some case law relating to wheel clamping
Alan g
>STEAR v SCOTT (1984)
>Conviction for damage to wheel clamp by removing it : Criminal damage to a wheel
>clamp
Got any more details on this?
>
>CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE v HOYLE (1989)
>Motorist found guilty of criminal damage to wheel clamping hooks
This looks like he damaged a local authority clamp so it was probably
lawfully applied
>
>LLOYD v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (1992)
>Wheelclamping lawful in private car park when unauthorised motorist has been
>warned by notice : Wheelclamping lawful in private car park with warning notices
>and forcible removal causing damage to the clamp held to be an offence
Only if the motorist is held to jave consented.
>
>BLACK & ANOR v CARMICHAEL 1992
>Scotland-wheel clamping held to amount to theft and the demand for payment to
>release the vehicle held to amount to extortion (S)
>
>DAVID ARTHUR AND ANNETTE ARTHUR v ANKER (1996)
>Wheel clamping held to be a lawful remedy against trespassing motorists but
>charges for releasing clamps must not be unreasonable.
>
>SEAGAR ENTERPRISES LTD (T/A ACE SECURITY SERVICES) v COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS &
>EXCISE (NO.15432) (1998)
>Fee for removal of wheel clamp subject to VAT.
>
>MARINA HELEN VINE v WALTHAM FOREST LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL (2000)
>An appellant who had not seen signs warning about clamping could not be held to
>have consented to, or voluntarily assumed the risk of, her car being clamped.
>
>MARCEL AKUMAH v HACKNEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL (2002)
>It was not necessary for the defendant council to make bylaws under s.23(1)
>Housing Act 1985 in order to introduce a parking scheme and have the power to
>park, clamp and remove vehicles. Accordingly, the claimant's car was lawfully
>removed where it was clear that his parking vouchers had been amended and were
>therefore rendered invalid. * Application for leave to appeal to the House of
>Lords pending.
--
Alan G
"The corporate life [of society] must be
subservient to the lives of the parts instead
of the lives of the parts being subservient to
the corporate life."
(Herbert Spencer)
Alasdair Baxter
>>STEAR v SCOTT (1984)
>>Conviction for damage to wheel clamp by removing it : Criminal damage to a wheel
>>clamp
>
>Got any more details on this?
The correct citation is Stear v Scott [1992] RTR 226, DC.
Unfortunately, I don't have access to Road Traffic Reports.
I came across the following article by Peter Seago, part of which is
reproduced below:
"The case of Lloyd v DPP [1992] 1 All ER 982 raises probably more
questions than it answers. The defendant had parked his car in a
private car-park which he was not entitled to enter. There were clear
signs indicating that unauthorised use of the park would result in
wheel clamping and that any clamps fitted would only be removed upon
payment of £25. L’s car was found on the park by the employees of the
security firm employed by the park’s owners to clamp unauthorised
cars; the car was not displaying the necessary permit and so it was
clamped. When L returned and found his car clamped, he had a heated
dispute with the employees of the security firm after which L left his
car on the park and took a taxi. He later returned and sawed through
the chains securing the clamps. He left the clamps and the chains and
drove off. He was charged with criminal damage contrary to s 1(1) of
the Criminal Damage Act 1971. He did not seek to rely on any of the
specific defences under the Act, but on a general defence of lawful
excuse which is preserved by s 5(5) of the Act.
Clearly, the case raises both civil and criminal issues and the Court
of Appeal makes it clear that they wished only to tackle those civil
issues which were necessary to resolve the criminal charges. The court
does not, for96 example, come to any conclusion as to whether or not
wheel clamping is lawful. As far as Lloyd was concerned, the
Divisional Court comes to the conclusion that whether or not the
clamping constituted a trespass, he had taken the risk of having his
wheels clamped and was not in a position to complain when it occurred.
He was, in effect, deemed to have consented to the clamping. Even if
the firm was wrong to refuse to remove the clamps without payment, it
did not follow that the defendant had the right to damage the clamp in
order to recover his car. He had the option of paying the £25 and then
taking action in the civil courts.
