Nice point
Peter Brooks
on quantum mechanics. However there was an interesting article that I
read recently, I think in the New Scientist, though I don't have the
reference.
I liked the point made about hidden variables. A mathematician was
quoted as saying that it would be odd if there weren't any hidden
variables as, without them, how would objects showing statistical
regularities 'know' what regularities they were supposed to be
showing.
I thought it a very nice point. After all, statistics (though some
invest it with more god-like powers) only shows regularities because
they are caused by an underlying behaviour. Truly random things don't
and can't show statistical regularities - if they do it proves that
they aren't random.
Dave Smith
Anyhow, I'm not sure how absolute randomness could be
demonstrated.....
Dave
Peter Brooks
half-life, that should do it.
Paul Grieg
In that case, there might be hidden variables causing the lack of
randomness.
Hidden variable theories have no power because they bring nothing new
& substantial to the table for us to feast on. Quarks are also, in a
sense, hidden because they are always found in bound states (neutrons,
protons...) But as theoretical constructs they flawlessly explain the
generation of post-decay particles. Hidden variable theories explain
nothing & make no predictions beyond those of the Copenhagen
interpretation.
Why do you quote a mathematician on quantum theory? Would you quote an
accountant to make a point in macro-economic theory? Mathematicans
provide useful tools for physicists, but you keep the tool maker in
the tool shed, not in the board room.
Peter Brooks
> On May 1, 10:20 am, Peter Brooks <Peter.H.M.Bro...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On May 1, 10:46 am, Dave Smith <da...@dsmith60.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > On 1 May, 08:05, Peter Brooks <Peter.H.M.Bro...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > I don't really want to get into another long, and fruitless discussion
> > > > on quantum mechanics. However there was an interesting article that I
> > > > read recently, I think in the New Scientist, though I don't have the
> > > > reference.
>
> > > > I liked the point made about hidden variables. A mathematician was
> > > > quoted as saying that it would be odd if there weren't any hidden
> > > > variables as, without them, how would objects showing statistical
> > > > regularities 'know' what regularities they were supposed to be
> > > > showing.
>
> > > > I thought it a very nice point. After all, statistics (though some
> > > > invest it with more god-like powers) only shows regularities because
> > > > they are caused by an underlying behaviour. Truly random things don't
> > > > and can't show statistical regularities - if they do it proves that
> > > > they aren't random.
>
> > > Anyhow, I'm not sure how absolute randomness could be
> > > demonstrated.....
>
> > If you had a substance that displayed radioactive decay but had no
> > half-life, that should do it.
>
> In that case, there might be hidden variables causing the lack of
> randomness.
>
be remarkably cunning variables....
In any event, it doesn't matter if there are, or are not, hidden
variables involved. I was simply remarking that a radioactive element
with no half-life would be evidence of randomness. How anything
achieved randomness would be quite another matter, I doubt that it is
possible at all.
>
> Hidden variable theories have no power because they bring nothing new
> & substantial to the table for us to feast on. Quarks are also, in a
> sense, hidden because they are always found in bound states (neutrons,
> protons...) But as theoretical constructs they flawlessly explain the
> generation of post-decay particles. Hidden variable theories explain
> nothing & make no predictions beyond those of the Copenhagen
> interpretation.
>
It isn't really a concern about theory, it's a concern about what is
the case.
>
> Why do you quote a mathematician on quantum theory? Would you quote an
> accountant to make a point in macro-economic theory? Mathematicans
> provide useful tools for physicists, but you keep the tool maker in
> the tool shed, not in the board room.
>
I was quoting a mathematician on the subject of statistics.
The Averdein Building
> variables. A mathematician was quoted
> as saying that it would be odd if there
> weren't any hidden variables as, without
> them, how would objects showing
> statistical regularities 'know' what
> regularities they were supposed to be
> showing.
One underlying explanatory level seems to beg yet another for it--an
insanely infinite regress that looks more like constructivism than
exposing reality as it is independent of humans. In terms of what is
"real", it might be better to surrender to "miracle regularities" at an
earlier stage (parsimony fashion), and classify further explanatory
developments as language or descriptive systems that are "useful and
effective for something" rather than involving entities that have
literal "external world" existence. Thus the 20th-century inclination
among empiricists for disparaging (metaphysical) being and retreating to
language.
But a nominalist-like lack of "realness" for deeper theories should by
no means stop them from being produced and tested. As Carnap indicates
below, it impedes progress to dogmatically oppose a broad endeavor
outright before it has fully demonstrated itself to be useless. Just
because a particular system involving hidden variables may yield no
effective fruit doesn't justify barring the development of others.
