Re: The End of Faith
Richard Corfield
> Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes really
> believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
> antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
> might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty about
> the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
Does this apply to all faiths, or only the more vocal ones?
It can be hard, if you think you've found the way, to accept that others
must find their own. That is human nature. There are groups however that
teach this, but even if your group attempts to teach "The way of the
world" rather than "The rules of a God" letting others work it out for
themselves is hard to do. Unfortunately some forget that basic message.
If we took God out of the question and applied it to practical things
where do we draw the line. What conceptually differentiates
Craving is the universal source of suffering
Greed leads to misery.
Enjoy what you have, not what you can't obtain.
Waste not, want not
It is generally a good idea to look before crossing the road
The first was said by Buddha, the second pair seem to say similar
things but are more "every day". You can have interesting arguments
about motivation and The American Way which seems fuelled by greed at
times. The third is something we were always told as kids[1], the fourth
is just plain obvious (footbridges aside).
Then there are things like
Don't steal
Don't lie
which seem pretty universal.
- Richard
[1] For Terry Pratchett readers: I wonder if that one's in The Way of
Mrs Cosmopolite :-)
--
_/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ Richard Corfield <Richard....@gmail.com>
_/ _/ _/ _/
_/_/ _/ _/ Time is a one way street, .
_/ _/ _/_/ _/_/_/ except in the Twilight Zone 3^
Gareth McCaughan
> Our situation is this: most of the people in this world believe that the
> Creator of the universe has written a book.
Not an auspicious beginning, since this is fairly clearly wrong.
Muslims believe that; some Jews and Christians do, and some more
Jews and Christians believe something rather like it, but I'd
be surprised if even half of either of those groups is within
spitting distance of believing that the creator of the universe
has written a book. Very few other religions have any belief
much like that. So that would be something like 1 billion Christians
and 1 billion Muslims. The population of the world is between
6 billion and 7 billion. Oops.
--
Gareth McCaughan
.sig under construc
Nick Milton
>Our situation is this: most of the people in this world believe that the
>Creator of the universe has written a book.
Here he falls at the first hurdle
Jeremy P
news:6o18m2tf3s38ql5fl...@4ax.com...
Agreed. Posh may have created a unique and distinctive musical sound and
have the power of all shopping, but I don't think many people think she
created the universe.
Now, can anyone help me? I'm trying to follow her beauty tips, but I don't
have room for another sixteen wardrobes, and my personal shopper at the
Co-Op hasn't been so attentive of late.
--
Jeremy Parsons
Gone but not forgotten... Back yet rarely noticed...
Dianelos Georgoudis
Good point.
I think I detect an alarming trend here. Sam Harris is a well-known
contemporary author on atheism, as is Dawkins, and it seems to me that
both are increasingly a) making statements that are over the board, and
b) turning virulent. I have always considered atheism to be a tolerant
and measured meme. Many memes become more popular by tending to evolve
aggressive traits that motivate feelings of hate and intolerance
towards minds that do not harbor them, and I wonder if we are not
witnessing this kind of mutation happening with atheism also.
In plain English what I am saying is: I fear that the unreasonable and
unkind attitude these two well-known authors project will influence
many other atheists too.
Nick Milton
wrote:
>Now, can anyone help me? I'm trying to follow her beauty tips
Big sunglasses
Gareth McCaughan
> I think I detect an alarming trend here. Sam Harris is a well-known
> contemporary author on atheism, as is Dawkins, and it seems to me that
> both are increasingly a) making statements that are over the board, and
> b) turning virulent. I have always considered atheism to be a tolerant
> and measured meme. Many memes become more popular by tending to evolve
> aggressive traits that motivate feelings of hate and intolerance
> towards minds that do not harbor them, and I wonder if we are not
> witnessing this kind of mutation happening with atheism also.
>
> In plain English what I am saying is: I fear that the unreasonable and
> unkind attitude these two well-known authors project will influence
> many other atheists too.
It's possible. In view of how unpleasant and inaccurate many
Christians are willing to be about atheists, I'm tempted to
say "turnabout is fair play" but, well, it isn't. (Jesus was
on the whole right about repaying evil with good.)
So far as I can tell, Dawkins is more accurate and less rude
than Harris.
Robert Marshall
> "Nick Milton" <nickspamt...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:6o18m2tf3s38ql5fl...@4ax.com...
>> On Tue, 21 Nov 2006 16:57:26 +0000, {R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>>
>>>Our situation is this: most of the people in this world believe
>>>that the Creator of the universe has written a book.
>>
>> Here he falls at the first hurdle
>
> Agreed. Posh may have created a unique and distinctive musical
> sound and have the power of all shopping, but I don't think many
> people think she created the universe.
>
I thought the guilds control the spice rather than vice versa
> Now, can anyone help me? I'm trying to follow her beauty tips, but I
> don't have room for another sixteen wardrobes, and my personal
> shopper at the Co-Op hasn't been so attentive of late.
They're certainly a bit of a melange
Robert
--
Conformity means death for any community. A loyal opposition is a
necessity in any community Karol Wojtyla (1969)
Links and things http://rmstar.blogspot.com/
Kendall K. Down
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes really
> believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
> antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
> might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty about
> the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
It may have escaped your notice, but atheism does not escape from the
strictures of your final sentence.
God bless,
Kendall K. Down
--
================ ARCHAEOLOGICAL DIGGINGS ===============
| Australia's premier archaeological magazine |
| http://www.diggingsonline.com |
========================================================
Michael J Davis
<nickspamt...@hotmail.com> writes
... as in 1 Cor 13:12.
Mike
[The reply-to address is valid for 30 days from this posting]
--
Michael J Davis
http://www.trustsof.demon.co.uk
<><
For this is what the Lord has said to me,
"Go and post a Watchman and let
him report what he sees." Isa 21:6
<><
Gareth McCaughan
[quotation from Sam Harris:]
> }> Our situation is this: most of the people in this world believe that the
> }> Creator of the universe has written a book.
[me:]
> }Not an auspicious beginning, since this is fairly clearly wrong.
> }Muslims believe that; some Jews and Christians do, and some more
> }Jews and Christians believe something rather like it, but I'd
> }be surprised if even half of either of those groups is within
> }spitting distance of believing that the creator of the universe
> }has written a book. Very few other religions have any belief
> }much like that. So that would be something like 1 billion Christians
> }and 1 billion Muslims. The population of the world is between
> }6 billion and 7 billion. Oops.
["{R}":]
> So you can ignore what he is saying because your definition of most is
> different to Sam's ?
Well, I can ignore anything that actually depends on his
claim that most people believe that the creator of the
universe has written a book, or on the idea that religious
people generally believe that (which he gives the impression
that he thinks). And I can treat what he says with the
respect due to someone who is as sloppy as that.
And, possibly more to the point, people who unlike me
aren't atheists can do so too, and his sloppiness may
give them an excuse to ignore anything worthwhile he
has to say. That might be a pity, depending on how much
that's worthwhile he actually has to say and on whether
any non-atheists read his books.
> You will have to forgive him as he is:
> a) young ( I guess 35 )
> b) American
Why would that oblige me to forgive him? (Or: why would
I not have to forgive him if he were 64 and Lithuanian?)
Jeremy P
news:9+GSSoCs...@trustsof.demon.co.uk.invalid...
> In message <ksn8m21ovat80d7n7...@4ax.com>, Nick Milton
> <nickspamt...@hotmail.com> writes
>>On Wed, 22 Nov 2006 14:11:18 -0000, Jeremy P <newsr...@0uce.com>
>>wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>>Now, can anyone help me? I'm trying to follow her beauty tips
>>
>>Big sunglasses
>
> ... as in 1 Cor 13:12.
Thank you. Actually another passage has solved my wardrobe problem:
http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus%2013:47-52;&version=46;
--
Jeremy Parsons
Patrick Herring
|
| On Wed, 22 Nov 2006, Jeremy P. wrote:
|
| > "Nick Milton" <nickspamt...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
| > news:6o18m2tf3s38ql5fl...@4ax.com...
| >> On Tue, 21 Nov 2006 16:57:26 +0000, {R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
| >>
| >>>Our situation is this: most of the people in this world believe
| >>>that the Creator of the universe has written a book.
| >>
| >> Here he falls at the first hurdle
| >
| > Agreed. Posh may have created a unique and distinctive musical
| > sound and have the power of all shopping, but I don't think many
| > people think she created the universe.
| >
|
| I thought the guilds control the spice rather than vice versa
Showing your age there Robert <g>.
I mentioned recently to a group in the pub that Sting had been in the
film of Dune, and got blank looks from all but one... eeuch...
--
Patrick Herring, http://www.anweald.co.uk
zen christianity: http://www.anweald.co.uk/zenchristianity/
Robert Marshall
> Robert Marshall <sp...@chezmarshall.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>|
>| On Wed, 22 Nov 2006, Jeremy P. wrote:
>|
>| > Agreed. Posh may have created a unique and distinctive musical
>| > sound and have the power of all shopping, but I don't think many
>| > people think she created the universe.
>| >
>|
>| I thought the guilds control the spice rather than vice versa
>
> Showing your age there Robert <g>.
:-) I haven't read it for ages, though my son is in the process of
working his way though the complete set - which I never had the
patience for, I ground to a halt at the end of the first book
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> }aggressive traits that motivate feelings of hate and intolerance
> }towards minds that do not harbor them, and I wonder if we are not
> }witnessing this kind of mutation happening with atheism also.
>
>
Who was it who said "fear is the mother of violence".
> }In plain English what I am saying is: I fear that the unreasonable an=
> }unkind attitude these two well-known authors project will influence
> }many other atheists too.
>
> I sincerely hope so. We must all do our bit against religion.
Including being like the very people you fear?
Peter R
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
>
LOL....so it seems!
Revd. Eric Potts
>
> > You will have to forgive him as he is:
> > a) young ( I guess 35 )
> > b) American
>
> Why would that oblige me to forgive him? (Or: why would
> I not have to forgive him if he were 64 and Lithuanian?)
<irony alert> Because in that case he might be an asylum seeker or one
of those people that the terrible gods of Brussels say we must allow
into our country whether we want them or not!
</ irony alert>
Richard Corfield
>
> Thank you. Actually another passage has solved my wardrobe problem:
> http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus%2013:47-52;&version=46;
>
Do you wear that much leather? I don't think I have any.
