently
>>>> anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
>>>> anti-socialist. A
>>>> brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
>>>> tirelessly
>>>> satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
>>>> composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
>>>> parodic
>>>> visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared –
>>>> wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
>>>> the
>>>> slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
>>>> facts
>>>> and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
>>>> Akintola
>>>> and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
>>>> tensions
>>>> and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
>>>> founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
>>>> they
>>>> called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried,
>>>> unsuccessfully,
>>>> to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
>>>> Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
>>>>
>>>> It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
>>>> and
>>>> realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
>>>> ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
>>>> simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
>>>> pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
>>>> which
>>>> no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate”
>>>> the
>>>> singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
>>>> quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
>>>> to
>>>> this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the
>>>> January
>>>> 15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
>>>>
>>>> In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
>>>> Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
>>>> last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
>>>> assertion
>>>> to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
>>>> is
>>>> that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
>>>> work
>>>> of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
>>>> to
>>>> the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s
>>>> formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other
>>>> modes,
>>>> forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
>>>> art
>>>> or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
>>>> happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
>>>> typically
>>>> and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
>>>> things
>>>> actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
>>>> the
>>>> most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
>>>> that
>>>> gap.
>>>>
>>>> In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
>>>> experience, he
>>>> had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
>>>> practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
>>>> individuality
>>>> had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
>>>> No
>>>> Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
>>>> Trouble
>>>> with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
>>>> Country
>>>> marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture
>>>> in
>>>> which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
>>>> considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
>>>> defense
>>>> of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
>>>> a
>>>> fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
>>>> choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
>>>> next
>>>> week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition.
This is the kind of shortsighted narrow-mindedness that has in recent times fuelled Southern agitation for separation from the North a la South Sudan. Northerner propagandists (particularly core northerners) can’t eat their cake and have it – insisting on one Nigeria (because of oil revenues), yet resisting full integration of Nigeria’s diverse peoples that would consolidate our oneness as a nation.
If we are to evolve into one truly united prosperous nation where all Nigerians feel at home in whatever part of the country they reside, indigeneship will have to go. The distinction between indigeneship and citizenship is utterly nonsensical and retrogressive. Every citizen (even naturalized ones) ought to be an indigene.
Having said that, I don’t think the issue can be easily resolved by simply legislating citizenship to replace indigeneship. It’s one thing for National Assembly to pass legislation to that effect, but the deep seated ethno-religious & state biases of Nigerians (and that is what matters) won’t change just because of some new law in our statute books. Our people will device ways to circumvent laws that they deem contrary to their conscience.
Methinks integration will happen naturally and the notion of indigeneship will disappear within a generation if our leaders can do the right thing and transform this potentially great nation into a prosperous land of abundant opportunities.
The key word here is “opportunities.” Our inordinate preoccupation with indigeneship is largely driven by unhealthy competition for scarce resources and few opportunities in our failed dysfunctional nation. When you have 300 people applying for just 10 job vacancies or university admission places, those in authority will tend to favor their own tribe, co-religionists, state indigenes.
Conversely when opportunities are abundant - in excess of applicants - it becomes pointless to discriminate. You employ whatever applicant is available regardless of ethnicity, religion or state.
Within 2 or 3 decades of such secular detribalized prosperity, a new generation of detribalized Nigerians who know nothing of “indigene” in job applications or school admission, would emerge to consolidate a truly unified Nigeria.
This is not at all high minded speculation. We were close to it during the oil boom of the 1970s when graduates were recruited straight from the universities. I remember the Chief Justice of Borno was a Yoruba Judge.
Back then opportunities abounded and discrimination based state of origin, religion or ethnicity was minimal.
There was no divisive agitation for Sharia, derivation or resource control.
So let’s put the horse before the cart and enthrone responsible visionary leadership that can positively transform Nigeria into a land of abundant opportunities. Indigeneship will gradually disappear on its own.
Nafata
4.
Response by maxim...@yahoo.com on Yan Arewa
Reading AUT's argument, are the following points made the bases for the "NO' vote?:
The government would have to do its best-if it's able to-to draw the people themselves into the process of governance through the enablement of their initiatives.
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at
Austin.
For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a�general�sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the �concept of �'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of �what their culture consists of as a�democracy�where certain things are�believed�not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I�remember�well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification�with�what was described as an English way of life?
I�found�it very�interesting�that while waiting at �train stations in London, the�Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know-�, particularly the women,�would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the�available�space�on the bench. They would wait�until you�noticed them standing and�interpreted� themas waiting for you�to move�so they�could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my�experience�in England, people,�particularly�women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in�passing�without�flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious � that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant �ethnicity be �one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest �Gellner.
� � � It cannot be denied that, in the situations that produced African
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of �Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
� � � � Sent from my BlackBerry wireless device from MTN
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn�t: Reflections On Achebe�s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
�an
Igbo coup�. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only�he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country �a Nigerian ruling class� only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This �architecture�, this �grammar�
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe�s
�explanations�, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that �explanations� and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe�s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the �opening shot� in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe�s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe�s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of �motives�
or
�interests� that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, �tribe�: Was it, or was
it
not, �an Igbo coup�.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
�southern coup�, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or �forcing� Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe�s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, �an Igbo coup�? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving � in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d��tat, this single thread of
ethnicity
or �tribe� is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe�s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or �tribalism� while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe�s own words, is the particular case:
�By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable� (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government�s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola�s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared �
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called �Egbe Omo Olofin�. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde�s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to �contaminate�
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo �in name only�, the
January
15 coup could not have been �an Igbo coup�.
In last week�s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman�s
formulation of this �big grammar�, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe�s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe�s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week�s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
only
speculatively with this choice, with particular reference to what I
personally regard as one of the most controversial aspects of There Was
A
Country, this being the link that Achebe makes in the book between what
he
deems the endemic ethnic scapegoating of Igbos in our country and the
utter
collapse of meritocracy in post-civil war Nigeria.
Concluded.
bje...@fas.harvard.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at
Austin.
For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at
Austin.
For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
� � � For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� � � For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� � � To post to this group, send an email to
USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� � � To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
� � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
� For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� For previous archives, visit �http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue- � � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
CompcrosComparative�Cognitive�Processes and Systems
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a general sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the concept of 'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of what their culture consists of as a democracy where certain things are believed not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I remember well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification with what was described as an English way of life?
