On the Matter of How Many People Died in Operation Weti-e of 1965 in Western Region of Nigeria
Mobolaji Aluko
Once more NCNC strategy failed. Amid widespread charges of voting irregularities, Akintola's NNDP, supported by its NPC ally, scored an impressive victory in November. There were extensive protests, including considerable grumbling among senior army officials, at the apparent perversion of the democratic process. In the six months after the election, an estimated 2,000 people died in violence that erupted in the Western Region. In the face of the disorders, the beleaguered Balewa delegated extraordinary powers to the regional governments to deal with the situation. By this time, Azikiwe and the prime minister were scarcely on speaking terms, and there were suggestions that Nigeria's armed forces should restore order.
The first issue that we must note was that we are talking about two elections in 1965: the Western Region assembly elections on October 11 1965 and the Lagos legislative elections in November 13, 1965. Since the Nzeogwu military coup was on January 15, 1966, one therefore does not really know "the six months after the election" that the above reference was referring to in which "an estimated 2,000 people died in violence that erupted in the Western Region."
1962 | May 13: Census enumeration begins, and continues for two weeks |
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1963 | January 1: Akintola returns as Western region premier |
1964 | February 3: Midwest regional Elections |
1965 | January 4: President Azikiwe invites PM Balewa to form new government November 13: Lagos parliamentary elections |
1966 | January 2-12 - riots in Ibadan, Lagos, Ilesha UNQUOTE
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Oga AdeniranI hear you and I agree that the foreign media tends to overplay negative reports concerning us. However on this issue I find it very difficult to believe your assertion that only 5 people died in operation wetie.1. It takes a stretch of imagination to believe that in a politically charged environment mobs had the rationality to first ask inhabitants of homes to come out before setting their homes on fire.2. You were a student at UI when this was going on. With limited communications of those days there is no way you could have known the state of matter all over western region. We are talking about 1965! In 1983 I was a political aware student union official at the Enugu campus of University of Nigeria. Ekwueme thugs and Nwobodos thugs were involved in a battle over control of the old Anambra state. Lives and property were lost. I followed that imbroglio and I cannot say with certainty how many lives were lost. I don't see how an undergrad in UI can know how many lives were lost all over western region during operation wetie.3. Having said that, I am open to education. Can you share with us digitised copies of newspaper reports of those days? Excerpts from books on operation wetie? Because your assertions go against the grain of all we grew up reading about operation wetie---- when neighbours doused their neighbours in petrol and set them on fire!Joe
Sent from my IphoneBolaji and Joe,Thanks to Bolaji for bringing up this write-up. It is somewhat alarming that such an estimate would be proffered and remain available for circulation. It is patently false. I am aware of other estimates that are also false but not anywhere as gross.My recommendation REMAINS that we search the archives of Nigeria's newspapers of that era to collate the reporting, as they occurred, of incidents of deaths via WETIE. That would have a greater chance of accuracy because it would report the deaths, including the names of the victims and the places where such killings took placeForeign news accounts and/or reporting of events in non-Western countries often reflect vertical and horizontal exaggerations. Let me recall three examples with which you all might be familiar:1. In the late 1960s and early 1970, no less a news organization than the CBS Evening News by Walter Cronkite fed the American listeners daily diet of casualties on the Viet Nam war front. It reported about x for the number of Americans dying in the war, y (> x) for the South Vietnamese, who were American allies and z ( > 1000(x+y)) for the Viet Congs, the "enemies". It occurred to me, even then, that at the rate that the Viet Congs were being "killed", it should not take more than 3 months to completely wipe out the Viet Congs and North Vietnamese, given what the population figures were. Well the war continued unabated until a negotiated end was put to it in 1973.2. A report was brought out on these fora recently in which a British colonial officer wrote that the Igbo were using human flesh as protein supplement. For me to take that as the "gospel" TRUTH would require hard core evidence, which was not supplied.3. There have been pictures posted on these fora in recent years of burnt up human bodies claimed to be the actions of certain groups in Nigeria against certain other groups therein. Further investigation showed that those pictures came from the internecine wars in Somalia.There has been too much of a tendency by others to cast unsavory events in Africa in exaggerated tones. It has helped to create an image in the West of a continent whose peoples can really only be thought of as savages. I was a member of the Action Group Student Organization at the University of Ibadan during the period in question. At that time, I found each reported death unsettling, and I am thankful that I did not know about more than 3, alert as I was to the goings-on. That is why I confidently say the total deaths could not be more than 5.Adeniran AdeboyeOn Feb 1, 2013, at 10:35 AM, Mobolaji Aluko wrote:Joe Attueyi:You asked:QUOTEAre you in a position to share your source of the estimate of about 2,000 as the casualties of operation wetie?UNQUOTESure... wade through the excerpt below, and read about some of the surrounding circumstances - as elucidated by the writer(s).And there you have it.Bolaji Aluko1964-1965 Elections
The federal parliamentary election campaign in December 1964--the first since independence--was contested by two political alliances incorporating all the major parties. The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was composed of the NPC, Akintola's Western-based Nigerian National Democratic Party, and opposition parties representing ethnic minorities in the Midwestern and Eastern regions. It was opposed by the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), which joined the NCNC and the remnants of the Action Group with two minority-based northern allies, the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the United Middle Belt Congress.
