HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CRISES AND CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
Toyin Falola
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CRISES AND CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
WITH REFERENCE TO NORTHERN NIGERIA AND KADUNA STATE
By
Yusufu Turaki
(Ph.D. in Social Ethics, Boston University, 1982)
Professor of Theology and Social Ethics,
Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS)
I. INTRODUCTION
The frequency of religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence since 1980 to the present has reached endemic proportions. This is a reflection of a national crisis, a nation at the brink of collapse, and a nation in search of its own soul. Nigerians are deeply concerned and worried about this and have begun to device ways and means of addressing the problem.
At the start, we need to make three fundamental assertions:
1. It is not possible for us as Nigerians to have a proper grasp of the nature of religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence in Nigeria today, without understanding our primordial, religious, cultural and colonial past, what we were before the arrival of Islam, the colonial masters and Christian missions, and what we became during and after the Islamic, colonial and Christian, and post-colonial eras. (We need to do self-appraisal: what we have thought about ourselves and others as people, religious and cultural groups).
2. It is not possible for us to solve contemporary religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence in Nigeria without correcting the inherited primordial, religious and cultural, and colonial structures and negative values and redressing these legacies, if contemporary Nigeria is to be reoriented along the paths and principles of justice, equality, freedom and equity in socio-political relationships of all Nigerians in the distribution of national resources, rewards and statuses for the benefit of all by the Governments. (We need to do self-appraisal: what primordial values and structures of inequality and injustice are we still holding on to the detriment of others and building a united Nigeria where no one is oppressed?).
3. It is not possible to achieve peace, unity and respect for human dignity and worth of all Nigerians, if we have not personally and collectively made a deliberate effort and commitment to these noble virtues as the primary goal or end of our dialogue and relations among and between people, and ethnic and religious groups. First, we must be committed personally and collectively to peace, unity and human rights and secondly see them as ultimate goals that must be attained before we can even start to deliberate with each other. (We need to pledge commitment to doing the above as both individuals and groups).
Secondly, we need to state how Nigerians have chosen to address the current Nigerian crises, conflicts and violence.
1. We have heard some Nigerians who state that the current spade of crises and conflicts are not religious but political, ethnic or economic. This places them on the bench of those who are politically correct. They do not want to offend some Nigerians with a religious talk. For this reason, they ensure that religion is out of the question. It is a taboo to insinuate that Nigeria’s current problems are religious, or even to mention that Boko Haram is a terrorist group or jihadist. But religion dominates Nigeria’s life.
2. Some Nigerians believe that Nigeria’s current crises, conflicts and violence are politically, ethnically and economically induced and its solution must be rooted in these same social factors. But the truth is, the political culture of Nigeria is still primitive and undeveloped. Nigeria seems not at the present to have any national political solution. No political agenda for creating a New Nigeria. So they waste their time with irrelevant political theories. Again, the economy of Nigeria is so underdeveloped that Nigeria seems not to have any economic solution. No economic agenda for creating a New Nigeria. The cry for jobs, ruined education, unemployment, infrastructural decay and national unity cannot be realized by any means so long as Nigerians are still being chained, psyched and hypnotized by the evil and destructive forces of ethnocentrism and primordialism. Similarly, hypocrisy, corruption and religious bigotry have all conspired to rob Nigeria of any hope of being cured of its ethnic and regional leprosy. Hence, no amount of political, economic, or educational solution will re-create and re-make Nigeria, unless the dark and evil forces of ethnocentrism and primordialism are severely dealt with and routed.
3. In short, the truth is, no one is effectively solving Nigeria’s problem and no solution in sight. After all, Nigerians themselves are beginning to believe the prophets of doom, pundits of nihilism and witches of fate. What a dark and gloomy moment for Nigeria!
Thirdly, the terror of Boko Haram. Those who are not familiar with the history of religions, especially Islam are mistakenly confused and misled. Boko Haram has many apologists and sympathizers. Some say that this group is not religious, but purely a product of political or economical circumstances of a woefully failed Northern Nigeria. Some say that it is not a terrorist or a jihadist group, but a product northern underdevelopment or the rise of ethnic militias. Some equate it with the Niger Delta Militants so that they too could reap the bounties of Nigeria’s oil loot. While some say other things about the group. In short, there are too many apologists and spoke-persons for Boko Haram in that Nigerians have failed to both see and hear Boko Haram for themselves. Nigeria’s statesmen peace ambassadors urge for dialogue as the only viable option. Unfortunately the core values and the motivating social and religious factors of Boko Haram cannot be dialogued. Should Boko Haram finally settle for a dialogue, then the truth is this group is not what they claim to be. It could be a sinister or disgruntle political or ethnic group wearing the garb of religion. Obstacles to any dialogue with Boko Haram are their own definition and meaning of Jihad and Sharia. Not all Nigerian Muslims who share the same core values of Jihad and Sharia are in agreement with the activities of Boko Haram. The beliefs and practices of Boko Haram are well rooted in the history of religions but as for Boko Haram the history of Islam. Boko Haram has graduated from being a back-yard group into international limelight. Its links with Somalia, the Maghreb, Mali, Yemen and neighbouring splinter Islamists groups confirms the pan-Islamist world-wide revolution. It hard for any Nigeria to convince Boko Haram that she in its essence, outlook and actions is not a jihadist organization. It is amazing how Nigerians have shut their ears and eyes from hearing or seeing Boko Haram as she is. Unfortunately, what they both see and hear of Boko Haram is measured in terms of politics, economics and regionalism. The message of Boko Haram is religiously coded and only those who can decode it can know the essence of their existence and interpret their actions. They are very consistent in saying who they are, and the truth about themselves. They have always corrected Nigerians who mis-read, mis-understand, mis-interpret, or misrepresent them. But there are some Nigerians who have made up their minds never to listen to Boko Haram but to only themselves, their apologists, or their interpreters. Boko Haram defines itself within an historic tradition of Islam. They say of themselves that they are bona fide jihadists with a jihadic and Sharia agenda. In word and deed they have faithfully kept their own brand of Islamic promise and identity. The emergence of Islamic groups like the Boko Haram is not new in the history of religions or in Islamic history. Repeatedly in history, they often re-surface on the religious scene and only to disappear in a short while. The problem with Nigeria and its external friends is that Boko Haram is disbelieved. They seek to white-wash for Nigerians. The point here is that the evil forces at work that have blinded Nigerians to the problem of Boko Haram and similar other issues are fear, hypocrisy, corruption, primordialism, ethnocentrism, regionalism and religious bigotry. The State and security forces are drenched in corruption. Northern leaders are entangled in hypocrisy, ethnocentrism, regionalism and religious bigotry. Not long ago, we had the fad of Sharia politics. The Sharia politicians deceived people that Sharia would bring justice and development. Unfortunately, the Sharia apostles only used it to loot their states’ treasuries and left their states impoverished. Religious bigotry and hypocrisy have become a trade mark in our national political and religious life.
Fourthly, Nigerians by and large have not had a proper diagnosis of their national crises, conflicts and violence and the need to finding their enduring historical social roots. All Nigerians, the ethnic, religious and regional groups have their own core values, their hidden authority codes that motivate, shape, mold and define the moral character, attitudes, behaviours and social and spiritual practices. Nigeria’s core values are primary to understanding the reasons and/or the motivating factors for social crises, conflicts and violence. This paper focuses primarily upon the historical foundations, the core values and the authority codes that motivate, inspire and moderate the attitudes, behaviours and social practices of Nigerians. For example, ethnic nationalities and militants are driven by not by national political and economic principles, but by their core values which are at variance with national values. We have relied too much upon the social scientists that have proffered solutions in politics, economics, education and religion but to no avail since every passing day, Nigeria gets worse and worse and deeper in the quagmire. For this reason, this paper offers another way of diagnosing our national problems by drawing our attention to the significance of the powerful, pervasive and enduring influence of the core values and hidden authority codes, namely, ethnography, geography, religion and culture of all Nigerians. It is what history or fate does with these primordial social factors in our national life.
Fifthly, we ask, What are the challenges and problems of Nigeria? What are the ethnic, primordial, religious, cultural, colonial and post-colonial social factors that have become the building pillars and major obstacles to Nigerians’ peaceful and harmonious coexistence? We need to identify these socio-historical core values that are the roots of social, structural, cultural, religious and ethnic crises, conflicts and violence. These socio-historical factors and core values have over the years contributed immensely towards the development of some of Nigeria’s negative heritage that is the foundation of crises, conflicts and violence. We need to go back to the social, structural, cultural, religious and historical roots of our contemporary problems. The task of this paper is to identify, collate and define these socio-historical factors.
Sixthly, this paper gives reference to the crises, conflicts and violence in Kaduna State. Kaduna State is a miniature of Nigeria. Concrete and local practical examples of social issues can help us put flesh and what is relevant to some national issues that are often given to sweeping generalizations. The Memoranda mentioned in this paper refer to the materials which the citizens of Kaduna State sent to the Kaduna State Peace and Reconciliation Committee. No Memorandum was specifically mentioned or treated in this paper. However, the Memoranda have helped in examining some national issues in depth and in some cases proffering some solutions using Kaduna State as a case study.
This paper is a summary of my major works in social ethics, colonialism, missions, Islam and Christianity in Nigeria: (1) The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethical Analysis of the Colonial and Post-Colonial Society and Politics in Northern Nigeria (1993); (2) The Theory and Practice of Christian Missions in Africa: SIM/ECWA History and Legacy in Nigeria, 1893-1993 (1999); and (3) Tainted Legacy: Islam, Colonialism and Slavery in Northern Nigeria (2010). For this reason, I do not intend to give details but only highlights in view of time and space. I will refer readers to these works for the research sources and detail analysis of some issues. There are issues and social facts that could have been included but were left out. Ignorance of many social facts is being admitted due to human limitations which my readers could easily add to enrich and strengthen this paper. There are those who may wish to say that I said certain things which I shouldn’t have and those who may wish that I should have added some very valuable social facts. Be that as it may, may all our views and desire coalesce in developing a new political culture for Nigeria that transcends our ethnocentrism and primordialism and religious bigotry. My primary goal is to provide a basic background and framework towards understanding and solving our national problems.
The Structure of the Paper
The sources for this paper are drawn with specific reference to Northern Nigeria. Their socio-political implications profoundly affect and dominate Nigerian politics and social life. They form the basis of understanding Nigerian social, political, economic, religious and regional issues. For this reason, sources with reference to Southern Nigeria were minimal.
The paper has identified four (4) primordial social factors, namely, ethnography, geography, religion and culture as very important social variables for our study, which form the basic building blocks for understanding many social issues. Our primary focus is on the issues of crises, conflicts and violence in Nigeria and Northern Nigeria in particular. Our research goal is to find out historically how crises, conflicts and violence have been generated in Nigeria generally. Furthermore, the paper has also identified the key players who represent traditions or legacies that have exerted powerful and pervasive influence over the people and society. These legacies are: African Traditional Legacy; Islamic Legacy; British Colonial Legacy; Christian Missions Legacy; Political Legacy (Nationalists, Parliamentarians and Politicians), and the Military Legacy. The role played by each legacy in defining, shaping, molding and conditioning both the people and society and their outcomes are carefully identified, collated and defined. Our primary focus is on the negative social forces, social formations and social dynamics that tend towards crises, conflicts and violence. Finally, the paper takes us through the time-line: African traditional and pre-Islamic era; the Caliphate era; the colonial (the British and the missionary) era; and the post-colonial era (politicians and soldiers). This time-lime is to help us see how each era with its own dominant legacy handled the questions of ethnography, geography, religion and culture.
The paper holds the view that the God given social facts are good in themselves and therefore they could not generate any crises or conflict. Ethnicity, land, religion and culture must be handled by human beings as means of enhancing the well-being of all human beings. It is the wrong use of these blessings of God and creation by human beings and social structures and institutions that generate crises, conflict and violence. Even the best of humans, in the comity of humans, they have to be taught how to behave and live and let live. Human excesses in relations to other humans, in the use of ethnicity, land, religion and culture, must have to be tamed or moderated, otherwise, there will be no harmony, peace, justice, equality or freedom.
The paper asserts that all issues raised so far can be categorized as having their roots and solutions in these four primordial historical social factors: Ethnography (ethnicity); geography (land), religion and culture. With this innovative and creative methodology and format, the paper takes on its systematic analysis of the issues pertaining to crises, conflicts and violence in Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular.
Ethnography embraces both ethnicity and its story or history. A people group is often wrapped-up in its own story and identity. This paper uses the term ethnography as a bigger concept that embraces both ethnicity and its history. The idea here is that we are dealing with many ethnic groups and their own stories. A people cannot be divorced from its own story/history. It is possible to strip ethnicity of its ethnography, or land of its Geography. This is what historically the Empire Builders and social reformers have done. Islam, Christianity, British colonialism, politicians and soldiers, all have manipulated our primordial social factors that are responsible for some of our contemporary national and regional crises, conflicts and violence.
Geography embraces both land and its symbiotic and ecological location in a given territory on earth. A land is more than just a piece of earth, but that it must have the available physical features that grant its status of being a “land” or “territory”. For example, “What is the geography of this land? When this term is used in a minimal form, we simply call it “land.” Geography and land locate where an ethnic group exists with its history, religion, culture and social institutions. It is possible to strip land of its Geography. Our ecological problems, land grabbing and migration are serious issues in contemporary Nigeria. Empire Builders and social reformers have manipulated land, or territory for both the advantage and disadvantage of others. This socio-historical is creating big issues, especially for the Middle Belt areas.
The dynamic combinations between ethnography and geography produce (1) religion; (2) culture; and furthermore (3) humanity; and (4) environment/creation. The human agent uses the dynamic combinations of ethnography, geography, humanity and environment/creation to produce a community, a society, a nation, a state, or institutions and structures. In this paper, we have identified the following human agents as the actors, the players or the builders of both humanity and creation/environment: (1) the traditional African; (2) the Muslim; (3) the British colonialist; (4) the Christian missionary; (5) the nationalist/politician; and (6) the soldier. These are the actors who have acted upon Nigeria’s ethnography (ethnicity), geography (land), religion and culture and as a result have created the monsters of Nigeria’s ethnicity/tribes, religions, cultures, communities, societies and the Nigerian social environment. The paper examines specifically the possible areas of crises, conflicts and violence which these actors have created for Nigerians over the years. Their solutions lie in identifying their root causes and proffering solutions.
Further to these ones already mentioned are the additional very important social variables that are worth considering as to how they have been handled by the various legacies already mentioned, the political leaders and the ordinary human beings. These additional social variables are (1) man; (2) family; and (3) government and state. We need to examine how these social units have been treated and handled by the human actors that have brought about crises, conflict and violence.
Religion and culture are the by-products of the dynamics between ethnography and geography.
Far North geographically refers to the northern parts of Northern Nigeria that is occupied by the Hausa, Fulani and the Kanuri groups. Both ethnography and geography set them apart from the rest in the North.
Middle Belt geographically refers to southern parts of Northern Nigeria which is occupied by the non-Hausa-Fulani and the Kanuri groups. Both ethnography and geography set them apart from those of the Far North.
In Kaduna State, we face an historical situation where the crises and conflicts are defined in terms of the north-south political, ethnic and religious axis. For this reason, the political, ethnic and religious divide is caused by the primordial historical factors of ethnography, geography, religion and culture. The historical roots of our crises and conflicts are imbedded in these given primordial social facts. (We need to examine the meanings and implications and use of these primordial social facts by the specific historical actors mentioned already).
II. ETHNOGRAPHY, GEOGRAPHY, RELIGION AND CULTURE
The historical roots of crises and conflicts in Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular can be traced back to these primordial social factors of ethnography, geography, religion and culture. Secondly, how the human agents have used man, family and government/state to engender crises and conflicts. Our task is to collate and define the historical roots of each specific crisis or conflict that has been identified. Crises, conflicts and violence do not take place in a vacuum, but in a given social environment. First, we need to define the historical context of Nigeria within which crises and conflicts take place. For this reason, we need to define the Nigerian social environment, especially that of the North and Kaduna State in particular. For example, the April 2011 Presidential Elections in Nigeria and the post-elections riots in the North raised a serious political national question. Hence, it is necessary to begin with the primordial social factors which determine the nature and scope of national politics and Kaduna State in particular. For this reason, this section defines these social factors within the context of Nigeria.
A. Nigeria: Historical and Social Background
This section states very briefly the historical and social background of the Nigerian society. The socio-political setting of the Nigerian society can be divided geographically and culturally into two broad major areas: (1) the North; and (2) the South. This very colonial classification formed the basis for understanding Nigeria’s historical ethno-regional politics, cultural and religious conflict, and socio-political, moral and ethical problems which we are currently passing through as a nation and also in miniature, Kaduna State. It is important that we understand some historical, geographical, political, cultural and religious factors, which have contributed in shaping and defining the nature of the Nigerian society and its politics.
Nigeria is a Creation of British Colonialism.
We begin with British declaration of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria on 1st January 1900. By this date the British had Southern Protectorate and Northern Protectorate and administered separately until amalgamation. Economic and political considerations led to the colonial amalgamation of Nigeria on 1st January 1914 by Lord Lugard. After this amalgamation the Colonial Administration made no effort to encourage horizontal interaction among various ethnic groups and the political Regions. The amalgamated Protectorates were administered politically separate from each other. Under these separate administrations, each cultural grouping maintained its identity, its individuality and its nationality until in 1947, for the first time, under the Richards Constitution, the two Protectorates (North and South) had an opportunity to interact politically. Colonial attempts at integrating Nigeria between 1946 to 1954 generated ethnic and regional politics, conflict, fears and suspicions which had cast a long shadow of long-term consequences for post-colonial Nigeria. In 1954, a Federal Constitution created Nigerian federalism with autonomous Regional Governments (North, West and East). Nigerian polity and social environment can be divided into three periods: the era of modern politics (1946-1966), the military era (1966-1999), and the Civilian Democracy (1999 to the present).
The lopsided nature of Nigeria's federal set-up generated the fear of political domination among various ethnic groups and the regions, and also the colonial Federal Constitution ignored the question of unequal representation of Regions and ethnic groups. The Federal Constitution of Nigeria between 1954 and 1966 failed to create a stable, just and participatory social order. The colonial federal structure of Nigeria faced serious socio-political problems, such as, the structural imbalance of Regions and inequality of ethnic groups, revenue allocation, franchise and citizenship. Conflictual interpretations and sectional conceptions of these issues and others undermined ethnic harmony, cooperation and the stability of the country. Ethno-regional politics both at the federal center (Lagos) and within regions were dominated by the major ethnic groups. Political representation at the federal center was based on the politics of population.
The socio-political problems of the Nigerian social environment can be stated as: (1) the political norms and rules of the game, especially in the regions, tended to reflect the socio-political values of the dominant ethnic group: (2) the political institutions tended to reinforce ethnic cleavages between the rival and competing major groups while the weaker and smaller groups were always at a disadvantageous position, at best, a clientele position (subordinate position); and (3) political rewards or services tended to be dominated by the powerful and dominant groups, while the weaker and smaller groups did not get any fair share or participation.