I found it very interesting that while waiting at train stations in London, the Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know- , particularly the women, would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the available space on the bench. They would wait until you noticed them standing and interpreted themas waiting for you to move so they could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my experience in England, people, particularly women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in passing without flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant ethnicity be one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner.
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
“an
Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar”
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s
“explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives”
or
“interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was
it
not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
“southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of
ethnicity
or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case:
“By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared –
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate”
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the
January
15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s
formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to�include�a�circumspect�approach to social relations, a culture of�diplomacy, a�sensitivity�to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell�us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of�communities.�ethnicity�refers to a particularly �kind of�community�that demonstrates relatively close kinship�bonds�compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as�societies�achieve�greater�cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become�increasingly�mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations�between�israeli jews and israeli arabs and that�Israeli�jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of�those�situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its�ethnicity�unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish�identity�as �the essence �of their state is the�dominant�ideology there
on�queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people �struggling with each other to�catch�taxis�almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a�general�sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the �concept of �'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of �what their culture consists of as a�democracy�where certain things are�believed�not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I�remember�well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification�with�what was described as an English way of life?
I�found�it very�interesting�that while waiting at �train stations in London, the�Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know-�, particularly the women,�would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the�available�space�on the bench. They would wait�until you�noticed them standing and�interpreted� themas waiting for you�to move�so they�could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my�experience�in England, people,�particularly�women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in�passing�without�flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious � that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant �ethnicity be �one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest �Gellner.
� � � It cannot be denied that, in the situations that produced African
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of �Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
� � � � Sent from my BlackBerry wireless device from MTN
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn�t: Reflections On Achebe�s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
�an
Igbo coup�. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only�he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country �a Nigerian ruling class� only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This �architecture�, this �grammar�
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe�s
�explanations�, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that �explanations� and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe�s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the �opening shot� in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe�s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe�s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of �motives�
or
�interests� that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, �tribe�: Was it, or was
it
not, �an Igbo coup�.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
�southern coup�, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or �forcing� Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe�s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, �an Igbo coup�? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving � in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d��tat, this single thread of
ethnicity
or �tribe� is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe�s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or �tribalism� while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe�s own words, is the particular case:
�By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable� (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government�s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola�s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared �
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called �Egbe Omo Olofin�. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde�s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to �contaminate�
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo �in name only�, the
January
15 coup could not have been �an Igbo coup�.
In last week�s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman�s
formulation of this �big grammar�, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe�s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe�s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week�s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
� � � For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� � � For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� � � To post to this group, send an email to
USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� � � To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
� � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
� For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� For previous archives, visit �http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue- � � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to�include�a�circumspect�approach to social relations, a culture of�diplomacy, a�sensitivity�to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell�us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of�communities.�ethnicity�refers to a particularly �kind of�community�that demonstrates relatively close kinship�bonds�compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as�societies�achieve�greater�cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become�increasingly�mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations�between�israeli jews and israeli arabs and that�Israeli�jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of�those�situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its�ethnicity�unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish�identity�as �the essence �of their state is the�dominant�ideology there
on�queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people �struggling with each other to�catch�taxis�almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a�general�sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the �concept of �'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of �what their culture consists of as a�democracy�where certain things are�believed�not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I�remember�well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification�with�what was described as an English way of life?
I�found�it very�interesting�that while waiting at �train stations in London, the�Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know-�, particularly the women,�would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the�available�space�on the bench. They would wait�until you�noticed them standing and�interpreted� themas waiting for you�to move�so they�could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my�experience�in England, people,�particularly�women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in�passing�without�flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious � that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant �ethnicity be �one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest �Gellner.
� � � It cannot be denied that, in the situations that produced African
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of �Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
� � � � Sent from my BlackBerry wireless device from MTN
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn�t: Reflections On Achebe�s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
�an
Igbo coup�. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only�he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country �a Nigerian ruling class� only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This �architecture�, this �grammar�
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe�s
�explanations�, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that �explanations� and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe�s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the �opening shot� in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe�s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe�s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of �motives�
or
�interests� that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, �tribe�: Was it, or was
it
not, �an Igbo coup�.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
�southern coup�, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or �forcing� Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe�s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, �an Igbo coup�? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving � in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d��tat, this single thread of
ethnicity
or �tribe� is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe�s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or �tribalism� while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe�s own words, is the particular case:
�By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable� (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government�s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola�s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared �
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called �Egbe Omo Olofin�. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde�s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to �contaminate�
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo �in name only�, the
January
15 coup could not have been �an Igbo coup�.
In last week�s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman�s
formulation of this �big grammar�, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe�s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe�s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week�s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
� � � For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� � � For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� � � To post to this group, send an email to
USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� � � To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
� � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
� For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� For previous archives, visit �http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue- � � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
Intermarriage is prohibited by the Jewish Halakha.[202] In the case of mixed Arab-Jewish marriages, emotions run especially high. A 2007 opinion survey found that more than half of Israeli Jews believed intermarriage was equivalent to national treason. A group of Jewish men in Pisgat Zeev have started patrolling the town to stop Jewish women from dating Arab men. The municipality of Petah Tikva has also announced an initiative to providing a telephone hotline for friends and family to report Jewish girls who date Arab men as well as psychologists to provide counselling. The town of Kiryat Gat launched a campaign in schools to warn Jewish girls against dating local Bedouin men.[203][204]
All the claims made are referenced and linked in the essay.
Also : Israel's Fear of Jewish Girls Dating Arabs; Team of Psychologists to "Rescue" Women
Also helpful-For Netanyahu, Jewish Israel Comes Before Democratic Israel
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 3:00 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
the truth is people queue for buses in some places and not in others.
here at michigan state, students kind of hang around the bus station, and stumble on when the bus arrives. we don't form lines as in england. in new york i have actually seen more lines forming, but that's because there are more people and they are more stressed about getting on the bus, getting a seat, and getting where they need to be.
the same with driving: here in the midwest, we are probably the most considerate drivers in the world. but as you get closer to any big city, detroit, chicago, new york, the tension rises, people tend not to let you in when trying to change lanes or merge, the start stop is much much faster, and the experience is tenser. it is even worse because the traffic gets thick, and then stops, and no one wants anyone to get ahead of them.
we are not like that in mid-michigan
we are a more polite community!
