Debit card fraudulently used

[Phil Mcbride]

Hello,

I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.

One of them was a charge to an online gambling casino (Neogames
Internet GB), a hotel abroad and other small value transactions. I
didn't do any of these. An example of one of the fraudulent
transactions is below:

POS **** 17MAY12 , NEOGAMES 356 2248 , 4974 , INTERNET GB £25

After answering some security questions and cancelling the card, the
bank said they'd refund me the money and report the matter to the
police.

I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
your security code)?

Realistically what are the police going to do about this?

What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details
for buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)

Thanks.

Phil

[Dr Zoidberg]

"Phil Mcbride" <philmc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:28ad5401-c149-4f73...@w24g2000vby.googlegroups.com...

To answer your last question first, you don't tend to be able to buy child
porn with a credit card so there's not too much to worry about there.

As for how they got your card details, "almost never" is plenty of
opportunity for them to have leaked out - either through a compromised
database or unscrupulous member of staff.
They won't have needed your PIN or three digit security code - the criminals
know where they can make purchases with just a long card number and expiry
date.

--
Alex

[Periander]

On 28-May-2012, Phil Mcbride <philmc...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
> ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
> credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
> and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
> your security code)?

The most probable explanation is that one of the on-line purchases you made
was just a we bit bent and the vendor kept your debit card info that they
then sold on. Your card will then have been used to purchase goods and
services, most of which wouldn't show up as being suspicious to your bank,
the banks use a variaty of means to monitor purchases and in due course that
last one flagged up.

> Realistically what are the police going to do about this?

The banks and police have agreements in place, once the banks trace the
fraudsters the details are passed to police who will arrest/charge as
appropriate. The rational is this - the bank has refunded you, you have thus
lost nothing, the bank is the victim, the police cannot investigate without
access to the various banks transactions databases, the bank wont allow that
so they do the financial investigation side, the police will act on the
package delivered to them the bank.

--

All the best,

Periander

[Andy Burns]

Phil Mcbride wrote:

> I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
> asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.

> How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
> and security code

Presumably they purchased services where they knew the card number alone
would suffice (a cardholder not present transaction).

> Realistically what are the police going to do about this?

I doubt it'll be reported to them.

[steve robinson]

The fraudsters steal your details from the atm machines

[Nightjar]

On 28/05/2012 16:10, Phil Mcbride wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
> asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.
>
> One of them was a charge to an online gambling casino (Neogames
> Internet GB), a hotel abroad and other small value transactions. I
> didn't do any of these. An example of one of the fraudulent
> transactions is below:
>
> POS **** 17MAY12 , NEOGAMES 356 2248 , 4974 , INTERNET GB £25
>
> After answering some security questions and cancelling the card, the
> bank said they'd refund me the money and report the matter to the
> police.
>
> I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
> ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
> credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
> and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
> your security code)?

There are numerous devices for harvesting data at ATMs; a fairly crude
loop of tape that stops the card being ejected until the crook retrieves
it, cameras that show the card as it goes in and the PIN entered into
keypad, skimmers attached to the slot that read the magnetic stripe as
the card goes in and even complete false ATM fronts that have one or
more of these built in.

> Realistically what are the police going to do about this?

Probably nothing. However, it may help them establish a pattern that
leads to the criminal or it might be something they can add to a list of
crimes if something else leads them to the culprit.

Colin Bignell

[A.Lee]

Phil Mcbride <philmc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
> asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.

....

> After answering some security questions and cancelling the card, the
> bank said they'd refund me the money and report the matter to the
> police.
>
> I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
> ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
> credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
> and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
> your security code)?

You probably have inadvertently had your card read by a 'card reader'
attached to an ATM. A TV show recently showed how it is done, and that
the crooks no longer clone the card immediately, they wait a few weeks,
so that the victim does not know where they had their card read.

There are still many thousands/millions of places worldwide that will
accept a credit/debit card without either the PIN, or confirmation of
identity.