These socio-political problems resulted from the colonial legacy. Melson and Wolpe described this situation in the following words:
Our argument... is that much contemporary communal conflict is being waged not by traditional entities, but by communities formed in the crucible of mobilization and competition.... Moreover, political conflict associated with cultural pluralism is due not to the nature of pluralism or diversity in itself, but to a process of inhumane and uncontrolled modernization which pits one communal group against another in a frantic search for wealth, status, power and security.[1]
Post and Vickers, and Okoli based their works on the thesis that Nigerian political conflict was the result of colonial institutional structure.[2] Nnoli's similar thesis was that ethnic politics in Nigeria was based upon colonial stratified inequality between the elites of various ethnic groups that were in competition against each other.[3] Again, Okpu argues that the institutionalization of the ethnic minorities within the colonial structure was the root cause of Nigerian political instability between 1960 and 1965.[4]
The collapse of the First Republic of Nigeria on January 15, 1966 was usually attributed to many social factors, such as, the multi-ethnic and religious composition of the population, the uneven level of social, economic and educational development, the constitutional structure of the country under colonial rule and the First Republic, and the total absence of truly national political parties. These social factors no doubt reveal the inherited colonial social structures of inequality, insecurity and incompatibility.
Social dilemmas that confronted the post-colonial society can be briefly listed: (1) social conflict between traditional values and western and/or colonial values; (2) the conflict between national and sub national (ethnic or religious) identities; (3) the conflict between national and ethnic or religious basis of political legitimacy; and (4) the conflict between internal mechanisms of socio-political conditions among ethnic groups and the dilemmas created by the emergence of new social values that may not necessarily be western or traditional. The concept of social justice and of a sustainable society should pursue these social dilemmas, as they are responsible for generating socio-political conflict and instability.
Why this Nigeria’s historical and social background?
We need to understand Nigeria’s primordial social factors: Ethnography and Geography.
- Geographical and Ethnic Composition of Nigeria
1. Southern Nigeria
Southern Nigeria can be divided into two broad societies, namely, Western and Eastern societies. The Western societies had large ethnic groups, such as, the Yoruba, Edo, Ijaw, etc. and were predominantly traditional
with a large Muslim population in certain areas of Yoruba land. The Eastern societies had large ethnic groups, such as the Igbo, Efik, Ibibio, Anang, etc. and were predominantly traditional until the arrival of Christianity.
a. The West
The Yoruba and the Edo or Bini, just like the Hausa-Fulani in the North, had centralized political, administrative and judicial systems, which were controlled by traditions. Where Islam existed in the West,
it too came under the powerful influence of traditional values.
The Western coast of Nigeria came under European influence in the 15th century, especially through the early contacts of the Portuguese with the kingdoms of Benin and Warri.
This part of West Africa was named the Slave Coast because of the slave trade introduced by Europeans in the 17th century. This obnoxious trade caused inter-ethnic wars, depopulation and instability in the region until the British colonial rule in the 19th
century when Lagos became a Crown Colony in 1860. Modern Christian missions entered Yoruba land by 1840s.
The Fulani warriors and Islamic jihad had a base at Ilorin, the northern edge of Yoruba land and raided the Yoruba land in places as far south as Oyo, Ibadan and Abeokuta. That was how Islam was first introduced into Yoruba land. In western societies, Islam,
Christianity and traditional religions have generally co-existed harmoniously. The African traditional worldview was able to influence and moderate the socio-political excesses of both Christianity and Islam in western societies.
b. The East
The Igbo, Efik, Ibibio and others, just like the peoples of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, did not have centralised political, administrative or judicial systems as did the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Edo. This area, like the West, also came under European
influence, especially during the period of slave trade. Important city-states such as Opobo, Bonny and Brass in the Delta Region grew and became powerful, as did Calabar in the Cross River Region. Arochukwu and Onitsha became powerful trade centres in Igboland.
As it was in parts of the Western region, the slave trade introduced by Europeans caused inter-ethnic wars, depopulation and instability until the colonial rule in the late 19th century.
Christianity entered the region in the 1840s and grew more rapidly than in any other region. This region was followed by the Middle Belt in the rapid growth of Christianity. The traditional values, however, had a very powerful influence on Christianity. Islam
did not make any serious in-roads into the region until after the civil war in the 1970s.
2. Northern Nigeria
Northern Nigeria can be divided into two large regions consisting of two broad ethnic groups: The Northern part, known as Hausa land and Bornu, which was composed predominantly of Muslim groups; and the Southern part, designated as the Middle Belt, which was predominantly traditional and made up largely of the non-Muslim groups. The major ethnic groups in the Northern part are the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri of the old Kanem-Bornu Empire, while the Southern part consists of well over 250 ethnic groups concentrated in Plateau, Bauchi, Southern Kaduna, Adamawa, Sardauna (former Northern Cameroons) and Benue areas. The relationship between the Muslim groups, in the Hausa land and Bornu, on the one hand, and the traditional groups, in the Middle Belt, on the other, was characterised by trade, migrations, slave-raiding, slave-trading and wars of territorial expansion and later in early 1800s, the Islamic jihad before the British occupation of Northern Nigeria in 1900s.
Arab and Islamic influence was very strong in this region especially in commerce and trade, slave trade and the Trans-Saharan Trade. The irony of the era was that while the Europeans were plundering the West Coast with commerce and slave trade, the Arabs were doing the same in the Hinterland (Sudan). The Middle Belt region was plundered for both European and Arab commerce and trade, and slave traders. Europeans who brought Christianity and Arabs who brought Islam, both engaged in the obnoxious slave trade.
In an attempt to create an impression of “One North”, some politicians, statesmen and opinion leaders, tend to ignore the primordial social facts of ethnography, geography, religion and culture, thus creating a caricature of a “monolithic North.” The dominance of this social fact in modern Nigeria only goes to fan the embers of crises and conflicts. Based upon the primordial social facts of ethnography, geography, religion and culture, Northern Nigeria can be divided into two broad communities: the Far North and the Middle Belt.
The term Middle Belt in itself generates great anxieties and fears in some people. The term is used cautiously as not all Northerners like the term. The anxiety and fear of the word Middle Belt are deeply rooted in the politics of ethnography, geography, religion and culture of both the peoples of the Far North and the Middle Belt.
a. The Middle Belt
In mission, Islamic and colonial records, the inhabitants of this area were usually referred to as "Pagans". The bulk of the work of Christian Missions in Northern Nigeria was in this area until the early 1930s, when the Colonial Administration lifted the ban
barring Christian Missions from entering the Muslim Emirates of the Hausaland and Borno, with the exception of Zaria and Bida areas, where the Church Missionary Society (CMS) was stationed before the consolidation of colonial rule over Northern Nigeria.
Linguistically, the traditional peoples of the Middle Belt were classified as Benue-Congo or Semi-Bantu. Many also were classified under the Chadic Group, like the Hausa and the Kanuri. Generally, all the non-Muslim groups exhibit similar characteristics in
culture, language, religion, customs, physical features, social values and organisation. This probably indicates that, in the distant past, they might have had the same origin. Their socio-political organisation lacked centralized authority, administrative
machinery and constituted judicial institutions but had its own variant forms based upon democratic and consensual and communal principles of kinship or blood-group.
The contacts of these societies with the Hausa-Fulani, the Kanuri, the Colonial Administration and Christian and Muslim missions, especially in the colonial era, brought about rapid social changes and transformation to this area. Indeed, the impact of Christianity,
Western civilisation and Islam upon these traditional societies has been quite substantial and profound.
b. The Far North
The Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri in the Far North have been in contact with the outside world for many centuries. For centuries, Hausa land and Borno were under the profound influence of Islamic and
Arab civilizations. In the Western Sudan, ancient empires, such as Mali and Songhai, introduced Islam, education, commerce and political institutions that contributed a lot in stimulating socio-political development in Hausa land and Borno. Links with North
Africa, Egypt and especially the Maghreb, strengthened economic, religious, social and cultural ties with the Hausa land. The rise of economic, political and cultural power of the Hausa States and Borno brought them fame in the Arab, Mediterranean and Western
worlds. Travellers, scholars, Muslim missionaries and merchants from these lands visited the Hausa land and Borno.
At the end of the 18th century, the Fulani or Fulbe moved into Hausa land in large numbers and later became the religious and political rulers of the land after the Jihad of Usman dan Fodio in 1804, which successfully overthrew the Hausa kings. Islam and Fulani
rulers in consequence replaced Hausa traditional religion, culture, traditions and rulers. However, some have endured to the present.
Given its recognizable civilisation, the Hausa, as a distinct ethnic group in Northern Nigeria, attracted the interest of scholars, statesmen and religious men throughout the Middle Ages. Fascination about the Hausa land lured Europeans in the form of colonial
adventurers and Christian missions.
There were some major socio-political differences between the Muslim and the Traditional groups in the North, which had important implications for both mission and colonial policies. The Muslim groups were united together not only by Islam and Usman dan Folio’s
Jihad of the early 1800s, but also by the assimilating power of Hausa language and culture, as well as the Sokoto Caliphate structure which covered a vast land across the northern parts of the Central Sudan of West Africa. Kanem-Bornu also played the same
significant Islamic role as the Sokoto Caliphate. Conversely, the traditional religions of the peoples of the Middle Belt were mainly particularistic and local and far-removed from the universalism of Islam or Christianity. The numerous languages and dialects
of the peoples of the Middle Belt did not have any assimilating power or wide influence like the Hausa language, which was increasingly becoming a trade language in the Central Sudan. These peoples did not have any unifying ideology like Islam or the assimilating
power of the Hausa language and culture.
The Middle Belt did not have any centralised authority, administrative machinery, or judicial and fiscal institutions covering vast areas and cutting across ethnic or geographical boundaries. These segmentary societies were just like “mini republics” which
did not have a common ethnic identity, authority or legitimacy. Each “republic” (tribe) was a confederacy of communities and villages based upon lineage and kinship systems. Each lived on its own and was independent of others because the sense of “tribal”
affinity and unity excluded all those who did not belong.
The rise of Islamic power in Northern Nigeria drastically changed the socio-political conditions and the nature of inter-ethnic relations, especially
between the Muslim and the Traditional groups. Islamic worldview represented "universalism" while the traditional African religions and culture in general represented "particularism".
The Jihad, which generated Islamisation, colonisation and slave trade and slave-raiding, also introduced the religious and social stratification between the Muslim and the Traditional groups. Thus, the pre-colonial inter-ethnic relations between the
Muslim and the Traditional groups were, to a large extent, determined by religion, culture and ethnicity.
It was upon these two broad-based distinct societies of Northern Nigeria that the Colonial Administration imposed a colonial super-structure
in 1900. The same administration had imposed a colonial superstructure over the two Protectorates of Nigeria, namely, Southern and Northern Protectorates.
Christian missions also carried out their mission work within these two broad societies in the North. The Church in Northern Nigeria was born within three powerful contexts: (1) the traditional context, mainly in the Middle Belt areas; (2) the Islamic context,
mainly in the Far North; and (3) the colonial context of British twin-rule over the Northern Region and the whole of Nigeria.
The Colonial Administration and Christian missions had transformed these southern and northern societies. The consequences of this transformation in post-colonial Nigeria have influenced greatly the nature of politics and religious conflict in Nigeria.
Thus far, we have identified four very important social factors in the history and making of Nigeria worth mentioning, namely, traditional, Islamic, colonial, missionary and Christian. These historical social factors have had profound influence on the nature,
growth and development of Nigeria as a nation. These geographical, cultural, ethnic and religious factors have greatly affected the nature of politics, state policy, Muslim-Christian relations and ethno-regional politics in both colonial and post-colonial
Nigeria.
In Northern Nigeria, crises and conflicts are drawn between mainly the peoples of the Far North and Middle Belt. The same battles lines are also drawn within Kaduna State between the representatives of the peoples of the Far North and Middle Belt. For this reason, we need to examine in depth the historical roots of the crises and conflicts. But we need to summarize the implications of the Nigerian social environment (context) as it affects national development and integration. This Nigeria’s background is what we call the primordial social factors of ethnography (ethnicity), geography (land), religion and culture.
C. A Preview of Nigeria’s Primordial Values
The nature of Nigerian politics, ethno-religious riots, and social crises and conflicts are governed mainly by Nigeria’s primordial values and institutions. Nigerians have used ethnic/tribal myths to project their worldview, thought and feelings about their origin, value, prestige, glory and destiny. These primordial social facts were captured in the colonial historiography and ethnography as collated by the colonial anthropologists and colonial political officers and as well as the clams of land and subjects prior to the arrival of the British colonialists. Many Memoranda as submitted to the Kaduna State Peace and Reconciliation Committee based their claims of land or chiefdom on some of these historical ethnographies.
Nigerians in general and the peoples of Kaduna State in particular have used (1) ethnicity/tribalism, (2) land, (3) religion and (4) culture, which are indeed good in themselves and are
the primary human values as tools and weapons of war, conflicts and violence whenever things went wrong in their relationships with each other. It is the use of our primordial values and institutions to advance self-interests or to perpetuate an advantageous
position, or to maintain a rewarding or beneficial status quo. We have identified an historical pattern of relationship which existed between mainly the Muslim and the non-Muslim groups in the North and Kaduna State in particular. The crises and conflicts
which have existed between the two groups were rooted in these emerging historical social structures:
(1) there is a pattern of superiority-inferiority relationship between the two groups based upon religion, culture and ethnicity;
(2) there is a pattern of dominance-subordination relationships between the two groups based upon ethnicity and religion;
(3) there is a pattern of the politics of inequality, domination or exclusion between the two groups.
Many Memoranda submitted to the Kaduna State Peace and Reconciliation Committee made references to the fact that these social patterns of relationship still exist between the two groups. These social patterns of relationship have been the source of crises and conflicts, among many. The use of derogatory and demeaning terms such as, arne, kabila, gambari, nyamiri reflects ethnic stereotyping. The subordination of one ethnic group to the rule of another generates ill-feelings, resentment and bitterness. Politics of inequality and domination have aroused discrimination, bias and resentment. Most Memoranda are calling this Committee to redress and correct the patterns of superiority-inferiority between the peoples of the North and the South of Kaduna State. Similarly the pattern of dominance-subordination between the two groups be redressed and corrected. Our task is to find the historical roots of these patterns of relationship.
Generally, the social and political expressions of Nigerians whether negative or positive are rooted in the historical and social background presented in the previous sections. One aspect of this expression that is worth mentioning is the challenge of ethnocentrism and primordialism. These two concepts are rooted in our ethnography, geography, religion and culture. We can also trace some of our socio-political crises and conflicts to these two concepts.
Ethnocentrism and primordialism are rooted in Nigeria’s ethnography, geography, religion and culture. The historical social dynamics of these social factors have produced our dominating worldview of ethnocentrism and primordialism. It shapes the way we see, understand, interpret and apply the world around us.
How our national life is being governed by our worldviews of ethnocentrism and primordialism?
D. Ethnocentrism and Primordialism and National Life
Ethnocentrism and primordialism are major contributors to crises and conflicts in Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular. Ethnocentrism consists of primordial, traditional, ancient tribal, cultural, religious and regional or sectional values and institutions. Since prior to and after independence national political leadership in Nigeria has suffered a great setback. Political leaders seem to lack legitimacy to rule and lead the people. Whether by a ballot box or a barrel of a gun, leaders come to power, but they do not command followership or loyalty across ethnic, religious or regional groups because the followers hold them in high suspicion and disrespect. For example, President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Goodluck Jonathan are the best case study of this problem in the North. Political leaders are not trusted or respected across the national divide. Both the followership and leaders are torn apart by ethnocentrism (ethno-regional, cultural and religious rivalries). Ethnocentrism weakens the legitimacy of political leaders to rule and lead. It also feeds the followership with suspicion and lack of loyalty and respect. Ethnocentrism in our national political life is the greatest enemy to the emergence of true national politics and also to nation building and integration, and nationhood and citizenship. Ethnocentrism is the vicious and cancerous virus that eats up and destroys national moral character and virtues. Ethnocentrism is the excessive love of one’s own ethnic, cultural, regional or religious group to sometimes hatred or exclusion of others. It breeds exclusivity, parochialism, proclivity, tribalism, or regionalism/sectionalism. It dominates, subordinates, or excludes others.
The April 2011 Presidential and Governorship Elections and the post-elections riots that erupted in the Northern States and Kaduna State in particular, reflect the pervasive influence of ethnocentrism and primordialism. Principally, religion and culture provided the basis upon which the post-election riots erupted.
True national politics may not develop unless the challenge of ethnocentrism and primordialism is tackled head-long so as to free both the political leaders and the followers to pursue genuine nationhood, citizenship, development, and national interests, ideals and standards. For true political leadership to emerge and peace to reign in Nigeria, there is a great need for politics to transcend ethnocentrism, religious bigotry and regionalism. True national political leadership and followership must first of all put Nigeria first before any forms of sub-nationalism.
From the Memoranda, there are many crises and conflicts that revolve around the issues of ethnicity, land, religion and culture. The difference between the ethnicity, religion and culture between the peoples of the North and South of Kaduna have been exploited and used as the basis of some crises and conflicts. The differences in religion, culture and physical features have been the bane of crises and conflicts. Some of the crises and conflicts have resulted in the differences of religion and culture. Land and chieftaincy issues have also been the source of crises and conflicts. Some claim ancestry or prior occupation, while some claim conquests or first arrival in the vicinity. Some complained that they had their own traditional rulers before the colonial masters imposed foreign ones over them. Such claims and counter claims can be the source of crisis and conflict. Some have complained of being subjected to derogatory or inhumane treatment and discrimination. Others of being treated unjustly and unfairly. All these forms of crisis and conflict need a clear understanding of their root causes, otherwise lasting solutions cannot be proffered. It is on the basis this quest that the search for the historical root causes of our crises and conflicts become imperative.
III. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CRISES AND CONFLICTS
The search for the historical root causes of crises and conflicts will be divided into four basic epochs, namely, (1) the African traditional era which was pre-Islamic and pre-colonial; (2) the Caliphate era which included Sokoto and Kanem-Bornu; (3) the colonial era which included the British colonial rule and Christian missionary activities; and (4) the post-colonial era which included the civilian and military regimes. Our task in each era is to identify, collate and define the most important historical roots of the crises and conflicts. Our crises and conflicts reflect the profound influence of (1) the African traditional legacy; (2) the Islamic legacy; (3) the British colonial legacy; (4) the Christian missionary legacy; (6) the post-independence political legacy; and (7) the military legacy. Each epoch and its legacy have generated its own historical roots of the crises and conflicts. Our primary goal is to state how each historical epoch and its legacy used the primordial social factors of ethnography, geography, religion and culture to build a social order that became rife in later years with crises and conflicts.
We begin with the African Traditional epoch and its legacy.
A. African Traditional Epoch and its Legacy
From the Memoranda, the crises and conflicts that were enumerated were deeply rooted in the primordial social facts of ethnography, geography, religion and culture. While some are as a result of the contemporary circumstances. We need to take these primordial social facts one by one and show how an uncritical use of these by human beings can become the root causes of some of the crises and conflicts.
1. Ethnography
Some of the crises and conflicts as reflected in the Memoranda are rooted in ethnography that is ethnicity and history. The claims of land, chieftaincy are rooted in the various ethnic perceptions of ancestry and history. When an issue is in dispute, its ethnography must be thoroughly understood and addressed. Ethnicity and its history can be a source of crises and conflict.
a. Solidarity and Brotherhood of Black Africans
In the midst of claims and counter-claims as regards ethnicity, land, religion and culture, there is a great need to establish the solidarity and brotherhood of all Black Africans so that we can understand and appreciate the composition of the various ethnic groups that inhabited the ancient Central Sudan which later became Northern Nigeria. Everything about them was African and traditional. They had their own distinct religions and cultures different from Islam or Christianity. They were all Black Africans, the descendants of Ham, the son of Noah who came from generations after the first human being Adam. They all had one progenitor as their ancestor and one Creator who is God. This fact of God’s creation and descent from Adam and Ham make all Black Africans to exist as one people, one human solidarity, hence the equality and the brotherhood of all Black Africans.