"The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the
acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic forms in any branch of
science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the
ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the
efforts required. To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic
forms instead of testing them by their success or failure in practical
use, is worse than futile; it is positively harmful because it may
obstruct scientific progress. The history of science shows examples of
such prohibitions based on prejudices deriving from religious,
mythological, metaphysical, or other irrational sources, which slowed up
the developments for shorter or longer periods of time. Let us learn
from the lessons of history. Let us grant to those who work in any
special field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression
which seems useful to them; the work in the field will sooner or later
lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function.
Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them,
but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms." --Rudolf Carnap,
'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology'
~~~Drew
=ATTENTION= This is a shared internet device (non-PC). Post a response
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_ _ _ :-) Thanks,
_ _ _ the assistant admonitor
Peter Brooks
> >
> One underlying explanatory level seems to beg yet another for it--an
> insanely infinite regress that looks more like constructivism than
> exposing reality as it is independent of humans. In terms of what is
> "real", it might be better to surrender to "miracle regularities" at an
> earlier stage (parsimony fashion), and classify further explanatory
> developments as language or descriptive systems that are "useful and
> effective for something" rather than involving entities that have
> literal "external world" existence. Thus the 20th-century inclination
> among empiricists for disparaging (metaphysical) being and retreating to
> language.
>
Carnap, but I think he wasn't much given to mysticism.
What makes an infinite regress 'insane'? What makes a regress
'infinite'?
Why roll over and die with mystical 'miracle regularities', when you
have the alternative of explanation?
You have, I think, missed the point of my first posting. I wasn't
suggestng that we needed any mystical quest for hidden variables
because the various QM 'interpretations' were unsatisfactory. Quite
the reverse. I'm all for sticking to the equations and ignoring
fanciful metaphorical 'interpretations' - they're just that, fanciful
and metaphorical.
Rather I was pointing out the sensible point that a statistical
regularity requires causation. Of course there are spurious
statistical regularities, but even these have a cause. The notion of a
'random' or, alternatively, 'uncaused' result that nevertheess shows
statistical regularity is a nonsensical one. There is no need to
ponder any QM or other reality, the mathematics is sound. If there is
a statistical regularity, then there is a cause for it - even if it
might be experimental error. There is no room for an uncaused
statistical regularity anywhere apart from the realm of magic.
If it's magic that you're keen on, then I think conversations with
witches should be more your aim rather than conversations with
rational people.
The Averdein Building
> to mind. You quote Carnap, but I think he wasn't
> much given to mysticism.
??? Shouldn't expect a reason for a non sequitur, but I especially can't
fathom why this one (mysticism) would even cross your mind in regard to
logical positivism or that era of Philosophy of Science. It's form is
similar to saying: "You quote Donald Trump, but I don't think he was
anti-capitalist."
Plus the quote was to support pursuit of your possibility of "hidden
variables" (at least as a potentially useful or functional descriptions
[nonrealism]).
>What makes an infinite regress 'insane'? What makes
> a regress 'infinite'?
So you're not a fan of parsimony? To each his own.
>Why roll over and die with mystical 'miracle
> regularities', when you have the alternative of
> explanation?
Mysticism again? At least the source of this has been revealed. The
"occult" and scientific realism have two things in common from the
standpoint that they "can" both concern entities not visible in routine
perception being an explanation for events. By "miracle regularities" I
did not mean either, but rather lawful-like events of experience that
are foundational (simply happen, "float on their own") without hidden
causes. That is, no further endless(?) substrates, whether natural or
supernatural, from which they or their appearances emerged.
If any proposed explanatory postulations about empricial / measurable
regularities were proposed that espoused theoretical entities or
conditions (like higher dimensions, parallel universes, superstrings,
etc) these would not be taken to be literally real, but only
descriptive, useful or pragmatic (if the latter panned-out). There are
multiple metaphysical interpretations of quantum physics --a
circumstance almost reminiscent of the point that Kant tried to make
with his antinomies; so apart from the question of whether any of them
is useful, an antirealist or nonrealist stance is applicable.
>You have, I think, missed the point of my
> first posting.
You make references to mysticism and feel that I (ONLY) could have
missed what a post concerned???!!! But I'll grant this is understandable
from your POV since I may be one of the few people on the planet who'd
use "miracle" or "miraculous" with the intention that Strawson sometimes
does. So apologies on my part if this truly isn't the tired, old tactic
of misrepresentation that you're engaging in.