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
ken
On 1/4/13 1:32 AM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to include a circumspect approach to social relations, a culture of diplomacy, a sensitivity to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of communities. ethnicity refers to a particularly kind of community that demonstrates relatively close kinship bonds compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as societies achieve greater cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become increasingly mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations between israeli jews and israeli arabs and that Israeli jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of those situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its ethnicity unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish identity as the essence of their state is the dominant ideology there
on queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people struggling with each other to catch taxis almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a general sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the concept of 'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of what their culture consists of as a democracy where certain things are believed not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I remember well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification with what was described as an English way of life?
I found it very interesting that while waiting at train stations in London, the Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know- , particularly the women, would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the available space on the bench. They would wait until you noticed them standing and interpreted themas waiting for you to move so they could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my experience in England, people, particularly women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in passing without flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant ethnicity be one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner.
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
“an
Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar”
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s
“explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives”
or
“interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was
it
not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
“southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of
ethnicity
or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case:
“By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared –
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate”
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the
January
15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s
formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
CompcrosComparative Cognitive Processes and Systems
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
the truth is people queue for buses in some places and not in others.
here at michigan state, students kind of hang around the bus station, and stumble on when the bus arrives. we don't form lines as in england. in new york i have actually seen more lines forming, but that's because there are more people and they are more stressed about getting on the bus, getting a seat, and getting where they need to be.
the same with driving: here in the midwest, we are probably the most considerate drivers in the world. but as you get closer to any big city, detroit, chicago, new york, the tension rises, people tend not to let you in when trying to change lanes or merge, the start stop is much much faster, and the experience is tenser. it is even worse because the traffic gets thick, and then stops, and no one wants anyone to get ahead of them.
we are not like that in mid-michigan
we are a more polite community!
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
ken
On 1/4/13 1:32 AM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to include a circumspect approach to social relations, a culture of diplomacy, a sensitivity to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of communities. ethnicity refers to a particularly kind of community that demonstrates relatively close kinship bonds compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as societies achieve greater cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become increasingly mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations between israeli jews and israeli arabs and that Israeli jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of those situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its ethnicity unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish identity as the essence of their state is the dominant ideology there
on queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people struggling with each other to catch taxis almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a general sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the concept of 'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of what their culture consists of as a democracy where certain things are believed not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I remember well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification with what was described as an English way of life?
I found it very interesting that while waiting at train stations in London, the Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know- , particularly the women, would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the available space on the bench. They would wait until you noticed them standing and interpreted themas waiting for you to move so they could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my experience in England, people, particularly women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in passing without flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant ethnicity be one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner.
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
“an
Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar”
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s
“explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives”
or
“interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was
it
not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
“southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of
ethnicity
or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case:
“By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared –
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate”
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the
January
15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s
formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
Wikipedia
Opposition to intermarriage
Intermarriage is prohibited by the Jewish�Halakha.[202]�In the case of mixed Arab-Jewish marriages, emotions run especially high. A 2007 opinion survey found that more than half of Israeli Jews believed intermarriage was equivalent to national treason. A group of Jewish men in�Pisgat Zeev�have started patrolling the town to stop Jewish women from dating Arab men. The municipality of�Petah Tikva�has also announced an initiative to providing a telephone hotline for friends and family to report Jewish girls who date Arab men as well as psychologists to provide counselling. The town of�Kiryat Gat�launched a campaign in schools to warn Jewish girls against dating local Bedouin men.[203][204]
All the�claims�made�are referenced and linked in the essay.
Also�:�Israel's Fear of Jewish Girls Dating Arabs; Team of Psychologists to "Rescue" Women
Also�helpful-For Netanyahu, Jewish�Israel�Comes Before Democratic�Israel
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 7:52 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU <tva...@gmail.com> wrote:
will look into this-�
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 3:00 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
the truth is people queue for buses in some places and not in others.
here at michigan state, students kind of hang around the bus station, and stumble on when the bus arrives. we don't form lines as in england. in new york i have actually seen more lines forming, but that's because there are more people and they are more stressed about getting on the bus, getting a seat, and getting where they need to be.
the same with driving: here in the midwest, we are probably the most considerate drivers in the world. but as you get closer to any big city, detroit, chicago, new york, the tension rises, people tend not to let� you in when trying to change lanes or merge, the start stop is much much faster, and the experience is tenser. it is even worse because the traffic gets thick, and then stops, and no one wants anyone to get ahead of them.
we are not like that in mid-michigan
we are a more polite community!
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
ken
On 1/4/13 1:32 AM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to�include�a�circumspect�approach to social relations, a culture of�diplomacy, a�sensitivity�to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell�us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of�communities.�ethnicity�refers to a particularly �kind of�community�that demonstrates relatively close kinship�bonds�compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as�societies�achieve�greater�cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become�increasingly�mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations�between�israeli jews and israeli arabs and that�Israeli�jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of�those�situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its�ethnicity�unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish�identity�as �the essence �of their state is the�dominant�ideology there
on�queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people �struggling with each other to�catch�taxis�almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a�general�sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the �concept of �'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of �what their culture consists of as a�democracy�where certain things are�believed�not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I�remember�well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification�with�what was described as an English way of life?
I�found�it very�interesting�that while waiting at �train stations in London, the�Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know-�, particularly the women,�would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the�available�space�on the bench. They would wait�until you�noticed them standing and�interpreted� themas waiting for you�to move�so they�could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my�experience�in England, people,�particularly�women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in�passing�without�flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious � that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant �ethnicity be �one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest �Gellner.
� � � It cannot be denied that, in the situations that produced African
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of �Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
� � � � Sent from my BlackBerry wireless device from MTN
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn�t: Reflections On Achebe�s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
�an
Igbo coup�. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only�he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country �a Nigerian ruling class� only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This �architecture�, this �grammar�
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe�s
�explanations�, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that �explanations� and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe�s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the �opening shot� in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe�s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe�s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of �motives�
or
�interests� that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, �tribe�: Was it, or was
it
not, �an Igbo coup�.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
�southern coup�, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or �forcing� Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe�s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, �an Igbo coup�? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving � in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d��tat, this single thread of
ethnicity
or �tribe� is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe�s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or �tribalism� while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe�s own words, is the particular case:
�By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable� (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government�s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola�s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared �
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called �Egbe Omo Olofin�. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde�s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to �contaminate�
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo �in name only�, the
January
15 coup could not have been �an Igbo coup�.