Common ancestry, solidarity and equality bind all Black Africans together as one people. This common ground of creation, humanity, solidarity and brotherhood becomes the basis for the quest for unity and peaceful co-existence of all ethnic groups in Kaduna State. This primordial social fact should be made the basis of judging any ethnic, religious and cultural excesses that do not promote the well-being of fellow human beings.
b. Ethnicity
In traditional Africa, ethnicity is rooted in an ancestral blood group of kinship and communal values. The common denominator for all members of the clan or the ethnic group/tribe is the ancestor, the progenitor. The ethnic boundary is defined by the ancestry and blood. Humanity is defined in terms of the in-group or insiders and the out-group or outsiders or strangers. Its philosophical and ethical view of life and the world is particularistic and not universalistic. One belongs to: (1) an ancestral blood-group or communal kinship; and (2) the ancestral land. An outsider or a non-blood-group member can be become a blood-group member by assimilation or becoming one with the group. Ethnicity from this ancient traditional worldview is intertwined sacrally with both ancestral land and ancestral blood-group (kinship). Africans who still hold on to this ancient worldview find it very difficult to open up to others. Our current serious problem of the indigenes versus strangers/settlers in Kaduna State is deeply rooted in this ancient worldview. The traditional worldview of the ancestral blood-group or kinship community and the ancestral land must be given a new interpretation in our modern context that can accommodate other ethnic groups.
Human rights are not rooted in individuality, but in both ancestral land and ancestral blood-group. Traditional concepts of human rights hold the two human factors in balance and equity. Rights are not deposited in anything outside of the communal kinship system and ancestral land. The questions and definitions of modern concepts, such as, citizenship, nativity or indigeneship, settlers or strangers are deeply rooted in ethnic and land values. Issues, such as, cultural and religious rights, ancestral land rights, chieftaincy and traditional rights are all rooted in ethnic and land values. In traditional African worldview, ethnicity and land are inseparable entities. African traditional ethnography (ethnicity) is rooted in geography (land) and vice versa. Could an ethnic group exist without land? Land grabbing by government or the powerful groups often meet great resistances from the ethnic groups because of this traditional worldview. It would be naïve to try solving issues of ethnicity, land, indigene-stranger relations, religious and cultural matters without a thorough examination of the traditional African worldview. The African traditional worldview is known to be very powerful, pervasive and enduring.
Tribalism/nepotism is rooted in the concept of blood-group and kinship community. It defines who is an insider or an outsider. It destroys impartiality, equal treatment, merit or excellence and breeds corruption. Ethnicity engenders affinity, obligations and loyalty of one to a specific group.
Ethnic/religious/cultural affinity is very strong in Kaduna State. For example, just as the ethnic groups of Southern Kaduna form a minority in Northern Kaduna, so also the Hausa and the Fulani in Southern Kaduna constitute a minority, even though they form a regional majority. This ethnic/religious/cultural affinity is the source of some crises and conflicts between the two major groups. The creation of Local Governments, Senatorial Zones and Districts has sharpened the issues of ethnic affinity, obligations and loyalty and thereby breeds competitive and rival politics. Some Memoranda reflect the desire for and/or a return of some people back to their broader ethnic fold. Some advocate ethnic, cultural or religious separation. Ethnic values cannot be taken lightly as they can easily trigger crisis and conflict.
Ancient ethnic values if they are not redefined or moderated in modern contexts where people of various ethnicity, religion and culture do meet, they are a great potential for crises and conflicts. For this reason, there is a great need for a specific definition or an understanding of ethnicity that can engender a harmonious and peaceful co-existence of all ethnic groups. This has to rule out any exclusivist or parochial definition or practice of ethnicity/religion/culture that engenders crisis or conflict. A proper definition of ethnicity and understanding will rule out the negative patterns of superiority-inferiority relations between ethnic groups or dominance-subordination relationships.
Later, we are going to see how Islam, the British colonialists, Christian missionaries and the post-independence politicians and soldiers gave different meanings to African ethnicity.
2. Land
Land is more than just a piece of the earth. In traditional Africa, land and its geography are defined by ancestry and sacredness. In the same way its ownership. It is only held in trust by the ancestors for the kinship community. No individual owns the land but the ancestral kinship community under the spiritual guardians, the ancestors and the divinities. Land therefore, is ancestral and sacred. Land could not be possessed by conquest. It could only be acquired or inherited through ancestral means. Both the use and possession of the land are defined in sacral ancestral terms. Thus, conquest and annexation of lands are religiously prohibited. Territorial expansion is out of the question. For this reason, many ancient ethnic groups did not have any expansionist philosophy of land, kingdoms or territories.
Traditionally, land is owned by an ancestral blood-group as a gift from the divinities and the ancestors. Land could not be owned without a legitimate blood-ancestry. Individuals do not have the right of disposing of land. Land is always communal and has a guardian. Land when taken by force or war cannot change status; it ever remains an ancestral communal possession. This ancient understanding is quite different from modern views about land. Land issues are very prominent in the Southern Kaduna where the traditional worldview about land is very strong.
In traditional Africa, there is a very strong affinity between the land and the ethnic group. While geography gives the land its location, scope and definition, ancestry and kinship give it a stamp of ownership. Land cannot be defined in the absence of ancestry, just as ancestry cannot be defined without land. Therefore, land always belongs to the ancestors and kinship. The African ancestors must have land to be buried and to perpetuate the living-dead in the service of their descendents.
Form the foregoing; this traditional worldview of the land is a very serious issue that demands a very careful study and resolution. Nigerians today are demanding land and space for expansion, but the constraints of traditional worldviews pose as great obstacles. It is the removal of these traditional obstacles to ethnicity and land by force that have erupted in crises and conflicts. The ethnic and land matters have been further complicated by the additional definitions of ethnicity and land which was brought by Islam, the British colonialists, Christian missionaries and the post-colonial politicians and soldiers which will be taken up much later. However, many Memoranda have called for the reinterpretations of the definitions of ethnicity and land by both the British colonial masters and the Hausa-Fulani rulers. These Memoranda are seeking for a new interpretation of land, citizenship, settler-stranger-indigene questions, chiefdoms and chieftaincies.
But in ancient times, there was fluidity of movements and migrations of peoples all over Africa. Many of the Memoranda alluded to the fact of migrations and naming of places of movements or origins. We are not sure exactly when peoples began to settle down in various geographical places and began to claim lands and built communities, kingdoms and empires which can be dated in history. The issues of migrations and ethnic boundaries will be taken up during the colonial era.
3. Religion and Culture
A new religion or culture should not denounce or reject the ethnicity (blood-group) or the ancestral land to which an ethnic group rightly belongs. Rather, it is assimilated, domesticated, adapted, or contextualized.
In traditional Africa, both religion and culture are the by-products of the social dynamics of ethnography and geography. For this reason, religious and cultural matters are deeply rooted in land and ethnicity. The sacredness and the rights of a human being are rooted in both ethnicity and land not in religion or culture. Religion and culture are only the outward and visible manifestations of the beliefs and practices of the blood-group or kinship community. It is the ethnic group that owns its religion and culture and not otherwise. The essence of religion and culture is ethnicity. Traditional Africans who convert to Islam or Christianity cannot in African traditional worldview disown their ethnicity/blood-group or the ancestral land. In African traditional worldview, an African who converts to Christianity or Islam is still an ethne or an ethnic person. What is primary is not religion or culture, but ethnicity, the blood-group or kinship. Converts into Christianity or Islam cannot on the basis of their new religion disown their essence, ethnicity and the ancestral and sacred land.
Some of the crises and conflicts we are facing are as a result of the change of identity. Identity change takes place at the level of ethnicity, land, religion and culture. Clash of identities is a common phenomenon in Northern Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular. Later, we are going to show how Islam, British colonialism, Christianity and post-colonial politicians and soldiers brought about radical changes to the African traditional ethnicity, land, religion and culture. Many Memoranda reflect the clash of identities. For this reason, there is a great need of a thorough understanding and definition of these identity changes and the confusion and conflict that they bring.
4. Conclusion
We conclude by stating that by and large, our current crises and conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular are rooted in the African traditional social values of ethnicity, land, religion and culture.
The next section takes us through the Islamic Era and its own contributions to our subject matter.
B. Islamic Epoch and Its Legacy
The Islamic epoch and its legacy present a different understanding, interpretation and application of ethnicity, land, religion and culture from that of the African Tradition. The socio-political impact of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu is rooted in the Islamic legacy. How did Islam define the ethnicity, land, religion and culture of the peoples of Central Sudan?
1. Pre-Islamic Conditions
Inter-ethnic relations existed between the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri, on the one hand and the many ethnic groups that dwell on the southern plains and hills of Northern Nigeria. It was based upon peaceful trade, especially the long distant trade called fatake. Exchanged of goods and commerce between the two regions and peoples brought the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri and other numerous smaller ethnic groups together. The Fulani who were mainly pastoralists who migrated from the Futa Jalon and Futa Toro areas of the Senegambia of West Africa moved across the Sahel Belt as far East as the Cameroons and Central Africa. The Fulani were the new comers to the area after most ethnic groups had settled down and ethnic boundaries were being drawn. The Jihad of Usman dan Fodio changed the ethnic, religious, cultural and the political scene of the Central Sudan in the early 1800s. Islam was spread basically by two means: peaceful and jihad. Jihad became an instrument of change of identity: ethnicity, religion, culture and politics.
From some of the Memoranda, there is a very strong reflection of the crises and conflicts between Muslims and the non-Muslims, whether Christians or traditionalists. The root of this religious crisis needs to be identified and defined so that a solution can be proffered.
The non-Muslim misunderstanding of jihad and as well as the application of jihad by some Muslims are serious sources of crises and conflicts. For this reason, understanding is first of all required from both Muslims and non-Muslims.
2. The Islamic Jihad
a. A Definition
- The Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad
- Declaration of the Holy War (Jihad)
- Creation of an Islamic State and Sharia
- Defined Social Status
- Kaffir Status
- Dhimmi (Protected) Status
Later in the development of Islam, the practice of paying a ransom for the kuffar became institutionalised in the dhimmi (protected) status.
- The Choice of Enslavement
- Islam and Ethnicity
In the Middle Belt areas, Islam as religion is a very powerful social tool for Hausanization. On becoming Muslims, the converts to Islam tend to abandon their ancestral land and ethnic identity by becoming Hausa. Hausanization does bring about the change of ethnic, cultural and language identity. A person of a minority ethnic group can easily become assimilated to the majority Hausa group through Islam. There are many social, political cultural and religious advantages for a minority person to change into a majority ethnic group. There are tremendous powerful social, cultural, political and religious forces at play in the Middle Belt areas that shrink the traditional African land, ethnicity, religion and culture. It is this social threat and encroachment that trigger the revival of ethnic nationalities, crises and conflicts. The conflict between the majority ethnic nationalism and the minority ethnic nationalism has often been manifested in political and economic dominance and marginalization.
- Islam and Ancestral Land
C. British Colonial Epoch and its Legacy
The Memoranda from most ethnic groups, specifically from Southern Kaduna and the Maguzawa are rooted in African traditional worldview of ethnicity and land. During the pre-Islamic and the pre-colonial eras, ethnic groups roamed the vast Northern territory as reflected in the colonial and ethnic historiography and ethnography. Before the advent of the Fulani Jihad in the early 1800s, ethnic land boundaries were beginning to be formed. The Fulani Jihad had already under Usman Dan Fodio defined what land is Dar al-Harb or Dar al-Islam. The expansion and annexation of the territories beyond the Hausa and Borno lands boosted the jihadist flag bearers in the Middle Belt areas, especially in the Hausa and Fulani enclaves in the Middle Belt. The claims and counter claims of the jihadists and the Muslim rulers, on the one hand, and that of the peoples of the Middle Belt, on the other, did not really matter as the British colonialists were focused upon imposing Pax Britannica on the Region. The British took their decisions at their discretion, expedience and instance.
By 1900s, the British colonial masters had a pretty good idea of ethnic boundaries by their many updated ethnographic and linguistic maps throughout the colonial period. After independence in 1960, the civilian and especially the military regimes brought a lot of political and boundary changes and demographic movements of the peoples, especially into the new states capitals and local government headquarters. Of specific interests are the demographic movements from the rural areas into the urban areas, the influx of Southerners into the Northern cities and towns and even villages and the movement from Hausaland into the Middle Belt areas. Kaduna city and Abuja are producing a complex case study of urbanization and the question of the status of some ethnic groups like the Gbagyi in Kaduna and Abuja.
- British Occupation of Central Sudan (Northern Nigeria)
British colonial rule began in West Africa at the height of the Sokoto Caliphate’s religious, cultural, and economic power and territorial extent. Although the British colonial era lasted for only about sixty years, it played an important role in shaping contemporary Northern Nigeria. The Caliphate’s colonialism and hegemony was replaced by British colonial administration, which ended the Caliphate’s practice of slave raids, slave trading and slavery, and brought the region’s warring factions under the British Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which brought together the three religions of the area, Islam, traditional African religion and Christianity.
The British provided new socio-political structures, institutions and values, creating a new context within which both the Muslim and the non-Muslim groups interacted and defined themselves and others. But in doing this they also institutionalised the hostility between Muslims and non-Muslims. As a result, British colonial rule actually strengthened the socio-political role and status of the Muslim rulers. Furthermore, Islam was made the state religion, with Christianity and traditional religions being given only a secondary status.
British rule also coincided with the start of Christian missionary activity in Northern Nigeria, which further complicated Muslim–non-Muslim relations. The colonialists and the missionaries had different goals: the former to establish political rule under the British government, and the latter to establish the reign of Christ. They also had different approaches and beliefs about Africa. So although their interests sometimes coincided, they were also often at odds. At the same time, the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria were in conflict and each had their differences with the British administration and with the missionaries. As a result, the British rulers had to address issues relating to the Muslim groups, the non-Muslim groups and the Christian missionaries.
The quest to abolish slavery was the chief impetus behind British involvement in Africa south of the Sahara, and eventually in the establishing of colonies there. William Wilberforce, a Member of Parliament, had successfully waged a campaign against the slave trade, and then against slavery itself, in the British Empire. In 1807, the Abolition Act prohibited all British subjects from participating in the slave trade, and in 1833 the Abolition of Slavery Act ended slavery in the British colonies. In Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, Robinson and Gallagher observed that British involvement was motivated by “moral suasion and duty”, that is, by moral responsibility (Robinson and Gallagher, 1961:2)
Thomas F. Buxton continued in the footsteps of Wilberforce and founded the Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade on the West Coast of Africa, especially the Slave (i.e. Nigeria) Coast. He succeeded in persuading the British Government to send an expedition to the area to establish a practical alternative to the slave trade, namely legitimate trade.
In 1841, the British Government sent out three ships, the Albert, the Wilberforce and the Soudan, to explore the Niger River with a view British Colonial Rule Established in Northern Nigeria to establishing trading relations with the states of the Niger territories (today, the northern parts of Nigeria) so that legitimate trade would supplant the slave trade. The means was to be industrial mission, specifically industrial farms to promote agriculture and for the general social welfare of the local communities. The mission was headed by Bishop Ajayi Crowther, a freed slave from Sierra Leone. Although it failed, the quest to abolish the slave trade aroused the interest of both colonialists and missionaries in the Niger territories, and both groups continued to work in the region.
In 1886 Britain granted the Royal Niger Company a charter to trade on the Niger River and to make treaties with the states of the Niger territories. In December 1898 the Charter was withdrawn and Britain brought the territories under colonial rule. On 1 January 1900, at Lokoja, the flag of the Royal Niger Company was taken down and the Union Jack was hoisted in its place under the authority of Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick D. Lugard, the British High Commissioner. Between 1900 and 1903 British forces conquered most of the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, including Sokoto, Gwandu, Katsina, Kano, Bauchi, Zaria, Kontagora, Nupe, Ilorin and Adamawa. But the colonial administration managed effectively to occupy the entire non-Muslim Middle Belt as late as the early 1930s.
The British did not establish direct rule over the defeated Sokoto Caliphate and the Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu. Rather, they set up native administrations using indigenous rulers and existing institutions. They did not, however, grant this privilege of indirect rule as extensively to those in the Middle Belt.
2. Philosophy and Meaning of Indirect Rule
Some important historical factors necessitated the development of both indirect rule and indigenous administration. After occupying Northern Nigeria, Lugard was faced with the challenge of administering a vast region, setting up communications and exerting effective political control with an insufficient labour force and funds. He used the existing administrative systems of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu partly to defuse the danger of armed conflict with Islamic forces, and partly for convenience.
Working with existing structures was also convenient, because the Muslim states already had centralised and bureaucratic institutions and governments. Lugard incorporated them into his system of indigenous administration, with some modifications and improvements.
Prior to the invasion of Hausaland, Lugard and others had thought that radical reforms and changes to political structures were necessary if the territory were to be civilised and brought into the international system. But after the conquest, the British chose to make social and political changes only gradually. The philosophy of “gradualism” was embedded in the concept of indirect rule (Whitaker, 1970:71-76) and was the reason that the British colonial administration defended the status quo and strongly opposed any radical changes to or reforms of the social and political structures. Lugard defined indirect rule as follows:
The cardinal principle upon which the Administration of Northern Nigeria was based was what has been commonly called “Indirect Rule”, viz., rule through Native Chiefs, who are regarded as an integral part of the machinery of Government and Law…” (Lugard, 1913-1918:296).
Central to Lugard’s concept of indirect rule was the position and role of chiefs or indigenous rulers and indigenous institutions in the colonial administration. In Native Races and Their Rulers C.L. Temple describes the philosophy of indirect rule.
By Indirect Rule I mean a system of Administration which leaves in existence the administrative machinery which had been created by the natives themselves, which recognizes the existence of Emirs, Chiefs, and native councils, native Courts, Pagan Courts, native police controlled by a native executive, as real living forces … by which European influence is brought to bear on the native indirectly through European officers - political, police, etc. and by which the European keeps himself a good deal in the background, and leaves the mass of native individuals to understand that orders which come to them emanate from their own Chiefs rather than from the all-pervading white man. (Temple, 1968:30).
Consistent with these principles, the indirect rule established by the British incorporated indigenous socio-political institutions from the Muslim emirate system, and Islamic religion, culture, values and institutions, into the new colonial structure. Thus the Islamic political philosophy and culture of the Caliphate formed the foundations of both indigenous and colonial administration in Northern Nigeria. Even though the Muslim rulers were defeated and lost their sovereignty, their British colonial masters created a system in which they could continue to rule.
The British also used Muslim rulers to administer some of the non-Muslim areas, thus subordinating the non-Muslims there to Muslim Hausa-Fulani rule.
3. Indigenous Administration
The indigenous administrations had three basic institutions: authority, courts and treasuries. A “native authority” was any chief or other African appointed by the governor as the executive head of an administration. “Native courts” were developed out of the Islamic judicial system and/or native customs and law. “Native treasuries” were created out of the fiscal systems of Muslim states. These institutions formed the foundations of the emirate, or indigenous model of administration. In the Muslim areas, emirates were headed by emirs (or amirs), while in the non-Muslim areas, each administration was headed by a chief or council.
Indigenous administration gave autonomy to the Muslim rulers and peoples, but in the non-Muslim areas some ethnic groups lost their independence to Muslim, Hausa-Fulani rule.