Only last Friday I used a little used card at a shop I use often, had
forgotten the PIN, and they inputted the details while I was there,
without the PIN. It did go through.

> Realistically what are the police going to do about this?

Nothing.

> What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details
> for buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)

Nothing.


--
To reply by e-mail, change the ' + ' to 'plus'.

[Mike Scott]

On 28/05/12 16:10, Phil Mcbride wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
> asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.
>
> One of them was a charge to an online gambling casino (Neogames
> Internet GB), a hotel abroad and other small value transactions. I
> didn't do any of these. An example of one of the fraudulent
> transactions is below:
>
> POS **** 17MAY12 , NEOGAMES 356 2248 , 4974 , INTERNET GB £25
>
> After answering some security questions and cancelling the card, the
> bank said they'd refund me the money and report the matter to the
> police.

Cynical me, maybe - but was it actually the bank? I'm assuming /you/
answered the 'security questions'??

>
> I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
> ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
> credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
> and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
> your security code)?

Maybe they didn't. But it looks like you've just given away some
interesting info over the phone.

>
> Realistically what are the police going to do about this?
>
> What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details
> for buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)
>
> Thanks.
>
> Phil

I think I'd call the bank.....


--
Mike Scott (unet2 <at> [deletethis] scottsonline.org.uk)
Harlow Essex England

[Roland Perry]

In message <28ad5401-c149-4f73...@w24g2000vby.googlegroup
s.com>, at 16:10:04 on Mon, 28 May 2012, Phil Mcbride
<philmc...@gmail.com> remarked:

>I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
>ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
>credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
>and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
>your security code)?

The potential elephant in the room is "inside job".

>Realistically what are the police going to do about this?

Not much, they'll probably just send it as a statistic to the DCPCU

http://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/Police-The-dcpcu.asp

(You'll note that "insiders" is one of their four risks).

>What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details
>for buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)

Not much unless the police seize an illegal pay-per-view server with
your details on. Even then, they have probably learnt from earlier
unhappy ventures and should note that your card was reported as
compromised.
--
Roland Perry

[TTman]

"Phil Mcbride" <philmc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:28ad5401-c149-4f73...@w24g2000vby.googlegroups.com...

Looks like you card was compromised with a camera and skimmer installed into
an ATM machine....
The skimmer reads the code and the camera records your PIN entry.
The police will definitely be interested...

[Jethro_uk]

On Mon, 28 May 2012 16:10:04 +0100, Phil Mcbride wrote:

> What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details for
> buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)

Google "Operation Ore". You would have gone down the steps (unless you
did the decent thing like some accused, and topped yourself).

[Jethro_uk]

On Mon, 28 May 2012 17:40:03 +0100, Dr Zoidberg wrote:

> To answer your last question first, you don't tend to be able to buy
> child porn with a credit card so there's not too much to worry about
> there.

Operation Ore ? Landslide ?

[Phil Mcbride]

Mike Scott wrote:
> On 28/05/12 16:10, Phil Mcbride wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
> > asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.
> >
> > One of them was a charge to an online gambling casino (Neogames
> > Internet GB), a hotel abroad and other small value transactions. I
> > didn't do any of these. An example of one of the fraudulent
> > transactions is below:
> >
> > POS **** 17MAY12 , NEOGAMES 356 2248 , 4974 , INTERNET GB £25
> >
> > After answering some security questions and cancelling the card, the
> > bank said they'd refund me the money and report the matter to the
> > police.
>
> Cynical me, maybe - but was it actually the bank? I'm assuming /you/
> answered the 'security questions'??

You are right to be cynical. I too was cynical when the bank called me
up - I hung up and made a mental note to go home and Google for the
number that came up on my mobile phone before answering.

Anyway, I forgot to do so and they called again. IIRC the call was
just to confirm I was the account holder (an automated voice read out
my name, so at this stage I knew they had my phone number and bank
account name, making it less likely to be phone harvesters), and then
they said "Do you recognise these transactions..."