In last week�s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman�s
formulation of this �big grammar�, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe�s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe�s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week�s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
� � � For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� � � For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� � � To post to this group, send an email to
USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� � � To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
� � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
� For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� For previous archives, visit �http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue- � � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
--
CompcrosComparative�Cognitive�Processes and Systems
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
hi toyin
you cited wikipedia stating that israel did everything to prohibit intimate relations between israeli jews and arabs. that didn't make sense to me. however, what you cite below does strike me as perfectly believable. the point is that if half of israeli jews are opposed to it, half are not. that split reflects the split between the orthodox and more secular jews, with the group of men cited below no doubt orthodox. if there is a movement to stop it, it is because it is, in fact, happening, at least somewhat.
in the u.s. at least half jewish marriages are now mixed, if not more. fewer in israel, to be sure, but the mixing is still real
what strikes me is the hatefulness of the purists, the self-righteous group that polices the ties of others.
i guess i am self-righteous myself in condemning them.
ken
On 1/4/13 3:05 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
Wikipedia
Opposition to intermarriage
Intermarriage is prohibited by the Jewish Halakha.[202] In the case of mixed Arab-Jewish marriages, emotions run especially high. A 2007 opinion survey found that more than half of Israeli Jews believed intermarriage was equivalent to national treason. A group of Jewish men in Pisgat Zeev have started patrolling the town to stop Jewish women from dating Arab men. The municipality of Petah Tikva has also announced an initiative to providing a telephone hotline for friends and family to report Jewish girls who date Arab men as well as psychologists to provide counselling. The town of Kiryat Gat launched a campaign in schools to warn Jewish girls against dating local Bedouin men.[203][204]
All the claims made are referenced and linked in the essay.
Also : Israel's Fear of Jewish Girls Dating Arabs; Team of Psychologists to "Rescue" Women
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 7:52 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU <tva...@gmail.com> wrote:
will look into this-
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 3:00 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
the truth is people queue for buses in some places and not in others.
here at michigan state, students kind of hang around the bus station, and stumble on when the bus arrives. we don't form lines as in england. in new york i have actually seen more lines forming, but that's because there are more people and they are more stressed about getting on the bus, getting a seat, and getting where they need to be.
the same with driving: here in the midwest, we are probably the most considerate drivers in the world. but as you get closer to any big city, detroit, chicago, new york, the tension rises, people tend not to let you in when trying to change lanes or merge, the start stop is much much faster, and the experience is tenser. it is even worse because the traffic gets thick, and then stops, and no one wants anyone to get ahead of them.
we are not like that in mid-michigan
we are a more polite community!
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
ken
On 1/4/13 1:32 AM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to include a circumspect approach to social relations, a culture of diplomacy, a sensitivity to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of communities. ethnicity refers to a particularly kind of community that demonstrates relatively close kinship bonds compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as societies achieve greater cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become increasingly mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations between israeli jews and israeli arabs and that Israeli jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of those situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its ethnicity unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish identity as the essence of their state is the dominant ideology there
on queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people struggling with each other to catch taxis almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a general sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the concept of 'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of what their culture consists of as a democracy where certain things are believed not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I remember well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification with what was described as an English way of life?
I found it very interesting that while waiting at train stations in London, the Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know- , particularly the women, would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the available space on the bench. They would wait until you noticed them standing and interpreted themas waiting for you to move so they could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my experience in England, people, particularly women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in passing without flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant ethnicity be one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner.
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
“an
Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar”
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s
“explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives”
or
“interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was
it
not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
“southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of
ethnicity
or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case:
“By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared –
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate”
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the
January
15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s
formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
CompcrosComparative Cognitive Processes and Systems
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
thanks.
the wikipedia�article�has�links�to its sources which one�can�check to assess�their�validity.
why should�you�think you�could�be be �self�righteous in�condemning�the�purists?�
are all possible�responses�as�good�as �each�other?
are there no�criteria�by which we can assess�your�response in�comparison�with�theirs?�
i expect the implications of other mixed jewish �marriages are much �less�challenging�than��mixed�marriages between�Israeli�jews and arabs �bcs the stakes are much�higher�in the latter case�
On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 3:22 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
hi toyin
you cited wikipedia stating that israel did everything to prohibit intimate relations between israeli jews and arabs. that didn't make sense to me. however, what you cite below does strike me as perfectly believable. the point is that if half of israeli jews are opposed to it, half are not. that split reflects the split between the orthodox and more secular jews, with the group of men cited below no doubt orthodox. if there is a movement to stop it, it is because it is, in fact, happening, at least somewhat.
in the u.s. at least half jewish marriages are now mixed, if not more. fewer in israel, to be sure, but the mixing is still real
what strikes me is the hatefulness of the purists, the self-righteous group that polices the ties of others.
i guess i am self-righteous myself in condemning them.
ken
On 1/4/13 3:05 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
Wikipedia
Opposition to intermarriage
Intermarriage is prohibited by the Jewish�Halakha.[202]�In the case of mixed Arab-Jewish marriages, emotions run especially high. A 2007 opinion survey found that more than half of Israeli Jews believed intermarriage was equivalent to national treason. A group of Jewish men in�Pisgat Zeev�have started patrolling the town to stop Jewish women from dating Arab men. The municipality of�Petah Tikva�has also announced an initiative to providing a telephone hotline for friends and family to report Jewish girls who date Arab men as well as psychologists to provide counselling. The town of�Kiryat Gat�launched a campaign in schools to warn Jewish girls against dating local Bedouin men.[203][204]
All the�claims�made�are referenced and linked in the essay.