4. Colonial Administration
British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria had two broad, hierarchical levels of government. At the top was the British-controlled administration headed by the high commissioner (governor or lieutenant-governor); it comprised the residents, district officers (DOs), assistant district officers (ADOs), other European political officials and technical staff, and African clerical and non-clerical staff. Below this level was the indigenous administration of each emirate or division headed by the “native authority” or paramount chief, each with his own staff.
The first level of administration was based on British socio-political institutions and was controlled by the British political officials. This was the supreme authority. The second level was based upon the indigenous socio-political institutions and was controlled by African native rulers. This was the subordinate authority.
The high commissioner was responsible to the governor-general at Lagos, the capital of Nigeria, and the governor-general to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, who was also responsible to the king or queen, the head of the British Empire.
The central government was based in the capital. The region was divided administratively into provinces, divisions or emirates, districts and village areas. Each provincial administration was headed by a resident, and under him were the DOs, ADOs and their support staff. The resident represented the high commissioner in the province and was also the chief adviser to the paramount chiefs.
British colonial policies and administrative practices can be understood only from the perspective of British assumptions about Africa and Africans. Their ethnocentrism shaped their policies and was used to justify their colonising of other countries. Their belief that some people could be classified as more civilised than others led them to ascribe a superior social status to Muslims and an inferior one to non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria. This resulted in preferential treatment for Muslims and helped to institutionalise the hostilities between Muslims and non-Muslims.
5. Theories of Racial Superiority
British assumptions about British superiority were influenced by racial theories, which shaped their view of the religion, character, customs, and appearance of others. These views in turn shaped the policies by which the British ruled their colonies.
Regarding this British “superiority”, R.E. Robinson and John Gallagher state:
Upon the ladder of progress, nations and races seemed to stand higher or lower according to the proven capacity of each for freedom and enterprise: the British at the top, followed by a few rungs below by the Americans, and the striving go-ahead Anglo-Saxons. The Latin peoples were thought to come next, though far behind. Much lower still stood the vast Oriental communities of Asia and North Africa where progress appeared unfortunately to have been crushed ... Lowest of all stood the “aborigines” whom it was thought had never learned enough social discipline to pass from the family and tribe to the making of a State.” (Robinson and Gallagher, 1961:2
The policies that Frederick D. Lugard developed for the region were deeply influenced by his belief in European superiority and his view that some groups in the Protectorate were superior to others. Lugard strongly justified British occupation of Northern Nigeria on the grounds that it provided wealth for Britain and civilised the peoples of Africa.
This “dual mandate” philosophy was based upon Lugard’s assumption that African interests and British interests were congruent. In Dual Mandate he states:
Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane. That the benefits could be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate. (Lugard, 1923:72-80)
Lugard believed that Britain had a moral responsibility to put down the disorder caused by the evils of the slave trade and to provide good administration to the “primitives”. In Dual Mandate he states:
It was the task of civilisation to put an end to slavery, to establish courts of law, to inculcate in the natives a sense of individual responsibility of liberty, and of justice, and to teach their rulers how to apply these principles, above all, to see to it that the system of education should be such as to produce happiness and progress. I am confident that the verdict of history will award high praise to the efforts and achievements of Great Britain in the discharge of these great responsibilities. (Lugard, 1923: 72-80)
As already mentioned, Lugard also gave some groups in Africa, particularly the Muslims, preferential treatment. He based his assessment of peoples on a hierarchical classification and on his opinion of peoples’ physical and mental characteristics. Lugard classified the peoples of tropical Africa into three groups: the primitive tribes, the advanced communities, and the Europeanised Africans. Lugard placed the “pure negroid” at the bottom; it was assumed that “pure” Africans had no civilisation, and that whatever traits of “advanced” civilisation they had came from Semitic and Hamitic influences from the Middle East and North Africa. He classified the Muslim Fulani and Hausa as “advanced tribes”.
Lugard concludes his analysis of African culture, religion, civilisation, physical features, character traits, demography and socio-political organisation by saying:
Such, in brief, are the peoples for whose welfare we are responsible in British tropical Africa. They have a fascination of their own, for we are dealing with the child races of the world, and learning at first hand the habits and customs of primitive man. (Lugard, 1923: 72-80)
6. Colonial Policies towards Muslim Rulers
Even before the British fully occupied Northern Nigeria, Lugard had set a precedent for the preferential treatment of Muslim areas. He was influenced both by his belief that Islam was a superior religion and culture and by the prospect of war.
Faced with the power of the Muslim rulers and the profound influence of Islam, Lugard had to make tactical approaches to the Muslim rulers when he tried to move into the Sokoto Caliphate. He sent the Sultan a copy of his 1 January 1900 proclamation, which inaugurated British rule over Northern Nigeria (ARNN, 1901–1911:147). Lugard based his subsequent correspondence with the Sultan on this proclamation, especially on its mandate to rule over the Caliphate and put an end to slavery. Any caliphate or kingdom that would not submit to British colonial rule would be made to do so by force of arms.
In 1902, the Sultan reacted unfavourably and challenged Lugard’s claim to sovereignty over the Sokoto Caliphate by appealing to the ultimate source of his authority and legitimacy as defined by Islam:
From us to you. I do not consent that any from you should ever dwell with us. I will never agree with you. I have nothing ever to do with you. Between us and you there [can be] no dealings except between Mussulmans and Unbelievers (“Kafiri”); war as God Almighty has enjoined on us. There is no power or strength save in God on High. (ARNN, 1901–1911:159)
The Sultan’s uncompromising stand no doubt gave Lugard a sense of the Muslim rulers’ hostility towards the newly established colonial rule. The Sultan declared a jihad between himself and the British, whom he saw as kuffar. How could an Islamic state be defeated and ruled by infidels?
Faced with stiff political and religious opposition from the Muslim rulers, Lugard had no choice but to settle the question of sovereignty by military force. Within three years he conquered both the Sokoto Caliphate and the Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu and imposed British colonial rule over them and the other kingdoms in the region. He took the Caliphate’s capital, Sokoto, in 1903 and defeated the Sultanate in the same year.
As part of his tactical approach Lugard paid attention to the religious implications of British colonial rule in the Islamic areas and made a major policy statement (ARNN, 1901–1911:162–65). He assured the Muslim rulers that “there will be no interference with your religion nor with the position of the “Sarikin Musulmi” (Sultan) as head of your religion” (ARNN, 1901–1911:159). Earlier, in 1901, Lugard had made the same clear promise of non-interference in religious matters to the Emir of Adamawa: “Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion. All men are free to worship God as they please. Mosque and prayer places will be treated with respect by us.” (ARNN, 1901-1911:164; Graham, 1966:17)
The British colonial rulers, who were aristocrats, were also influenced by the affinity they felt with Muslim rulers, who were also aristocrats (Heussler, 1968, 1969).The British wanted to assure the Muslim rulers of their friendship and their determination to maintain it. For that reason, the British could not properly address the dhimmi status and near slavery of the non-Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria.
As a result, the political and religious stance of the British colonial administration, which was expressed in its policy of religious non-interference, led to the development of policies, administrative practices and attitudes that supported and protected Muslim rulers and societies. It also led to policies that prevented any social integration between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups and any Christian activities. The colonial rulers preferred policies of separate development similar to Apartheid (separate development of races) of South Africa. British colonial attitudes and policies towards Christian missions and the non-Muslims also reflected their principle of religious non-interference. Later, the colonial rulers made the Muslim rulers their junior partners in indigenous administrations. They were to oversee the Africans on behalf of the British.
7. Colonial Policies towards the Non-Muslim Subjects
- The Pastoralist Fulani
- Summary: The Colonial Social Order
In contemporary Nigeria, the presence of the structures of inequality, insecurity and incompatibility and a variety of conflicting values, make it even more difficult for a development of a national consensus on the norms and values of national politics, ethics and integration.
The issues raised by the Memoranda can be classified into the following emergent social structures and values of the British colonial social order in colonial Nigeria.
1. That the colonial social order was characterised by:
(1) The establishment of districts, provinces, and regions based upon racial or tribal inequality and the pattern of dominance-subordination relationships between ethnic groups and regions;
(2) Differential or preferential treatment of ethnic groups and regions;
(3) Stratified inequality in political, social and economic spheres;
4) The creation of new ethnic hierarchies and tribal social units;
2. That the long-term consequences of the colonial socio-political policies and values were:
(1) the institutionalisation of the socio-political conflicts between ethnic groups and regions;
the uneven social, political, economic, and educational development between ethnic groups and regions;
(2) the development of social and historical advantages or disadvantages of ethnic groups and/or regions in the colonial and post-colonial systems;
(3) the continuity of the unjust colonial structures and values in the post-colonial Nigeria;
(4) the setting up of unbalanced political system at the center for the regions and within regions and the introduction of the politics of population and domination.
3 That social and political policies and administrative practices and attitude of the Colonial Administration towards ethnic groups were based upon:
(1) Social, cultural and religious differences of the ethnic groups;
(2) the concept of racial/ethnic inequality of the tribal and religious groups;
(3) colonial justification of racial, cultural and religious differences of the ethnic groups in implementing such policies.
The British colonial masters righted their obnoxious imperialism, paternalism and colonialism by granting political independence to Nigeria in 1960. But unfortunately, Nigerians themselves have held on tenaciously to those structures and values of internal colonialism. Cultural and ethnic independence are yet to be granted to some Nigerian people and religious groups. Hence the cries of many Memoranda for a political redress.
The Colonial Administration used ethnicity/tribalism, land, culture and religion to establish the colonial social and moral order. Issues arising have become the foundations of social, structural, religious and communal crises and conflicts in both colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.
- The Legacy of Christian Missions
The work of Christian Missions in the Southern Nigeria is completely left out of this analysis in view of our subject. The case study of the work of Christian Missions in Northern Nigeria brings out by far more socio-political issues that are endemic to crises and conflicts in Nigeria. The ethno-religious riots and Boko Haram are the characteristics of a northern society and less of Southern Nigeria.
British colonialists and Christian missionaries advanced into the Niger territories almost simultaneously during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The colonialists were in Northern Nigeria to end the slave trade, establish legitimate trade and “civilise” Africans. While Christian missions were also in Northern Nigeria to stop the spread of Islam in Africa, to win Africans for Christ, and to fulfill the “Burden of the Sudan.” Their differing missions led to serious conflicts in Hausaland. Those conflicts, and the colonialists’ promise of non-interference with Islam, resulted in discrimination against Christian missionaries and people who became Christians.
In Northern Nigeria, Christianity was established by faith missions that opposed British colonial policies. They were not a tool of the colonialists; indeed, the British colonialists saw Christianity as a threat to their “mandate” for tropical Africa. In the Middle Belt, the work of Christian missionaries brought a measure of freedom to the people. The non-Muslims under British-Muslim rule were subjected to forced labour and servitude, and Christianity was seen as liberating agent. In some places in the Middle Belt, Christian converts rejected the servitude and the inferior status imposed upon them, in some cases refusing to submit to forced labour or to pay taxes. The allegiance of the people shifted from the British-Muslim rulers to the new missionary-convert teachers and evangelists. Christians in Northern Nigeria saw Christian missions and Christianity as liberators from the colonialism of the Sokoto Caliphate, the Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu and the British Administration.
- Christian Missions and the Colonial Administration
Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) was among the first pioneering Christian missions in Northern Nigeria and in later years it became one of the largest, covering a wider geographical territory than any other single Mission in Northern Nigeria. There were many other Christian Missions which operated in Northern Nigeria, such as, Church Missionary Society (CMS), Sudan United Mission (SUM), Church of the Brethren Mission (CBM), United Missionaiy Society (UMS), Roman Catholic Church (RCM), Dutch Reformed Church Mission (DRCM), Lutheran Mission and other small ones.
The Middle Belt of Nigeria was abandoned to Christian missions by colonial religious and social policy. The bulk of educational, medical, literature and social development activities in the Middle Belt was borne by Christian missions. The colonial masters did very little in terms of modern development in the area. Without Christian missions, the Middle Belt would have been abandoned to ravaging domineering and enslaving socio-political and religious forces of the day.
Christian missions have done by far more to the development of the area than the colonial masters and the Hausa-Fulani rulers. Some peoples of the Middle Belt were enslaved, plundered, subjugated, dehumanized and denied their basic human rights under both the Caliphate and British colonial rule. Christian missions came as their liberators.
The conflict between the colonialists and the missionaries were quite revealing in the annual reports of the British residents in the Provinces. They registered their displeasure with the activities of Christian missions. They saw Christianity as subversive and dangerous to British-Muslim rule in the North. The attitudes of the British and the Muslims towards Christians and Christianity were institutionalised in government policy, which in most cases worked against the interests of Christians in the North.
Some major colonial policies towards the Christian Missions can be listed as: Christian Missions banned from the Muslim emirates until the early 1930s; colonial regulatory policy on missionary activities in the North; colonial views on education, social change and Christianity.
Between the 1910s and the late 1950s, the British Colonial Administration promulgated several regulatory policies to control the activities of Christian missions, ostensibly in defense of the principle of religious non-interference. These policies found their full expression in 1955 in the Missionary Permit, which compelled individuals to apply to the Government of Northern Nigeria for a license to operate as a missionary. It is important to note the conditions under which missionaries could operate were only for Christian missionaries and nothing for the Muslim missionaries:
1. In towns or villages or quarters of towns or villages which are Mohammedan or predominantly Mohammedan, not to preach at all in the vicinity of mosques, or in the markets, or other places to which the public particularly resort, and not to preach in or near other public places except in so far as the Native Authority may through the Resident give his Consent thereto.
2. Not to carry out house-to-house visiting among Mohammedan residents for purposes of missionary propaganda except in compounds at which a previous indication has been given that such house-to-house visiting would be welcomed generally by the people of the compound.
3. Not to distribute or attempt to distribute Christian literature to Mohammedans unless there has been a spontaneous request from an adult individual.
4. To conduct yourself and to encourage all members and followers of your mission to behave in such a way as will not offend the religious beliefs and observances of any section of the community, whether Moslem or non-Moslem.
5. To refrain from and discourage any action which might be detrimental to the approved system of administration or lead to inter-tribal discord. (SIM Archives, Missionary Permit, April 1955).
These and many more conditions inhibited any real understanding between the missionaries and the colonial administration, because both had much at stake. After Lugard’s departure in 1906, his successors intensified the controversy. These post-Lugardians, such as Giruard, Temple and Palmer, had been powerful residents of the Muslim emirates. Their conception of indirect rule led them strongly believe that indigenous administration, particularly in the Muslim areas, should be protected from the subversive influence of Western civilisation. They viewed the Christian missionary as disruptive, and this perception intensified their fears and suspicions. In their attempts to control Christian missionaries, the colonial administration sent out memoranda and government circulars to all residents and district officers in Northern Nigeria on how to check their activities. Colonial regulations were imposed on itinerancy, evangelism, visitation, preaching, church planting, mission stations, religious instruction and schools, and relations with Africans. The negative impact of these regulations on the status of African Christian converts and of Christianity itself endured into post-colonial Nigeria. When Christian missions faced the problems imposed by the regulatory policies, they often reacted by making charges against the colonial administration. These charges reveal the status of African Christian converts and Christianity relative to that of Muslims and Islam. Some of
these charges were:
1. That the Colonial Administration prohibited missionary work in the Muslim areas contrary to the British common law of religious freedom and toleration.
2. That the Administration aided the advancement of Islam into the non-Muslim areas and that Muslim missionaries and traders were allowed to propagate their Muslim faith anywhere.
3. That British colonisation of Northern Nigeria gave impetus to the rapid spread of Islam beyond the confines of the Muslim areas.
4. That the quarter-mile rule and the Township Ordinance were means of keeping missionaries out of urban centres and that this hindered relationships between the missionaries and their converts.
5. That the Administration had prevented the missions from preaching publicly and that it was often very difficult to obtain permission to plant churches and build new mission stations and schools.
6. That the Administration favoured Muslims over African Christian converts and that sometimes Christian converts were persecuted by the colonial officers.
7. That the Administration was anti-Christian and pro-Muslim
8. That Lugard was friendly with the missionaries and that he never opposed missionary work but rather encouraged it.
9. That the post-Lugardians did not understand Lugard’s policies; instead they promulgated anti-Christian policies.
10. That the Muslim Emirs were friendly to the Christian missions and would have allowed missionaries in their territories but for the opposition of British colonial officers (Turaki, 1999a: 215-216).
2. Christianity and Colonial Views
The education policies of the colonial administration were based upon European racial theory and were hostile to the spreading of Western civilisation and Christianity. Christian missions were viewed as a threat because they brought powerful agents of social change into the Middle Belt: a new faith and Western education. The British and Muslim rulers did not want people to convert to Christianity or have access to Western education because such religious and social changes gave a measure of rights and autonomy to some Christian converts who had been treated no better than slaves. The colonial political officers preferred the status quo that pagans should remain pagans and retain their dhimmi or slave status so that they could be controlled effectively. The emirate model imposed upon the non-Muslim groups was threatened by Christianity.
To control the impact of Christianity in Northern Nigeria, the early British administrators promulgated ordinances to control education and prevent “unsatisfactory” mission education from spreading through the North. In an attempt to control the rate of social change, especially in Muslim areas, it based education on a policy of separate development of the Muslim and the non-Muslim groups, a kind of rudimentary apartheid. The colonial administration also regulated missionary education because it did not like the influence that this had had in Southern Nigeria. Some administrators wanted to preserve African culture and claimed that Christianity was a destabilizing force.
In 1906 Lugard said, “Racial distinction should be accepted as the true basis of African education” (Lugard, 1923:431, 1933a:11, 1970:131). Furthermore, he objected to the teaching of the missionaries on equality:
I am informed that they preach the equality of Europeans and natives, which, however true from a doctrinal point of view, is apt to be misapplied by people in a low stage of development, and interpreted as an abolition of class distinction. (ARNN, 1901–1911:470)
The views of other colonial officers on education and their strong aversion to African Christian converts also affected the converts’ status.
The colonial administrators found support for their fear of disrupting African societies through Western education from prominent writers and anthropologists. The views of those who wanted to preserve African culture echoed the ideas of Mary Kingsley, a British writer and explorer, of E.D. Morel, a British journalist, and of Lugard himself.
Mary Kingsley believed in the preservation of African culture against the “evil” and the “destructive” forces of Western civilisation (Kingsley, 1964). Morel was a strong advocate of the preservation of African culture and believed that Africans must be educated in a manner specific to them. He was opposed to “Anglicisation” and “Christianisation” (Morel, 1968) and feared that Western education might lead to “denationalisation” or “detribalisation”. (Morel, 1967)
Particularly interesting were Morel’s views on Islam and Christianity. In Affairs of West Africa, which was first published in 1902, he said,
Islam to the Negro is the stepping stone to a higher conception of existence, inspiring in his breast confidence in his own destiny, imbibing his spirit with a robust faith in himself and in his race. Christianity does not do this for the Negro. The effects, indeed, it quite discourages. Instead of inculcating a greater self-reliance, it seems to lessen that which exists. The Christian Negro for the most part is a sort of hybrid. He is neither one thing nor the other. (Morel, 1968:230)
In Affairs of West Africa, Morel also says, “Islam, despite its shortcomings, does not, from the Nigerian point of view, demand race suicide of the Nigerian as an accompaniment of conversion” (Morel, 1968:230). He believed that under Islam “the whole bearing of the man suggests a consciousness of citizenship, a pride of race which seems to say: ‘We are different, thou and I but we are men’” (Morel, 1968:230). Morel’s views provided a rationale for negative colonial attitudes towards Christian missions, and especially towards African converts to Christianity and the influence of Western education, and for the promotion of conservative education policies.