I pressed "1" which was the response if one or more were not
recognised and got passed on to a human operator.

>
> >
> > I've been thinking that I almost never use my Debit Card except at
> > ATMs. For online purchases or at restaurants/shops, I always use my
> > credit card. How could the fraudsters have gotten my card details, PIN
> > and security code (some online transactions ask for 3 characters of
> > your security code)?
>
> Maybe they didn't. But it looks like you've just given away some
> interesting info over the phone.

After I confirmed I didn't recognise some transactions I was told by
the human operator they will put a block on my account and I had to go
into a branch with photographic ID to unblock it, and answer further
questions.

The account was duly blocked from my internet banking so if it was the
fraudsters they have a slick operation going!

[Periander]

On 28-May-2012, Jethro_uk <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:

> > What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details for
> > buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)
>
> Google "Operation Ore". You would have gone down the steps (unless you
> did the decent thing like some accused, and topped yourself).

Yup terrible that, a few folks who had had their credit cards stolen were
investigated because their cards were used to access websites showing
children being used for sex - and were released NFA once the facts had been
established. At the same times and a little later in the case of appeals a
whole host of wannabe and actual child abusers claimed that they'd had their
card details stolen as well ... tough shit.

... and yes, just for the avoidance of doubt I see no difference between
someone paying to see a child being raped and otherwise used for sex and he
person(s) actually carrying out the act, in fact I see no difference between
those who would defend such activity and those who actually carry it out.
Colour me old fashioned and even prejudiced I simple hate scumball rapists.

Appreciating that this is a somewhat inflammatory subject - or at least it
was on the unmoderated group where a great many child abusers used to post
incessantly on the unfairness of being locked up and placed on the sex
offender register merely because they'd raped a child or watched the images
of one being raped the above shall be my last words on the subject - at
least on this thread.

[Zapp Brannigan]

"Jethro_uk" <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote in message
news:hvRwr.438324$JQ.7...@fx02.am4...

Can you cite any proven examples of false conviction resulting from
fraudulent use in the Ore cases? There is an oft-stated assertion that
many innocents were swept up with the trawl, but when the best available
test case was put forward for appeal it didn't withstand scrutiny at all.

See para 54 - "These suggestions are fanciful in the extreme. The appellant’s
theory (for it is no more than such) that he was the victim of the
machinations of a fraudulent webmaster is, in our view, pure speculation."
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/o-shea-judgment-06122010.pd

[steve robinson]

From a personal POV i would rather they be placed on the gallows than
the sex offenders register

[Big Les Wade]

Zapp Brannigan <ZBr...@DOOP.com> posted

>
>"Jethro_uk" <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote in message
>news:hvRwr.438324$JQ.7...@fx02.am4...
>> On Mon, 28 May 2012 16:10:04 +0100, Phil Mcbride wrote:
>>
>>> What would have happened to me if the fraudsters used these details for
>>> buying or accessing illegal services? (child porn comes to mind)
>>
>> Google "Operation Ore". You would have gone down the steps (unless you
>> did the decent thing like some accused, and topped yourself).
>
>Can you cite any proven examples of false conviction resulting from
>fraudulent use in the Ore cases?

False convictions are hard to establish because the legal establishment
is so resistant to overturning them. The O'Shea one you cite is very
shaky indeed, but the judges used every possible tirck of self-deception
to uphold it.

But what you have to recall is the mere fact of an investigation is seen
as an accusation and is enough to produce dreadful consequences for the
accused person and his family. It is even worse if the suspect is
bullied or bluffed into accepting a caution, as in the case of Charles
Redman.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1439081/Sex-offender-doctor-is-sti
ll-allowed-to-treat-NHS-patients.html

"Mr Redman, who is married with a teenage son, was arrested at his
Derbyshire home in December after his credit card details were found at
a child porn website. He was suspended by the University Hospital. In
April, he accepted a police caution and was placed on the sex offenders'
register for five years."