Also�:�Israel's Fear of Jewish Girls Dating Arabs; Team of Psychologists to "Rescue" Women
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 7:52 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU <tva...@gmail.com> wrote:
will look into this-�
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 3:00 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
the truth is people queue for buses in some places and not in others.
here at michigan state, students kind of hang around the bus station, and stumble on when the bus arrives. we don't form lines as in england. in new york i have actually seen more lines forming, but that's because there are more people and they are more stressed about getting on the bus, getting a seat, and getting where they need to be.
the same with driving: here in the midwest, we are probably the most considerate drivers in the world. but as you get closer to any big city, detroit, chicago, new york, the tension rises, people tend not to let� you in when trying to change lanes or merge, the start stop is much much faster, and the experience is tenser. it is even worse because the traffic gets thick, and then stops, and no one wants anyone to get ahead of them.
we are not like that in mid-michigan
we are a more polite community!
as for the policing of separation between jews and arabs in israel, i wonder if anyone could actually corroborate that story. seems like a myth more than reality.
ken
On 1/4/13 1:32 AM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
omoluabi connotes a group of values that define a person of good breeding in yoruba culture.
i understand such values to�include�a�circumspect�approach to social relations, a culture of�diplomacy, a�sensitivity�to how one presents oneself in public etc
those better informed could refine this or tell�us more
Oyiba- not come across it.
whats its source?
community is too general. there are different kinds of�communities.�ethnicity�refers to a particularly �kind of�community�that demonstrates relatively close kinship�bonds�compared to humanity as a whole.
england is a country, like nigeria is.
nigeria does not constitute one ethnicity.
but both countries can be said to be composed by ethnic clusters.
as�societies�achieve�greater�cosmopolitanism and become more open, however, such ethnic lines become�increasingly�mixed.
in israel for example,wikipedia states everything is done to prevent intimate relations�between�israeli jews and israeli arabs and that�Israeli�jews who 'fall' into such unsanctioned alliances, as 'assisted by special 'counselling centres' to come out of�those�situations
that is one group described as doing everything to keep its�ethnicity�unmixed. i have not crosschecked it, but its what i expect the israeli jews to do since their jewish�identity�as �the essence �of their state is the�dominant�ideology there
on�queuing, im struck too see in hitchcock's north by northwest and up till sex and the city people �struggling with each other to�catch�taxis�almost like in nigeria.
it would not happen in england.
dont they que for buses in the US?
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:05 AM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
toyin
(to shorten things up-it is getting late)
1. i hate "caucasians"--it seems an awkward, historically repulsive term, to avoid the directness of "the whites." les blancs; the whites. whiteness; whitey.
if you don't like it, try oyiba, that works perfectly well
2. what is omoluabi?
3. what exactly do we lose if we use the term "community," instead of ethnicity?
no one would call the English an ethnicity; but they do form a community, with its own cultural values, its own exclusions and inclusions, etc. you are perfectly right to describe the quaint customs of their community at train stations. i once stood outside a cordoned off area, patiently waiting with thousands outside victoria station, while the police ascertained that the bomb threat from the ira was gone, before we could get inside.
gotta tell you: the calm lines of people did not have anything whatsoever to do with what it would have been in new york! we don't even have a word for what those strange englishers do when they wait for buses--"queuing"--all i know from queus is that they are tails in french, another white people who don't wait in lines either
ken
ken
On 1/3/13 6:42 PM, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU wrote:
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful
'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-
'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a�general�sense.
The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the �concept of �'omoluabi'.
In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of �what their culture consists of as a�democracy�where certain things are�believed�not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.
What of the drive in England-if I�remember�well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification�with�what was described as an English way of life?
I�found�it very�interesting�that while waiting at �train stations in London, the�Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know-�, particularly the women,�would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the�available�space�on the bench. They would wait�until you�noticed them standing and�interpreted� themas waiting for you�to move�so they�could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my�experience�in England, people,�particularly�women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in�passing�without�flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.
It should be obvious � that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant �ethnicity be �one way of looking at culture?
thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest �Gellner.
� � � It cannot be denied that, in the situations that produced African
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of �Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
� � � � Sent from my BlackBerry wireless device from MTN
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn�t: Reflections On Achebe�s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
�an
Igbo coup�. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only�he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country �a Nigerian ruling class� only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This �architecture�, this �grammar�
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe�s
�explanations�, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that �explanations� and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe�s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the �opening shot� in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe�s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe�s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of �motives�
or
�interests� that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, �tribe�: Was it, or was
it
not, �an Igbo coup�.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
�southern coup�, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or �forcing� Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe�s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, �an Igbo coup�? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving � in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d��tat, this single thread of
ethnicity
or �tribe� is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe�s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or �tribalism� while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe�s own words, is the particular case:
�By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable� (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government�s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola�s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared �
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called �Egbe Omo Olofin�. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde�s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to �contaminate�
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo �in name only�, the
January
15 coup could not have been �an Igbo coup�.
In last week�s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman�s
formulation of this �big grammar�, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe�s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe�s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week�s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
� � � For current archives, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� � � For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� � � To post to this group, send an email to
USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� � � To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
� � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit
http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
kenneth w. harrow
faculty excellence advocate
distinguished professor of english
michigan state university
department of english
619 red cedar road
room C-614 wells hall
east lansing, mi 48824
ph. 517 803 8839
har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
� For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
� For previous archives, visit �http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
� To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
� To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue- � � � unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
--
CompcrosComparative�Cognitive�Processes and Systems
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
-- kenneth w. harrow faculty excellence advocate distinguished professor of english michigan state university department of english 619 red cedar road room C-614 wells hall east lansing, mi 48824 ph. 517 803 8839 har...@msu.edu
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
�
�
They killed one Igbo person- an officer who was not of high rank.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
ideally or to a large extent?-beautiful'.... citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.striking thought in this context- 'that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.'
is this completely true-'i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.'
Various people may have pervasive among them, a conception of what it means to be Yoruba or English, for example, in a general sense.The Yoruba conception/s for example, may perhaps be summed up in the concept of 'omoluabi'.In English general culture, these ideas also emerge along with people's views of what their culture consists of as a democracy where certain things are believed not to be possible even if they could be elsewhere.What of the drive in England-if I remember well- to get immigrants to demonstrate a degree of identification with what was described as an English way of life?
I found it very interesting that while waiting at train stations in London, the Caucasians-if anybody knows of a better term please let me know- , particularly the women, would almost never ask you to move so they could sit on the available space on the bench. They would wait until you noticed them standing and interpreted themas waiting for you to move so they could sit.
I found this amazing, coming from a country where you ask rather than wait.