>The notion of a 'random' or, alternatively,
> 'uncaused' result that nevertheess
> shows statistical regularity is a
> nonsensical one. There is no need to
> ponder any QM or other reality, the
> mathematics is sound.
If you're not venturing "hidden variables" from a scientific (or entity)
realist stance, then I don't have an issue with you about it (was
waiting for that to be clarified further).
We can constructively devise underlying "explanations" without
dogmatically attributing literal existence to them. But if this had
instead within the context of realism, I'd have a distaste for the idea
of an infinite parade of stratums of new entities to explain former
ones. Unending boxes (causes) within boxes (causes) is akin to
mysticism, IMO (more endless unknowns / mysteries remaining at any stage
of postulation / investigation).
>If there is a statistical regularity, then
> there is a cause for it - even if it might
> be experimental error. There is no room
> for an uncaused statistical regularity
> anywhere apart from the realm of
> magic.
How could "uncaused" apply if there was a magic realm responsible
(occult forces, occult personhoods, etc)? I take it that you're using
traditional meanings for "magic" rather than my unconventional
"Foundational, axiomatic, the buck stops here when it comes to
explanations" concerning "miracle regularities". Which would not be
augmented with any metempirical "realms" or "entities" of either
supernatural or natural being.
>If it's magic that you're keen on, then I think
> conversations with witches should be more your aim
> rather than conversations with rational people.
What a charming degree of judgemental and misguided arrogance you keep
releasing. Your penchant for projecting misrepresentations into posts
suggests that you're the one who could feel right at home in a group of
witches, creationists, etc. But as I alluded earlier, this may not have
been deliberate on your part and I'll accept the blame for the
misunderstanding if such is the case.
Peter Brooks
>
>
> >The notion of a 'random' or, alternatively,
> > shows statistical regularity is a
> > nonsensical one. There is no need to
> > ponder any QM or other reality, the
> > mathematics is sound.
>
> If you're not venturing "hidden variables" from a scientific (or entity)
> realist stance, then I don't have an issue with you about it (was
> waiting for that to be clarified further).
>
been putting the simple point that a statistical manifestation as
solid as a half-life has an underlying cause. I think that that's a
pretty realistic and pragmatic position - claiming that it hasn't a
cause is so peculiar as to require some very special pleading.
>
> We can constructively devise underlying "explanations" without
> dogmatically attributing literal existence to them. But if this had
> instead within the context of realism, I'd have a distaste for the idea
> of an infinite parade of stratums of new entities to explain former
> ones. Unending boxes (causes) within boxes (causes) is akin to
> mysticism, IMO (more endless unknowns / mysteries remaining at any stage
> of postulation / investigation).
>
doll, then that's just the nature of the thing, it has more dollies
inside it. You might object to it, curse it, consider it taboo and so
forth, but that won't get rid of the inner dolls no matter how hard
you work at it - you need superglue for that, and even then you
haven't got rid of them, just made them inaccessible. Russian dolls,
incidentally, conform to the standards [only?] physical manifestation
of a regress, that is one that is not infinite.
>
> >If there is a statistical regularity, then
> > there is a cause for it - even if it might
> > be experimental error. There is no room
> > for an uncaused statistical regularity
> > anywhere apart from the realm of
> > magic.
>
> How could "uncaused" apply if there was a magic realm responsible
> (occult forces, occult personhoods, etc)? I take it that you're using
> traditional meanings for "magic" rather than my unconventional
> "Foundational, axiomatic, the buck stops here when it comes to
> explanations" concerning "miracle regularities". Which would not be
> augmented with any metempirical "realms" or "entities" of either
> supernatural or natural being.
>
whistler on the ship 'caused' the storm, but this is only a very loose
usage of the term 'caused'. The method whereby the whistler and the
storm are linked is magic, which does not operate by any physical laws
(that's the point of it).
>
> >If it's magic that you're keen on, then I think
> > conversations with witches should be more your aim
> > rather than conversations with rational people.
>
> What a charming degree of judgemental and misguided arrogance you keep
> releasing. Your penchant for projecting misrepresentations into posts
> suggests that you're the one who could feel right at home in a group of
> witches, creationists, etc. But as I alluded earlier, this may not have
> been deliberate on your part and I'll accept the blame for the
> misunderstanding if such is the case.
>
Peter Brooks
>
>
> >What makes an infinite regress 'insane'? What makes
> > a regress 'infinite'?
>
> So you're not a fan of parsimony? To each his own.
>
simpler.
>
> >Why roll over and die with mystical 'miracle
> > regularities', when you have the alternative of
> > explanation?
