Realism: several types
The Spotlight On
existence independent of their being known so that their relation to
the subject in knowledge is only an external, not an internal or
immanent, relation.
Aristotelian Realism: The doctrine which holds that man does not infer
the existence of external objects from representative images or "ideas"
in consciousness, but perceives them directly in some form through a
presentation of the objects themselves in sense-perception.
Critical Realism: The doctrine which holds that we know physical
objects by means of, and in terms of, logical ideas, but that it is the
external object which we know and to which this complex act of
cognition is directed; wheat we perceive is existentially identical
with the independent reality, but it has, when being perceived, certain
qualities -- notably the sense qualities -- which it does not possess
when not perceived.
Critical Presentative Realism: That form of presentative realism which
holds that some qualities of objects are real and as such are perceived
immediately, while others are not actually and formally, but only
potentially and causally, present in the objects; these latter have no
formal existence independent of the perceiving subject. Also called
moderate presentative realism.
Epistemological Realism: The theory that the real object has an
existence independent of the experient's perception and thought.
Moderate Realism: In the problem of the universals, it is the doctrine
which holds that there are no universal realities outside the mind, but
we have universal ideas in the mind, and there is a foundation in the
things themselves for these universal ideas; universals are formally in
the mind, but fundamentally in the things.
Objective Representative Realism: That form of representative realism
which holds that our "representations" or "ideas" resemble the external
objects.
Presentative Realism: The doctrine which holds that physical, external
objects are presented directly in some form to consciousness in
sense-perception, so that their reality is perceived as it exists "out
there" in nature. Also called immediate, intuitive, natural realism or
perceptionism.
Representative Realism: The doctrine which holds that the human mind is
immediately aware, not of the external objects themselves, but of its
own internal "representations" or "ideas" only, from which it then
infers the external, non-Ego reality as their cause. Also called
mediate, hypothetical, cosmothetical, inferential realism.
Rigid Presentative Realism: That form of presentative realism which
holds that the things perceived are actually so in nature as they
appear to the senses. Also called naive presentative realism.
Subjective Representative Realism: That form of representative realism
which holds that our "representations" or "ideas" do not resemble the
external objects.
Transfigured Realism: The doctrine which holds that the reality
underlying appearances is totally and forever inconceivable to us; we
know only appearances (phenomena) of reality and in them reality is
transfigured or altered to such an extent that there is no resemblance
between reality and the perceptual knowledge we have of it.
Neo-Realism: The doctrine which holds that there are existent objects
not conditioned by perception or cognition; all the attributes of the
percept as experienced and all its relations, except that of being
experienced, independently characterize such objects; pan-objectivism.
Bob
Somewhere buried in all this hogwash is Existential Realism:
direct realism: Theory of perception according which we perceive
material objects directly, without the mediation of ideas or sensory
representations.
Cormagh
leave the list by the door, so we can put one on everyday, like a hat.
Bob
>I have to say there are some attractive options here. Maybe we should
>leave the list by the door, so we can put one on everyday, like a hat.
Those breakdowns remind me of what a bunch of blind people reported
when they tried to describe an elephant.
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
> direct realism: Theory of perception according which we perceive
> material objects directly, without the mediation of ideas or sensory
> representations.
That one was left out because it is false on its face. A person with no
sensory inputs perceives nothing.
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
> Those breakdowns remind me of what a bunch of blind people reported
> when they tried to describe an elephant.
Take away their tactile sensations also and you have a bunch of direct
realists.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>> direct realism: Theory of perception according which we perceive
>> material objects directly, without the mediation of ideas or sensory
>> representations.
>That one was left out because it is false on its face. A person with no
>sensory inputs perceives nothing.
Where does it say there are no sensory inputs? It only says there are
no sensory representations.
forbi...@msn.com
I'm not sure one can talk about "sensory input" without "sensory
representation".
I'm not even sure one can talk about "input" without "representation".
I don't consider a push on a chair "input" for the chair because the
chair's
response isn't calculated from a representation of the forces. The
chair's
response is a direct effect of the forces. In the 1970s I worked on
flight
simulators. The joystick was held in place by 1,600psi of pressure yet
it
appeared as if I could move it with the tip of my finger. What
happened
was there were "sensors" on the stick that detected my small pressure
on the stick and respresented it as a voltage to an analog computer.
The computer would move servos around to calculate the impacts of all
the simulated forces and the result was a movement of the position of
the stick that cause all of the calculated forces to equal out.
To me the distinctive characteristic of "input" is that it is
representational.
Craig Franck
> Publius wrote:
>
>>> direct realism: Theory of perception according which we perceive
>>> material objects directly, without the mediation of ideas or sensory
>>> representations.
>
>>That one was left out because it is false on its face. A person with no
>>sensory inputs perceives nothing.
>
> Where does it say there are no sensory inputs? It only says there are
> no sensory representations.
In direct or naive realism there are sensory representations. The claim
is being made that our perceptions reveal a public world of objects as
they are in reality.