Another option is to go for a religion with distinctive robes. Normally
involves becoming a monk in said religion though. Then it's just a case
of picking colour (white/brown for Christian was it, orange for
Buddhist) and itchyness (I think the Buddhists get that one easier).
No more wardrobe problem.
- Richard
Simon Robinson
> I mentioned recently to a group in the pub that Sting had been in the
> film of Dune, and got blank looks from all but one... eeuch...
Because of the reference to Sting, or to Dune, or to both?
Richard Corfield
>
> Including being like the very people you fear?
>
There's a bit somewhere in Hindu philosophy about someone who so hated his
god, and so concentrated on hating his god, that he ended up achieving
Union with him anyway, his mind being so focused. Georg Furstein in his
book refers to it as "Yoga of Hate". The person in question did some
quite evil things from this hatred.
That brings about the question alluded to here. Can hating something so
much actually cause you to become like the thing you hate?
It also comes to mind whenever I see a Christian preaching about Satan.
I've seen some who seem to focus on hating Satan above loving God.
Also, in the context of Hinduism, is it possible to achieve Moksha despite
doing some nasty things, only requiring the right mental conditions?
(And lack of Karma if you're a Hindu, which is part of the right mental
conditions following Buddhist ideas on that)
Gareth McCaughan
Ah yes, I forgot about that one. But somehow I don't think it's what
{R} had in mind. :-)
Robert Marshall
>
> Patrick Herring wrote:
>> I mentioned recently to a group in the pub that Sting had been in
>> the film of Dune, and got blank looks from all but one... eeuch...
>
> Because of the reference to Sting, or to Dune, or to both?
>
Maybe as part of his Dowland[1] album, he should have sung
O Rose, thou art sick!
The invisible worm
That flies in the night,
In the howling storm,
unfortunately Dowland didn't set it but it might go nicely on the lute
with a certain Dune association
Robert
Footnotes:
[1] Not heard it but I believe its been panned
Patrick Herring
|
| Patrick Herring wrote:
| > I mentioned recently to a group in the pub that Sting had been in the
| > film of Dune, and got blank looks from all but one... eeuch...
|
| Because of the reference to Sting, or to Dune, or to both?
They knew about Sting but Dune was not very familiar. Neither was
Jonathan Livingston Seagull. However, they're both still on the bookshop
shelves, so maybe I'm just ahead of the next retro wave.
Trevor Jenkins
> Sting Dowland[1]
>
> [1] Not heard it but I believe its been panned
As a fan of Dowland's music I was intrigued to find that Sting had
produced this album. ... Then I heard a BBC Radio 3 broadcast of a live
performance he gave at LSO St John's to promote the album; good grief the
man couldn't even get his own songs right let alone Dowland's --- actually
that's what he should have done, let them alone.
Anyone wanting a better introduction to Dowland should tune their TV to
ITV of a Saturday night for The X Factor. No Dowland to be heard at all
but even the worse of the auditions is better than Sting and his band
were. If Beethoven were still alive and able to hear Sting he'd be glad he
was deaf.
Regards, Trevor
<>< Re: deemed!
Kendall K. Down
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> Religious moderation is just a cherry-picking of scripture, ultimately=
> is just diluted Iron Age philosophy. It isn=E2EURTMt
Well, that's a new one. I'm used to various alternatives for apostrophes,
particularly when the fancy ones are used, but =E2EURTHM I have not
encountered before. Anyone got an explanation?
Gareth McCaughan
> On Thu, 23 Nov 2006, Simon Robinson wrote:
>
>> Patrick Herring wrote:
>>> I mentioned recently to a group in the pub that Sting had been in
>>> the film of Dune, and got blank looks from all but one... eeuch...
>>
>> Because of the reference to Sting, or to Dune, or to both?
>
> Maybe as part of his Dowland[1] album, he should have sung
...
> [1] Not heard it but I believe its been panned
James Fenton was quite complimentary about it in the Grauniad.
(But that wasn't a review as such.)
Alec Brady
<8ob6m25mme9kjmtjp...@4ax.com>,
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes really
>believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
>antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
>might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty about
>the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
So how do you explain my behaviour towards my wife?
--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> }> }aggressive traits that motivate feelings of hate and intolerance
> }> }unkind attitude these two well-known authors project will influence
> }> }many other atheists too.
> }>
> }> I sincerely hope so. We must all do our bit against religion.
> }
> }Including being like the very people you fear?
>
Yep fair enough. Any of the other atheists here wanna tell me why he's
wrong?
Peter R
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> }> }unkind attitude these two well-known authors project will influence
> }> }many other atheists too.
> }>
> }> I sincerely hope so. We must all do our bit against religion.
> }
> }Including being like the very people you fear?
>
Jesus: "Love your enemies"
Peter R
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> virgins he has been told are waiting for him.
Please define sane in that context?
Peter R
John Blake
<plast...@maxnet.co.nz> wrote:
Does love = blow them to bits?
JB
Dianelos Georgoudis
[snip]
> It's possible. In view of how unpleasant and inaccurate many
> Christians are willing to be about atheists, I'm tempted to
> say "turnabout is fair play" but, well, it isn't. (Jesus was
> on the whole right about repaying evil with good.)
How would justify the belief that it is right to repay evil with good?
I recall your ethical axioms, but repaying evil with good will quite
possibly lead to an overall increase of pain by giving the evil-doers
free reign. Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
life of an enemy?
Mary Magdalene's wasting the precious stuff on Jesus' feet also led to
an overall increase of pain - Judas was right to object. Ethics is so
difficult as a philosophical field because no axioms-and-rules based
system appears to work in all cases. Which brings us to a very
interesting question: How do we know in which cases these ethical
systems do not work? How is it that we seem to be intuitively sure
about what the right thing is and are thus able to judge the failures
of this or that ethical system?
Kendall K. Down
Alec Brady <alec....@virgin.net> wrote:
> >Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes really
> >believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
> >antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
> >might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty about
> >the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
> So how do you explain my behaviour towards my wife?
Surely the explanation depends on whether you have stopped beating her?
Kendall K. Down
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> }> Religious moderation is just a cherry-picking of scripture, ultimately=
> }> is just diluted Iron Age philosophy. It isn=E2EURTMt
> }Well, that's a new one. I'm used to various alternatives for apostrophes,
> }particularly when the fancy ones are used, but =E2EURTHM I have not
> }encountered before. Anyone got an explanation?
> Of course, but you wouldn't believe me - would you.
Not if the explanation involves evolution, no.
Alec Brady
<ou4bm2d46q2ntiv16...@4ax.com>,
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>Do you want to bet that the last words of the 9/11 bombers weren't "Allah
>Akbar" ?
I'll take that bet. Their last words were probably "Allahu akbar"
philip....@ntlworld.com
> In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 22 Nov 2006 08:37:07 GMT, "Kendall K.
> Down" <webm...@diggingsonline.com> wrote:
>
> }In message <8ob6m25mme9kjmtjp...@4ax.com>
> } {R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> }
> }> Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes really
> }> believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
> }> antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
> }> might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty about
> }> the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
> }
> }strictures of your final sentence.
>
> Atheism, or non-theism which I prefer, is not a religion.
Which doesnt address the point being made.
> If it has a creed, it is logic, science and the suspension of belief.
Which doesnt address the point being made.
> No Atheist welcomes the end-of-days or insists the only he knows the truth.
What do you mean by end of days? Some atheists do indeed insist that
they know the truth, quite vehemently so.
> No sane atheist flies planes into buildings so that he may go fuck the 72
> virgins he has been told are waiting for him.
Have you any evidence that anyone ever did that, theist or otherwise?
> Do you want to bet that the last words of the 9/11 bombers weren't "Allah
> Akbar" ?
I'll bet £10,000.
And thanks for all that handwaving. Care to address the point that was
made or are you not up for that?
Phil
Gareth McCaughan
> Gareth McCaughan wrote:
> [snip]
>
>> It's possible. In view of how unpleasant and inaccurate many
>> Christians are willing to be about atheists, I'm tempted to
>> say "turnabout is fair play" but, well, it isn't. (Jesus was
>> on the whole right about repaying evil with good.)
>
> How would justify the belief that it is right to repay evil with good?
> I recall your ethical axioms, but repaying evil with good will quite
> possibly lead to an overall increase of pain by giving the evil-doers
> free reign.
In such cases, it's probably inadvisable to repay evil with good.
It isn't by accident that I included the words "on the whole".
> Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
> life of an enemy?
Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
enemy, and because your[1] natural tendency is going to be to
overvalue your life relative to others', so that some attempt
at compensatory overvaluing of others equalizes things a bit.
[1] Generic.
> Mary Magdalene's wasting the precious stuff on Jesus' feet also led to
> an overall increase of pain - Judas was right to object. Ethics is so
> difficult as a philosophical field because no axioms-and-rules based
> system appears to work in all cases. Which brings us to a very
> interesting question: How do we know in which cases these ethical
> systems do not work? How is it that we seem to be intuitively sure
> about what the right thing is and are thus able to judge the failures
> of this or that ethical system?
Another equally interesting question that should perhaps be
addressed first is: *Do* we know, or is it just that we are
confident about our prejudices and guesses? If you're sure
that we do know, then your reasons for being sure may shed
some light on how we know.
Gareth McCaughan
I might have a go, if I were more sure of what he means.
Trevor Jenkins
> And thanks for all that handwaving.
Hey, I thought I was the one that did the handwaving around here. ;-)
Regards, Trevor
<>< Re: deemed!
Alec Brady
<87lkm0s...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>,
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>> Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
>> life of an enemy?
>
>Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
>enemy...
Worth no less to whom?
>...and because your[1] natural tendency is going to be to
>overvalue your life relative to others', so that some attempt
>at compensatory overvaluing of others equalizes things a bit.
Why is equalizing things good?
> [1] Generic.
Gareth McCaughan
[Dianelos:]
>>> Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
>>> life of an enemy?
[me:]
>> Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
>> enemy...
[Alec:]
> Worth no less to whom?
Worth no less, simpliciter. If it turns out that that's not
a meaningful concept, then that means moral realism is wrong;
fair enough, I'll cope. At that point the correct translation
of "worth no less" becomes something like "worth no less from
my perspective" (which is not, of course, the same, as "of no
less immediate concern to me"; similar considerations apply,
e.g., to planning for the future), and my conclusion remains
the same as far as my actions and preferences about others'
actions are concerned.