Aside from the personal cost to Redman himself, the trust he worked for
had to replace him with a locum at an *additional* cost of about
£100,000, if I recall correctly. The police subsequently rescinded the
caution but never accepted any blame.

The full saga in all its instalments used to be on the Staffordshire
Sentinel website but has been removed following a relaunch of the
paper's site.

>There is an oft-stated assertion that many innocents were swept up with
>the trawl, but when the best available test case was put forward for
>appeal it didn't withstand scrutiny at all.

What you mean is "The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal." That's not
the same as "It didn't withstand scrutiny".

>See para 54 - "These suggestions are fanciful in the extreme. The
>appellant’s theory (for it is no more than such) that he was the
>victim of the machinations of a fraudulent webmaster is, in our view,
>pure speculation."
>http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/o-shea-jud
>gment-06122010.pd

I read the O'Shea judgement carefully at the time. The EWCA judges'
comments were very largely naive rubbish, or worse.

--
Les

[Mark]

On Mon, 28 May 2012 22:55:02 +0100, Phil Mcbride
<philmc...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
>Mike Scott wrote:
>> On 28/05/12 16:10, Phil Mcbride wrote:
>> > Hello,
>> >
>> > I recently got a call from Natwest's fraud prevention department
>> > asking me to confirm some suspicious transactions.
>> >
>> > One of them was a charge to an online gambling casino (Neogames
>> > Internet GB), a hotel abroad and other small value transactions. I
>> > didn't do any of these. An example of one of the fraudulent
>> > transactions is below:
>> >
>> > POS **** 17MAY12 , NEOGAMES 356 2248 , 4974 , INTERNET GB £25
>> >
>> > After answering some security questions and cancelling the card, the
>> > bank said they'd refund me the money and report the matter to the
>> > police.
>>
>> Cynical me, maybe - but was it actually the bank? I'm assuming /you/
>> answered the 'security questions'??
>
>You are right to be cynical. I too was cynical when the bank called me
>up - I hung up and made a mental note to go home and Google for the
>number that came up on my mobile phone before answering.

It is possible to spoof caller ID information and I have occasionally
received calls myself with erroneous CLID.

>Anyway, I forgot to do so and they called again. IIRC the call was
>just to confirm I was the account holder (an automated voice read out
>my name, so at this stage I knew they had my phone number and bank
>account name, making it less likely to be phone harvesters), and then
>they said "Do you recognise these transactions..."

It's unlikely but possible. The only way I would reveal information
is if I called them myself (assuming they can't/won't prove who they
are first).

With regards to how they get your details - they don't exclusively
rely on ATMs. I have seen fraudulent use of my credit cards on more
than one occasion and they had *never* seen the inside of an ATM.

One card had only ever been used 4 times (at large, reputable
retailers -- all online) but no-one seemed bothered about it (except
me).

In the latest case my credit card company did not spot it so the
fraudster(s) got over a month for their spending spree. The
transactions could not have been more untypical of my spending and I
had already tried to close the account so they should have noticed.
--
(\__/) M.
(='.'=) If a man stands in a forest and no woman is around
(")_(") is he still wrong?

[Nick Odell]

On Tue, 29 May 2012 15:25:02 +0100, Mark
<i...@dontgetlotsofspamanymore.invalid> wrote:

>
>It's unlikely but possible. The only way I would reveal information
>is if I called them myself (assuming they can't/won't prove who they
>are first).
>

If you call them back, use your cellphone or skype or you may fall
victim to the latest cunning stunt:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/may/23/credit-card-users-phone-call-courier-scam?newsfeed=true

Essentially, you phone your own bank on the number of your choosing
and you still end up talking to the fraudsters. It's not quite as
simple as that but the article explains better than I could.