This is not just the (somewhat) trivial claim that the parts that make up
your car's engine are shaped as they appear (if they weren't, it wouldn't
run in all likelihood) , but the engine really is hot and noisy and the car
is in fact the color you think it is. (They can get away with the last part
because it reflects how the words "color" and "hot" are used in normal
language; so it's a non-scientific claim that you are not making a mistake
by saying things are colored.)
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
>>> direct realism: Theory of perception according which we perceive
>>> material objects directly, without the mediation of ideas or sensory
>>> representations.
>
>>That one was left out because it is false on its face. A person with no
>>sensory inputs perceives nothing.
>
> Where does it say there are no sensory inputs? It only says there are
> no sensory representations.
Ah. Sensory data represents nothing? It is only random neural firings?
How do you know of an external world, then?
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>> Where does it say there are no sensory inputs? It only says there are
>> no sensory representations.
>Ah. Sensory data represents nothing? It is only random neural firings?
I have no clue how perception of Being works. All I know is that when
I put my hand on a hot stove burner, the very first thing I am aware
of is that there is something out there. That happens before my brain
creates any "representations".
Try this experiment. Have someone touch the palm of your hand with
various kinds of very hot objects and various kinds of very cold
objects for just an instant. In every case you will perceive Being but
you will likely not be able to form any "sensory representations". You
can demonstrate this by calling out "hot" or "cold". See how many your
senses misrepresent.
>How do you know of an external world, then?
Something is causing the neurons to fire.
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
>>Ah. Sensory data represents nothing? It is only random neural firings?
>
> I have no clue how perception of Being works.
Don't you think that is something you should be prepared to explain, if
your position is that you directly perceive "being?"
> All I know is that when
> I put my hand on a hot stove burner, the very first thing I am aware
> of is that there is something out there. That happens before my brain
> creates any "representations".
Virtually all developmental psychologists and neurophysiologists would
disagree with you. They would claim the first thing you are aware of is a
specific pain. That there is something "out there" causing the pain is an
inference, and comes considerably later. That is why we can have phantom
pains in missing limbs --- amputees feel a stabbing pain in a foot, and
infer a foot and something stabbing it, when neither exists.
> Try this experiment. Have someone touch the palm of your hand with
> various kinds of very hot objects and various kinds of very cold
> objects for just an instant. In every case you will perceive Being but
> you will likely not be able to form any "sensory representations". You
> can demonstrate this by calling out "hot" or "cold". See how many your
> senses misrepresent.
That kind of experiment is useless for the question you're asking. By age 3
or so, you've already built up a "world model," in which various sensory
inputs are associated with external causes. To find those associations, you
observe behavior before they are formed, such as in neonates, or cases
where they break down. There are many of those.
>>How do you know of an external world, then?
>
> Something is causing the neurons to fire.
In that case, the sensory data represents an external world. You are
contradicting youtself.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>> I have no clue how perception of Being works.
>Don't you think that is something you should be prepared to explain, if
>your position is that you directly perceive "being?"
I do not understand how consciousness arises. So I cannot possibly
explain in scientific terms how we perceive Being. I know we do, but I
don't know how it happens.
That's why I find all this psychology bullshit so ridiculous. None of
it is scientific. It's all based on madeup subjective crap.
>Virtually all developmental psychologists and neurophysiologists would
>disagree with you. They would claim the first thing you are aware of is a
>specific pain.
How the hell could they know that. They don't have a scientific
understanding of brain function much less consciousness.
You are trying to peddle snake oil but it will not sell to productive
scientists because they know better. if they tried that crap they
would never get their work published.
Publius
news:43a33d41....@news-server.houston.rr.com:
>>Don't you think that is something you should be prepared to explain,
>>if your position is that you directly perceive "being?"
>
> I do not understand how consciousness arises. So I cannot possibly
> explain in scientific terms how we perceive Being. I know we do, but I
> don't know how it happens.
>
> That's why I find all this psychology bullshit so ridiculous. None of
> it is scientific. It's all based on madeup subjective crap.
That is a most interesting group of statements. You "cannot possibly
explain in scientific terms how we perceive Being," but you "know we do."
And then you dismiss "psychology" for being "unscientific?" After you have
just baldly claimed knowledge you admit has no scientific basis?
> How the hell could they know that. They don't have a scientific
> understanding of brain function much less consciousness.
Actually, a great deal is known about brain function. And you don't need a
theory of consciousness to account for what an animal knows when. It can be
ascertained behaviorally.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>That is a most interesting group of statements. You "cannot possibly
>explain in scientific terms how we perceive Being," but you "know we do."
>And then you dismiss "psychology" for being "unscientific?" After you have
>just baldly claimed knowledge you admit has no scientific basis?
You are confused by your blatant prejudices.
I said we need a scientific explanation, and I also said we do not
have one. You infer incorrectly that we will never have one.
>Actually, a great deal is known about brain function.
None of it by psychologists.
>And you don't need a
>theory of consciousness to account for what an animal knows when. It can be
>ascertained behaviorally.
Psychological bullshit.
I want to know scientifically what consciousness is.
Publius
news:43a56d18...@news-server.houston.rr.com:
> I said we need a scientific explanation, and I also said we do not
> have one. You infer incorrectly that we will never have one.