The decision in Lloyd seems to be entirely reasonable. If a motorist
leaves his car in a multi-storey car-park where it is made perfectly
clear that the doors will be shut at 19.00 hrs and that they will only
be opened after that time for a payment of £50, he will be deemed to
have accepted this as a term of the contract. It would not be
significantly different if the owners of the car-park had provided
that cars left after 19.00 hrs would be clamped and released only upon
payment of £50. A trespasser can be in no better position than someone
who leaves his car by virtue of a contract or licence. Of course, if
the notice specified a totally unreasonable term, such as cars that
were left after 19.00 hrs would be destroyed, neither the lawful
parker nor the trespasser would be deemed to have consented to it. In
these circumstances the court may well be prepared to sanction the use
of force by the motorist to protect his car against destruction.
Would the answer be different where there are no clear signs warning
the motorist of the possibility of wheel clamping? Not necessarily.
The Divisional Court clearly held as binding the decision in Stear v
Scott (28 March 1984, unreported) where the facts were substantially
indistinguishable, though that case would seem to have been decided,
not upon the basis of consent to wheel clamping, but simply upon the
basis that it was not reasonable to use force to recover your property
when that property had got onto the land of another by means of
trespass.
Does the person who attaches the wheel clamp commit any offence? The
owner of the land is clearly entitled to shut his gates and prevent
the car owner from entering onto his property, though it is equally
clear he is not entitled to destroy the car. Does wheel clamping
constitute criminal damage? It is hard to see that there is any
damage. Admittedly, the clamp has rendered the car inoperative just as
removing the rotor arm renders a car inoperative and it would seem
that removal of a part of the car would constitute criminal damage.
However, whereas removal of the rotor arm requires something to be
done to the car to render it operative, in the case of wheel clamping
the action that is required is to dismantle the clamp. The court in
Lloyd was inclined to think that clamping a car did not constitute
criminal damage. In any case, even had the court taken the opposite
view, it would still have been open to say that the landowner was
justified in attaching the clamp. Would it be possible to argue that a
demand for money for the removal of the clamp constituted an offence
under s 21 of the Theft Act 1968 – making an unwarranted demand with
menaces? Such an approach has been taken in Scotland. However, it is
suggested that the person making the demand would almost certainly
believe he had the right to make the demand".
--
Alasdair Baxter, Nottingham, UK.Tel +44 115 9705100; Fax +44 115 9423263
"It's not what you say that matters but how you say it.
It's not what you do that matters but how you do it"
Alasdair Baxter
>MARCEL AKUMAH v HACKNEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL (2002)
Transport - Road - Road traffic - Parking place - Leaving vehicle
otherwise than as authorised - Claimant being issued with number of
penalty charge notices for failure to display valid visitors parking
permit - Claimant issuing proceedings against defendant - District
judge finding parking permits having been tampered with rendering them
invalid - District judge dismissing claimant’s claim - Judge finding
parking permits not having been tampered with - Whether judge in error
Public authority - Act done in pursuance of public duty or authority -
Public duty or authority - Local authority operating controlled
parking scheme requiring display of valid parking permits - Local
authority clamping or impounding vehicles following refusal to pay
penalty charge notices issued for failure to display valid parking
permits - Whether local authority entitled to operate scheme without
making by-law - Housing Act 1985, s 21(1) - Local Government Act 1972,
s 111
[2002] EWCA Civ 582, (Transcript: Smith Bernal)
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
BUXTON LJ, MOSES J
17 APRIL 2002
17 APRIL 2002
BUXTON LJ: [1] I will ask Moses J to give the first judgment.
E Robb for the Appellant
S Kadri QC and E Pipi for the Respondent
Hackney Legal Services; Clifford Watts Compton
MOSES J: [2] This is an appeal by the Mayor and Burgesses of the
London Borough of Hackney (“the council”), with permission of the full
court, against a decision of His Honour Judge Cotran given on 29 June
2001 at the Shoreditch County Court. He allowed an appeal from a
decision of District Judge Wright delivered on 22 February 2001. She
had dismissed the respondent Mr Akumah’s claim.
[3] On three occasions the council had clamped Mr Akumah’s car
where it was parked on Woodbury Down Estate. That estate belongs to
the council and is managed by it. The council operates a parking
scheme on the estate. There were no specific findings in relation to
the details of that scheme in either of the judgments of the two
judges, but exhibits and Housing Estate Committee documents provide
sufficient information for the purposes of the particular points
raised in this appeal.