>> ...and because your[1] natural tendency is going to be to
>> overvalue your life relative to others', so that some attempt
>> at compensatory overvaluing of others equalizes things a bit.
>
> Why is equalizing things good?
Because the other person's life is worth about the same as mine
(see above for further discussion), and it's better (by definition
of "worth", I think) for your priorities to be somewhat aligned
with the actual worths of things.
If it turns out that moral realism is wrong, then we can change
"worth" to "worth (from my perspective)" and "better" to "better
(from my perspective)"; that suffices to ground my choices and
my feelings about others' choices, but doesn't give anyone else
any direct reason for acting in one way rather than another.
Alec Brady
<874psnp...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>,
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>Alec Brady wrote:
>
>[Dianelos:]
>>>> Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
>>>> life of an enemy?
>
>[me:]
>>> Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
>>> enemy...
>
>[Alec:]
>> Worth no less to whom?
>
>Worth no less, simpliciter. If it turns out that that's not
>a meaningful concept, then that means moral realism is wrong;
>fair enough, I'll cope.
I think 'worth' has to mean 'worth to someone'. Of course, as a
theist, I think there's always someone in the quad.
>At that point the correct translation
>of "worth no less" becomes something like "worth no less from
>my perspective" (which is not, of course, the same, as "of no
>less immediate concern to me"; similar considerations apply,
>e.g., to planning for the future), and my conclusion remains
>the same as far as my actions and preferences about others'
>actions are concerned.
But there are no longer any grounds for thinking someone is wrong in
disagreeing with your moral evaluation. We come back to Icarus'
'personal opinion'.
>>> ...and because your[1] natural tendency is going to be to
>>> overvalue your life relative to others', so that some attempt
>>> at compensatory overvaluing of others equalizes things a bit.
>>
>> Why is equalizing things good?
>
>Because the other person's life is worth about the same as mine
>(see above for further discussion), and it's better (by definition
>of "worth", I think) for your priorities to be somewhat aligned
>with the actual worths of things.
>
>If it turns out that moral realism is wrong, then we can change
>"worth" to "worth (from my perspective)" and "better" to "better
>(from my perspective)"; that suffices to ground my choices and
>my feelings about others' choices, but doesn't give anyone else
>any direct reason for acting in one way rather than another.
Quite. It allows Mother Teresa to get away with evil acts (if that's
what happened) on the grounds that they were right from her
perspective, and it doesn't make sense to challenge her.
Of course, someone might say "I prefer her not to act that way", but
that's not grounds for *her* to change.
Peter R
>>
>>
>>Jesus: "Love your enemies"
>>
>
> Does love = blow them to bits?
Ca?
Pet
Dianelos Georgoudis
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>
> > Gareth McCaughan wrote:
> > [snip]
> >
> >> It's possible. In view of how unpleasant and inaccurate many
> >> Christians are willing to be about atheists, I'm tempted to
> >> say "turnabout is fair play" but, well, it isn't. (Jesus was
> >> on the whole right about repaying evil with good.)
> >
> > How would justify the belief that it is right to repay evil with good?
> > I recall your ethical axioms, but repaying evil with good will quite
> > possibly lead to an overall increase of pain by giving the evil-doers
> > free reign.
>
> In such cases, it's probably inadvisable to repay evil with good.
> It isn't by accident that I included the words "on the whole".
There are many people today who, maybe secretly, believe that "an eye
for an eye" is the best strategy as far as decreasing the overall
amount of pain goes. Many people believe that repaying evil with good,
or even paying good to people who don't deserve it, is a formula for
increasing evil and pain in the long run. Can you give an example where
repaying evil with good would decrease the amount of pain on the whole?
> > Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
> > life of an enemy?
>
> Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
> enemy, and because your[1] natural tendency is going to be to
> overvalue your life relative to others', so that some attempt
> at compensatory overvaluing of others equalizes things a bit.
>
> [1] Generic.
Let's analyze your ethical model mathematically. Let Lm and Le be the
intrinsic values of my life and of my enemy's life, and Lm=Le. Let Em
and Ee quantify the evil I myself and my enemy will bring into the
world if we live. (If one is apt to do more good than evil than the
variable Ex will have a negative value. Also, in most worldviews Em <
Ee ; that's why we call the other person an "enemy".) Now my
enemy's life is in danger. If I don't try to save her the probability
of her surviving is Se. If I try to save her there is a probability of
myself surviving is Sm and the probability of my enemy surviving is
Ses. Reasonable cases are those where Ses > Se. Also it's reasonable
to state that Ee<Le and Em<Lm signifying that the intrinsic value of
human life always weights more than the evil one might do in the
future; in other words that your model will never ethically justify to
kill someone. For simplicity's sake let's arbitrarily define the
universal and intrinsic value of human life in 10, so Le=Lm=10, and
assume that Ex is normalized in such a way that its value can be added
to Lx.
The ethical choice we confront is whether to try to save our enemy's
life (case "s") or not save it ("ns"). Here is the total amount of
future evil TE in each case:
TE(ns) = Se*(Ee - Le) + Em - Lm
TE(s) = Ses*(Ee - Le) + Sm*(Em - Lm)
So, according to your model, one should choose to save one's enemy only
when TE(s)<TE(ns). Let's call this ethical model U (it's similar to
Utilitarianism).
Let us try to put some reasonable values in the equations and see what
happens. Suppose there is a good chance that our enemy will die if we
don't help her, so Se=0.5. If we do try to help, her chances of
survival increase to Ses=0.8 but there is a chance of ourselves not
making it, so Sm is less than 1, say Sm=0.9. Finally let's suppose that
the evil our enemy will do in the future if she survives is Ee=2 and
that the evil we shall do in the future is Em=-3. We get:
TE(ns) = 0.5*(2 - 10) - 3 - 10 = -17.0
TE(s) = 0.8*(2 - 10) + 0.9*(-3 - 10) = -18.1
The future amount evil TE(ns) if we try to save our enemy will be less
than the future amount of evil TE(ns) if we don't, so in this case
the ethical model U tells us that we should try to save our enemy, as
does the ethics of Jesus. Fine.
Now in the praxis when one is confronted with such an ethical decision
one often does not know the other person, so one must assume the
average Ee that holds for all people. And here we encounter a paradox
hidden in the ethical model U: If we look around we find that people do
not often risk their lives to save other peoples' lives. Normally
they don't even risk a small bit of their long term economic security
to do that. So it's reasonable to claim that a person who would risk
her life to save a stranger's would have an Em that is much less than
Ee. And here is the problem. Let's suppose that the average value of
Ee=2 is reasonable and see what happens if a very good person (say one
with Em=-20) confronts the ethical question about trying to save an
average person. Now we get:
TE(ns) = 0.5*(2 - 10) - 20 - 10 = -34.0
TE(s) = 0.8*(2 - 10) + 0.9*(-20 - 10) = -33.4
So now according to the ethical model U this particularly good person
should *not* try to save a stranger, because doing so would actually
increase the total amount of evil in the world. It's easy how that
happens: By placing her life at risk this particularly good person also
risks denying the world her future good actions. And the paradox is
obvious: One would expect that the better a person is the more probable
it is that this person would decide to risk her life to save another
person. But as we see here U implies that if a person is especially
good then that person should *not* try to save another person. A clear
paradox, which I think shows that the ethical model U is deeply flawed.
--
Thinking about this issue I think we can improve model U by noting that
Ex is not a constant value but depends on whether I will try to save my
enemy or not, because trying to save my enemy would almost certainly
make me a better person (so Ems < Em) and my action would serve as a
powerful ethical example for my enemy so she too would become a better
person (so Ees < Ee). Actually some people may disagree about the
latter case and argue the opposite, namely that doing good to a person
who does not deserve it actually makes them worse persons (so Ees >
Ee). In any case here is the improved model U2:
TE(ns) = Se*(Ee - Le) + Em - Lm
TE(s) = Ses*(Ees - Le) + Sm*(Ems - Lm)
I think this improved model may help neutralize the paradox above.
Let's assume:
Le=Lm=10
Se=0.5, Ses=0.8, Se=0.9
Em=2, Ems=1 (i.e. assume that our ethical example will improve our
enemy's character)
Ee=-20, Ees=-25 (representing that if we try to save our enemy we will
become better persons too)
Now we get:
TE(ns) = -34
TE(s) = -38.7
So the paradox disappears, because now the good person risks her life
but if she survives she will be an even better person decreasing the
overall evil. Her enemy will also be a better person adding to the
utilitarian effect. But let's see what would happen if those who
question the power of the good example are right, and the saved enemy
would become a worse person. So let's use Em=2, and Ems=3. We get:
TE(ns) = -34
TE(s) = -37.1
So U2, still works. But it works only if we assume that doing good
increases one's virtue. This of course makes eminent sense within the
Irenaean theodicy, i.e. the moral virtues defense. If doing good would
also increase our enemy's virtue it's even better, but this is the
weaker requirement.
There are still cases where U2 advices us not to try to save our enemy,
for example when the risk for ourselves is too large. Let's try the
values:
Le=Lm=10
Se=0.5, Ses=0.8, Se=0.5 (so there is a 50% chance of dying trying to
save our enemy)
Em=2, Ems=1
Ee=-20, Ees=-25
We get:
TE(ns) = -34
TE(s) = -24.7
So in this case U2 advices very good people not to try to save a
stranger, contradicting Jesus' ethics which apply in all cases. In
this case the ethical model U2 appears to make sense, but only if one
believes in the reality of death. Jesus advised us to *always* try to
save a stranger (enemy or not). Is this reasonable? Let's see how the
model looks from the perspective of Ireneaen eschatology, i.e. under
the assumption that there is no death that stops our spiritual journey
towards perfection, so that whether we survive or not our intent to
save that stranger becomes irrelevant:
TE(ns) = Em - Lm + Ee - Le
TE(s) = Ems - Lm + Ees - Le
We know from personal experience that Ems<Es, and as I personally
believe in the power of the example, so I claim that at least in
general Ees<Ee too. But then TE(s) will always be less than TE(ns)
demonstrating that, as Jesus asked of us, it always makes sense to try
to help others no matter what. Jesus' ethics is eminently compatible
with Ireneaen eschatology.
Peter R
> Tell me the point I/You were making and I will address it,
> which by default includes not addressing it if I choose.
LOL.....
Peter R
John Blake
Translate, please.
JB
Dianelos Georgoudis
[big snip]
> Jesus' ethics is eminently compatible with Irenaean eschatology.
