> I don't think it's at all helpful to refer to a formal document by a
> non-intuitive name, orn ambiguous and even less intuitive acronym. The
> document we are talking about here is a letter sent by the police
> following an allegation of harassment; calling it an "allegation od
> harassment letter" or a "harassment warning letter" is both
> unambiguous and clearly reflects its actual purpose. I am deeply,
> deeply suspicious of the motives of anyone who wishes to obscure its
> purpose by insisting on a non-intuitive name.
>
The CA comment on this may be of interest if you have not seen it -
especially the bit in parentheses:
56.. Notwithstanding the suggestion in the Practice Advice that the
use of the word "warning" should be avoided in police notification
letters, (a suggestion carefully followed in this case), the fact is
that the tone and content of the letter are unmistakably those of a
warning. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that one can find many
references to a letter of this kind as a "warning" letter. Similarly, it
is referred to in the CRIS report as a "FIHW" - i.e. a first instance
harassment warning. This has certain adverse consequences for Ms T. One
is that a person reading the letter and the CRIS report would naturally
conclude that the police thought there was some truth in the allegation,
since, if they did not, they would simply have recorded the fact of the
allegation without taking any further action. (The judge did not accept
that service of the letter carried the implication that the police have
given credence to the allegation, but on this question we respectfully
disagree with him.) Another is that information of this kind, clearly
falling well short of a conviction, might be disclosed in response to a
request for an enhanced criminal record certificate (although it is fair
to say that there appears to have been no instance yet in which that has
occurred). However, even putting that possibility aside, in the light of
the authorities to which we have referred, in particular Wood and S, we
think that the letter and the CRIS report contained information of a
personal kind, the systematic processing and retention of which will
involve an unlawful interference with the right to respect for private
life unless it can be justified. Moreover, even if the information is
properly to be regarded as public in nature, it is of a kind which the
subject can reasonably expect to be forgotten about over the course of
time and so enter the sphere of private life: see L, per Lord Hope,
paragraph [27]. In our view, therefore, the judge was right to hold that
article 8 was engaged.