I inferred no such thing. I questioned how you can "know we do" (perceive
"Being"), not only in the absence of a scientific explanation, but even of
an account of what "perceiving Being" consists in, i.e., what counts as
"perceiving Being."
How is "perceiving Being" different from perceiving pain, or perceiving
yellow, or perceiving sound?
>>And you don't need a
>>theory of consciousness to account for what an animal knows when. It
>>can be ascertained behaviorally.
> Psychological bullshit.
>
> I want to know scientifically what consciousness is.
Observation and correlating stimuli with responses is not science?
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>how you can "know we do" (perceive
>"Being"), not only in the absence of a scientific explanation,
Did the planets not travel around the sun in nearly elliptical orbits
before Newton's Laws?
>but even of
>an account of what "perceiving Being" consists in, i.e., what counts as
>"perceiving Being."
Knowing that there is something out there from the senses.
You have to include the senses because otherwise you would have to
include self awareness. I suppose in a very real sense self awareness
is also knowledge of Being. But perception implies the senses.
>How is "perceiving Being" different from perceiving pain, or perceiving
>yellow, or perceiving sound?
Perceiving Being is not as specific as the things you enumerated. I do
not have to interpret abything when I perceive of Being. I simply know
that there is something out there. The sense data are in the rawest
possible form - like one small bit of sense data is sufficient if I am
able to know it.
Pain, yellow, sound all go to the nature of the object being
perceived. They are not needed to perceive Being. Only the awareness
thru the senses is necessary.
The Principle of Perception of Being is also known as the Authority of
the Senses. Aristotle and Aquinas wisely sidestepped all the
epistemological overhead of subjective interpretation of sense data by
stating axiomatically that we can trust our senses to tell us that
there is an objective world out there. Despite centuries of convoluted
psychological double talk, from Kant forward (maybe even as far back
as Descartes) we still have this awareness that there is a real
objective physical ordered world out there. If there weren't then
science would be not only meaningless but impossible. The incredible
success of science, in particular physics, tells us that there is
rationality to our acceptance of the Authority of the Senses.
I realize that this is something people who have never studied physics
cannot appreciate the way a productive physicist can. The only
solution to that is for philosophers to study physics. I am convinced
from personal experience that philosophers make excellent physicists.
So why not give it a try. When you are finished with graduate school,
having mastered QM, Relativity and all the other arcane subjects, you
will be a completely different person. You will be a Realist.
You will make the creation and destruction operators of Second
Quantization literally cause the emergence of particles like electrons
and positrons out of the fluctuations of the Vacuum quantum field. You
will see two photons collide and create these particles and more.
Once you learn how to create and destroy matter in Quantum Field
Theory you will never look upon the world as you did previously
because you will experience not only a very important explanation of
how matter is created (epistemological), but you are actually doing it
on paper the same way the Universe does it in reality (ontological).
Before you say, "That's only a model", be aware that QFT is capable of
predicting things that were heretofor completely unknown to
physicists. Models don't do that. Only laws of physics do that. It is
impossible to overlook that most crucial aspect and still claim to be
rational.
>Observation and correlating stimuli with responses is not science?
Of course it's not science, any more than taxonomy is a science in
biology. Systematics is necessary for science but certainly not
sufficient.
We need real world experiments that begin with an hypothesis,
something we can test empirically or infer from empirical data. If you
so the actual tests, you are called an experimentalist, whereas if you
do the inferring from experimental data, you are called a theorist. We
need both in the brain sciences.
forbi...@msn.com
Bob wrote:
> On Mon, 19 Dec 2005 04:50:50 -0600, Publius
> <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>
> >how you can "know we do" (perceive
> >"Being"), not only in the absence of a scientific explanation,
>
> Did the planets not travel around the sun in nearly elliptical orbits
> before Newton's Laws?
Newton didn't invent the laws; he discovered them. This distinction
is quite great.
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
>>how you can "know we do" (perceive
>>"Being"), not only in the absence of a scientific explanation,
> Did the planets not travel around the sun in nearly elliptical orbits
> before Newton's Laws?
They sure did. That is because, once we have those laws in hand, and they
prove useful in explaining and predicting observations, they become
"real," and eternal. Until a better theory comes along, that is.
"Impetus" and the luminiferous ether and the Dalton atom (not to mention
gods and demons and evil spirits) were "real" also --- until they were
scrapped.
>> but even of an account of what "perceiving Being" consists in, i.e.,
>> what counts as "perceiving Being."
> Knowing that there is something out there from the senses.
That is repetitive. What counts as "knowing something is out there," as
distinguished from knowing you see yellow, or feel warmth?
That is a substantive question, Bob --- not an argumentative one. People
experience all kinds of "false" sensory impressions, such as the phantom
pains I mentioned earlier, and *cannot distinguish them from those which
have an observable external cause*. Someone who experiences a phantom
pain in a missing foot *also* thinks there is "something out there." And
could he not see that the foot is missing, and probably also remember
losing it, you would have a hard time persuading him the foot did not
exist. If "being" is directly perceived, as you contend, *there should be
no phantom pains*, because, though the pain is perceived, the "being" is
not. But phantom pains are quite explicable if existents are *inferred*
from pains and other sense data.