I just found out that the more precise word here is "pareschatology".
Eschatology refers to the end of times, the eschaton. Pareschatology
refers to what happens between death and the eschaton.
Gareth McCaughan
[me:]
>>>> Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
>>>> enemy...
...
[Alec:]
> I think 'worth' has to mean 'worth to someone'. Of course, as a
> theist, I think there's always someone in the quad.
Would you say something similar about other value-words -- "good",
for instance?
On what grounds (if any -- it might, of course, just be an
arbitrary decision) should we choose to govern our decisions
by worth-to-God, etc., rather than worth-to-us?
[I described how it would be if moral realism were wrong;
Alec, I think it's a bit unfair -- no, actually, a *lot*
unfair -- to snip in such a way as to give readers the
impression that I think moral realism *is* wrong, which
I don't. Anyway, here's what I said on that hypothesis:]
>> At that point the correct translation
>> of "worth no less" becomes something like "worth no less from
>> my perspective" (which is not, of course, the same, as "of no
>> less immediate concern to me"; similar considerations apply,
>> e.g., to planning for the future), and my conclusion remains
>> the same as far as my actions and preferences about others'
>> actions are concerned.
[Alec again:]
> But there are no longer any grounds for thinking someone is wrong in
> disagreeing with your moral evaluation. We come back to Icarus'
> 'personal opinion'.
If moral realism is wrong then indeed there aren't any
universal grounds for thinking that. But of course each
individual moral agent could have grounds for thinking it
(relative, of course, to her own moral position). And
the fact that, empirically, different people's moral
positions tend to resemble one another -- particularly
within a single culture -- means that discussion of moral
issues between different people is possible, even if it
can't take the form of each person undertaking to show
that the other's view is universally, absolutely wrong.
>> If it turns out that moral realism is wrong, then we can change
>> "worth" to "worth (from my perspective)" and "better" to "better
>> (from my perspective)"; that suffices to ground my choices and
>> my feelings about others' choices, but doesn't give anyone else
>> any direct reason for acting in one way rather than another.
>
> Quite. It allows Mother Teresa to get away with evil acts (if that's
> what happened) on the grounds that they were right from her
> perspective, and it doesn't make sense to challenge her.
It could very well make sense to challenge her. For instance,
her (hypothetical) evil acts might be inconsistent with her
own moral system -- perhaps she didn't notice the inconsistency,
or perhaps she chose to ignore it. In that case she would have
acted in a way condemned by her own system, and it would make
perfect sense to challenge her.
Or her (still hypothetical) evil acts might be inconsistent
with her *professed* moral system, and dishonesty might be
inconsistent with her *actual* moral system. Then, again,
it would make sense to challenge her on the grounds that
she was dishonest about her moral system.
Or her (...) evil acts might be inconsistent with her professed
moral system, she might not care about dishonesty, but there
might still be value of a different sort in challenging her
publicly: to draw attention to her evil acts and her dishonesty,
so as to stop people having wrong opinions of her and acting
on the basis of those opinions. Likewise if her evil acts were
consistent even with her professed moral system but she'd
somehow managed to avoid everyone knowing that she was a
professed immoralist.
Or (getting back to more normal moral debate, as opposed to
the exposure of evil) her evil actions might be entirely
consistent with her moral system, but that system might be
founded somehow on incorrect ideas about -- for instance --
the will of God, or the psychological effects of suffering.
Then one might try to get her to change her moral system.
Or her moral system (with those evil consequences) might
not in any objective sense be based on an error, but one
might still hope that she would rethink it when (say) shown
in detail some of its consequences. (That might happen if
there were some tension between her moral system and her
emotions or her moral intuitions -- as, in fact, I think
there are for most of us.)
To summarize: it seems to me that there are *lots* of
situations in which a moral nonrealist might reasonably
choose to engage someone in debate about moral issues;
and, in fact, I think those situations cover most of the
situations in which actual moral discussion is ever any
use.
(There'd be no point, for a moral nonrealist, in engaging
someone in debate if the two parties' moral systems have
no substantial point of contact. But then, pragmatically
speaking, there'd be no point for a moral realist either.)
> Of course, someone might say "I prefer her not to act that way", but
> that's not grounds for *her* to change.
No, but as I've observed above it's quite possible for someone
to present her with (what they might reasonably hope would be)
grounds for her to change.
Gareth McCaughan
>>> How would justify the belief that it is right to repay evil with good?
>>> I recall your ethical axioms, but repaying evil with good will quite
>>> possibly lead to an overall increase of pain by giving the evil-doers
>>> free reign.
>>
>> In such cases, it's probably inadvisable to repay evil with good.
>> It isn't by accident that I included the words "on the whole".
>
> There are many people today who, maybe secretly, believe that "an eye
> for an eye" is the best strategy as far as decreasing the overall
> amount of pain goes. Many people believe that repaying evil with good,
> or even paying good to people who don't deserve it, is a formula for
> increasing evil and pain in the long run. Can you give an example where
> repaying evil with good would decrease the amount of pain on the whole?
I doubt that I can provide detailed calculations in any
specific instance, but here's one reason why a policy of
at least not going so far as "an eye for an eye" is good:
(1) we inevitably tend to overestimate the harm others
have done us and underestimate the harm we do them, so
that an attempt to follow "an eye for an eye" is liable
to lead to escalation; and (2) any escalatory policy is
unstable and liable to lead to feuds and the like. Whereas
responding to ill-treatment by being nice tends to defuse
situations, Romans 12:20 notwithstanding.
And here's a very simple reason why repaying evil with
good might be a good policy: doing good to someone is
better for them than doing evil to them (that's what
"good" means here, right?), and ceteris paribus what's
better for them is better simpliciter.
>>> Why indeed should one risk one's life trying to save the
>>> life of an enemy?
>>
>> Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
>> enemy, and because your[1] natural tendency is going to be to
>> overvalue your life relative to others', so that some attempt
>> at compensatory overvaluing of others equalizes things a bit.
>>
>> [1] Generic.
>
> Let's analyze your ethical model mathematically. Let Lm and Le be the
> intrinsic values of my life and of my enemy's life, and Lm=Le. Let Em
> and Ee quantify the evil I myself and my enemy will bring into the
> world if we live. (If one is apt to do more good than evil than the
> variable Ex will have a negative value. Also, in most worldviews Em <
> Ee ; that's why we call the other person an "enemy".)
Nope; your model -- which for some reason you are calling my
model -- is broken right here. Enmity is generally symmetrical.
If it were perfectly symmetrical then on average Em and Ee would
be exactly equal. If, as seems plausible, Bad People are more
likely to regard others as their enemies, then the asymmetry
works in the direction of making Em > Ee more likely.
Your model -- which for some reason you are calling my model --
also entirely ignores the effect on the "enemy"'s future attitudes
and behaviour of your action. I think most people generally behave
better after others have treated them with generosity than after
others have been unkind to them.
> Now in the praxis when one is confronted with such an ethical decision
> one often does not know the other person, so one must assume the
> average Ee that holds for all people.
I don't think this is plausible for any case in which the other
person can be regarded as one's "enemy".
> And here we encounter a paradox
> hidden in the ethical model U:
[SNIP: exceptionally good people, the only ones actually likely
to act according to U, or indeed according to any difficult
system of ethics, are ipso facto likely to be better for the
world than the people they might save.]
That's a nice observation. Perhaps in fact dying for the sake
of one's enemy is not something people should do. But I remark
(1) that death is an extreme special case, and that most ways
in which one might put another's interests first don't have that
paradoxical consequence, or at least not to anything like the
same extent; and (s) that for psychological reasons we aren't
in fact free to choose our moral systems completely freely,
and perhaps any psychologically possible moral system that
has very good consequences in general would also command some
actually suboptimal self-sacrifices.
You say that this shows that "U" is flawed; I think the most
it shows is that if I were to adopt "U" then I shouldn't in
fact think self-sacrifice on the scale we've been discussing
a good thing. Fair enough. And, indeed, perhaps it generally
isn't a good thing.
> Thinking about this issue I think we can improve model U by noting that
> Ex is not a constant value but depends on whether I will try to save my
> enemy or not, because trying to save my enemy would almost certainly
> make me a better person (so Ems < Em) and my action would serve as a
> powerful ethical example for my enemy so she too would become a better
> person (so Ees < Ee).
Right. I remark once again that although you called "model U"
my model, it is not in fact my model. You made it up. In making
this change, you move your straw model nearer to how I actually
think.
> So U2, still works. But it works only if we assume that doing good
> increases one's virtue. This of course makes eminent sense within the
> Irenaean theodicy, i.e. the moral virtues defense. If doing good would
> also increase our enemy's virtue it's even better, but this is the
> weaker requirement.
The "Irenaean paradigm" is in no way required for U2 to be seen
to be more realistic than U.
> There are still cases where U2 advises us not to try to save our enemy,
> for example when the risk for ourselves is too large. Let's try the
> values:
...
> So in this case U2 advises very good people not to try to save a
> stranger, contradicting Jesus' ethics which apply in all cases.
Fine with me.
> In
> this case the ethical model U2 appears to make sense, but only if one
> believes in the reality of death. Jesus advised us to *always* try to
> save a stranger (enemy or not).
Did he in fact do that?
Peter R
>>
> Translate, please.
Sure. Ca = what do you mean by that?
Peter R
Alec Brady
<873b85k...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>,
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>Alec Brady wrote:
>
>[me:]
>>>>> Because their life is worth no less on account of being your[1]
>>>>> enemy...
>...
>[Alec:]
>> I think 'worth' has to mean 'worth to someone'. Of course, as a
>> theist, I think there's always someone in the quad.
>
>Would you say something similar about other value-words -- "good",
>for instance?
Hm. I think 'good' has a few meanings, for some of which I might say
something similar. It might be fair to say that, for some sense of
'good' the corresponding issue is 'good for what' rather than 'good to
whom'. It still requires some sort of intensionality, though, doesn't
it? The lightning that blasts the tree is only 'bad' if the tree is
treated as having a point of view.
I can't get my head round it right now. I'll try to give it some
thought - ask me again in a few days if you're still interested. But
my gut feeling is that, yes, I want to say the same kind of things for
other value-words.
>On what grounds (if any -- it might, of course, just be an
>arbitrary decision) should we choose to govern our decisions
>by worth-to-God, etc., rather than worth-to-us?