I have also found it striking that in my experience in England, people, particularly women, referring to people one does not know,do not look one in the face in passing without flashing a polite smile. Amazing! It must something learned.It should be obvious that peoples may be described in terms of cultures and why cant ethnicity be one way of looking at culture?thankstoyin
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 10:36 PM, kenneth harrow <har...@msu.edu> wrote:
dear shina
the long extract was from johannes fabian's Moments of Freedom, which is about popular culture.
it echoes his other work on time, which you mention, in one chapter. ethnicity is not central to this book, but it figures in to it.
the core is the cultures he discusses in Shaba, and the way popular culture (like the informal sector) functions outside the dominant, ordered, state, high, etc culture. for him freedom characterizes the popular, and its political resistance is a function of its placement in society as unofficial, unvalued, etc. like for instance things like smoking! or storytelling, vs publishing a novel, say
as for ethnicity, i do not think it is the same as genes.
we have genes, we inherit lots both genetically in the culture our parents place us into, in the world, which mark us. but none of this determines us, like a fiber we can't resist.
we are, i would hazard, a combination of the same things as culture above: ordered and controlled by larger forces than our will, and disordered, unofficial, resistant.
i postulated something like that earlier, citing judith butler, for whom our agency comes from a subjectivity formed both in resistance and acquiescence to the forces that govern our psyches, like our parents.
i made that claim concerning colonialism; but here we can simply make something similar re ethnicity: we are in it, especially as it interpellates us and we respond to it; and we resist or refuse it; and we find our agency in the play of both this acquiescence and resistance.
i strongly believe that it is colonial thought that gave ethnic definitions to africans as if they were objects: wolof are this, igbos are that, etc. i despair to think that africans would have accepted these designations as if they were innate, as if the colonialists won.
that doesn't mean ethnicity doesn't exist; it means it isn't innate. and it means no one is defined by it, because if they were, they would not have agency.
to be human is to have agency--the very thing colonialists and slave owners and early anthropologists and historians all tried to deny africans
ken
Prof.,
I must say I enjoy reading the Fabian extract you posted. I am certainly interested in reading the whole essay if I can lay my hands on it. Is he the same Fabian that wrote a book on anthropology and time or something?
For quite a while now, I've been fascinated, especially by the debate in nationalism studies between the primordialists and the constructionists. I took a serious interest in the debate on ethnic configuration between Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner.
Let me thank the moderator for calling all of us to task on the informal sector as an important aspect of Nigeria's national existence. I am all too glad I could lay my hands on something on which I can be educated and which can contribute to the ongoing debate about the national well being of Nigeria. All I think I have done is simply to identify what I've observed for a while as a 'citizen' of Nigeria. I am therefore also waiting for Prof. Olukotun to contribute a magisterial piece that will move the debate forward and enable small fry like me learn from the mouth of the elder.
While we await that contribution, permit me to share an elaboration. I will do this by responding in part to Prof. Harrow's historical reconstruction of Ibrahim's graphic statement. For Harrow, ethnicity should be seen more as a construct rather than an original sin.
"ethnicity wasn't an original sin; it is the current sin, reconstituted
as if it were an originary identity, a response to a period of
insecurity and weakness".
I agree with this historical trajectory and it gives us the foundation for arriving at where we are now as a 'developing' state. By 'original sin', I think what Ibrahim meant is simply that the foundation for the construction of ethnicity was laid at the emergence of the Nigerian state by both the colonisers and the postcolonial leadership. The failure of that leadership as well as the dynamics of postcolonial politics in Nigeria compromised the promises of independence for the majority of the anticolonial masses in Nigeria. That, we can say, is the beginning of the fundamental problem of suffering in Nigeria. Philip Zachernuk, in Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (2000), gives a very damning analysis of the pre-and post-independence roles of our 'founding fathers' that contributed, in a large part, to where we are today.
I hazard the hypothesis that the dream of national integration became fatally aborted with the inability of the nationalists to come to term with the question of how a law and order state founded on an exploitative logic could birth social transformation. From then on, the imperative was to attend more to what can be called the national, rather than the social, question. The former concerns how the unruly diversity created by the Lugardian amalgamation can be brought under a mechanical unity. The latter concerns how that diversity can benefit from the social transformation of their lives. Unfortunately, the leadership failed to see the intimate connection between the fulfilment of the latter and the achievement of the former. It is in this sense, for me, that nationalism became an elitist bubble that burst every time it confronts the raw edges of the people's deprivation and suffering. What has happened to our beloved NYSC and the Quota system?
How are the hapless masses expected to react to the volte-face of the nationalists after independence as well as the gradual but steady impoverishment of their existence through the steady and inexorable collapse of formal structures? Of course, find their own meanings within an informality that answers to a Geertzian logic of commonsense and ontology. The informal sector is, for me, a penumbral, elastic and contradictory site of confrontation for, and enactment of, meanings. To follow Geertz, it is a web of significance individuals have spun for themselves to enact their understanding of what they are capable of doing in socio-economic terms.
Remember, as far as I am concerned, informality was created from the imperative of suffering. It is an ongoing attempt to make suffering sufferable. And its structures are therefore not erected to deny that suffering, but to deny that "life is unendurable" and meaningless outside the spheres of the state. The informal sector therefore speaks to an instrumental social existence and the ontology of survival that attends it.
It is within this penumbra of informality that all kinds of activities-white, black, grey, paradoxical-operate The realm leaves the beast of ethnicity to roam largely unfettered. It is the realm where jokes abound about the owambe Yoruba, the cunning Ibo, the Hausa who is eternally a 'mola' (a dunce, largely a perjorative corruption of 'mallam') and the rascal Warri guy! Within the realm, my constructed 'Yoruba' identity sits snugly with me than the fact that I am an igbomina person. Ethnicity enables the struggle for existence beyond the vale of tears called the state! We mend our roads (for instance, like my own axis of the network that broke down barely three months after it was 'mintly' commissioned), organise our own security, provide our own foods and enact our own existence. We also freely and ethnically caricature and confront anyone who attempt to hinder such meaningfulness.
Outside of this loose realm, of course we come together for the sham ritual of integration when Nigeria confronts, say, Brazil in an international soccer match. After this-and woe to the leadership if we are beaten silly-we return to burrow in our informality beyond the lures of patriotic zeal. I give you an instance: Do you imagine there can be a comparison, in terms of attendance, between a Man U versus Barca match (on the one hand), and a Nigeria versus Togo match? I don't think so. If I watch the Nigerian match, it is likely for the reason that I am a football addict, not because of any patriotic zeal. The informal sector, I repeat, was constructed from the deadwoods of nation-building.
For proper national integration to commence, it must commence at this level of informality, paradoxically. It is paradoxical because informality is meant to operate beyond the scope of government and in opposition. Nation building must commence there because it packs an untapped national energy that our leadership have failed to see all the while beyond their instrumental perception of informality as another avenue to increase revenues and line the already obscenely bloated pockets.