Nick

[Ken]

In article
<28ad5401-c149-4f73...@w24g2000vby.googlegroups.com>,
Phil Mcbride <philmc...@gmail.com> writes

The buyers bank pays, or takes back from as the case may be, the
seller's bank. They don't know who the money goes to, and have no
commercial incentive to investigate anything, or seek to find out.
--
Ken

[Andy Burns]

Nick Odell wrote:

> If you call them back, use your cellphone or skype or you may fall
> victim to the latest cunning stunt:
>
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/may/23/credit-card-users-phone-call-courier-scam?newsfeed=true
>
> Essentially, you phone your own bank on the number of your choosing
> and you still end up talking to the fraudsters.

Use the "RECALL" button in your land line phone to clear down the line
first.

When the suspected fraudster phones, briefly press "R" or "Recall",
you'll get a dial tone, the fraudster is on hold, replace the receiver,
your phone will give a ringback, don't answer it (if you do you'll
reconnect to the fraudster) eventually the ringing will stop and your
line is cleared, the fraudster is gone, you can safely make an outbound
call.

[Zapp Brannigan]

"Big Les Wade" <L...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
news:UVLduWJn...@obviously.invalid...
> Zapp Brannigan <ZBr...@DOOP.com> posted

>>There is an oft-stated assertion that many innocents were swept up with
>>the trawl, but when the best available test case was put forward for
>>appeal it didn't withstand scrutiny at all.
>
> What you mean is "The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal." That's not the
> same as "It didn't withstand scrutiny".

No, I meant what I wrote. I also read the judgement carefully, and felt
that the appellant's claim of innocence was fatally undermined by the facts
(in particular paras 26 & 27). You perceive it differently, as you have
said.

I would not have been surprised (or unhappy) to see a few successful
appeals, because I was philosophically open to the possibility that an
operation on the scale of Ore might trawl some false positives. But if the
O'Shea case was the best available to inquisition21 et al, I don't need to
lose any sleep over that.

Earlier link was broken, btw -
<www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/o-shea-judgment-06122010.pdf>

[Mark]

Why do people still fall for these? There's so many clear signs it's
a scam.

[Adam Funk]

On 2012-05-29, Nick Odell wrote:

> If you call them back, use your cellphone or skype or you may fall
> victim to the latest cunning stunt:
>
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/may/23/credit-card-users-phone-call-courier-scam?newsfeed=true
>
> Essentially, you phone your own bank on the number of your choosing
> and you still end up talking to the fraudsters. It's not quite as
> simple as that but the article explains better than I could.

Why why why, in this modern world, does the phone system not
disconnect a call completely once one party hangs up?

[Man at B&Q]

On May 29, 11:30 pm, Andy Burns <usenet.aug2...@adslpipe.co.uk> wrote:
> Nick Odell wrote:
> > If you call them back, use your cellphone or skype or you may fall
> > victim to the latest cunning stunt:
>

> >http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/may/23/credit-card-users-phone-c...

>
> > Essentially, you phone your own bank on the number of your choosing
> > and you still end up talking to the fraudsters.
>
> Use the "RECALL" button in your land line phone to clear down the line
> first.
>
> When the suspected fraudster phones, briefly press "R" or "Recall",
> you'll get a dial tone, the fraudster is on hold, replace the receiver,
> your phone will give a ringback, don't answer it (if you do you'll
> reconnect to the fraudster) eventually the ringing will stop and your
> line is cleared, the fraudster is gone, you can safely make an outbound
> call.

That depends on what services you have paid for from your landline
provider.

MBQ

[Ken]

In article <jq10ln$33r$1...@dont-email.me>, Zapp Brannigan
<ZBr...@DOOP.com> writes

I don't know anything about the case other than following the link that
you generously provided. But what I surmise is that the police made an
unannounced visit to the man's home, carried out a search, took away
computer hard drives and removable media for forensic examination. They
then failed to find any incriminating evidence, but instead relied upon
such evidence from a completely different person, that has no connection
with him other than being charged with the same crime.

You might say, ah but he could have downloaded the information to a
micro SD card, dug a 10 foot hole in the garden, filled in the hole, and
then planted an oak tree on the top of it. But quite apart from the fact
that he was presumably downloading the information to look at it, not to
record it for posterity, I recollect that computer experts that post to
this news group, have suggested that the computer would leave an
electronic trail that would be difficult, if not impossible, to erase.