That sets God over against us as though we were separate characters
with separate interests. That, I think, just makes God another player
in the game. That may be how some people see it, but I'd argue that it
isn't classic theism - at least, not classic Christianity.
God is the ground of existence, the cause within causality. To act
contrary to the nature of that ground is to act contrary to our own
nature. It's not just unwise to go against God's values, it's
fundamentally nonsensical.
>[I described how it would be if moral realism were wrong;
>Alec, I think it's a bit unfair -- no, actually, a *lot*
>unfair -- to snip in such a way as to give readers the
>impression that I think moral realism *is* wrong, which
>I don't. Anyway, here's what I said on that hypothesis:]
I abjectly apologise if that's what I did. Actually, I don't think I
did, I certainly didn't mean to: I left in your "worth no less
simpliciter", which I thought made the point. But I accept I may have
been unforgiveably careless; in which case, apologies.
>>> At that point the correct translation
>>> of "worth no less" becomes something like "worth no less from
>>> my perspective" (which is not, of course, the same, as "of no
>>> less immediate concern to me"; similar considerations apply,
>>> e.g., to planning for the future), and my conclusion remains
>>> the same as far as my actions and preferences about others'
>>> actions are concerned.
>
>[Alec again:]
>> But there are no longer any grounds for thinking someone is wrong in
>> disagreeing with your moral evaluation. We come back to Icarus'
>> 'personal opinion'.
>
>If moral realism is wrong then indeed there aren't any
>universal grounds for thinking that. But of course each
>individual moral agent could have grounds for thinking it
>(relative, of course, to her own moral position). And
>the fact that, empirically, different people's moral
>positions tend to resemble one another -- particularly
>within a single culture -- means that discussion of moral
>issues between different people is possible, even if it
>can't take the form of each person undertaking to show
>that the other's view is universally, absolutely wrong.
That makes the possibility of moral disputes depend purely on the
contingent fact that we happen to share underlying moral assumptions.
Unless such deep moral structures can be shown to be hard-wired there
is always the chance that two people will lack the common ground for
moral dispute.
I suspect that those structures are hard-wired. Indeed, I suspect
that, no matter how many times evolution is re-run, any species that
gets to the point of being a moral agent will necessarily have the
same deep moral structures. I can't prove that, of course.
>>> If it turns out that moral realism is wrong, then we can change
>>> "worth" to "worth (from my perspective)" and "better" to "better
>>> (from my perspective)"; that suffices to ground my choices and
>>> my feelings about others' choices, but doesn't give anyone else
>>> any direct reason for acting in one way rather than another.
>>
>> Quite. It allows Mother Teresa to get away with evil acts (if that's
>> what happened) on the grounds that they were right from her
>> perspective, and it doesn't make sense to challenge her.
>
>It could very well make sense to challenge her. For instance,
>her (hypothetical) evil acts might be inconsistent with her
>own moral system -- perhaps she didn't notice the inconsistency,
>or perhaps she chose to ignore it. In that case she would have
>acted in a way condemned by her own system, and it would make
>perfect sense to challenge her.
Agreed. But that's just saying that the deep moral structures are the
same. In the absence of such deep agreement, it would be possible to
end up with acts that are evil to one person but good to another.
>Or her (still hypothetical) evil acts might be inconsistent
>with her *professed* moral system, and dishonesty might be
>inconsistent with her *actual* moral system. Then, again,
>it would make sense to challenge her on the grounds that
>she was dishonest about her moral system.
>
>Or her (...) evil acts might be inconsistent with her professed
>moral system, she might not care about dishonesty, but there
>might still be value of a different sort in challenging her
>publicly: to draw attention to her evil acts and her dishonesty,
>so as to stop people having wrong opinions of her and acting
>on the basis of those opinions. Likewise if her evil acts were
>consistent even with her professed moral system but she'd
>somehow managed to avoid everyone knowing that she was a
>professed immoralist.
Immoralist on whose moral system? I wasn't assuming she necessarily
had some idiosyncratic system - it migt be one that's as common as
being left-handed.
>Or (getting back to more normal moral debate, as opposed to
>the exposure of evil) her evil actions might be entirely
>consistent with her moral system, but that system might be
>founded somehow on incorrect ideas about -- for instance --
>the will of God, or the psychological effects of suffering.
>Then one might try to get her to change her moral system.
But the 'will of God' option was (I thought) excluded by hypothesis,
and the argument from the psychological effects of suffering relies on
shared systems of values.
>Or her moral system (with those evil consequences) might
>not in any objective sense be based on an error, but one
>might still hope that she would rethink it when (say) shown
>in detail some of its consequences. (That might happen if
>there were some tension between her moral system and her
>emotions or her moral intuitions -- as, in fact, I think
>there are for most of us.)
>
>To summarize: it seems to me that there are *lots* of
>situations in which a moral nonrealist might reasonably
>choose to engage someone in debate about moral issues;
>and, in fact, I think those situations cover most of the
>situations in which actual moral discussion is ever any
>use.
>
>(There'd be no point, for a moral nonrealist, in engaging
>someone in debate if the two parties' moral systems have
>no substantial point of contact. But then, pragmatically
>speaking, there'd be no point for a moral realist either.)
>
>> Of course, someone might say "I prefer her not to act that way", but
>> that's not grounds for *her* to change.
>
>No, but as I've observed above it's quite possible for someone
>to present her with (what they might reasonably hope would be)
>grounds for her to change.
Yes, but...they all depend on a shared subset of moral values, with
the hope that one of the competing moral systems will turn out to be
inconsistent. And, absent a tight theory of how such a state of
affairs might come about, I have no reason to think that a non-realist
theory of morality could really work.
Gareth McCaughan
>>> I think 'worth' has to mean 'worth to someone'. Of course, as a
>>> theist, I think there's always someone in the quad.
>>
>> Would you say something similar about other value-words -- "good",
>> for instance?
>
> Hm. I think 'good' has a few meanings, for some of which I might say
> something similar. It might be fair to say that, for some sense of
> 'good' the corresponding issue is 'good for what' rather than 'good to
> whom'.
Sure. The point I was aiming at is that there are these words,
like "good" and "worth", whose primary application is relative
but that many people think can be applied absolutely too; you
indicated your skepticism about the absolute application of one,
and I was wondering whether that extends to all the others. It
sounds like it does.
>> On what grounds (if any -- it might, of course, just be an
>> arbitrary decision) should we choose to govern our decisions
>> by worth-to-God, etc., rather than worth-to-us?
>
> That sets God over against us as though we were separate characters
> with separate interests. That, I think, just makes God another player
> in the game. That may be how some people see it, but I'd argue that it
> isn't classic theism - at least, not classic Christianity.
>
> God is the ground of existence, the cause within causality. To act
> contrary to the nature of that ground is to act contrary to our own
> nature. It's not just unwise to go against God's values, it's
> fundamentally nonsensical.
That all sounds very fine, but I think it has a couple of
problems.
1. It's very far from clear what it means. In fact, it's
very far from clear that it means anything.
2. The more radically unlike us God is, the less clear
it is that he's a suitable candidate for being the "someone"
in "worth to someone" or the "something" in "good for something".
Can the ground of existence, the cause within causality, have
interests and goals? Well, maybe, but once again it's not
clear even that the question has meaning.
3. If it were *really* fundamentally nonsensical to act
against God's nature, then we couldn't do it and it would
be impossible to base morality on the wrongness, or unwisdom,
or nonsensicality, of doing so. At least, so it seems to me;
but probably I'm misunderstanding you. Could you explain
what you mean by saying that it's fundamentally nonsensical?
>> [I described how it would be if moral realism were wrong;
>> Alec, I think it's a bit unfair -- no, actually, a *lot*
>> unfair -- to snip in such a way as to give readers the
>> impression that I think moral realism *is* wrong, which
>> I don't. Anyway, here's what I said on that hypothesis:]
>
> I abjectly apologise if that's what I did. Actually, I don't think
> I did, I certainly didn't mean to: I left in your "worth no less
> simpliciter", which I thought made the point. But I accept I may
> have been unforgiveably careless; in which case, apologies.
Ooooops. No, what actually happened is that *I* deleted
some bits that I thought didn't need responding to, then
had to do something else for a while, then came back and
forgot what I'd deleted. You didn't, in the least, do
what I said you did; the fault was entirely mine. No
apologies needed, other than mine for bearing false
witness and generally being a twit. Sorry.
>> If moral realism is wrong then indeed there aren't any
>> universal grounds for thinking that. But of course each
>> individual moral agent could have grounds for thinking it
>> (relative, of course, to her own moral position). And
>> the fact that, empirically, different people's moral
>> positions tend to resemble one another -- particularly
>> within a single culture -- means that discussion of moral
>> issues between different people is possible, even if it
>> can't take the form of each person undertaking to show
>> that the other's view is universally, absolutely wrong.
>
> That makes the possibility of moral disputes depend purely on the
> contingent fact that we happen to share underlying moral assumptions.
Well, in practice it does even if moral realism is correct,
so what's actually worse here about moral nonrealism -- other
than that it happens not to be moral realism?
> Unless such deep moral structures can be shown to be hard-wired there
> is always the chance that two people will lack the common ground for
> moral dispute.
Yes, which will make meaningful moral discussion between them
impossible regardless of whether either of them is objectively
right. (Unless something other than moral dispute is capable of
leading one or both of them to change those deep moral structures,
which it might be, again regardless of whether moral realism is
correct.) But ...
> I suspect that those structures are hard-wired.
... I have the same suspicion, in which case there will almost
always be some scope for moral discussion despite cultural
differences.
> Indeed, I suspect
> that, no matter how many times evolution is re-run, any species that
> gets to the point of being a moral agent will necessarily have the
> same deep moral structures. I can't prove that, of course.
Perhaps we wouldn't call anything a "moral agent" unless its
structures had enough resemblance to ours :-).
[Alec, on disagreeable consequences of moral nonrealism:]
>>> Quite. It allows Mother Teresa to get away with evil acts (if that's
>>> what happened) on the grounds that they were right from her
>>> perspective, and it doesn't make sense to challenge her.
>>
>> It could very well make sense to challenge her. For instance,
>> her (hypothetical) evil acts might be inconsistent with her
>> own moral system -- perhaps she didn't notice the inconsistency,
>> or perhaps she chose to ignore it. In that case she would have
>> acted in a way condemned by her own system, and it would make
>> perfect sense to challenge her.