Thus, if I must be patriotic, the state must come to my rescue in answering the social question that confronts me daily. If it does not, to hell with patriotism! The leadership can go on singing their lonely songs of national unity.
Adeshina Afolayan
First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn’t: Reflections On Achebe’s
New
Book (2)
By Biodun Jeyifo
Superficially, it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed
“an
Igbo coup”. However, scratch a little deeper and complicating factors
are
discovered: One of the majors was Yoruba, and Nzeogwu himself was Igbo
in
name only…he was widely known as someone who saw himself as a
Northerner,
spoke fluent Hausa and little Igbo, and wore the traditional Northern
dress
when not in uniform.
Chinua Achebe, There Was A Country
In the end, I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute
power
over narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can
arrange
stories about others pretty much where, and as, they like.
Chinua Achebe, Home and Exile
If in There Was A Country “a Nigerian ruling class” only appears in the
narratives and reflections of the author in the final fourth part of the
book, this is only the most stunning aspect of the general intellectual
and
discursive architecture of the book. This “architecture”, this “grammar”
is
none other than the fact that for nearly all other parts of the book
with
the exception of that concluding fourth part, all of Achebe’s
“explanations”, all of his speculations in the book are relentlessly
driven
by ethnicity, and a very curious conception of ethnicity for that
matter.
Logically, inevitably, the corollary to this is that “explanations” and
speculations based on class, and more specifically on intra-class and
inter-class factors, are either completely ignored or even deliberately
excluded. As I shall presently demonstrate, this is a remarkable
departure
from virtually all of Achebe’s writings prior to this recently published
book. For now, let me illustrate this startling matter of the complete
subsumption of class into ethnicity in There Was A Country with two
particularly telling examples out of innumerable other instances in the
book.
The first of our two selected examples pertains to nothing less than the
January 15, 1966 coup itself, arguably the “opening shot” in the chain
of
events and crises that led to the Nigeria-Biafra war, the central
subject of
Achebe’s book. It so happens that there is quite a significant body of
both
general and academic writings and discourses on this signal event. And
indeed, Achebe’s long citation of his sources in the bibliographic
section
of his book mentions many of these writings and discourses on the
January
15, 1966 coup. It is therefore baffling that of the variety of “motives”
or
“interests” that have been ascribed to the coup plotters, the single one
that Achebe addresses in his book is ethnicity, “tribe”: Was it, or was
it
not, “an Igbo coup”.
There have been suggestions, there have been speculations that it was a
“southern coup”, this in light of the fact that most of the political
and
military leaders assassinated or inadvertently killed were,
overwhelmingly,
either northerners or southerners in alliance with northern leaders.
More
pertinent to the present discussion, there has also been an even more
plausible speculation that class and ideological interests were
significant
in the motives of influential members of the coup plotters like Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu and Wale Ademoyega. Of the two alliances of the ruling
class
parties of the First Republic, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and
the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), with the exception of Festus
Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister, all those assassinated belonged to
the
NNA. S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, was a diehard NNA
chieftain; there is compelling evidence that this was why he was
assassinated while Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region,
was
spared because he was a major figure in the UPGA alliance. As a matter
of
fact, there is clear evidence that some of the coup plotters had the
intension of making or “forcing” Chief Awolowo to assume the office of
Prime
Minister in the belief that the progressive northern allies of UPGA were
far
more regionally and nationally popular and credible than the southern
and
conservative allies of the NNA.
Achebe’s book pays not the slightest attention to these other probable
factors in assessing the motives of the January 15 coup plotters. Was
it, or
was it not, “an Igbo coup”? That is all Achebe is interested in
exploring -
and disproving – in There Was A Country. Of the many threads that form
the
complex fabric of that fateful coup d’état, this single thread of
ethnicity
or “tribe” is all that Achebe strenuously tries to unravel in his book.
This
may be because by the time of the terrible pogroms of May 1966 against
Igbos
in the North, all other plausible motives for the coup had been almost
completely erased by assertions, indeed pronouncements that the coup had
incontrovertibly been an Igbo coup. But Achebe’s book was written more
than
forty years after the event and it had the advantage of both historical
hindsight and a vast body of accumulated research and discourses. For
this
reason, there is no other conclusion left for us other than a finding
that
Achebe almost certainly has a driving rationale for sticking exclusively
to
ethnicity or “tribalism” while simultaneously ignoring or excluding all
other plausible, and in some cases factual, factors.
At any rate, this is precisely what Achebe repeats in the second of our
two
examples. This pertains to the period of regional and nation-wide crises
between 1964 to 1966 that preceded the January 15 coup and the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Here, in Achebe’s own words, is the particular case:
“By
the time the government of the Western region also published a white
paper
outlining the dominance of the ethnic Igbo in key government positions
in
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority, the
situation for ethnic Igbos working in Western Nigeria in particular and
all
over Nigeria in general had become untenable” (p. 77). This is indeed a
fact, but it is a partial fact, one aspect of a complex of facts and
realities many of which Achebe chooses to ignore or obscure. It is
useful to
carefully state what these other facts and realities were.
First, the government of the Western region that Achebe alludes to here
was
that of Chief S.L. Akintola and his party, the Nigerian National
Democratic
Party (NNDP). Arguably, these were the most perniciously right-wing
government and party in southern Nigeria in the entirety of our
post-independence political history. Achebe completely ignores this fact
and
fixes exclusively on this government’s anti-Igbo programs and diatribes.
Secondly, Akintola’s government and party were not only virulently
anti-Igbo, they were also scurrilously anti-welfarist and
anti-socialist. A
brilliant orator and a master of Yoruba rhetorical arts, Akintola
tirelessly
satirized a range of targets and issues of which Igbos were only one
composite group. He was particularly fond of spewing out twisted,
parodic
visions of welfarism and socialism in which everything would be shared –
wives, children, family heirlooms and personal belongings. There is not
the
slightest doubt in my mind that Achebe had to have been aware of these
facts
and realities; but he ignores them completely. Thirdly and lastly,
Akintola
and his party quite deliberately stoked the fires of intra-ethnic
tensions
and resentments within Yoruba sub-groups and they took this as far as
founding a rival Pan-Yoruba organization to the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which
they
called “Egbe Omo Olofin”. And for good measure, they tried,
unsuccessfully,
to instigate the late Duro Ladipo to write and produce a play to counter
Hubert Ogunde’s famous pro-Awolowo and pro-UPGA play, Yoruba Ronu.