> You have to include the senses because otherwise you would have to
> include self awareness. I suppose in a very real sense self awareness
> is also knowledge of Being. But perception implies the senses.
And thus you must explicate the difference between sensing "being" and
sensing, say, yellow.
>>How is "perceiving Being" different from perceiving pain, or perceiving
>>yellow, or perceiving sound?
>
> Perceiving Being is not as specific as the things you enumerated. I do
> not have to interpret abything when I perceive of Being.
Are you suggesting that you may "perceive being" absent any specific
qualities? That is, you perceive neither redness nor the texture of the
petals nor the prick of a thorn nor the scent of roses, yet you can
perceive the "being" of the rose?
> The sense data are in the rawest
> possible form - like one small bit of sense data is sufficient if I am
> able to know it.
What if you stand up suddenly and see spots? Are you perceiving "being?"
Or try this:
http://www.harmsy.freeuk.com/GDexp.html
> Pain, yellow, sound all go to the nature of the object being
> perceived. They are not needed to perceive Being. Only the awareness
> thru the senses is necessary.
How is perceiving a rose, though you do not perceive the color, shape,
texture, scent, etc., different from perceiving a rock? Or nothing at
all?
> The Principle of Perception of Being is also known as the Authority of
> the Senses. Aristotle and Aquinas wisely sidestepped all the
> epistemological overhead of subjective interpretation of sense data by
> stating axiomatically that we can trust our senses to tell us that
> there is an objective world out there.
Aristotle and Aquinas sidestepped those issues because they were not
aware of them, or of the many ways in which the "authority of the
senses" is undermined by common experience. We can perhaps trust our
*minds* to justify an external world, but hardly the senses. We have to
construct that world from sense data that is thoroughly fallible.
> Despite centuries of convoluted
> psychological double talk, from Kant forward (maybe even as far back
> as Descartes) we still have this awareness that there is a real
> objective physical ordered world out there. If there weren't then
> science would be not only meaningless but impossible. The incredible
> success of science, in particular physics, tells us that there is
> rationality to our acceptance of the Authority of the Senses.
On the contrary. It tells us that we have a certain facility for
constructing a coherent world despite the fallibility of sense data; for
working around those shortcomings.
> Models don't do that. Only laws of physics do that. It is
> impossible to overlook that most crucial aspect and still claim to be
> rational.
If a model is not predictive we discard it in favor of one that is.
Bob
>> >how you can "know we do" (perceive
>> >"Being"), not only in the absence of a scientific explanation,
>> Did the planets not travel around the sun in nearly elliptical orbits
>> before Newton's Laws?
>Newton didn't invent the laws; he discovered them. This distinction
>is quite great.
Indeed it is because it says that the laws are part of the essence of
material objects and not just fabrications of the mind.
Now what is your question? I do not understand what you are asking
above. I can know we perceive Being because I know that I exist. I do
not need a scientific explanation to know that I exist.
And although I cannot know for certain that anything else exists, the
preponderance of the evidence overwhelming points to the fact that
something does exist out there. I find it incredible that I might be
the only existing thing and everything else is the result of
electrical impulses in my brain.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>What counts as "knowing something is out there," as
>distinguished from knowing you see yellow, or feel warmth?
>That is a substantive question, Bob --- not an argumentative one. People
>experience all kinds of "false" sensory impressions, such as the phantom
>pains I mentioned earlier, and *cannot distinguish them from those which
>have an observable external cause*. Someone who experiences a phantom
>pain in a missing foot *also* thinks there is "something out there." And
>could he not see that the foot is missing, and probably also remember
>losing it, you would have a hard time persuading him the foot did not
>exist. If "being" is directly perceived, as you contend, *there should be
>no phantom pains*, because, though the pain is perceived, the "being" is
>not. But phantom pains are quite explicable if existents are *inferred*
>from pains and other sense data.
Abberations such as those enumerated above do not mean that the
authority of the senses is in doubt. The preponderance of the evidence
points to the existence of a real objective material world out there
in spite of the occasional malfunction of the human brain.
>And thus you must explicate the difference between sensing "being" and
>sensing, say, yellow.
Sensing Being is perceiving that something is out there. Sensing
yellow is perceiving something specific is out there.
>> Perceiving Being is not as specific as the things you enumerated. I do
>> not have to interpret anything when I perceive of Being.
>Are you suggesting that you may "perceive being" absent any specific
>qualities?
I can perceive being as long as something impacts my senses in any
manner.
>That is, you perceive neither redness nor the texture of the
>petals nor the prick of a thorn nor the scent of roses, yet you can
>perceive the "being" of the rose?
Absolutely as long as something impacts my senses..
>> The sense data are in the rawest
>> possible form - like one small bit of sense data is sufficient if I am
>> able to know it.
>What if you stand up suddenly and see spots? Are you perceiving "being?"
No. But such an abberation does not impeach the authority of the
senses, anymore than running out of gas impeaches the authority of an
automobile.
>Or try this:
>http://www.harmsy.freeuk.com/GDexp.html
Is there not something out there? That was the very first thing I
noticed when the page loades, before I tried to figure out what it
was.