[4] The council operates a parking scheme on the estate. It enables
residents, who may purchase permits to park on designated spaces for
their visitors, to purchase 10 vouchers for £2.50 in respect of those
visitors. Each voucher has a space in which can be inserted the day,
the month, the year, the hour and the minute, presumably of first
parking, and the registration number of the car. The instructions on
the front of the permit say that the permit must be displayed visibly
so it can be read from the outside of the vehicle, and that it is an
offence to park without displaying a valid permit. A new voucher is
required for each day of parking.
[5] The instructions on the back warn the holder of the voucher as
follows:
“You are liable to be issued with a penalty charge notice if you:-
indicate false arrival information
do not display a valid voucher when parking
park beyond the time allowed
alter the entry on the voucher.”
[6] Under the heading “Use of Visitors Permits”, the voucher
continues:
“INSTRUCTIONS
1. When you park display with the Visitors Voucher clearly in the
window WITH THE CURRENT VOUCHER COMPLETED IN INK.
2. You must fill in the date, time of parking and registration
number clearly.
3. ANY ATTEMPT TO ALTER ANY OF THE DETAILS ON ANY PARKING VOUCHER
WILL RENDER THE PERMIT INVALID.”
[7] There were further instructions which I need not detail.
[8] On either 25th or 26 January 2000 (it is not wholly clear), the
council issued a penalty charge notice and clamped Mr Akumah’s
vehicle. The parking officer issued a penalty charge notice, known in
the jargon as a “PCN”, and against the word “contravention” shown on
the PCN wrote the code 04. It is apparent from the council’s own
instructions (not referred to on the vouchers themselves) that that
means that the vehicle was parked without displaying a permit.
[9] On 15 February 2001 a parking officer issued a PCN in respect
of Mr Akumah’s car with the code 09, denoting that it had been parked
on a footway. Neither the fact that it had been parked without
displaying a permit on 25 January nor that it had been parked on a
footway was correct.
[10] To have the clamps that were put on the vehicle on those two
occasions removed, Mr Akumah had to pay a total of £120.
[11] On the third occasion, on 1 June 2000, the code that was put
on the PCN that was issued referred to a burnt-out vehicle. The
vehicle was not burnt-out. The vehicle was clamped. Mr Akumah refused
to pay and it was towed away. He refused to pay the sum that would
have enabled him to use the vehicle again.
[12] He appealed using an informal procedure, but asserted
subsequently that despite appealing he had heard no more. He brought
proceedings in the Shoreditch County Court claiming the return of £120
and damages for conversion. I should note that in the pleadings he
complained that the clamping was unlawful because incorrect codes had
been put on the PCN, and asserted that on each occasion the claimant’s
vehicle was properly parked in a residents’ parking bay and displayed
a valid residents’ parking permit.
[13] The defence of the council was unhelpful and inaccurate. It
denied that the coding was incorrect, although it was subsequently
accepted that it was. It denied that the clamping and towing were
unlawful, and further asserted that the appeal procedure had been
properly followed.
[14] There was a reply to the defence that reiterated the
complaints made as to incorrect coding and the inadequacy of the
appeal procedures. The pleadings are surprising because, so far as Mr
Akumah’s claim and reply is concerned, they were well drafted and
clear, despite the fact that Mr Akumah was appearing in person. They
take no point questioning the legality of the council’s power to
introduce the parking scheme on the Woodbury Down Estate. But that
point was raised at the hearing before District Judge Wright in
November 2000. Accordingly, she adjourned the hearing to February 2001
so that Housing Estate Committee documents could be produced.
[15] The District Judge found as a fact that all three vouchers
issued on those three occasions had been tampered with, amended and
were therefore invalid. She observed that the codes on the PCNs were
incorrect, but concluded that that was beside the point. She dismissed
Mr Akumah’s claim.
[16] There were two other features of her judgment. First, she did
refer to the point taken as to the validity of the scheme. She said
that she had looked at the committee documents, that the regulation of
car parking was necessary, but dealt with a point that was apparently
taken before her by Mr Akumah, appearing in person, namely that there
had been no proper consultation. She concluded that there had been
proper consultation - although quite how that fell within the terms of
the claim as made is not clear - but said in any event she could not
deal with any other arguments because they were matters of policy.