The British colonial administration employed anthropologists to gather ethnographic materials as the basis for formulating government policies on various ethnic groups. Most of these government anthropologists shared the views of Kingsley, Morel and Lugard on culture, religion, education and social change.
Morel’s and Lugard’s views on education and social change can be summarised as follows:
1. The rejection of missionary education in favour of the Government’s
2. The alienation of the missionary influence within the Emirates.
3. The development of an educational system based upon separate development of ethnic groups and racial inequality.
4. Emphasis upon moral education based upon religious principles and cultural lines.
5. Emphasis upon the preservation of traditional values as opposed to denationalisation or detribalisation or Anglicisation or Christianisation.
6. The influential Morelian views of the superiority of Islam over African Christianity.
7. The development of anti-Westernisation and anti-Christianity policies among the post-Lugardians.
8. institutions which are threatened by Western civilisation and Christianity (Turaki, 1999a:244).
The group of people most adversely affected by colonial policies on education and social change were the Christian missionaries and the Africans who converted to Christianity. The latter were subjected to all kinds of ridicule and persecution by the British colonial rulers. These and similar policies that seek to control Christianity have continued in some of the Northern States to the present. Some were re-enacted soon after the take-over of mission schools in 1972/73. Some of the Northern States do not Christian Religious Knowledge in Public Schools, establishing of new churches, Christian burial grounds and other restrictions. These policies and attitudes towards Christians in some Northern States only add up crises and conflicts.
3. Christian Coverts and Colonial Treatment
Many British colonial officers were opposed o Africans being converted to Christianity. They called the converts insulting names such as “mission boys”, “black white men”, “half baked”, “rebels”, “hot heads”, “detribalised”, “denationalised”, “anglicised”, and “Christianised”. The colonial rulers hated the African converts because they saw them as a threat to African customs and traditions and to the authority of the colonial government, the emirs and the traditional chiefs. The colonial office in Kaduna was flooded with Provincial Reports by the residents on missionary activities and the havoc supposedly being caused by the so-called “mission boys”.
In many areas of the Middle Belt the British refused to allow Christian missions to establish mission stations or schools for fear of conversions and the effects of education. Some British colonial rulers incited the local people to reject Christian missionaries who came into their areas. Some advised the Muslim rulers not to allow Christian missionaries into their emirates. Some British colonial officers destroyed Christian places of worship and denied permits to Christian missionaries. All these steps were meant to restrict the spread of Christianity, which was seen as a threat to British-Muslim rule in the North.
In the early 1930s the British colonial administration lifted the embargo on the activities of Christian missions in the Muslim areas
This missionary background helps us to understand the basis for British colonial policies, administrative practices and attitudes towards both Muslim and non-Muslim communities and towards Islam and Christianity. The British colonial officers discriminated against Christian missions and African converts in many ways. They frowned on Christianity as a religion, viewing it as a destabilising influence within the region. For this and other reasons, they made second-class citizens of non-Muslims and institutionalised the dhimmi and slave status imposed upon them
Some of the crises and conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the Northern Nigeria are rooted in the British colonial policies and the suspicion over the activities of Christian missions and their converts. Nigerians cannot continue in this kind of religious policies and suspicions. Freedom, respect and protection of religion should be made a primary national value that Nigeria must attain and preserve. Nigerians should be able to put behind them the obnoxious policies of the past eras of the Caliphate, British colonialism and Christian missionaries. The misgivings that religious bodies have about these historical legacies whether good or bad, should be discussed and discarded. Traditional, Muslim and Christian bodies should address amicably all sensitive issues and negative values that religions generate.
In the private, religious bodies or ethnic groups or regional groupings tend of imposing their values and institutions upon others. In consequence, this attitude only leads to crises and conflicts. The collective will of all Nigerian people groups is necessary for creating a conducive, harmonious and peaceful Nigeria. From the contemporary social prognosis, there is a possible threat of the clash of violence of people and religious groups, the extinction of some ethnic groups and languages, and the possible drift of massive population into the Middle Belt areas of Nigeria. Can we follow reason and save ourselves from self-destruction through incessant riots, violence, crises and conflicts.
- Christian Missions and Ethnicity
Ethne or a people-group occupies a very important place in Christianity. Christianity reaches out not only to individuals, but also to people-groups. An ethnic group as an entity receives is the primary goal of missions. Many missionaries came to Africa because they received God’s call for a particular ethnic group or region. The early pioneers were often referred to as a missionary for Tangaleland, or Gbagyiland, or Jabaland, or Hausaland. A missionary prepared himself/herself for ministry among the people of a particular ethnic group. A missionary had to learn the language and to be able to reduce that language into writing.
Many languages in the Middle Belt areas have been reduced to writing, especially through Bible translations. This missionary activity has done far more to preserve African languages, African identity and ethnicity than any other means. Christian missions contributed immensely in consolidating Hausa as the lingua franca of Northern Nigeria. Christianity was the major factor and means of spreading and consolidating Hausa as a lingua franca.
The type of Christianity that was brought to the Middle Belt affirms the ethnicity and the languages and the localities of the peoples of the Middle Belt. It was from the missionaries that the peoples learn of human rights, dignity and freedom. Some of the early protests movements against the colonial rule were motivated by some Christian values and the work of Christian missions.
Christianity helped the peoples of the Middle Belt to retain both their ethnicity and languages. The major difficulty which the colonial masters faced with the peoples of the Middle Belt was their quest for freedom, rights and equality of human beings. Some of the crises and conflicts in the Northern States are as a result of some of the peoples’ refusal to capitulate to domination and oppression. When people are enlightened, it is very difficult to subjugate them.
One of the most difficult forms of socialization is to ask masters and servants to become friends. Political, social and religious socialization will be a difficult task to undertake.
From the legacy of British colonialism and that of Christian Missions, we now come to the legacy of the post-colonial period of the nationalists, parliamentarians and politicians after independence in 1960.
E. The Parliamentarians
The parliamentary system at independence (1960) was a continuation of the colonial system. The parliamentarians, in other words, "tribal politicians" or “tribal nationalists”
were groomed to take-over or stepped into the shoes of the colonial masters and not necessarily to restructure the colonial system in terms of human values, principles of justice, peace, equality and freedom. They imbibed and sanctioned colonial values and
practices and did use the inherited colonial system and the inherited primordial values and institutions to boost, strengthen and entrenched their tribal or regional dominance in regional and national politics. Since the colonial system was founded upon an
unjust social order and an imbalanced political structure, and unjust moral values of tribal or religious superiority, the parliamentary system which inherited this unjust colonial social order could not stand the test of time and collapsed in January 1966
as the Military forcefully stepped in.
Why did the "inherited" parliamentary system and with its inherited primordial and colonial values fail? It was bedeviled by many negative social values and practices, such as:
1. It was founded upon the colonial unjust social order and the imbalanced political structures;
2. Ethno-regional politics, which was characterised by domination, fears, rivalry, aggressiveness, manipulation, corruption, greed, etc.;
3. Unacceptable revenue allocation formulas and the distribution of resources and their politicization, which led to uneven or unfair distribution of resources;
4. There was the denial of democratic process of government in terms of equal representation and participation in government;
5.The blatant misuse of State resources and power, and corruption, nepotism and tribalism.
These negative social values and practices, which were incorporated and entrenched in the colonial social order, were later to become the motivating political factors and values for the parliamentarians. These parliamentarians failed at any substantial restructuring
of the unjust colonial social order and negative values because they were controlled and dominated by their sub-national and parochial values, which stood against national unity and integration and universal human values of rights, equality and freedom.
Unfortunately, Nigerians themselves have held on tenaciously to structures and values of inequality and injustice. Full independence is yet to be granted to some Nigerian people groups as some of the Memoranda assert. The British have somewhat corrected their
imperialistic, paternalistic and colonial attitude and mentality by granting independence to Nigeria, but regrettably, some powerful groups in Nigeria have held on to their primordial and colonial values and structures which have held some Nigerians in bondage
and servitude. “Internal colonialism” still persists and has not been corrected in some areas. Governor Jaafaru Isa and Governor Ahmed Makarfi have sought to correct or extend such by the creation new chiefdoms and emirates.
By looking back, at independence, the parliamentarians did not correct the unjust colonial structures, which have become foundations for religious and communal conflict soon after independence in 1960. The task for politicians and government is that of correcting
the injustices of the past generations.
Next, the military legacy.
F. Military Regimes: Nation-State Building and National Integration
In world history, the military have been the best instrument of nation-state building. Some of the most powerful nations in history and even in our modern times have been built by their military. But the Nigeria’s military might and force could not overcome the suffocating and strangling power of ethnocentrism and primordialism. Nigeria’s military was seduced and incapacitated. They handed over Nigeria mutilated, battered and crippled. George Washington, Bolivar, Napoleon, Lenin, Mussolini, Stalin, Haile Salesse, Mao Tsetung and many others effectively used the military to build their nations.
The soldiers who took power from the parliamentarians in January 1966 succeeded in correcting, somewhat the imbalanced political structures through the creation of
new states, local government reforms and new revenue allocation formula. The Military regimes succeeded also in centralizing the political system at the centre and weakening regionalism. The successes of the Military regimes are many but their rapid nation-state
building and national integration had created new political, social and economic and religious problems, such as:
1. Even though the Military regimes created states and local governments to solve the problem of political imbalance and fears of domination, they have rather created new imbalances and fears of domination within the states and local government areas. The new
majority-minority issues within states, ethnic and sectional rivalry within states or geo-political regions still abound and have even become more intensive over the years;
2. The soldiers, unfortunately, usually allowed themselves to be used, controlled, manipulated by certain powerful political pressure groups and institutions for their own political or economic well-being and other sub-national interests, such as religion,
ethnicity, class and sectionalism;
3. The Military philosophy of centralization-decentralization of governmental functions; national development plan, political reforms and indigenisation policy did not clearly define the following:
national goals, objectives, ideals and values; purposeful leadership based upon national goals and objectives and the mobilization of the nation toward achieving such set goals and objectives in social, economic and political life; development of a sound
economic system, educational system, health system, the judiciary, the police, and the national services system, as means to raising standards of living and national development; nationhood and citizenship and national integration.
4. The Military regimes preoccupied themselves with structural and constitutional reforms and neglected the most important area of our national life, that is, the moral reform of the nation which was contingent upon the unjust colonial social order. The moral
decadence of the life of the nation sabotaged any social, political and economic reforms of the Military. The reason being that the negative values of the colonial social order, which remained unchanged and uncorrected, frustrated any meaningful reforms;
5. The soldiers saw themselves as national saviors or as modern nation-state builders and for this reason introduced many socio-political and economic reforms. There was an assumption by the Military those structures of inequality, insecurity and incompatibility
and political and economic imbalances can be corrected by states creation, local government reforms, economic development and constitutional and social reforms. To be successful in achieving these goals, the soldiers saw the necessity of building strong state
machinery based upon the principles of bureaucratic-authoritarianism (of Latin American examples) and statism (of socialist examples). The State assumed the position of a “Leviathan'” (sea monster) and embarked upon the centralisation of state power and bureaucracy.
State control was made possible through military might and the accruing oil revenues.
The desire to achieve a good level of political and economic development led the military into borrowing indiscriminately and the use of development theories and public policy-making which were borrowed from Western and Islamic social sciences. The question
of relevance of these developmental theories and models of economic and political development was hardly raised as has been clarified.
The Presidential System under President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) was a Military Experiment which failed woefully because it did not take into account, (1) the cultural background, the colonial legacy and the primordial values of Nigerians; and (2) the religious, moral and ethical state of the nation. Nigerians who entered into national politics with their strongly held colonial values and ethnic, regional and religious values sabotaged the Presidential System. The old ethno-regional and religious politics of the parliamentarians was somewhat revived and political, state and national corruption went out of proportions.
Even though the Military developed a very strong Constitution of 1979 with strong emphasis upon social justice and federal character and also had provisions for good government and national ethical structure, yet it failed on account of those reasons already stated. Principally, it failed because: (1) there was no strong political machinery for enforcing the provisions of the Constitution and the national ethical structure and (2) the operators of the Constitution and the government manipulated them for their selfish and sub-national interests.
The failure of the Military Experiment was not due to the weakness of the structural, constitutional and social reforms, but rather the absence of what General Murtala Mohammed outlined in his speech to the Constitution Drafting Committee which all pointed to the ethical and moral state of the nation. General Murtala's address was predicated upon moral and ethical principles such as social justice, rights, freedom and equality of citizens and human beings. Here we can see a powerful motive of ethics and morality built into the Constitution. General Obasanjo's famous Jaji Address, a few years after General Murtala's Address was more of a treatise on moral political philosophy. This address was a call to all Nigerians to take up the question of national morality and ethics seriously.
It was only in 1982 that Nigerians in large numbers became aware that the national problem was more than just being political and economic, but ethical, moral, social and religious. For the first time, the managers of the Military Experiment came to the public to announce the need for an "ethical revolution'' in the country. The need to address both public and private life, conduct, morality and social behaviour and practice became so acute in that President Shehu Shagari launched an Ethical Re-orientation Committee. During this period, national politics and national life was anything but moral and ethical.
Generals Buhari and Babangida) in 1983 took over power from President Shehu Shagari. They have observed with great concern that the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy as stated in the constitution seem not to guide national and state policy-making. The conduct of public officers and of the operators of the private sector has revealed a serious lack of honesty, hardwork, humility and humaneness. The attainment of self-reliance in political economy has continued to be a mirage owing to wholesale adoption of foreign values, institutions and consumption patterns and the continuation of colonial cultural bondage. Furthermore, national and individual life has not been significantly moderated by the national ethical structure as contained in the Constitution. This is what General Buhari and his Deputy General Idiagbon stepped in to correct. As Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Tunde Idiagbon at the launching of the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) had this to say about the moral and ethical crisis facing Nigeria:
"the terrible evils of indiscipline, lack of faith and commitment and corruption have eaten deep into the nation's fabric”.
Furthermore, he listed, "other undesirable manifestations like greed, dishonesty, impatience, discourtesy, vandalism, indecency, brutality, armed robbery, drunkenness, tribalism, ostentation, selfishness, insensitiveness to filthy surroundings and many other readily identifiable ills of our society."
General Babangida’s regime sought to address the serious socio-political and socio-economic questions. He embarked upon the eradication of ignorance and the emancipation and the liberation of "chained" and "enslaved" citizenry. True freedom, and rights must be grounded and rooted in economic self-reliance and social justice, hence the society must be reconstructed. Programmes such as. Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Self-Reliance (MAMSER), Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI), National Directorate for Employment (NDE), Better Life for Rural Women (Better Life) and the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were set up to restructure and reform society.
General Babangida produced the 1989 Constitution and established a Presidential political system based upon two political parties.
The military regimes in their impact have succeeded in arousing the negative colonial values described in the previous sections. The examples are: the Sharia-Secularity debates; religious and communal riots; ethno-regional politics, consciousness and interests; military-civilian rivalry; and fears and suspicions over policies and practices as favouring some ethnic groups and some sections of the country. Examples of such military actions are:
- General Buhari and Idiagbon amended the "personal" definition of Sharia in the 1979 Constitution, which aroused counter reactions from the Christians. The contentious issues of the Sharia debates were reduced to quiet state policy.
- In 1986, the General Babangida's Regime sought to redefine the secularity of the Nigerian state by enlisting Nigeria as a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). The Muslim-Christian rivalry was inflamed and heightened. This incidence also almost ruined the Debates of the Constituent Assembly in 1989 on the Sharia issue. The Military had to intervene and stopped the Debates on Sharia since it was capable of destroying the existence of Nigeria. Sharia was declared a “no go” area and was taken out of the hands of the Constituent Assembly.
- In 1992, General Babangida normalized relations with the State of Israel. This was a unique and unusual move by a Head of State who himself was a Muslim. The reaction of both Muslims and Christians were muted in view of the religious sensitivity in diplomatic circles in Saudi, Israel and the Vatican.
- General Babangida realising the crucial role of religion, he set up a religious body (ACRA) to arbitrate between the Government and the religious bodies and also to moderate the belligerent posture of the Christian and Muslim groups.
- General Abacha made Nigeria to join the Islamic Eight and sent representatives to the OIC. He welcomed the Islamic Bank.
- General Abacha created the six zones: Northwest, Northeast, North-Central, South West, Southeast and South-South.
- General Abubakar Abdulsalami produced the controversial 1999 Constitution.
Under the military, religion became a plaything of the powerful. It was no longer the wish and the desires of the people but the most powerful can scheme and manipulate religion at the expense of national interest and unity. Compromise and toleration were long dead!
Military Local Government Reforms and State Creation
Military Local Government Reforms of 1976 brought about very serious socio-political changes in Nigeria. The Native Authority (NA) that was discarded addressed adequately the issues of (1) indigene-settler-stranger questions and (2) the role of local government in development and governance.
In the NA system, all children born within the NA were considered indigenes and were entitled to all the benefits that the citizens of the local government enjoyed, like education and scholarships and civil service. During the NA era, the question of who is an indigene, or settler, or stranger were never raised and not one was excluded who was known to have been a resident who qualified. For example, in Lafia NA, the Tiv were indigenes, so also were the Hausa and Fulani in Jemaaa and in other places. During the military era, states and/or Local Governments were created as a reward given to the military and political elites of certain ethnic or religious groups in certain states. Such states or local governments were given to the elites to run the states or local governments as they deemed fit. The citing of capitals of states or local governments brought about riots and crises in places like Jigawa State, Delta State, Nasarawa State, Ife City, Ibadan City and Jos City. The military created states or local governments, or refused to create certain ones in order to please some people or some ethnic groups. After the creation of some states, some residents who were indigene in the NA era suddenly became non-indigenes or settlers. In some local governments creation, the population composition of the various ethnic groups changed in terms of majority-minority or Muslim-Christian ratio which intensified the crises and conflicts between ethnic or religious groups. Jos North Local Government is the best example of this socio-political change during the military era. The same socio-political phenomenon affected the ethnic and religious compositions of Kaduna metropolis. As a result, politics, urbanization and migration in some states and local Governments are governed by religious or ethnic ratios.
The military philosophy of state and local government creation was also based upon political mathematics in balancing the numbers of states or local government between Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria. This political mathematics took root in the British colonial Nigeria which used population as means of political balancing or dominance between the North and the South.
Furthermore, most of the states in the North were created by the military based upon the ethnic/religious, or north-south axis. Usually the northern parts of a state were predominantly Muslim Hausa, Fulani or Kanuri, while the southern parts have a large minority population of the non-Muslim, non-Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri. As it turned out, each northern state has a majority Muslim Hausa, Fulani or Kanuri and a minority non-Muslim, non-Hausa-Fulani or non-Kanuri. This political arrangement has created serious imbalances in politics, religion, ethnicity and culture. The majority-minority syndrome whether in ethnicity or religion plagues some northern states, such as, Kaduna, old Plateau, Kebbi, Yobe, Borno and a few others. The colonial dominance-subordinate relationships between ethno-religious groups were perpetuated in the military state or local government creation. The cries of religious, ethnic, political or cultural dominance and discrimination are found in many states of in Northern Nigeria. Kaduna State is the best case study of this type of military philosophy of state creation or local government creation.