Are you saying we must know what something is before we can know that
it is there? That's what you seem to be saying all the time.
>How is perceiving a rose, though you do not perceive the color, shape,
>texture, scent, etc., different from perceiving a rock? Or nothing at
>all?
As long as there is something out there it is going to make itself
known in terms of its existence, although there is always the chance
that the brain has malfunctioned. If you are trying to get me to say
that I need specific sense perceptions to perceive Being, then I am
not going to. All that is needed is some *valid* sense experience to
perceive Being. I can even misinterpret what the something is -
mistake a vase for two faces but that does not keep me from declaring
that something is out there.
>We can perhaps trust our
>*minds* to justify an external world, but hardly the senses. We have to
>construct that world from sense data that is thoroughly fallible.
I do not understand what you mean by "trust our minds to justify an
external world". All it takes is some sense data to tell me there is
something out there. Indeed, I can be deceived, but not all the time
unless I am psychotic, and I am not psychotic and neither are most
people.
If you are in the dark, you have a bad cold, your ears are covered and
you bump into a chair, you know immediately that something is out
there without knowing what it is. You do not need to use your mind to
justify that. As long as your sense of touch is working and your brain
can perceive tough data, you can know that something is out there.
>> Despite centuries of convoluted
>> psychological double talk, from Kant forward (maybe even as far back
>> as Descartes) we still have this awareness that there is a real
>> objective physical ordered world out there. If there weren't then
>> science would be not only meaningless but impossible. The incredible
>> success of science, in particular physics, tells us that there is
>> rationality to our acceptance of the Authority of the Senses.
>On the contrary. It tells us that we have a certain facility for
>constructing a coherent world despite the fallibility of sense data; for
>working around those shortcomings.
You are trying to justify all this psychology nonsense. It is not
needed. Every sensient creature that has ever lived has sensed that
there is something out there.
>If a model is not predictive we discard it in favor of one that is.
The model per se is not what does the predicting.
If you don't believe me then repeat the experiment a friend of my
thesis advisor did when he graduated. He tried to do productive
physics using only mathematical models. He failed after a long period
of attempts. That's because the predictions come from the laws of
physics not the models of those laws. The laws are embedded in the
essence of matter, not in the interpretations our minds concoct. The
models are only the means whereby we are able to envision the workings
of the laws of physics, they are not substitutes for them.
A famous example of this was James Clerk Maxwell who discovered the
basic classical laws of electromagnetism. One of the things he
discovered is the Maxwell Stress Tensor, which is required to conserve
energy and momentum in certain kinds of electromagnetic events. In
order for him to construct the laws that goverened this Stress Tensor,
he modeled the interactions of electromagnetic forces with mechanical
gears and pulleys. Those mechanical models helped Maxwell discover the
law of the Stress Tensor which had nothing to do with gears and
pulleys.
When I draw the plans for something, I put down things that are
representational of the real thing. For example I might build a
wireframe model. I certainly do not expect the craftsmen who build the
real thing to hand me a wireframe object. Similarly when physicists
employ mathematical models, they certainly do not expect you to take
them literally and imagine that the Universe is somekind of equation
acting out its solution.
There is no actual wave function that moves around in Hilbert Space in
the real world. That is just a mathematical model - a representation
of what is really going on. It's the laws of QM that are actually
governing the behavior of the Universe much the same as the rules of
baseball govern how the game is actually played. A walk thru the
baseball hall of fame is not going to tell you how the game is played
- you have to observe it first hand to see what is going on and even
then you need to know the rules in advance, not just the players'
names and field positions.
A model of a baseball game will tell you the names of the players, the
positions they play and maybe some background information about how
the players have performed in the past. But that is not the laws of
baseball. That does not tell you how the game is actually played.
You can build all the models you want, mathematical, mechanical,
animations, etc. describing in exacting detail every nuance about
planetary motion, but none of it will ever allow you to know what the
laws of physics tell you about the essence of matter.
Publius
news:43a84c75....@news-server.houston.rr.com...
> Abberations such as those enumerated above do not mean that the
> authority of the senses is in doubt. The preponderance of the evidence
> points to the existence of a real objective material world out there
> in spite of the occasional malfunction of the human brain.
The thrust of the point was whether "something out there" is directly
perceived, or inferred from sensory data. It was not whether those
inferences are normally justified. You have been contending that there is no
inference; that the external world is directly perceived. If that is the
case, no one should be fooled by a phantom pain, since only the pain is
perceived --- the missing foot could not be.
>> That is, you perceive neither redness nor the texture of the
>> petals nor the prick of a thorn nor the scent of roses, yet you can
>> perceive the "being" of the rose?
>
> Absolutely as long as something impacts my senses..
But what is going to impact your senses, if all those specific sensations
are absent? There is no generalized, non-specific sensation, of "being" or
anything else. There are only specific sensations caused by specific kinds
of stimuli impinging specific neural receptors.
>>http://www.harmsy.freeuk.com/GDexp.html
>
> Is there not something out there?
Yes, there is *something* out there. There are no black dots within the
white dots, however. Yet that is what you see. There is no "being" to the
black dots.
