Collateral Damage
The criminal and chaotic situation in Mali, today, is a direct result
of NATO's intervention in Libya to overthrow Gaddafi. In the
wake of the Arab Spring, many of us were in favor of removing Muammar
Gaddafi from power to open another door to the winds of democracy
blowing in the region. Most urgently, we wanted to see an end to
the humanitarian disaster provoked by the regime in Tripoli, by
throwing boats full of African immigrants to the sea; and to stop the
impending massacre of the population of Benghazi threatened by the
narcoleptic dictator.
At that time, Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, with the help of France's
own media-savvy intellectual, Bernard Henri Levy, (BHL), had concocted
a narrative, well packaged for our consumption, in which the Libyan
strong man, like Sadam Hussein, or Hitler, was described as capable of
committing unprecedented crimes against humanity; and the National
Transitional Council (NTC) as only motivated by their passion for
democracy.
Thus, the invasion of Libya was clinically executed from the air by
NATO planes, to the greatest relief of the majority of the United
Nations members and all those who believed that a democratic change in
the Arab world in general, and Libya in particular, will safeguard the
world against terrorism, gender inequality, anti-Semitism and racism
against Blacks.
Today, I am not writing about these clichés, racist and islamophobic
sound bites that are often embedded in narratives whose true motifs
tromp democracy and humanitarian concerns for cold neoliberal economic
plans.
How else would one explain the situation of poor Mali, defenseless
with its archaic tanks and machine guns pitted against the soldiers of
the former Gaddafi army and their sophisticated weaponery. As
the Malian army retreats, the rebel army moves in one town after
another, cutting the throats of soldiers and civilian population;
destroying everything in their way; and creating panic among the
populations of Gao and Timbuctu, which lie ahead of them. More
than 250,000 civilians have fled these towns and nomadic settlements,
to seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Mauretania, Burkina
Faso, Algeria and Niger. The populations of Agelhok, Goundam and
Tessalit in Northern Mali have suffered the horrific crimes that NATO
forces had prevented Gaddafi's forces from committing in Benghazi.
Additionally, Northern Mali, after the fall of Timbuctu and Gao, will
soon become an unchallenged haven for radical Islamist groups such as
Aqmi, Al Qaeda and Ansardine, all intent on imposing the Sharia law
from Algeria to Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Tchad and Sudan.
Another major threat to the region is the drug trade, transiting in
the Sahara desert, on its way to Spain, France and Italy.
The defeat of the Malian army in the North has created a national
discontent with a weakened and humiliated regime in Bamako that was
considered by many as one of the beacons of democracy in West Africa.
President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) has now been exposed as a weak
leader, always seeking consensus and never acting decisively to combat
corruption, or to draw the line on how far he was willing to give in
to the demands of the Tuaregs in the North. ATT was also accused of
undermining the democratic institutions by always caving in to the
demands of demagogic religious leaders who were opposed, in the name
of Islam and tradition, to the constitutional amendment for equality
between men and women.
Faced with this general discontent, wounded pride and anger directed
at the President, a junta made up of junior officers has seized power,
like bank robbers taking advantage of a black out to put their plan
into execution. The Coup seems more ironic, not to say
ridiculous, given that, on the one hand, the disarray in Bamako, the
capital city, sends a strong signal to the rebels that they are
winning the war; and on the other hand, the presidential elections are
only one month away, and ATT has reached the end of his last term in
office.
As hard as it is to take a Coup d'état seriously nowadays in Africa,
the silence of Obama, Sarkozy and BHL over Gaddafi's former soldiers
in Northern Mali, side by side with members of Qaeda, Aqmi, Ansardine
and narco-trafickers seems even more unfathomable. The fact that
Gaddafi's former intelligence Chief, Abdullah al-Senussi, was recently
arrested, with a Malian passport, in Mauretania, is an indication that
NATO and the Libyan National Transitional Council did not complete the
job in Libya; they just deterritorialized it and made it the problem
for Mali today, and soon for Niger, Mauretania and Niger. It is
a déjà vu of another American and NATO botched job, with which
we're all familiar. Some would even say that it is the logic of
neoliberalism: follow the money and don't get bogged down with moral
imperatives.
Now, with the Coup d'Etat in full gear and the radical religious
groups in control of the North, the usual suspects are lining up with
their condemnations of the Coup, their desire for a peaceful
negotiation of the conflict in the north, and the return to
constitutional order in Mali. We're familiar with this
narrative, too, from the UN, the US, the EU, and the AU.
Likewise, no one will be surprised if they fell on deaf ears among the
junta in Bamako and the Qaeda and Aqmi in the North.
The populations in Bamako and elsewhere are in shock, and their only
reaction, so far, has been to take cover and protect their
properties-cars and goods-from the soldiers turned looters.
It is clear therefore that the Malians' discontent with their
democratically elected President is not matched by a show of support
for the Coup makers. In fact, it has been hard for many Malians,
who had thought that their country had gone past an army take-over of
power, to wake up for the last three days and find that their country
has regressed more than twenty years back.
So, I dare predict the imminent collapse of this Coup, like the end of
a nightmare that people have awaken from. By next week, if civil
servants in Mali stay at home and refuse to collaborate with the
junta, and if the neighboring countries shut their doors to members
and emissaries of the impostors, then I do not think that they will
last long. On the contrary, I see them retreating to
their barracks, soon after they have finished looting public and
private properties.
As for the Northern
question, clearly the Tuaregs deserve a lasting solution to their
plight. Successive Malian governments have attempted to sweep
under the carpet their demands for equal rights, better education and
better infrastructures. Now they have returned from Libya,
better equipped with an army, comprising of Tuaregs from Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger, and radical Islamists and renegades from Libya
and Algeria. They are now too strong for any Malian army
to deal with, single handedly. With the elections coming in
France and the United States, it is also hard to believe that Sarkozy
or Obama will get too heavily involved in this far removed conflict.
It would seem that Mali's best option, toward the Northern question,
remains a regional one, with Algeria and Nigeria playing the
leadership roles, either in negotiation or war. This Coup could
not have come at a worst time.