Not surprisingly, the NNA adopted a platform that reflected the views of the northern political elite and, hence, was an attempt by the NPC to gain firmer control of federal politics through an alliance with the Western Region. Its appeal to voters outside the north was based essentially on the advantages to be gained from associating with the party in power. The NNA preyed on Yoruba fears of Igbo domination of the federal government. The UPGA was employed in an attempt by the NCNC to use the two regional governments that it controlled as a springboard to domination of the federal government. Strategically it offered a reformist program, combining a planned economy that endorsed increased public spending while also encouraging private enterprise. The UPGA proposed to divide the country into states that reflected ethnicity. Its proposals were intended to undermine the existing regional basis of political power by creating a sufficient number of states in each region so that none of the mayor ethnic groups--Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo--could dominate region. The UPGA presented itself as an alternative to northern and, more specifically, to Hausa-Fulani domination of the federal government. Convinced that it would win if the election were held in an atmosphere free from interference by ruling parties in the Northern Region and the Western Region, the UPGA spent most of its efforts denouncing what it regarded as NNA intentions to rig the election in those regions.
The election was postponed for several weeks because of discrepancies between the number of names on voting rolls and on census returns. Even then the UPGA was not satisfied and called on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was effective in the Eastern Region, where polling places did not open in fifty-one constituencies that had more than one candidate running for office. In other constituencies in the region, UPGA candidates ran unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million voters cast ballots, out of 15 million who were eligible. The NNA elected 198 candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies returning results. After an embarrassing delay, President Azikiwe agreed to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. The boycott had failed to stop the election, and in March 1965 supplementary elections were held in those areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos where the boycott had been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all these constituencies, bringing the NCNC-dominated coalition a total of 108 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPGA became the official opposition.
After this decisive defeat, the UPGA prepared for the November 1965 legislative election in the Western Region in an attempt to gain control of the three southern regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos, the region surrounding the capital. If successful, the NPC-dominated NNA still would have controlled the House of Representatives, but it would have given the predominantly southern UPGA a majority in the Senate, whose members were chosen by the regional legislatures.
Once more NCNC strategy failed. Amid widespread charges of voting irregularities, Akintola's NNDP, supported by its NPC ally, scored an impressive victory in November. There were extensive protests, including considerable grumbling among senior army officials, at the apparent perversion of the democratic process. In the six months after the election, an estimated 2,000 people died in violence that erupted in the Western Region. In the face of the disorders, the beleaguered Balewa delegated extraordinary powers to the regional governments to deal with the situation. By this time, Azikiwe and the prime minister were scarcely on speaking terms, and there were suggestions that Nigeria's armed forces should restore order.
In January 1966, army officers attempted to seize power. In a well-coordinated action, the conspirators, most of whom were Igbo, assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, and Bello in Kaduna, as well as senior officers of northern origin. In a public proclamation, the coup leaders pledged to establish a strong and efficient government committed to a progressive program and eventually to new elections. They vowed to stamp out corruption and to suppress violence. Despite the bloody and calculated character of the coup, these sentiments appealed directly to younger, educated Nigerians in all parts of the country.
The army's commander in chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, quickly intervened to restore discipline within the army. In the absence of Azikiwe, who was undergoing treatment in a London hospital, Balewa's shaken cabinet resigned, leaving the reins of authority to the armed forces. Ironsi, also an Igbo, suspended the constitution, dissolved all legislative bodies, banned political parties, and as an interim measure formed a Federal Military Government (FMG) to prepare the country for a return to civilian rule at an unspecified date. He appointed military governors in each region and assigned officers to ministerial positions, instructing them to implement sweeping institutional reforms.
Ironsi and his advisers favored a unitary form of government, which they thought would eliminate the intransigent regionalism that had been the stumbling block to political and economic progress. A decree issued in March abolished the federation and unified the federal and regional civil services. Civilian experts, largely Igbo, set to work on a new constitution that would provide for a centralized unitary government such as the NCNC had favored since the 1950s.
Although the decree contained a number of concessions to regional interests, including protection of northerners from southern competition in the civil service, Ironsi's action showed dangerous disregard for the nuances of regional politics and badly misjudged the intensity of ethnic sensitivities in the aftermath of the bloody coup. The failure of the military government to prosecute Igbo officers responsible for murdering northern leaders stirred animosities further. Igbo civil servants and merchants residing in the north made the situation even worse through their triumphant support for the coup. Furthermore, Ironsi was vulnerable to accusations of favoritism toward the Igbo. The coup was perceived not so much as an effort to impose a unitary government as a plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria. Likewise, many Muslims saw the military decrees as Christianinspired attempts to undermine emirate government.