It must be emphasized that all these intra-class and intra-ethnic facts
and
realities were so well-known at the time that Achebe could not have been
ignorant of them. We are left with no other conclusion than that Achebe
simply had no place in his book for any factors, any realities beyond a
pristine, autochthonous conception of ethnic identity and belonging in
which
no other aspects of social identification are allowed to “contaminate”
the
singularity of ethnicity . This, I suggest, is what we see in its
quintessence in the argument expressed in the first of the two epigraphs
to
this essay to the effect that Nzeogwu being Igbo “in name only”, the
January
15 coup could not have been “an Igbo coup”.
In last week’s beginning essay in this series, I made the assertion that
Achebe is one of the greatest realist writers in world literature in the
last century and half. I now wish to clarify the relevance of that
assertion
to the present discussion. One of the most compelling claims of realism
is
that it is the mode or genre in which the chain of representation in a
work
of literature or, more broadly, an intellectual treatise, comes closest
to
the chain of causality in nature, history or society. In a layman’s
formulation of this “big grammar”, this means that above all other
modes,
forms and genres, it is in realism that what is presented in a work of
art
or a treatise is as close as you can possibly get to how things actually
happened. Another way of putting this across is to suggest that
typically
and unavoidably, there being always and forever a big gap between how
things
actually happen and how they are (re)presented in writing, it is only
the
most gifted and talented realist writers that come close to bridging
that
gap.
In all of Achebe’s books on our pre-colonial and postcolonial
experience, he
had come closer than perhaps any other writer to this conception and
practice of realism. More specifically, ethnicity, class and
individuality
had been superbly interwoven and productively explored in such titles as
No
Longer at Ease, A Man of the People, Anthills of the Savannah, The
Trouble
with Nigeria and Home and Exile. Thus, in my opinion, There Was A
Country
marks a radical rupture in Achebe’s writings on our country, a rupture
in
which the realist rigour of his previous writings gives way to, or is
considerably modified by a mystique, an apologia, an uncompromising
defense
of Igbo ethno-nationalism. I do not think that Achebe took this path in
a
fit of absent-mindedness; to the contrary, I think it is a decision, a
choice he made in this new book quite deliberately and purposively. In
next
week’s continuation of this series, I shall deal extensively even if
"Exploring Every Corner of the Cosmos in Search of Knowledge"
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfric...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsub...@googlegroups.com
That was fun.
Salutations to Professor Ogo Ofuani for his lectures in stylistics to our third year class at the University of Benin, where he seemed to perform wonders of literary analysis but demonstrated how this wonder was performed, to Niyi Osundare for the fantastic analyses of "Words of Iron, Sentences of Thunder : Soyinka's Prose Style", to George Steiner's love of language as in After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, to David Crystal and Michael Halliday on stylistics.
thanks
Ahhhhh.... my fans have been motivated into action.I am compiling what I describe as examples of the poetry of invective from Nigerian centred listserves.This piece from Franklyne Ogbunwezeh is an impressive addition.Imagine the learnedness in this coinage:"a genocidare in the most proximate potency."Does that word 'genocidare' exist?Google shows he meant "Genocidaire"But thats allright. Its a striking English which I am pleased to come across for the first time.See his other lines:"All you need to do is to give him the platform and he will ventilate the repressed angst that has been propelling his genocidal intentions."......the mindset that really informs some of the cryptic murderers that hide in cyberspace to peddle their trade hoping that some nutjob will gain inspiration for mayhem from their unvarnished nonsense."Beautiful-'cryptic murderers'- how can murderers be cryptic? Not simply hidden or concealed but cryptic?Wow.Cryptic...crypt- physical space- [en]crypt-method of shaping virtual, digital space through presenting information in a concealed manner- creating the virtual analogue to the subterranean space of the crypt, where perhaps rites that blaspheme humanity are performed in an evil church as evoked in Soyinka's A Shuttle in the Crypt or where the holy space of the church, evoking the womb of human being, Dennis Brutus's "lambent flame of man's inherent humanity", becomes the space of scriptic- significators-in virtual space- activity that seeks to raise an altar to the inhuman, to adapt Dennis Wheatley's novels on magic and Algernon Blackwood's "Strange Worship".See the almost incantatory rhythm at play here:"cryptic murderers that hide in cyberspace to peddle their trade hoping that some nutjob will gain inspiration for mayhem from their unvarnished nonsense."Hmmmm.....peddle...fine word...peddler, a street hawker, evoking here, not just the sense of determined labour but of ignominy....the line comes to rest in the final noun phrase " unvarnished nonsense".With the movement from 'inspiration for mayhem', culminating in the sheer dismissal of the offerings of the peddler, " unvarnished nonsense", linking back to "cryptic murderers that hide in cyberspace to peddle their trade", the whole sequence evokes an almost Shakespearean sense of gravitas and outraged humanity.
That was fun.
toyin
Recognizing one’s
limits of knowledge,
depth of ignorance,
plain inability to be other than subjective
conditions that define human being
one may jump body and soul
into expanding
one’s
learning,
training,
interest,
and experience scales and scopes.
“Confucius claimed: 'to know that you know what you know, and to know that you don't know what you dont know, is true wisdom'. The problem with this dictum is that it is very hard to draw the boundary between one and the other.”
oluwatoyin
Confucius seems to me to have it right. Wisdom is the denominator. When an opinion peddler is not wise, they are more likely to be unaware of their knowledge limitation. They may mislead others without intending to do so. This among others is why arrogance is vain and folly, and humility/modesty are enlightening and virtuous.
I dare to add that all knowledge is contextual and therefore intrinsically fallible. It is not known for example that there is a state of absolute and complete knowledge in the human realm? Is it any surprise therefore that theories are effected by assumptions, laws have exceptions, culture changes, poisons have antidotes, and beliefs guide believers even when believers know they are not proven truths.
oa
Why is it near impossible for some forum participants to see things through the ethnic prism only? “Falsehood” is a word that experienced, knowledgeable, and serious commentators know to use with great caution. To state that an assertion or claim is false implies the certainty that the truth is categorically different.
Commentators familiar with historical, literary, political, and religious conversations and discourse know to be slow to describe any expressed position as false. That one disagrees with another does not necessarily make another’s position false. Both positions may in fact be partly false and partly true.
If one remembers that the truth is the first casualty in politics and war, one would be more hesitant to take an entrench position in related matters.
oa