What are the socio-political issues which have militated against military splitting of Kaduna State? Who benefits or loses should Kaduna State be split? Some aspects of the contemporary animosity, fears or suspicions that exist between the North and the South of Kaduna State are rooted in their primordial social factors of the political mathematics of population ratios between Muslims and Christians, the emergence of the majority-minority conundrum of religion and ethnicity, the aroused sentiments of indigenes versus settlers questions and Christian-Muslim relations. The political, religious or cultural alignments across states or local governments are increasingly becoming a dominant political feature of Northern Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular. For example, a majority ethnic or religious group in a state or states can become a minority in a certain part of a state or states. Similarly, a minority group in a state or states can become a majority in its own area of dominance, or a majority group in a state or states can become a minority in the minority area. The complicated ethno-religious crises and conflict in many parts of the North stem from this rival social composition. The ethno-religious riots in Kaduna State since 1987 to date has been complicated by this majority-minority conundrum. Reprisal attacks meted against a minority group residing within a majority are usually motivated by the ethno-religious composition of the majority-minority social factor.
The military state and local government creations intensified (1) the north-south rivalry within some states; (2) majority-minority rivalry in many states; (3) Muslin-non-Muslim rivalry in some states; (4) indigene-settler rivalry; and (5) political control or dominance of either the state or local government by rival ethnic or religious groups.
Because Kaduna State has not been split, it is plagued by the fears and schemes of (1) the political games of groups that find themselves as a minority in a given area: (a) the minority groups in the North which come from Southern Kaduna, (c) the indigenous minority groups in the North; (c) the minority groups in the South which come from Northern Kaduna, (d) the indigenous minority groups in the South; and (2) the political games of groups that find themselves as a majority in a given area: (a) the majority groups in the North, (b) the majority groups in the South. This type of ethno-religious divide could compound the nature of state politics, state and local government creation, ethno-religious relations, and the indigene-settler issues.
The impact of the Local Government Reforms of 1976 can also be observed in the philosophy and role of governance. The reforms were made when petro-dollars were in abundance. The principles of revenue generation, good governance and development at the grass roots suffered a setback. The reforms were based upon the principles of massive funding from the Federal Government. This led local governments and gradually later the states to eventually lose the principles of self-support and self-governing. Both local governments and the states totally relied on the Federal Government for almost everything. The Local Government Reforms contributed immensely in opening up the floodgate of corruption and underdevelopment at the grass-roots. Gradually the philosophy of government was exchanged for consumption. Gradually, government lost the concept and principles of good leadership and good governance. The majority of Memoranda address the economic issues which have been abandoned as a result of corruption, lack of good leadership and good governance.
The military regimes and their reforms brought Nigeria down to the level of underdevelopment. Development/transformation takes place at two levels, (1) at the level of humanity, this includes individuals and people groups, human communities and societies, or nations; and (2) at the level of creation, and this includes the environment, the land, the sea and the sky. These two levels are related to each other by means of human spiritual and moral skills, educational skills, and labour and manual skills. First of all, we need to focus on transforming the individual whose mind needs a proper and correct orientation, renewal and development. How do we achieve this in our nation? A Nigerian is a person who has a mind, a culture, a religion and a worldview. He/she lives in an environment, a community, a society, a nation and in the world. This requires giving him/her a functional education and training in the arts of spiritual and moral skills, labour and manual skills, and educational skills that can lead to the renewal and transformation of his/her mind, culture, worldview and environment. The primary objective is to help a human being know how to manage himself/herself as an individual, develop and transform his/her people, environment, community, society and nation. Effective transformation is training a human being in the arts of spiritual and moral skills, labour and manual skills, and educational skills so that he/she can be capable of developing and transforming his/her human potentials for the good of humanity. It is teaching him/her in regards to how to use these three basic skills to create a viable and healthy society, environment and nation. This requires that we re-orient, renew, transform and re-educate an average Nigerian to change his/her mind, life style and ways from the destructive beliefs, habits, attitudes, behaviours and practices that militate against the well-being of himself/herself, others, the land, the environment, the community, the society, and the nation.
It is unfortunate that an average Nigerian or a community is not fully trained, prepared and groomed to master all human skills and potentials that can transform human beings and the environment. This failure is primarily rooted in the ignorance of humanity and creation. The problem of poverty, unproductivity and underdevelopment is rooted in a faulty definition and understanding of both humanity and creation. The environment, community and society are aspects of creation that can be developed and transformed for the good of all humanity. Man needs to acquire spiritual and moral skills, educational skills and labour and manual skills that can help create a healthy humanity, economy and environment.
Most of the Memoranda that harped on economics would ever remain unmet because our concept of development does not focus on total transformation of a human being and the environment.
What Nigeria did the Military hand-over?
G. Post Military: The Fourth Republic
By the time Chief Obasanjo took over as the elected President of Nigeria in May 1999, the Nigerian polity had swung to the extremes of the politics of ethnic nationalism
and Islamic revolution. Sub-nationalism, primordial, ethnic/tribal, cultural and religious values have taken over the national moral order. The real issue is not democracy, but group identity, be it tribal, regional or religious. The national psyche has become
deadened by the oppressive years of military rule and that of the moral decadence of corruption and indiscipline. Its ideology is not democracy, but nihilism. It is more prone to chaos, disorder and instability than to orderliness and stability. Its watchword
is violence rather than peace.
Ethnicity and religion have dominated the political scene since President Obasanjo took over in 1999. This is a revival of parochial and primordial values and sub-nationalism. This is a protest against national integration. We have signs of irredentism and
balkanization. Cultural, ethnic and religious groups have emerged to sponsor these sub-national sentiments, such as, OPC in the South West, Bakassi in the South East, MASSOP in the South-South, ACF in the North and MBF in the Middle Belt and Sharia in the
North. These groups are not signs of stability and unity, but militancy and revolutionary and are out to defend the causes of sub-nationalism as against national unity.
The current political parties have been weakened by intra-party feuds which are deeply rooted in sub-national and ethno-regional interests. The signs for political, economic and social instability and violence are rife.
The Sharia debates and the setting up of Islamic theocratic states in some northern states are based upon exclusive religious mentality. This has given room for misinterpretation and application of the Constitution. Religion has given the mandate for doing
so even at the expense of our corporate existence and social contract. The fact that Nigerians have allowed religion to be the basis of defining our corporate existence and constitutional interpretations, they have in consequence bowed down to the revolutionary
forces of instability, violence and conflict. This is a reflection of what rules the psyche of a typical Nigerian: lawlessness, violence, arrogance, corruption, indiscipline, moral decadence, parochialism, ethnocentrism and primordialism. The present psyche
of Nigeria needs exorcism, revival, transformation and change.
Given the nature and the high profile of religion and the frequent religious crises in the country, President Obasanjo set up a religious body (NIREC) as a means of getting both the Muslim and Christian leaders to meet from time to time to deliberate on religious
and national matters. Besides, the Government has consulted with various religious and communal groups in search for peace and solutions to communal and religious clashes, violence and conflicts.
Two dreadful social factors that have arisen within contemporary Nigeria are ethnic nationalism and religious militancy. They are the rule of the day. How did Nigeria arrive at these during its nation-state building? The rise of ethno-regional politics and
religious riots and conflict are signs of the crisis of nationhood.
The combined work of the soldiers and politicians has brought Nigeria to the brink of collapse and ruin. Opportunities of building a strong virile Nigeria were wasted at the altar of ethnocentrism, primordialism, corruption and failed leadership.
IV. CRISIS OF NATIONHOOD
The Military factor is quite influential in the revival of the "old" regional, tribal and religious values. The Regime of Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi in 1966 ushered
in the Ibo dominance, though briefly, while General Gowon's ushered in and also instituted the dominance of the Northern military officers in the Armed Forces. It was not until the Regime of Generals Murtala and Obasanjo that religion began to assert itself
as a dominant political factor within the successive Military Regimes. The explosive and heated debates about the constitutional status of Sharia have only succeeded in placing Sharia and religion of the "old" North in the centre of our national political
arena. Nigeria since then has been dangerously divided on the question of the constitutionality of Sharia and the secular status of the State. The "old" North had Sharia and customary laws, while the "old" South had secularity and customary laws.
With the Military decentralisation of regional political powers and centres and the increasing centralisation of political powers at the centre (Lagos), and the subsequent creation of many states which weakened regionalism and regional political centres, those
groups interested in acquiring and using political power must have to fight it out at the centre (Lagos).
The political elites and the Military class that dominated the centre would in consequence, whether consciously or unconsciously impose their socio-political values at the centre. The policies, administrative practices and attitude of the Government at the
centre whether civilian or military would no doubt reflect the socio-political values of its operators.
Nigeria is a nation that is undergoing a crisis of nationhood. These are the signs:
1. Revival of “Old” Regional and Ethnic Values
The Political Transition Programme of the Babangida Regime and its political programmes have succeeded in raising a serious "National Question". The crisis of nationhood
bears upon several salient factors, such as; revival of the "Old" regional and ethnic and religious values. From the previous sections, we have observed that the fall of the First Republic (Parliamentary System) was as a result of ethno-regional politics.
Ethnicity and regionalism were the major political factors that brought the demise of the First Republic.
As a result of the unpredictable nature of the State and its Political Transition Programme, the political programmes enunciated have in consequence unleashed and aroused the negative innate qualities, and socio-political values of Nigerians. More than any
regime, the negative colonial values have re-emerged and are re-asserting themselves in contemporary Nigeria.
The examples of which are the sharia-scularity debates, religious and communal riots, ethno-regional politics, consciousness and interests, military-civilian rivalry, fears and suspicions over policies and practices as favouring some ethnic or religious groups
and some sections of the country.
2. Revival of Religious and Communal Sentiments.
In contemporary Nigeria, religious, ethnic, sectional and regional sentiments are rife and are also quite high. From 1982 to 1984 we witnessed intra-religious riots and as from 1987 to 2001 we have witnessed increasing inter-religious and inter-ethnic riots.
The religious riots of Kaduna State in 1987, those of Bauchi and Kano States, 1991 and Taraba and Kaduna States, 1992 and 2000 are worth mentioning and studying. The communal riots of Benue, Taraba and the Zangon Kataf of Kaduna State, 1992 are also worth mentioning.
The frequency of the religious and communal riots in the Northern States is the current manifestations of the long-term consequences of the colonial legacy in Northern Nigeria. In Kaduna State, Bauchi State and Taraba State (Jalingo episode), the battles were
fought at two fronts: religion and ethnicity. The Zangon-Kataf episode defined the colonial historical conflict between the Kataf and the Hausa which was not corrected by the political overlords of the Kaduna State whether civilians or military. While that
of Bauchi State was between the Hausa-Fulani and the Sayawa. The bone of contention centred upon chiefdom and political autonomy. These ethnic groups want their own chiefs and chiefdoms and not to be placed under Hausa-Fulani rule. The religious riots in Kaduna
City, Zaria City and Ikara in Kaduna State in 1987 and 1992 defined the resurgence of the colonial religious conflict of the Muslim and the non-Muslim groups in the colonial system. The perpetrators of the religious riots in Kaduna State and Bauchi State targeted
primarily Christians of Northern States' origin. This fact should not surprise anyone as we have already seen how the Colonial Administration created the two antagonistic communities within the Northern System. The questions of socio-political role and status
and patterns of dominance-subordination relationships between ethnic groups still generate rivalries, resentments and contempts.
The political philosophy of the military and especially that of General Babangida was quite conducive to the resurgence and revival of the colonial negative values, whether religious or cultural or ethnic or social.
Central to the issue of religion in Nigeria is the question of Christianity in the Northern States of Nigeria. It has become necessary that this issue be looked into:
the plight of the Christians of northern origin. Christians of northern origin are the products of the work of Christian missions in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. They hold and present a unique position in the Christian-Muslim relations in the history
of Nigeria. Boko Haram’s is the instrument that is enforcing a new definition of Christians and Christianity in the Northern States. It is religion that defines who is a Northerner and who is not. If Boko Haram can be used to achieve this, so be it. The minority
status and weakness of Christianity in the Northern States is being gradually confirmed by Boko Haram.
3. Revival of Sectional and Regional Sentiments
The revival and the resurgence of the "old" regional values and the religious and ethnic values even under the Military regimes have, in consequence induced the current sectional and regional sentiments. The age-long fear of political, religious, cultural and
economic domination by some ethnic groups or regions or sections is currently being revived and in consequence, politics is highly polarised along these lines. In Kaduna State it is along the North-South divide. The quest to have access to and control political
power and institutions and the state machinery is re-asserting such parochial and sub-national values. The majority-minority conflict of political and economic control of states has become sharpened in the military and post-military regimes.
The new political axes of the polarity of North versus South, and Islam versus Christianity or the new political regions of the Far North, Middle Belt, West and East, South-South are indeed the contemporary expressions of sectional or regional or ethnic or
religious sentiments.
Has the Military class succeeded as a "corrective regime" in forging a new Nigeria devoid of all social ills, corruption and moral decadence, which the Military set out to correct and eradicate? The military had succeeded in exhuming ethnocentrism and primordialism, and militant ethnic and religious groups that live under the divisive religious, cultural, sectional and regional sentiments. Either Nigeria’s national sentiment is long dead or it is yet to born. We no longer live under any national values, ideals, objectives and standards. Might is right, where dominant groups seek to impose their sub-national values upon the rest of us Nigerians.
The question of Christians of Northern origins as raised by militant Islam must be given more priority than Boko Haram. Boko Haram if it could be a camouflaged disgruntled Northern politicians then it possibly be the political voice of the majority North as against the minority Middle Belt. By chasing out of the North Christians from the South, the agenda is very clear, majority North versus minority Middle Belt. The battle lines had been drawn since 1980 after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeni of 1979. Hausanization, migration, Islamization, pastoralization and the extinction of smaller ethnic groups and languages of the Middle Belt are very serious contemporary social issues that need to be addressed urgently.
What is the state of Christians of Northern origins?
V. CHRISTIANS OF NORTHERN ORIGIN
Many of the Memoranda address the plight of Christians of northern origin. For this reason it needs to be addressed specifically. What is the place of Christians of northern origin in the religious question of Nigeria? We need to examine this religious
group as unique in Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria. What the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and 1999 states about the governance and the fundamental human rights of Nigerians in Chapters I, II, III and IV are far from being realised
by Christians of Northern origin in their respective ancestral lands and Sates. Historically, Christians of Northern origin did enjoy some relative fundamental human rights as from 1900s up to 1972, that is from the inception of the British Colonial Administration,
through to the NPC Government under Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and relatively under General Gowon until the take-over of Mission Schools and Hospitals by various States of the Federation in 1972. Prior to this, the NPC Government of Northern
Nigeria took over missions Primary Schools and created the Local Education Authority (LEA) much earlier. Christians of Northern origin did enjoy some aspects of their fundamental human rights under the Colonial Administration and even under the premiership
of Sir Ahmadu Bello. The serious erosion of their fundamental human rights started as from 1973 and grew increasingly worst year after year up to the present. This apparent loss of Christian rights was as a result of increasing power and dominance of Islam
and the application of the tenets of Muslim Sharia in the Northern States. Christians of Northern origin began to lose their fundamental human rights under the era of military regimes and it has reached its peak in this democratic dispensation.
Since 1973, Christians of Northern origins have been subjected to all kinds of religious, cultural, social, political and economic discrimination, alienation, persecution and marginalisation. The primary reasons for this lost of fundamental human rights is
simply because (1) they are Christians and (2) the increasing drive for Islamization and application of Sharia in the Northern States. On account of these, there is a very strong aversion against Christians of Northern origin by some State Governments and
some Muslim groups in the Northern States. The strongest manifestation of this aversion is in this present democratic dispensation. What an irony? The primary reason for Christian persecution by some State Governments is because these State Governments see
themselves as exclusively Islamic. As it were from democracy to theocracy. The persecution of Christians is seen not only as coming from some Muslims groups, but also from some State Governments that are supposed to provide them with solace and succor and
to protect, preserve and defend their human rights. It is important that we list acts of deliberate and systematic denial of the fundamental human rights of Christians of Northern origin as from 1973 to the present. This is what Christians of the Northern
origin are saying about their plight and position in some of the northern states.
A. What Christians Say About Some State Governments’ Actions and Attitude Towards Them:
It is important to state that not all State Governments in the North practice what some do as listed below:
Refusal to grant C of Os for the building of churches
Refusal to grant and assign burial grounds to Christians
Refusal to grant fairly and justly radio and TV times to Christians in contrast to Muslim's privileges
Refusal to allow the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge in Government Institutions
Discrimination against Christians in matters of State appointments and promotions
Use of Government Media Houses to propagate Islam as against Christianity
Use of Government Funds to promote Islam and Islamic Institutions as against those of Christians
State Government judicial application of Sharia against Christians
The high-handedness of Government on inter-religious conflict and riots involving Christians and Muslims
B. What Christians Say About Some Muslim’s Actions and Attitude Towards Them:
It is important to state here that not all Muslims share the views of some Muslims towards Christians as listed below:
Attitude of differential and preferential treatment in matters of Islam or Christianity
Incessant killings of Christians and burning of Christian churches, institutions and houses since 1980 to the present
Practice and application of Sharia as a tool to persecute and subjugate Christians
Instituting acts of violence and conflict against Christians
Disregard and lack of respect for Christians who are their kith and kin
Intolerant and arrogant attitude towards Christians in public matters.
In modern Nigeria of today, it is very difficult to ascertain why State Governments and some Muslims in some of the Northern States have singled out and targeted Christians of Northern origin for religious, social and political discrimination, persecution and
marginalisation. The potent tool, which some State Governments and some Muslims use to discriminate, subjugate and marginalise Christians, is the STATE MACHINERY and the SHARIA, the Muslim Legal System.
Christians of Northern origin as it is now seem not to have protection against the atrocities of some State Governments or some Muslim groups under the present 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. The provisions of the Constitution are not strong enough to protect
them from the persecution and discriminatory practices of self-declared Islamic States and Muslim Sharia in some Northern States. If Christians of Northern origin or from other states are to enjoy the provisions of human rights in the Constitution and in their
respective States as it is the privilege of their Muslim counterparts, their plight and provocation in the Northern States must be redressed and corrected by justice and the National House of Assembly and the Federal Government. There must be constitutional
provisions as national statutes of protecting, preserving, promoting and defending the fundamental human rights of Christians in the Northern States. Secondly, the Federal Government should set up A Human Rights Commission to study and monitor thoroughly the
case and condition of Christians in the Northern States. This same request can be made as a case for the protection of the rights of Muslims in the predominantly Christian areas, particularly in the South. Muslims need to be protected against the abuse of
human rights by some Christians and some states in the Federation.
It is a historical fact that the entire North including the predominantly Muslim areas benefited from mission education, medical work and literature work. Nobody can deny the historical and substantial contributions of missionaries and Christianity to the growth
and development of the vast Northern Region of Nigeria. Just a few decades ago, missionaries did their work all over Northern Nigeria. As a result, we have Christian converts in those areas.
Some Muslims and some State Governments in Northern Nigeria have refused to recognise the fact that there are Hausa and Fulani that are Christians. There are Northern indigenes that are Christians and as indigenes, they have the right of full citizenship in the Northern States. By virtue of birthright and birthplace and by religious preference and freedom, they demand their constitutional and human rights. The State Governments belong to both Christians and Muslims who are indeed kith and kin. They deserve to have the rights of State/Government and to practice their Christianity anywhere in the Northern States unhindered and unmolested. The same can be said of any Muslim anywhere in Nigeria, especially in the Middle Belt area.
Some indigenous Christian groups in Yobe State have been chased out of their ancestral land towards the end of 2011 by some ravaging Islamists. This is a very unfortunate incident that has grave ramifications for Christian-Muslim relations in the Northern States. As both Islam and Christianity are foreign in origin and nature, there should be an understanding and respect for a religious choice of an individual or a group. African ancestry, brotherhood and solidarity should be the common ground and basis of all African descent to tolerate, respect and to understand each other. Ethnicity, religion, culture and land are the givens of life by the Creator and for this reason, stand as the foundations of humanity. What is required of all of us is to affirm our differences in ethnicity, religion, culture and geography/land. It makes no sense in modern Nigeria for a Nigeria or a group of Nigerians to be denied their ancestral rights on any grounds.