[17] Secondly, she referred to the requirement (as she called it)
in the instructions that the voucher be completed in ink, but she made
no finding as to whether in fact any of the vouchers had been
completed in ink or in pencil.
[18] Subsequent to her dismissal of the claim, amended grounds of
appeal were drafted either by Mr Akumah or on his behalf. They raised
a number of points, but the fourth point raised was that the clamping
procedures employed were entirely without lawful basis, and there was
a reference to art 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention
on Human Rights. This point was amplified by contending that the
judge’s rulings were inconsistent with the powers conferred on the
council to make byelaws in relation to regulation of parking of
vehicles on land other than a highway.
[19] His Honour Judge Cotran made no reference to those arguments
whatever in his judgment; although it is conceded by Mr Robb,
appearing for the council, that points were touched on by Mr Akumah,
again appearing in person. But as I have said, they find no reference
in the judgment.
[20] The judge reviewed the District Judge’s judgment in detail,
and rightly noted that her judgment was based on her conclusion that
the vouchers had been tampered with and not on the basis that any of
the vouchers had been completed in pencil. He accepted that if the
permit had been altered, then, as he put it, the validity of the
permit would be impugned. But he went on at p 6F to say:
“The finding that there was an alteration of the details on it,
with the greatest respect, by a visual look at an indentation -
certainly in respect of the third one - is not a finding that I can
accept in the face of the clear position taken by Mr Akumah from the
beginning that it is untrue that it was filled in, in pencil or the
evidence that it was filled in by a guest.”
[21] He then went on to say that even if it had been filled in by
pencil, it would not have been invalid. He overturned the finding by
the District Judge that the permits had been altered.
[22] The respondent today seeks to uphold the decision of His
Honour Judge Cotran on different grounds. In the Respondent’s Notice
he asserts that the parking scheme as a whole is unlawful and that
this has been a live issue throughout the history of this case. That
argument was amplified in the skeleton argument.
[23] Though the Respondent’s Notice was out of time, this was a
matter that had been raised by Mr Akumah, certainly in his grounds of
appeal to Judge Cotran, and appears to have been raised in oral
argument before Judge Cotran. Accordingly, we have given leave for the
point to be argued orally before us today on the limited ground which
I shall identify. As I have said, this was not a point considered by
either of the previous judges in their judgments.
[24] Mr Kadri QC argues that the only power conferred on the local
authority to regulate parking on the estate and to clamp and remove
vehicles was by making byelaws to that effect. He refers, in support
of that submission, firstly to s 23(1) of the Housing Act 1985.
Section 23 reads:
“(1) A local housing authority may make byelaws for the management,
use and regulation of their houses.
(2) A local housing authority may make byelaws with respect to the
use of land held by them by virtue of section 12 (recreation grounds
and other land provided in connection with housing), excluding land
covered by buildings or included in the curtilage of a building or
forming part of a highway.”
[25] That power was extended by s 7 of the Greater London Council
(General Powers) Act 1975. Section 7 reads:
“(1) The powers of the Council, a borough council and the Common
Council of the City of London under section 23(1) of the Housing Act
1985 to make byelaws for the management, use and regulation of houses
provided by them shall extend so as to enable them to make byelaws
prohibiting or regulating the parking or use of vehicles on any land
held by them for the purposes of Part II of that Act, not being a
highway.
(2) Where the Council, a borough council or the Common Council of
the City of London have reasonable cause to believe that an offence
against byelaws made under section 23(1) of the Housing Act 1985 has
been committed in respect of the parking of a vehicle the provisions
of section 17 (Duty to give information in certain cases) of the Act
of 1972 shall apply to such parking as they apply under that section
to the use of a vehicle notwithstanding that the said parking may be
outside the area of the local authority.”
[26] Accordingly, submits Mr Kadri QC, the system in respect of the
estate has no legal authority.
[27] It is accepted that no byelaws under the powers conferred by
the sections to which I have referred have been made. Those
submissions, however, do not deal with the logically prior question:
does the council have power to regulate car parking on Woodbury Down
Estate without making any byelaws at all? In my judgment it does. s
21(1) of the Housing Act 1985 imposes a duty on the council to
exercise management, regulation and control over its houses. It reads:
“21(1) The general management, regulation and control of a local
housing authority’s houses is vested in and shall be exercised by the
authority and the houses shall at all times be open to inspection by
the authority.”