> Are you saying we must know what something is before we can know that
> it is there? That's what you seem to be saying all the time.
Nope. I'm saying you can see things *that are not there at all*. And that
you cannot tell the difference without some investigation. The "being" of
the black dots is an inference, which you abandon after investigating
further.
> If you are trying to get me to say
> that I need specific sense perceptions to perceive Being, then I am
> not going to.
Heh. Then you'll have to describe the non-specific sense perceptions confer
that knowledge. I'm sure neurophysiologists will be very interested.
Bob
wrote:
>The thrust of the point was whether "something out there" is directly
>perceived, or inferred from sensory data. It was not whether those
>inferences are normally justified. You have been contending that there is no
>inference; that the external world is directly perceived. If that is the
>case, no one should be fooled by a phantom pain, since only the pain is
>perceived --- the missing foot could not be.
A person's foot is not "something out there". Anyway, are you saying
that because the brain can be tricked it therefore cannot be trusted
to perceive Being directly?
If it can be tricked when it attempts to infer the existence of a
missing foot, then how can it be trusted to infer the existence of
Being?
There is no inference needed to perceive Being, therefore the
malfunction of inference with missing feet is irrelevant. If anything
you are helping me make my case, because the malfuction of your
inference mechanism is at fault and therefore cannot be trusted to
infer Being.
A newborn infant can directly perceive Being. It does not need any
inference. For an adult, the first thing that happens when I encounter
Being is the direct perception without any inference.
>But what is going to impact your senses, if all those specific sensations
>are absent? There is no generalized, non-specific sensation, of "being" or
>anything else. There are only specific sensations caused by specific kinds
>of stimuli impinging specific neural receptors.
There is a generalized non-specific sensation of Being. It is the
direct perception of Being. No inference regarding the nature of the
sense data is required for me to perceive Being.
You hear a sound coming from across the room - it is not a phantom
sound - it is a real objective sound caused by a real objective
object. You do not know what it is, only that it is. You have just
directly perceived Being. No need for any inference.
>>>http://www.harmsy.freeuk.com/GDexp.html
>> Is there not something out there?
>Yes, there is *something* out there.
Then you have just perceived Being.
There are no black dots within the
>white dots, however. Yet that is what you see. There is no "being" to the
>black dots.
That is not what is meant by the perception of Being. You are defining
Being to be something specific and then claiming that one cannot
perceive Being because they can't infer the specific object you equate
with Being.
Being is the act of a possibility that constitues itself by asserting
itself. It is the act of assertion on the senses that allows us to
perceive material Being. The phrase "something out there" means that
something in the real objective world has asserted itself on the
senses. Our brain detects that assertion and thereby perceived Being.
To know what specific kind of thing it is, that requires your
inference. But inference is not needed to perceive Being.
>> Are you saying we must know what something is before we can know that
>> it is there? That's what you seem to be saying all the time.
>Nope. I'm saying you can see things *that are not there at all*. And that
>you cannot tell the difference without some investigation. The "being" of
>the black dots is an inference, which you abandon after investigating
>further.
It is indeed true that the brain is susceptible to being fooled. But
that does not mean that one must use inference to perceive Being.
There are far more instances when the brain is not being fooled where
Being is perceived directly without inference.
>> If you are trying to get me to say
>> that I need specific sense perceptions to perceive Being, then I am
>> not going to.
>Heh. Then you'll have to describe the non-specific sense perceptions
The fact that the sense data is present is the non-specific sense
perception you want.
>confer that knowledge. I'm sure neurophysiologists will be very interested.
I never claimed perception of Being resulted in "that knowledge". When
a physician raps his happer on your knee, do you perceive Being
directly (and your knee flinches) or do you go thru some inference
process in which you decide that your knee should flinch because the
sense data cause the proper inference?
What if the physician fakes the hammer blow - will you still flinch?
Publius
news:43a97950....@news-server.houston.rr.com:
> A person's foot is not "something out there". Anyway, are you saying
> that because the brain can be tricked it therefore cannot be trusted
> to perceive Being directly?
Of course it is. The body is surely part of the physical world. The
neural mechanisms by which you are aware of your foot work the same way
as those by which you are aware of a hot stove. The only difference is
that your body "follows you around."
As for the brain being tricked, per your theory it must be tricked twice.
It must be tricked into sensing the pain in the missing foot, and also
tricked into sensing the "being" of the missing foot (since you claim the
perception of "being" is something distinct from perception of, say,
pain, color, etc.). And all these double tricks must be be perfectly
coordinated. Occam would object.
But if "being" is perceived directly, how can the brain be "tricked" at
all? It can be tricked only if it *infers* the foot from the pain,
because that inference can be faulty. If it is perceived directly, there
is no room for trickery. You could only be tricked into wrongly
identifying a thing, not tricked into thinking something exists which
does not.
> If it can be tricked when it attempts to infer the existence of a
> missing foot, then how can it be trusted to infer the existence of
> Being?
It infers feet, hot stoves, the Moon, etc., from sensory data, and
imputes "being" to all of them. If the data is faulty or spurious, so is
the inferrence. E.g., garbage in, garbage out.