>
> Agreed. But that's just saying that the deep moral structures are the
> same. In the absence of such deep agreement, it would be possible to
> end up with acts that are evil to one person but good to another.
Yes. (Aren't you just restating what moral nonrealism means?)
If their moral structures are similar enough, then moral
dialogue is possible, regardless of whether moral realism
is right or not. If their moral structures are too dissimilar,
then moral dialogue is not possible, again regardless of
whether moral realism is right or not.
If moral realism is right but their structures are too
dissimilar, then one party may be able to bask in the warm
glow of knowing that they're Right. (But the other party
may be equally convinced the other way.) This doesn't seem
to me to constitute a strong argument for the correctness
of moral realism.
>> Or her (still hypothetical) evil acts might be inconsistent
>> with her *professed* moral system, and dishonesty might be
>> inconsistent with her *actual* moral system. Then, again,
>> it would make sense to challenge her on the grounds that
>> she was dishonest about her moral system.
>>
>> Or her (...) evil acts might be inconsistent with her professed
>> moral system, she might not care about dishonesty, but there
>> might still be value of a different sort in challenging her
>> publicly: to draw attention to her evil acts and her dishonesty,
>> so as to stop people having wrong opinions of her and acting
>> on the basis of those opinions. Likewise if her evil acts were
>> consistent even with her professed moral system but she'd
>> somehow managed to avoid everyone knowing that she was a
>> professed immoralist.
>
> Immoralist on whose moral system? I wasn't assuming she necessarily
> had some idiosyncratic system - it might be one that's as common as
> being left-handed.
On the moral systems of "everyone" (meaning, of course,
something like "a sizeable fraction of the population who
might possibly care about her moral system").
>> Or (getting back to more normal moral debate, as opposed to
>> the exposure of evil) her evil actions might be entirely
>> consistent with her moral system, but that system might be
>> founded somehow on incorrect ideas about -- for instance --
>> the will of God, or the psychological effects of suffering.
>> Then one might try to get her to change her moral system.
>
> But the 'will of God' option was (I thought) excluded by hypothesis,
> and the argument from the psychological effects of suffering relies on
> shared systems of values.
One can have incorrect ideas about the will of God even if
there is no God to will. (Indeed, if there is no God then
Mother Teresa certainly did have incorrect ideas about the
will of God, unless she was a closet atheist.)
I don't understand your comment about arguments from the
psychological effects of suffering. I was envisaging a
situation like this one:
- Mother Teresa believes that suffering ennobles the
spirit, making people kinder and more generous and
more patient and so on.
- It turns out that actually suffering generally makes
people more short-tempered, less generous, and nastier.
- Mother Teresa regards it as good for people to be
kind and generous and patient.
(Note: all three of those are purely hypothetical; I am
not making any statement about what Mother Teresa actually
believed or about what effects suffering generally has
on people's niceness. And of course I know she's dead :-).)
If those things are true, then *anyone* (whatever their
own moral system) who wishes (for whatever reason) to
change Mother Teresa's attitude to suffering, and hence
her actions -- e.g., her alleged policy of not providing
analgesia to people in great pain -- can reasonably point
out to her that her attitude to suffering is based on some
incorrect beliefs about the psychological effects of suffering.
>>> Of course, someone might say "I prefer her not to act that way", but
>>> that's not grounds for *her* to change.
>>
>> No, but as I've observed above it's quite possible for someone
>> to present her with (what they might reasonably hope would be)
>> grounds for her to change.
>
> Yes, but...they all depend on a shared subset of moral values,
Which, it conveniently turns out, we[1] mostly have. I dare say
moral nonrealism wouldn't work well in practice[2] if we all
had entirely unrelated moral systems. Neither, so far as I can
see, would moral realism.
[1] In some sense of "we".
[2] In some sense of "work well".
> with
> the hope that one of the competing moral systems will turn out to be
> inconsistent.
Several of the scenarios I described don't involve either system
turning out to be inconsistent.
> And, absent a tight theory of how such a state of
> affairs might come about, I have no reason to think that a non-realist
> theory of morality could really work.
I'm not sure I understand what it is you're lacking a theory for.
Are you now making an abductive argument for moral realism, on
the grounds that you can't see how we'd come to have so much
common moral ground if moral realism is wrong?
Michael J Davis
<nos...@spam.nium.org> writes
>Sam Harris also said:
>
>Religious moderation is just a cherry-picking of scripture, ultimately=
>talking about the contemplative life, or spiritual experience, or ethi=
>norms, or those features that keep communities strong and healthy.
>
>Religious moderation is a relaxation of the standards of adherence to
>ancient taboos and superstitions. That=E2EURTMs really all it is. Mode=
>Christians have agreed not to read the bible literally, and not read
>certain sections of it at all, and then they come away with a much mor=
>progressive, tolerant and ecumenical version of Christianity. They jus=
>attention to Jesus when he=E2EURTMs sermonizing on the Mount, and clai=
>the true Christianity. Well that=E2EURTMs not the true Christianity. I=
>selective reading of certain aspects of Christianity. The other face o=
>Christianity is always waiting in the book to be resurrected. You can =
>the Jesus of Second Thessalonians who=E2EURTMs going to come back and =
>into the pit. This is the Jesus being celebrated in the Left Behind no=
>This is the Jesus that half the American population is expecting to se=
>come down out of the clouds.
Nasty speech impediment he has! ;-)
(Apostrephiosis, I think it's called)
Mike
[The reply-to address is valid for 30 days from this posting]
--
Michael J Davis
http://www.trustsof.demon.co.uk
<><
For this is what the Lord has said to me,
"Go and post a Watchman and let
him report what he sees." Isa 21:6
<><
Jeremy P
No I didn't, it didn't post cos I'd accidentally messed up my computer date
(ta, debbie, for spotting my idiocy). So I'm retrying...
> "Kendall K. Down" <webm...@diggingsonline.com> wrote in message
> news:8eeeb08a4...@diggingsonline.com...
>> In message <2erbm2t50dqs9vq52...@4ax.com>
>> Alec Brady <alec....@virgin.net> wrote:
>>
>>> >Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes
>>> >really
>>> >believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
>>> >antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
>>> >might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty
>>> >about
>>> >the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
>>
>>
>> Surely the explanation depends on whether you have stopped beating her?
>>
>> Kendall K. Down
>
>
> --
> Jeremy Parsons
> Gone but not forgotten... Back yet rarely noticed...
>
Jeremy P
No I didn't, it didn't post cos I'd accidentally messed up my computer date
(ta, debbie, for spotting my idiocy). So I'm retrying...
> news:6oibm2tjjvqvd7vui...@4ax.com...
>> Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
>> |
>> | Patrick Herring wrote:
>> | > I mentioned recently to a group in the pub that Sting had been in the
>> | > film of Dune, and got blank looks from all but one... eeuch...
>> |
>> | Because of the reference to Sting, or to Dune, or to both?
>>
>> They knew about Sting but Dune was not very familiar. Neither was
>> Jonathan Livingston Seagull. However, they're both still on the bookshop
>> shelves, so maybe I'm just ahead of the next retro wave.
>>
>> --
>> Patrick Herring, http://www.anweald.co.uk
>> zen christianity: http://www.anweald.co.uk/zenchristianity/
>
> The first single I ever bought, on the markdown rack, was in a sleeve that
> said it was 'Be' from JLS, but when I got home it turned out to be Queen's
> Seven Seas of Rye. (Or was it seven seeded wholewheat, it's a long time
> ago.)
>
> First single, but second record. My first was the LP 'Scoobie Doo and the
> Snowman Mystery,' which wasn't even the proper voices.
>
> The Sting record is about as misleading as either, in terms of cover vs
> listening experience.
Michael J Davis
<newsr...@0uce.com> writes
>Gone but not forgotten... Back yet rarely noticed...
>news:9+GSSoCs...@trustsof.demon.co.uk.invalid...
>> In message <ksn8m21ovat80d7n7...@4ax.com>, Nick Milton
>> <nickspamt...@hotmail.com> writes
>>>On Wed, 22 Nov 2006 14:11:18 -0000, Jeremy P <newsr...@0uce.com>
>>>wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Now, can anyone help me? I'm trying to follow her beauty tips
>>>
>>>Big sunglasses
>>
>> ... as in 1 Cor 13:12.
>
>Thank you. Actually another passage has solved my wardrobe problem:
>http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus%2013:47-52;&version=46;
>
And the following chapter has good advice in dealing with dry rot.
(Leprosy of houses).
Dianelos Georgoudis
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> > There are many people today who, maybe secretly, believe that "an eye
> > for an eye" is the best strategy as far as decreasing the overall
> > amount of pain goes. Many people believe that repaying evil with good,
> > or even paying good to people who don't deserve it, is a formula for
> > increasing evil and pain in the long run. Can you give an example where
> > repaying evil with good would decrease the amount of pain on the whole?
>
> I doubt that I can provide detailed calculations in any
> specific instance, but here's one reason why a policy of
> at least not going so far as "an eye for an eye" is good:
> (1) we inevitably tend to overestimate the harm others
> have done us and underestimate the harm we do them, so
> that an attempt to follow "an eye for an eye" is liable
> to lead to escalation; and (2) any escalatory policy is
> unstable and liable to lead to feuds and the like. Whereas
> responding to ill-treatment by being nice tends to defuse
> situations, Romans 12:20 notwithstanding.
All good points. Also signs of non-aggressiveness/submission tend to
defuse other peoples' aggressiveness resulting to a better winning
strategy for all concerned. I understand there are good evolutionary
grounds for that.
[snip]
> > Let's analyze your ethical model mathematically. Let Lm and Le be the
> > intrinsic values of my life and of my enemy's life, and Lm=Le. Let Em
> > and Ee quantify the evil I myself and my enemy will bring into the
> > world if we live. (If one is apt to do more good than evil than the
> > variable Ex will have a negative value. Also, in most worldviews Em <
> > Ee ; that's why we call the other person an "enemy".)
>
> Nope; your model -- which for some reason you are calling my
> model -- is broken right here. Enmity is generally symmetrical.
> If it were perfectly symmetrical then on average Em and Ee would
> be exactly equal. If, as seems plausible, Bad People are more
> likely to regard others as their enemies, then the asymmetry
> works in the direction of making Em > Ee more likely.