[28] It seems to me in this modern day and age when most residents
will have cars which they wish to park near their homes, that it is
inherent in and certainly conducive and incidental to a council’s duty
to manage, regulate and control their housing, that they should
regulate and control the parking of cars on their housing estate. For
my part, I regard such regulation and control as inherent in the
function which it is the duty of the council to perform under s 21(1).
But even if that were wrong, the council has subsidiary power to do
anything which is conducive or incidental to the discharge of their
functions. That power is contained in s 111 of the Local Government
Act 1972. Section 111(1) reads, under the rubric “subsidiary powers”:
“Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this
section but subject to the provisions of this Act and any other
enactment passed before or after this Act, a local authority shall
have power to do any thing (whether or not involving the expenditure,
borrowing or lending of money or the acquisition of any property or
rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or
incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions.”
[29] It must be emphasised that because that is a subsidiary power,
it is necessary to identify the function with which the power the
council purports to exercise under s 111 is linked. There is no
difficulty in identifying such a function. It is contained in s 21(1).
[30] Mr Kadri QC argued that the function under s 21(1) does not
include the regulation of parking, nor is regulation of parking
incidental or conducive to the function in s 21(1): it is a wholly
separate and distinct function. If, he submits, regulating parking was
inherent or subsidiary to that housing function under s 21(1), so too
it would have been subsidiary or inherent in the management, use and
regulation of council’s homes under s 23(1). In that event there was
no need for Parliament to extend the power to make byelaws by means of
s 7 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1975.
[31] I do not agree. Section 23 of the Housing Act 1985 and s 7 of
the 1975 Act are concerned with the power of the local authority to
make byelaws which carry with them the right to prosecute and impose
criminal sanctions. Particular care is therefore required to identify
the source of such powers. Moreover, s 7 widens the power to make
byelaws beyond the management, regulation and use of houses to any
land, not being a highway, held for the purposes of housing and
provides the power to acquire information where there is reasonable
cause to believe an offence contrary to the byelaws has been
committed.
[32] I do not therefore accept that the impact of the extension of
powers beyond those in s 23(1) of the 1985 Act is such as to make it
impossible to take a common sense view of the nature of the function
of regulating and managing a housing estate. As a matter of common
sense, that function includes regulation of car parking, or at least
carries with it that power which is plainly conducive and incidental
to the housing function under s 21(1).
[33] No other point was taken before us today by Mr Kadri QC. He
has not pursued the written argument relating to the Human Rights Act,
which was not in force in any event at the time these actions were
taken by council, nor has there been any argument in relation to the
actions of clamping and towing away of cars. This is not surprising,
since no facts were found such as would enable the court to reach any
conclusion had such arguments been advanced. I conclude that the
introduction of the parking scheme was lawful, despite the absence of
any byelaws.
[34] I turn next to the ruling of His Honour Judge Cotran,
particularly that passage I have already cited at p 6F Mr Kadri QC
says it was open to the judge to disagree with the findings of fact of
District Judge Wright. He was not an expert, but nor was she. The
issue has become confused by questions as to the use of pencil. It
appears that the use of a pencil has some relevance, because it was
only by use of the pencil first and a pen later that the alterations
could be made, making it appear as if there had only been one entry.
But that is beside the point. District Judge Wright was clearly
entitled to find that the vouchers had been tampered with. Her finding
did not merely depend upon examination of those vouchers. There had
been no denial of tampering of those vouchers during the course of the
arguments raised by Mr Akumah. It was not a point taken by him at any
stage in his grounds of appeal. If he denied that those vouchers had
been tampered with, I, for one, would have expected him to say so. But
he never did. On the contrary, he appears to have blamed somebody else
on the second and third occasions. The finding, as I have said, was
clearly open to District Judge Wright. It was not open to Judge Cotran
to dismiss her findings because of Mr Akumah’s denial that he had
filled in the vouchers in pencil or on the basis that he had said that
the vouchers had been filled in by a guest which was, after all, a
statement that did not meet the point at all.