> There is no inference needed to perceive Being, therefore the
> malfunction of inference with missing feet is irrelevant. If anything
> you are helping me make my case, because the malfuction of your
> inference mechanism is at fault and therefore cannot be trusted to
> infer Being.
Is the "being" of a non-existent foot "directly perceived" or not? If it
is, how can something which does not exist be directly perceived? If it
is not, then why does the subject think the foot exists?
> You hear a sound coming from across the room - it is not a phantom
> sound - it is a real objective sound caused by a real objective
> object. You do not know what it is, only that it is. You have just
> directly perceived Being. No need for any inference.
The tinnatus patient will think the same thing, when the phantom sound
first appears. Only after some investigation does he realize that there
is no sound "out there." That there is a sound "out there" is an
inference, which he later discovers is faulty.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>It infers feet, hot stoves, the Moon, etc., from sensory data, and
>imputes "being" to all of them. If the data is faulty or spurious, so is
>the inferrence. E.g., garbage in, garbage out.
What if the Being I perceive is something I know nothing about, like
an exterrestrial alien behind me tapping me on the shoulder? How do I
"infer" and "impute" in that case?
Anyway, Being is an Act, not a thing. I perceive Being when it asserts
itself on my senses. Inference is something I do after I perceive
Being.
According to your claim that the body is part of the real objective
world, which we carry around with us, then the phantom foot and
tinnitus examples illustrate that first I perceive Being and then
infer what it is. The phantom leg and tinnitus assert themselves on my
senses, which allows me to perveive Being as the existence of
something out there. If I infer incorrectly that is not caused by
misperceiving Being, but by misinferring what is the cause of that Act
of Being.
It is inference that can go wrong, not the perception of Being. If you
claim that psychotic people perceive Being when nothing is there to
perceive, I would reply that they did not perceive Being but were
tricked by their malfunctioning brain. The existence of faulty
perception does not cast doubt on the normal process of perceiving
Being and does not mean that you must rely on inference for perception
of Being to be a real process.
If you treat Being as an Act and not a thing, then your confusion
should clear up. You will then be able to separate the Act of Being
from the Object that Exists. You perceive the Act of Being and infer
what the Object that Exists is.
--
Our revels now are ended. These are actors as I foretold
you were all spirits and are melted into air, into thin air,
and like the baseless fabric of this vision, the cloud-capped
towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, the great
globe itself, yea, and all that it inherits, has dissolved,
and like this insubstantial pageant faded, leaves not a rack
behind. We are such stuff as dreams are made on, and our little
life is rounded with a sleep.
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
> What if the Being I perceive is something I know nothing about, like
> an exterrestrial alien behind me tapping me on the shoulder? How do I
> "infer" and "impute" in that case?
You infer that something is tapping you. You won't infer what until you
gather more data. But even the first inference could be mistaken --- it
could be a tic in a shoulder muscle.
> Anyway, Being is an Act, not a thing. I perceive Being when it asserts
> itself on my senses.
You're begging the question, which is, How do you distinguish "being
asserting itself" from spurious sense data?
> According to your claim that the body is part of the real objective
> world, which we carry around with us, then the phantom foot and
> tinnitus examples illustrate that first I perceive Being and then
> infer what it is. The phantom leg and tinnitus assert themselves on my
> senses, which allows me to perveive Being as the existence of
> something out there.
Yup. Something which does not exist.
> If I infer incorrectly that is not caused by
> misperceiving Being, but by misinferring what is the cause of that Act
> of Being.
Ah. Then the tinnatus tone is itself "Being"? Phantom feet and tones are
"real" things also, so I'm just mis-identifying which real thing is the
cause of the sense data?
> The existence of faulty
> perception does not cast doubt on the normal process of perceiving
> Being and does not mean that you must rely on inference for perception
> of Being to be a real process.
It sure does. Unless there is an inference, there is no possibility for a
faulty perception.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>> What if the Being I perceive is something I know nothing about, like
>> an exterrestrial alien behind me tapping me on the shoulder? How do I
>> "infer" and "impute" in that case?
>You infer that something is tapping you.
Why do I need to "infer"?
>You're begging the question, which is, How do you distinguish "being
>asserting itself" from spurious sense data?
Just because the senses can be fooled does not mean that they
malfunction all the time.
Anyway, according to you, the body is "something out there" so even
your so-called "spurious" sense data qualify as perception of Being
without any inference required.
>
>> According to your claim that the body is part of the real objective
>> world, which we carry around with us, then the phantom foot and
>> tinnitus examples illustrate that first I perceive Being and then
>> infer what it is. The phantom leg and tinnitus assert themselves on my
>> senses, which allows me to perveive Being as the existence of
>> something out there.
>Yup. Something which does not exist.
Are you claiming that phantom leg and tinnitus originate solely in the
brain? If so, then why is it not experienced by people with two legs
and no history of auditory problems.
The facts are that phantom leg originates in the nervous system of the
missing leg and tinnitus originates in the inner ear. Therefore,
according to you, the body is "something out there" so even these
so-called "spurious" sense data qualify as perception of Being without
any inference required.