>
> Mysticism again? At least the source of this has been revealed. The
> "occult" and scientific realism have two things in common from the
> standpoint that they "can" both concern entities not visible in routine
> perception being an explanation for events. By "miracle regularities" I
> did not mean either, but rather lawful-like events of experience that
> are foundational (simply happen, "float on their own") without hidden
> causes. That is, no further endless(?) substrates, whether natural or
> supernatural, from which they or their appearances emerged.
>
were some in the sixties, but it took an effort of will to believe
that they weren't as organised as any table tapping at a seance.
>
> If any proposed explanatory postulations about empricial / measurable
> regularities were proposed that espoused theoretical entities or
> conditions (like higher dimensions, parallel universes, superstrings,
> etc) these would not be taken to be literally real, but only
> descriptive, useful or pragmatic (if the latter panned-out). There are
> multiple metaphysical interpretations of quantum physics --a
> circumstance almost reminiscent of the point that Kant tried to make
> with his antinomies; so apart from the question of whether any of them
> is useful, an antirealist or nonrealist stance is applicable.
>
(considering the implications of multiple universes is certainly fun -
one implication is that we all live forever, though, of course, not in
all universes) they aren't, as you say, worth taking seriously as
'real'.
>
> >You have, I think, missed the point of my
> > first posting.
>
> You make references to mysticism and feel that I (ONLY) could have
> missed what a post concerned???!!! But I'll grant this is understandable
> from your POV since I may be one of the few people on the planet who'd
> use "miracle" or "miraculous" with the intention that Strawson sometimes
> does. So apologies on my part if this truly isn't the tired, old tactic
> of misrepresentation that you're engaging in.
>
that you say it is a tired old tactic, so, maybe, you see it lurking
by some form of projection.
I think, though, that I've represented a pretty simple,
straightforward point and haven't seen a counter to it. I've no
conscious knowledge of any intention to mislead anybody or to
misrepresent anything as something else.
Dave Smith
I tend to think of events being random in two different ways -- being
irregular (having no discernible or predictable pattern), and being
unrelated (statistically independent). Isn't it possible that certain
events are regular whilst also being statistically independent of all
other events?
Dave
Peter Brooks
in China can be independent of those of people in Brazil, but both can
be regular, so, yes, the two are different.
How can an event be independent of all other events though?
Dave Smith
> How can an event be independent of all other events though?
I tend to assume that every event has a cause, whether or not I know
what the cause is. However, I don't see how such an assumption could
be proved.
Dave
Peter Brooks
However, the very point that started this thread is that, if you
observe a regularity in some behaviour, then it is difficult to see
how there cannot be a cause. Of course the regularity might be a
coincidence - and we're good at spotting those - so just one
regularity doesn't establish the matter.
If, though, you can conduct repeatable experiments that show that in
situation X, you get a constant result Y, as in, if you observe the
radiation from a sample of Uranium 235, you'll find that it has a half-
life of 704 million years, then there must be something about the
atoms that 'knows' when to decay. Otherwise, if it was a random event
(that it each atom decayed utterly spontaneously, based on no history
- in other words had no cause) then two lumps of U235 would be
expected to show different half-lives. This would render the measuring
of half-lives a non-repeatable event.
Even I have managed, successfully, to measure the half life of various
substances within ranges of reasonable experimental error, so they do,
in my view, have a very clear reality.
So I'd say, rather than it being a matter of 'proof' that things have
causes, it is a matter for a sceptic to find something that doesn't.
If there is something, then that's interesting. I think it would be
reasonable to say that things in another universe would have to have
separate causes from things in this universe - that's really what it
means to be a different universe, to have a separate physical
existence or, in other words, a separate causal chain. You couldn't,
because of this, measure things there, so that makes it rather less
interesting as a practically demonstrable phenomenon.
We might be falsely inclined to this view by special circumstances of
where we are - evolution, for example, is a powerful case of very long
observable causal chains. The trouble is that even things observed at
the limits of our ability to observe appear (like radioactivity) to
have causes too.
Dave Smith
I haven't got anything new to say. We ran over many of these
arguments back in November 2002. The thread started out as 'Cuba
Crisis 1962' and was changed to 'Chance'. I raised the 'half life'
issue and Lance produced some 'heavy' quotes favouring an explanation
in terms of indeterminism rather than hidden variables. You seem to
have changed your position somewhat. You might find it interesting to
have a look.