Troops of northern origin, who made up the bulk of the infantry, became increasingly restive. Fighting broke out between them and Igbo soldiers in garrisons in the south. In June mobs in the northern cities, abetted by local officials, carried out a pogrom against resident Igbo, massacring several hundred people and destroying Igbo-owned property. Some northern leaders spoke seriously of secession. Many northerners feared that Ironsi intended to deprive them of power and to consolidate further an Igbo-dominated centralized state.
In July northern officers and army units staged a countercoup, during which Ironsi and a number of other Igbo officers were killed. The Muslim officers named thirty-one-year- old Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, a Christian from a small ethnic group (the Anga) in the middle belt, as a compromise candidate to head the FMG. A young and relatively obscure officer serving as army chief of staff, Gowon had not been involved in the coup, but he enjoyed wide support among northern troops who subsequently insisted that he be given a position in the ruling body. His first act was to repeal the Ironsi decree and to restore federalism, a step followed by the release of Awolowo and Enahoro from prison
UNQUOTEOn Fri, Feb 1, 2013 at 12:10 PM, topcrest topcrest <topc...@yahoo.com> wrote:Prof AlukoAre you in a position to share your source of the estimate of about 2,000 as the casualties of operation wetie?Joe
Mobolaji Aluko
According to a Federal Government estimate, the violence had claimedthe lives of over 160 persons by 13 January 1966 – these were 64 civilians killed by the police, 91 killed byother civilians and seven policemen among others (Daily Sketch, Daily Times and Daily Express, 14 January1966. Daily Express and Daily Times, 23 November 1965.). The UPGA however estimated that casualties ofthe 1965 crisis ran into hundreds (Daily Express and Daily Times, 23 November 1965.). In its own estimate,the Nigerian Tribune - whose press was in 1965 burnt down and its publications banned by the government ofWestern Nigeria but which continued to publish its titles clandestinely - claimed that about 567 people lost theirlives during the crisis while about 1,000 others were wounded (Nigerian Tribune, 3 January 1966.). Unofficialestimates given in the British press put the total number of the dead at over 700 (Daily Express and DailyTimes, 23 November 1965. 22i bid, 12 January 1966.).
Prof Aluko,Operation wetie was (is) part of our recent history.
I grew up knowing it as a time when people revolted against fake election results by dousing their political enemies with petrol and setting them and their property on fire.
When someone of the status of Oga Adeniran then stated that no more than 5 people were killed during the crisis, any student of history ought to be interested in that narrative.
Thanks for your intervention in this discourse.
I believe we can put it to bed that the killings during operation wetie were more likely in the hundreds and accords more with the received history than the new version my teacher was trying to teach us.
Joe
From: Mobolaji Aluko <alu...@gmail.com>
To: Joe Attueyi <topc...@yahoo.com>
Cc: Adeniran Adeboye <aade...@mac.com>; Naija Politicse- Group <NaijaP...@yahoogroups.com>; "niger...@yahoogroups.com" <niger...@yahoogroups.com>; 'Yan Arewa <yana...@yahoogroups.com>; Ra'ayi <Raay...@yahoogroups.com>; Omo Odua <omo...@yahoogroups.com>; naijaintellects <naijain...@googlegroups.com>; USAAfrica Dialogue <USAAfric...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, February 2, 2013 8:17 PM
Subject: On the Matter of How Many People Died in Operation Weti-e of 1965 in Western Region of Nigeria
Mobolaji Aluko
Prof Aluko,
Thank you for your historical context. However, I'd like you to note the following points:
(1). The AG Youth Association, of which Pa Fasanmi was the President and Chief Soji Odunjo, the secretary, toured all parts of Yorubaland in the heat of the crisis and were eyewitnesses to these things. Pa Fasanmi is still alive.
(2) They were able to contain "dousing people with petrol", even while in support of resistance.
(3) BEFORE "wet e", it was NOT uncommon for dead bodies to suddenly appear in the backyard of NNDP's opponents.
(4) "WET e", even as direct response to the declared NNDP "victory" DID NOT start until AFTER the sitting of the Assembly.
Sop, there is a need to make a distinction between the resistance/violence that had been brewing since 1962 all through to January 1966. But "wet e" was of a specific period within that mix.
Leye Ige
--- On Sat, 2/2/13, Mobolaji Aluko <alu...@gmail.com> wrote:
From: Mobolaji Aluko <alu...@gmail.com>
Subject: [OmoOdua] On the Matter of How Many People Died in Operation Weti-e of 1965 in Western Region of Nigeria
To: "Joe Attueyi" <topc...@yahoo.com>
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