The embarrassment of
Boko Haram is that it is using jihad and militancy to achieve the same old objectives of weakening Christianity in the Northern States. Could
Boko Haram be one of the contemporary strategies of inflicting fears into the minority Christianity in the Big North? Hypocrisy and religious bigotry have hindered any effective and sincere answer to the question of Christians of Northern origins.
The truth is, both Islam and Christianity are foreign religions in the North. Our forefathers practiced African Traditional Religions before they became converts to Islam or Christianity. If Christianity is a foreign religion in the North, so it is with Islam.
If Northern Muslims claim the rights of citizenship based upon Islam, so it is with Christians. If Muslims claim the rights of Sharia so it is with Northern Christians, the claim of their State and Christian rights. You cannot give one thing to the other and
deny the other the same thing. If Nigeria must give Muslims in the North their religious rights, they must also give to Christians in the North their religious rights also. There cannot be peace, unity and stability where there is no justice, freedom and equality.
The question of the place of a northern Christian in the Northern State must have to be addressed very seriously.
There are two major volatile issues for Nigeria to solve, namely, the question of the place and status of Christianity and the question of the use and distribution of land, all in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. There are ominous signs of the Middle Belt becoming a future “blood-bath” of Nigeria, if these two social factors are not properly handled and addressed by Nigeria. We have already seen and witnessed the might, power, influence and dominance of the Majority in the region.
Why have history, social forces and dynamics conspire against Nigerians?
Instead of producing national values, ideals and standards of morality and ethics that build people and the nation, Nigeria is replete with negative social values. Not values that are national building blocks, but very destructive evil and wicked values and forces that are a prohibita to nation building, development and transformation.
What are those negative social values?
IV. NIGERIA’S NEGATIVE SOCIAL VALUES
Whenever Nigerians are asked “Why things don’t work in Nigeria”, they easily list a catalogue of things: corruption, indiscipline, tribalism, poverty and many others. But these are only symptoms. Nigeria’s negative social values are what make things don’t work in Nigeria. Nigeria has enough man-power, resources and money and what it takes to build a virile and prosperous nation. The problem of Nigeria is not lack of man-power, not lack of resources. It does not have good national and sustainable values. Rather, Nigeria is replete with negative social values that are obstacles to national development and transformation. For any meaningful national development and transformation to take place, Nigerians must have to deal with the historical and current spade of negative social values.
This section summarises the entire paper by reducing our discussion to some social ethical values, attitudes and practices as are found in the Nigerian social environment right from the historical past to the present. We simply outline the negative social and ethical values that pose great obstacles to political, economic and social development of Nigeria, which help to create the atmosphere of crises, violence and conflicts. They are the fodder for corruption, religious and communal conflict and social crisis and political instability and economic underdevelopment.
The purpose of this list is to give guidance on how to identify and deal with these root causes of crises and conflicts. These negative social values have been the by-products of social dynamics and nation-state building right from the traditional era to the Caliphate era to the colonial and missionary era and to the post-colonial era. I will only list them with brief comments.
A. Practices of Inequality and Injustice
Nigerian pre-Islamic and pre-colonial societies had well-developed racial or tribal myths to project their worldviews, thought, and feelings about their origins, values, greatness, glory and destiny and pride. These primordial values were later incorporated
into the new colonial social order. They became the hidden "authority codes" or "core cultural" values which defined, conditioned and molded social behavior, attitude and practice and general conception of life and the world. This incorporation of primordial
values, therefore, helped to entrench the continuity of traditional values and influence on the new Nigerian state and Nigerians in general.
These primordial values influenced ethnic or tribal or religious attitudes and practices in a number of ways across the ethnic groups in Nigeria, such as:
1. Prescribed inferior-superior statuses and socio-political roles of ethnic/tribal groups
Ethnic/tribal groups are known to have ascribed to themselves (1) superior status over all others; and (2) superior socio-political role in society or State. From this vantage position, they usually prescribe (1)
inferior status to others presumed to be lower than they in human hierarchical classification; and (2) inferior socio-political role in society or State to all those presumed to be lower in status. Throughout history, humankind has for all ages, practiced
ethnic/tribal or religious discrimination, prejudice, stereotyping, differential and preferential treatment. Others have treated fellow human beings according to their "ascribed" or "prescribed" status and socio-political role in society. Such primordial values
are deeply rooted in the worldview, conscience, attitude and practices of ethnic/tribal/religious groups.
When an ethnic group/tribe or a religious group uses the concept of superiority or inferiority against others, the socio-political consequences are grave. The application of these in human relations is unjust and negative. They reflect the creation of inequality
among human beings. The result of this injustice manifests itself in all kinds of atrocities and inhumanity. Others are denied the opportunities of equal treatment and representation simply because their group has been labeled or stigmatized. Social behaviour,
attitude and practice based upon such values abound in societies and are the sources of communal and religious conflict.
This very social fact is a reality in Kaduna State especially as it involves relations between the peoples of the Northern and Southern parts of Kaduna State as stated
in some of the Memoranda. The same can be found in many places across Nigeria.
2. Practices of tribal injustice and inequality against certain groups
Do ethnic/tribal or religious groups practice injustice or inequality against others? The answer is in the affirmative. Such values and practices have their basis in ascribed/prescribed status and socio-political role of groups in society. The socio-political
role of an ethnic/tribal or religious group in a given society or State has been determined by what social status has been ascribed or prescribed. This can be observed in practices of discrimination, prejudice and differential and preferential treatment of
fellow human beings based strictly on ethnic/tribal/religious considerations.
One is treated thus not because of individual merit but because of what ethnic/tribal/religious group one belongs. Labeling of individuals or groups based upon ethnicity or tribalism or religion has had devastating consequences upon human beings and such practices
abound in our society.
This very social fact is a reality in Kaduna State especially as it involves relations between the peoples of the Northern and Southern parts of Kaduna State. The
same can be found in many places across Nigeria.
3. Provisional unequal opportunities to ethnic/tribal/religious groups in economic matters, social access and mobility, and recruitment into civil service
Unequal opportunities to various groups within society or State are a common practice in Nigeria. Opportunities, access, and social mobility, statuses and rewards within societies and states are usually determined by ethnic/tribal/religious factors and not
necessarily by personal merit or circumstance. One's ethnic group or tribe or religion usually determines recruitment and employment of civil servants or personnel. Distribution of state's statuses and rewards are usually based upon ethnic/tribal/religious
affinity, loyalties and obligations. Tribalism has characterized both State and ethnic practices and attitudes throughout the ages. Such are meted against certain individuals or groups not because of personal merit but group's identity. Such practices abound
in Nigeria.
This very social fact is a reality in Kaduna State especially as it involves relations between the peoples of the Northern and Southern parts of Kaduna State in matters of state’s politics, governance and leadership. The same can be found in many places across Nigeria.
4. Denial of full participation or representation in government, political freedom, equality and human dignity and rights to certain ethnic or religious groups
Cases abound where certain ethnic or religious groups are denied full participation or representation in government by both the State or power groups that control the state machinery. This act of denial is usually
caused or justified by in-group affinity, loyalty and obligations. Similarly, in some cases, individuals are denied political participation or representation simply because of their ethnicity/religion. There are cases, where certain ethnic/religious groups
are denied their political rights and freedom, equality and human dignity. Such practices abound in Nigeria.
This very social fact is a reality in Kaduna State especially as it involves relations between the peoples of the Northern and Southern parts of Kaduna State in matters
of state’s policies. The same can be found in many places across Nigeria.
5. The general neglect or failure to develop certain ethnic groups and areas
Practices of neglect or the refusal to develop certain groups and their areas or regions are quite common. These acts of neglect or refusal are mostly based upon ethnic/religious considerations. Citing of industries,
amenities, institutions, district and regional headquarters, etc., are usually based upon these human values rather than on good political and economic reasons. Cases abound where states or powerful ethnic or religious groups have abandoned others to neglect
simply because of what group they belong or where they come from.
B. Rivalry and Antagonism
Within Nigeria, the existence of rival and antagonistic communities abounds. Before European colonisation of Nigeria, Nigerians existed in different communities and conflicts between them existed in wars of territorial
expansion, slave raiding and slave trade. Under colonialism, some of these historical social and cultural conflicts between various communities were somewhat incorporated and institutionalised by the new colonial social order. As a result, the colonial powers
institutionalised a potential of ethnic/religious tensions, violence and conflict. These communities were usually not nurtured under the principles of human equality, justice, human co-operation, harmony and respect for human rights and dignity. Instead, they
were nurtured under the colonial social order, which allowed and even encouraged tribal and religious intolerance, inequality and differential and preferential treatment of groups.
The colonial masters left behind them at independence rival and antagonistic communities, which were nurtured and brought up separately. The fears of ethnic/tribal domination, political and economic control, and cultural and religious dominance and control
in post-colonial Nigeria led to suspicions, tensions, violence and conflicts.
Can we trace contemporary government or ethnic policies, attitude and practices that reflect ethnic or tribal or religious superiority or dominance of one or more groups over others? Do national policies widen the gap or entrench the historic differences of
ethnic or tribal or religious communities? Are there traces of government or ethnic policies, attitudes and practices, which seek to impose the supreme dominance of one ethnic or tribal or religious group over others? We are witnesses to several major catastrophic
ethnic or religious tensions, violence and conflict in our country. These social factors are establishing themselves as the distinguishing characteristics of socio-political norms across Nigeria.
The history of modern Nigeria has revealed the increasing polarization and intolerance of ethnicity, regions and religion.
C. Stratified Inequality and Social Hierarchy.
Stratified inequality and social hierarchy within Nigeria can be observed historically in the following ways:
1. The subordination of one or more ethnic groups to the other's rule and political control
The making of a modern Nigerian state and the establishment of colonial social order did subordinate some ethnic groups to the rule and political control of others. This was resented and rejected by many ethnic groups but had to acquiesce under colonial bayonets
and powers. Colonial masters did not correct this internal colonialism before leaving the Nigerian scene at independence. Many ethnic groups did not celebrate political independence as free human beings, but did so under the uncorrected internal colonialism.
They were still under the rule and political control of the privileged ethnic or tribal groups when independence came. In post-colonial and post-independence Nigeria, many ethnic groups are yet to earn their political freedom and equal status with others.
The mantle of colonial subordination is still being cast over them. Religious and ethnic conflict and tribal wars of secession and political control have been motivated by these collective feelings of ethnic, tribal and religious pride. Political process and
peaceful means could not correct these and in consequence have resulted in civil, religious and ethnic conflicts.
2. The institutionalisation of the dominance of one or more ethnic or tribal groups through the development of their ruling families or elites and the use of their socio-political values and institutions to build a modern Nigeria, to the neglect of others
Colonial masters did develop and use the already existing tribal social values and institutions to build the colonial social order. The advantaged and favoured ethnic or tribal or religious groups were the ones that were usually developed and trained for political
leadership. They then became the junior partners with the colonial masters in administering the affairs of the colonial state and especially in overseeing certain under-developed ethnic or tribal groups. The most privileged groups had their cultural and religious
values incorporated into the new colonial social order and for this reason had a prior advantage of exerting their cultural and religious dominance and influence over the new colonial state. Those so disadvantaged had to leave under the dominance of others.
Fears and resentment of such cultural and religious dominance and political control often lead to tensions, violence and conflicts. Similarly the arrogance, pomposity and pride of the advantaged ethnic/tribal/religious groups often lead to resentment, fears,
tensions and conflicts.
3. The maintenance and defense of the privileged position of the ruling ethnic groups and the maintenance of their socio-political status quo
It is a common phenomenon in Nigeria to see changes of state leadership not initiated by democratic means but by the use of force through coups d'etat or by one or more ethnic groups taking up arms against the so-called state. This is because the privileged
groups do not believe in sharing or democratizing political power nor give opportunities to others also. Brute power and military coups d'etat are the means of forcing out entrenched political power and status quo or bring into the political arena those who
have been denied for so long. Ascent or descent from political power of ethnic groups is a common political phenomenon. The struggle to maintain and defend a privilege political position and the quest to dislodge others has kept Nigerian politicians in a perpetual
belligerent state.
4. The creation of political elites to succeed the colonial masters at independence with heavy concentration of one or more ethnic groups in different geo-political centres within Nigeria
The development of political elites has often reflected heavy concentration of one or more ethnic or tribal groups. This phenomenon has been the reason for advocating the concept of "federal character" which aims at securing fair and even distribution or representation.
Attempts at correcting this political imbalance have resulted in political crisis and instability in Nigeria. Ethnic groups so advantaged and those so disadvantaged do not usually agree on what political formula should be used in order to establish viable
political and economic institutions. Rivalry and wrangling among the political elites as to who should control political power and the state have dominated the contemporary political scene in Nigeria.
5. The unjust political and economic institutions, which reflected ethnic or tribal biases and preponderance.
One of the principal reason why injustice increases in Nigeria is that the inherited unjust structures of inequality of the imperialist colonial era and/or of the pre-colonial era have been uncorrected by post-colonial programmes of nation-state building. If
the inherited patterns of inequality were not deliberately corrected, those already in positions of advantage would keep the rest in a subordinate position. Correcting structural and political imbalances has never been an easy task. Prescribed solutions through
the theories and models of political and economic development have only aggravated and confused the situation. That was the problem of the Military political engineering of Nigeria. In the final analysis, it all ended up in a state of chaos, confusion, social
decay, indiscipline and moral decadence.
Does stratified inequality still exist within Nigeria? Is it political, economic, religious, ethnic or tribal? Are there structures of inequality, insecurity and incompatibility within Nigeria? If there are, what sort of socio-political values do they generate?
Do they impede a healthy relationship between ethnic groups and/or the State?
D. Political and Social Alienation
A general study of Nigeria reveals that there are certain ethnic or tribal or religious groups that were denied or alienated from any active political participation in both colonial and post-colonial political systems at the local, provincial, regional and
national levels. The fundamental basis of colonial alienation of certain groups from active political participation was its erroneous racial concept of their inferior status and socio-political values and roles. Reasons given by the colonial administrators
to justify their policies were usually presented as tribal or racial "inferiority" and political "immaturity." The alienation of certain groups from political participation in the colonial system denied them the opportunity to develop politically and economically.
This social inequality created uneven development of all groups within the given states.
Colonial social order was hardly a just and participatory society. It did not seek to maximize participation of all sectors of society and the welfare of all persons or groups, and even development of all groups and areas within states. At independence, national
leaders did not correct these but even incorporated their pre-colonial traditional values with that of their colonial masters.
Are there still practices and policies undertaken by governments or groups in post-colonial Nigeria, which display systematic alienation of other groups in the area of political, social and economic participation? What values or social structures, which are
being propagated that reflect exclusive ethnic/religious values and practices? Political, economic, cultural and religious control of the State machinery has always been interpreted in terms of "group power" and not otherwise. The symbolic representation of
the group in power or government satiates ethnic/religious feelings and consciousness.
E. Pattern of Ethnic/Tribal Relations
As already stated, pre-colonial tribal societies of Nigeria used racial or tribal myths to project their worldviews, thought, and feelings about their origins, values, greatness, glory and destiny and pride. Under colonialism, new racial theories were introduced
such as the innate or biological superiority or inferiority of races or ethnic groups or cultures or religions. Colonial rationalization of the superiority of certain races or ethnic groups over others consolidated the pre-colonial tribal myths and religious
differences and stereotypes and thus in consequence was institutionalised within the colonial system. Colonial racial theories gave collective pride of particular racial groups or "tribes" a rational and so-called scientific bias. These, in effect, formed
the basis of the development and the continuity of primordial social values which are plaguing Nigeria.
What are the patterns of ethnic or racial relations across Nigeria? Are they characterised by discrimination, prejudice, intolerance, aggressiveness, alienation, dominance, parochialism, etc? What sub-national values which belong to exclusive ethnic or tribal
or religious groups, which seem to over-ride national integration, patriotism, loyalty, citizenship and commitment to national goals, ideals and objectives?
F. Existence of Antagonistic Communities
Before the British colonisation of Nigeria, two broad communities existed in Northern Nigeria and conflict between them existed also in wars of expansion, slave-raiding, and slave trade. Under colonialism, the social and cultural conflict between these communities
were somewhat institutionalised through colonial policies, attitudes and administrative practices. In effect, the Colonial Administration institutionalised a potential of religious or ethnic or cultural conflict among communities, which were developed and
nurtured separately and in isolation to each other. These communities were not developed under the principles of human equality and justice, human cooperation, harmony and respect for human personality and dignity and rights. Instead, they were nurtured under
religious and cultural intolerance, racial or tribal inequality and of differential treatment of ethnic and religious groups.
A combination of these social and moral values, practices and attitudes of ethnic/religious groups compound tensions, violence and conflict in Nigeria. From our study, we have observed that there were some social values and institutions, which belonged to specific
ethnic or religious group, but such were incorporated and institutionalised into state policy, practice and attitude. Nation-state builders used ethnicity, culture and religion to established new states in Africa in general.
These negative values cannot allow good leadership and good governance to emerge in the country. Have the best doctors, lawyers, administrators, engineers, professors and many others, our negative values would disarm them for any effective performance.
What must done to tackle our negative social values?
VI. NIGERIA NEEDS A NEW NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY
The current national political setting and debates have failed in addressing the national question of Nigeria since independence. The basis for this assertion is the necessity for Nigeria to have a new political discourse that is rooted in Nigeria’s nationalism and which we seem not to have. Three major reasons are being advanced why Nigeria needs a new national political discourse, culture and philosophy.
1. The first reason for a new national political discourse is that Nigeria needs a new crop of national political leaders who will move Nigeria forward and play clean national politics that transcend the divisive, reactionary, domineering and hegemonic old politics of ethnocentrism, primordialism, regionalism and religious bigotry. This new national political discourse will expose the obstacles and the dangers that old politics of ethnocentrism, primordialism and regionalism have posed for Nigeria’s unity, development and nation building since prior to and after independence. The paper had already carefully outlined most of these negative core values and obstacles. We need a new national political discourse that will promote the virtues of nationalism, national unity, national values, standards, federal character, civil religion and a national ethic. A guild of journalists, the academia, religious leaders whose religious values and ethics are co-terminus with Nigeria’s geo-political entity can be in the vanguard in leading this new political discourse at all levels of our national life. Nigeria in this new dispensation needs a new political discourse, philosophy and culture that transcend anything sub-national: ethnicity, regionalism and political religion.
2. The second reason for a new national political discourse is that Nigeria needs a new crop of national developmental political leaders that will move Nigeria forward and institute radical reforms and transformation of the Nigerian environment and peoples. The new national political discourse will concentrate on the necessity of grooming national developmental political leaders with a primary agenda for national development of both the environment and peoples through massive training and acquisition of labour skills, technology and functional education. The new national political discourse will provide a national united voice that holds all political leaders accountable to the people and the nation. National and public pressure must be sustained until national development political leaders begin to emerge in Nigeria. Old political tricks of elephant projects and siphoning of public funds and all forms of corruption are to be exposed through national political discourse. Mounted efforts through massive participation of the general public of putting sustained pressure on political leaders until they adopt national values and standards of development of both the environment and the people.