>
> Your model -- which for some reason you are calling my model --
> also entirely ignores the effect on the "enemy"'s future attitudes
> and behaviour of your action. I think most people generally behave
> better after others have treated them with generosity than after
> others have been unkind to them.
Well, I find I often have trouble understanding what the other person
means :-( I thought you were suggesting an ethical model where both the
value of life and the value of future deeds are quantified. Anyway,
whose model this is is not important. I am sure you agree that debate
is not an intellectual competition, but rather two minds working
together for discovering truth. Of course it would help if one
understood the other better.
I see now that the use of the concept of "enemy" was unfortunate; for
many reasons: first because it's irrelevant to the model (it does not
use Ee > Em), secondly because in many situations where the risk of
one's life is a factor we are not dealing with enemies, and thirdly
because it's quite possible to consider a better person to be one's
enemy.
[snip]
> > Thinking about this issue I think we can improve model U by noting that
> > Ex is not a constant value but depends on whether I will try to save my
> > enemy or not, because trying to save my enemy would almost certainly
> > make me a better person (so Ems < Em) and my action would serve as a
> > powerful ethical example for my enemy so she too would become a better
> > person (so Ees < Ee).
>
> Right. I remark once again that although you called "model U"
> my model, it is not in fact my model. You made it up. In making
> this change, you move your straw model nearer to how I actually
> think.
Well, I think U represents a good first try to abstract a version of
utilitarianism that takes into account the intrinsic value of human
life. One easily sees that U does not work at all, unless one includes
in the model the thesis that personal virtue increases every time we do
a good deed, thus adding an additional and intrinsic value in good
deeds. Which I think very well reflects Jesus' speaking of the creation
of treasure in heaven. The improved, virtue-earning, U2 works much
better as an ethical model but does not accurately reflect Jesus'
ethics, according to which love should be totally unconditional and
uncalculating. Jesus ethics makes sense according to an utilitarian
model only if death is removed from the equations, i.e. if one
considers that death is not the final event in one's ethical career,
just as Irenaean theodicy has it.
Indeed, what I found most interesting in that analysis is that Jesus'
ethics appears to be eminently compatible with the Irenaean theodicy
and, conversely, rather incompatible with the Augustinian theodicy.
Augustinian theodicy looks back and justifies evil on humankind's past
fall. Irenaean theodicy looks forward and justifies evil on humankind's
future ascension. I think it was unfortunate for Christianity that the
Augustinian idea became dominant. I am not sure why this happened.
Maybe a guilt-ridden meme, as is the idea of humankind's past fall, is
more useful for the creation of cohesive power structures with good
internal control. Or maybe Jesus' idea of the virtue of meekness and
humbleness is easy to misunderstand as an expression of intrinsic
unworth, instead, as it should, as an expression of intrinsic value. In
any case what best works, both as an explanation of the presence of
evil and as an explanation of the meaning of Christian ethics, is the
Irenaean theodicy. I think that's an important Christian insight.
> > So U2, still works. But it works only if we assume that doing good
> > increases one's virtue. This of course makes eminent sense within the
> > Irenaean theodicy, i.e. the moral virtues defense. If doing good would
> > also increase our enemy's virtue it's even better, but this is the
> > weaker requirement.
>
> The "Irenaean paradigm" is in no way required for U2 to be seen
> to be more realistic than U.
Right. But U2 is closer to the Irenaean paradigm in the sense that both
affirm the intrinsic value of doing good, in the sense that doing good
increases virtue, which, if one survives, increases the utilitarian
profit for all. I would say it's U3 (or Jesus' ethics which I
abstracted at the very end of the previous post - the one that denies
the reality of death) that is exactly compatible with the Irenaean
paradigm.
> > There are still cases where U2 advises us not to try to save our enemy,
> > for example when the risk for ourselves is too large. Let's try the
> > values:
> ...
> > So in this case U2 advises very good people not to try to save a
> > stranger, contradicting Jesus' ethics which apply in all cases.
>
> Fine with me.
>
> > In
> > this case the ethical model U2 appears to make sense, but only if one
> > believes in the reality of death. Jesus advised us to *always* try to
> > save a stranger (enemy or not).
>
> Did he in fact do that?
Well, doesn't this question contradict your previous statement? In any
case my reading of Jesus' ethics in the gospels leaves me with a clear
sense that Jesus asked us to always do good no matter what -
unconditionally and uncritically. Specifically, I think that according
to Jesus' ethics if an old bum falls in the river and is drowning one
should try to save him at a great risk to one's life even if one is
young and has a family with little children that are dependent on one.
Which is a difficult ethical precept to understand, unless one believes
in the reality of Irenaean pareschatology.
John Blake
How many Christians in your experience actually 'love their enemies'?
ISTM that most would rather blow them to bits, e.g. as in the current
war in Iraq. Of course you could argue that Bush, Blair and Co. are
not really Christians but I think that view would leave the world
rather short of Christians altogether.
BTW, what language was that?
JB
Nick Milton
<johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>How many Christians in your experience actually 'love their enemies'?
All of us aspire to, some try to, a few succeed
>ISTM that most would rather blow them to bits, e.g. as in the current
>war in Iraq.
Well, why don't you try a poll here?
Or why don't you look at what some of the churches say?
http://www.cjd.org/paper/jp2war.html
http://www.cathnews.com/news/303/124.php
http://www.cjd.org/paper/benedict.html
http://www.amconmag.com/2005/2005_08_29/article.html
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0103-05.htm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4259062.stm
http://www.urc.org.uk/iraq_2003/pastoral_letter.htm
http://www.fcnl.org/iraq/
http://www.ncccusa.org/iraq/quakers.html
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/16/tutu.bush.blair/index.html?eref=sitesearch
etc etc etc
I wonder what your "ISTM" is based on?
philip....@ntlworld.com
> In uk.religion.christian on 24 Nov 2006 10:30:47 -0800,
> "philip....@ntlworld.com" <philip....@ntlworld.com> wrote:
>
> }And thanks for all that handwaving. Care to address the point that was
> }made or are you not up for that?
>
> which by default includes not addressing it if I choose.
>
"Certainty about the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in
this one"
was what you said
The point was that you are included in that.
Phil
John Blake
A fine list of Christian leaders/organisations mostly condemning the
Iraq war, and rightly so IMO. To quote a comment by the Methodist
Church " Some in the Church are pacifists, who believe that there can
never be a moral justification for war or military action." While
rather extreme isn't this in keeping with the teachings of Jesus?
'Turn the other cheek' and 'Love your enemies' etc.
>I wonder what your "ISTM" is based on?
With an estimated 70% of the UK declaring as Christians and around 90%
of USA citizens claiming to be believers in Christ and his teachings
and the leaders of both countries promoting their belief in the
Christian god, it seems that those fine sounding utterances have been
converted to 'Blow them to bits'.
JB
Nick Milton
<johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>A fine list of Christian leaders/organisations mostly condemning the
>Iraq war, and rightly so IMO. To quote a comment by the Methodist
>Church " Some in the Church are pacifists, who believe that there can
>never be a moral justification for war or military action." While
>rather extreme isn't this in keeping with the teachings of Jesus?
>'Turn the other cheek' and 'Love your enemies' etc.
Indeed.
>>I wonder what your "ISTM" is based on?
>
>With an estimated 70% of the UK declaring as Christians and around 90%
>of USA citizens claiming to be believers in Christ and his teachings
>and the leaders of both countries promoting their belief in the
>Christian god, it seems that those fine sounding utterances have been
>converted to 'Blow them to bits'.
Ah, I see. You are confusing politics and religion.
If you want to know what Christians think, then ask them, or read what
they write. Don't ask politicians.
Alec Brady
<2erbm2t50dqs9vq52...@4ax.com>,
Alec Brady <alec....@virgin.net> wrote:
>On Tue, 21 Nov 2006 16:57:26 +0000, in
><8ob6m25mme9kjmtjp...@4ax.com>,
>{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>
>
>>Intolerance is thus intrinsic to every creed. Once a person believes really
>>believes that certain ideas can lead to eternal happiness, or to its
>>antithesis, he cannot tolerate the possibility that the people he loves
>>might be led astray by the blandishments of unbelievers. Certainty about
>>the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in this one.
>
>So how do you explain my behaviour towards my wife?
I notice that {R} has not ventured an opinion here. Why is that, {R}?
John Blake
Politics and religion are so tightly enmeshed in the USA and to a
lesser extent in the UK that it's difficult to address one without
involving the other. If only they could be separated. Even so, with
such a high percentage of Christians in the USA, how can the country
ever consider going to war?
JB
Nick Milton
<johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>Politics and religion are so tightly enmeshed in the USA and to a
>lesser extent in the UK that it's difficult to address one without
>involving the other.
However if you are criticising one or the other, then it is important
to draw the distinction. I am sure you are quite capable of doing so.
>If only they could be separated. Even so, with
>such a high percentage of Christians in the USA, how can the country
>ever consider going to war?
I think you probably know the answer to that one. You ned to look at
the issues which the last US election was really fought over.
Alec Brady
<9hnqm2l392s32atgh...@4ax.com>,
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>There is no next life.
Are you certain?
Alec Brady
<u54rm2h8r8596m0mv...@4ax.com>,
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 12:30:56 +0000, Alec Brady
>I have no idea :)
OK, do you want to go for it now?
Kendall K. Down
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> }"Certainty about the next life is simply incompatible with tolerance in
> }this one"
> I don't think I have ever talked about the next life, except as whimsically
> suggesting I would like to be a cat.
> }was what you said
> }The point was that you are included in that.
> There is no next life.
And the certainty with which you make that statement is simply incompatible
with tolerance in this one.
God bless,
Kendall K. Down
--
================ ARCHAEOLOGICAL DIGGINGS ===============
| Australia's premier archaeological magazine |
| http://www.diggingsonline.com |
========================================================
John Blake
<nickspamt...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>On Wed, 29 Nov 2006 14:25:44 GMT, John Blake
><johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>
>
>>Politics and religion are so tightly enmeshed in the USA and to a
>>lesser extent in the UK that it's difficult to address one without
>>involving the other.
>
>However if you are criticising one or the other, then it is important
>to draw the distinction. I am sure you are quite capable of doing so.
>
If a Christian ignores the teachings of Jesus by calling his actions
'politics', can he still claim to be a Christian?
>>If only they could be separated. Even so, with
>>such a high percentage of Christians in the USA, how can the country
>>ever consider going to war?
>
>I think you probably know the answer to that one. You ned to look at
>the issues which the last US election was really fought over.