--
Ken

[Bill Borland]

In article <c35h99x...@news.ducksburg.com>, Adam Funk
<a24...@ducksburg.com> writes

>
>Why why why, in this modern world, does the phone system not
>disconnect a call completely once one party hangs up?

So that the called party can hang up, go to a more convenient
extension, and re-answer without losing the call.
--
Bill Borland

[Andy Burns]

Man at B&Q wrote:

> Andy Burns<usenet.aug2...@adslpipe.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> When the suspected fraudster phones, briefly press "R" or "Recall"
>

> That depends on what services you have paid for from your landline
> provider.

I don't believe it does.

Certainly you use a similar procedure to establish a three-way call, but
AFAIA recall itself isn't a paid-for service, you may need to set a
switch under the phone between TBR and ER or similar though. Maybe if
you're not a BT customer it might vary.

[Andy Burns]

Adam Funk wrote:

> Why why why, in this modern world, does the phone system not
> disconnect a call completely once one party hangs up?

Then how would you transfer a call from one extension to another?

[Adam Funk]

I know that's the historical explanation, but *now*, when many people
who want to do that sort of thing have linked phones, why should some
miscreant be able to hijack your phone line after you (think you) have
hung up?

Even if the facility to hang up & reconnect is still useful for some
people, the phone companies could probably provide some special code
(maybe a * or # code) that will definitely terminate the previous call
after hanging up & picking it up again.

[Mark Goodge]

On Wed, 30 May 2012 22:05:02 +0100, Adam Funk put finger to keyboard and
typed:

>On 2012-05-30, Bill Borland wrote:
>
>> In article <c35h99x...@news.ducksburg.com>, Adam Funk
>><a24...@ducksburg.com> writes
>>>
>>>Why why why, in this modern world, does the phone system not
>>>disconnect a call completely once one party hangs up?
>>
>> So that the called party can hang up, go to a more convenient
>> extension, and re-answer without losing the call.
>
>I know that's the historical explanation, but *now*, when many people
>who want to do that sort of thing have linked phones, why should some
>miscreant be able to hijack your phone line after you (think you) have
>hung up?

Because PABXs expect things to work that way. It would break the way that
most of them handle blind transfers if any receiving phone hanging up
terminated the call. And there's such a huge userbase of installed PABXs
that it's unrealistic to make any changes to the way that call termination
is handled without a lead time sufficient for them all to be replaced.

>Even if the facility to hang up & reconnect is still useful for some
>people, the phone companies could probably provide some special code
>(maybe a * or # code) that will definitely terminate the previous call
>after hanging up & picking it up again.

That does exist. It's how, for example, you can call a recorded information
line and hear the announcement followed by being returned to the dialling
tone. But most domestic phones don't implement it.

Mark
--
Blog: http://mark.goodge.co.uk
Stuff: http://www.good-stuff.co.uk

[Adam Funk]

On 2012-05-31, Mark Goodge wrote:

> On Wed, 30 May 2012 22:05:02 +0100, Adam Funk put finger to keyboard and
> typed:
>
>>On 2012-05-30, Bill Borland wrote:
>>
>>> In article <c35h99x...@news.ducksburg.com>, Adam Funk
>>><a24...@ducksburg.com> writes
>>>>
>>>>Why why why, in this modern world, does the phone system not
>>>>disconnect a call completely once one party hangs up?
>>>
>>> So that the called party can hang up, go to a more convenient
>>> extension, and re-answer without losing the call.
>>
>>I know that's the historical explanation, but *now*, when many people
>>who want to do that sort of thing have linked phones, why should some
>>miscreant be able to hijack your phone line after you (think you) have
>>hung up?
>
> Because PABXs expect things to work that way. It would break the way that
> most of them handle blind transfers if any receiving phone hanging up
> terminated the call. And there's such a huge userbase of installed PABXs
> that it's unrealistic to make any changes to the way that call termination
> is handled without a lead time sufficient for them all to be replaced.