3. The third reason for a new national political discourse is that Nigeria needs a new crop of morally and ethically transformed national politicians that will move Nigeria forward and institute radical national moral and ethical reforms and transformation of the Nigerian peoples. The new national language and slogans must be of necessity of a national ethic and national ethical structure. A new conception of a minimum public moral and ethical code for all Nigerians to subscribe to and uphold. Minimum Public decorum, decency and good manners be developed to reflect a new national trait, patriotism and citizenship. How to be a Nigerian or “this is not in our character”, can be slogans that can create a sense on nationhood or nationalism. There is so much that mass media, journalists, scholars and universities and institutions of learning and religious groups whose values are co-terminus with the Nigerian geo-political entity can do in changing the national political discourse that promotes our national unity, values and standards and to de-emphasize the divisive and negative values of ethnocentrism, primordialism, regionalism and religious bigotry. We may want to state categorically, that ethnicity, primordial values and religion are very good in themselves. They all have good and positive values which must be harnessed for the common good of all. However, the negative and divisive use of these can tear the country apart and for this reason, should at all cost, not be brought into national life, which become the source of conflict, crisis and violence as we have witnessed in our short national history and also as outlined already in this paper. Should violence erupt in Nigeria, the root causes are always the wrong use of ethnicity, religion, culture or regionalism to achieve our selfish or sub-national ends.
How could this be achieved? Nigeria needs prophets, social reformers and transformers, martyrs and God’s divine intervention that can use Nigeria’s ethnography (ethnicity), geography (land), religion and culture to build a new Nigeria. Nothing will ever work in Nigeria unless the negative values of ethnocentrism, primordialism, regionalism and religious bigotry are dealt with. My next paper explains how this could be done in Nigeria.
VII. CONCLUSION
From our study of social history, we can draw some conclusions. It appears as if, the entire Nigerian society which originated from a single African traditional society has been divided and consolidated into two broad antagonistic societies with very deep divisions in ethnography/ethnicity, geography/land, religion and culture. This divisive nature of the Nigerian society affects how both rival and antagonistic groups (North versus South) handle the issues of the State and Government, the family, religion and culture. The national North-South dichotomy can be repeated in the North between the Far North and Middle Belt. The same is also true of Kaduna State and many other States in Nigeria.
But these concluding points apply specifically to Northern Nigeria.
- African Traditional Era: undivided humble beginnings and origins.
- Islamic Caliphate Era: Divided into Hausaland vs. Middle Belt; Muslims vs. non-Muslims; Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb.
- British Colonial Era: Divided into Colonialists vs. Missionaries; Muslims vs. Christians; (Muslims, British Colonialists and Hausaland) vs. (Traditionalists/Christians, Missionaries and Middle Belt).
- Post-Colonial Era: (Parliamentarians, Muslims and Hausaland) vs. (Parliamentarians, Traditionalists/Christians, Middle Belt).
- Post-Colonial Era: (Soldiers/Politicians, Muslims and Hausaland) vs. (Soldiers/Politicians, Traditionalists/Christians and Middle Belt).
As summarised above, Nigeria and Northern Nigeria in particular, is a deeply divided society on the basis of ethnography/ethnicity, geography/land, religion and culture. Over the centuries they have deeply wounded each other. The coming of the foreigners (Islam, Christianity, colonialists and missionaries) into their midst has further deeply divided them. They have misused their differing ethnography, geography and the acquired foreign religions and cultures as tools for self-destruction. They compete with each other with the aim of total annihilation of the other, but if not, dominate them. Land issues and the question of Christianity in the Northern States will be the most significant challenges that lies ahead. Unless these two issues are adequately dealt with, only God can knows the catastrophe that lies ahead of this part of Nigeria. Therefore the task of solving the problem of religion and land in the Middle Belt of Nigeria becomes imperative.
In conclusion, you can now make up your mind whom to believe has a solution to Nigeria’s problem. If you are asked to fix Nigeria, how would you do it? Great nations in the world, did not at first start by applying political, economic and educational models and theories as prerequisites to nation-state building, but they made a primary deliberate efforts at defining and transforming their ethnography, geography, religion and culture by making them viable and conducive for development and transformation. For Nigeria to be developed and transformed, it must have to address and transform its primary and primordial social factors as outlined in this paper. It is how to transform them, harness their potentials and tame their excesses. How can we develop and formulate a common ground approach that can create harmony, balance and unity in diversity out of our ethnicity (ethnography), land (regions), religion and culture? The next paper as a follow-up to this deals with how to address The Problem of Nigeria. We have just concluded looking at The Problem with Nigeria which is its endemic proneness to crises, conflicts and violence as rooted in our manipulated ethnography (ethnicity), geography (land), religion and culture.
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Yusufu Turaki. The Theory and Practice of Christian Missions in Africa: A Century of SIM/ECWA History and Legacy in Nigeria, 1893-1993. Nairobi: IBS Africa, 1999.
Yusufu Turaki. "The Institutionalization of the Inferior Status and Socio-Political Role of the Non-Muslim Groups in the Hierarchical Structure of the Northern Region of Nigeria: A Social Ethical Analysis of the Colonial Legacy". Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1982.
Yusufu Turaki. The Politics of Religion and Ethnicity in Northern Nigeria: National Round Table on “Democracy and Nation Building: The Challenge of Our Time." ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria April 7-10, 2002.
Yusufu Turaki. 2003. “The Sharia Debate in the Northern States of Nigeria: Implications for Muslims, Christians and Democracy in Nigeria.” Paper presented at the Conference on the Sharia Debate and Shaping of Christian and Muslim Identities in Northern Nigeria, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
Yusufu Turaki. Tainted Legacy: Islam, Colonialism and Slavery in Northern Nigeria. Isaac Publishing, MacLean, VA, USA, 2010.
Yusufu Bala Usman, ed.). 1979. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers. Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University.
M.R. Waldman. 1965. “The Fulani Jihad: Reassessment.” Journal of African History 6, 333–55.
K.W. Wesler, (ed.). 1998. Historical Archaeology in Nigeria. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
W. Wilberforce. 1986. Real Christianity. Reprinted under series of Classics of Faith and Devotion. Portland. Oregon: Multnomah Press.
C.S. Whitaker. 1970. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946–1966. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
H. Willink. 1958. Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them. London: HMSO.
J.R. Willis, (ed.). 1985. Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa: Vol. 1. Islam and Ideology of Enslavement. London, Frank Cass.
[1] Melson and Wolpe, p. vii.
[2] Kenneth W. Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972); and Ekwueme F. Okoli, Institutional Structure and Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, D.C: University Press of America, 1980).
[3] Ugbana Okpu, Ethnic Minority Problems in Nigerian Politics: I960-1965.
[4] Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub. Co., Ltd., 1978).
Department of History
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Cornelius Hamelberg
“We, the elected representatives of the people of Nigeria,
concentrated on proving that we were fully capable of managing our own
affairs both internally and as a nation. However, we were not to be
allowed the selfish luxury of focusing our interest on our own
homes.” (Nigeria's first prime minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,
addressing the nation on 1st October 1960)
So much has happened since then and at this critical juncture of
national life in Nigeria, have read Professor Yusufu Turaki's essays
http://www.google.co.uk/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=Yusufu+Turaki+:HISTORICAL+ROOTS+OF+CRISES+AND+CONFLICTS+IN+NIGERIA+WITH+REFERENCE+TO+NORTHERN+NIGERIA+AND+KADUNA+STATE+&oq=Yusufu+Turaki+:HISTORICAL+ROOTS+OF+CRISES+AND+CONFLICTS+IN+NIGERIA+WITH+REFERENCE+TO+NORTHERN+NIGERIA+AND+KADUNA+STATE+&gs_l=serp.12..0i30l2j0i5i30l2.85446.117488.0.118586.3.3.0.0.0.0.94.165.2.2.0...0.1...1c.OD3eGnS9R8w&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=19e37c0ddddf3693&biw=1024&bih=639
in tandem with Professor Toyin Falola's “Violence in Nigeria: The
Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies” - as some
necessary background understanding.
http://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=Violence+ndingin+Nigeria:+The+Crisis+of+Religious+Politics+and+Secular+Ideologies&btnG=&hl=en
Are these two Nigerians (Messrs Falola and Turaki) not to be included
in the investigative Commission that should be looking into the
problem and making their recommendations to the Federal government?
Re- “what we were before the arrival of Islam, the colonial masters
Islamic, colonial and Christian, and post-colonial eras. (We need to
do self-appraisal: what we have thought about ourselves and others as
History professors in particular will research “the historical roots”
to every crisis in modern civilisation. It could be said that “before
the arrival of Islam, the colonial masters and Christian missions” the
vast entity now known as Nigeria, Africa's most populous country did
not exist as Africa's Sleeping Giant. Some still see Nigeria as the
Lugardist experiment still in process ( as Nigeria evolves into real
nationhood) and pray that the country's amalgamation of states will
hold together, that things will not fall apart – and one says this,
mindful of Biafra's erstwhile leader Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu still
expressing some doubts from time to time after the Biafra adventure,
with the preamble “we must visit the very foundations of Nigeria” -.
and that preamble always hinted at the possibility of the dissolution
of those foundations, since as Abraham Lincoln also famously said,
“"A house divided against itself cannot stand." If that foreboding
should ever pass into reality, it's doubtful that a mere “two-state
solution” would do the healing miracle whether based on religion or
ethnicity. Nigeria is more complicated than that.
2.”It is not possible for us to solve contemporary religious and
communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence in Nigeria without
correcting the inherited primordial, religious and cultural, and
colonial structures and negative values and redressing these
Since independence, Nigeria has been “ at the crossroads” so many
times. It's not as if the contemporary problems can be reversed or
solved by merely grasping the evolution of the problem from its very
genesis, but the more light that can be thrown on where we are and how
we got there, the better and just now it would be good to hear more
critical voices from the North, about these crucial matters....
On Jul 14, 4:20 pm, ezeikechu...@yahoo.com wrote:
> RrrRRRrrRRrrrRRrrRrRrrrRrRRrrRRrRTttttTtttTtTtTtTttttTtTtTTttTTTrrRrrrrrrrrRrrrRrRR
> Sent from my BlackBerry® smartphone provided by Airtel Nigeria.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Toyin Falola <toyinfal...@austin.utexas.edu>
>
> Sender: usaafric...@googlegroups.com
> Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2012 09:49:24
> IN NIGERIA
>
> HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CRISES AND CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
> WITH REFERENCE TO NORTHERN NIGERIA AND KADUNA STATE
>
> By
>
> Yusufu Turaki
> (Ph.D. in Social Ethics, Boston University, 1982)
> Professor of Theology and Social Ethics,
> Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS)
>
> I. INTRODUCTION
>
> The frequency of religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence since 1980 to the present has reached endemic proportions. This is a reflection of a national crisis, a nation at the brink of collapse, and a nation in search of its own soul. Nigerians are deeply concerned and worried about this and have begun to device ways and means of addressing the problem.
> At the start, we need to make three fundamental assertions:
>
> 1. It is not possible for us as Nigerians to have a proper grasp of the nature of religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence in Nigeria today, without understanding our primordial, religious, cultural and colonial past, what we were before the arrival of Islam, the colonial masters and Christian missions, and what we became during and after the Islamic, colonial and Christian, and post-colonial eras. (We need to do self-appraisal: what we have thought about ourselves and others as people, religious and cultural groups).
>
> 2. It is not possible for us to solve contemporary religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence in Nigeria without correcting the inherited primordial, religious and cultural, and colonial structures and negative values and redressing these legacies, if contemporary Nigeria is to be reoriented along the paths and principles of justice, equality, freedom and equity in socio-political relationships of all Nigerians in the distribution of national resources, rewards and statuses for the benefit of all by the Governments. (We need to do self-appraisal: what primordial values and structures of inequality and injustice are we still holding on to the detriment of others and building a united Nigeria where no one is oppressed?).
>
> 3. It is not possible to achieve peace, unity and respect for human dignity and worth of all Nigerians, if we have not personally and collectively made a deliberate effort and commitment to these noble virtues as the primary goal or end of our dialogue and relations among and between people, and ethnic and religious groups. First, we must be committed personally and collectively to peace, unity and human rights and secondly see them as ultimate goals that must be attained before we can even start to deliberate with each other. (We need to pledge commitment to doing the above as both individuals and groups).
>
> Secondly, we need to state how Nigerians have chosen to address the current Nigerian crises, conflicts and violence.
>
> 1. We have heard some Nigerians who state that the current spade of crises and conflicts are not religious but political, ethnic or economic. This places them on the bench of those who are politically correct. They do not want to offend some Nigerians with a religious talk. For this reason, they ensure that religion is out of the question. It is a taboo to insinuate that Nigeria’s current problems are religious, or even to mention that Boko Haram is a terrorist group or jihadist. But religion dominates Nigeria’s life.
>
> 2. Some Nigerians believe that Nigeria’s current crises, conflicts and violence are politically, ethnically and economically induced and its solution must be rooted in these same social factors. But the truth is, the political culture of Nigeria is still primitive and undeveloped. Nigeria seems not at the present to have any national political solution. No political agenda for creating a New Nigeria. So they waste their time with irrelevant political theories. Again, the economy of Nigeria is so underdeveloped that Nigeria seems not to have any economic solution. No economic agenda for creating a New Nigeria. The cry for jobs, ruined education, unemployment, infrastructural decay and national unity cannot be realized by any means so long as Nigerians are still being chained, psyched and hypnotized by the evil and destructive forces of ethnocentrism and primordialism. Similarly, hypocrisy, corruption and religious bigotry have all conspired to rob Nigeria of any hope of being cured of its ethnic and regional leprosy. Hence, no amount of political, economic, or educational solution will re-create and re-make Nigeria, unless the dark and evil forces of ethnocentrism and primordialism are severely dealt with and routed.
>
> 3. In short, the truth is, no one is effectively solving Nigeria’s problem and no solution in sight. After all, Nigerians themselves are beginning to believe the prophets of doom, pundits of nihilism and witches of fate. What a dark and gloomy moment for Nigeria!
> Thirdly, the terror of Boko Haram. Those who are not familiar with the history of religions, especially Islam are mistakenly confused and misled. Boko Haram has many apologists and sympathizers. Some say that this group is not religious, but purely a product of political or economical circumstances of a woefully failed Northern Nigeria. Some say that it is not a terrorist or a jihadist group, but a product northern underdevelopment or the rise of ethnic militias. Some equate it with the Niger Delta Militants so that they too could reap the bounties of Nigeria’s oil loot. While some say other things about the group. In short, there are too many apologists and spoke-persons for Boko Haram in that Nigerians have failed to both see and hear Boko Haram for themselves. Nigeria’s statesmen peace ambassadors urge for dialogue as the only viable option. Unfortunately the core values and the motivating social and religious factors of Boko Haram cannot be dialogued. Should Boko Haram finally settle for a dialogue, then the truth is this group is not what they claim to be. It could be a sinister or disgruntle political or ethnic group wearing the garb of religion. Obstacles to any dialogue with Boko Haram are their own definition and meaning of Jihad and Sharia. Not all Nigerian Muslims who share the same core values of Jihad and Sharia are in agreement with the activities of Boko Haram. The beliefs and practices of Boko Haram are well rooted in the history of religions but as for Boko Haram the history of Islam. Boko Haram has graduated from being a back-yard group into international limelight. Its links with Somalia, the Maghreb, Mali, Yemen and neighbouring splinter Islamists groups confirms the pan-Islamist world-wide revolution. It hard for any Nigeria to convince Boko Haram that she in its essence, outlook and actions is not a jihadist organization. It is amazing how Nigerians have shut their ears and eyes from hearing or seeing Boko Haram as she is. Unfortunately, what they both see and hear of Boko Haram is measured in terms of politics, economics and regionalism. The message of Boko Haram is religiously coded and only those who can decode it can know the essence of their existence and interpret their actions. They are very consistent in saying who they are, and the truth about themselves. They have always corrected Nigerians who mis-read, mis-understand, mis-interpret, or misrepresent them. But there are some Nigerians who have made up their minds never to listen to Boko Haram but to only themselves, their apologists, or their interpreters. Boko Haram defines itself within an historic tradition of Islam. They say of themselves that they are bona fide jihadists with a jihadic and Sharia agenda. In word and deed they have faithfully kept their own brand of Islamic promise and identity. The emergence of Islamic groups like the Boko Haram is not new in the history of religions or in Islamic history. Repeatedly in history, they often re-surface on the religious scene and only to disappear in a short while. The problem with Nigeria and its external friends is that Boko Haram is disbelieved. They seek to white-wash for Nigerians. The point here is that the evil forces at work that have blinded Nigerians to the problem of Boko Haram and similar other issues are fear, hypocrisy, corruption, primordialism, ethnocentrism, regionalism and religious bigotry. The State and security forces are drenched in corruption. Northern leaders are entangled in hypocrisy, ethnocentrism, regionalism and religious bigotry. Not long ago, we had the fad of Sharia politics. The Sharia politicians deceived people that Sharia would bring justice and development. Unfortunately, the Sharia apostles only used it to loot their states’ treasuries and left their states impoverished. Religious bigotry and hypocrisy have become a trade mark in our national political and religious life.
> Fourthly, Nigerians by and large have not had a proper diagnosis of their national crises, conflicts and violence and the need to finding their enduring historical social roots. All Nigerians, the ethnic, religious and regional groups have their own core values, their hidden authority codes that motivate, shape, mold and define the moral character, attitudes, behaviours and social and spiritual practices. Nigeria’s core values are primary to understanding the reasons and/or the motivating factors for social crises, conflicts and violence. This paper focuses primarily upon the historical foundations, the core values and the authority codes that motivate, inspire and moderate the
>
>
> read more »
OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU
Cornelius Hamelberg
The news reports we've all been reading about Boko Haram atrocities
confirms
“Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned”
Ungovernable anarchy.
Can we say of Nigerians that
“The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity” ?
If anything, the Boko Haram financed violence is surely based on
conviction
whilst Nigerian intellectuals and policy makers deliberating on the
matter have so far been impotent when it comes to translating their
deliberations into a winning strategy for saving Nigerian lives. If we
are to go by the concern expressed in the media about the senseless
violence, the media as the conscience of the nation is equally “full
of passionate intensity”
We lack a law and order society. Whatever became of the spirit of
WAI , the war against indiscipline ?
Sambo Dasuki is going for a ceasefire through dialogue and
negotiations and not for the annihilation of the unidentifiable.
Foreign counter-terrorist experts are there, so is the Nigerian
military, police and para-military (mobile police) and Boko Harami
religious leaders.
We are told that the economic conditions in the North should be
improved and the grievances of the Boko should be addressed. Is that
happening?
On Jul 15, 6:48 am, OLUWATOYIN ADEPOJU <toyinvincentadep...@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
> I wish it could be fully summarised, highlighting its central points, as a
> prelude to the main essay.
>
> toyin
>
> On Sun, Jul 15, 2012 at 12:01 AM, Cornelius Hamelberg <
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> corneliushamelb...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > “We, the elected representatives of the people of Nigeria,
> > concentrated on proving that we were fully capable of managing our own
> > affairs both internally and as a nation. However, we were not to be
> > allowed the selfish luxury of focusing our interest on our own
> > homes.” (Nigeria's first prime minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,
> > addressing the nation on 1st October 1960)
>
> > So much has happened since then and at this critical juncture of
> > national life in Nigeria, have read Professor Yusufu Turaki's essays
>
> > .,cf.osb&fp=19e37c0ddddf3693&biw=1024&bih=639
> > in tandem with Professor Toyin Falola's “Violence in Nigeria: The
> > Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies” - as some
> > necessary background understanding.
>
>
> read more »