See above.
JB
Simon Robinson
> A fine list of Christian leaders/organisations mostly condemning the
> Iraq war, and rightly so IMO. To quote a comment by the Methodist
> Church " Some in the Church are pacifists, who believe that there can
> never be a moral justification for war or military action." While
> rather extreme isn't this in keeping with the teachings of Jesus?
> 'Turn the other cheek' and 'Love your enemies' etc.
One reason why some might think otherwise is based on eg. Luke 3:14
(though that's John, not Jesus, teaching, although it is still in the
gospels).
'Then some soldiers asked him, "And what should we do?" He replied,
"Don't extort money and don't accuse people falsely—be content with your
pay.'
Noticeably absent from the advice is "Give up being soldiers"
Similarly Matthew 8:8-10 (this is Jesus):
'The centurion replied, "Lord, I do not deserve to have you come under
my roof. But just say the word, and my servant will be healed. For I
myself am a man under authority, with soldiers under me. I tell this
one, 'Go,' and he goes; and that one, 'Come,' and he comes. I say to my
servant, 'Do this,' and he does it."
When Jesus heard this, he was astonished and said to those following
him, "I tell you the truth, I have not found anyone in Israel with such
great faith'
Jesus is interacting with a soldier but offers no word indicating he
sees anything wrong with the soldier's career.
(Incidentally I do recall asking similar questions a few years ago with
a couple of US Christians who were very strongly in favour of the right
to bear arms. Their reaction was that Jesus never said anything at all
specifically about carrying arms).
More generally I don't think it's inconsistent to love your enemies
while maintaining an army/going to war: It simply requires an attitude
of mind that says that war is something sad that you have to do to
prevent a greater evil, and, very obviously, an attitude of trying to
avoid inflicting any harm on your opponents beyond that which is
necessary to avoid whatever the greater evil is. And ISTM turning the
other cheek is compatible with war if you view that principle as
applying to people who are seeking to harm *you* (personally), but not
applying to your reaction to people who are seeking to harm others whom
you might wish to defend.
Nick Milton
<johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>On Wed, 29 Nov 2006 15:29:23 +0000, Nick Milton
><nickspamt...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 29 Nov 2006 14:25:44 GMT, John Blake
>><johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Politics and religion are so tightly enmeshed in the USA and to a
>>>lesser extent in the UK that it's difficult to address one without
>>>involving the other.
>>
>>However if you are criticising one or the other, then it is important
>>to draw the distinction. I am sure you are quite capable of doing so.
>>
>
>If a Christian ignores the teachings of Jesus by calling his actions
>'politics', can he still claim to be a Christian?
Anyone can claim to be a Christian.
John Blake
Thank you Simon. That makes it a little easier to understand what
seems to me to be a major inconsistency between the scriptures and the
actions of Christians. Though the examples you quoted are rather weak
when compared to the 'commands' (not sure of the right word) given by
Jesus, concentrating as they do on omissions rather than statements.
JB
Simon Robinson
> If a Christian ignores the teachings of Jesus by calling his actions
> 'politics', can he still claim to be a Christian?
Since a fundamental teaching of Christianity is that we are all sinners
and therefore we all do wrong things, there doesn't seem to be any clash
between ignoring the teachings of Jesus on occasions, even quite often,
and still being a Christian. I guess if someone knowingly ignored *all
or most* teachings of Jesus all the time and was unrepentant about it
then that might make me more inclined to question whether the term
'Christian' was a good description for them.
Simon Robinson
[Me]
>> Jesus is interacting with a soldier but offers no word indicating he
>> sees anything wrong with the soldier's career.
> Thank you Simon. That makes it a little easier to understand what
> seems to me to be a major inconsistency between the scriptures and the
> actions of Christians. Though the examples you quoted are rather weak
> when compared to the 'commands' (not sure of the right word) given by
> Jesus, concentrating as they do on omissions rather than statements.
No problem :-) IMO one of the strengths of Jesus' teaching is the focus
on underlying principles as much as specific actions. But of course that
focus is always going to leave scope for disagreement over how you
implement those principles.
Also possibly relevent: I think very few Christians actually get their
moral principles solely from the Bible. Plenty claim they do, and
possibly most of those genuinely (naively?) believe they do, but in
practice it's impossible not to be influenced by the
culture/tradition/environment/etc. in which you find yourself. Indeed,
for all my disagreements with the RC church, I think one strength it has
is that by having the explicit doctrine that 'Tradition' is one means by
which God's will is communicated, it is explicitly acknowledging
something that inevitably happens in any church, but which
evangelical/protestant churches are often reluctant to acknowledge.
Simon Robinson
> In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 23:54:35 GMT, Alec Brady
> }{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> }
> }>There is no next life.
> }
> }Are you certain?
>
> Yes.
Why?
pg
news:4t858sF...@mid.individual.net...
| {R} wrote:
| > In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 23:54:35 GMT, Alec
Brady
|
| > }{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
| > }
| > }>There is no next life.
| > }
| > }Are you certain?
| >
| > Yes.
|
| Why?
'I' would remember ;)
Alec Brady
<75dtm2tm5jt42gmi0...@4ax.com>,
{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 23:54:35 GMT, Alec Brady
>Yes.
So you're intolerant towards people who think there is one, yes?
Debbie
>There is no difference at all between a lettuce and a human.
Oh yes there is. A lettuce won't break your heart...
--
Debbie posting as Debbie
pg
news:u6rtm2pnssavvini2...@4ax.com...
| In uk.religion.christian on Thu, 30 Nov 2006 13:39:37 +0000, Simon
Robinson
| <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
|
| }{R} wrote:
| }> In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 23:54:35 GMT, Alec
Brady
| }> }{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
| }> }
| }> }>There is no next life.
| }> }
| }> }Are you certain?
| }>
| }> Yes.
| }
| }Why?
|
|
| Because you and I will rot away, because brain activity is
electro/chemical
| and that dies too.
| There is nothing to go anywhere, so why have anywhere for it to go ?
|
| There is no difference at all between a lettuce and a human.
Oh I don't know about that, I relish the former with a decent
vinaigrette, but the latter ...
Seriously though, I wonder about the arbitrary line that decides which
life forms should qualify for a 'next life'. Humans only? If so, at what
precise point along the evolutionary path did they evolve to the point
that they passed muster?
Robert Marshall
> On Thu, 30 Nov 2006 14:42:13 +0000, {R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
>
>
>>There is no difference at all between a lettuce and a human.
>
> Oh yes there is. A lettuce won't break your heart...
>
You can break the heart of a lettuce though
Robert
--
Conformity means death for any community. A loyal opposition is a
necessity in any community Karol Wojtyla (1969)
Links and things http://rmstar.blogspot.com/
Phil Saunders
news:u6rtm2pnssavvini2...@4ax.com...
> In uk.religion.christian on Thu, 30 Nov 2006 13:39:37 +0000, Simon
> Robinson
> <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
>
> }> In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 23:54:35 GMT, Alec Brady
> }> }{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> }> }
> }> }>There is no next life.
> }> }
> }> }Are you certain?
> }>
> }> Yes.
> }
> }Why?
>
Im not :-)
Phil
pg
| In uk.religion.christian on Thu, 30 Nov 2006 20:32:41 +0100, "pg"
| <n...@alpesprovence.net> wrote:
|
|
| }Seriously though, I wonder about the arbitrary line that decides
which
| }life forms should qualify for a 'next life'. Humans only? If so, at
what
| }precise point along the evolutionary path did they evolve to the
point
| }that they passed muster?
|
|
| {R}
It was aporetic, in that it's the kind of question you frequently end up
debating with yourself - few theists will engage on topics such as this.
Simon Woods
> "{R}" <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote in message
> news:u6rtm2pnssavvini2...@4ax.com...
> | In uk.religion.christian on Thu, 30 Nov 2006 13:39:37 +0000, Simon
> Robinson
> | <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
> |
> | }{R} wrote:
> | }> In uk.religion.christian on Wed, 29 Nov 2006 23:54:35 GMT, Alec
> Brady
> | }> }{R} <nos...@spam.nium.org> wrote:
> | }> }
> | }> }>There is no next life.
> | }> }
> | }> }Are you certain?
> | }>
> | }> Yes.
> | }
> | }Why?
> |
> | Because everybody is dead.
> |
> | Because you and I will rot away, because brain activity is
> electro/chemical
> | and that dies too.
> | There is nothing to go anywhere, so why have anywhere for it to go ?
> |
> | There is no difference at all between a lettuce and a human.
>
> Oh I don't know about that, I relish the former with a decent
> vinaigrette, but the latter ...
... a glass of Chianti?
pg
news:1164957042....@n67g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
:) Full-bodied of course
John Blake
So it seems that anyone who claims to be a Christian is considered to
be one even if they don't bother to live and behave in the manner
Jesus advised; that makes a nonsense of the term IMO.
JB
Alec Brady
<75rvm257uio0lt7vq...@4ax.com>,
John Blake <johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>So it seems that anyone who claims to be a Christian is considered to
>be one even if they don't bother to live and behave in the manner
>Jesus advised; that makes a nonsense of the term IMO.
Do you think it's wrong to use 'Christian' as a cultural label? What
about using it to describe things like music - does the St Matthew
Passion have to try to live like Jesus wants before we can call it
'Christian' music?
I would call Henry VIII a 'Christian monarch'. It seems you wouldn't.
Have I understood you?
John Blake
wrote:
>On Fri, 01 Dec 2006 09:09:36 GMT, in
><75rvm257uio0lt7vq...@4ax.com>,
>John Blake <johnremov...@f2s.com> wrote:
>
>>So it seems that anyone who claims to be a Christian is considered to
>>be one even if they don't bother to live and behave in the manner
>>Jesus advised; that makes a nonsense of the term IMO.
>
>Do you think it's wrong to use 'Christian' as a cultural label? What
>about using it to describe things like music - does the St Matthew
>Passion have to try to live like Jesus wants before we can call it
>'Christian' music?
>
How would you define 'Christian culture'? If you mean the predominant
culture of the UK then that seems to bear very little relationship to
the religion that has the same name.
>I would call Henry VIII a 'Christian monarch'. It seems you wouldn't.
>Have I understood you?
No I wouldn't, unless 'Christian' means something other than what I
think it means.
JB
Nick Milton
Is that because you see Christianity as a set of rules to be obeyed?