[35] He had not heard the witness. The only basis upon which he
appears to have allowed the appeal, as he himself says, was the fact
that he concluded that the mere filling in of a voucher by pencil was
not invalid. But that was not the basis of District Judge Wright’s
decision. The only other basis found by His Honour Judge Cotran was,
as I have said, to disturb the factual findings of District Judge
Wright, which he was not entitled to do.
[36] The vouchers were altered and were, accordingly, invalid. I
only add that I do not think it wise to make any ruling on what the
position would be if the only defect in the vouchers was that they
were filled in in pencil. That is not this case. I, for my part, would
allow the appeal and restore the decision of District Judge Wright.
BUXTON LJ: [37] I agree with everything that has fallen from my Lord.
I only add two very small footnotes.
[38] The first is to reinforce what my Lord has said about the
relationship between s 7 of the Greater London Council (General
Powers) Act 1975 and s 23(1) of the Housing Act 1985. Mr Kadri argued
that the contrast between those two sections demonstrated that the
powers under s 23(1) were limited as he said them to be. It is however
clear, in my judgement, as my Lord has already said, that s 7(1)
extends the powers of a housing authority beyond those in s 23(1), or
at least avoids any unclarity in the important area of making byelaws.
In particular, s 7(1) of the 1975 Act extends to the regulation of
parking on any land held for the purposes of Pt II of the Housing Act
1985. It is clear from that Part, and not least from s 17(4) of it,
that there may be circumstances where a housing authority holds land
for the purposes of Pt II of the 1985 Act, but where there is no
housing yet in place. That is quite clear from the terms of the
statute. The making of or power to make byelaws in respect of land
that is not currently being used for housing purposes, and which may
indeed be well away from the area of the local authority, does seem to
me to be an extension of the power in s 23(1), and one that therefore
shows that those who drafted the Act of 1975 cannot be assumed to have
taken the view of the reach of s 23(1) that Mr Kadri urges.
[39] The second and quite different point is this. The court had
some considerable hesitation in permitting the matters raised in the
Respondent’s Notice to be raised at all. As my Lord has said, they
were not raised in the original grounds before the District Judge.
They, or at least some complaint, was raised orally before her by Mr
Akumah, but in terms (and it is no criticism of him) that are not
wholly clear. The matter was not addressed at all by Judge Cotran. We
were in the end persuaded by Mr Kadri that because of that history,
and bearing in mind the fact that Mr Akumah had been representing
himself until a late stage, we should entertain the submissions that
Mr Kadri wished to make. But I would emphasise that all that we have
decided, on what may be a question that further arises as to the
management and validity of local authority parking schemes, is the
point that turns on the availability of the powers to be found in s 21
of the Housing Act 1985 and s 111 of the Local Government Act 1972.
There may be other issues to be debated about the reach and extent of
local authority housing parking schemes that are not covered, or not
necessarily covered, by those considerations. We did not enter into
anything of that sort: first, because we were not invited to; but
secondly, because of the history of the matter we had absolutely no
factual findings, and indeed no information, about the detailed nature
of this scheme so far as its requirements are concerned, other than
those that were set out before District Judge Wright. We have
therefore decided the matter on that limited basis, and I think it
right to emphasise that that is the limit of this court’s judgment.
[40] Those remarks, as I say, are merely ones of footnote. I also
would allow the appeal.
Paul C. Dickie
<l...@london.com> writes
>[2002] EWCA Civ 582, (Transcript: Smith Bernal)
>COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
>BUXTON LJ, MOSES J
>17 APRIL 2002
>council issued a penalty charge notice and clamped Mr Akumah’s
>vehicle. The parking officer issued a penalty charge notice, known in
>the jargon as a “PCN”, and against the word “contravention” shown on
>the PCN wrote the code 04. It is apparent from the council’s own
>instructions (not referred to on the vouchers themselves) that that
>means that the vehicle was parked without displaying a permit.
> [9] On 15 February 2001 a parking officer issued a PCN in respect
>of Mr Akumah’s car with the code 09, denoting that it had been parked
>on a footway. Neither the fact that it had been parked without
>displaying a permit on 25 January nor that it had been parked on a
>footway was correct.
> [10] To have the clamps that were put on the vehicle on those two
>occasions removed, Mr Akumah had to pay a total of £120.
> [11] On the third occasion, on 1 June 2000, the code that was put
>on the PCN that was issued referred to a burnt-out vehicle. The
>vehicle was not burnt-out.