I see, it's a "backward compability" technical problem then. Thanks.

>>Even if the facility to hang up & reconnect is still useful for some
>>people, the phone companies could probably provide some special code
>>(maybe a * or # code) that will definitely terminate the previous call
>>after hanging up & picking it up again.
>
> That does exist. It's how, for example, you can call a recorded information
> line and hear the announcement followed by being returned to the dialling
> tone. But most domestic phones don't implement it.

In the last sentence, do you mean the consumers' own pieces of
equipment don't implement it, or the phone company's domestic services
don't? Is there any good technical reason for not providing this
option so ordinary people's phone lines can't be hijacked?

[Percy Picacity]

On 2012-05-31 06:20:03 +0000, Anthony R. Gold said:

> On Wed, 30 May 2012 11:15:10 +0100, Ken <K...@dasha.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> I don't know anything about the case other than following the link that
>> you generously provided. But what I surmise is that the police made an
>> unannounced visit to the man's home, carried out a search, took away
>> computer hard drives and removable media for forensic examination. They
>> then failed to find any incriminating evidence, but instead relied upon
>> such evidence from a completely different person, that has no connection
>> with him other than being charged with the same crime.
>>
>> You might say, ah but he could have downloaded the information to a
>> micro SD card, dug a 10 foot hole in the garden, filled in the hole, and
>> then planted an oak tree on the top of it. But quite apart from the fact
>> that he was presumably downloading the information to look at it, not to
>> record it for posterity, I recollect that computer experts that post to
>> this news group, have suggested that the computer would leave an
>> electronic trail that would be difficult, if not impossible, to erase.
>

> The defendant's big problem appears to be that his defence was not credible.
> If his defence has been that he did pay more than once but then never had the
> courage to proceed to download any materials be might have faired better.

Surely he was charged with encouraging or paying purveyors of illegal
pictures (paraphrased) precisely because they couldn't prove he
actually looked at/downloaded anything illegal.

--
Percy Picacity

[Mark Goodge]

On Thu, 31 May 2012 12:35:02 +0100, Adam Funk put finger to keyboard and
typed:

>On 2012-05-31, Mark Goodge wrote:
>>
>> That does exist. It's how, for example, you can call a recorded information
>> line and hear the announcement followed by being returned to the dialling
>> tone. But most domestic phones don't implement it.
>
>In the last sentence, do you mean the consumers' own pieces of
>equipment don't implement it, or the phone company's domestic services
>don't? Is there any good technical reason for not providing this
>option so ordinary people's phone lines can't be hijacked?

AFAIK, the hardware doesn't implement it. But it's also possible that it
does, but it's an undocumented feature.

[Bill Borland]

In article <rrdi99x...@news.ducksburg.com>, Adam Funk

Isn't there some fiddle with the "recall" button which does
just that?
--
Bill Borland

[Adam Funk]

On 2012-05-31, Mark Goodge wrote:

> On Thu, 31 May 2012 12:35:02 +0100, Adam Funk put finger to keyboard and
> typed:
>
>>On 2012-05-31, Mark Goodge wrote:
>>>
>>> That does exist. It's how, for example, you can call a recorded information
>>> line and hear the announcement followed by being returned to the dialling
>>> tone. But most domestic phones don't implement it.
>>
>>In the last sentence, do you mean the consumers' own pieces of
>>equipment don't implement it, or the phone company's domestic services
>>don't? Is there any good technical reason for not providing this
>>option so ordinary people's phone lines can't be hijacked?
>
> AFAIK, the hardware doesn't implement it. But it's also possible that it
> does, but it's an undocumented feature.

Interesting, thanks.

[Adam Funk]

If there is, it ought to be disseminated to the public so people can
avoid the scam.

[Maurice]

Or call back from a different number. Land line or Mobile.

--
Maurice