>Then the tinnatus tone is itself "Being"? Phantom feet and tones are
>"real" things also, so I'm just mis-identifying which real thing is the
>cause of the sense data?
Perception of Being does not require any identification of which real
thing is the cause of sense data. The mere existence of external sense
data is sufficient for perception of Being.
>It sure does. Unless there is an inference, there is no possibility for a
>faulty perception.
Unless that originates in the brain, it is not faulty in terms of
perception of Being. Something IS out there to cause the sense data.
The fact that you may not know accurately what it might be is
irrelevant.
--
"There are two kinds of truth, small truth and great truth. You
can recognize a small truth because its opposite is a falsehood.
The opposite of a great truth is another truth."
-- Niels Bohr
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
Why is your newsreader not trimmimg NGs on this thread like it is on
the other one?
Publius
server.houston.rr.com:
> Why is your newsreader not trimmimg NGs on this thread like it is on
> the other one?
It doesn't trim any. Responses are posted to all groups to which the
article responded to was posted. *Followups* to the response are directed
to one group (unless the writer of the followup adds more groups).
However, if the original message was posted to 3 or fewer groups, then
followups go to them all. This thread exists in only 3 groups.
The idea is to prevent message flooding. Most decent usenet clients follow
the same rules by default.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>The idea is to prevent message flooding.
It is not you prerogative to do that because it prevents participants
from seeing the followups.
>Most decent usenet clients follow
>the same rules by default.
My client is Free Agent, which is extremely decent - and it does not
trim NGs.
--
Merry Christmas!
Thisbe
> On Fri, 16 Dec 2005 03:31:17 -0600, Publius
> <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>
> >> Where does it say there are no sensory inputs? It only says there are
> >> no sensory representations.
>
> >Ah. Sensory data represents nothing? It is only random neural firings?
>
> I have no clue how perception of Being works. All I know is that when
> I put my hand on a hot stove burner, the very first thing I am aware
> of is that there is something out there. That happens before my brain
> creates any "representations".
But the hot stove burner (HSB) does not possess qualities like pain and
tactile sensation, which I assume is your conscious "awareness" in this
case. Pain and tactile sensation are the brain's way of representing
the hand's encounter with the HSB and any damage it did. Your brain may
have sent a neural message to your hand to get off the HSB a fraction
of a second before you experienced representational sensations, but
that's part of the physical interactions taking place throughout the
universe rather than conscious perception. Perhaps it would more
suitably be called "mechanical detection and response" rather than
"perception of Being", just as in a burgler alarm device.
> Something is causing the neurons to fire.
I'd love for that to be a total and unquestionable certainty, but I
don't believe the arguments of skeptics and antirealists can be so
utterly refuted. They can be said to not be of much use, or foolish, to
whatever extent that empirical regularities may not justify such
reasoned negativity in everyday life. One may contend that experience
cannot possibly be a deceiver; but this seems yet another conviction
that serves the purposes of everyday life, rather than a proof.
Have a nice day, Thisbe :)
Bob
>But the hot stove burner (HSB) does not possess qualities like pain and
>tactile sensation, which I assume is your conscious "awareness" in this
>case.
I never claimed that. All I said is that the first thung that happens
is that you are aware of something out there. Sometimes, as a matter
of fact, a severe burn starts out feeling like ice and then when the
inference occurs you realize what it is.
Publius
news:43ad4dc5....@news-server.houston.rr.com:
>>> What if the Being I perceive is something I know nothing about, like
>>> an exterrestrial alien behind me tapping me on the shoulder? How do
>>> I "infer" and "impute" in that case?
>>You infer that something is tapping you.
> Why do I need to "infer"?
Because all you know immediately is a certain sensation. It could be caused
by a muscle or nerve tic. Because sensations of that kind are usually
associated with external sources, you will inductively infer such a source
for this one.
>> You're begging the question, which is, How do you distinguish "being
>> asserting itself" from spurious sense data?
> Just because the senses can be fooled does not mean that they
> malfunction all the time.
They don't have to malfunction all the time. They only need to malfunction
some of the time. That obliges you to explain how you tell the difference.
If you do it by gathering more data, then your conclusion that there is
"something out there" is *an inference from the data*.
> The facts are that phantom leg originates in the nervous system of the
> missing leg and tinnitus originates in the inner ear. Therefore,
> according to you, the body is "something out there" so even these
> so-called "spurious" sense data qualify as perception of Being without
> any inference required.
You don't know immediately where those sensations orginate. That they
originate in the nervous system is a second hypothesis you adopt after the
first is discarded. The only thing known immediately is the sound or pain
itself. Anything you ultimately settle on to explain them is an inference.
> Perception of Being does not require any identification of which real
> thing is the cause of sense data. The mere existence of external sense
> data is sufficient for perception of Being.
Only the "being" of the sensation itself. You do not know immediately
whether it is external or not.
Bob
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>>>You infer that something is tapping you.
>> Why do I need to "infer"?
>Because all you know immediately is a certain sensation. It could be caused
>by a muscle or nerve tic.
Which according to you is still part of the external world. Therefore
a muscle or nerve tic constitutes the perception of "somethibg out
there".