And yet he lost his case, on a lot of quibbling whether or not the
vouchers had been rendered invalid -- which is surely quite *another*
offence code -- rather than on the facts of the case as presented above.
When a court sees fit to reinterpret the case as it pleases, is it any
wonder that folk are ceasing to have any belief that justice might
prevail for any individual citizen?
The stuff about whether or not the council had the right to impose such
restrictions was irrelevant, as was any mention of the Human Rights Act.
What *was* relevant was the nature of the penalty charge notices issued
and the claims made on them by the parking goon, yet that seems to have
been quietly forgotten by the judges almost as soon as they started to
pontificate at some length about matters which had, frankly, next to
bugger all to do with the case before them.
Presumably the date at [9] is a typo and should read "15 February 2000"
which would restore the sequence of events. It seems to have been
accepted that, on 25/1/00, the vehicle had a valid ticket displayed and
that on 15/02/00, the vehicle was not parked on a footway; at [11], it
seems to have been accepted that the vehicle was not "burnt out" as
alleged on the PCN. One really must wonder just why Mr Akumah lost his
case, if none of the allegations made by the parking goon(s) was
accepted.
I really do hope he takes his case further -- to Europe, if needs be.
--
< Paul >
Alan g
wrote:
>On Sat, 08 Mar 2003 19:19:08 +0000, Alan g<m...@privacy.net> wrote:
>
>>>STEAR v SCOTT (1984)
>>>Conviction for damage to wheel clamp by removing it : Criminal damage to a wheel
>>>clamp
>>
>>Got any more details on this?
>
>
>The correct citation is Stear v Scott [1992] RTR 226, DC.
>Unfortunately, I don't have access to Road Traffic Reports.
>
>I came across the following article by Peter Seago, part of which is
>reproduced below:
>
>"The case of Lloyd v DPP [1992] 1 All ER 982 raises probably more
>questions than it answers. The defendant had parked his car in a
Indeed it does
Thank you for posting this. It still does not clear up the issue of
whether it is permissible to remove a privately applied wheel clamp
only that in certain circumstances it isn't.
--
Alan g
>In article <k5fk6v8aq5gkv6r0m...@4ax.com>, Alan says...
>
>>>STEAR v SCOTT (1984)
>
>>Got any more details on this?
>
>STEAR v SCOTT (1984)
It raises as many questions as it answers.
In *a particular* circumstance it is illegal to remove a clamp. The
implication is that in other circumstances it would be perfectly legal
to remove a clamp.
Seems to be we suck it and see.
>
>DC 28.3.84
>
>Appeal by motorist against conviction for unlawful damage to a wheel
>clamp (Denver boot) contrary to s.1(1) Criminal Damage Act 1971 by removing
>same with a crowbar when he found his car had been `clamped' for parking
>in restricted area in a hospital car park,& throwing the clamp over a
>parapet. HELD: The prosecution submitted the Health Authority was
>entitled to wheel clamp by virtue of a right analogous to the rights of a
>landowner with straying animals & referred to various passages referring
>to Clerk & Lindsell on Torts: Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts &
>Glanville Williams on Animals but it appears for the purposes of the case
>unnecessary to decide on what the rights of the Health Authority were in
>relation to the appellant's car on their land. Appellant was a trespasser
>& had no right to park the car where he did. To provide a defence he has
>to show that a person who brings his chattel on to another's land is
>entitled to use force to take it back. Even if the fixing of the clamp
>was a counter-trespass by the Health Authority, no authority found
>showing appellant was entitled to use force in removing it or to throw
>the clamp over the parapet. In YB 9 Edw.IV 35 per Clerk & Lindsell on
>Torts(15th Ed)p.1,113 it is said that if a man takes my goods by force on
>to his land I may enter his land and retake my goods & the entry is
>lawful but if I bail my goods to a man,I cannot justify entry to retake
>them for it is by no wrong that they came there. Appellant parked his car
>in a restricted space after warnings not to do so. A notice on the car
>notified him that he could go to the reception desk to have the clamp
>removed. The appellant did not have a reasonable excuse within s.1 or s.5
>Criminal Damage Act 1971 & was rightly convicted of criminal damage to
>the wheel clamp. Appeal dismissed.
>
>RTR 226