Dave
Peter Brooks
>
>
> I haven't got anything new to say. We ran over many of these
> arguments back in November 2002. The thread started out as 'Cuba
> Crisis 1962' and was changed to 'Chance'. I raised the 'half life'
> issue and Lance produced some 'heavy' quotes favouring an explanation
> in terms of indeterminism rather than hidden variables. You seem to
> have changed your position somewhat. You might find it interesting to
> have a look.
>
much a change of view as an appreciation of the argument. I'm still of
the view that the interpretation is more of a pedagogic just-so story
that can help or hinder understanding the matter itself, but isn't the
same as an explanation - which is contained in the maths.
I like the arguments for indeterminacy, I certainly understand its
appeal, even if, when examined, it doesn't help in the sky-hook
restoration process. I also see the argument against hidden variables,
based, as far as gut-feel is concerned, in an objection to a reliance
on some 'mystical' yet-to-be-discovered but unexplained thing. What I
like is the elegance and simplicity of this observation which I raised
as the 'nice point' of this discussion. It seems difficult to refute.
I'm perfectly happy to admit changes of view and, indeed,
inconsistencies and lack of view on my part. Fortunately I'm not
obliged, even to myself, to be consistent at all times with myself.
Looking at some of the posts you refer to, and they are interesting, I
agree with our inclination to spot patterns where there aren't any -
in white noise, for example. I also think that this most recent
argument is different from that that simply relies upon statistical
regularity. As we discussed then, 'g' is a statistical manifestation
that has predictive power and appears to turn up behind apparently
quite different tests. In the light of this most recent discussion, I
think we have to, as we did then, argue that there is something, or
are some things, that cause 'g', otherwise it couldn't turn up in all
these different places so consistently.
I think that the quote from Lance that you mention is:
"
Randomness at the quantum level is certainly part of a larger
theoretical
framework.
Apparently many people, notably Einstein, believed that a deeper
deterministic theory would be found to subsume QM.
"The search for such theories has come to be known as the search for
hidden
variable theories. The term _hidden variables_ is picturesquely
descriptive
of what is desired. The hope is that back of the probabilistic
variables
observed in quantum mechanics will be found deterministic causal
variables
that will account for the observed probabilistic phenomena, as is
characteristic of classical statistical mechanics. [...] The analysis
of
hidden-variable theories has had a complicated history in modern
physics,
beginning with the celebrated proof of von Neumann that dispersion-
free
states and, consequently, hidden variables are impossible in quantum
mechanics. It is important to realize what the connection between
dispersion-free states and hidden variables is. Dispersion-free
states
correspond intuitively to classical states in which position and
momentum,
for example, are definitely and exactly determined. The central idea
is that
hidden variables lead to the specification of such dispersion-free
states.
Various improvements that weaken the assumptions of von Neumann [made
in his
celebrated proof] have been made subsequently in the literature. [...]
In a
beautiful series of papers beginning with Bell [1964 and 1966] a much
more
reasonable and intuitive treatment of hidden variables has been given,
and
their impossibility has been demonstrated experimentally at a rather
satisfactory level. Without entering into the details, essentially
what Bell
has been able to show is that if we start with the paradox of
Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen (1935), which argues for the incompleteness of
quantum
mechanics, [...] and if we insist that a hidden variable theory that
removes
the incompleteness must satisfy natural conditions of causality and
locality, then by considering a simple system of two particles of
spin
one-half, these conditions cannot be satisfied. There can be no
hidden
variable theory for such two-particle systems. Within the context of
this
analysis, Bell was able to derive an inequality that has come to be
known as
'Bell's inequality', and this has been used by Clauser [et al. 1969]
and
Freedman and Clauser [1972] to show that by use of Bell's inequality
the
existence of local hidden variables imposes restrictions that are, as
Bell
originally showed, in conflict with quantum mechanics, and that,
second, new
experimental data are in agreement with quantum mechanics. Moreover,
well
within the accuracy of experimental error, the data violate the
restrictions
required by local hidden variable theories. [...] I think it is fair
to say
that the outcome of this whole sequence of papers, both theoretical
and
experimental, is to provide perhaps the most conceptually satisfying
confirmation of the ultimately statistical character of quantum
mechanics
that we yet have." [Suppes, p. 23-25, with several omissions].
"
As far as I can see, this doesn't address radioactive decay. There's a
whole discussion of the paradox of non-locality here
http://nostalgia.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox - but, again, it
doesn't address radioactive decay - which doesn't rely on non-local qm
effects. The radioactive decay question is mentioned in:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism#Determinism.2C_quantum_mechanics_and_classical_physics
but, again, there's no contradiction to the particular point of this
thread.